Whilst I am mulling over the future of Think Defence, the National Audit Office has released their long awaited report to the 2012 Carrier Strike reversion decision, or in other words, the CVF F35 Switcheroo
[browser-shot width=”550″ url=”http://www.nao.org.uk/report/carrier-strike-the-2012-reversion-decision/”]
The Ministry of Defence acted quickly once it realized, in early 2012, the extent to which its 2010 decision to procure the carrier variant of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) had been based on immature data and flawed assumptions. In May 2012, the Department announced that it was reverting to procuring the short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) variant of the fighter. In a report published today examining that 2012 decision, the National Audit Office has called for the Department to introduce a degree of consistency in decision-making not previously apparent in the Carrier Strike programme and to work within the financial and capability assumptions underpinning the decision, if it is to deliver value for money.
By February 2012, the estimated cost of converting the aircraft carrier for the carrier variant of the JSF, requiring the ship to be fitted with catapults and arrestor gear (‘cats and traps’), had increased by 150 per cent: from £800 million to about £2 billion. As a result, the Department estimated that, over the next ten years, the STOVL option would be £1.2 billion cheaper than the carrier variant. This difference halves to £600 million over 30 years.
Another key factor was that the carrier variant option of the JSF could also not be delivered until 2023, three years later than the planned date of 2020. The Chief of Defence Staff judged that, in the emerging security environment, such a gap in capability would be undesirable. When the Department reverted to the STOVL option, it announced that it would deliver the Carrier Strike by 2020. However, a week later, it delayed investment in Crowsnest, the helicopter based radar system making up the third element of Carrier Strike, meaning that the system is not now scheduled to be fully operational until 2022, two years later than the carriers and aircraft.
Resolving the future of the Carrier Strike programme (comprising the Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers, the Joint Strike Fighter aircraft operating from them and Crowsnest) was central to the Department’s efforts to balance its ten-year equipment budget. When the implications of the 2010 decision became clear, the Department acted quickly to put in place a unique, streamlined approvals structure, with focused attention from senior officials. This was crucial to the pace of decision-making.
The Department expects to write off £74 million as a result of the reversion decision; but this cost could have been ten times higher if the decision had been made after May 2012.
Successful delivery will require the Department to manage significant affordability and technical risks. There are cost, schedule and technical risks across the JSF programme over which the Department has limited control. The highest risk phases of carrier construction and integration are yet to come and the Department must successfully conclude complicated negotiations with commercial partners.
Today’s report notes that the carrier variant of the JSF has a greater range and payload than the STOVL variant and would have provided a more effective strike capability. However, STOVL creates the option to operate Carrier Strike from two carriers, providing continuous capability. By contrast, the carrier variant could operate from only the one carrier installed with cats and traps and therefore could provide capability for only 70 per cent of the time.
Pick the bones out of that one but in the meantime, some selected reading from Think Defence towers on the issue;
This one being the most up to date, so if you only read one, read this
Others
- Looking Forward to an F35 Future – Part 3 (The Promise)
- CVF Aircraft Launch and Recovery Equipment FOI
- Making Sense of the F35 Decision
- Reasons to be Cheerful – Part B
- Why I Joined the Dark Side
- Forward to Plan B
- F35 – Back to Plan B
- Arse, Meet Elbow
- That NAO Report
- How Do You Solve a Problem Like Maria and/or CVF?
- SDSR – Analysis #05a (Carrier Strike)
- A French Affair
- Too Expensive to Cancel
- CVF Rumour and Sigh*
- Thoughts on CVF
- I Am Puzzled
- B or C
And my all time favourite post on the subject
mmm, we do seem to have spent rather a lot of time discussing this one:)
A Summary of the Decision Making Process
On the decision itself, summarising from the first linked post;
- For some reason, the NSC’s Option 1, by far the most pragmatic option was rejected
- Liam Fox and the Service Chiefs were dazzled by the Strategic Raiding fad and prestige of operating a mini me USN style ‘proper carrier’
- Liam Fox allowed the switch decision to proceed based on estimated costs because he could not resist scoring a political point over the previous government
- Liam Fox did not have the balls to defer any decision until after the SDSR deadline and so went forward with cost estimated prepared in weeks
- The Civil Service failed in its duty to provide some measure of decision making governance
- The Service Chiefs had the same cavalier attitude to information assurance and ignored all the previous work that consistently pointed to STOVL as being the most sensible option
- The Service Chiefs were tempted by the delights on offer from the F35C
- The RAF, specifically, saw an opportunity to simultaneously protect Typhoon and get a Tornado replacement at the expense of operational flexibility
- Everyone was prepared to ignore the realities of the F35B development issues because it fitted their agenda
- Phil Hammond, to his great credit, stood up to the Service Chiefs and demanded a rigourous analysis, the same rigourous analysis that should have happened, and in fact, did happen many times before
- Phil Hammond made a brave decision to revert
- There are still a whole gaggle of bitter and twisted people who just don’t get it and are prepared to put in jeopardy the programme(s) to further their agendas
The only one who comes out of this debacle well is Phil Hammond
The Guardian
You may have seen the article this morning from Nick Hopkins of the Guardian
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2013/may/10/navy-jets-cant-land-hot-weather
This is exactly the reason I started Think Defence, to counter complete and utter nonsense like that headline.
@ repulse
What a waist on money $ 10 billion that the us military can’t afford to turn a 50kt bomb into a precision munition.
nd I thought our military had the wrong ideas on spending its money. Just goes to show th more money the defence department has the more likley it is to waste it. Given the capability of the US trident fleet with 72 Trident D5 s at sea all the time anything else spent on nuclear weapons is a joke. It’s all just inter service rivalry.
@x: sorry to burst your bubble my friend, but pets in boxes is not due to be fitted to the F35 until 2030. I obviously blame the short sightedness of the penny pinching government.
@ nab my point wasn’t to get rid of the threat just to quantify it. How likely was it they would attack and what was their chances and their intent, that was the thrust of my point. Re styx like I said what was their capability? @ x fair enough e haven’t got enough, how many should we have?
@ Mark
I think all our defence planning is based on tricky trigonometry trying to pick a point somewhere between political expediency, the US will always be there, tri-service tribal warfare, kicking the can down the road for the next lot, and a hope that the next “one” won’t happen on my watch.
x
The number of voyagers we have prob gives a gd indication on the number of fj we intend to deploy to future operations. And luckily we have are very own airfields in the north/south Atlantic, med and Indian Ocean.
The interesting thing about crowsnest is what’s if for, and how any awac asset let alone a carrier based awac will be integrated with large scale LO aircraft operations particularly for offensive strike. This will be as new to the US as to us and may very well change AWACS from how we see it today.
In the 90s when carrier were looked at did anyone then look at orientating our entire fast jet fleet to carrier capable airframes? Did anyone within the armed services think such a sea change pardon the pun could/would be possible. Given the force structures envisioned they must of known this may have had to happen considering the numbers of aircraft that could in theory have been operated by these ships.
@ Repulse
I was going to respond, then I saw the word Obama, and then I saw this link on the Grundian website which is much more interesting and probably more relevant to defence than anything that comes out of lame duck gun grabber Barry’s Whitehouse,
https://witness.guardian.co.uk/assignment/5189022fe4b0917c6345be1d?INTCMP=mic_1591
Mike,
The decision about fort class replacement has been deferred until 2015 MARS goes ahead. Agree on crows nest
@ Topman re airfield in theatre
My point was that the lack of Voyager aeroplanes when we have access to fields in distant lands and even over distance seas.
Whether in a multi-polar world they will always be available we shall see. The fact the USN and USMC operates air arms bigger than the RAF and we depend on US diplomatic and economic muscle to open doors for us I wonder why the USAF just doesn’t do it all….. ;) ( I know it is a tad more complex than that! :) ) Lastly as I have said there is more to CVF than FJ.
Sir H has done a good article related to this, and one thing he touches on which has been only squeaked about on this grand thread – support by RFA’s… seem,s we’re content (like with crowsnest) to defer the decision to support our nice shiney new tubbs with new support vessels and instead have geriatric RFA’s instead… not really the modern shiney image we’re shown regarding CVF.
@ NaB,
“… the fact that carrier-based air had niche capabilities based on the specific aircraft is precisely the sort of thing that is often trotted out in reverse (you don’t need a carrier-fighter, typhoon does that or you don’t need strike we’ve got Tonka), so you’ll have to live with it I’m afraid.”
— Not really, no. Your entire argument hinged on the principle of ‘carriers do/did this, which land can’t’. Which was false, as you then went on to point out yourself.
“The USAF and Europe may well have lots of recce, but that didn’t stop the Naval recce systems being both the ones available and in demand.”
— I suspect the others were as well. And if there is spare capacity for recce, why would it not be used? Out of spite? Again, I go back to point one. Your argument hinged on that being a Carrier unique capability, which it’s not.
“The point regarding basing was not to suggest that carriers have a non-existent logs chain.”
— You’d be surprised the number of people who do try and make this argument.
“I don’t know of anyone who would sensibly claim you could attack Iraq without access to Kuwaiti and Saudi airspace.”
— I know plenty of people who would, like the Italian that WiseApe referenced earlier. It’s practically a cornerstone of carrier debates for people to evoke images of absolute freedom of operation for carriers, making comments about bases and over flight rights without realising (or realising, but not acknowledging) that these same conditions often apply to the Carriers to.
This goes back to the general bug I have with carrier debates. Carriers can be incredibly useful, as you point out with the El Dorado Canyon scenario. But the way some talk about them, and some of the ridiculous arguments that are used, you’d be forgiven for walking away with the impression that Carriers are Death Stars, minus the vulnerable exhaust port.
@ X,
“Just because the lesson is from 410 plus years ago doesn’t, with a little modification for modern circumstances, make it less relevant.”
— So why do you get in such a huff when people talk about a modification of lessons learned much, much closer to the present, when the power structures of Europe were much closer to what they are now?
“If you think a heavy armoured division and short legged FJ tactical air force are going to keep the Straits of Hormuz open or the Straits of Malacca open, keep pirates at bay in the Gulf of Aden, help the Canadians in the Arctic, keep a watch in the South Atlantic, interdict Chinese warships in the India Ocean etc. etc. then good for you”
— And one CVF, with a few escorts is going to deter the entire Iranian military? Is it going to sweep the hypothetical Chinese hoardes from the Malaccan strait? The answer to that would be “no”. Although the combined air forces of the middle eastern nations would have a role to play in holding off Iran until the US rocks up in force.
“Were the Balkan Wars in the UK national interest?”
— If supporting NATO is not in our military interest, then what it is? Europe is right on our doorstep. It’s absolutely in our interest to show the rest of Europe we will pitch in to help them out when they need us. And absolutely in our interest to remind the rest of Europe that certain things will not be tolerated. This also helps to explain why the proven use of chemical weapons in Syria by Assad should be considered in the UK national interest if it occurs, because we do not want the use of chemical weapons by nation states to become normalised around the world.
” But what really grinds my gears about this place is when somebody like myself says we should really invest in maritime capability and I get heaped with criticism back there is never ever a cogent thought out repost”
— You get plenty of them, usually from multiple quarters. When delivered, your normal response to them is to tell the person that posted it “don’t talk to me. Don’t respond to me. Don’t address me” etc.
“No alternative presented.”
— Multiple alternatives have been presented over time. Again, you simply choose to ignore them and tell the posters not to bother talking to you anymore etc.
That you dislike their theories, disagree with them etc is fine, your perogative. But don’t pretend that people never bother to try. They have, multiple times. But you just complain and then ignore people. That’s your problem, not theirs.
Topman – if there are no defences, then anything that can carry a decent sized set of bombs and rockets is a threat, that’s the point.
@x I suppose we’ll agree to disagree about the relationship with Europe. A balance is a one strategy, I might be a bit simply minded but I like to look at it as a three legged stool. As to the airfield in theatre, well it’s been done to death. But history does tell us more often than not they are there. At vast distances it’s unlikely we well be on our own if they are onboard with our op, it’s nit the realms of fantasy to think of friendly airbases.
Follow the PDF link in the Guardian article and apparently we could store them in Lakenheath. Seems the yanks also seem to have 320 TLAM/N still also… sure they would give them to their best friends :)
Just saw this:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/apr/21/obama-accused-nuclear-guided-weapons-plan
So 3 CVFs with nuclear armed F35s plus nuclear cruise missile SSNs it is then :)
@ Topman
I said we take lessons from the past and modify them. I think a return to a Britain integrated into Europe as it was in Medieval times has gone. We have moved on culturally. The Western World no longer ends at the Pillars of Hercules. Without sounding too Churchillian there are English speaking peoples across the seas with whom we have more in common. Surely the lesson of the 20th century is that for the UK Continental affairs are toxic?
As for the “Cold War” I was being extreme to prove a point. Where is the alternative to a maritime strategy? That is what I was driving at. I never see one. More salami slicing? And why isn’t a maritime strategy an answer to that oft floated statement here “that we can’t do everything”?
One final thought. Do you know why Voyager AirTanker cock-up really annoys me? Because it really it doesn’t do enough to help us cover the distances when there is that oh so convenient air field in theatre. We have vast distances to cover. And we get 9 tankers. You watch when we get an MPA they will procure it with the wrong AAR system……
@Topman
Indeed balance and an understanding of what we should/ can do ourselves and the best way to make a contribution to a coalition on a larger more complex op.
@x no I don’t see I rerun of the cold war as useful. But neither do other periods of the past teach us every thing. I’m not sure I’d agree with us having poor relation with Europe. In fact using the past as a lesson we will integrate closer with Europe. Good our bad idea. I’m not sure we well be securing the straights of Malacca either. But I do agree balance is key.
@nab the first set is a possibility against shipping but a serious threat? I want there so wouldn’t really wasn’t to second guess, I ask more for sake of Clarity. As to Styx threat I assume they accessed the sea through Montenegro?
@ Topman
I know you are not having a pop. Those who don’t learn from the past are doomed to repeat it etc. etc. We have to look for parallels between our current age and times past so we can discern for ourselves a path to the future. There was an Empire long before Victoria. If anything we are in a period similar to the first Elizabethan age where we sit on the edge of a powerful Europe. A Europe with who we don’t have the best relations; cordial and business like for the best. If we look at Elizabethan times we see that Britain gained revenue by looking outwards from Europe. Just because the lesson is from 410 plus years ago doesn’t, with a little modification for modern circumstances, make it less relevant. Just as lessons from other periods are no longer valid. If you think a heavy armoured division and short legged FJ tactical air force are going to keep the Straits of Hormuz open or the Straits of Malacca open, keep pirates at bay in the Gulf of Aden, help the Canadians in the Arctic, keep a watch in the South Atlantic, interdict Chinese warships in the India Ocean etc. etc. then good for you. (Not you you a nominal you. :) ) Personally I think the UK’s armed forces are about protecting national interests. I saw somebody mention Serbia above. Were the Balkan Wars in the UK national interest? Did they threaten LNG imports or grain imports or the import of iThingies? No. Should we invest then in basing our entire defence thinking on pissing about in little states then? Sell the Royal Navy for scrap and buy MRAPs by the bushel? No? Why? Balance you say. Yes because we already have enough MRAPs and a population sick of seeing our brightest and best die for ill defined ever shifting political aims with snappy sound bite names. And this isn’t me having a pop. But what really grinds my gears about this place is when somebody like myself says we should really invest in maritime capability and I get heaped with criticism back there is never ever a cogent thought out repost. No alternative presented. It is blatantly obvious that we can’t do without a land element. But to see it as the be all and end all when our history points to the exact opposite is an insult. As I said above how does it get in theatre, how is it resupplied, and who exactly allows in a politic sense to deploy? I can’t be bothered to even discuss air power. If the RAF couldn’t cover the Fleet in 82 as they had promised they were able to do when CVA was cancelled they sure as heck aren’t going to be able to do it now. It is all about balance and realistic expectation. Perfectly valid in the Cold War to have a large continental style army sitting across the border from the foe backed up by a largish airforce and to let seapower wither. But please lets not kid ourselves that is a suitable model for now.
NAB,
definitely on the G3 side of life, and Ops not O&D at that. Of course, we took the threat assessment from G2, who’d spoken with J2, who no doubt had cleared their lines with JIC. It may have been heavily summarised to me, but the message was “no air threat”, and certainly for Grapple, there really was none, and so no destroyers needed in the Adriatic.
Case in point – we brought in an extra battalion of French Foreign Legion to Ploce (the Deuxieme REP, ignominiously arriving in their n-teenth war by chartered ferry, not by parachute), and the main problem was in sorting out traffic control to get them from the port to the ring road and then onwards to Sarajevo. Not the might of the Serb Air Force attacking their ship while still offshore.
The main problems with carrier aviation in Bosnia were (1) they had a completely unresponsive chain of command, with about 9 steps between UN ground commander and pilot operating in a NATO force and (2) the British Harriers did not have adequate resolution on their sensors to allow me to clear authority to drop bombs. After a couple of months, I sent a signal back to MoD on the national net saying “let’s not bother anymore”, and a week or so later, Lusty pushed off somewhere else, and we certainly did not miss the rather useless Harriers.
I did once see a Harrier over Bosnia, but it was at about 5,000 feet, not in comms with me, and probably just cruising about.
Topman if memory serves Fulcrum and Fishbed with bombs and rockets, plus shore and ship based Styx. Both require more than harsh words to defeat / deter.
John – I notice you’re still not presenting your evidence regarding the constructive quality and survivability of the ships. Until you do, you’re going to be grouped with Lewis Page.
As for the decision making – as far as the programme (coherence and funding) is concerned it has rarely been made by top notch people. It has been made by a bunch of people in Whitehall with little or no real knowledge of the ins and outs, advised by a staff of competing interests and characterised by lack of money. And conducted against a background of counter-briefing based on hot air and speculation (see Gordon Brown’s jobs programme, your assertions regarding the construction of the ship and the suggestion that it can only operate 12 “short-range” jets for further details). Frankly, I’m astonished it’s managed to survive. That it has tells you something else. Those that understand what it will (eventually) bring are desperate to keep it and that includes CDS and CJO.
On the operational and technical front of the ship and aircraft design, as posted earlier, you’ve got a bunch of people making choices based on the best technical information at the time. Some of those choices have turned out to be wrong in hindsight (risk factor for EMALS, low priority for MASC) some have turned out to be right (size and design of ship, build strategy). That’s life I’m afraid.
Chris – the fact that carrier-based air had niche capabilities based on the specific aircraft is precisely the sort of thing that is often trotted out in reverse (you don’t need a carrier-fighter, typhoon does that or you don’t need strike we’ve got Tonka), so you’ll have to live with it I’m afraid. In fact, “joint” EW squadrons were set up with EA6B and flew out of Italy during GRAPPLE and subsequent. My contention is that all tacair ought to be carrier-capable (not based) to allow just that flexibility.
The USAF and Europe may well have lots of recce, but that didn’t stop the Naval recce systems being both the ones available and in demand.
The point regarding basing was not to suggest that carriers have a non-existent logs chain. I’m intimately familiar with what is required for that, which incidentally means I’ve got a clue about what you need for a land-based force as well. The point was not that the carrier wings didn’t need support – of course they did – the point was that their support did not encroach on crowded bases in theatre, which whether you chose to believe it or not were close to capacity. There are reasons lots of things were flying from Fairford, DG and Thumrait and a lot of it was to do with ramp space.
On your GW2 example, I don’t know of anyone who would sensibly claim you could attack Iraq without access to Kuwaiti and Saudi airspace. However, there is a difference between using airspace and using bases (see Turkey in GW2). The classic example of overflight denial is Op El Dorado Canyon in 1986. The effort expended to get the Lakenheath wing over Tripoli was out of all proportion to effect and something the A6E was perfectly capable of doing. I seem to recall some of the Gulf states limiting what could be done prior to GW2 as well, not important in the long run, but indicative that all has not been as sweet and harmonious as some might suggest.
RT – assuming you weren’t G2 or J2 in your staff jobs, who provided the threat estimate? Do you think that perhaps they had already done the analysis of likely air and missile threats? And concluded that the assembled naval force would be able to take care of them?
The guys I’ve spoken to who deployed on Granby and Telic (invasion phase) were most certainly worried about the air / missile threat to their transport shipping. The chaps from 17P&M who had ships stacked up waiting to unload over a single jerry-built linkspan in Kuwait because the yanks had every other one were certainly aware of and concerned about the threat.
Other examples? Norway 1940, Eighth Army 1941-2, Crete 1941, Dieppe 1942, Italy 1943, Overlord 1944, Musketeer 1956. We also had an empire to stage from back then. Not much after that as we had the lovely cold war balance of terror to keep a lid on most things. Point being threat – as you are well aware – is both intention and balance of capability. A perceived imbalance in capability can embolden intent.
I tend to believe that we will continue to need boots on the ground in the future – although hopefully not of the duration of Telic/Herrick. I think the difference between us is that I think we may come up against some opposition to this that is slightly more capable than the peace loving people of Umboto Gorge……
Ultimately, the effectiveness of CVF boils down to three factors:
1. The extent to which the size and configuration of the vessel facilitates and supports air sorties
2. The ability of the aircraft to actually perform those sorties
3. Our ability to protect it
If I’ve learned anything from the manifold TD articles on these topics it is that the size of the two carriers will enable us to perform at a level totally beyond that of the Invincible Class of ‘Through-deck Cruisers’. And, as many people have pointed out, there were never any real barriers to converting the QE to ‘Cats and Traps’, it was just a question of time and cost. So, what I really think matters is the aircraft we select to fly from CVF decks.
Criticism of the F-35 programme has been very vocal. My judgement of it, having read widely on this topic, is that the desire to make a Harrier replacement one of three JSF versions has significantly handicapped the capabilities of the other two.. Many USAF commentators are doubtful whether the F-35A will be a better aircraft than the F-16. Sure, the F-35A will have much improved avionics and weapons, but the basic flight envelope may well prove to be on a par with the F-16 rather than significantly better as you might hope with an aircraft designed 30 years later.
All that said, there is no doubt that the F-35B is a better aircraft than the Harrier: longer range, faster, greater internal fuel load, greater weapons payload, stealth capability, easier to fly, easier to service, plus all of the existing benefits. So if you’re going to buy any JSF version, then the F-35B seems to make the most sense.
There’s still much development work to be done on all JSF versions (particularly the F-35C), but maybe the F-35A will perform better than the naysayers predict. Perhaps it is fair to say that the F-35B will probably be the least risk version, even though it was at most risk of cancellation 2 years ago.
For these reasons alone, even before the UK cuts its cloth according to its available material finances, the F-35B seems like a sensible decision. At the very earliest planning stages of CVF, we decided we wanted a STOVL aircraft for our particular needs and budget. We were foolish to ever reconsider that decision. (By the same token I’d love to drive a McLaren MP4-12C, sadly my budget only runs to an Audi S3 – even so the latter car does 80-90% of what I need and want!!!) in summary, then, we’re getting exactly what we wanted and it will be better than what we had before.
Maybe the F-35A will come good and be capable of serving as a Tornado replacement. But I note that the US is now gearing up to replace the F-22 and F-15 with a new fighter / strike aircraft, the FA-XX. That could well suit the UK for both Tornado and Typhoon replacements.
NAB
If every decision has been made by a fantastic top of his game professional, why is the current position so far from prime?
@JH
For gods sake now you are at it.
Sinking from rough seas? Really? Only 12 jets? Has anyone seen the SOP? As I pointed out yesterday the TAG will depend upon the threat and will be generated by the Pros not the Politicians or bloggers!
NAB
Frankly, I agree with the straw man comment. Unless something changes we will have one operable 65,000 ton STOVL carrier + one in reserve. Only 12 short range fighters aboard + helicopters, many of them not designed for naval operations. No AEW, tanker, SEAD or long range strike capability. Carrier likely to go straight to the bottom from rough seas/battle damage. Carrier junkie that I am, I cannot get excited by this hollowed out capability. I am even more gloomy than our Northern friend.
Of course the pols could stop wasting our money on the EU/foreign aid/overpaid non-jobs for their pals & then spend the money on a decent airgroup & escorts, but that is very unlikely.
So two large impressive ships that will look great in a fleet review off Portsmouth, but precious little use in a shooting war. I doubt we will be second behind the US when the Chinese & Indian programmes get going.
RT
For someone who is always telling us about his job experiences etc you do sometimes fail to back up your points. Probably to get a bite and yes I have bitten.
And having done staff jobs involving mounting of a land force for both Bosnia and GW2, the concept of thinking about an air threat to the commercial shipping was completely absent from thinking through the mounting options) You got away with doing a shit job then.
For air defence of troop transport failure look no further than Sir Galahad, by the time Gw2 cam round thankfully planning was being done properly and both ourselves and the USN were escorting convoys of troops and supplies into theater and especially through risk zones and choke points.
I do not doubt that sea-launched air power and missiles are sometimes useful, my point is more with the balance of probabilities that for Britain, it is ultimately to do with boots on the ground, and so probably our spending should reflect that fact.
A statement without any facts to back it up. The ability to project power and sustain operations at a level required by the Defence Planning Assumptions is being retained. The wars that you allude to have been electives where the Uk army has performed superbly in the conventional phase but have struggled to maintain a footprint during the “occupation”. Thus proving that they are correctly scaled for what we should be doing. The “occupation” phases have also proven extremely unpopular with the public and any future Government who commits ground forces without an exit timetable will simply be ensuring there own quick exit.
There is simply no credible threat to the actual Uk that can be defeated by “boots on the ground” alone. Any future conflicts we get dragged into are likely to be small in scale but at a reasonable distance or on a massive scale at a massive distance (god forbid) where our input will be most useful in high tech capabilities.
As it is, we are getting one CV and a non-usable spare, a few jets of really limited capacity, a couple of years later an expensive and seriously limited helicopter-based air surveillance capability, and the chances of all 3 being available in the same time-frame being less than 66%. Meanwhile, all potential enemies seem to be concentrating on getting new generation SSKs, cunning IEDs, and suborning some sections of British society to believe in their cause and to carry the attacks to our home cities.
We are indeed getting one CV. the use or not of the second carrier will continue to be debated until it is launched. We will in all probability have another 2 SDSR type events and 3 General Elections before then. We have ordered 48 jets with more to follow and by what comparison do you call a 5th generation stealth VSTOL jet “limited capability”.
Have you priced airborne AEW capabilities throughout the world, have you seen how much crows nest will cost? Define limited in terms of AEW? A Merlin based sytem would have a range against 0 feet target of 153NM against a raid at a few thousand feet it would be over 200Nm. yes not as good as an E2 but way cheaper, and a good capability.
The chances of all 3 being available in same time frame less than 66%? Workings please, are you trying to tell me that we only have a 66% chance of being able to put F35 and AEW on a Carrier and sail it ever? On a specific date? by a specific date?
Potential enemies getting new SSKs. Well India, Malaysia and Chile are ordering Scorpene SSKs from France. Vietnam has ordered Kilos from Russia as has Algeria. Israel Dolphins from Germany and Turkey and Portugal 214s also from Germany. So who and why are our potential enemies in there? Of course luckily we are replacing T23 with T26 and also deploy Merlin in an ASW role. MPA would be nice but need host nation support and as SSKs are defensive submarines and lack the realistic capability to poke around the Uk unless our European neighbors decide to then it is less of an issue against SSKs.
Cunning IEDs have less targets with boots on the ground and if you think invading their countries helps dissuade them from suborning our population well?
@ nab, genuine question, what anti shipping capacity did the Serbs have? @x I think it’s a bit odd to claim others are locked in some sort of cold war mentality, whilst referencing many things quite often through a late Victorianto 20a time frame. Each to their own and all that, but you do seem to do exactly what you perceive as weakness in others thoughts. This isn’t me having a pop, just something a bit curious
Et al on my phone so more later.
The only time since WW2 a uk territory has had to be fought over Carriers were essential.
NAB,
you make a coherent and impassioned case for CV / AD by T45, but it is not supported by history. Just when has any form of British power projection (of a land force) been threatened by attack from the air, other than the Falklands, an example which I noted in my original comments?
(And having done staff jobs involving mounting of a land force for both Bosnia and GW2, the concept of thinking about an air threat to the commercial shipping was completely absent from thinking through the mounting options)
I do not doubt that sea-launched air power and missiles are sometimes useful, my point is more with the balance of probabilities that for Britain, it is ultimately to do with boots on the ground, and so probably our spending should reflect that fact.
As it is, we are getting one CV and a non-usable spare, a few jets of really limited capacity, a couple of years later an expensive and seriously limited helicopter-based air surveillance capability, and the chances of all 3 being available in the same time-frame being less than 66%. Meanwhile, all potential enemies seem to be concentrating on getting new generation SSKs, cunning IEDs, and suborning some sections of British society to believe in their cause and to carry the attacks to our home cities.
Waste of bloody money, the whole CV “system”.
@ NaB,
I actually realised I missed out Sierra Leone, so there’s one back for the coastline.
Now, I would dispute some of the points you raised.
The US, some of our European allies, and indeed ourselves have provided a lot of the SEAD. The USAF has its Wild Weasels for example, though granted a lot of the electronic jamming was lost after GW1. But that also kind of skips around the point that it was the type of aircraft (or lack of) in question that affected the electronic SEAD. If the Prowler was launched from a land base, you have the same effect again without needing the carrier. I think it’s disingenuous to confuse the two principles there.
The USAF, us, and many of our European allies have also possessed airborne recce pods of various flavours for a long time now.
And yes, aircraft need bases. As indeed Sir Humphrey pointed out a while back, deployed naval forces require the same, for various kinds of logistical support when deployed away from home. It’s one of the big myths that somehow ships are unaffected by the need to use land based infrastructure.
And while you joke about not having the basing support available, again I would move you back to the reality of what we’ve experienced on operations, which has been support available for almost all theatres since WW2. Not always there, and nobody can guarantee it, but our network of allies and other partners has come up trumps time after time after time.
The way people talk about host nation support and over flight rights annoys me because a) the tone and usage of this argument is normally designed to influence susceptable readers into thinking that these things are denied on a routine basis when needed, when in fact history would point to the opposite happening, and b) the assumption that these things do not effect the Navy, or naval aviation. We always hear the phrase about aircraft carriers “… without being constrained by over flight rights…” etc, or words to that effect, when indeed carrier aviation often requires precisely such permission.
A classic example given is always GW2. We’re always told that if Kuwait and other nations had not provided support, what would the allies have done then without aircraft carriers? To which I would suggest people go and look at the size of the gap between Kuwait and Iran, and understand that without permission to use Saudi or Kuwaiti air space (and clearly not Iranian), then that would have been the corridor through which the Navy would have had to squeeze its air force. By my rough measurements that’s a corridor of about 10 miles.
The armed forces need balance, at least to meet todays challenges. Aircraft carriers are a significant part of that, and will be in the future for us. But that goose gets far too over cooked by some, to the point of being cremated.
Still think that we should have gone for a Harrier 3 and 4x 30-40,000 ton multi-purpose assault ships to replace the Invincible’s/Fearless/Intrepid and eventually Ocean back in the 1990’s!
Having said that the likely outcome (although very pricey) of 1 CVF active (with the other in reserve) carrying 12 jets, a mixed bag of over a dozen helicopter’s and maybe some Royal Marine’s now and again isn’t a bad end result. 1-2 T45 available will be all the outer cover a task-group will normally need, but we also need to make sure that enough T26 end up being procured to get a couple thrown in, as well as enough modern auxiliaries to maintain an effective logistical chain.
Hi Repulse,
When the Joint Command was in the making, I was expecting it to be a more of a budget and capability management exercise, exactly for the kinds of things that you mention.
– instead, it turned out to be an operational command for well-defined niches
– nothing wrong with that; they do need a “home”
– but “jointness” may (?) still have some way to travel
“GW1, mostly land based air, carriers not indispensable. Serbia/Kosovo, mostly land based air, carriers not etc. GW2, mostly land based air, carriers not etc. Libya, mostly land blah. Afghanistan, a lot of the work was done by B-2, B-1 and B-52, including fixed strikes and CAS, though carriers were quite handy. But not indispensable.”
Somewhat understating things Chris. Indispensable in the sense that all would be lost without them? Agreed, no. Indispensable In the sense that the carrier contribution provided niche capabilities including most of the SEAD (post GW1 and retirement of EF111), a lot of the tactical reconnaissance (SHAR, F14+Tarps) and probably most importantly provided a significant contribution of Tacair and ISTAR without demanding shore-based ramp space and logs, which believe it or not is far from infinite. I would argue yes.
That contribution is I think what you and others miss. There were 6 CVW, plus a load of TLAM in the various battle groups in GW1 and similar for GW2. Would those operations have failed without carrier air? Probably not, but might have taken longer and incurred more casualties. Were they made easier by the presence of carrier air? Indisputably.
If used properly the CVFs will be Purple assets to be utilized by all 3 branches of the armed forces. I could easily see the TAG containing FAA F35Bs, RAF Chinooks and AAC Apaches.
Having CVFs is part of delivering a balanced force in my view.
We’ve been focusing on counter insergency ops for the past 10 years, to the detrement of maritime capability. Nothing balanced in that.
“Have you thought of the function of a T45? It is to protect the big asset. Nothing else. And if you have no big asset because you do not need it, why have a T45?”
Incorrect I’m afraid. If you want to “put boots on the ground”, in general you have to transport them there and in the main some of the troops, most of the equipment and most of the log support ends up going by sea. Now on Herrick, we’ve been quite fortunate, in that Terry Taliban doesn’t really have a conventional warfighting capability, so our ships have been unmolested before the Pakistanis decided that they’d stop letting us tranship through the country, forcing us to supply largely by air at exorbitant cost. There’s a reason the Points sail to Cyprus and then offload their 1200LIMS of cargo to be air freighted from Akrotiri and it most certainly is not efficiency or value for money.
However, TELIC, PALISER, GRAPPLE and GRANBY all involved transport by sea. Although the West Side Boys weren’t exactly a threat to those ships, the Serbs and Iraqis most definitely were. Ever give any thought to why those ships were able to unload safely without being attacked? Largely because the capability of US and RN escorts and coalition airpower was such that the effort was judged not worth the pain.
In the future, if as you suggest we have to put boots ashore, you can bet it’ll be ships doing most of the lifting again. That means LPH, Albion, Bays, Point Ro-Ros and others which will need protecting from missile and air threats. That function will be provided by QEC and T45.
Unless of course you’re either in favour of “someone else” providing that protection, or you are of the E Blackadder school of warfare where “the prerequisite of a British campaign was that the enemy should under no circumstances carry guns — even spears made us think twice. The kind of people we liked to fight were two feet tall and armed with dry grass”.
@ WiseApe,
Even from a Patriots fan I expected better. Quoting Gabrielle?
The problem with Gabby’s position on carriers is the same problem that the PTT seems to have; that while a good carrier with a comprehensive air wing can be very valuable and has a degree of flexibility built into it, it is not nor ever will be a Death Star around which the rest of the military revolves.
Take the second sentence of that bit you quoted from him, where he says Carriers are indispensable in a wide range of scenarios etc. GW1, mostly land based air, carriers not indispensable. Serbia/Kosovo, mostly land based air, carriers not etc. GW2, mostly land based air, carriers not etc. Libya, mostly land blah. Afghanistan, a lot of the work was done by B-2, B-1 and B-52, including fixed strikes and CAS, though carriers were quite handy. But not indispensable.
In fact, the number of scenarios in which carriers have proved “indispensable” in the last 50 years or so has been vanishingly thin.
And this is one of the real sad things about these conversations. It’s like X’s comment above about people living by the sea etc. That kind of stuff always sounds great in theory and is used mainly because it would hint towards his chosen solution, until you start totting up the number of theatres that we’ve actually been in that were effectively land locked. Iraqs coastline is laughable. Afghanistan, Kosovo/Serbia, all land locked. Libya alright. We’re now helping the French in where? Mali. Land locked.
Considering so many people live by the sea we seem to spend an awful lot of time fighting well away from it.
There’s no debating with Gabby, and frankly, I think with X as well. They’ve already decided their solution; CVF, bigger navy, boo RAF, boo army, etc. They’re just looking for the questions which their chosen force provides the answer for.
Never mind the reality of what we’ve been up to mostly for the last twenty years. Never mind that someone like Australia finds land based MPA to be one of the key enabling features of its maritime security. Or that someone like Australia, surrounded by huge tracks of water (like a certain nation I know), understands the future and current potential value of its army in keeping certain problems at arms length, before they get too close to home shores.
We hear all about the Navy being the key player in the Empire and sure enough it’s come up again. I believe we discussed this not long ago, during which I made the point that the army and navy were symbiotic in their relationship at the time. Neither could have worked without the other. The army would be stuck on land and cut off without the navy, but the navy without the army would have been reduced to sitting out to sea and watching the locals brewing tea through their telescopes.
“Have you thought of the function of a T45? It is to protect the big asset. Nothing else” – No, it’s to protect ALL of your assets, it’s one layer of air defence. We had 12 T42s with no CVFs remember?
We can just hope that the next SDSR is underpinned by a thorough threats analysis, RE
“And that mono-capability is probably not very useful month by month and year by year, and yet chews up an enormous proportion of the defence budget”
while not agreeing or disagreeing with the statement.
X,
reading on an iThing, that’s a huge amount of text, that also makes the brain hurt a bit.
I will try to be shorter. Modern wars and situations shorter than wars are ultimately sorted out by boots on the ground, not necessarily by fighting, but in some cases by softer skills.
The CVS (or is it CVF? who cares) system is mono-capable, in that all it does is provide a mobile airfield that for most operations is not needed at all, war planes with the ability to bomb the crap out of people (if they are reachable with the war planes’ short legs), a laughably poor ISTAR capability, and a whole self-licking self-defence sub-optimal even-shorter legged air surveillance capability based on a sodding helicopter. And for big £Cost. Have you thought of the function of a T45? It is to protect the big asset. Nothing else. And if you have no big asset because you do not need it, why have a T45?
And that mono-capability is probably not very useful month by month and year by year, and yet chews up an enormous proportion of the defence budget.
“Bang for buck” ,CVS/F is about 1% efficient, even if we had one continuously at sea with a full air wing doing several dozen missions per day per airframe (which we won’t).
Hi NaB,
I am sure this is right ” it’s the marine & electrical systems that are causing the issue”… but
As it is not an option (some serious inter-service re-prioritisation might make it into one) to operate both of the QEs simultaneously, I would invite this crewing calculation (which I can’t do):
A) the remaining mini-carrier + Ocean in the capability (readiness for it) that she was designed for
vs.
B) a full QE crew [one only], including the peace-time airwing + the skeleton manning for Ocean that I was suggesting, to maintain a fast ferrying capacity for helos to be available to the task force in sufficient numbers, and maintainable over a period of, say what it took for Op Corporate from the day of sailing
I understand that manning is the real bottle neck when you analyse which capabilities cost what over, say 40 years, and this is just the best way of us getting to (as you say) 2025, when we might be in a position that is not so overstretched that making the major capital investment decision is “an option” again?
APATS
When we were going to have two with 36 aircraft on each, 12 T45 and associated t26, AND all the RFA. Then we could perhaps deploy such a group for a useful period.
But we are only getting one, and the number of aircraft we are getting is unlikely to produce 36 deployable aircraft. That can be sent against an enemy that’s not too hard and not too far away. for a short period of time…
I echo RT’s point what’s that all for apart from willie waiving.
As for whoever it was who said ‘Straw man’ to me. In effect I was pointing out what we are going to get, was not what we paid for, what we wanted then, and our reach has exceeded our grasp.
The point is we keep doing this.
We will not be going down the ARAPAHO route. Look up MV Astronomer/RFA Reliant for details – one reason we eventually got approval for the ASS (which became LPH).
Ocean may well get a SLEP to get her out to the mid-20s. There’s little wrong with the ship structure, it’s the marine & electrical systems that are causing the issues.
RT said “we will design our defence policy around the fact that we have a maritime capability and too small an intervention capability on the land, and not look at the actual needs that our defence policy should be addressing, which might be hundreds of miles inland, and not conducive of bombing the crap out of the natives, but rather supporting a complex peace enforcement with land presence.”
We have just spent £18 billion pounds on Afghanistan. Even money suggests that within the decade after withdrawal it will reverted back to what it was before “we” went in. Remember why the Soviets went in was to prop quite a progressive modern state where women worked and went to school from barbarians who wanted to model society on what their good book told them it should be. Consider number from heroin ODs are falling in the UK, they now average about 600 per year; that is just deaths and doesn’t take into all the suffering from wrecked lives of parents and loved ones of addicts, those who are suffering because of addiction, and those who suffer from crime generated by those looking to pay for addiction. Deaths per terrorism in the UK per year starting from 1997, 5. That is 7/7 deaths spread out over a decade. Are British soldiers burning poppy fields to prevent this threat to domestic security? No. Poppy fields are something to be patrolled through and guarded because for some complex political reason burning the fields is apparently wrong. And to placate the government in Kabul, or should that be more accurately the “Government of Kabul” seeing as their influence doesn’t actually extend much further than the city limits, the CIA hands over bags of cash to them. Not worth 444 British lives, not worth 1.
http://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/opium-fields-4.jpg
So I ask does nation building work or neutralising states work? Probably not. That £18 billion could have been spent on shoring up our energy production, storage, and infrastructure capabilities. No that is a real security concern. If figures are to be believed 37,000 pensioners died because of reasons related to the cold. Better odds that then of 1 in 12 million per year of some Islamist blowing himself up on the number 32.
One would humbly suggest the threat from Islam extremism, the “folk devil” it may or may not be, is best combated here in the UK. The trouble with threats is they don’t have to be real to be threatening. Somewhere between fringe anti-Jihadists and the extremes of pro-multiculturalism activists and academics lies the true concerns of the indigenous British and whether what they are concerned is about is imaginary, real, or a Kafkaesque chimera of the former two options it is HMG’s prime duty to address that fear. An 18 year old bleeding out being held by another weeping 18 year old propped up against a mud brick wall in the dust and heat yards from an open stinking sewer ditch in a far away country which we don’t know doesn’t achieve anything in addressing the British public’s wider concerns. Soldiers aren’t diplomats, they are for the time when diplomacy has failed, and the rules of civilisation have to be put to one side. Soldiers aren’t policemen either. We need to minimise the risk to them.
Rules are the problem, rules of engagement that is. HMG currently has to borrow money to keep the country running. And yet each year HMG gives out £10 billion per year to the Third World because it is the good Christian thing that those with plenty help the poor. Of course there are wider considerations that giving help to poorer states keeps them on an even keel and hopefully they won’t become the next hot bed of extremism. That we borrow money from markets kept liquid by Chinese money and that Chinese are investing billions in Third World. More much more than we in the West. The Chinese method is different from our own. We because of post-1968 socialist post-colonial outlook want to reform and change societies. The Chinese let others be. This has some unsavoury aspects to it as we see the prepencity for violence in some quarters for violence and cruelty that is shocking to us civilised Westerners. Well shocking to the political elites and those of us who pretend we are informed. Violence against innocencts is wrong, but can the same said of violence against bandits and pirates whatever drove them to that life? If some here were truly honest and open I vouch that they would confess in seeing nothing wrong with summary execution of the odd pirate band. Chinese money greasing the right palms and turning a blind to, or should be more accepting of, the methods used to keep their projects safe mean we all can have iPads. That isn’t to say we should draw our ROE from the Wafen SS playbook. But that we should be more accepting of letting military men doing their job and that for the many to prosper sometimes some a few will die. In a way we make a mockery of how precious life is by trying to save every life. It can’t be done. Death is a part of nature. But there is a difference between sacrifice and waste. Going ashore quickly, realistic expectations of causalities (our and theirs), reducing political inference once the military option is taken (expect violence of action), and getting out quickly is the way to reduce our deaths and maimings.
Again if some of us here, especially us older ones, will admit if they are honest that Africa has gone to hell in hand basket since the Europeans left. Back in the times of Empire we had troops in all the colonies, large colonial field forces of natives, a large fleet both naval and merchant to move troops about, political guile, a large industrial base and commercial confidence, and more realistic rules of engagement. The Army though compared to our Continental neighbour’s armies with land borders was small. But it was everywhere and due to Pax Britannica could be moved at will. Much like today’s modern forces. The Army was the point of a very long spear that, I am sorry to say, depended on a very large navy. We don’t have all those overseas bases now, the political will, commercial depth, and so are dependent on the forces of Pax Americana to get us where we need to be to show support for our masters in Washington latest venture. And a large element of Pax Americana is sea power. Let’s not kid ourselves that we could mount an Afghanistan style operation of own. We struggled to maintain a brigade plus support troops in theatre for 10 years.
British Empire in 1921………
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/b8/British_Empire_1921.png
My readings here and elsewhere and over at the august organ of uniformed thought ARRSE lead me to believe that one of our main problems now in defence thinking is that too many think this,
http://resourcesforhistoryteachers.wikispaces.com/file/view/cold_war_mp.jpg/30572399/480×349/cold_war_mp.jpg
is still our strategic reality. No need for a navy as long as we have a big army and a big airforce. As I have said here countless times before and I will say again as much for the truth of the matter as to irritate the simpler thinkers here armies of island nations don’t have strategic worth. How many months did it take to deploy a division from Germany to Saudi in Gulf War 1? How did they get there? Did they drive? No they were transported by sea, a sea secured by Pax Americana. And the supplies that went by air got there through skies again secured by Pax Americana. Air forces are ok if you have that ever convenient runway in theatre. But as we shift to multi-polar world where cash talks can we assured of that runway? Isn’t that what the RAF convinced HMG when CVA01 was scrapped? Black Buck may or may not be a wasted effort but it did demonstrate that modern FJ is really short legged. How many tankers again? How many bombs were carried irrespective of whether they hit or not? How many tankers are we getting through Voyager AirTanker PFI deal? Same could be said of Op Ellamy. Odd that the first raid was to launch cruise missiles and yet any talk of substituting missiles for planes here is often met here with incredulity. Better we have £600 million worth of FJ than £600 million of frigate or destroyer. Let’s talk about the Falklands War for I know it sticks in the craw of many here who see it as the exception to their settled model of Cold War NATO Western Europe. Yes it was a fluke for the period. But seen as one campaign in the sweep of modern British history was exceptional? No. As we move to a multi-polar world of shifting alliances the chances are we will need to drop formed formations anywhere on the globe. Coming wars won’t be about depth they will be about speed. Planting your flag first anywhere on the globe. And that’s why we need a large aviation platform like CVF.
The sea is the ultimate avenue of commerce and military adventurism. Investing in CVF we give concrete support to our main guarantor of safety, the US. The British public won’t stand for another Afghanistan. Two thirds of the world’s population live within 100 miles of the sea. As the other third are dependent on the those other two thirds I would suggest control of the sea is somewhat important. Two thirds of the planet’s surface is covered in sea and that is where the majority of the world’s untapped resources are to be found. Not for nothing are China and their neighbours squaring up over those islands. It doesn’t matter how many armoured brigades are sitting around Salisbury Plain because by the time we have moved the war will be over. Better a battlegroup of NATO quality soldiers over the beach today than war tomorrow. Better a flight of helicopters across sea in to failing state today than hand wringing by the F&CO and dead hostages tomorrow. Better we get there first, dig in, and then wait for them to rustle up 4 times as many troops to dislodge us.
We can’t do everything. We have finite resources. We need to a pick a direction. We need to play our part. We need to look to our history. And in a world that looks like this,
http://thetruthnews.info/world_map.gif
one would humbly suggest that buying big capable ships is the way to go.
Hi APATS, yes, it will probably turn into our very own Arapaho project
“we may see her being asked to soldier on at a reduced tempo (only used for major exercises, actual ops) for as long as possible”
– a handy, self-deploying way to get 12 Merlins and 6 Apaches to where they are required, and the maintenance facilities travel with them (the trucking experience for Libya, even on European motorways, was redious, and we all know about availability of heavy airlift)
– Ocean is not far off in size from what was trialled “ARAPAHO at-sea testing was completed 07 October 1982 at the Norfolk International Terminal, Norfolk, Va., when the 18,000-ton container ship Export Leader – configured with a portable modular aviation facility – returned to port after having logged 178 day and 45 night helicopter landings”
– if you just keep the navigation crew and essential onboard maintenance permanently manned, remove the support for the land contingent, rely on RN Reserve for the rest and on-board the helo wing when, as you say they are going on Ops or to a major exercise… should be cost efficient for a unique, added capability
” All these changes & postponements, have just cut capability while adding cost. QE may look impressive, but now the Treasury has stripped out all the armour, bulkheads & subdivision, how survivable are they in a real fight? Logical replies would be better than insults.”
I don’t believe I was being insulting – merely pointing out that uninformed speculation is not a substitute for fact. Speaking of which, would you care to elaborate on your evidence for “the Treasury” stripping out “armour, bulkheads and subdivision”, noting that bulkheads are of course part of the subdivision. You may also wish to look up Lloyds Rules for Naval Ships which form the basis of the oft-quoted “commercial standards”. Much of the content is actually based on and extracted from the old Naval Engineering standards.
I’m certainly no fan of the way the procurement has been conducted (see umpteen posts to confirm it), but funnily enough that has very little to do with the design of the ship and everything to do with the endless series of delays forced upon the project by incompetence and inter-service bickering (see the myth re “Gordon Browns job creation scheme” which was actually started by a senior pongo). They have cost more than they should – no argument. Would three smaller ships have cost less? I suspect not, but might have had less opposition on the basis of their size, which is odd, considering it is capability we’re buying and collectively they would bring less at higher operating cost.
On the subject of capability, the ship can and will operate up to forty fast jets. The fact that various numbers between 6 and 18 have been postulated as a planning assumption makes no difference. A ship designed for 18 aircraft can generally only operate 18 – which all the OA has shown to be of very limited value in many of the more demanding scenarios. The nice thing about having a big ship is that you can have forty cabs if you need them, which is a much better position than spending a slightly smaller amount of money on smaller ships and finding you haven’t got enough room. Guess what, you won’t get another ship any time soon…..
And one last time. The reason the ships were not contracted as CTOL ships is simple. There was an organisational factor and a technical factor. The organisational factor was that to maintain a worked up CTOL airgroup was perceived (rightly or wrongly) as requiring more training time to achieve. That also meant that to maximise the benefit of that training, all the squadrons would need to have embarked for longer. Perfectly do-able, if all the squadrons were FAA, but that would require expansion of FAA at the expense of “something” – the something being logically RAF, but conceivably other elements of the RN. Also perfectly do-able if the RAF committed to embarking the full force as requested, but for the RAF that would mean losing OpCon of a significant chunk of their force structure. Funny old thing, no-one wanted to force through this course of action, so one factor pointed to STOVL which was perceived as requiring less embarked time. Nonsense IMO, but perceived nonetheless.
On the technical risk front, there is one current (count them) manufacturer of steam catapults in the world in the US. They are about to lose their business to General Atomics who make EMALS. Yes, MacTaggart-Scott have catapults on their website, but have not manufactured one since 1966 – hardly comforting from a risk point of view. So – we have a very limited supplier base for steam and a significant below decks maintenance and manning issue. All of which equals risk and cost. Not good for a programme even back in the early noughties being castigated for being “too big” and therefore by implication “too expensive”. The alternative – EMALS – was at the time still entirely developmental and very high-risk and cost. It’s also fair to say that back then the performance difference between the B & C models was a little less pronounced than it subsequently became for a while and the programme issues with both were yet to emerge. So you have a choice between a system that requires little in way of equipment and perceived to need much less training versus a system that was on the cusp of changing technologies with both old and new bringing significant risk and cost.
On that basis, it is easy to see why the decision to go with STOVL was confirmed. The ship was the size it was to accommodate the required number of aircraft on the roof and allow the sortie generation rate to meet the requirement. A “requirement” btw which was primarily based on sorties required for various joint and combined scenarios, rather than number of aircraft carried. If there was an omission during that time it was to apply less significance to FOAEW/MASC, which (other than the residual cancellation risk of F35B and the possibility of UCAV) is the real reason people tend to decry the STOVL configuration for QE. The fact is that there were usually enough joint or more often combined assets assumed in the scenarios to make our MASC contribution of low overall value. As with all assumptions based on “someone else will do it”, that may now be tested as the US refocus towards IO/PO and our E3 force is down to 6. However, back then, all was “fine” as far as the operational analysts were concerned (and to whom RT should address his question as to whether carriers are needed).
I would personally love QE & PoW to be EMALS-fitted ships and I think if we started now we’d end up with such. However, we didn’t start now – we started then, when we needed to and we’ve ended up where we are because with regard to the ship configuration and design, people made rational choices on the information they had.
Hindsight is a wonderful thing, but the people dealing with the realities back then made the choices they could on the information they had. The result will be a capability second only to the US and which will allow the UK a range of military options for some very uncertain times.
Just noticed your post re Dick Phillips who was DOR(Sea) until about 98. Those designs you mention were not those used in the SDR deliberations. The SR(S) 7068 Dossier used the designs generated by DNA&FP for costing purposes. The later OA done before 2000 developing sortie rates led to the change from 40000 to 65000 te. None of it had anything to do with Brown. His only role was to delay the order right up until at the last minute he though it might save him.
@RT – You asked the question: “Has anyone (not on TD, but in the wider defence world) ever answered the question “Do we need the things, or would the vast cost of the system (boats, jets, Crowsnest) be better spent on something different…” – I merely pointed out that the answer is yes. Fair enough if you don’t agree with their conclusions. As to the cost, well it’s a fraction of Typhoon/Tankers.
There’s an Italian bloke has a blog – I won’t provide a link out of respect to TD as the two don’t get along, but hopefully TD won’t mind me quoting him (saves me a lot of typing):
“The carriers are key enablers for an expeditionary force. They are indispensable in a wide range of scenarios which require the projection of military power far away from the UK’s shores. They are perfect for interventions that chiefly require air power, such as operations in Libya in 2011. But they are also excellent to gain air superiority far away from home and protect the arrival of land forces, including land-based aviation, which is notoriously most vulnerable on the ground, and which would incur huge risks in trying to deploy to a menaced base in a war zone in absence of friendly forces providing cover.
And they are of course essential to support a forcible entry operation, especially an amphibious assault.
For the UK, the two new aircraft carriers in construction are even more important because they are also the only possible replacement for the current LPHs platforms (HMS Illustrious and HMS Ocean), since the notional LPH(Replacement) program has been dead in the water at least since 2006.”
They also of course provide the outer layer of air defence for naval forces in the absence of the Cousins.
The carriers cost a little south of £6billion – £1.2billion of that thanks to the one-eyed Scotsman – what could you spend that amount on that would deliver the same effect?
” I look to the future.” – How? And how are you able to do it any better than those who do SDSRs? O.K. they got it wrong, but who got it right?
@Ixion – Sorry but that’s a bit obscure for me – and this is Mr Obscure speaking. Are you arguing we built the wrong ships for what we intend to use them for or against them in their originally intended role? Or both!
Ixion,
Really? in what way?
APATS
You think wrong.
Wiseape
That’s the point! It is like saying we have this challenger tank. We have to open this can of Tuna, lets drive the tank over the Tuna, then we can announce we used the tank this year for something….
My background is on the edge of mainstream national politics. My view of how we got where we are on carriers, goes something like this.
The 80s view is that the RN needed 3 carriers so that they would always have two to send to a crisis(assuming one in refit). The early 90s thinking on an Invincible replacement was that it would be a repeat STOVL design, but larger as HMS Hermes had the same beam as Invincible, but 67 ft longer. Invincible struggled to operate 21 aircraft in the 1982 conflict, while Hermes managed over 30 at times. So the assumption of a “Super Invincible”, as replacement came about.
The 1997 CDISS paper “British Naval Aviation in the 21st Century” by Rear Adm RTR Phillips RN, looked at 4 designs. A 26 aircraft CTOL , 39,000 DWT, 272 m long design + 3 ASTOVL designs . A 20 aircraft, 26000 DWT, 203 m, while the second was a 30 aircraft , 37000 DWT , 249 m long design & lastly a 40 aircraft , 46000 DWT, 304 m design.
Had we gone for 3, then the smaller ASTOVL designs were more likely. However a prominent left wing think tank said the RN should cut from 3 to 2 carriers in the post cold war world. That meant only one carrier in a crisis. So the aircraft on one deck not two. So that one carrier had to be big enough to take the larger airgroup. The larger carrier led to the STOVL vs CTOL rows still going on now.
Gordon went along as it meant a lot of jobs in Rosyth, but any useful bits not relating to jobs in Rosyth went overboard. A decent airgroup for example.
With Cameron,Clegg, Osborne & Milliband, we have the blind leading the blind. I fear it will not end well.