As we loom towards the SDSR publication with decisions possibly already made, Scottish politicians are uniting behind it, various English MPs are uniting behind it, BAe are releasing stories about how much they have already spent and the mainstream media, it would seem, have a series of ‘senior sources in the MoD’ that have as many opinions on the decision as rounds of 5.56mm expended in Afghanistan daily.
The RN spin machine is being put into high gear, much like the other service spin machines, it must be said.
As soon as you question the CVF, you are instantly labelled a Royal Air Force stooge because it’s taken as red that anything anti-CVF is automatically a dastardly plot by the RAF to get rid of the Fleet Air Arm.
I hate inter service politics with a vengeance, but I do sometimes wonder if it overplayed outside those that are serving, operations have a tendency to drive out politicking, and we should give people more credit. It beggars belief to think that the RAF is basing its, and the nations, plans on the degree by which those plans do in the RN/FAA. Despite this, there are a number of naval biased think tanks, websites and others that continually make the case for their own service, funnily enough, CVF is always the answer; whatever the question and it is always ‘those other boys’ that should bear the brunt of any cuts, we are a bloody island you know!
To be a ‘CVF denier’ is to attract scorn, especially at Think Defence, given the many eloquent and knowledgeable Andrew that frequent the comments section!
I am going out on a limb here fellas, we have to continually ask; can we justify the expense such a capability? We must be rigorous in looking at everything in defence because however much we would want more money, it is not likely to appear. Wish lists of nice to have equipment that are incongruous with our foreign policy objectives/aspirations and size of the trouser must be eliminated if we are to have a military that is effective for the most likely roles we might ask them to carry out.
Wishing for more money is not a practical strategy, to steal a quotation from the film Bad Santa;
Wish in one hand and shit in the other, see which one fills up first
Before we get into question of aircraft the decision to proceed with CVF has to be justified.
Justifying CVF
The talk today is of small Scale Focussed Interventions and acting in coalition with others for anything else. This is nothing new and has actually been the case since the 1998 SDR.
Given that we have very few overseas territories and there are more economical means of protecting them the decision on CVF then rests on what those contributory capabilities need to look like. We might argue the nature of what a small scale focussed intervention is but what it doesn’t require is 2x 65k tonne CVF and 150 JCA, the capability is clearly in the optional column.
Therefore, if we proceed with CVF/JCA it is out of choice, not necessity.
If I could turn the clock back I would have selected a smaller scale naval expeditionary air capability more in line with the Spanish and Italian forces. This would still have provided a small-scale capability for focussed interventions but would have allowed the allocated funds to be spread across a wider range of defence capabilities but with CVF and JCA so advanced it would be a wasteful decision to cancel now.
The penalty clause issue is often highlighted, but this fails to recognise the commercial realities of the UK defence monoculture. It would be a brave politician to cancel the lot now but whilst we are still in the ‘blame it on Labour’ mode it remains a possibility. No matter how much it would waste now, that figure pales into insignificance when measured against the cost of CVF/JCA over the next 40 odd years.
In its favour, CVF will not be a one-trick pony, the design is extremely versatile and its significant size increases that versatility to an even greater degree. It will be able to provide outer layer air defence, support embarked forces with close air support, carry out deep strike, ISR and a number of secondary roles such as a helicopter platform, non-combatant evacuation and disaster support. Despite the acknowledged all round flexibility of a ship like CVF its supporters sometimes tend to overemphasise usefulness, making spurious claims and dubious comparisons with the RAF.
In seeking to justify CVF, the two fundamental mistakes are in comparing it with others and over stating the issue of host nation support.
‘CVF will put the RN into the first division, only behind the USN’ or other such comments are often heard. Frankly, I don’t mind how we compare with anyone; this is not a competition in a pub toilet. We have to measure what capabilities it brings to UK defence.
The second mistake people often make is to confuse the utility of carrier borne air in general terms, usually framed by the USN, with that to be delivered by CVF. The USN and RN are not the same and as soon as we all recognise this, the better. The linchpin on which the argument for carrier air rests is host nation support. Overfly rights may be denied, so access from the sea enables an operation to proceed, fixed air bases are vulnerable to attack, so an offshore floating base is the most survivable option.
This makes a number of assumptions, that the over water route will always have overfly rights or not need them and that host nation support is always not available? History tells us that host nation support has been generally available except for a very few instances. There are examples of operations where naval aviation was the only option, but they are limited and this might be an inconvenient truth but it is a truth nevertheless.
What carrier delivered fast air provides is short duration, early entry air power and organic area air defence? As operations progress, land basing generally becomes more established and ground-based aircraft closer to the area of operations becomes the most efficient means of delivering air power. Many operations have a deliberate build up phase as the necessary political pieces are slotted into position, this means time for land-based air power to deploy and establish.
Many carrier operations will also require support from land-based aircraft, ISR and AAR for example.
The RAF have shown they can deploy in numbers and sustain operations, we might seek to improve this of course, but the facts remain, the RAF has a comprehensive expeditionary capability.
The reality is this …
Land and carrier based fast air is complementary, it is not an either or argument and should not be presented as such.
I am a supporter of carrier aviation, but I like to think I can view it dispassionately and without bias.
There is a strong case for CVF, but I am concerned about its impact across the naval and wider defence budget and this leads me down the road of maximising capability whilst minimising cost.
One or Two
I have heard many people say they would rather have none than only 1 CVF, but this seems to be an irrational argument given that the capability for force projection remains a discretionary one.
Yes, of course with only 1 we could not guarantee availability and whilst the one and only CVF was in refit a requirement might pop up, sods law comes into play. The argument in favour of 2 also rests on the number of contracts placed, but this is a simple cost v risk scenario, can we hedge against the risk?
We should not look at CVF in isolation; they will always be operating with other assets and a number of interesting options can be considered.
Option A is to simply plough ahead with 2, operate them with a full complement of JCA each and replace HMS Ocean with a new design. This is of course the favoured RN option but not supportable in terms of cost.
Option B is to still build the pair and put one into immediate reserve. This would save operating costs and reduce crewing requirements but with sufficient notice, would still be able to provide some capacity in response to emerging strategic threats. Operating the ship with some elements of Royal Navy Reserve or Sponsored Reserves might also be worth investigation.
Option C is to link CVF with a replacement for HMS Ocean. Ocean has been excellent value for money, but it has had more than its fair share of problems. By still putting 2 CVF’s into the water and operating them as flexible platforms, optimised for mixed loads of JCA, helicopters and soldiers/marines we could reduce overall crew and maintenance requirements. This is the most likely option given a reduced buy of JCA but operating a CVF in the role of LPH is not ideal because of its size and value.
Option D is to build one CVF but pair it with an early Ocean replacement, a design based on the Spanish Juan Carlos I and Australian Canberra, these are multirole LHD that still provides capacity for an STOVL JCA. Refits could be aligned so that at all times, for those non-discretionary SSFI, we had a capability available for both helicopter and fast jet operations. There would not normally be interchangeable and if only one were available then the nature of operations that could be performed would be limited. A CVF and LHD pair provides some degree of hedging against the availability issue and whilst of course it is not ideal, in this financial environment we have to accept compromise. In due course, HMS Albion and Bulwark will need replacing and at this point we might also consider a follow-on LHD order, so the RN will eventually have 1 CVF, 3 LHD and the 4 Bays; still a formidable capability.
I think Option C is the most likely but D is also an interesting longer-term option for maximum cost savings.
What Aircraft
With that in the bag we have to consider the aircraft, there is little point having an aircraft carrier with nothing to fly off them. The first aircraft onboard should be the Harrier’s, unless the SDSR retires them early, in which case there will be an embarrassing period where we have an aircraft carrier and no aircraft!
What aircraft to buy is the several billion-pound question.
The first thing I would say on this is that bloggers and commenters are not in possession of the full facts and even those in a position of knowing everything aren’t actually in that position at all, especially because the actual final cost of any F35 variant is an unknown. The MoD has repeatedly carried out various studies and estimated that the F35B offers the most cost-effective aircraft that meets requirements, over the total lifespan.
Considering other options though . . .
Switching to CTOL
Whilst it is true that the CVF is an adaptable design with allowance made for catapults etc at this stage the ‘drawings’ would have to be redrafted, and appropriate changes made to the production schedules. The first of the class is well advanced, so this would simply add extra cost and time delays. The last time we slowed down the build rate it cost a billion pounds.
If we did change to catapults we have three choices, go straight for steam, buy into the US EMALS or develop EMKIT/EMCAT into a useable system. In terms of risk, steam is probably the lowest but we would be buying into an obsolete technology that is incredibly maintenance intensive. The US EMALS is probably the most mature of the electromagnetic systems and will likely be production ready by the time we need it but the costs are not insignificant. The EMCAT from Converteam offers a sovereign solution at an unknown cost and risk. In addition, would be a deck landing and arrestor wire system.
All three options carry significant capital costs, x2
On top of the capital costs are the costs involved with operating CTOL aircraft and this is where they are likely to be significant. One of the overwhelming drivers of increasing costs in the defence sphere are people, armed forces across the western nations are facing increasingly high personnel costs and this is resulting in a pressure to reduce crewing through automation.
Each extra position on board needs more than one person to fill it and each person will need paying, have food and accommodation costs, pension, healthcare, training and many other costs that go with employing a military person. CTOL will require extra deck handling and engineering personnel. A whole rank structure will exist around these extra positions and each one will need training, training means course development, e-learning modules, simulators and trainers, who will of course, need paying etc.
Every single extra position on board and ashore will be sitting on top of a pyramid of other people.
Another point that people often ignore is the churn rate in personnel, individuals come and go and whilst we are only paying for one at a time whilst they are in service, over the life of the ships we will be paying many instances of pensions. Like a snowball rolling down a hill, pension costs accumulate, there is a reason we are sitting on a public sector pensions time bomb and this is it. CTOL operations require rapidly perishable skills and for safety reasons have to be maintained at a high level, even if operations are largely ground-based, Afghanistan for example. This creates an additional burden and will mean greater numbers of aircraft and aircrew.
CTOL also adds significant weight to the deck and surrounding structure and let’s not forget we would need to invest in a training aircraft just for deck operations, yet another type with all that this entails.
The big question is, do these additional capital and ongoing costs come in at a figure less than the capital and ongoing cost of the F35B. We cannot hope to know and there remains a degree of uncertainty in any calculations but several studies within the MoD have consistently shown the additional costs of CTOL to be significant enough to outweigh the relatively modest increase in capability that the F35C might offer or capital cost savings from something like the F18.
If we did opt for CTOL, there are basically three choices, the F18, Rafale or F35C and each has a range of advantages, disadvantages and costs. The F35C would be the favourite in this group and might still be a long-term option but the lure of cooperating and sharing costs of training and maintenance with France makes the Rafale a dark horse.
The F18 is certainly proven but is at the end of its development life and would likely need replacing sooner rather than later.
Whatever the various performance, political issues or other advantages of these alternatives the cost, when measured as joint capability (not just to the RN) is less than F35B.
What about STOBAR
An intriguing possibility is short take off but arrested recovery with the proposed Sea Gripen giving everyone something to think about, but whilst we could reduce the capital and running costs associated with catapults it would still need a high degree of deck and aircrew training and questions remain on useable loads once the extra weight of a more robust undercarriage and tail hook is added. The Gripen is a much underrated and robust aircraft but the Sea Gripen is still at the drawing stage and costs are unknown, would it really be suitable and have any longevity in the JCA role?
The F35B
The STOVL is currently the preferred option to fulfil the Joint Combat Aircraft requirement; we have purchased 3 as part of the design and development phase and are currently heavily involved with the flight trials.
Let’s be frank, things aren’t going particularly well with the B variant, lagging in terms of development schedule with ongoing issues on component reliability, exhaust issues and weight. However, these problems are often overstated and show me any other advanced weapon system that has managed to avoid development problems.
I am sanguine about the development snags, for I think they are just that, snags. The swirling controversy on price estimates means that realistically, no one really knows how much the things are and there is very little point trying to pin down a figure.
When ready for deployment we will be getting a system of systems that is a generation ahead of anything we have, an aircraft with masses of growth potential and a massive global supply chain and logistics capability. We need to step away from comparing it to others in pure kinematic performance terms because its sensor fusion, low observability and situational awareness will enable it to carry out its missions much better than the alternatives.
The performance difference between the C and B model is noted, in some respects the C might be a better solution, but we have to balance a number of factors and the additional costs involved with the C, even considering a difference in capital costs, do not compensate. There are other advantages with STOVL like sortie rates, poor weather operations and the versatility of operating on constrained runways on land. These enable transition to ground locations before that location might be capable of fully operating conventional aircraft.
I don’t want to gloss over the historic and ongoing problems but cutting and running at this stage simply would not be sensible.
Plans seem to be for an initial purchase of between 40 and 50 which again, seems sensible.
What About UCAV’s
UCAV’s would favour a CTOL design but the path which UCAV’s are going down is not certain, and any useable design is many years away. Ultra-long range and optionally manned F35B’s might even be part of the future solution mix so as these uncertainties remain, trying to second guess them is not productive, it will simply lead to more delay and more cost.
AEW
One advantage of going CTOL is that it opens an opportunity to operate the E2 Hawkeye airborne early warning aircraft, but this would be an even greater cost and whilst it might be superior to a Merlin-based solution, again, the increase in capability does not offer a clear enough advantage to justify the massive extra cost.
Sweating One’s Assets
Ignoring the emotions of what could have been and without going over old ground, if we accept that CVF and F35B is the sensible and likely way ahead from this point, how can we maximise our investment.
It’s an obvious statement to make, but we must make every penny count and be single-minded.
Can we really afford two fast jet forces?
No.
This means that an F35B squadron must be self-contained whether it is operating from a land base or CVF, the same aircrew, the same maintainers, armourers and others. The people go wherever the aircraft go. It is simply not true to say that RAF personnel do not want to go to sea and if it is in the interests of defence then, retention issues permitting, they must go where they are needed.
If that means a ship or an airbase, then that is what it is. Operating in a larger pool of personnel means that harmony guidelines become more achievable, even on an enduring basis. Putting people into 2 smaller organisations reduces flexibility, career prospects and impacts retention. The aspiration of having a full complement of strike aircraft is simply unaffordable and a waste of a very flexible resource, as I said above, we are not the USN.
This means the FAA completely lose the fast jet role to the organisation that is wholly concerned with operating aircraft, the RAF.
Another option we might explore is joint operational conversion training with the USMC or possible European operators like Spain and Italy. This reduces the requirement for training vessels and possibly aircraft, delivering obvious economies of scale.
Summary
CVF remains fully justified in whatever strategic stance we take.
The F35B would seem to provide the greatest flexibility and capability at the lowest cost.
Options still remain on numbers and how it is operated in a wider context, such as turning the CVF pair into a multirole air/amphib or disbanding the FJ element of the Fleet Air Arm
1. Against anyone who is not too “hard”
> Yup – already defined as medium scale and under
>> so thats £10 billion for what massive usable capapbilty extention exactly?
>>> the ability to to deploy and sustain up to three strike squadrons anywhere in the world in a matter of weeks regardless of basing rights, and within range of ninety percent of humanity.
2. Sustainable only for a period of weeks
> Yup – no ten year wars, marvellous!
>> or 2 month deployments sorting out another Falklands.
>>> lol, do you want to tell me how we would do the falklands without carriers?
3. Supplies of spares and stores permitting
> Yup – as always
>> You got me! And as always there won’t be any (remind me how much we were paying for this)?
>>> but every other capability will have magical fairy spares, right?
4. Sometime in the unspecified future when/if it all works
> Yup – just as it has ever been.
>> OR we could (revolutionary approach) buy stuff that already works.
>>> are we arguing about capabilities or specific platforms, cos i’m fairly sure that carriers have been demonstrated to work for some years now.
5. Meanwhile not being able to say ” Bo to Goose” (in maritime terms), anywhere else at the same time.
> the choice is navy + carrier/arg [or] big army [not] japan style destroyer armada
>> So that’s let’s buy GBFO White elephant x 2 because we can, rather than try and think/pursuade paymasters of an alternative that is cheaper.
>>> it isn’t a white elephant, it is that simple.
6. At the risk of a loss form which it is unlikely the RN would recover.
> as opposed to how well the RN will do in a COIN dominated doctrine?
>> Yep as you would only be risking parts of it at a time.
>>> no, the RN is staying more or less the same on the matter of escorts, its merely a matter of whether the arg/carriers are kept.
Mike W – “I think that this will be an important element in deciding whether we can procure two or just one CVF, or whether we shall have to make do with none.”
The Carriers would in any eventuality outside of the Falklands never operationally deploy together, they would in effect leap-frog each other as the ready group, and while there is some overlap where both will be roaming the seas this will mostly be covered by training and transit.
So, only one escort group which will probably be 1x AAW and 1x ASW (possibly two ASW depending on the deployment).
Integrating a steam catapult in an existing CV design is impractical, EMALS is still a huge modification, STOBAR does likely limit the Take-off weight too much, even with ski ramp.
Single use RATO engines (there are even patents for RATO-based catapults) are probably too expensive.
So what’s about a simple motor-driven catapult?
A Rafale has a thrust of at most 151 kN. Electric or piston engines can add very much to this.
Back in WW2 the Luftwaffe had a piston-engine-based catapult prototype that worked well (RATO was still preferred).
It accelerated 14,000 kg aircraft to 200 km/h on 100m – the aircraft of that time had a thrust comparable to about 3 kN only. The piston engine of the catapult was rated at only 320 hp.
“FIST Landflugzeugschleuder Kl 12”
A modern super sports car engine + a 10° ski ramp should be able to replace steam catapults and EMALS.
This is going to get silly but i couldn’t resist: –
Against anyone who is not too “hard”
> Yup – already defined as medium scale and under
> so thats £10 billion for what massive usable capapbilty extention exactly?
2. Sustainable only for a period of weeks
> Yup – no ten year wars, marvellous!
> or 2 month deployments sorting out another Falklands.
3. Supplies of spares and stores permitting
> Yup – as always
> You got me! And as always there won’t be any (remind me how much we were paying for this)?
4. Sometime in the unspecified future when/if it all works
Yup – just as it has ever been.
> OR we could (revolutionary approach) buy stuff that already works.
5. Meanwhile not being able to say ” Bo to Goose” (in maritime terms), anywhere else at the same time.
> the choice is navy + carrier/arg [or] big army [not] japan style destroyer armada
> So that’s let’s buy GBFO White elephant x 2 because we can, rather than try and think/pursuade paymasters of an alternative that is cheaper.
6. At the risk of a loss form which it is unlikely the RN would recover.
> as opposed to how well the RN will do in a COIN dominated doctrine?
> Yep as you would only be risking parts of it at a time.
Cannot recall where but I recently read a memoire of the Falkalnds; which pointed out just how much agro a handful of Exocets caused to the Entire RN. When the the then current red airforce Northern aviation stratagy was to sweep the RN from GUIK by firing Hundreds of Antiship missiles at once.
I know according to the scuttlebutt the Type 45’s radar can identify the species and sex of seagull at 40 miles (apparantly). it will be really impresive when they get it to rotate.
But can it realy cope with 40 silkworms fired from the Iranian coast off the backs of trucks?
One question that does not appear to have been discussed very much in connection with this topic is just how many ‘escorts’ will be tied up to protect one CVF carrier and how many needed to guard two (or is that simply a matter of doubling the figure?).
You see, I, like some other contributors, am a landlubber and do not know much about these matters. However, it strikes me that at the very least one air defence destroyer (Type 45) and one anti-sub frigate will be needed for each carrier. And then there are the supply ships (oilers etc. – I know they are not techically escorts). Could anyone inform an ignoramus like myself how many more escorts will be needed. Given the limited number of escorts we possess, I think that this will be an important element in deciding whether we can procure two or just one CVF, or whether we shall have to make do with none.
Will you pardon me if this subject has been dealt with in the welter of material on this topic. I just have not had time to read it all.
@ Rupert – If better jointery cannot emerge from from the SDSR then i want the command structures of all the services smashed up, even if the amlagam afterwards looks a little rickety, the alternative might be no JCA if cost savings cannot be made on the FAA.
but i’m not committed to this position, merely sympathetic to it.
Jim30, thanks for that, you’ve given me a lot to think about. I am willing to be educated :)
1. Against anyone who is not too “hard”
> Yup – already defined as medium scale and under
2. Sustainable only for a period of weeks
> Yup – no ten year wars, marvellous!
3. Supplies of spares and stores permitting
> Yup – as always
4. Sometime in the unspecified future when/if it all works
Yup – just as it has ever been
5. Meanwhile not being able to say ” Bo to Goose” (in maritime terms), anywhere else at the same time.
> the choice is navy + carrier/arg [or] big army [not] japan style destroyer armada
6. At the risk of a loss form which it is unlikely the RN would recover.
> as opposed to how well the RN will do in a COIN dominated doctrine?
jedibeeftrix
Handing over the FAA to the RAF has been tried several times, in 1939 and with the advent of joint force harrier. In both these cases, we rapidly ended up with the RAF doing their best to destroy the FAA in favour of land based assets, and with the FAA being handed back to the RN in due course (during WW2 and hopefully shortly). The RAF is effectively a one trick pony: it’s existence can only be justified by assuming that airpower can win wars by itself. Integrating the RAF into the Army and Navy would save some money, but also improve some of the strategic thinking….
If by “strategic power protection” You mean: –
1. Against anyone who is not too “hard”
2. Sustainable only for a period of weeks
3. Supplies of spares and stores permitting
4. Sometime in the unspecified future when/if it all works
5. Meanwhile not being able to say ” Bo to Goose” (in maritime terms), anywhere else at the same time.
6. At the risk of a loss form which it is unlikely the RN would recover.
Then yea I mean strategic power protection”
Hi Richard – sorry I couldn’t immediately give credit to the idea!
“Your thoughts/general opinions on this model would be greatly appreciated.”
Sounds perfectly plausible, but having not been on the ‘inside’ i am utterly unqualified on matters like this or the specific technical merits of equipment.
I try not to dig down in the ‘weeds’ for precisely this reason. :)
i am very sympathetic to splitting helis between the RN and the Army whilst giving the FAA to the RAF.
more jointery is needed, especially [real] jointery.
“They will destort the size and functions of the RN for half a century reducing it’s combat surface fleet to a 1 trick pony dedicated to 2 (almost literaly)Hanger Queens.”
otherwise known is doing the RN’s most important job – strategic power projection.
Realistically how much are we looking to save/cut here – £4 to £ 7 billion per year over the next 5 years??
Also, to add into the toxic brew that is the MoD finances at the minute is the PFI payment bow wave
Most of the PFI’s signed up for haven’t really had their payment profiles kick in yet, some of the big ones start acting like a Las Vegas slot machine and start spewing forth cash from the MoD’s finite and reducing budget
You couldn’t get a worse problem
Delayed replacements really really desperately needing replacement NOW
Normal kit that needs replacing
PFI bow wave payments
Increasing cost of compensation, wounded payments etc from a long period of operations
Unfunded aspirational programmes
10-120% budget cut
Trident
I really cannot see this post as anything other than wishful thinking, of the: –
“we are just going to Have to afford them” Variety
It’s not just the Carriers or even what goes on them that is the problem.
Their escort and support structure / force has to be considered.
If it is
1 2 x Type 45
2 1 X underway replenishment vessel (Fort class?)
3 1 X CVF
4 30 x F35
5 2 x awacs Helicopter
6 3 (ish ordinary copters)
7 1 X SSN
The kind of “back of the fag packet” calculation you hate = Circa £8-9 billion pounds of assets purchase price. An entire years procurement budget at current rates parked in harms way. The loss of which would be the biggest single loss of maritime prestige and authority since the IJN carriers went down at Midway.
It will be too vulnerable to deploy in any contested situation with Rusia, China, US Japan,(and a few others), and massive overkill for many other situations.
They will destort the size and functions of the RN for half a century reducing it’s combat surface fleet to a 1 trick pony dedicated to 2 (almost literaly) “Hanger Gueens”. Which will have to be cosseted, protected; (and if the history of ARK Royal / Eagle is anything to go by), frequently lacking effective capabilty thru shortages of spares, manpower etc etc.
STOVL aircraft are much more function/ limitation critical that conventional aircraft. the F35B is far from out of the woods(If published data is to be believed), and several expensive years from being a usable system. One example is the aircraft is largely composite – being a few 100 kilos overweight is going to be hard to cure when you are already at the edge of current technology. Bear in mind USAF already talking about cutting back on it’s order of “Normal” F35s what is that going to do to unit cost?
This is why the “Scrap them now” option is probably nowhere near as wasteful as it sounds, and if the real costs for them; (and in particular the
F35B) Come in at anything like that currently projected in reality I will eat one; catapults or not as well.
“Finaly, the special brew drinkers at the MoD who came up with a long term plan that included an unfunded requirement for £36-7 Billion in equipment and are now having to sober up & face the real world.”
Slightly harsh comment! The reality of this ‘unfunded EP’ is more a direct result of two things happening. Firstly, a lot of kit is ending its life in the next few years, and had to be programmed in for replacement, as the Department was obliged to maintain its force levels as set out in the SDR of 98.
Secondly, kit from previous years which needed replacing years ago, and for which the replacement capability had been deferred to due a certain Mr G Brown imposing spending cuts in the department, still needs replacing and now is in direct competition for resources with the new list of kit that needs replacing.
The department is left in the position of having to programme funding to buy kit to meet mandated planning assumptions, while simaltaneously not being allowed to cancel any major projects (again at the insistence of Mr G Brown) to find the funding to pay for it.
The end result is a long ‘wish list’ of capabilities that need replacing, and which there is no funding for. The existing kit is expiring and needs to either go with no replacement, or be extended at some cost to wait for the new kit to arrive. At the same time the Department is being asked to make major in year savings cuts, and as such constantly defers or delays equipment to save money in year, but only making the long term problem worse.
What was needed to resolve this was an SDR or at least some now strategic guidance 4 or 5 years ago, and a willingness on the part of the last Government to allow MOD to cancel major projects, (which didnt exist due to a dual fear of being seen to be weak on defence, and concern over jobs in labour safe seats). Neither of these things happened, and the MOD was forced to carry on in this insane position.
Thankfully the new Govt will allow MOD to cancel projects and the SDSR will hopefully remove some planning assumptions, freeing up funding for other projects.
To say this is a nightmare is an understatement of epic proportions…
Regarding going to the Canadian Armed Forces model. Isn’t this really just changing the name? I remain far from convinced this would solve any problems and fairly certain it would create a few new ones!
Regarding the “Big Ticket Items” Sven is right. It is bad enough the Media fixating on these without this forum following suit. Admin has shown very well in a series of excellent posts (logistics, “ruthless commonality etc) where there is potential for significant long term savings.
Of course, this is only happening because there is a news vacuum. We have literally no idea what is really happening in the SDSR itself. The thing I find most disturbing is the lack of serious engagement by the armed forces themselves – witness inter-service rivalry.
We know that much of the Army’s focus is in Afghanistan right now and perhaps they are looking to reshape themselves somewhat beyond that.
It does appear to me that the RN have born the brunt of cutbacks during the last decade and they are hurting! and are making a case for recaptalization (and a very modest one at that).
X makes a very good point about hearing the RAF’s perspective. I would be interested to know how they see their role in the future.
“(Not totaly sure if the interest payments are right!)”
it’s about right. same size as overall defence spending.
Jedibeeftrix, essentially it would mean a the reorganisation of the forces into a singular defence force, such like those of Canada and Israel. Organisationally, I was considering the USMC as a basis. However, looking at past lessons of WW2 whereby air force assets were misused by being given to ground commanders, I had the idea of maintaining a strategic air force to maintain such things as long range supply and bombing missions. All other aircraft such as rotary assets, Harriers and the like would be part of a tactical airforce. For the navy, all shipping would be centred around the amphibious landing and support, with a separate strategic navy for the subs and others. Being something of a landlubber, others meaning anything else that didn’t fulfil the amphibious support role.
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2009/04/disjointed-command-the-future-of-warfare/
Your thoughts/general opinions on this model would be greatly appreciated.
Admin, very nice piece.
However i think we will get nothing but a huge fudge.
The Navy will be lucky to end up with one ship & the Raf-Navy will get 30’ish JSF’s to squabble over. Ocean will be got rid of & Ark Royal will be pressed into service in it’s place. I do not think the Navy will not get any new large ships (LPH or LPA), for quite some time.
I think this for these reasons.
Nobody wants to even think about a future where such ships will be used or even needed. Those whose job’s involve peering into the future seem to be unable to articulate convincing, reasoned arguments as to the need for them.
The public, who cannot get their heads around the idea of spending a lot of money on weapons while being told that there is a massive financial crisis and that there are going to be cuts in service’s because of it.
The public, also (imho), no longer trust or even want to listen to any government on military matters at all. Also i think that generaly people are angry that so many from the force’s are being daily shot at & blown up.
They questioned the reasons for going to war in the first place (quite rightly), but then the answers they got do not make any sense to them. Therefore, now, they do not believe what they are told & think there are other motive’s.
The current government, who are looking with dis-belief at having to borrow £150 Billion next year, £40+ Billion being to cover interest payments on what we have already borrowed. (Not totaly sure if the interest payments are right!)
The admin people at the MoD who seem unable & uninterested in explaining in a calm reasoned manner to the public their reasons for wanting extra troops, planes or ships etc etc. All i see are near hysterical, contradictory claims in the press & far too many arguments between the service’s.
Finaly, the special brew drinkers at the MoD who came up with a long term plan that included an unfunded requirement for £36-7 Billion in equipment and are now having to sober up & face the real world.
I think many people here are far better at fantasy fleet or raf than the experts who work for the MoD.
At least here people come up with idea’s that do not always cost the absolute maximum & take the longest possible time to complete before some bloke at the Treasury gets out his big red pen.
Which is really what i think will happen to PoW, i just hope that we don’t have cause to regret it.
OT – Anglo French Defence Cooperation from Chatham House:
http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/papers/view/-/id/936/
“Marcase, I think there’s a strong case of going for a combined defence force similar to the Canadian model, albiet with seperate arms for a strategic air and naval force.”
What does this mean in practice?
Jedibeeftrix, it may be less than successful in reality due to the differing ‘corporate identities’ being squeezed together, as the same appears to happen with large company take-overs and mergers. I was thinking something along the lines of the USMC in force organisation, with a strategic RN and RAF, something that I advocated in a post earlier quite a while ago.
George, I mentioned the manufacturing of new airframes for the GR.9’s. One of the reasons I didn’t mention the SHAR was the difference in capability, radar aside of course. If we had to go down this route, although not cheap, I’d consider putting an APG-79 or the Blue Vixen on the front. Although leasing a few AV-8B+’s with APG-65 radars off the UMC would be a great idea in the short term.
With regard to the E-3, given the size difference, speed, range, crew stations, how can the two compare. If we need an E-3 in Saudi Arabia at short notice it wouldn’t be a problem. Trying to get a E-2 Hawkeye there in the same scenario would be very different matter. Ok, we can’t land an E-3 on a carrier, but it is a fantastic strategic asset…..don’t throw it away! :-D
Hi X
Yes, I agree it is far from ideal, but if we continue down the F35B route, we may have carriers but no fast jets for a while, if the fatigue life does mean 2015 Out Of Service. Someone mentioned manufacturing new airframe for the GR9s and putting the engines/avionics etc into them but that is probably more expensive than recommissioning stored SHARs – the youngest of which was only in service for about 10 years. I suppose the other thing we could do would see if the USMC had any spares AV8BPluses in storage?
Another possibility would be to go down the CTOL route with the carriers (If We Choose To Afford them, as Jed said) is to lease stored F18Cs whilst waiting for the F35C to become available.
That being said, I think I would still prefer CTOL Carriers, Rafael and Hawkeye. Someone said we could use Hawkeyes to replace the E3s too – that may be a good idea.
“Would you advocate going down the ‘Defence Force’ route for the UK?”
I was under the impression that the Canadian’s thought it to be a less than successful move……..?
Marcase, I think there’s a strong case of going for a combined defence force similar to the Canadian model, albiet with seperate arms for a strategic air and naval force.
Would you advocate going down the ‘Defence Force’ route for the UK?
Personally I’m not a big fan, just wondering how you Brits look at it (or shoot it down immediately).
What about following the Canadian MoD model; a hypothetical UK Air Command which would include RAF, FAA and Army aviation assets. Think expanded and higher integrated Joint Harrier Force type, or better yet, the USMC model.
In theorly this could rotate Air Command personnel aboard CVF, UK air defence and Army support roles. With a flexible enough training/deployment program this could solve “carrier deployment fatigue”.
It would free up the RN from a very expensive and niche fighter requirement (which is still a valid requirement imho) and allows them to focus on the carrier and (strike) naval escorts.
I’m the first to admit that it would be a (cross) training and logistics mess, but still.
@ George
What sane administration would spend good money on refitting a handful of elderly airframes to fit a niche need?
Oh yes we would! Perhaps SDSR will see Nimrod finally retired…
(Sorry couldn’t resist it…)
Slight side issue on the aircraft side. Someone on a different topic cited 2015 as a date for GR9 out of service due to fatigue issues but I’ve just been doing a quick google and it appears that 11 SHARS were put in storage at Shawbury and 9 used at Culdrose SFDO. Could these be returned to service as an interim whilst waiting for the F35B?
I said armoured I meant armed. And I said 2 Makins, I meant 3. Um 3 x 40k ton ship = 120k tons of ship = 2 x CVF. Not that simple I know…….
Um. I am just a bit angry about it all. Sorry.
X, we certainly don’t blame the FRES fiasco on the MoD, the grown ups in green take an equal share of the blame
Off the top of my head…….
I would move Ocean over to RFA with a bit of automation for the engine spaces. She could replace Argus.
The SDSR debate does seem to be concentrating on the RN. I would really like to know if there are any light-blue-blogs out there advocating something. I would like to know how “they” see what is needed. Even something simple like how many Typhoons (and AWACS) we need to “defend” in peace time UK airspace. One squadron north and one south? Or what?
And what exactly do the Army need that they haven’t got now?
We blame MoD for the FRES cock up what about the generals, the defence professionals? Is it really beyond their collective ken to select a ruddy vehicle to transport a section and decide the level of firepower and protection it needs? It seems so. Remember some general signed of SA80…
Giving an average defence spend of 300billion a decade 5billion for CVF isn’t that much. Just as 20billion replacement cost for Trident or 1billion pa to sustain the deterrent (250 million for Vanguard, 750million for Aldermaston which last time I look wasn’t a MoD(N) facility.)
I think by discussing “host nation” support ThinkDefence is implying that not only the RAF can move about unmolested but so to can the Army. Or am I wrong?
Apart from me I don’t know if anybody else here has spent any time studying International Relations at a tertiary level. It appears not. So it may come as a bit of a shock to find that in the anarchic nation state system symbolism is surprisingly important. There is value in deploying large prestige platforms. I don’t see CVF just pounding tribesmen wielding AK47 into the sand; I don’t think these new wars amongst the people will be the only ones we will fight. There is a good chance that the next conflict may be at some crisis point where a collection of armed forces from differing groups will gather. Intel and posturing will probably more important than firepower. If it comes to shooting there will be a controlled rapid de-escalation as politicians and diplomats pull back from the brink. We are returning to a pre-Napoleonic era where exquisite expensive armed forces are to precious to commit for to long. And we also moving back towards a balance of power scenario where the world’s powers will come together in temporary alliances as dictated by their needs. In this scenario does UK Plc benefit from turning up with a few frigates and the promise of air support if the PFI tanker providers will let their birds fly in a warzone? Yes I have over egged the pudding a bit but I hope you get my drift. And lastly the next war probably won’t happen in a land locked stated. As said here early this week if A-stan had been Somalia would we be debating this? No.
Cap badge politics not important? I don’t see the generals, admirals, or air marshals asking David Cameron to wide up their service or cut their budget in favour of the other two. And I know on the ground it doesn’t impact. The soldier doesn’t care that the pilot of the Chinook is RAF or the nurse who tends his broke limb is RN. But to say it doesn’t matter at all is I feel a bit simplistic. Humanity is tribable, humans identify with one group or a number of groups. On the ground the soldier knows who gets the better deal when he is at patrol base shitting in a hole while some RAF clerk is in Bastion with three square meals a day and showers. And these difference do take on a broader tribable dimension tribe. I still maintain that there is no logic in there being a separate air service.
Come October we are all screwed. It doesn’t matter how much we play fantasy navy.
For my money we should have built two Makin Island’s and made sure we had enough fully armoured Darings to defend them.
“The ideal solution would have been a naval Typhoon, but this seems now too late, it should have been requirement from the outset but we are not as smart as the French. Even now the Sec of Def should not proceed without being completely convinced the Sea Typhoon is a non-starter. It is absolutely absurd for the RAF to have ordered more Typhoons than they can afford/justify but the FAA need to buy something else in a similar category.”
I’d take strong issue with that. The Typhoon originated in 1980, just as the SHAR was entering service, and the Invincibles were still in build. At that time the RN existed to do ASW, and there was no one who seriously advocated building CTOL carriers back then as a credible option.
By the time the initial CVS(R) studies were done in the mid 1990s the Typhoon was too advanced to change, and JSF was on the horizon. It made no sense then to navalise the Typhoon.
The research into whether it could be navalised has been done repeatedly, and the answer is always the same. To navalise Typhoon would require major (i.e. almost complete) redesign of the airframe to adapt it to carrier landings. There are massive issues with visibility from the cockpit and it would require a specialist landing system fitted to be able to land on a carrier. The costs have been looked at regularly and it is far more expensive to navalise Typhoon than it would be to buy JSF.
This is a classic example of MOD being blamed for whichever course of action it took – had it gone for a navalised Typhoon in the 80s, it would have been deservedly criticised for wasting money on an asset not required, nor needed in the current environment. Now its being criticised for not investing in said asset!
The two carriers were 1st mooted in the 1998 SDR, it’s a bit late to start debating their design and desirability given we are already well into building them. The fact that £1.25bn has already been spent is not new news, it was true as of last December if not earlier.
Firstly, although I would normally be concerned about sacrificing the long-term needs for short-term expedients, given the circumstances I think the priority needs to be getting the armed forces through a short-term budget crisis with the minimum of permanent damage. There is a real risk important capabilities will be lost irrevocably.
Secondly, we need to be less insanely ambitious. Britain’s armed forces seem to be obsessed with always the best, be it destroyers, submarines, whatever. Don’t always get the best of course, only the most expensive. Other major powers make do with less but we, it seems, cannot.
Assuming we need an expeditionary capability (I think we do) we need sea-based air power. If the two CVFs were cancelled, the cost of even two smaller ships (Cavour and Canberra classes are both around the £1bn mark) plus the cancellation costs of CVF bring us back to near the figure we first thought of, but with much less ship to show for our money.
Do we need two? The Charles de Gaulle has just emerged from a 14-month refit; if you really need a capability you cannot be without it for 14 months. If you can be without it that long you don’t really need it. Yes, we need two, but only one need be in commission at a time.
The key question is what aircraft? I agree the interim is to keep the Harriers flying as long as possible. The ideal solution would have been a naval Typhoon, but this seems now too late, it should have been requirement from the outset but we are not as smart as the French. Even now the Sec of Def should not proceed without being completely convinced the Sea Typhoon is a non-starter. It is absolutely absurd for the RAF to have ordered more Typhoons than they can afford/justify but the FAA need to buy something else in a similar category.
The F-35B I would not touch with a bargepole, it looks like a technological nightmare with not just high procurement and operating costs but also highly uncertain costs. The F-22 precedent is not reassuring. We cannot afford any cost over-runs; we need to be financially & technically cautious so Rafale or the F-18 Super-Hornet are the obvious choices. I would cancel the F-35 completely.
the wise words of JimWH at W1:
——————————————-
“Jedibeeftrix wrote:quick question; i accept that 72 is the magic number (i even used in my BFSD10 article), in your opinion would it make more sense to have four squadrons of nine JCA, or three squadrons of 12 JCA, given that both result in 36 frontline aircraft?”
I tend to think that it would be better to go for 4 smaller squadrons rather than 3 larger squadrons, though this is the more costly of the two. Going for 4 squadrons allows for more flexibility in terms of what you have the force do, and it allows for more seamless augmentation of squadrons during emergencies (i.e. it’s a bit easier to increase a squadron by 25% than it is by 33%). However, it is a bit more expensive since it requires duplication of squadron staff four times rather than three times.
Of course, it is worth noting that until/unless SDSR say otherwise, the plan is for four squadrons which have for a long time been accepted to be 12 aircraft (FMC) squadrons (implying a buy of at least 96). This 4×12 structure gives a great deal of flexibility in terms of models of deployment and really very good bang-for-buck.
“Jedibeeftrix wrote:If we accept that that twelve might be a likely normal complement, how does this effect available deck-space and below-deck-space for LPH operations, as compared to an Ocean?”
Well, again I think it’s a little premature to be worrying about this until/unless SDSR says that Ocean is gone and the LPH(R)/LHD are sh!te canned.
However, the the aviation facilities aboard CVF are predicated on packing about 40 aircraft aboard, which means that even if you have 24 spots taken up by the ‘strike’ component of the airgroup (16 Lightning, 4 MASC, 4 Merlin HM.2), you still have 16 spots available for ‘amphibious’ aircraft. However, recall that the folded Merlin is actually fairly small, so that’s not going to be too much of a problem.
The big problems I envisage are actually people and vehicles. CVF has berthing for around 1850 (IIRC), which means that once you’ve got the reduced air group and a command staff aboard, you’re probably down to about a battalion’s worth of personnel. The bigger problem is that as compared to the dedicated ‘phibs, I’m not sure what the storage of military supplies is like aboard CVF. Certainly there won’t be a dedicated vehicle deck separate from the hanger, and that does pose potential problems.
In essance I can’t see CVF really being a replacement for Ocean as an amphibious ship, though they’ll easily be able to take on the aviation component of Ocean’s role. And if used in conjunction with an LPD/LSD it shouldn’t be too bad. And hopefully, it’d only ever be an interim arrangement[1], so it wouldn’t be the end of the world.
[1] The replacement for the LPD is pretty much going to have to be an LHD.
———————————-
which in my [personal] opinion makes option c the least terrible of the reductive options.
I commented on a previous post the view that we should build both carriers but immediately designate one as a reserve – option B in this post. For the one in reserve this means we don’t have to buy planes for it or incur operating costs, but at least it will be there when it is wanted. This conclusion is driven by the view that while the constrained economic times and this government persist, that the choice of anything – planes to fly from the carriers in this case – has to be driven down to the barest cost.
The good bloggers to Think Defence do tend to say okay we’ll opt for this moderately good basic item and then add this and tweak that so we end up with something that we don’t know the cost of but it obviously costs a bit more, and rationalise that with the argument that this is all a good investment. And that may all be true; but the Chancellor is out to save some money in a hurry and he knows that if he gave way to every suggestion to pay for something new on the basis it’s a good investment then he’s not going to save what he wants – which means he is not going to let that happen.
It’s not just carriers – defence has a long shopping list (an odd concept for an organisation facing cuts) including: FRES tanks and mine resistant vehicles for the army, more helicopters for everyone, frigates and submarines for the navy, more Typhoons, transports, air tankers and MR4s for the RAF, a nuclear deterrent (until it was realised it had to be paid for), Rivet, cyber warfare, drones, more front line troops, no doubt lots of other less exciting stuff, as well as funds to keep what already exists. The merit of each has to be balanced against the merit of everything else. Very little on this wish list is going to materialise and the best chance of getting any one item will be if not too much money has been spent on something else.
Once cancelled carriers will not come back on any governments’ agenda, so if the navy wants them they really had better make the choice of aircraft affordable.
HMS Ocean is only 12 years old, what to do with it once retired early? The sale of early retirement naval vessels over the past years, have not exactly been handled graciously to say the least. Though granted New Labour were in power and that might have had something to do with it, but we still have the same MoD.
What to do with it, if we go for option C?
Does anyone remember the report that was done by either DSTL, DERA or DESG? Where they considered converting Typhoons so that they could be carrier based. I cannot seem to find it. Anyone have it?
Paragon
OCEAN was built to commercial standards as cheaply as possible to provide a ship which could do the job for 20 years. The main problem is linked to her sewage system which is simply not fit for purpose, and can only be fixed by taking the ship apart and starting all over again. She is generally a maintenance nightmare and has been worked hard for 10 years – she’ll be gone by 2018 and many in the RN will breathe a sigh of relief when that happy day comes!
Admin
I see your point on Sponsored Reserves, but ultimately their system works because you are running a simple vessel on routine work with very few complex sub systems to look after. Essentially the Points are merchant ships run on behalf of HM Government.
A vessel like CVF is going to be seriously complicated to run and maintain – which means industry would charge obscene amounts to provide the necessary skills to run a carrier. To justify sponsored reserves you need to have a civilian job for them to do, and a way for the company to make profit – I struggle to see how any company could make profit from CVF, except a manpower recruitment agency.
The other problem is that it takes a long time to work up a carrier – you cant just magic up the crew. If we wanted to run on CVF2 with a part time crew, you may as well park her permanently until CVF1 goes into refit – the time it would take to work up the ships company means the crisis is likely to be over by the time she’s ready!
“The British (or just Think Defence) discussion about the cuts seems to revolve mostly about Trident and CVF – two RN big ticket items.”
that might indicate a broad trend in the mindset of the british people, and its translation into the political ambitions of our ‘masters’.
Nice piece. Just wondering what the problems are with HMS Ocean that you alluded to?
Thanks
Sven
Thats a bit unfair, weve discussed cutting the RAFs JCA fleet entirely and the Army to less than half its current strength.
The British (or just Think Defence) discussion about the cuts seems to revolve mostly about Trident and CVF – two RN big ticket items.
It’s generally not very smart to fix one’s attention on big ticket items, but doing so on two big ticket items of just a navy without paying as much attention on army and air force matters is even less advisable.
“The RN spin machine is being put into high gear, much like the other service spin machines, it must be said.”
The RAF have excellent form as spin-masters worthy of the dark lord himself! :D
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/music/classicalmusic/8004828/RAFs-Central-Band-Reach-for-the-Skies.html
“As news reaches us of disreputable attempts by Army and Navy chiefs to fight off threatened budget cuts by dismembering the Royal Air Force, the RAF’s Central Band comes thundering low over the horizon with an immaculately timed riposte”
“There are examples of operations where naval aviation was the only option but they are limited and this might be an inconvenient truth but it is a truth nevertheless.”
These things do not exist in a vacuum, so we must always speculate; at what cost is this achieved? We can only speculate because this kind of negotiation will inevitably be subject to the 30 year rule.
“The talk today is of small Scale Focussed Interventions and acting in coalition with others for anything else. This is nothing new and has actually been the case since the 1998 SDR.”
It should be noted that it is usually mentioned in the same breath as the Joint Medium Weight Capability which is an idea that’s been knocking around for a few years, but as Peter Parkinson said on W1 there is no indication that any particular doctrine or force structure will survive as an input to the SDSR.
http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/UK_Rapid_Intervention_Options_45-47.pdf
“Option C is to link CVF with a replacement for HMS Ocean. Ocean has been excellent value for money but it has had more than its fair share of problems. By still putting 2 CVF’s into the water and operating them as flexible platforms, optimised for mixed loads of JCA, helicopters and soldiers/marines we could reduce overall crew and maintenance requirements. This is the most likely option given a reduced buy of JCA but operating a CVF in the role of LPH is not ideal because of its size and value.”
This is what I would most favour at the moment; a buy of 60+ JCA would provide four squadrons of nine aircraft and two OCU’s of nine aircraft, as well as half a dozen as attrition reserve and deep maintenance rotation. A carrier would normally embark with two squadrons, which should allow the 65k tonne platform to flex into a limited LPH role, but it could obviously operate three or even four squadrons at need. This has the benefit of being a temporary solution if necessary, as five years down the line if we decide we need a dedicated LPH and another two dozen JCA then we can go out and order some.
“I have heard many people say they would rather have none than only 1 CVF but this seems to be an irrational argument given that the capability for force projection remains a discretionary one.”
I don’t believe it is irrational, because with two you have the flexibility to work it into your contributions to collective defence, without two it becomes a jealously husbanded harbour queen then can rarely be tasked to NATO duties and never without making it entirely unusable as a sovereign capability.
“In terms of risk, steam is probably the lowest but we would be buying into an obsolete technology that is incredibly maintenance intensive.”
It is also a problem for a non nuclear ship without resource for vast quantities of cheap steam on tap 24/7.
“the additional costs of CTOL to be significant enough to outweigh the relatively modest increase in capability that the F35C”
Cost is also a factor with F35C too, as the lower sortie rate would require a larger number of aircraft to achieve the same number or JCA’s in the air AFAIK.
“This means the FAA completely lose the fast jet role to the organisation that is wholly concerned with operating aircraft, the RAF.”
Obviously a suboptimal solution, but probably a necessary one, and we underestimate the utility of a “crisis being a good time to make progress”, in that we might finally make the services work together, or specifically make the RAF learn to love the carrier.
“CVF remains fully justified in whatever strategic stance we take. The F35B would seem to provide the greatest flexibility and capability at the lowest cost.”
Very much agreed.
Excellent article, my thanks.
When I mentioned the RNR or other form of naval reserve, perhaps sponsored like those operating the Points, it was merely in a kind of aboard caretaker role, basically the ship would be in some form of enhanced ‘extended reserve’ with a core of full time RN command crew but reserves making up the difference.
Its not a particularly well thought through notion but something to keep the second CVF at a minimal level of readiness
Jed, I agree that HNS is a risk which is why I still support naval aviation but I wanted to draw attention to the over hyping it often gets that is not based on historical realities. The RAF have deployed overseas and in strength but it has taken a while, hence CVF becomes your rapid reaction early entry force, phase 2 is the F35B going ashore and Phase 3 is the full compliment building up from the UK
Good piece, and I agree with many of your judgements – particularly on using the 2 CVF model as the replacement for CVS and LPH.
I still think CTOL remains an option, although this as much the RN wanting to get back into ‘proper aviation’ as it is anything else. CVF was seen as their way back into their normal means of doing naval aviation, and I think there is a desire to lose the F35B if possible.
I think you overstate the costs of CTOL from a personnel perspective. The RN is always establishing new trades and branches, and disestablishing older ones. I never fail to be amazed at the number of obscure sub branches lurking around still. The CTOL teams would be similar, it would be a sub set of the FAA, and need no more than a few hundred people tops. Bearing in mind the extant aircraft handler branch is massively oversubscribed for recruitment, and remains so for several years, there isn’t really a manpower problem here.
Finally, you said “Operating the ship with some elements of Royal Navy Reserve or Sponsored Reserves might also be worth investigation.”
The RNR is not a seagoing organisation anymore. Its only about 2500 strong all in, and is designed to provide a lot of very small branches of 20-30 people carrying out jobs that the RN needs done, but can’t afford to do on a full time basis. There is no chance at all that the RNR could run a CVF.
I will echo Marcase by saying it is indeed a well written piece. And before it rip it to shreds, I would say although I am ex-Andrew, I am not overall a supporter of the CV programme. Personally I would have liked us to buy 2 or 3 Cavour class in a joint programme with our Italian allies, but hey, there you go……
So, firstly, although I applaud your budgetary gritty realism, your starting from the pessimistic point that we can’t afford this, and can’t afford that… As far as I am aware the UK is still one of the richest nations on earth, richer than Brazil and richer than India, which have carrier programmes. “Wishing for more money is not a practical strategy” is true, but justifying why more money from the finite pot should be spent on defence instead, say, international aid, is not the same thing.
Anyway, onto the detail:
Justifying CVF: “if we proceed with CVF/JCA it is out of choice, not necessity.” – of course ! All government expenditure is choice, but your point is well taken. However I think we are all pessimists when it comes to the SDSR, as the UK does not do “grand strategy” and all our politicians appear to be complete numpty’s :-(
“In seeking to justify CVF, the two fundamental mistakes are in comparing it with others and over stating the issue of host nation support.”
Well comparing our pathetic efforts, even if we get both ships and a full complement of aircraft, against the USN is of course plain stupid. Comparing what we could achieve against the yard stick of France, or Brazil would seem to be more realistic.
However I disagree with you on the subject of host nation support. Just because it has been available does not mean it will be in the future. The RAF has been reduced to tactical fighter aircraft, that need IFR to achieve any sort of strike range. How useful are these if we are facing decades of brush wars (which I dont believe we are, but many seem to think the “long war” is the new norm). This is why there is internecine warfare between the USAF fighter mafia and those who want a new long range strategic strike / ISR aircraft (for gods sake, dont call it a “bomber”).
So, no 2 carriers with less a 100 aircraft between are not a good argument for disbanding the RAF, but the no host nation argument is not as facile as you suggest, but this leads onto:
“The RAF have shown they can deploy in numbers and sustain operations, we might seek to improve this of course but the facts remain, the RAF has a comprehensive expeditionary capability.”
Erm, no – not really. Not their fault, not having a dig at the crabs, they have suffered stupid cuts too, since the days of constant deployments to norther and southern Iraq no fly zones, and to Italy to cover the Balkans. How many RAF fast jets are in Afghanistan ? What is the proportion against our ‘paper’ fleet ? Now, how many Belgium F16’s are in Afghanistan and what is that proportion of their total fleet ?
The RAF can certainly once again mount long term deployed and expeditionary operations, if it is funded properly in order to do so.
Onto your options:
Option A – 2CV, 1 LHA – the “preferred” or should that be the most expensive option, but no reason why we can’t have it if the Govt WANTS to fund it.
Option B – total non starter. Seriously, do you know the state of the RNR ? It would need a large cadre of regular sailors on shore bases who could be called upon to man the ship – which actually is common sense, but it won’t look good on the “bang for buck” balance sheet…..
Option C – You can spin a 65,000 LHA as “sweating your assets” or as a “frakkin waste of money” – just depends on how you want to look at it really.
Option D – The issue with having 1 of everything is that you just know its gonna be in dry dock when you actually need it…… :-(
What about Option E – complete them (or just the first one), to a bare minimum standard and then put them up for sale – India or Brazil might be interested.
Option F – Damn the penalty clauses – cancel them.
Aircraft.
As anyone who has read my previous comments knows, I am a proponent of the Rafale and a close operating / training / maintenance relationship with France.
If the SDSR can make an actual strategic rationale for a “first day of the war” semi-stealthy attack aircraft, then go with the F35C. Although personally I am of the opinion that we should never buy any version of the F35 and which should actually sue the U.S. government via whatever court / international trade organisation does such things, to get our development investment back, based on them reneging on their promises on intellectual property and sovereignty !
“We need to step away from comparing it to others in pure kinematic performance terms because its sensor fusion, low observability and situational awareness will enable it to carry out its missions much better than the alternatives.” – erm’ says who ? Not proven, and will not be a proven argument (one way or the other) for another ten years …….
“I don’t want to gloss over the historic and ongoing problems but cutting and running at this stage simply would not be sensible.” – actually it might be a very sensible thing that could in many ways save the programme, but seeing as no one can seem to provide true (well at least public, unclassified) potential through life operating costs for any F35 variant, how do you compare it ?
AEW – Hawkeye versus Merlin – extra capability not worth the cost. Well we can’t determine that yet surely, as we dont know what the SDSR will commit us to. How about retiring (selling) the E3 AWACS fleet and having a consolidated Hawkeye AEW fleet ? If tanks and frigates are cold war relics, then surely a large fleet of E3 to defend UK / NATO airspace against is a real relic ! Yes good enough is often just than, good enough, but sometimes better is best.
Ref: “Can we really afford two fast jet forces?” – Yes of course we can IF WE WANT TO ! Not long ago we could afford Tornado, Harrier, Jaguar, Tornado ADV and Sea Harrier – so your argument appears somewhat overly simplistic.
“It is simply not true to say that RAF personnel do not want to go to sea and if it is in the interests of defence then, retention issues permitting, they must go where they are needed.” – I don’t mean to sound snippy but I presume you are neither ex-RN or ex-RAF ? Because your glossing over this way to quickly. OK, get rid of the FAA, but then you have to advertise and make sure that anyone who joins knows the RAF knows they are going to sea. Or do you stream your staff, Typhoon versus F35. Typhoon people never go to sea, F35 people do, but they knew that when they joined so thats OK – but what about career paths ? There are going to be more billets for Typhoon people, so will they get promoted more quickly, in which case your penalizing the F35 people… blah, blah blah – just don’t gloss over the retention issues. I am sure it can be worked out in the end, but it will be difficult, and I say this having many, many good friends who are ex-RAF, it would be very difficult for their ‘corporate culture’ (can’t wait for all the fights between Matelots and Crabs on every run ashore…)
All in all great article, thanks :-)
Outstanding piece, this one’s a keeper.
Unfortunately, I’m afraid that reason will be overruled by the (political) view that aircraft carriers are “by definition” a Cold War Relic – no matter the rationale and clear-headed facts so very well posted here.
“Something has got to give” is another comment often heard, where CVF and Trident are engaged in mortal combat where even the eventual winner isn’t sure of survival.
Again, and excellent piece. Well done.
seems to me that co-ordination is the key and the ability to work together – but as usual it is easy to say and much harder to achieve.. streamlining to the politicians means cuts and ‘economies of scale’ but that would not really suit the abilities of the Armed Forces to actually be able to perform in their no doubt many diverse future perceived roles. What does seem likely though is the focus’ switch for global defence policy to handle middle to far eastern issues – UK concerns possibly therefore focus on trade route protection as a general issue… alongside actual deployment.. of course alongside closer relations with the 5 treaty parties and possibly the Brazilians.. so will be interesting to know if the fudge farrago that comes out in a rush of knee jerk political reaction that will be the SDR will actually stand up at all…