I have been writing about Project CVF since I started running my ill-educated mouth off on the pages of Think Defence (bloody hell, is it really 4 years ago) and I can’t remember a time when the Daily Mail esque words of national disgrace have been apt, but if the recent article in the Telegraph about CVF is true then quite simply, those words apply.
Never in the field of human conflict has so much embarrassment been caused to so many by so few.
It has been obvious to me for some time that the commodity the MoD lacks the most is credibility.
Credibility with politicians, credibility with the Treasury, credibility with the media and last but by no means least, credibility with service personnel
Incompetence and your common or garden fuckwittery are closely associated with the senior staff, the decision makers, at the MoD, in fact, the MoD is so closely associated with incompetence that no one is actually surprised when it can’t even get buying ladders right. What chance do they have with aircraft, ships and vehicles when at every turn, there is a banana skin?
Can we blame the media for taking the easy line, Treasury officials for being openly scornful of MoD project accounting, the National Audit Office for copying and pasting the forward to their Major Project Reports from the last one and everyone else to just shrugging their shoulders when the latest hugely expensive cock up is revealed?
If any project, and there are many others, absolutely typifies the MoD’s complete and utter lack of credibility, it is the CVF/JCA omnishambles.
One of my other major bugbears is that our national defence and security strategy has become equipment centric, the armed forces are not seen in the context of how they contribute to national defence, promotion of our interests or values, but by how many FRES Scouts ‘feel right’ or whether the extra range of the F35C makes us second only to the US Navy.
Instead of putting equipment into the rightful context of a national strategy we put equipment at the top of the agenda and write our strategy around it, tail wagging dog. I have even heard people genuinely talk about whose turn it is now, the Royal Air Force have had their turn with the Typhoon so the Fleet Air Arm should have a gazillion F35C’s.
This obsession with prestige major equipment projects, combined with the MoD’s general lack of credibility on all things financial combine to form a toxic brew.
Like some witch, crouching over a bubbling cauldron the final recipe in the potion is not eye of newt but a good stiff measure of inter service politics.
The clearest threat to the UK’s strategic interests is this combination, transnational terrorists and rogue dictators are mere amateurs when compared with inter service politics and execution incompetence.
When the National Security Strategy was published post the last election it talked about terrorism, regional instability and cyber-attacks but it singularly failed to recognise the obvious, that the squabbling children that are the defence decision makers in this country are working hard every day to undermine our defence posture and represent the highest risk!
I must not be alone in thinking this, the massed ranks of the mainstream media are surely on the case?
Unfortunately not, they are also sleeping on the job.
Journalists default to the position that everything in uniform equals good and politician or civil servant equals bad.
It is easy to talk of seat polishing bureaucrats or heartless penny pinching politicians because it fits the lazy brained journalistic narrative but it is far from the truth. In a world dominated by the 24×7 news cycle, the lack of meaningful analysis in the mainstream media, because we all seemingly have the attention span of a Goldfish, is a real tragedy.
Instead of actually seeing through the issues they peddle their tittle tattle and woefully inadequate analysis, cats and flaps indeed.
Even the august body that is RUSI can’t get the basics right, as their latest piece on CVF shows.
Without anyone holding the MoD decision makers to account nothing will change.
What role do they play except being a mouthpiece for the leak of the day, carefully released from one faction or another within the MoD, services and industry?
If not the MoD and media then we must be able to rely on politicians to inject some hard nosed reality.
Sadly not
Although we have all had harsh words for them, I am generally more sympathetic to Secretaries of State for Defence than one might imagine, the MoD is a tough gig because it’s poor reputation and, as above, complete lack of credibility make every decision a difficult one. They also know that no matter what they do, any casualty or apparent ill treatment of service personnel or their families will be front page news.
There have been complete Hoons in the hot seat of course but Robertson, Hutton, Ainsworth and Fox all struck me as being decent sorts with a genuine affection for the armed forces.
Despite their best intentions though, they have always operated in a vacuum where the lack of an underlying and coherent national security strategy means they have become vulnerable to a dazzling onslaught from vested interests wearing gold braid and sharp suits, the service chiefs and industry.
How can we be a ‘proper’ nation without these symbols of national pride they ask, but whilst signing the investment approvals they never seem to actually ask two very simple questions, can we afford it and if we think we can, what are we going to not buy instead.
A lack of strategy, feeble politicians, a woeful media, the defence industry lobby, service politics, execution incompetence and a fixation on major equipment projects have all combined to completely and utterly destroy the MoD’s credibility.
If there were any illustration of just how broken the MoD is, it is the Urgent Operational Request or UOR, the scale of which should serve as an illustration of exactly what I am talking about.
When you see UOR’s at multiple levels, across all three services and in such a massive volume, alarm bells should be ringing loud and clear across Whitehall and the media.
It is important to draw a distinction between the performance of the MoD in getting UOR’s out of the door and the need to do so in the first place.
But not once have I seen any criticism of the need for such an extensive UOR programme to cover gaping holes in the equipment programme where the vast majority of the gaps they fill are entirely predictable.
Politicians and the media take some sort of perverse pride in how bloody clever we are at getting life-saving kit into the hands of our brave boys but never ask why it wasn’t there in the first place.
The simple reason is all the money has and continues to be allocated to large projects, all fur coat and no knickers.
The Treasury, who cover the cost of the vast UOR programme from its reserve whilst simultaneously funding one of the largest defence budgets in the world have started to realise (if they hadn’t already) that the MoD is absolutely taking the piss.
Every operation we learn the same tired old lessons, not enough personal equipment, not enough transport, not enough ISTAR but instead of actually doing something with the lessons learned reports the MoD reverts to type, back to the sweet shop and the fizzy delights thereof.
An equipment plan dominated by CVF, JCA, FRES and all the other acronyms means the shaft of the spear is neglected so when it comes to being used it is brittle, not at all robust and needs expensive bodging to patch it up until the next time.
But surely there is simply not enough money in the defence budget?
Another easy line to take is if we can afford to give aid to India then surely we can afford just another couple of billion for the MoD, everything will be OK with just that much.
I know exactly how much money is in the defence budget; don’t need an annual report or Treasury estimate, the amount is this;
Never enough
This is why we have the annual orgy of incompetence called the Planning Round.
Time for a fizzy sweet based analogy!
If anyone has any kids they will know exactly what I mean with this one, buying pick and mix sweets used to be on weight but now most shops have a fixed price paper cup that one fills with cola bottles, smarties, fizzy boot laces and candy bananas (my favourite)
Naturally, one tries to fill the fixed volume fixed price cup with as many tooth rotters as possible, pressing down on the lid and wedging as much as possible into it, rushing to the check out before the contents expand and pop the lid off!
That cup is the defence budget and the cola bottles and assorted fizzy sweets are the major projects.
To anyone except those in the MoD it is obvious that two things happen.
First, the cup varies in size at the margins and second, the things inside the cup change shape.
Because the sweets are stuffed so tight any change in volume of sweets or cup will combine to pop the lid off and back to the rows of sweets we must go, empty them all out and start again.
The big sweets go back in first; these are our favourite sacred cow shaped ones.
But what if they don’t quite fit?
Thus starts the depressing cascade of short term delaying, reducing specifications and cancelling projects that conspire to deliver such shockingly poor value for money from our not inconsiderable defence budget.
Not finished with the fizzy sweet analogy but this brings me to CVF and JCA.
CVF and JCA was always too big for the bargain basement cup, everyone knew it, even those involved with the project, but vanity, hubris and plain old fuckwittery took over.
No one was prepared to face reality, have the balls to fish into the bottom of the cup and put it back on the shelf with all the other sweet delights.
The reason for this was because the other kids also had their own big sweets that they also wanted to wedge into the cup so everyone agreed they would support the others big sweets staying in.
There would be leaking and spinning to the press if one sweet was threatening the rightful place of the other but essentially, the big sweets stayed in.
Those bigger kids in the defence industry would also be skulking around, offering directorships and encouraging everyone to keep filling the cup. They could play the long game, knowing full well that a subtle word here or there could see their sweet favoured over the other with the promise of future business class travel and ‘marketing’ jobs for the big players.
Even our friends wanted a say in what sweets we picked, cheeky buggers.
But
Being crammed full of big sweets, the cup no longer had any room for smaller but more nutritious delights such as transport, logistics, training, basic equipment and spares.
So whilst the children in the MoD played their games, bickered with each other, measured themselves against other nations and generally spent the defence budget on sugary sweets, something else happened.
Real capabilities were beggared, hence the UOR programme.
There was always going to be a reckoning and whilst the current government would have us all believe they are cutting back on black holes, deficits and public spending the reality tells a very different picture.
Something different did happen at the last SDSR though; someone has the bottle to call out the MoD and industry.
If Dr Liam Fox can be thanked for one thing it is this.
He looked at the bulging pot of sweets and said, hang on lads
The problem with the good Doctor was, he got out manoeuvred by a cunning defence industry and seeing the writing on the wall, the service chiefs abandoned their cozy agreements about supporting each others major projects and went to full on stab each other in the back mode.
Service politics at its corrosive worst meant the SDSR turned into a last minute, salami slicing, short term and incoherent shambles
Adaptable Britain my big fat arse
Whatever the strengths and weaknesses of Dr Liam Fox, first and foremost, he is a politician. The SDSR was always going to be a tough sell and the mythical budget black hole, which even today, no one outside the MoD has seen the breakdown of, simply wasn’t going to be enough.
Something big was needed, something David Cameron could beat the Labour Party around the head with.
A swift one-two was formulated to demonstrate how tough and macho the new Government was, remember all that talk of sacred cows and making tough decisions?
Nimrod MRA4 was the quick jab.
Forgetting about its Conservative roots, the Labour Party had failed to get a grip, so that was the first quick dig, Labour incompetence left us without a choice.
Next came CVF
Now that has a special political value to the Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties and this is what makes it so totemic. There are a number of reasons, first, it is easily understood, second it was one of Tony Blair’s ‘liberal intervention’ projects but more importantly than anything else, it was being built in Scotland because Gordon Brown said so. Given the enmity that existed between David Cameron and Gordon Brown pre-election it was obvious CVF would not come out of the SDSR unscathed.
The RAF and RN knew this and knew it absolutely full well.
And so Operation Left Hook was started, a ‘fudge’ here, a spot of dodgy accounting there and hey presto, the plan for switching to the F35C was borne.
It ticked all the boxes.
The RAF and RN get a ‘proper’ carrier and longer range stealthy super jet, the government get something to batter the previous government with.
Cue House of Commons jibes about the Labour Party picking the wrong jet that flies less distance, is more expensive and carries fewer bombs. Nice and easy to understand and difficult to counter, three simple things that make the previous Government look incompetent and provides a fig leaf for the other cuts.
Remember, politics in everything defence.
No one cares about the number of soldiers cut by the way, remember, its equipment that gets in the papers because it is more easily understood by the dim witted hacks in the lobby and the nice but dim MP’s with their PPE degrees and old school ties.
The service decision makers, spotting a chance for more shiny toys became willing accomplices. Shoving decisions about converting the second carrier into the future was a classic short term decision ringed with a strategy characterised by one word, hope.
So everyone was happy, better equipment secured, convenient political brickbats to throw at the previous government and a handy set of media friendly soundbites readily available provide a cover for the other decisions (Harrier, MRA4, Sentinel etc).
The usual talking heads were wheeled out, articles written, RUSI conferences attended and mutual back slapping commenced. Everyone focussed on the extra range, payload, having Hawkeye replace the E3 Sentry, getting back into the big league, talking about out how we invented carrier aviation and of course, we are an island you know.
Everyone spent a lot of time describing how we should not sell or mothball the second carrier but failed to recognise that the very reason it was destined for the disposal agency was because of that switch on the F35.
Not a single newspaper reporter, blogger, think tank or politician questioned the decision on F35 or if they did, it was very muted.
[SMUG MODE ON]
Except one, me
[/SMUG MODE OFF]
I have been absolutely consistent in my opinion looking at the issue with a wide angle lens, F35B would be cheaper when taken in the round.
Which brings us up to date, the latest rumours, smoke signs and innuendo seemed to have pointed to a decision to reverse the choice of F35C. As conversion and other costs ballooned the financial benefits of the F35B became clearer and Phil Hammond was said to favour a reversion.
The usual leaky sieve MoD displayed a sharply honed knack for seeding the media with the appropriate rumours and all of a sudden the smart money was back on the F35B.
I happen to think this would be common sense decision that keeps things at a realistic level without stripping the rest of the armed forces of badly needed money and have said so repeatedly but what do I know?
[SMUG MODE BACK ON]
I also note with a wry smile that the most strident advocates of the F35C, because of its extra performance, prestige, interoperability, lower maintenance costs and all their other ‘points’ are now so casually having a bout of collective amnesia about what they said.
[/SMUG MODE BACK OFF]
Sensing the financially driven change the service lobby ‘machine’ kicked into gear, some more overt than others but there is no doubt in my mind that neither the RAF nor RN grown-ups actually want the F35B, this being possibly the best reason for forcing it upon them.
Articles have been written and papers circulated to shape the battlefield so to speak.
Part of this shaping is the Telegraph revealing that the US navy have weighed in to the debate, writing a letter to the MoD (at the behest of those vested interests no doubt) saying that the conversion costs will be half what we think.
This is the same Department of Defence that has bought the world the Future Combat System, cheap Littoral Combat Ships and affordable F35’s. When exactly has the DoD or MoD said something will be a pound or dollar and it been 50 pence or cents?
Forgive me a dose of cynicism.
Of course it is in the interests of the US Navy to have CVF able to operate the F35C; that much is obvious, but despite the US facing towards the Pacific and expecting Europe to pick up the slack in its overseas adventures CVF/JCA has to be in Great Britain’s best interests, no one else.
The Telegraph reported that MoD’s cost estimate for conversion was £1.8 billion but we don’t know what this actually entailed, did it include the extra crew needed or cost of developing an AAR capability needed for F35C operations for example?
The letter from the Secretary of the US Navy indicated that the cost for the launch and recovery equipment would be £458 million with other defence experts (yeah, I know) estimating that conversion would cost an additional £400million, nice round numbers are always suspect aren’t they?
£858million seems a long way from the reported £1.8billion estimate but are we looking at apples and apples, there are so many other variables to take into consideration, did that include one or two for example.
The letter has apparently thrown the proverbial cat amongst the pigeons, leading to David Cameron ordering a Treasury led investigation with a resultant delay in the announcement.
There was an announcement due on Monday, where everyone expected the decision on reversion to STOVL would be detailed but on Friday, this was cancelled; the letter from the USN being the catalyst for another look at the numbers.
If ever one needed an illustration of how little faith politicians have in the MoD it is this. One letter from a foreign power casting doubts on the MoD’s costings and all of sudden we are back to square one.
For once, the MoD may have been erring on the side of caution, putting a degree of risk into the calculation and making a realistic estimate that has room for variance.
With my pick and mix analogy, having a cup with a bit more room in it to compensate for the cup and sweets changing size.
Phil Hammond is no fool, he strikes me as being extremely ‘nose down’ competent, exactly the sort of Defence Secretary we need because he realises Champagne tastes and Brown Ale budgets are a recipe for zero credibility, something the MoD needs more than anything else.
This part of the Telegraph article struck me as the most significant;
“They want to ensure that the information the British Government is working from is accurate because currently that quite clearly is not the case,” said a Whitehall source.
Although it provides grist to the mill I despise with a passion ‘Whitehall sources’ because they betray the trust that the nation puts in them, quite clearly they are spinning against the MoD, running to the US Navy for help because Mummy (Spreadsheet Phil) is taking away their sweets.
If I was Phil Hammond I would be having several interviews without coffee on Monday morning and battering those ‘sources’ all over Whitehall’s car park, who the fuck do they think they are. I hope he sharpens his pencil and stabs the disloyal fuckers in the eye with it.
Sorry about the brief ranty interlude there!
We have excellent relations with the US Navy, US Marines, Air Force and Army; long may that continue but one of the huge strategic mistakes the UK has made over the last couple of decades is our slavish, embarrassing, forelock tugging and needy subservience to the USA.
There is no argument that CVF with cats and traps and F35C’s on the deck is the best military option when taken in isolation, no argument whatsoever.
But at what cost to the rest of our capabilities?
That is the key question.
We don’t have the same deep pockets as the US Navy and have to make sure we strive for balance across all three services without being blinded by the easy allure of those fizzy sweets.
This is what Phil Hammond realises, it has nothing to do with range, bomb load, whether we invented the steam catapult, whether the US or French can land their aircraft on the deck of CVF, how it fits in with doctrine or the emerging concepts of Carrier Enabled Power Projection
These are irrelevant.
The decision on CVF and JCA is about nothing more than credibility, the ability of the MoD to live within its means without indulging in fantasy procurement and then having to run cap in hand to the Treasury with an Urgent Operational Requirement every time there is a whiff of gun smoke.
Blogs and Internet forums are often criticised for indulging in fantasy fleets but it strikes me that the biggest proponents of the art of fantasy fleets are the professionals.
So if the most economic and balanced capability is CVF with the F35C then so be it, if it is F35B then equally, great, maybe the best answer is an F18, Rafale, Sea Typhoon or Sea Gripen?
I have my own view, the F35B, but it is one amongst many and based on zero intimate knowledge!
But in making the decision I hope we ask those tough questions and answer with an honest reply.
For a department that so desperately needs to establish some measure of credibility there will be no more second chances.
Nice one, TD. There’s also a piece of thinking that starts with what we as a nation intend to do with all of our forces. That should predate any equipment thinking.
I know for a fact it was not done before the CVF was decided upon. I can find nothing to say it was done later, and by the time of SDSR it was a done deal.
Major projects seem to have a “pass” on this sort of thinking. Not just CVF, I include FRES in that. FRES instead went straight to the fantasy requirements stage after only minuscule reflection on what and where we would use it.
TL; DR :)
What about credibility with us the public?
It is a cock up. But we are where we are. I don’t see it getting better. The only thing that can save the MoD is proper war or a decent clear and present danger to the UK and even though I think China and even a loose Islamic coalition on the southern and eastern end of the Med could be that danger they are a long way off. Perhaps a war for resources might sharpen public interest, who knows? With the NHS bimbling along and education in a similar state perhaps we are expecting too much of the MoD? Perhaps it is similar to a Saturday afternoon during the season when I am the best coach the Tigers have never had? That is to say it is easy to criticise from the side lines.
Do agree, strategic thinking, aka “What you want to do militarily as a nation” should be the first step to equipment planning as you and James mentioned.
An old lecturer of mine once said: “It doesn’t matter how hard you run or how long you run, if you’re running in the wrong direction, you’re just wasting your effort.” How is this important? Without a strategic direction, equipment procurement will simply go all over the place without a fixed direction of what you want the equipment to do.
How the mighty have fallen. M.O.D and Government don’t seem to know what the hell is going on so the U.S have stepped in and told the lapdog what is going to happen:
Reverting to jump jets for both of them would not help American military planners, who want to be able to base a squadron of their own jets on a British carrier.
Separate accommodation is being built on board HMS Prince of Wales with communications facilities that would be for “US Eyes Only”.
In other words, do as your told, we want it this way and we don’t care that we’re not the ones paying for it.
Surely we don’t need to spend 50 billion a year on defence to be this pathetic
We have spent close to 30 years attempting to get a supersonic fighter bomber that loses next to nothing in capability compared to conventional jets but can land vertically and on top offers unparalled istar capability in an a/c of its size. I think we have as near as damned done it with f35b why we want to give it up now I don’t know.
The f35 in the us has suffered as much leaking as cvf, force cutting has in the uk. Why people pedalling there agendas in the media because they’ve been over ruled in private. This in my view is corrosive and will taint the considered and frank reviews of programs/equipment if people think every review is going to be leaked and it’s generally only bit leaked not everything and only way to stop it is find them and sack them publicaly who ever they are regardless of rank.
As for the costs I wonder if someone in mod has decided you need two ships for a capability because if you take the us figures and double it you get close to that 1.8b figure quoted.
I see your sweets and raise you football.
If we look at the worlds aircraft carriers in footballing terms. Thats real football not the American type.
The US Navy are Man Utd in the Premier League
France also with fixed wing aircraft are in the Championship.
Spain, Italy, India with STOVL are Division 1.
While we at present with only a helicopter capability are at the bottom Division 2.
Now not only are we intending to join the Premier League but with an all 5th Generation aircraft fleet we are attempting to get to the top of that league bypassing all those in between in one go. Whats wrong with taking it a step at a time. Gain promotion to the Championship with Rafael/F/A-18/Sea Grippen. Then when we have secured our place, move into the big league with F35. Another forum suggests that buying F/A-18 instead of F35 saves £10 Billion. Even if we doubt the figures there should be a huge saving.
I am sick to death of the MoD throwing money away when we could but a similar capability off the shelf. Nimord AEW and MRA4, FRES etc. The only ray of light recently if the order from Korea of the RFAs new tankers, just perhaps someone at Mod is getting a grip on things.
TD
Yes to every word an paragraph of your article.
I expect the Carrier junkies will crawl out of their pits soon with
‘Yes but we NEEEEEED cvf So fuck everything else’.
Or the no less stupid, but even more unrealistic
‘Yes but we NEEEED cvf, WASAWPYK. and we can afford 2 with all the bells and whistles if only those cowardly politicos would cut…..’ (insert politcal prejudice here.
The F35 program is discussed in these halls, almost entirely in CVF context, and the program, as you say rivals ony CVF in its incompetence.
‘If wishes were horses beggers would ride’
CVF/F35 is now THE major danger to UK defence posture for the next 20 years, it wil suck us dry and leave us with nothing; and that is even if it works, (which it won’t).
There that feels better.
“Everyone spent a lot of time describing how we should not sell or mothball the second carrier but failed to recognise that the very reason it was destined for the disposal agency was because of that switch on the F35. I have been absolutely consistent in my opinion looking at the issue with a wide angle lens, F35B would be cheaper when taken in the round.”
You did support keeping just one tho…………
TD
On a more reasoned note.
Everything you have said above supports my point about the numbers game. we will soon be down to less that 30 real combat ships, in major part because of Nellie and Dumbo and F35. With less than 30 combat ships we can defend Portsmouth/solent. And that is about it.
I do not understand why anyone who thinks in terms of British Naval power can want the elephants as lilkey to enter service the waste of rescources involved, is staggering, we coulkd have had out 12 T45 (and more importasntly the support structures for them etc, if we had not gone in for elephant keeping instead.
@ TD – I agree with so much of what you say. However this problem is nothing new. TSR 2 and CV01 were just as big a f**ck up as JCA and CVF. How many UOR’s did the Army need in WWII or WWI or even the Napoleonic wars? Our military has always been like this. If I look abroad I see just as many f**k up’s if not more. Look at the French with CGD. Look at the USA with LCS, JSF, F22 etc etc. It’s endemic in all militaries across the world.
Looking at our military it seems clear to me that the quality of our officer corps is a major issue and has been for centuries. It seems incredible to me that some-one can enroll at Sand Hurst with fewer A- levels than it takes to go to the worst university in the country. Do we really feel that someone (especially someone who benefited from going to Eton, Harrow etc.) who was able to achieve this low level of academic attainment will after 20 years or running around on Salisbury plain be automatically qualified to manage a £10 – £20 billion procurement project.
I am not saying academics are the be all and end all but there is an old saying, garbage in garbage out.
I really think we also need to get rid of the public school boy mentality that seems to pervade at the higher echelons of the armed forces. Many of my impressions of officers of all three services have been of individuals far more interested in tradition and sacred cows than radical thought about how best to do the job.
My radical suggestion would be to scrap the concept of commissions and direct entry to officer training. If you want to be an officer you start as a private, new entry or AC. Why can’t a corporal with a degree in aeronautical engineering fly a Typhoon? Is a guy with 15 years of experience as a soldier more or less capable of managing a platoon than a 21 year old with 12 months of officers training under his belt?
We should also right into all ranks of the military’s contracts that they are never allowed to work for a defence contractor after leaving MOD employment.
I don’t think we would see an overnight turn around in the MOD but we may eventually see an improvement. I want the chief of the defence staff to be the best soldier, sailor or airmen we have not the best old boy from harrow.
The strength of our armed forces has always been the determination, discipline and good old common sense of the apparent lower ranks. In 300 years of being one of the preeminent military powers on earth how many officers have really distinguished themselves since Wellington and Nelson? Yet we always got the job done time and time again. It’s these qualities that we really need at the top of the military.
I do not agree with the thought that if only it was not for CVF, JCA or FRES we would have proper ladders, body armor or patrol vehicles. Most of the UOR’s have come not from a lack of budget but from a lack of foresight or proper planning. If it was not new toys they were pissing money up the wall on it would be too many ships, men or planes. The RN desperately needed 36 Escorts to guard the UK in 1998 but today 19 is fine? The RAF must have 300 combat aircraft even though it never send’s more than 20 to an operation? Don’t even mention a British Army with less than 100,000 men. It seems amazing to me that the exact number of men required to keep the United Kingdom safe and sound has been 100,000 give or take for 200 years irrespective of the size of the threat we faced or the level of technological improvement.
Budgets are irrelevant. The US has 10 times our budget and has just as many ships and planes lacking spare parts. Its patrol vehicles were just as crap as ours were. It has all our problems just more units. Obviously with such large budget’s they can afford more toys than we can but if the US had tried to commit as similar percentage to its air force to Libya as the UK and France did they would have had just as many problems with tankers as we did.
‘We should also right into all ranks of the military’s contracts that they are never allowed to work for a defence contractor after leaving MOD employment.’
It wouldn’t solve any problems and would unenforceable.
@ TD – I totally agree with your comments about our relationship with the USA. It makes me cringe every time a British politician goes to Washington because I know that we will have endless speculation by the media about “how special the special relationship is” with endless analysis about the gift the US president gives or how he shakes hands with the British PM.
It makes me sick that one of the world’s strongest military and economic powers, a country which faces zero in the way of credible threats could be so self-obsessed about its military relations with another country.
Anyone with actual knowledge of the situation knows that we have never been closer to the USA at any time since 1945. Yet the questioning of our relationship has never been harder. Since 2001 the tables have been turned. The USA needs the UK far more than the reverse. Yet our Politicians seem more subservient than ever.
The UK really is the only thing holding NATO together. We are the only nation that can and will make meaningful contributions to US operations.
We desperately need to come up with foreign and security policies that do not leave us subservient but make us real partners. Not just with the USA but with the rest of Europe and the rising super powers.
martin @3:20 I don’t think Sandhurst, is a huge problem, if you look at the last few army commanders they all have gone through Para Company and or SAS selection. That makes sure the wheat gets separated from the chaff.
But in a similar thread why do you have to be an officer to fly in the RN and RAF while in the army other ranks if only senior NCO’s are selected.
Pay and better conditions/terms of service.
@ Jim
“Now not only are we intending to join the Premier League but with an all 5th Generation aircraft fleet we are attempting to get to the top of that league bypassing all those in between in one go. Whats wrong with taking it a step at a time. Gain promotion to the Championship with Rafael/F/A-18/Sea Grippen. Then when we have secured our place, move into the big league with F35. Another forum suggests that buying F/A-18 instead of F35 saves £10 Billion. Even if we doubt the figures there should be a huge saving”.
I don’t think nay one can suggest that we are unable to operate at the premier leauge level. We just don’t have the money to do it. Buying F18 or Rafale then progressing to F35 is just going to mean we have even less money. I don’t see how this would help?
Martin
I do not disagree, with much of what you say.
Thay is in the most part the problem.
Quantity has a quality all of it’s own’
We are trying with things like CVF and Fres, to have
‘The best in the wrold for our boys’
(Cue Land of hope and glory wrapping of speakers in Union flag etc).
Anyone who opposes (insert project under discussion) is then by definition a traitor; who does not support ‘our’ troops or sailors or whatever.
Numbers count, If our airforce was twice the size in terms of combat aircraft, it could have dealt with Libya with quick change of step.
Why was it not twice the size? – Becuase it ‘Had’ to have typhoon rather than F18.
Why? Becuse Typhoon is better.
We ‘have to have Nellie and Dumbo.
Why?
Becuse Nellie and dumbo will be better than say 3 modified Juan Carlos.
T45 is better than f100
Chally 2 is better than say lepoard or Abrams.
All true but, in persuit of ‘best’ on a very limited budget; you eventually run down the numbers to the point of them being useless.
That is inexorable logic of persuing a high status, expensive hightech policy on a real terms decreasing budget.
One peice of fun to be had is goading carrier junkies by asking them how many more service escirts would they sacrifice to keep the elephants?
Down to 4 t45, 6 t26?
likewise when we are down to 50 opporational Chally2’s are they worth the candle keeping?
We need deployable numbers to make it worth while deploying.
Its all about learning to walk before running. We have not done cat and trap aircraft carriers since the 1970S. LM are supposed to have quoted £1.7 Billion to equip F35 with a AAR capability. Just how many F/1A-18 does that buy that can do the job, and also provide us with a secondary fighter/strike aircraft. What happens in 10 years when the F35 fleet is grounded because of cracks in the wing or similar we then have 1/2 carriers with no aircraft to fly off them. Lets face it even the USN is not going to an all F35 fleet.
@ Jim
martin @3:20 I don’t think Sandhurst, is a huge problem, if you look at the last few army commanders they all have gone through Para Company and or SAS selection. That makes sure the wheat gets separated from the chaff.
But in a similar thread why do you have to be an officer to fly in the RN and RAF while in the army other ranks if only senior NCO’s are selected.
No Idea? Given that half the famour few were NCO’s it makes little sense to me.
@ TD
Interesting post boss
@ All
I was just wondering, since the MoD has such a credibility issue why couldn’t we go back to the way the forces used to be run. This would make more senesce especially since, the heads of the armed forces are supposed to be having more control over their own budgets.
So why can’t we have a vastly smaller MoD, more akin to its functions in the 40s and 50s and bring back the three services properly.
So the new smaller MoD would contain:
-The National Security Council: to generate policy and “vision for the forces, this included spreading the budget between the 3 services
– The Chiefs of Staff Committee: to allowed joint planning and communication between the services
– R&D: all R&D to be run through MoD
– Veterans and welfare of forces personnel
– Any other jointery/very civil services heavy tasks
Then we would, re-establish the War Office, the Air Ministry and the Admiralty, who would be responsible for procurement for their own equipment and day-to-day running. However there would need to be some sort of mechanism in place to prevent different programs that share many of the same requirements running at the same time as this would waste money.
As for joint operations we already have PJHQ so thats that base covered.
^ Is probably just a load of mad ramblings
@ martin
‘Given that half the famour few were NCO’s it makes little sense to me.’
Like I said it’s to do with pay and retention. Rank and pay are connected to responsibility.
Why can’t you just give people flight pay irrespective of rank.
I should also add by having the 3 services separate they can be more independent and in theory (and I stress “in theory”), there should be less back stabbing because each service can spend their money how they like. This also makes them more accountable, if the sh*t does hit the fan we can offer UOR’s however when the dust settles we know which big wigs heads need to role for not having the right equipment in place
@IXION
I think the problem with buying off the shelf as far as the government is concerned, is that it does not create jobs for the UK population and also the fact they would get it in the ear about the UK losing the ability to make said vehicles/ships going forward.
There are benefits to buying off the shelf but there are also benefits to designing and building your own gear.
Getting your decision right on which option to take for the different projects seems to be the hard part
Already do, but it’s not really a great deal. When your up against the civilian airlines trying to get your people it’s not enough. Retention bonuses are currently 100k for some flight crew. Flying pay isn’t pensionable either.
Sorry to break into this conversation, but it seems to me that if you don’t have two aircraft carriers with catapults, you will be locked into your choice of aircrafts, it will be able take off from your aircraft carriers as F35B, whereas with catapults you are free to choose any aircraft like Super Hornet, Rafale if you will, I’m neither a soldier or a strategist, I’m like Gaby, I’m an amateur. If the americans want to pay you catapults, why not ?
WTF
Your not wrong, but how about a middle ground.
How about Juan Carlos modified and built in UK?
How about f18 built in UK (after all if we built 240 odd it should not costy THAT much more).
Even in the Uk we shoudl be able to buld a Kalashnikov for a 10th the price of SA80.
etc etc.
@Jim
Why buy F18 to be your fuel truck? Buy a flexible turboprop or slow jet instead. Use it for AAR, MPA, ISTAR etc etc. Cheap as chips compared to a Fast Jet, and able to lift twice as much fuel per airframe so you save on hanger space too. Cost reduction and force multiplication all in one hit.
“£1.7 Billion to equip F35 with a AAR capability”
Talking about money each service receives, I hear that it’s very unbalanced with the army receiving over 50% of the defence budget, is that true and if so, do people think it’s wise considering that we are an island nation? I would have thought most of the money or at least the biggest % should go into sub’s and ships
Re Joint procurement.
The Smart Acquistion programme set up in 2000 (I’ll try to keep a straight face as I type that) was meant to have one over-riding principle, which on paper was and is still good:
Joint decision making on programme funding, through a Joint Staff, leading to Joint capabilities being procured for the most realistic balance across Defence, and holistically across all the Lines of Deveopment
(there’s some paraphrasing there, but you get the gist)
For a while, it actually worked. I recall as an SO2 then getting involved in arguing the toss about whether such and such an ISTAR gap in capability was best met by a UAV, a new sensor on an existing air platform, or a new manned platform. Arguing for and against the proposition were staff from all three services, and some scientists from dstl. Weirdly, my vote was for a new sensor on PR Canberras which were still in service then, to then transfer with the PR role to Tornado in 4 years. So at least originally, in my experience, people from all three services took pains to make it work.
But, reality and politics intruded. Particularly among the very expensive programmes, the single service chiefs have very firm views on what is good for their own service, and they are not going to let an outbreak of jointer among SO2-1 star level result in the perceived diminution of their service. I recall very distinctly being invited to ACGS’s office to be told the Army’s party line before going into a balance of capability scoring exercise. ACGS of course was very clean hands – it was his MA who told me what to do, with the faint air of ACGS taking a dim view of my career prospects if I fouled up. Others of all 3 services reported similar “advice”. It was a problem that got more and more obvious as resources got tighter over the noughties.
I worked for a while in the Defence industry and could also observe politics at play, chiefly in the DIS which mandated certain companies were to be awarded the lion’s share of contracts, to keep capability in the country. That may be a good thing, but it also sometimes mandates an ineffective solution when there is a better/cheaper/faster solution in the US (I’m thinking of some missiles here). Of course, the worst example was the CVF contract, which was nakedly political to keep northern and Scottish shipyards going. Again, maybe not a bad idea in industrial terms, but it completely skews the original intentions of Smart Acquisition.
@ Frenchie, I suppose that would be a consideration although I don’t think they would be planning on changing the F35B for a long time once they had it and by the time they were thinking about changing it they might be looking at a new carrier anyway.
@IXION
Yes I think the middle ground off the shelf licence built works quite well, the apache seems to be a nice balance but I think it requires getting companies to agree to build items in the UK (which they don’t always want to do) and also you lose the right to sell vehicles/planes/ships to other countries. I think it’s all a bit of a balancing act.
@ James
‘I recall as an SO2 then getting involved in arguing the toss about whether such and such an ISTAR gap in capability was best met by a UAV, a new sensor on an existing air platform, or a new manned platform. Arguing for and against the proposition were staff from all three services, and some scientists from dstl. Weirdly, my vote was for a new sensor on PR Canberras which were still in service then, to then transfer with the PR role to Tornado in 4 years.’
Was that the raptor pod?
I think the real blame for this cock up lies with the Blair and Brown governments as much as with civil service and top brass incompetence. In truth do we really need a 65,000 ton CV? If we want to resume CATOBAR ops then a CdG sized ship would have been sufficient, the other big mistake was to link CVF together with the F-35, we should have gone with either the Super Hornet or Rafale M that are significantly cheaper and left open the option of buying a squadron of F-35C’s at a later date to deal with high value targets. But sadly we didn’t.
I don’t blame Fox or Hammond, yet, I think they’ve tried to make the best of an awful mess, time will tell if they are successful in their efforts!
@TD
I reckon the reason why all armed forces worldwide seem to be prone to these problems is that you need different skills sets between wartime and peacetime leaders.
The selection, training and development of junior service personnel is generally focussed around their war fighting skills. In wartime the best of these rise to the top, without necessarily acquiring the spohisticated budgetry, procurement and managerial skills need in the peace.
In peacetime we do try and pick the best managerial talent, but we are still picking from a pool that was originally selected for their war fighting attributes.
The result is we never get managerial skills comparable to the best civilian CEOs, plus when a big war does come around the military skills of the incumbent top brass are often found to be lacking.
The top British military leaders of WW2 were Montgomery, Alexander, Alanbrooke, Slim & Cunningham. None were in senior jobs at the start of the war. A lot of dead wood had to be cleared away before they got hold of the top jobs between them.
Montgomery never got to grips with the role of CIGS after the war. Slim did better. Alanbrooke was probably the best allrounder but never got to test his skills in either a big wartime operational command or as a peactime CIGS.
The American general of the last decade has been Petraus. Look how long it took before the Pentagon started listening to and promoting him over his more managerial and political peers. It will be fascinating to see how he goes at the CIA.
Another intersting case is Fisher. He was reckoned to be only a mediocre sea admiral, but proved to be one of the best peacetime managers, procurers and political streetfighters we have ever had. Beatie was a poor fighting Admiral but did a fair job of running the RN in the 1920s at a time of heavy cuts and inter service rivalry.
Going even further back Wellington was a brilliant army commander, a rubbish Commander in Chief and a pretty average Prime Minsiter.
Very very few of them turn out to be good at both fighting and managing, so we count ourselves lucky when we get someone who can do one or the other well.
Peter, good point about dead wood and WWII. Percy Hobart was one of the fathers of the German Blitzkrieg thinking but because of service politics started the war as a Home Guard Corporal yet without him, D Day would have been a much more costly affair
@ James
On a tangent, but as our expert in the field of green battle buses could the FRES problem have just been solved by an afternoon flicking Janes’ and saying we want 250 of that 8×8 and 250 of say Bronco (just an example before somebody starts discussing the merits of the ruddy vehicle I am not saying it is the optimal solution) and a year or so testing? (Ignore chuffing airportability too.) Are mountains made out of mole hills for the sake of creating work in procurement?
@ The Oncoming Storm
We can blame blair and brown till the cows come home. However most of the under f**k ups in the past decade were stared by the last Torie government, T45, Astute, MRA4 and the mother of all Typhoon were all enacted before they came to power. CVF being 40,000 tonnes or 65,000 tonnes would make little difference. Its not the shops or even BAE thast the problem its the constant f**king around that causes the over runs. Only in the MOD world does it make sense to pay £ 1 billion to delay something by one year rather than just finishing it on time and letting it sit at the dockside for a year. Just like paying BAE money not to build an 8th Astute when they could have ordered on for the same price.
@ Peter E re Jacky Fisher
Much the same could be so of Lord Louis Mountbatten. Crap captain, crap CinC, but absolutely wonderful technical reformer of the navy. Without him we wouldn’t have got our SSNs so soon. Mountbatten couldn’t stand Fisher as he reckoned Fisher stabbed his father in the back. But in so many ways career wise so similar.
@ James – I could not agree more. I can partly understand the need to go with new home grown tech in some fields such as SSN and even fast jets. But when looking for battle wagons with such a wide choice of proven of the shelf kit from around the world surley the FRES debacle should never have happened. Its all good and well going on about commonality to save cost but trying to get one vehicle to perform every task in the army just sounds like a fools eran.
Anyone fed up with Mr Smug yet?
Hell’uva rant, boss!
I would subscribe to most of your points.
Too bad the final outcome will not be decided in Whitehall but in Washington, because one or even two variants of the JCA are under heavy fire and threat of cancellation. The Bravo is the most likely candidate. How can one tell, which is the more secure solution at this point?
(If we had retained our Harriers we could have delayed our final decision up to 2018 or even 2020. Now, we can well end up with nothing in hands.)
We still have no numbers of F-35s to be procured. The ultimate cost difference between B and C is also still unclear. How can one tell which will be the cheaper solution, apart from MoD voodoo-economics?
Finally, we will issue UORs as long as we buy one-trick-ponies, who have to be turned into multi-role assets. CVF/JCA is IMO a notable exception from this pattern.
“If ever one needed an illustration of how little faith politicians have in the MoD it is this. One letter from a foreign power casting doubts on the MoD’s costings and all of sudden we are back to square one.”
It should be noted, that the foreign power issuing this letter builds aircraft carriers costing around $12b without aircraft, once destined to cost $6.5b!
One British leader who combined managerial and military success was Oliver Cromwell.
So alarming did the British find the experience of religiously oriented military dictatorship that politicians of all parties have worked like crazy to stop another one coming along ever since.
That touches on something very fundemental: the British will tolerate cock-up-by-committee because a true union of military and governmental efficiency is actually a very scary thing for a democratic society to contemplate.
@TD
I’ve got to fundamentally disagree with you about Dave B being cheaper in the round. Lifecycle costs of Dave C are much lower (on the order to 25% I think), and when coupled with the greater capability, means we have to buy a lot less of them to achieve the same affect as we would with Dave B. Simples.
The major point you’ve missed is that this has been known for a decade and the “fuckwits” as you put it, decided to carry on with Dave B and now we’re in a massive contracting mess when CVF should have been CATOBAR to begin with.
A big problem is who is responsible, and how do you make them responsible? The Chiefs sit on the top level MoD planning board with the ministers and shuffle the jigsaw pieces around to get the right picture and right cost (or try to). Even though these are the people mostly responsible for the decisions sacking them achieves nothing because they’ve reached the top and are going to retire in another few years anyway (and then move into Industry advisor mode). I haven’t a clue how to solve things.
Topman,
no not RAPTOR. I’ve Googled its’ service acronym and nothing comes up, so as far as I’m concerned that’s the way the MoD want it.
@martin
“Only in the MOD world does it make sense to pay £ 1 billion to delay something by one year rather than just finishing it on time and letting it sit at the dockside for a year.”
It’s called ‘savings’. Wonder if a single accountant in public service could spell the original meaning of the word!?
As ever, late to the party….
Jim, I’d like to bet good money on your ‘ten years time time with cracks in the wings’ comment about the F-35.
When I first heard of the major re-design of all variants because the F-35B was too heavy, airframe cracking and distortion immediately sprung to mind. Have any official sources mentioned anything regarding a reduction in airframe fatigue life? I remember back in the early nineties reading a Royal Aeronautical Society magazine article about the cracking of early Block F-16A’s because they were designed purely as fighters and not bomb-droppers. Until an economical repair solution transpired, I believe the threat of scrapping hung over a large proportion of the F-16A fleet.
Are we going to see the same trait with the F-35 fleet, or with hindsight should we have gove for a markedly different design on the F-35B only?
@ James
No problem.
http://www.moog.com/literature/ICD/Moog-TestSimulation-AerospaceTestingInternational-Mar2010-Article-en.pdf
The main changes to save weight of the f35b was a result of returning the weapons bays back to the original spec eg shorter than the other too this allowed the structure internally to support the stovl system be made much more simple and more load efficient coupled with reducing the weapons weight on 4 pylons reducting the structural requirement. This a/c was designed as a bomber from the begining and has been tested as such. Typhoon had a similar weight attack done on it too. Infact every a/c currently flying has had fatgiue cracking found and fixed even after they’ve been in service for some time and so i doubt this one will be any different.
Did anyone read the letter as capping the cost of the purchase of kit (effectively underwritten by the USN, I am sure they have ways and means with the supplier as they are the only “other” customer) and telling the UK only worry about the cost of modifications to the build?
RE “It should be noted, that the foreign power issuing this letter builds aircraft carriers costing around $12b without aircraft, once destined to cost $6.5b!”
The government doesn’t know whether it’s flipping or flopping. The reaction to this letter is just another indication of the lack of real forward planning, despite the multi-million pound reviews and assessments that we keep paying for.
If the Americans are convinced that EMALS and AAG will cost us far less than they think, perhaps they’d be willing to underwrite any cost overrun on conversion. I’m very suspicious; they have a clear interest in us taking the first of this deck gear – greatly reduces the risk and potential cost growth for their own over-budget carrier programme.
Hi BB,
What are the news on the delay with their first EMALS carrier? RE “interest in us taking the first of this deck gear – greatly reduces the risk and potential cost growth for their own over-budget carrier programme.”
Interesting about the cost growth, as if you take a long view (several decades) only missile and carrier programmes have broadly hit their cost targets, most other types having been way over
– but then again, EMALS is probably the biggest technology change in carriers since nuclear propulsion came along
forgot to type “US” in front of programmes
Fantasy Aircraft – Figures from the Internet:
http://www.defense-aerospace.com/cgi-bin/client/modele.pl?prod=133433&shop=dae&modele=feature
See Table 2.
STOVOL:
F35B = 300 (291.7) Million USD.
CATOBAR:
(See Telegraph 400 to 1 Billion USD per ship to fit CATOBAR, also bigger engines required for still air ?).
F35C = 240 (235.8) Million USD.
F/A 18 E/F = 60 Million USD.
Rafale M = 100 (91) Million.
Life time costs proportionate to purchase price, but with coating F35 are particularly expensive.
Choose your budget or ships and fleet of aircraft upto 40 aircraft per ship.
Current Budget 6 x f35B = 1.8 Billion USD.
The (frankly incredible) 1.7Bn cost of tying up a valuable F35 in an A-to-A refueling role was mentioned above. I wonder how far 1.7 billion quid would go in developing a new Greyhound from the new improved E2 fuselage; particularly if we shared the cost with France and the USA, the other likely interested parties. Wouldn’t that fill the tanker role? And provide COD and an improved platform for the (currently intended) Merlin’s ASaC kit too.
Wow. Does someone feel better now? Ranting is good for the soul I think. Couldn’t agree more with the general gist of what you said.
@ X
“On a tangent, but as our expert in the field of green battle buses could the FRES problem have just been solved by an afternoon flicking Janes’ and saying we want 250 of that 8×8 and 250 of say Bronco (just an example before somebody starts discussing the merits of the ruddy vehicle I am not saying it is the optimal solution) and a year or so testing? (Ignore chuffing airportability too.) Are mountains made out of mole hills for the sake of creating work in procurement?”
—
I think me and you have discussed this before. Find a bunch of NCO’s with plenty of relevant experience, from the various branches that will have to deal with the vehicles (including REME etc). Give them all the candidates. Give them a big playground to play in. Let them figure it out.
Within reason…
So where is everyone on the great Cola Bottle v Fizzy Bootlace v Candy Banana debate then?
Anyone else think the tea leaves are saying back to F35C, jungle drums are beating out C C C
Hi, ACC. The RUSI article, linked in the earlier thread, was the first I had read about the Royal Navy getting the first operational EMALS, rather than the second. I haven’t seen anything else that refers to that change.
That change though, will increase risk in our own programme – should we stick with Lightning-C. Assuming that change is correct, there are possibly more unknowns and greater risk associated with a conventional aircraft than F35B – despite what the Telegraph article above says, which is possibly referring to the B’s recent probationary period.
@BB
Having looked into a number of aircraft the basic weight, speed and fuselage characteristics of the EADS C-295 look the most suitable for developing into a carrier ‘combat enabler’.
It would need ‘navalisation’: folding wings, tail redesigned to lose about 1.5m of height, and a strengthened undercarriage and tailhook. Ideally also integration of JPALS for carrier approach. Service ceiling is 7,620m: better than Merlin, equal to V-22, but not quite up to E2.
It already has: low minimum speed for carrier approach, ability to lift 9,250kg on 5 pallets and a rear cargo ramp. Palletised mission systems exist the MPA role, and it has hard points for ASuW munitions. An AEW&C version exists as vapourware. In the AAR role it would do the work of two Super Hornets and for COD it lifts about twice what a C2 does.
Of course you can’t have it without a CATOBAR carrier – although most of the mission systems described above could also be put onto a V-22 Osprey which is STOVL.
While things might be terrible at the MOD regarding VFM and contractor management I thinks are scandalous at the DOD.
The LPD sage shows how bad things have got.
LM getting both the next gen fighters has become the nightmare it always promised to be.
A to A refuelling – $1.7bill to develop – LM is just having a laugh.
£452 mill for two cats and a arrestors wire system – Having a laugh.
Just where is the money going?
90m long contraption – looking at £2mill per metre.
Ike got it right – 50 years later and they are the giant vampire squid sucking the defence budget dry.
Chris B.
Not enough info in Janes to get the answers that you want. A good amount of key information is glossed over by the basic data.
On top of that, the year’s testing is the costly bit.
Not that the current method is necessarily the best or even good, but choosing out of a brochure isn’t necessarily better.
TD, I haven’t got the foggiest idea which variant we’ll go for.
Personally, I would have gone for B from the start – a fantastic increase in capability over Harrier (and a couple of smaller ships too – I wonder how much the dockyard work and dredging Portsmouth harbour to accomodate the QEs has cost). From where we were not so long ago, the plan to fit cats-n-traps to the second QE seemed the best plan – just suck up the costs for conversion like a man, and don’t worry about the other ship not having cats, as it would be years before we’d have the capacity to use both anyway. Now, with uncertainty with EMALS, I’m plumping for B as the lower risk option – but I’ve no clue what will actually happen.
Off topic, I wonder if just buying a couple of each model straight off the production line and battering them all over the place for 6 months would not be best way forward. Test to destruction and make decisions from there.
Winner refunds the MoD the cost of trials pair in return for the production contract
@TD
The Americans, the Navy and the RAF all want the “C” and I think they will get it. Two identical carriers alternating is the only cost effective arrnagement for crewing and I think they will get that as well.
My guess is Cameron has already made the call in principle: its now a question of what Hammond and Osbourne take out of the sweetie cup to pay for it.
The Americans have also frowned on the 82,000 man army, and I do not think politically they can cut brigades while Afghanistan is still on.
For me the most rampant cost inflation is in Fast Jets and so the savings will come from reducing the overall establishment with both early retirements and fewer new purchases.
T1 Typoon and Tornado will both go. Airframe hours will be the public excuse. There will then be a ‘Fast Jet Gap’ with late tranche Typhoon the only platform in service between 2015 and 2020. F35C will then come but maybe on a 1 in 1 out basis with whatever has high airframe hours at that date.
@ Chris B
Guilty as charged. More looking for a variation on a theme. All these arms companies spend zillions producing equipment that meets a requirement that is common to many forces. And the MoD spends a few more zillion defining its own requirements only to find out it is defining what has already been defined! Wanted I wanted to know off James the Red Trouser is does anybody within the MoD actually look what’s available first or does it all start from a blank sheet? And if it does start from a blank sheet is it done for a good reason or is it done to keep procurement staff in work? Take FRES I can’t tell one blasted 8×8 from another. They all take similar troop numbers; troops one hopes that are of a similar size. They have similar engines and transmissions and so similar performance. They all can mount similar weapons. They are all of a similar weight and volume; so many troops and machinery need so much armour and so on. Physics alone dictates that I suppose. And similar must be true for everything from rifles to artillery, and from No 1 uniforms to foul weather gear and a whole host of other stuff. All I want to know is how much notice is taken of what is going on outside the MoD.
I think you are probably right Peter, I get the feeling that we are back onto C but who knows
Whilst the Rn and RAF will be pleased if it goes this way I expect the Army will be the ones to take another bite of the shit sandwich
TD said “, jungle drums are beating out C C C”
Sorry but your jungle drums transmit on a different frequency to ours. We will have a compatible system in about two years time when we have decided on whether zebra or impala hide is better.
@ Mr fred
Don’t take the “Janes'” bit too literally eh?
Well we do have a team at pax river were both are being tested. So the team will have a gd view of both I’m a bit surprised the pm didn’t head down for a look see when he in Washington recently. The politics of changing maybe to difficult to go back. The pentagon should be giving a new costing to congress shortly so maybe we could give nao a classified briefing on cost and let them come down on the cheapest capability with least risk without giving the actual cost to the public. I’d be going for the b though.
Peter, we could easily get by through the Tornado to Lightning gap; I think you’re right that they will go, and as soon as they’re out of Afghanistan.
Looking at the recent behaviour of the French -undercutting SAAB for the Swiss deal, and 25 per cent under the Indian Typhoon package- they seem to be desperate to export Rafale at any cost. That should put the UK in an incredibly strong negotiating position if we wanted an alternative to Lightning-C. If the government had any balls, they could have Sarkozy sucking them right now.
Janes give bare facts and figures, there is a lot of things that are not covered in technical specs. As an example, X rifle might be the better than Y rifle on paper, but in use, their “small quirks” can be totally different, eg 20% jamming rate not mentioned, designed for an 8 armed octopus, parts that break if you look at it wrong, parts supplier closed down etc. All these won’t be on Janes, just the numbers.
Chris B,
I’m half with you on the wisdom of experienced NCOs, half not against you but observing there’s so much more to consider.
We’ve actually already got the experienced NCOs views plugged into the selection process via ATDU, ITDU, and the other Development Units (i.e. Sappers, Signals run something similar although call it something else, etc). ATDU for example were integral to the spastically named “Trials of Truth” that FRES ran for the UV competition. An old Regt mate of mine was CO ATDU at the time and told me it was very rigorous, and they paid close attention to what they were being told. Long may that continue, say I.
However, there’s an awful lot more to consider that I do not believe would be fair or appropriate to have SNCOs evaluate. Software coding and risk, for example. Strategic deployability and trade offs between tactical tracks vs operational wheels. Industrial offset arrangements. Through life training and repair costs. Ripple effects on trade training for REME. Is Nexter a better long term supplier than GD? Integration of Bowman with the French variant of the central data bus, which is nearly but not quite MilStd. Is a 43T vehicle operable on over 75% of European road networks? What about on African road networks? What proportion of engagements will take place in C3 terrain at over 1500m, and therefore is a 40mm main weapon preferable to a 25mm weapon? Is it better to have wading capability to 0.8m or 1.2m, and if so, which operational scenarios do you sacrifice for choosing the lighter weight of 0.8m capability?
I’m certainly not saying that NCOs cannot have a view on those sort of questions, nor that (reverse) only officers can. However, officers are trained in staff appointments to develop the sort of thinking that recognises these as being important questions, prioritising them, and getting the right sort of expertise which may well come from dstl or QQ or industry to input expert advice at the right time.
I wish it was as simple as opening up Janes and picking the wagon of choice. It took me a year of FRES ISTAR variant staff work before I felt confident enough to recommend Stryker with a 20mm sniper cannon and co-mounted 40mm AGL, and ten years later that is still my recommendation.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/9164950/New-delay-over-fighter-jet-choice.html
@x
Usually you’ve got a whole set of requirements to write beforehand. What the equipment needs to do, what it has to interface with, where is it going to operate. Some really basic questions fleshed out into a likely 100+ page document. Ask for proposals and even amongst the very similar 8x8s you can narrow down to a few candidates. Then go away and do some analysis about which will perform best in the scenarios you’ve come up with. All lots of weighting factors for training, disposal, fuel cost etc. and you’ve got the options with a number of ratings that can then be used to find the most cost/effective option.
Or how it’s meant to work anyway.
In the end the process has taken years, spent tens or hundreds or millions, and you’ve probably ended up with an option that works brilliantly for your OA scenarios but then the the world changes and you’re left with an inflexible option and an expensive modification bill.
…. along with a truly brilliant ISTAR suite. Goes without saying. We also developed a concept for “mini-mast” as a quick and dirty and cheap retrofittable. 3 metre extension, battery powered for silence. World class optics, small LRF, true (corrected) compass bearing, stadiametric graticule with mildots on the vertical scale. If necessary, drive off quickly with it mounted. We reckoned we could keep the sensor package under 5 kilos, and a base 3 inch metal telescope / top 2 inch gave it enough rigidity to resist wind and wobble. Less than 10 kilos all up, biggish shoebox size and runs off 28v. 95% of vertical obstacles to view in any European environment are less than 6m tall, so the 2metre height of turret plus 4metre extension was the sweet spot.
typo line 2. 4 metre extension, not 3 metre.
Hannay,
you are not per chance the Richard Hannay of DEC ISTAR 98-2000?
@James
I’m afraid I was thinking more along the lines of Major General Richard Hannay of WWI vintage…
oh well. There was a chance. the RH I knew retired to set up a nursery school in Clapham with his Mrs – a deliberate choice to exit defence life it seemed. Still, he was / is a clear thinker. I have not run across him in the last dozen years, hope all is well with him.
James,
Stryker for anything FRES? I’d be very interested to know what your reasoning behind that is. Fundamentally, AIUI, it is a superficially modified and overloaded Piranha III.
x,
For “Janes”, substitute “publicly available information” or even “vendor supplied information”
Mr Fred,
no no, not “anything FRES”. For a start I didn’t work on the UV part of the programme, although was aware of developments there. Specifically FRES ISTAR as it was then called, FRES SV now.
Yes, it comes from the Piranha family, although I’d take issue with “superficially modified and overloaded”. It was in dev at the time, and like all wagons in dev had technical risks and a whole series of Rumsfeldian known/unknowns. But in reality GD and the US Army got it working well, largely because it dove-tailed with the new “Stryker Brigade” concept that had a whole lot of political heft and budget in 2000-2004. Note that there are now around 8 or 10 variants of Stryker in all sorts of configurations. We then were only looking at the recce wagon.
It is a modified Piranha III. While “superficial” may be a little bit harsh, it is not entirely inaccurate either.
My understanding, admittedly limited by being based on publicly available information, is that Stryker would not be particularly technically suitable for any FRES vehicle (the “anything FRES” comment)
Mr Fred,
your understanding based on publicly available information was not shared by the trials teams in 2000-2004, but what did they know? The reality is that the requirements ran away with themselves. A failure of leadership within the procurement domain. We’ve now gone from a much-supported 8×8 to a double the weight tracked vehicle that is at best partially supported, and in any case not likely to be in service for another 5-7 years.
I once attended a presentation at HQ LAND at which the first slide put up was the single sentence “Hey, Abbey Wood desk warriors, haven’t you ever heard of Pareto”? Quite right too, although there was some minor fallout with a complaint from the ABW team. Nobbers, mostly.
The original ISD for FRES ISTAR was 2010.
James @ 8.35
Blow it out yer erse.
Are you some sort of Edwardian throwback?
You need “chaps” to do all the thinking, the men just need to do trade.
What is the going rate into
Two dodgy A levels – with the Art teacher providing you with very close support to get you through your History of Art – aka cartoons for beginners – coursework.
Add in the current “All must win prizes” attitude where every simple improvement must be lauded as if cold fusion had been cracked and you have a smug military establishment talking to itself as the world and the enemy pass them buy.
The more I get to understand the current modern military the more it looks like a make work scheme for the thick end of the private school output who don’t want to work in an office – just yet.
Missing word – Sandhurst.
Going rate is two dodgy A levels.
I love it how we meander
I see no one dares to challenge the ascendancy of the bright yellow foam banana over the fizzy cola bottle
@ TD
After the Biscuit Fund debacle you want me to comment on nutty and goffers? No jolly fear see my relief.
(We still haven’t found the stealth biscuit barrel. Any info gladly recived.)
@ FBOT
The time to complain is when he starts to call us the “other ranks”. Saying that I was wardroom guest member on more than few occasions. Personally I preferred to dine with the senior rates…..
@TD
Unfortunately the foam bananas have got to be kept whole and so can’t be crushed. Fizzy cola bottles are pretty much just gelatin and so you can squeeze loads of them in. Personally I prefer the taste of fizzy cola bottles, but I’m awfully tempted by jelly squirms as they preserve the taste but can be wound into the cup to maximise volume usage.
What people should realise is that the MOD selection process for new cost estimators and analysts starts with an assessment of whether the applicant will be a good civil servant.
Ability, training or specific competence in costing is completely irrelevant, they presume that they already know all about costs and will educate the new entrant.
That’s why Bernard Gray has said its route and branch change that’s needed – they will never be any good at costing while the HR function is run by the MOD……….. Only as a GOCO can competent costing professionals be put in place.
Until the old guard are rendered powerless the useless will induct the useless, with no come back, no sanction and all the usual perks
FBoT, pray tell your background that leaves you to see what others cannot?
My turn for a rant.
One of the corner stones of the MoD skrew up was the creation of the DPA monolith called Abbey Wood. For any one who doesn’t know this was the headquarters of the Defence Procurement Agency and was part of the migration of many MoD departments from London to the far end of the M4 corridor where many senior Sercive and Civilian mandarins bought lovely houses in the country.
At this time the MoD was establishing both the DPA and DLO with an aim at having a far more joined up and efficient procurement and support structure in place for equipmet. DPA develpoed and purchased the kit and when mature DLO took over responsibility for in service support. Things went pear shapped almost immediately when IPTs in the DPA refused to transfer to DLO sites on their programmes maturity stating all sorts of reasons, the majority of which had nothing to do with the actual programme but more to do with moving home, school etc. Therefore the DLO began to stagnate as existing platforms retired it shrank and DPA expanded with new projects. Eventually after further reorganisation and after numerous name changes, what was left of the DLO has been relocated to be next to Abbey Wood.
This is the opposite of what should have happened. The DPA never had any idea of what was required to actually operate and support a platform and never got the cost anywhere near right. Spares were never ordered in the quantities required and many developmental programmes have suffered delays through the DPA’s underestimations regarding cost. It has always been good and ideas but crap in implementing them. The DPA was always where Politicians came to discuss things as that was where the headlines were. The DLO had to deal with the Shit that resulted and often had its budget reduced to coever overspeands at the DPA those these were ofter disguised as moritoriums rater than cuts but the impact was the same, especially on the frontline where shortages were common of everything from nuts to engines.
Regarding UORs, these have been part of management plans for years. Systems are brought on line often with out warfighting kit because it isn’t needed in peacetime. Our leaders decision to commit UK forces to a number of operation over the past two decades has shown this up but it has been spun as a positive rather than a lack of investment. We couldn’t have fought any of the conflicts from 1982 to present day without using NATO and or US stock of ammunition for example and do people remember to problems we had trying to use ammo bought from Pakistan in Afghanistan!
Though it will never happen, Defence needs to be handled very differently from other Governmental departments like health and education. We are asking men and women to put their lives on the line at the Governments discression. Tis funds and other resources need to be driven by nedd rather than accounts. However the need is decised by Governemnt and so things need to start with a review of what our foreigh policy is and what part our armed forces are required to play in it. There has to be a firm link between Governmental aspirations and the ability of aor armed forces to carry them out and this need to be laid down in law with ministers accountable to the law.
As for keeping the books balanced, the aims and only realy aims should be to have kit fit for purpose and best value for money. Job creation should have no bearing at all. IF for political reasong politicians decide that jobs are a priority then they must accept any cost implication and the knock on effects and if that means an increase in funding or a lowering of aspiations fine, but their must be an end to smoke and mirrors. Defence and the lives involved are far too important to be a political football
geez.
if the F-35 is causing this much consternation then cancel the bloody thing and move on.
the US won’t cry, the UK won’t cry and it’ll help settle the defense situation.
sounds like a win win to me. heck you could even bolster the new friendship with France by buying Rafales.
win win win.
’nuff said. just do it … and move on.
I think people are taking the comments X made about Janes a little literally. The discussion we had in the past was not “give a group of soldiers a copy of Janes and then order what they pick out of the catalogue”!!
The discussion – if I remember it rightly – went much more along the lines of bringing together a number of test vehicles from anyone that wanted to compete for the deal.
Then put together a team of SNCO from the Infantry (presuming we’re including FRES UV now), recce, perhaps the armoured lads as well, RLC, REME, Royal Engineers, artillery, anyone that might have to work with the vehicle on at least a semi-regular basis.
These plucky gents would then subject the vehicles to their own, self devised testing regime covering exercises, trials etc, etc. Putting the vehicles through their paces and studying every conceivable angle from an operational standpoint, in a vigorous “end user test”.
The second part (as hinted at by my “within reason…” earlier) would involve the things that James covered regarding electronic architectures etc. The primary driver for selecting the vehicle would go to the SNCO’s decision. Perhaps unsuitable candidates (for industrial or compatibility reasons) could be eliminated before the test vehicles were turned over for the end user test?
Ok TD , you had your rant, my turn now.
Rant 1.
I want major equipment programmes to go to the Parliamentary defence committee at the start, not wait for them to get into trouble. Let them call witnesses from the MoD, Treasury, Foreign Office, DTI or whatever its called this week, the military, think tanks & even some commentators. Make sure we have ordered the right kit, in the right numbers, to the right spec, by the most cost effective means, then stiff penalties if the Treasury tries to back out or industry delivers a duff product.
Rant 2
Stategic planning. I still say the 1998 SDR came up with the minimum credible global mobile plan for UK armed forces. Shame Gordon never funded it. If the DfID budget went to defence, the 1998 SDR would be funded in full.
Rant 3.
The MoD cannot afford another billion plus write off of taxpayers money. No major order will get political clearance if we write off QE/PoW. After MRA4 as well, major MoD orders will be too toxic. So the forces would only get penny packets of UOR kit. Not good.
Rant 4.
We are where we are. Simplest fix, QE gets 12 F-35B + helos to be a sea control/assault carrier, while PoW gets 23 F-35C + cats/traps to be our strike carrier. RN gets flexible air support, no bad headlines, honour all round. We build 10% of F-35 , we do not build F-18 or Rafale. British jobs for British workers, remember.
Right, off to lie in a darkened room.
I may be some time.
@ FBOT 2213,
Why don’t you tell me why it is that the very large number of technical considerations which I illustrate form part of the working, educational or life experience of any single person? Why don’t you tell me what bit it is about my acknowledgement of the role of experienced NCOs in aspects of procurement that you disagree with? Why don’t you tell me what is wrong with the notion that staff officers are specifically trained to marshall and coordinate developing answers to complex questions?
And while you are at it, you might adopt a civil tone and open-minded manner.
Lord Jim and John, great Rant
Sol, have you actually read the post :)
RW, maybe you should look at the GOCO model in a future post
Hannay and X, re cola bottles, mad me laugh
FBOT,
and if your answer is more of the same abuse, don’t bother. You stick to answering questions about double skegs on hulls, and I won’t bother you. I wouldn’t expect you to venture into questions on AFVs. We’ll both be happy, and TD won’t need to wade in.
@ Chris B
Thanks for that.
@ All
Coming from an IT background, and when I say IT I don’t mean PCs I mean big boxes, I appreciate that testing has to be done and methodologies followed. But we can’t say the system isn’t working on one hand and then rush to its defence when those on the outside start to ask why things are so. I also have a fair understanding of procurement processes. There are two lessons I have taken to heart. One you ignore your user base at your peril hence the “RSM working party” idea. Two if you are the one handing over the millions (or billions) you are in the driving seat; it is up to your procurement team to win the deal not for the vendor to present a deal. Let say my plucky team of RSMs and friends decide that vehicle A is the best but vehicle B is being offered in a slightly better package YOU DON’T GO FOR OPTION B YOU GET YOUR BODS TO SQUEEZE OPTION A FOR THE DEAL THEY WANT BECAUSE YOU ARE THE ONES WITH THE MONEY. As for all the other stuff like wading depths, road availability surely that stuff these days will be available in an expert system? Looking at those 8x8s there seems to be little difference between any of them; they all being pushed at the same market and so will need similar capabilities to be competitive. The only way I could select one from another is if I was an expert in mechanised soldiery or if I knew what was like to exchange a powerpack at night in the rain in the middle of field. I appreciate there maybe some subtleties I am missing but I can’t see how it takes £500million and God knows how many years not to buy a vehicle. I don’t think it is the staff, I think it is the system that is broken. Of course MoD processes bought us the mega deal of the century FSTA so………….
James @ ….
My comments were based on the tone and content of your post.
Your tone was patronising in the extreme.
Your content was marginally more acceptable but only just.
Now a little factoid to put your mind at rest.
My background is Mech Eng and my experience is mainly automotive.
However I have some CV experience and I am into various commercial diesels.
Consequently naval stuff is a hobby, AFVs is closer to my day job.
Now that is out the way, how is FRES progressing?
They really do know how to spend the money but what are they delivering?
However if you want to move beyond 70’s Austrian lash ups then I may be able to help with a spot of concept generation. There are a number of commercial technologies and platforms out there that may have o lot of mileage in a military context.
Apologies to all fans of Swiss AFVs out there.
Got a bit mixed up, it is a Swiss 70’s lash up.
Fundamental issue: CVF is 65,000 tonnes and 36 jets of Great British engineering… ok. There will be two. ONLY TWO.
That is not what I call any measure of flexibility.
FBOT,
my tone was not patronising in the extreme, apart from in your head.
Reread my post to note the many acknowledgements, qualifiers and indications of complexity that is real life.
And don’t be so chippy.
i read it in great detail TD.
but i can’t help but feel more than a bit of frustration. i tire of the endless debates about the F-35.
i know that you have stated that the F-35B was the way to go…i get that.
but many others have stated that they should cancel the program and buy anything offered except the F-35.
i say go for it.
i mean seriously.
this is tiresome.
its ruining British credibility.
and to be honest i would rather have a credible British military that is second tier (when it comes to aircraft…i have no doubt British Infantry will always be 1st rate) than a first rate one that is going through this much turmoil.
if canceling the F-35 brings a bit of calm to the situation then i for one would be happy.
I VOTE FOR COLA BOTTLES!!!!
Sorry. Ahem. I think that’s my phone ringing. I better just… go… answer that.
I’m not sure if this has had an airing before on TD, or if it is new news, but the Mail appears to have uncovered a £600M refit/upgrade cost of the Harriers in the last few years vs a £112M sale price to USMC:
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2119894/MoD-tried-cover-selling-Harrier-jets-Americans-knock-price-112m-600m-refit.html?ito=feeds-newsxml
@james: I note they have a picture of a Sea Harrier :-(
We all know the reason for the withdrawal and sale in double quick time: the MOD wanted to ensure that the decision could not be revisited. It’s hardly news
Does anyone know if the F-35C has been able to take a wire yet? Last heard they were fitting a revised hook tip and beefing up the extension jack/damper to try and keep the hook in contact with the deck.
On the CVF, your worst case is that you pick the F-35C and match it with a cut price EMALS installation. One rather than two catapults or a reduced charging rate.
From what I read late April is the decision date now.
If the Colonials want us to buy the C version so bad, could we not press them to “loan” us the kits or do we not think they could push that past congress? (I don’t think they could).
Am I the only one who thinks that if it will cost £1.8 billion to convert F35C for AAR that we would be better spending the money on a purchase of F18. We could buy 45 F18 EF for this price. If we call the F18 the JCA and put them all in FAA hands then we could still purchase the F35C as a replacement for Tornado FOAS in the 2020’s. The F18’s could provide CAP for the carrier as well as CAS for the Marines. With 40 Aircraft we should be able to deploy a squadron of 12 on one carrier. If we are in any type of major operation we could deploy a second squadron of 12 F35C’s operated by the RAF. We could further also deploy a squadron of 12 USN F35C or F18 if the situation called for it. God only knows what actual production F35C’s will cost but if we guessed a price of £100 million each we could make the entire purchase of 80 aircraft for £5.4 billion. We would remove allot of the risk and cost of the JCA program, remove the need for self-development of AAR capability, remove the need to have combined FAA and RAF squadrons and we would lightly end up with a better all round solution.
I know there would be additional costs of operating a mixed fleet of aircraft. However surely commonality only goes so far to making savings. We would also be presented with the opportunity to share training and support costs with the USN. If the carrier conversion cost is £850 million its not inconceivable to find this type of money post 2020 for conversion of the second carrier as a hot spare.
I think F35 in any form is a very significant aircraft for the UK. Lest forget for a second it will likely be the most significant export product in British history. It’s likely going to be the last manned fast jet ever produced. It will be the only 5th generation aircraft we will be able to procure. We can keep going on about the costs of fast jest and the lack of basic kit in the Army. However fast jets win wars. We can’t expect our current fleets to fly forever. We need to buy something new in the next decade or else get out of the defence business all-together. The future will be UCAS. However I have no doubt when that future arrives it will be just as expensive and controversial as Typhoon and JCA have been.
While the MOD does need a very large dose of reality we also need to acknowledge that while the current economic climate is grim today it will not always be the case. Much of the JCA/FOAS requirement and purchase can be done post 2020 when the prices may not be so bad and the budget not so stretched. I don’t like the concept of kicking the can down the road but some-times when things are bad it’s the only option i.e in WWII when we had 240% debt to GDP. Was it not worth the cost? We have to avoid making a hasty decision today that will affect our military structure for the next 30 – 40 years.
That being said I think the choice between B or C has to come down to simple cost. Both will be very capable and far better than what they replaced. This entire debacle could have been avoided if the government made a simple statement in the SDSR.
“Due to concerns about increased cost and possible cancelation by the USA of the F35 B the MOD will launch a £30 million feasibility study into converting one or both the Queen Elizabeth Class carriers to operate the conventional F35 C model. Given the importance of this project it seems wise to have a contingency plan should the B version of the fighter be canceled. The review will be complted intime for PR 12 were we will make a final announcement on aircraft selection based on the available data at the time”.
In essence this is exactly what has happened it’s just the constant need for spinning and leaking that has made us all look like as**oles.
I simply don’t believe that the F-35 will be the last manned fighter. UCAS is a striker not a defender under any likely development. That makes it a single role aircraft even if the software can be made to work dependably. If you want to control your airspace you need manned aircraft. You only have to look at how operating costs have crashed and burned Global Hawk to see the likely end point of UCAS.
I would agree, Martin. The government would not look quite so foolish and disorganized now if they had used a more measured tone when they decided to look again at the C option, instead of using the opportunity to take a swipe at the previous bunch.
Personal and political embarrassment will feed into the current decision; might be why the government was quick to jump on this letter from the USN – I wonder if someone in the gov’t or MoD solicited this letter. Certainly not the way to conduct defence planning.
Good point Martin but why pass up an opportunity to use the forces as a political football when there are points to be scored.
Depending on who you listen to, the F35B is due to be cancelled or the F35C is due to be cancelled, factions, spin and briefing at large
I still think that F35B offers the UK the best combination of utility and cost (accepting there are many limitations) that won’t starve all three services of much needed funding.
So until the next brief, spin or rumour from various factions within the MoD surfaces in the Telegraph we will just have to hold our council
AJ, yes, totally agree
@TD, good post and I share you concern with how much influence the US can exert over such a key sovereign matter. I just wish we would have a government with some balls for once.
My overriding opinion on the CVF programme is that the worst case scenario is if we end up with a single all singing and dancing vessel and the other is either sold or left to rot.
I still believe there will be fudge on the menu with a short term buy of F35B (small in number @20) and then a commitment to “cats and traps” and F35C either in time for (yet another) delayed launch of PoW (a.k.a Ark Royal). At this point the F35Bs will either be sold to the USMC or the Italians / Spanish / Australians.
If the situation is genuinely that we spent 80m on a feasibility study for cats-n-traps, only to be surprised by a letter from the US Navy landing on the doormat of number 10 telling us how much everything should cost, then perhaps someone should go to prison – someone’s taken an awful lot of money for us to still not have a clue on the price tag.
And ditto, if someone from the Cameron camp has solicited this letter in order to justify spending a billion quid in order to avoid the PM having to eat his words on the F35B. Seems to be misappropriation somewhere.
It looks like the UK Mod is stuck with carriers they can’t afford so I do think that the F35 is a white elephant and that MoD would be better off buying F18 Super Hornet tried and tested and off the shelf. Low risk and at a lower cost ticks all the boxes the only problem is arrestor gear the new carriers are not designed for them. But I guess the money saved on not buying F35 should pay for that . Course could just scrap trident I not anti nukes but why do need them with America having so many already and who would be crazy enough to use them in the UK government ?
This is my take
1.
Decision to switch amazed everyone in the CVF world because it was done with hastily cobbled together information but as per the post, it read well and everyone in the RN and RAF thought happy days
2.
A few doubters would have said, hang on a min, the costs need firming up and for once, build in some risk margin, then double it and add a bit more.
3.
The surface is scratched and a horror story revealed, costs all over the place
4.
Backtracking commences, arguments break out over the accuracy of costs and how much fat to include in the cost. Back stabbing breaks out across all three services as they realise the huge extra costs are going to have to be swallowed by someone. Back of settee doesnt have any more cash and something is going to have to give
5.
Back stabbing carries on, brief, spin and counter spin erupts all over the interweb
6.
Someone in the RAF/RN Pro F35C camp asks for the USN to pitch in, after all, it would be better for the USN to have an extra F35C deck and in reality, it is the F35C that is now facing pressures on costs and design issues so they need all the help they can get
7.
USN and Pro F35C camp in the RAF/RN combine forces to thwart the evil Spreadsheet
8.
Dave says enough is enough, lets have an impartial study
9.
Thats where we are now, a fucking laughing stock and patsy for the USN looking like we will go back to C and therefore keep the RAF/RN/USN happy but fuck the Army and rest of the other two services. Next time there is unpleasantness abroad, expect UOR’s, equipment shortages and needlessly killed and maimed service personnel
10.
Normal jogging resumed for the MoD, chiefs and industry. Directorships and business class travel all round, hurrah, the RN is back at the top table of naval aviation, did I mention we are an island you know
11.
I need a foam banana
@ TD – you may be right about f35 b choice. I don’t care which we get I just want the decision made and an end to the farce. I can see the benefits of both solutions. I just wish I had 80 million to do s study and get some real answers on costs ;-)
@ aj fighter design studies take decades and to my knowledge there is not a single running study for a manned system I’n the west past f35.I agree that ucas may not cut it which means f35 is even more important. It may be a bomb truck but super maneuverability dedicated a2a fighers like ef and f 22 have proven rather un useful unto now.
If I was PM I would be asking “If we do do a double switch (back to cats and traps) – what can the US give us in return?”. How about lending us some F18s so we can delay our F35 purchase? Plus something the Army would dearly love?
Is this the death knell of F35B in all colours?
and
CVF was supposedly designed ‘for not with’ cats and traps…so why does is conversion so costly?
@Repulse: yes, a few F18C/D’s on a ten year lease would be nice. But to be honest, given how long it will take to convert the existing CVF, I would settle for 30 AV8BPlus. They can be in service in a 1.5 years: we don’t sit in a vacuum where our potential enemies just sit around while we have arguments about which superjet to buy. Carrier air is something we actually need :-(
Hi LJ, a very good and interesting account (again) about defence procurement and logistics background
Just wondering about this “We couldn’t have fought any of the conflicts from 1982 to present day without using NATO and or US stock of ammunition for example ”
– the value of things that go ‘bang’ is £ 39 bn on the books (the ready to use no-impairment figure, as for not needing work or even disposal, is something like 22 bn); I further assume that nuclear warheads are not part of this figure
– so do we stock the wrong kind of things then?
…and we postpone cats and traps until 2020, when both EMALS and F35C should be considerably more mature
I’m coming late to this party due to moving, but I wanted to say that I think this is an absolutely cracking article.
The problem we have in the military is we recruit people, and select and train them to be junior leaders – at its most fundamental, Sandhurst is about teaching a 21 year old to persuade a bunch of older seasoned cyncial gents to run towards gunfire and inflict violence.
What Sandhurts does not do, and what is so sorely lacking in the long haul is the realisation that with very few exceptions, by senior SO2 you need to have put managers into position where you from that point on have to deliver strategic leadership and management and oversee billions of pounds of expenditure.
I dont buy for one moment the idea that staff course prepares you for this -Shrivenham is seen by all I know who have attended as an up to 12 month jolly and death by powerpoint combined. No matter what people say, its hard to not draw the conclusion that the military excel at delivering leadership at a junior level, but only through chance and good fortune get good management at higher levels.
The reality is that the best managers and delivery folks will have left early on, seduced by the better career prospects in the private sector – why at SO2 level stay in if you will cap out at OF5 or 1*, when you could leave and go into industry on an OF5 salary in short order?
I’d almost argue that what is needed is the move to ditching staff college and instead sending most officers on an MBA or other course. Outside of a few ‘punchy’ command appointments, the reality of posts at SO1 level and above could arguably be seen as delivery or finance or project management. why not pay to give our people the proper skills, instead of a year of powerpoints with tired old blackadder goes forth clips and out of date information?
We are approaching the point where a two tier armed force is required – the fighters, and the supporters. Perhaps a genuinely revolutionary system of privatising all but the direct command jobs is needed, and instead hand over control of all support, planning and procurement to civilians.
How one can be an impartial observer in the planning round process is beyond me – you almost need to hand it to a neutral body, allow the armed forces to provide input, and then hand the results back to the forces with the directive to ‘implement’…
@jim30: what an excellent idea, and not just for the supporters. After all, a lot of those equipment decisions will be taken by the fighters anyway, best get them educated now. Staff could be something you take after your MBA.
The only issue I see is officer retention. Perhaps we could offer a bonus payable after the first posting post MBA and staff?
“CVF was supposedly designed ‘for not with’ cats and traps…so why does is conversion so costly?”
I can’t remember when EMALS whatever was suggested but you would have thought in 65k tons there would have been blanked off voids left for a pair of steam generators? And arrestor gear apparatus isn’t exactly modest in its dimensions either…
@ Jim30
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commissariat
I agree. Still say it is the “system” aka the politics and not the uniformed desk warrior. This discussion isn’t for me whether aircraft carriers are bad or which variant of F35 we buy it is about politics screwing the project over. And when I say politics I don’t mean civilian MoD bods who are dumped on as much as the uniformed bods.
This maybe several months out of date but maybe why the chiefs and defsec propose going back to the b it may not be all about the conversion costs.
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/awst/2011/08/08/AW_08_08_2011_p47-352385.xml
@mark: makes sense. STOVL launch and recovery involves lower speeds, so less rotor around to interfere with helicopter ops
Don’t we have an official secrets act? Could we or should we use such an act to close down the spin machine. It dose no one any good and it is surly damaging our national security.
Hi Jim30,
RE “what is needed is the move to ditching staff college and instead sending most officers on an MBA or other course”
– I think there must be a balance, so I would not second the first part above
– thereby “most” would also be deleted from the second part. Having said that, I’ve been to a couple of Wharton ExecEd courses (post-MBA, but aimed at practice, not a PhD)and on average 10 % of the class consisted of serving personnel, from different services – not just from one in particular. Also the WalMart heir was there, he hardly “needs” to go to school, but sees the value of it
You select for leadership. Train for management. The Army does the first as well as could be expected. It seems as blokes go up the chain the structural pressures become and more diluted with strategy and policy and even excellent leaders and managers become powerless against the ebb and flow of a whole mishmash of forces.
Is this just the reality of trying to drive programmes that are lasting up to 25 years? Or put another way, how can a programme work well when the person who will head it at fruition hasn’t even begun their military career yet, goes through 5 Parliaments and about 20 Ministers and on average at least one or two recessions and a constant change of government and strategic and world outlooks and events.
It just cannot happen.
Programmes need to be more focused, shorter, FAR less ambitious and we have to accept the capability loss as the price for actually having something.
Humans just can’t beat that system.
“Don’t we have an official secrets act?”
I couldn’t possibly comment. :)
@Martin: I suspect we need more sunlight here, not less. Deterrence in this day and age via obscurity is likely to fail :-(
jim30,
while I’d largely agree with you on the year of powerpoint that is Shrivenham, there are a couple of qualifiers:
Most (not all) officers go on to a further year of staff training after the technical year. That year includes political context as to how the MoD derives its’ priorities and budgetary training. The combination of the 2 years should equip an SO2 to take his or her place on a Joint staff in MB, ABW or PJHQ.
Those officers posted to ABW or MB in the procurement domain do not manage projects, instead they tend to focus on the requirements areas (ABW) or budgetary area (MB). Military project / programme managers tend to be SO1 or more senior on their second or third tour in ABW.
I’m not sure what project management training is given to the civil service in ABW. I’ve come across some very good ones and some very poor ones.
Meanwhile
http://www.defpro.com/news/details/33722
thanks Mark,
A good link.
– all of the informed buddy-buddy discussion we’ve had here…was based on what?
– with the time between now and the article, the swap of the third aircraft has been resolved
I think the USN tried to mix helo and catapult operations, but soon concluded that when on a large scale they are better kept on separate hulls, to be able to initiate ops simultaneously
Anyway, hearing about the preferred AAR method in March – can’t wait!
Mark @ 10.20
Why don’t we just put a roof on MARS 2 and do the helo stuff from there?
500 extra bodies @ 40ft2 per body crush load would be lost on a ship of that size.
Why don’t we get all VFM and do a bigger and better Ocean?
If we run with 2 or 3 flat tops then it offer some camouflage to the QEx2?
Finally crap names for carriers.
QE / PoW are for real fighting ships not aircraft service stations.
And no nonsense about them being “capital ships” that was appeasement propaganda to try and hide the fact that we didn’t have the industrial base to build battleships as fast as the Germans.
Also stop the AR fetish, what about Eagle / Hermes / Africa / Malta?
There were other carriers out there and some of these could actually handle damage control and counter flooding.
The AR the Titanic of aircraft carriers.
TD @ 10.53
That is just churnalism.
MOD PR driven rent-a-quote to fill papers.
Not having a go at the guy who did the flying but what did it really tell us?
Nothing more than the “all must win prizes” attitude is alive and well on the Forces / MOD.
pink shrimps blow cola bottles out of the water, that is all
Acc
Thats a gd question I haven’t seen the buddy cost anywhere other than on this thread. But I’d bet theyd integrate the hornet pod onto one of the f35s wet stations you need to clear the pod and receiver a/c approachs.
The us marines have shown for years the benefit of having fastjet and helicopters integrated together. And we look at our last campaign in Libya we had helicopters on ocean some in Malta and jets in Italy. We could have put all them together on a cvf of the coast with all the benefits of intel gathering communication dare I say joint operations base sea it’s for this reason cvf is the size it is to allow ease of air operations. Cvfs crew with the b version is practically the same as our current carriers so they shouldn’t be more expensive to run than the ones we have now only we get a considerable capabilty increase.
@ paul g
I prefer the chocolate stuff; the white mice, the chocolate buttons with hundreds and thousands on them etc.
Pink shrimps, only to be expected from hammer and tongs, no class
Gawd!!!!!! We can’t even agree what nutty to buy. Who are we then to comment on MoD procurement?
I’m sorry ‘nutty’ isn’t computing.
Hi Mark,
Yes “The us marines have shown for years the benefit of having fastjet and helicopters integrated together” but not involving catapults in the mix
RE “Cvfs crew with the b version is practically the same as our current carriers ”
– yep, with so much more capability
– but, even more intrestingly, if you take the CdG manning and do that number tonne-for-tonne for CVF, you will get 3-4 times the planned number (I would guess that nuclear propulsion is not manpower intensive). Of course you can only compare directly, if the size of the airwing is standardised
@ anyone:
This is a stupid question but, can a light “transport” STOL aircraft take off from a ramp? (something that could take ISTAR, AWACS, Fuel, MPA and light transport)
On another note I still think the F35 is a silly a/c as were only getting ~50. This means we can’t afford to lose one as they cost ~150 mil isn’t it. ;)
Well… not sure on the STOL and ramp.
Seem to remember a very old concept called JATO. :)
@RL-C
I expect some of them could – although they would need to use the full length of the deck and probably not carrying a full load.
More of an issue is the landing – approach speed is still around 150km/h and carrying any kind of cargo it would be a pretty dangerous operation without arresting wires.
You would also need to clear the whole deck for every launch and landing, messing up all sorts of other tasks and slowing down sortie generation rates.
Overall I suggest it would be more of a demonstration ‘stunt’ than a viable way or working – especially when a STOVL platfrom like Osprey exists that could do what you need without the hassle.
“can a light “transport” STOL aircraft take off from a ramp?”
Peter has an article in pipeline for a cats and flaps common support aircraft and I was looking at light STOL aircraft as an alternative, sort of C or B support options!
My current favourite is the Viking Twin Otter 400 which can launch and recover on the 900ft deck of a CVF and if it runs over, it has floats, just in case :)
A silly question:
Given that the stealth element will be used to maximum effect only when needed could the internal bomb bays be used to carry fuel tanks and have all the weapons on the outside?
@TD
The issue with lightweight planes like your Twin Otter is they can lift hardly any weight.
A C2 greyhound lifts 4,500kg for COD. To be useful in AAR you need to lift around 8,000kg of fuel plus the weight of tanks and drogue. Given the maximum launch and recovery weights for CATOBAR that actually narrows down the choice of airframe quite a lot.
IF we get some sort of intelligible CVF decision in the next few weeks I will send you the updated version of my article.
Problem is a smaller fixed wing a/c on a ship isn’t cheap. You have to take into account they will need to go into the hanger for a service that adds complexity. Chinook/v22 or a rfa provide the stores requirement or merlin aew provides niche capability and f35 is your local istar a/c or a few scan eagles if you like. Our wide area Istar a/c AWACS Astor rivet joint and aar a/c all have 5000-8000m range. The pure Istar a/c are not the ones we have issues with getting based. I can’t foresee anywhere we will operate we’re are very long range Istar a/c cannot support.
I see the Torygraph seems to have changed its mind yet again??
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/9164950/New-delay-over-fighter-jet-choice.html
Hopefully we might get some insight this afternoon, BBC Parliament are screening Live Defence Questions in the Commons at 14.30 when Hammond is due to speak. I don’t expect a definitive answer, but the question is bound to be asked and how he phrases the response might be of interest – to say the least!
Has anybody else heard the rumour that we will in fact be buying both the F-35B and F-35C?
C for Navy, B for RAF, at least initially.
@Different Garath
Think the other way round might be better, external droptanks with weapons in the bays. Once engaged or heading into the Initial Point for the bombing run, it can drop the external tanks for maximum stealth. Of course, this means it can’t use “ambush” tactics in air to air as the enemy would have seen it as well, but it should help complicate AAM guidance in the head to head phase.
Yes that at one point was the case pre sdsr or at least an option
All this changing horses mid stream got me thinking was the A version ever looked at for the RAF?
A STOL aircraft taking off from a ramp; I don’t see why not, but I would assume the ramp design and angle would only be optimised for one aircraft type – or compromised between an F35B and another support aircraft.
The Bronco has been operated from the USMC’s assault ships in the past. I don’t know the useful load though. There was some internet chatter a while back of Boeing going through with a new build Bronco to meet demand for light attack aircraft; don’t think anything actually came of it.
Pete, don’t bloody well come around here talking that common sense stuff, won’t get you very far at all :)
I know, a while ago I did a couple of posts quetsioning the usefulness of lightweight STOL aircraft to supplement rotary and UAV’s but the key issue is exactly as you say, payload.
The F35 engine is over 4 tonnes I think (do a bit of Google fu)
Topman
Don’t know if they did but if you used a crystal ball there’s certainly a valid path that could lead to the a version replacing typhoon and have around 150 fastjet fleet split between a and b versions as they are the most similar
Well its what a lot of folk would like, but surely the other way round? Its the dark blue types who are leading the charge to revert to the ‘B’ as it means that QE could start working up as a VSTOL Carrier from the moment she commissions, at the very least utilising the two ‘B’ variants we already own. The RAF have always wanted the ‘C’. not because they want to fly it off carriers (they dont!) but because its long legs coupled with stealth make it the perfect Tornado replacement, particularly when combined with Storm Shadow, which for good reason they dearly love. The nightmare for the RN is that conversion of PoW to a conventional carrier is substantially delayed, massively over cost, and that QE enters service and is floating around for years as the worlds largest helicopter carrier without any jets. The press would have a field day to say the least. White elephant or wot? In an ideal world the RN would prefer an all ‘C’ buy too. Its range and payload advantage speak for themselves, but if the costs of conversion prove too great, and at best meant that only one carrier enters service, they would always opt for two with the ‘B’ rather than one with the ‘C’?
@Mark
I could see some use in the A, I’ve read little about it. It seems to have a lot less written about it. Does it have fewer problems from a technical view point?
I’m trying to think why the A has less publicity and less whoo haa about it? The buyers seem to be USAF, the Dutch and ozzies. While we are talking about outside bets what about the A…?
Two with B not 1 with C, that sounds like a rather snazzy strapline
I hear so many variations on who is pushing for what it is hard to see through the fog of bluff and double bluff
Good to see you back pongoglo!
Pongolo do know who was operating which but there was certainly a split being talked about.
Topman yeah there’s been no big tec issues such as the lift fan or tail hook. It’s progress is quite gd and pretty much the one everyone’s buying. The other two get the really bad press in my view because theyre the ones Boeing can offer a option in place off. With marines often being told you don’t need fast air. Boeing and there supported were stunned when they were frozen out of f35 and that a power lobby group. The b version boeing could never make work and I think they hoped the variants would be split they didn’t believe the winner takes all government stipulation after all Boeing does make i think it’s the wings of the f22.
I wonder it’s something we should have looked at more closely about $25m cheaper as well. Probably a bit late now.
It is the way the Italians are going a and b
@ Phil re nutty
Ask APATS, Somewhat, or Anixtu….
My Pen & Sword Army slang dictionary only goes Army to English or I would respond in Army speak.
I seen to recall that the “A” uses the ‘boom method’ of AAR while the “C” uses the ‘drogue method’.
The relevance is that the UK’s existing and planned AAR tankers are drogue only – so a switch to “A” would also mean upgrading the AAR fleet.
Its short for Nutty Slack a toffee sweet containing nuts.
Peter there is space for the drogue option it maybe a dual option but the
Canadians are going with the drogue option on their a version.
Oh I know what it is. It just doesn’t compute. Uttered by the same bastards who turned my Med Centre into a Sick Bay and drank wets. Beasts.
Beasts? Ooh get her….. :) ;) :)
Beasts X, not breasts…
Just watching now..quite a few questions ref Carrier Strike (Hammond’s words not mine..not a mention of CEPP..obviously doctrinaly he’s behind the curb.. .) I thought however somethings of interest. Am recording it, and will have to play back and listen again, however to me most reassuring point of note was that he referred repeatedly to the carriers in the plural. In the past he has been pretty dogged in towing what appeared to be the party line in insisting on the singular ie delivering ‘THE carrier’. Just played it back. His exact words are ‘ there is no intention to revisit the decision to build the carriers, the review is around how we operate THEM, how we use THEM, and how we ensure that THEY remain affordable into the future.’ Everything in his tone indicated that in his mind at least that both vessels were part of the solution and would be operated by the UK (as in the use of the royal ‘WE’)in one form or other at least. I felt strongly that the implication was that the option to sell as openly stated in SDSR was no longer in mind.
Peter/Mark,
There have been aircraft equiped with both AAR systems, notably the F101 Voodoo and F105 Thunderchief. Also maybe B66 Destroyer although not sure about this.
We can also look much closer to home as the E3D Sentry in RAF service can also AAR both ways.
However as things are now to get an F35 of any description to use both methods will add another several billion pounds.
@ Observer
You may have point. Phil may well be a Philipa….
And I knew he typed beasts. :)
@Pengoglo – Don’t get over-excited. They will both be built and that is pretty much the extent of the Government’s commitment at the moment. Everything else is ‘under consideration’. They will both exist so of course Hammond is referring to both of them for the moment. Don’t forget, they have not even decided which hull should become the operational carrier in 2020…
Personally I think finding a buyer for the 2nd carrier just wont happen so like it or not, the RN will have two big hulls to look after. Whether they dock one or turn it into the Heli carrier (LPH like Illustrious is doing now) remains to be seen.
@ Desk Jockey
I think Brazil, Indian, Russia, or even dare I say it the US would snap the MoD’s hand off to buy one of the CVFs.
AAR? How about dragging the S-2B Viking back out of the Mojave desert and sticking it back on the carriers?
Strip out the ASW kit and it should lighten the airframe somewhat and still have two seats spare for passengers to fulfil a ‘light’ COD role, plus it still has a strike capability. Minimal conversion costs and a proven airframe.
With all the A-10’s the U.S Airforce is retiring there shouldn’t be a shortage of engines….
I think there is quite a bit of confusion about AAR
The USAF F35A’s will only be fitted with a boom receptacle but they can also be fitted with a probe, specified at build stage.
The Canadian or Dutch ones for example
…ok, S-3B Viking (hangs spotter head in shame).
Seems to me the costs of operating two platforms alternatley will not be much more than operating one on its own SO LONG AS THE TWO ARE IDENTICAL.
Just becuase a lone carrier is in refit does not mean we save the crew’s wages. We want them to be ready again when it comes out so we still train them, nurture them, second them to USN and try to keep their skills current as best we can.
IF the two carriers are identical it costs no more in wages to swap the one crew between them. Just the addtional fuel and consumables used by having more sea days p/a.
The problem comes if the two ships that are not identical. Then you have two parallel sets of deck skills to maintain and you end up paying twice, with lots of retarining and work-up whenever you try and switch from one ship to the other.
TD
What was the mythical £1.7bill charge from LM for?
Are the A / B / C versions missing out on AAR commonality?
@x
I certainly think we should be marketing the design actively to India and Brazil.
Industrial strategies being what they are any sales are likely to be license built, but consider the design fee and how much of the componant supply chain is in the UK and its no big deal if the metal bashing is done elsewhere.
@FBOT
Perhaps it was to integrate buddy pods onto the F35?
“What was the mythical £1.7bill charge from LM for?”
@X – I agree that India is probably the most likely contender. They have just got their new carriers (makes our CVF prject look good by comparison!) off the Russians though and spanking more money trying to get CVF to work with Migs just cannot be appealing.
Russia, France and the US have their own shipyards to try to keep gainfully employed. Buying a foreign warship, not matter how cheap, is political dynamite, they just wont do it.
Brazil should be the lead contender as they have ‘ambitions’ on this front. However, they are supporting Argentina in their ‘Las Malvinas’ claim… Seriously, buying a huge British warship that could contest Britains military capabilities while publicly supporting the ‘other side’…? Another political hot potato that will scupper any deal. Plus the US don’t want big ships flying rival flags playing in their backyard so the UK isn’t going to upset them…
So who is left that is willing to buy a carrier – China! The screams of anguish from the other side of the Atlantic would be quite defening! I can’t think of any other possible customers. No one else is in the market and/or wants to buy foreign.
I’m sure Israeli Aircraft Industries built a drop tank with an inflight refuelling probe down the centre so their KC-130’s could cross-refuel with aircraft equipped for boom only.
I’m sure it was also mentioned for the Apache as well, if only I could find a link…..
The US could use a QE sized carrier as a dedicated training carrier. This would free the other carriers for operational tasking and allow the US Navy to reduce their CVN-fleet from 11 to 10 or 9 or 8 ….
@Peter Elliot – Sorry mate, you are rather sadly wrong. Keeping Invincible (decommissioned!) tied up at the dock cost the MOD over £50k per year (parliamentary answer somerwhere on this). That was for a rusting heap of junk. A serving/tid up ship, expected to actually do something, needs a refit and you are talking £20-60m for each one of those. If you want two exactly the same hulls you have no choice because each refit dramatically changes the ship. One will be behind the other if you don’t.
Plus you need double the crew numbers otherwise some RN families are going to get pretty pissed at you! One CVF already effectively needs more than one crew, so you are talking 3-4 crews for two ships rather than 1.5/2 effectives.
The big stinker is the cats and traps. Treasury does not want to pay for two of them. They aren’t cheap. There goes the keeping the two carriers the same argument!
The only charge to lm so far was the 2b dollars for uk entry into the development phase as a level 1 partner this includes integration of uk specific requirements. And the additional payment for the purchase of 3 a/c. The buddy pod will be most likely the hornet pod and is used for the bolter or black deck requirement.
Ace rimmer think the problem with Viking is there trap lifed you can fly them ok you just can’t land them on a ship.
WW, I was going to say that it would be pretty expensive just for a training carrier, but given the great deal they got on our Harriers, we’d undoubtedly flog them a carrier at a bargain basement price as well.
Mark, I guess that would mean opening the production line back up, which equals more costs and updating an old aircraft. It was a good idea while it lasted…..
@ DJ
Brazil has just bought 3 OPVs from us. Brazil foreign policy towards its neighbours is as much about keeping China out as the Spanish speakers on side. Latin and F&CO logic being what it is I don’t a sale would cause either side much of a problem!!! I wouldn’t put it past HMG to sell a another T23 off to Chile within the near future either.
As for Russia well their yards will be building Mistrals. A CVF sale would be a one off. They are cash rich and pragmatic. If Mr Putin wanted it I don’t think labour relations would worry him too much. There is a difference between getting a bargain and going abroad as result of a tender process as part of a planned programme.
@Desk Jockey
Yes – I agree with most of that. I was simplifying for clarity
What I said ‘1 crew’ what I meant was 1 crew at sea plus all the land side spare bodies that go into keeping a full crew at working tempo. Not sure what the ratio is but that’s what I meant. People also join and leave the crew depending on their career paths so it is never a static entity. You could call it ‘1 extended crew’ if you want.
Sure the second hull will also incur refit costs but the service life of both hulls will also be extended.
Agree absolutely that it is the capital costs of getting to the position where we have two identical serviable hulls in the water that is the major sticking point at the moment.
The costing comparison I was alluding to is exactly the same as would be for Albion and Bulwark. We incur extra refit costs for the second hull and more sea days, but only have to maintain one ‘extended crew’ and the ships last longer becuse they are being worked less hard.
Ace,
I remember way back seeing a photo of a Douglas Skyray which showed it with a drop tank including a AAR probe sticking out the front.
Also in recent history buddy stores have been fitted to all sorts. Buccaneer/Tornado/USN A7/Sea vixen/Scimitar/NZ A4 etc. Obviously not difficult so why LM want £1.7 billion to put a pod on F35 I do not know.
@FBOT
Apart from a few exceptions USAF/USN variants of the same aircraft have always had different AAR systems. Most notably F4 and A7. That is why after the unmentionable conflict the extra Phantoms for the RAF had to be ex USN F4J as USAF F4D/E versions had incompatible AAR systems.
Was the Sea Harrier capable of buddy to buddy? If so
those 9 at Culdrose could act as tankers?
Kentish Paul, having had the misfortune to work in the construction industry, a highly priced cost attached to a contractual variation was a sign the contractor didn’t really want to do it. Especially if it was coming towards the end of a job or if it involved a lot of re-design work. Given the delays to the F-35 project, LM probably loaded the quote so as to hope it went away so they could get on and get the thing into service.
It’ll probably come to the surface again on a later Block, and the quote will be a lot less when they’ve got designers sat twiddling there thumbs with nothing to do!
OK does anyone know just how the buddy-buddy refueling tank works. Does it store fuel as well as the hose, or is it just the hose with fuel pumped from from the aircrafts normal tanks. If it has fuel in the buddy tank can it be replenished or is it just a one tank gas station.
Have read back up the thread Jim posted that LM were supposed to have asked for 1.7b to fit the aar pod but provided no link to we’re he read it. Maybe he could provide more detail.
http://www.cobham.com/about-cobham/mission-systems/about-us/life-support/davenport/products/air-to-air-refuelling-equipment.aspx
Half way down the page
Mark @5:38 I read that some time ago I can net even remember if it was on line or in print.
Cracking read here, check out them pics of a Sea Vixen refuelling a Valiant
http://www.seavixen.org/index.cfm?fa=contentGeneric.ahecdwrddykjxcae
Marks Chobham links suggests its a 300 gallon tank unable to replenish itself. “The store is mounted on an ejector rack by two lugs spaced 30 in apart. The store has an internal capacity of 300 gal and is capable of pumping fuel to a receiver aircraft at the rate of 220 gal/min with a drogue pressure of 30 to 60 psi. A ram air turbine drives a variable displacement hydraulic pump when the store is activated. Hydraulic power generated by the pump provides the power to drive the hose reel and fuel pump motors. The store provides hose guillotine, jettison, and sealing; pod jettison; and fuel dump emergency provisions.”
Strange to read the list of aircraft integration: A-4, a-6, A-7, S-3A, S-3B, F/A-18E/F
The short range F/A-18 A-D not being on the list.
Was this what you were on about KP
http://airrefuelingarchive.files.wordpress.com/2009/05/f-16-vista-sargent-fletcher-art-s-pod.jpg?w=600&h=516
Cobham own Sargent Fletcher now
@Ace,
Only too true. We obviously shared the same industry. After mining it was Channel Tunnel, Jubilee Line, CTRL, Canary Wharf et al. Every new project was re-invent the wheel. (Oh no we’re not doing that way! this is much better.)
@TD
Yes, very similar, only the Skyray pod had the probe coming horizontaly from the centre of the tank. Will try and find the photo. It was probably in an old book of mine.
@Peter Elliot. Well James Arbuthnot would seem to agree with you I thought? He ‘welcomed the rumour’ that SecState was considering a switch back to the VSTOL for precisely that reason. In his view a, we don’t have the money to convert both, and b, if we revert to VSTOL we might be able to operate ‘both carriers rather than just one’. I also thought it interesting that Hammond opened his statement with ‘as the Prime Minister stated last week we will be guided the facts, and if the facts change, we will change our plans and not plough on regardless as the last government did’. To my mind kindof implied a u-turn was imminent, especially if they have the support of the Defence Commitee, which of course Arbuthnot chairs. He did however say that he would present their findings to the house ‘very shortly’. Personally I have to say that Im a fan of the ‘C’, range, payload etc, and not just because both the plane and the ships look nicer -lol! If however it means we can afford to operate both carriers in RN service, and by which I mean even if rarely at sea together, but there to cover refits etc, I would go with the ‘B’ anytime. Guess we must wait and see?
Yes indeed. Regarding refit costs of 2 hulls the logic goes that a ship that is in service half the time needs half the number of refits, so two ships alternating will generate the same number of refits as one ship being flogged year in year out.
Plus each refit can be planned and executed at leisure over a period of a couple of years in the most economical way without the pressure to get the ship back to sea ASAP.
granted the Shore:Sea ratio for the crew will be higher to refelct the greater number of sea days, but we are talking about marginal numbers here not orders of magnitude.
I personally favour plan “C” but if the cost of getting 2 hulls alternating in service is to switch to “B” then I can live with it.
The weapons payload difference between the too variants is interesting.If both jets have full internal fuel the difference is only 1000lbs in weapons payload its also interesting that the paveway 3 is not due to cleared internal on either jet but I don’t know if the uk intends a new 2000lb weapon, but the only other lg bomb the uk has is paveway 4 and it’s internal on both versions. The c bring back and the b bring back in srvl mode are also similar with the c being larger . Someone on here mentioned meteor issues on the b version but other than that I’m not really sure in practice how much we lose with the b. Increased maintencance on the b vrs increased training on the c might be the other balancing act.
@TD,
Not the picture I had in mind but close enough. Pod on left wing.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:F4D-1_VF-102_CVA-59_landing_Mar1961.jpg
Mark the B’s external hard points have a reduced capability compared to the other two. There only rated from the outside-in 300lbs, 1,500lbs, 5,000lbs. While the A and C is 300lbs, 2,500lbs, 5,000lbs. The internal 5,000lbs one being for drop tanks, and on the B is the only position that can take Storm Shadow.
@Mark
Much lower lifecycle costs and increased effectiveness of Dave C (mostly through longer range) mean that a buy of only ~20xDave C is needed to offset the conversion costs. Through life with a larger aircraft buy and we’re saving billions of pounds.
KP, I can imagine working with the MOD is no different, I’d probably have to sign out a leather helmet and a sponge keyboard so I could bang my head repeatedly without doing any additional damage to what’s been done already!
Peter E
If QE is F-35B & PoW is F-35C, is there a need for the crews to be completely trained seperately?
The engines,radars,comms,galleys,etc will be the same on both. Maintaining Merlins on both will be the same. Only a small number of crew will be F35B/C specific & or cats/traps.
The UK gov has poured in over £1 billion on F-35 R&D. The UK builds 10% of it. We cannot afford to write this off. The MoD will not be trusted with taxpayers cash, if we keep cancelling expensive kit at the last minute, with nothing to show for all the billions spent.
Jim
That’s all true but the c can’t carry it’s max weapons load with max internal fuel which is why I phrased it the way I did. The fuel pylon or storm shadow is the not unique to the b version but the raf requirement is a land requirement.
I know the pm said that but then if you add the additional training requirement for carriers I’m not sure it’s as big as claimed. As for the cost the averaged over program flyaway a/c cost eg not including development but including ancillary supt cost given in this years budget request to congress put the cost difference between the two a/c at 4m dollars.
@Ace, Yes,used the leather helmet many times, left one job as I was accused of leaving work on time at 18:00! “Yes,its ok,but most people stay till 20:00”! WHY,WHY,WHY. They sat there and did F*all until the “BOSS” left (who had done nothing since 14:00) because they worried about their jobs.
Sorry all, rant over.
KP, thought it was just me! Been there, done that, once the director had one of the blokes drop additional work off at my house at 10pm, to be done for the following day. Funnily enough I walked shortly afterwards.
Just to throw a curve-ball into the F-35 debate, does anyone know if drop tanks can be fitted in the weapons bays, for those ‘long distance, low drag ferry flight moments?’ Or is this a ludicrous suggestion?
Thanks Ace. Apologies TD, a little bit off thread. Stinking cold, will go and take some medicine.
The bay aren’t plumbed for fuel but there is some rumours the isrealis maybe looking at conformals.
Didn’t quite understand Mark’s response (we’ll here more, I’m sure) but this is the basis on which I don’t think (as stated before) the “B” will be a Tornado replacement:
“Jim says:
March 26, 2012 at 6:33 pm
Mark the B’s external hard points have a reduced capability compared to the other two. There only rated from the outside-in 300lbs, 1,500lbs, 5,000lbs. While the A and C is 300lbs, 2,500lbs, 5,000lbs. The internal 5,000lbs one being for drop tanks, and on the B is the only position that can take Storm Shadow.”
@ Wooden Wonder,
Aside from the excellent name which I hope is referring to one of the finest aircraft of WW2, I thought this was a good statement; “CVF was supposedly designed ‘for not with’ cats and traps…so why does is conversion so costly?”
This is why we all questioned the costs of the studies when they first came out (aside from the large expense for something that didn’t seem all that expensive). The Carriers were supposedly built with conversion in mind, so why does it take another £30 million to check whether they bothered to do the work that they were supposed to?
Very odd.
@ Paul G
“pink shrimps blow cola bottles out of the water, that is all”
Clearly your taste buds have been eroded by years of being around various fuels, oils and other chemical compounds. The Cola bottle is the supreme British penny sweet in every way, shape and form.
Acc
Hope this clears it up the storm shadow can only be carried on the 5000lb pylon no matter which varient we buy so it’s either extra fuel or stormshadow no matter which one we buy. The range requirement for deep strike is a land based requirement so if I can fwd base at sea all the time does that mitigate that range issue. Does fitting typhoon with conformal tanks mitigate that as that coupled with a single under fuse tank would give typhoon tornado range. That what I mean.
Hi Mark,
My answer to both of the questions would be: yes, and yes
As the first yes is further out into the future than the second one (that one is not funded – at least not yet), and bearing in mind that the second one becomes “redundant” with the first “yes” kicking in – but later in time… I am not trying to be confusing, just logical –
Then: does this all not mean that JSF and Typhoon are complementary, but there will be a very long bridge, provided by Tornado, if we don’t want to fund some UK-specific developments (effectively) twice?
Hi, Chris.B. You might expect that if we gave someone tens of millions of pounds to carry out a study into fitting cats’n’traps, we’d be able to ask how much it would cost and recieve an answer that was well within a one billion quid margin of error!
But perhaps my expectations are just too high.
Acc
Yes very complimentary but I would say its better to have both done as it maximises your options capabilty much more that the past. Problem with typhoon is 3 of the 4 partners arent that interested in developing it further and don’t even have all the systems fitted that current raf jet have.
Think they left space and weight for cats and traps don’t think any detail was ever really done in how to operate such a ship
A steam generator to fire an aircraft off the pointy end would be a big bit of kit. I would humbly suggest it would require a volume about the size of a single decker bus. Similarly arrestor gear isn’t trivial in its space requirements.
We could use a new MPA; so would a sizable MPA that could also carry a clutch of StormShadow fill the land based long range strike role better (in most of the likely scenarios the UK might face) than Typhoon – with just one or two missiles and a much higher dependency on AAR? Save the money, just don’t bother integrating it.
Eventually getting StormShadow aboard the carriers should still be worthwhile though.
You know I was slagging off journalists in the post
I dare you lot to read this
https://twitter.com/#!/haynesdeborah
Quality through and through with a dash of dodgy OPSEC to boot
@ x
“A steam generator to fire an aircraft off the pointy end would be a big bit of kit. I would humbly suggest it would require a volume about the size of a single decker bus. Similarly arrestor gear isn’t trivial in its space requirements.”
Surely the ship was designed with that in mind, what with the whole “fitted for, but not with”? It’s like building a car with space allotted for a future upgrade to CNG, then charging the owner for a study into how to fit the CNG, where it should go etc. Surely all of this was thought of in the beginning.
And BB made a good point. How can you do a study to come up with a price, only to do another study later and find out you were over 100% off the mark, without any political implications to drive up your cost?
TD
Where’s that biscuit tin and the sweets.
@TD, stop following attractive (well, a bit skinny actually) blondes. Surely you have better things to do than see what sort of tiny sandwiches she exists off?
Otherwise, it would, OMG, be *so* unfair :-(
Christ almighty that tweeting account has boiled my blood. Bored is she?
Well fuck off back to Blighty then you fucking cow.
Another reporter after some excitement, get shot at once and then go home thinking they know war when the blokes have to rinse and repeat for another 4 months.
I will stop there before I have a stroke.
TD – thanks for posting the Twitter feed. What an utterly vile, self obsessed little harridan she seems.
Clearly HMG should be prosecuting the war purely to provide her with good copy, and let her do things her way. Lets apply all 9,500 troops in theatre to help her get ‘her’ story, because nothing else matters.
Woeful isnt it
Surrounded by military stories of every shape, size and colour the Times Defence Editor comes up with bloody cats and spilled spag bol, no wonder the media team have decided she needs to have those tweets pre authorised as well
look at me, look at me
Perhaps she could use her down time to read a book about the big old subject of defence, you know, a bit of research.
Do these people have OPSEC briefings by the way and I am sure the little snippet of info about the two KIA’s will be well received by everyone as well
Fuck my old boots as they
Andy McNab looks like a bloke who used to be in Eastenders btw seeing as she name drops him.
Bet she’s gutted she didn’t get to see the blokes get shot or look at their dead bodies so she could experience it.
I had a camera crew follow me before I deployed, I naively thought it would be good and I could put across the story of the TA. We told them we weren’t interested anymore when the producer deliberately started to try and make my other half cry so she could film it.
Best news I had all tour was that one of them had been shot in the leg looking for action whilst they were out there.
It was a recent TA documentary. Can’t remember the name.
It’s all ego.
Slightly depressed that she got a place on a trooper that many other journalists, particularly local ones would have loved to have got. The end result is the impression of a whinging person, more obsessed with minor things, and moaning about the audacity of people in a warzone wanting to try to ensure that operational information is protected, and thus saving peoples lives, rather than her own precious little world.
What a truly awful woman!
@Phil: the TA and the Taliban by any chance?
Yeah that was the badger! They weren’t getting enough action where they were so I think they flew to PB4 and got a 7.62 for their trouble.
Good.
@ Chris B
Well I posted that more to see if somebody better informed would pipe up and say roughly where all these voids could be found. I suspect that the MoD would take the re-organise the innards route approach such as move cabins, blank off a chunk of the hanger, etc. etc.
As I understood it, the CVF design team asked for EMALS and AAG sizing, power etc requirements, but General Atomics was not allowed to give it to them. Blair never exploited all that the US were willing to give us, the idiot. I suspect this has made it harder, but given that ACA were in STOVL mode from day one, it’s easy to let the requirements for “for but not with” slip. That being said, CVF has plenty of size and potential power, which will make adaptation much easier. The same cannot be said about F35, which due to it’s single engine, is up against every limitation: even small weight gains can be crippling.
That’s real journalism, right there. You don’t get that from John Simpson.
http://s1-02.twitpicproxy.com/photos/full/545507041.jpg?key=7331024
Observer said: “Think the other way round might be better, external droptanks with weapons in the bays. Once engaged or heading into the Initial Point for the bombing run, it can drop the external tanks for maximum stealth. Of course, this means it can’t use “ambush” tactics in air to air as the enemy would have seen it as well, but it should help complicate AAM guidance in the head to head phase.”
I’m just thinking about regular patrols rather than specific missions. More fuel to make for a longer range, particularly on the F35B. For times when it isn’t required to be super stealthy nor carry lots of weapons. Perhaps even going so far as to remove the bomb bay doors and use distended belly tanks.(It is a Lightning …) And to push that idea further if the bomb bays were filled with flush fitting fuel tanks in place of the regular doors for patrols you could maybe have a couple more pylons on the underneath of the tanks. If you are operating them with external items maximum stealth has ceased to be a priority.
Two internal tanks plus two external tanks would still leave you with at least four pylons free on the existing design. Going by figures provided earlier in these comments that would allow for approximately 3600lbs for weapons on the B. Would that be enough for regular carrier operations? I don’t know what they would be expected to be armed with on a daily basis. Internal tanks would also allow for a bit longer range and still carrying Storm Shadow missiles.
I’m sure the RAF too would appreciate the longer range and more external pylons if they were to get the same plane as the Royal Navy. Even with the B they would generally be operating from runways so STOVL operations and stealth operations would be less of a priority for their day to day routine.
McNab? Wasn’t he the TC of Bravo 2-0? I’m surprised they allowed him in. He really screwed up that time.
Paul, what with that picture and that red trouser website I am getting concerned about your internet browsing, is it a craftsman thing?
Hansard from yesterdays fun and games in Parliament
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201212/cmhansrd/cm120326/debtext/120326-0001.htm#1203264000010
Hi Mark @ 9:43,
I of course agree “would say its better to have both done as it maximises your options capabilty ”
– but I was trying to track down the minimum
– and, consequently, for how long there will be a proper justification for the Tornado part in the overall fleet
TD, cheers for the link to Hansard. Looks to me that the fact that the RN will be ‘operating’ both carriers is beyond question now. Which is very positive news…
TD, thanks for the Hansard link
– the Chair of the Defence Committee paused for emphasis “would mean not having to find £2 billion *per carrier*” which I would read as cheering the home team on, on the final straight
– Hammond has totally dropped the cross-decking of aircraft as part of carrier co-op with the French, and now limits it to planning the dove tailing of deployments? Quite a change from the end of 2010
– he was talking about complex capability *trades*[I take it, as an excuse for it taking more time…well, it is not an excuse as it is very complex, but managing expectations after one has been created is difficult] in the pending carrier review (Hansard got it down as “traits”)
ACC, yes, I noticed the clarification on what interoperability with the French actually means in practice, coordinating deployments not having Bastille Day celebrations on the poop deck!
Hi Repulse,
Hammond actually side-stepped Russell Brown’s question completely:
“will he confirm that the Government will deliver continuous carrier strike capability by 2020, as outlined and pledged in the SDSR?”
Hi TD, which on the other hand need not be the definition of co-op with the Americans (flying the same planes)
So he will make a statement to the house shortly. I read it as both carriers will be completed and everything else has still to be decided. No change to quote Clint still a cluster fu**.
@ WF
I have said elsewhere that EMALS was what IT bods called vapourware. Something beyond an idea but yet much past a demonstration of principle engineering elements. The trouble today with everything being computerised it easy to flesh out ideas so they appear further along than what they are. Saying that CVF seems to be a rather “full” ship considering the RN’s modest (compared to the USN’s) needs.
F35 ARMED WITH GREEN LASER see image http://blogs.ottawacitizen.com/2012/03/26/photo-f-35-completes-first-night-refueling/
Well no its not but the way some press reporters are going these days would not be surprised to see the headline. However its a good shot of a night refueling exercise.
@x: well, for vapourware it appears to be merrily launching aircraft just fine :-)
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/EMALS-Electro-Magnetic-Launch-for-Carriers-05220/
@wf
The bit that still seems to be vapourware is the AAG.
Has anyone heard of an actual arrested landing using the prototype AAG yet?
@ wf
Is it launching aircraft from a British hull? Will the system be exactly the same as the US system or require modifications as those things we British buy so often seem to do because we need it a different length, weight, size, colour, or made out of chocolate to fit exacting MoD specifications? Is there a system in a “crate” in Scotland ready to be fitted? For the MoD it is a vapourware. But a bit further on that I remembered!!!! :) ;)
Good quote:
“The collaboration that we have discussed and intend to progress with the French essentially concerns carrier deployment—working together to ensure deployments that make sense and which are coherent when looked at together. It is not about interoperability of aircraft as such. We expect that whatever decision we come to, the co-operation and collaboration that we have been discussing with the French will go ahead and will be an important part of our posture in operating our carrier strike force.”
I like the references to “continuous carrier strike capability” as it piles political pressure on in support of what i believe was always a covert decision of the SDSR – that although the costs of two carriers could not be committed to in SDSR2010, they will be in SDSR2015.
I remain pretty sure we’ll keep both.
Yes CVF will have a wine cooler fitted. And the CdeG will have a system fitted to keep beer warm.
@x: god knows why we should make changes to EMALS. You would hope the MOD wouldn’t be that stupid….
But it’s real. So there is some hope :-)
@ wf
For all it is working over and even considering we were going for F35b originally I find EMALS to be a flakey. I think what I have been trying to say is if forethought for CATOBAR was built in from the get go, considering the size of the ship and that steel and fresh air are still cheap, space would have built in for a conventional steam system from the get go.
This is the third time I’ve written this: “I HATE THIS FU**ING COMPUTER!”
Re: the lack of cannon on the F-35B/C, the Swedes had a novel idea for the cannon-less JA-37 Viggen, they ‘scabbed’ a 30 mm cannon onto the underside of the fuselage adjacent to the centreline pylon, so you could still use it.
It only carried around 125 rounds, but it was better than nothing and ok for a couple of squirts. A cannon scabbed onto the underside of the F-35 might actual stealthier than the proposed cannon pod, plus it would free up the centreline pylon for other stores.
Journalists: Robert Fisk, there’s a man who knows about detail.
Hi, x.
EMALS isn’t vapourware, but it is still in the Alpha phase; and if the Royal navy get the first cats rather than the US Navy, we will have the Beta product with all the expensive glitches (though some are now saying that the US will be footing the bill for any unexpected cost growth regardless of who has it first).
This probably links in to the question ACC pointed to earlier about continuous carrier strike by 2020 – no chance; not enough aircraft about; air and deck crews still finding their feet; and the first operational EMALS still getting debugged.
X, as for diffeent length, weight, size, colour etc. Fitting the American inches of EMALS into the European centimetres of the QE’s voids could take quite a bit of hammering.
Regarding equipment and resources.
The USN and USMC, with three times the UK budget, has a 200,000 land force, complete with organic Air Superiority, Ground Attack and ISTAR fixed wing, attack and transport rotary, along with armour and artilery.
It operates 11 super carriers, 40 landing ships, 100 escorts 71 nuclear submarines, and 3700 aircraft.
That we cant afford a 70,000 man army, 3 super carriers, 15 landing ships, 30 escorts, 20 submarines and 1000 aircraft would seem, odd.
We’ve not had a Security Strategy since Suez went tits up, we’ve outsourced it, or ignored it, or indulged in fantasy.
Terrorists arent a threat the UK.
Can anyone provide a single example of a successful insurgency fought without foreign aid? Or I suppose massive internal support?
Yet thats what the National Security Exercise identified as our biggest threat, none state actors with high school chemistry and the anarchists cookbook.
Since anyone with even a MoDicum of brainpower can see the above is not a threat capable of violently overthrowing HMG, is it any wonder strategic thinking has been replaced with equipmentism?
If The Question is
“How does this prevent the violent interuption of Lawful Rule by Herm Majesties Government”, a great deal of this sites sacred cows come under the sword, but CVF and F35 do not…
@ Brian B
I suspect it will reach a gamma, delta, and epsilon phase and then somebody will just figure out boiling water is cheaper…… :)
@x
Ever get a suspicion that you are complaining just for the sake of complaining?
EMALS is beyond a doubt not vapourware, you just needed something to complain about, so you downgraded it to vapourware. Bad boy.
I’m actually curious as to how it works. Flemming’s left hand rule indicates that to launch an object, the object must have either a current running through it, or generate a magnetic field to push off from the current generated one. Wonder if they electrically charged or magnetized the plane.
I can remember watching a documentary on a Japanese maglev train project (I really should get out more!), they stated the projected costs were quoted as around a million pounds a metre. Ok, that was a few years ago, but it gives you an idea regarding the costs of the EMALS system.
Observer, I’m guessing that the EMALS system utilises some sort of ‘captive sledge’ that attaches to the nose wheel of the aircraft in the time honoured manner. Electrically charging or magnetising the aircraft on a regular basis can’t be good for the aircraft.
Those calling for a reversion to Steam Catapult and Hydraulic Arrest on the grounds of cost need to think about the impact on airframe fatigue.
One of the advantages of EMALS and AAG is that it is kinder to the airframes than Steam and Hydraulic. If the planned 8,000 hour life of the UK’s F35 fleet could be extended by just 10% becuase of the effect of using EMALS & AAG then the savings in deferred replacement expenditure are huge.
The figure of 8,000 hours (and the eqivalent number of launches and traps) must be based on the fact that the USN will still have Nimitz class Steam Catapults in service for the next 40 years, so all the USN’s F35C fleet will have some exposure to this system throught their lives. If EMALS is fitted to both QEC from 2020 then the UK F35C will never meet a Steam Catapult in their lives, and so should last considerably longer than their USN equivalents.
@Ace
You’re right on the doing weird stuff to airframes part, which is why I’m curious as to how they plan to go about it. I’m going to take a closer look at the EMALs videos on Youtube to see if I can spot something like a wheel sledge.
(It’s a trick, they just have a HUGE pair of rubber bands under the deck.) ;P
BB, RE: EMALS, “we will have the Beta product with all the expensive glitches”
Makes sense, we’re doing the same with the aircraft..
“Observer, I’m guessing that the EMALS system utilises some sort of ‘captive sledge’ that attaches to the nose wheel of the aircraft in the time honoured manner.”
Everything I’ve seen and heard so far points to this. You’ll just have a fairly standard sled to connect to the nosewheel, then it’s the sled that gets accelerated, taking the aircraft with it.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CSZr58hH_cI
EMALS, F-35, a sled. Job Done.
Observer, youtube video:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=euLsg_viWW0
Look at the black and white ‘wedge’ at 0:27 and 1:19, the latter shows the ground crew linking it to the nosewheel.
I am more interest to know what margins were built in at the planning stage for CATOBAR beyond the normal FFBNW etc.
Chris.B, great link, for all its project problems, F-35 still looks like a truly exceptional aircraft.
Just had a look on the Wikipedia entry for the QE2 CVF, never mind the catapult system, look at the self defence kit:
Phalanx CIWS, 30 mm guns, Miniguns
No SAMS? Given the cost and value (both human and strategic) of the ship, I’d have thought it would have a more comprehensive defence system than this.
T45 had better be as good as people say it is!
May want to upgrade to a missile CIWS such as SeaRam at some point in the future though!
As good as I think T45 will be, I do find it odd that CVF has no missile defence of its own.
If they put the ski-jump back they could put some packs of SeaCeptor to one side and perhaps hang a few more packs off the quarters. Unlike the Italians I don’t think we thought too much about defending our carrier. We don’t do kinetics. :)
Something to consider, numbers from the Phoenix Think Tank, a F35B on internal fuel only, flying at an economical speed has an endurance of 90 minutes, compared to 190 minutes for the F35C.
So on missions like CAP it takes two Bs to do the same job as one C.
Peter Elliot, X, Chris B totally agree, but remember when these were planned we were supposed to have 12 T45s. Would not be surprised to see Sea Ceptor added at some time. There is a space between the forward island and the lift which could be used as well.
Yes Jim plenty of space and options,
http://militarytimes.com/blogs/scoopdeck/files/2009/09/cvf-qe-in-dock.jpg
Look back aft on the port quarter and you can see the VLS for Aster……..
http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_NjHp5DLYx9o/TOkIqpOpgyI/AAAAAAAAAyk/JML9UhxXLiY/s1600/Italian%2Baircraft%2Bcarrier%2BCavour.jpg
It would make sense to upgrade the Phalanx to a Rolling Airfame platform or the SeaRam as mentioned earlier. With all the guns, it does look like the RN is worried about swarming small craft.
And no. No SAMs anywhere near the jump ramp. You don’t want your own planes anywhere near your own air defences. Especially if the Phalanx radar gets reused. Those don’t recognise IFF. It would be hilariously tragic if your own AAMs closed off your ability to launch planes.
Of course we took Sea Dart off the in Invincibles to make space for more aircraft. Maybe some of the same thinking has been at work here?
I guess if there will always be at least one T45 and often 2 in company then fitting a third set of Sea Viper to the task group could look like overkill. After all a T45 can never launch a FJ whereas a QEC can – so it makes sense to design around maximising your primary weapons system.
I note however that USS Gerald Ford will have the ESSM and top-of-the-range radar so the USN clearly thinks differently on that one.
@ Peter E
Well CVF will always sit at the centre of the task group. And the fewer FJ there are the more shipborne AAW will be needed. Then there is a being able to send the T45 off down threat. And then there are technical problems.
We could play fantasy-fleets-what-if and speculate about CVF + SeaViper and an escort group of say 4 cheap diesel frigates (for the cost of say 2 T45) with PDMS and ASW helicopter group.
Has anyone worked out what we are actually going to use these money-sucking CVF monsters to do? It seems to me to be a rather more fundamental question than what sort of missile they have on them, or don’t (and that question is certainly not an invitation to come up with all sorts of additional expenditure!).
In strategic terms, I believe they are fundamentally mismatched to either our real needs, or indeed our doctrine. They will be 7 pound sledgehammers to crack a hazelnut, but then when we need to change a fuse in a plug, the only tool in our toolbox is a seven pound sledgehammer. That’s not ignoring the reality of the procurement, which is clearly proceeding. But when launched, what are they actually going to do? Obviously, one will be permanently in refit, so we are only talking about one CVF available at any one point in time.
Let’s hope these CVFs cost pennies a year to run, because that’s all we will have left.
With a ship’s crew smaller than the Invincibles, and turbo electric power, they aren’t going to be expensive to run. There’s a reason that cruise liners have become more affordable (if not always well crewed!), it’s because electric propulsion makes them cheaper.
AIrcraft carriers are a lot more flexible than destroyers or submarines. They can both make and defend amphibious landings, defend large areas of sea against high end threats, and do disaster recovery. Morever, they are future proofed: the aircraft that fly off them can be changed or updated. A destroyer or sub can only be replaced
According to the gov
The CVF is to be a joint defence asset with the primary purpose of providing the UK with an expeditionary offensive air capability that has the flexibility to operate the largest possible range of aircraft in the widest possible range of roles.
Including
As an early coercive presence that can promote conflict prevention through deterrence
As a flexible and rapidly deployable offshore base during expeditionary operations when airfields may be unavailable or denied, or when facilities ashore are still being established
Contributing to the support of peacekeeping forces, and, when necessary, initiating offensive military action .
James
Elephants will be used for everything.
Carrier junkies are so inventive at creating reason justifying there habit.
Expecting any day some carrier junky to suggest it will be used as a replacement for FRES, or Chally 2!
Coz at the moment its a Fleet carrier, a ‘Strike’ carrier (whatever the hell that is), an LHA, etc etc. The important word of course to a CJ is carrier, the rest is just verbage.
@ James
We could use them as giant floating venues for Royal Marine Band concerts,
http://farm7.staticflickr.com/6240/6338699872_372bb17edd_z.jpg
http://img257.imageshack.us/img257/8420/610xght.jpg
James these money-sucking CVF monsters are still cheaper that Typhoon and FRES. In fact the ships are cheap its the aircraft selected to fly off them thats expensive.
@ James
http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_WDsEaKOhn9U/R3CvPnrQiFI/AAAAAAAABmY/1f5_KqR6qA0/s320/golf-on-aircraft-carrier.jpg
A different Gareth, “if the bomb bays were filled with flush fitting fuel tanks in place of the regular doors for patrols you could maybe have a couple more pylons on the underneath of the tanks.”
Like that idea! With a cannon scabbed onto the lower fuselage and an inflight refuelling probe in one of the wing drop tanks….what are we going to call it? The F-35D?
@x
I see you picked a vapourware American carrier for the golf conversion.
You could do really good crazy golf too where the ball is suddenly whisked away on a sled powered by big, powerful electromagnets…
“You could do really good crazy golf too where the ball is suddenly whisked away on a sled powered by big, powerful electromagnets…”
Carrier golf. We’ve just invented a new sport.
Place the ball on the tee (sled), select the right power setting and try to drop it into the hangar of a frigate sailing up ahead.
@ Peter E
Some of the holes are connected to the steam main. And some have electro-magnetic wotsits in them. It is going to take about three years of testing to decide which system is best for getting the balls back out.
Crazy golf? Um. Now that could be a problem. Where would put the little windmill? Back aft? Fo’ard? And what orientation for the little sails? I suppose we could have a proper miniature windmill?
I know what you are thinking won’t the blades interfere with ship’s systems. Well funnily enough no the Cloggies, who invented the windmill, have got that covered……
http://www.dynamixx-e2d.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1188:raytheon-to-help-dutch-air-force-mitigate-wind-farm-radar-interference&catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=67
@James
Well, they’re here to stay, so I’m sure you’ll find something for them to do, even if it’s just a floating flight training center, which is what the Americans use them for most of the time anyway.
Hmm… close some airfields and flight schools and transfer them to the CVF? Might be a more economical use of them than sailing up and down the Atlantic.
And I really dislike the F-35, not only due to budget overruns and delays, but also the fact that their stealth is reduced to a ” Congressionally permitted level of stealth.” Which means 1) It isn’t the best. 2) It DELIBERATELY isn’t the best. and 3) Politicians are once again tying the hands of people that might have to use the damn plane in a war.
Unfortunately, like the carrier, it’s here to stay.
You can say this for the MoD, they have somewhat classic comedic timing
http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/News-and-Events/Latest-News/2012/March/27/130327-Yeovilton-Hunter
Could they work on CVF?
We are where we are.
Large chunks of QE/PoW exist now.
If the carrier haters get them scrapped, then the backlash against ALL big MoD projects, means their fave tanks/helos/frigates/missiles,etc ALL get canned.
We dare not make large defence projects too politically toxic.
John Hartley
What you have is always cheaper than what you have to buy.
Elephants are very much a ‘fact on the ground’ or rather slipway.
So we will use them for something. But a 65,000 ton floating ‘useful’ space. had bettter be cheao to use and flexiblke. One thing it really will not do is ever carry 36 F35 c or d into some glorious ‘strike action’. You know what we are paying for them for….
Jim @ 9.48 / TD @ 10.45
The problem with replacing the Harrier with the F35 is that one is a light fighter – versatile / flexible / economical – while the other is a full on US MIC fleece the taxpayer special / very top dollar bloated project that is well on the way to producing a heavyweight unaffordable aircraft.
The figures involved with the F35 project are now just short of lunacy, I think the numbers would put a man on Mars and a woman on Venus.
What I find really troubling about the whole project is the way the original F22 technology seems to be being thrifted specifically the stealth dimension while the price just keeps going up and up. At the moment LM seems to be as dysfunctional as Tesco.
@ IXION
Roman soldiers apparently had a saying “have you seen the elephant?” meaning “have you seen combat?”
I think Hannibal lost both his elephants and his navy.
@ all
Since people have been looking at what we’ve got left in storage and money is still obviously tight at the MOD why don’t we go back to basics and what we have used in the past? It worked then….. Right?
After looking at this website: http://www.demobbed.org.uk/aircraft.php I think I have found the ultimate solution for the near term. Most of these aircraft are covered in hangers and museums so they should still have a bit of life in them but they may take a bit of work to get into service but think of the jobs! ;)
Fleet Air Arm
6x sea hawk
5x Sea Vixen
4x Gannet (various flavours)
10x McDD Phantom + the Americans may have a few in the boneyard we could have
9x Buccaneers
Royal Air Force
50x Jaguars at Cosford (DCAE)
9x Vulcan
So for the FAA we could have a Carrier Air Wing of 4x Gannet (3 AEW, 1x COD/Tanker), 6x Buccaneers and 9x McDD Phantom (assuming we get a few spares from the boneyard). And in 4 ASW Merlin helicopters and 2 Lynx for plane guard gives us a nice 25 plane package.
As for the RAF, can Tornado and integrate strike weapons for Typhoon. Drag the 50 or so Jaguars out of DCAE (most of the Jags seem to be in taxi-able condition) and form 3x 9 plane CAS squadrons with a training OCU flight and spares. For long range Bombing drag the 9 Vulcan B2’s out of storage and museums, re-engine with EJ200 (non-afterburning) which is slightly smaller and lighter and fit some new avionics. 9 should mean we can have one at continual readiness to do a long range strike/bombing mission. Each Vulcan could carry 8 storm shadow missiles. So instead of the RAF’s epic several long range Tornado strikes (and I am not having a dig at the crews of the tornados it was an impressive feat) to lob 6-8 Stormshadows from the UK at Libya, they could have used say 2 Vulcans and launched twice as many missiles possibly without or very little AAR support?
And as a final thought to all these depressing defence related times:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=buqtdpuZxvk
or should that be:
And pray that there’s intelligent life somewhere up in space,
‘Cause there’s b*gger all down here IN THE MOD?
I’ll get my coat
P.S. this was a light-hearted response, and I still have most of my faculties remaing (I think?). Again good piece TD
Forget who asked the question but on the matter of long range fuel tanks in the F-35 weapons bays.
The RAAF looked at this as an option early on in the project when Lockheed was calling for national requirements in return for money.
The idea was to use F-35A’s with 2 fuel tanks in place of internal JDAM’s as a replacement for the RAAF recom pallet equipped F-111c’s. They could still carry 2 AMRAAM’s as self defence. The issue seemed to die as F-35 weight problems surfaced.
@ The MM
On the understanding that your post was more jovial than anything, but interesting to bring up, for the price of putting those aircraft back in the air (given the life left in them and their design) you’d be better off asking BAE to build something new, like a modern version of the Jaguar e.g. designed from scratch as a “light bomber/CAS”, with no radar, no fly by wire gubbins etc, but perhaps with a bit more range and an integral laser marker.
Chris B.,
The lack of Naval Jaguar was a terrible missed opportunity — and yet an oustanding opportunity to blame the French for something when they’ve earned it :)
Two slightly random thoughts. These thoughts are based on the RN being caught in a much wider wave, across most of the world’s navies, of the trend to “newer, fewer, and multi-role.” In that case, one of the principal potential virtues of CVF (the platform onto which F35 is to be plunked) is that you can have an LPH replacement and a “traditional” carrier of roughly the strength of CdeG in a non-“strike” (ie not loaded with two dozen rafale and 4-5 AEW/ASW) configuration inside one hull at the same time:
– I’ll ask those in the know around here, and there are some: what would it take to STOBAR Rafale, and what would you get in the end? (I say this because, like BB, I think that if the India kerfuffle amounts to anything more than the usual dance over Indian defence procurement, then Dassault will find their conkers well and truly in a vice and a gentle squeeze would do wonders for MoD’s meagre resources.) I don’t want a technophile engineer’s answer — it’s not optimal! Horrors! :) — because optimisation isn’t the point. It doesn’t have to compete against Dave-C, or even itself. In STOBAR it just needs to compete with the only other real short-takeoff option, F35B. Rafale’s solid range (even when you cream off French hyperbole it’s at least as good as Dave-C) doesn’t matter so much, nor its payload, if you intend to use it over shorter distances on something that’s also sending out long-legged helis, and that’s acting principally in a CAP/CAS role to enable sea control, defeat of enemy naval assets, and enabling Army forces to get ashore and set up shop, rather than in the semi-mythic world of “first-day strike” where all Douhet’s fantasms come for a quiet pint and some prawn-flavoured crisps.
– One of the main reasons I can see for shifting back to Dave-B, given the enormous expense, is not only creating options for an efficient carrier/LPH hybrid, but to get a head start — for some company that’s not BWoS (maybe Bombardier can buy even further into British aerospace’s physical and human capital?) — to build a follow on VSTOL or STOL fighter. There’s clearly a market — look at all the interests that will either be disappointed (now window-shopping for their flatdecks) or outright ****ed (looking at you, Armada and Marina Militare, not even getting started on USMC) if Dave-B went for the chop. Also, like several commenters here already the death of manned air is overrated — the difficulty is the exquisite platforms. There had been step-backs from that in the past: from knights to cavalry, the arquebus to musketry, etc. We haven’t seen that yet in the era of aerospace engineering but it’s not an impossible result, and I don’t mean just UAV swarms or Super Tucanos. But even if platforms remain relatively exquisite, you’ll still need man-in-the-loop “shepherds,” and a set of human eyes somewhere in the process is particularly useful on CAS, where something logisticaly and physically nimble in small spaces like a V/STOL platform comes in handy. God forbid we look ahead on industry’s behalf of course ….
Jackstaff
I would say the landing is more difficult than the take off. Requires more experience more people more training more ship modifications potientaly benefits in about a decade to ease this. Takeoffs have been practically hands free since the hornet entered service so the benefits of the stobar option are minimal in my view.
As for rafale take off it needs to get to anywhere between 130-150 knts in less than 700ft it currently requires 1600 ft+ on land so your reducing payload a lot to make it work it’s structural weight will pretty much be stipulated by the landIng so not much room for savings there.
Isn’t Gripen the one that will potentially be STOBAR? Saab have set up a design office in London for the Sea version. Sure I read they expected to be able to beliver in 18 months if they got an order.
Grippen has a lot going for it if they ever produce a naval version. Cheaper, faster, newer (F35 excepted) and goes farther than the competition. Designed to be rearmed and refueled in 10 minutes. Can even works onshore from rough and ready airstrips including roads.
@Jim
When Saab announced the London design office, they seemed to suggest that they had received encouragement from the MoD.
‘The Swedish company announced its plan following a 24 May meeting with Ministry of Defence officials in London, where it is also to open a new headquarters to accommodate the project team.
The move comes as Saab chief executive Håkan Buskhe has revealed a strategy to significantly expand the company’s presence in the UK by pursuing fresh business opportunities. “The MoD is looking for competition,” he said.’
It’s in an article here: http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/saab-to-complete-sea-gripen-design-work-in-uk-357137/
P.S. I see the article quotes delivery by 2018 rather than the mad 18 months I suggested – that was the design phase. Doesn’t 2018 tie in with the UK carrier programme?
As mentioned up thread the hole in the market isn’t really either CATOBAR or STOBAR shaped. Maybe Saab should be hiring ex harrier engineers in a hurry?
Saab’s culture of rugged, reliable, low weight, low cost platforms would suit ‘Harrier 3’ and be very attractive to those countries fed up waiting to be fleeced for F35B.
I’ve seen the 2018 delivery date used in SAAB documents, clinch. certainly goes to reduce our programme risk further if we do choose cats’n’traps. Nice to know there could be a cheap alternative to fall back on if we can’t afford the F35 in usefull numbers, unlike if we choose the B version.
The USN Growlers will not be replaced by F35 any time soon. Buying F18 potentially gets us that considerable EW capability too; does F35’s stealth trump F18’s electronic warfare? And to what cost?
We should also conside that in ten years time that an early operational version of X47b could quite conceivably have carried out simple strike missions, and the technology will only continue to mature. So taking one of the other three CATOBAR (Rafale, F18, Naval GripenNG) aircraft doesn’t necessarily write us out of long range and/or stealthy strike.
If asked to make a choice, I would choose CATOBAR, it makes the carrier more useful strategically, and gives it greater flexibility in the types of aircraft it can use.
I’ve commented before that mixing the F-35 with the carrier program confused the issue massively. Instead of designing a carrier for air power, it now seems like the carrier was designed for the plane, arse backwards as it is. You design aircraft to launch from carriers, not carriers to launch specific aircraft.
Some of the CVF comments here are I’m afraid, the same old urban myths that have somehow become “fact” over time.
Myth 1 – The EPP is “dominated by CVF/QEC”. Given that the total cost of QEC (the ship) is allegedly somewhere between £5BN and £7Bn depending on what you count as in or out , yet the EPP provision for pure capital spend ranges between £7-10Bn pa over the last four and (planned) future four years. QEC build programme began in 2008 and is due to complete in 2020. If you divide £7Bn by 12 years, you get just shy of £600M pa (or 8.5% of the lowest Capital spend year). Now obviously, QEC spend will actually be more concentrated than an average value, but even taking (say) eight years of QEC spend (£875M pa)you can only get 12.5% of total capital. Hardly dominating, although it may be the highest single total. No, I haven’t included the aircraft, but they are allegedly to be multi-use across capabilities, depending on whether this suits particular briefers or not.
Myth 2 – There was no plan behind the use and size of the ships. The Staff Target (7068) for the ships was endorsed in the dog days of John Majors government and confirmed a requirement (subsequently validated in SDR98) for up to 40 aircraft per ship. This was an output of reams of operational analysis carried out independently of the Navy (I23/24 were the study numbers I recall). Subsequent OA at the end of the 90s suggested that a sortie rate of 100+ / day was required, which led to an understanding that the 40000te ships proposed as concepts would need to be bigger to deliver that rate. The number of aircraft did not change. Size with ships is not directly proportional to cost by the way and when the price for the larger ships was submitted by the ACA it was £3.2Bn. Unfortunately, no-one had updated the EP (as was) which remained at £2.8Bn. A two year round of trying to square this circle ensued, which achieved nothing other than delay and ensuring costs actually grew. In any case, although the sortie rates have been revised down in recent years, this has largely been based on the assumption that “somebody” (for which, read the US) will provide other bits of the requirement. Obama has been quite explicit recently that this can no longer be relied on, so expect the sortie rate to go up again, unless somehow peace and light breaks out worldwide or more pertinently in the Mediterranean / Africa / Middle East.
Myth 3 – The carriers were sized and build yard allocated either to appease or at the behest of, Gordon Brown. In fact the one person who did the most to prevent the carriers being built and so incurred the most cost escalation is the aforementioned Financial Genius. The ships were already at their current size or larger by 2001. The only yards in the country that could have constructed them in one place were Swan Hunter and Harland and Wolff, but by 2001, both yards had lost the facility to do so (it isn’t just a dock). From that point, it was always going to be a distributed manufacture and the only other places capable of assembling the ships were Inchgreen (Clyde), Nigg (NE Scotland) or Rosyth. Given that Rosyth was active (although not as a shipyard), while the other two were essentially derelict or mothballed, Rosyth was a no-brainer. As I write, the build appears to be going very well indeed.
Myth 4 – Operating the F35C will require some form of airborne tanker. Maybe, maybe not. However, F35B will also need a tanker as it’s landing serial (rolling VL) will take up as large amount of deck area (if not more) as an arrested landing and will consequently be exposed to the same risks of “delay”, exacerbated by having a limited amount of fuel with which it (the F35B) can land.
Unfortunately, “baby” carriers (ie thsoe with less than 30-odd aircraft) make very little sense militarily. It should not be forgotten that we ended up with our CVS by accident. They were supposed only to provide ASW helos and a limited anti-shadower capability. That they subsequently managed to do more was largely due to a design with a lot of flat deck and a one-off of an aircraft, flown by some superb naval aviators. However, once the need to have aircraft carriers was re-established, the replacement was always going to be bigger to deliver a “useful” capability.
Without carriers, there is little point in most of the other naval assets, save SSK, MCMV and OPV for coastal defence. Similarly, there is no capability requirement for the RAF to have anything other than Air Defence aircraft and possibly support helicopters. The Army need only have a sufficient cadre to provide anti-incursion to the UK.
That should save an absolute fortune.
The “selective European” model for force structure (ie have “useful” platforms that can do a bit of what is required overall) relies on having “someone” to provide the difficult bit. Uncle Sam is clear that he isn’t doing that, so who will it be?
Hi clinch, RE
“Doesn’t 2018 tie in with the UK carrier programme?”
– yes, it does
– training the ship’s crew (off Lusty ’14 and Ocean… by then, putting her in ‘ready [?] reserve’)
So, Brazil is the way to go (and a few 26’s on the deal)
– only Gripen and Rafale still in that competition
Not A Boffin
Sorry but we have ended up with 65,000 ton baby carriers.
Myth One
A fixed 10 year slice (and in fact only going to increase in reality there are many circles yet to be squared- does your figure incluse the cats and traps debacle?); remains a huge slice of a diminishing cake.
Myth 2
IF you accept the need for these elephants, then fine, but we aint gonna 40 aircraft per ship etc etc, so the staff target might as well have been for nuclear hoverships.
Myth 3
The decision not to use a polish/other european or even Korean yard that turns out 65,000 ton plus ships like shelling peas; has produced a very costly build. The decision not to go european was a directly political one. Backed by the square jawed sons of Nelson who would have had a fit driving a Korean carrier hull about. (Cue jokes about there not beinga any old sea dogs o board becuse the chef’s cooked them.)
Myth4
This is exactly my (and if I may Take TD’s name in vain his as well) Point. Big shiny elephants with fast sexy pointy jets on them, are useless without boring things like AEW and tankers, which our plans for seem to be at the back of fag packet stage.
The elephants will only carry 12 aircraft so no better force multipliers than any 30,000 tonner.
The point is your right:- about staff targets requirements etc; we just could not afford them in the first place and were just dumb to try. Instead of getting our strike carriers with 40 odd aricraft we have 2 big fur coats but no Knickers.
‘Without carriers, there is little point in most of the other naval assets, save SSK, MCMV and OPV for coastal defence. Similarly, there is no capability requirement for the RAF to have anything other than Air Defence aircraft and possibly support helicopters. The Army need only have a sufficient cadre to provide anti-incursion to the UK.
That should save an absolute fortune’
Sounds like a plan
X
Romans never liked war elephants – why? Because to their sober sensible millitary minds they were at least as much danger to their own side as the enemy; and cost a fortune to feed; tying up men and rescouces. No parrallels there then….
The move to F35B is an RAF drive. Hammond wants to close the £38BN hole by the end of this Parliamentary session so is looking for quick wins. CAS bypassed the normal routes and proposed the worst case estimate for converting the carriers as a viable saving – £2.9BN according to BAE’s estimate.
So the RAF is willing to cut off its nose to spite its face in order to play politics. And BAE’s quote for changing the design is outrageous. My US colleagues are laughing at our inability to rein in our contractors, especially the cost of fitting cats and traps. Just bear in mind that the unit cost of a Nimitz supercarrier is currently estimated at $4.5BN – that’s £2.9BN in Sterling. Add to that the fact that EMALS is already paid for – £400M paid last year.
Rumours abound of offers from Newport News to do the conversion work for us at a substantially reduced cost. Now wouldn’t that be hilarious?
I will also be switching on my smug mode later this year when F35B finally gets shitcanned. Of course by then we will have backtracked on F35, fucked off the USN having already screwed over the USMC, degraded our relationship with our closest ally and the end result will be billions wasted, a politician or two sacked, and (as usual) the RN will be left holding a pile of shit and will bend over backwards again to come up with some sort of capability from it.
If this sort of fantasy toy-swapping goes on in Westminster and Whitehall, together with the politicking and policy abuse by the other two Heads of Service unwilling to surrender their empires, it’s small wonder we end up in such absurd situations.
Somewahtinvolved
‘the RN will be left holding a pile of shit’
Thats what you get when you own elephants. Maybe The RN could go inot rubbarb production to defray the costs….
Hi PE, RE
“Saab’s culture of rugged, reliable, low weight, low cost platforms ”
– Draken, Mach 2 on one of the engines that the BAE Lightning had two of, was not bad?
That’s one thing I’ve always wanted to know about SRVL. If the F-35b requires SRVL to bring back a meaningful load (and at the moment it seams to?) And the length of deck required for SRVL is about the same size as the landing area for a CATOBAR or STOBAR carrier then surely going for a STOBAR or CATOBAR Gripen for example (based on range/payload) would be cheaper? Plus the Gripen can be re-engined with the EJ200. There was also some rumour of turning the 2 seater version of the Gripen into a EW varient like the Growler.
So I really have two questions
1) How much deck space is required for SRVL? How often would we have to use this method compared to VL
2) Could we not reduce the tornado fleet to around 50 (so about reduce by half), put of buying the F-35c till 2025 (osd for tornado), fit cats to one carrier in this parliment and buy long lead items for the second to be converted meaning that the next government would need finish the job and order about 45 Naval Gripens (possibly in partnership with brazil- through them some work) which would allow 36 jets at most to be embarked or more regularly 18 navl gripens with support aircraft?
The navy could then have by 2030:
2x 14 plane Gripen Squadrons (allows for 2 tankers)
1x 12 plane F-35c squadron
1x 8 plane EW Gripen squadron
This would allow 2 semi-permanemt airgroups to be formed of 14x Gripen, 4x EW Gripen, 6x F-35c for strike, plus supporting AEW and ASW assets on a regular basis. The RAF would the rely on 100 batch 2/3 Typhoons and say 50 F-35c for strike. Giving UK plc around 200 fast jets in total. Which I think is more than enough.
Sorry for the long post and possible spelling errors I wrote this on my phone
@ACC
Nowhere in there did I say ‘low capability’. I’m an admirer of Saab. Thoese adjectives are compliments. :-)
“Saab’s culture of rugged, reliable, low weight, low cost platforms ”
@ Not A Boffin
Many here would argue that the RAF and Army don’t need a sizeable navy to project power. They will say they have always had access to bases and over flying rights. What would you say to those commentators?
@TMM
Only issue with your plan is that it leaves us with 3 types of FJ in service rather than the 2 we are currently aiming for, so some of your capital savings would have to be reinvested in the logistical tail.
Also for me the EW it should go in the same bag with MPA and ISTAR: ie a modular suite on a non fighty airframe.
Hi PE, yes , that is my reading of those words, too
@ Not a Boffin –
Good post generally, but particularly the following:
“The “selective European” model for force structure (ie have “useful” platforms that can do a bit of what is required overall) relies on having “someone” to provide the difficult bit. Uncle Sam is clear that he isn’t doing that, so who will it be?”
Spot on!
@ Peter Elliot
Thanks for the reply. I always thought the 2 fast jet types were only an RAF requirement and to my mind the F-35c is going to be overkill for most situations in the next 15 years short of a major op taking place. Therefore I suggested using an EJ200 engined naval gripen for the FAA because a) the gripen is renowned for having low running costs and b) the EJ200 would allow us to have commonallity with Typhoon for a degree. Plus the Gripen would allow us from day one to use the vast majority of weapons we have in service now without paying for integration. So the future fast-jet fleet in my mind should look like:
106 Typhoons – 5x 12 squadrons for RAF+ 14 plane OCU/OEU
66 F-35c – 2x 12 plane RAF squadrons, 1x FAA squadron + 14 plane OCU/OEU
48 Naval Gripens – 2x 14 plane FAA squadrons+ 8 plane OCU
So the RAF would have 7 frontline squadrons and the FAA would have 3. With a total fast jet fleet of 220.
NaBoffin,
Like jedi above, I agree with most of it, but as you have chosen to have catchy headlines, your myth n:o 1 makes no sense?
“Myth 1 – The EPP is “dominated by CVF/QEC”. Given that the total cost of QEC (the ship) is allegedly somewhere between £5BN and £7Bn depending on what you count as in or out , yet the EPP provision for pure capital spend ranges between £7-10Bn pa over the last four and (planned) future four years. QEC build programme began in 2008 and is due to complete in 2020. If you divide £7Bn by 12 years, you get just shy of £600M pa (or 8.5% of the lowest Capital spend year). Now obviously, QEC spend will actually be more concentrated than an average value, but even taking (say) eight years of QEC spend (£875M pa)you can only get 12.5% of total capital. Hardly dominating, although it may be the highest single total.— THIS PART AGREED No, I haven’t included the aircraft, but they are allegedly to be multi-use across capabilities, depending on whether this suits particular briefers or not.–
– you obviously quote a source that lists the assumptions (for comparability, or for anything else) but we have not had a chance to be party to those
I agree a lot with what not a boffin says
The f35b can bring its full internal load and sufficient fuel to preform a vertical landing in a hot climate.
Srvl will increase that but does have to have a bolter requirement BUT should there be any event were fuel or some other emergency situation precludes this they can always dump some ordnance to allow a vertical return so in my view the tanker requirement for this is significantly less than cat and trap options.
The tanker requirement mind you is as difficult as clearing the hornet pod on the f35 wet station.
The idea is for a 2 type fleet with a potiental single fleet of 2 variants. So adding a 3 rd in gripen ect makes little sense and for the stobar gripen I think it would be as like as a naval typhoon.
I fear this however is all heading down the same old inter service tornado Harrier route which is all rather sad.
I have tracked down the cost of the buddy refueling conversion. Firstly I apologize to all my memory failed me its 1.6 billion dollars.
See here
Date: 28 August 2011.
To: The House of Commons Defence Committee, The Public Accounts Committee
From: Commander Nigel D MacCartan-Ward DSC AFC
Reference: NDMW/HCDC/PAC – August 2011.
39. It is understood that the MoD has asked the manufacturer for a costed study on whether a ‘buddy-buddy’ tanking capability can be fitted to some F-35C Lightning II aircraft specifically for the use of the Queen Elizabeth class air group. This would entail major design modifications and development work because of the aircraft’s current configuration and would most likely negate or reduce the stealth qualities of the aircraft so modified. Further, the cost of such a “one-off” venture is likely to be very high since no other planned operator is requesting such development and all associated costs will therefore fall to the UK taxpayer. In 2010, a figure of US$1.6 billion* was mooted in Whitehall for the development costs alone and, unquestionably, the cost of each modified aircraft would be substantially more than that of the basic F-35C Lightning II.
40. *It should be noted that US$1.6 billion could be used to procure 27 F/A-18 Super Hornet fighter aircraft for the conduct of operational requirements.
http://warships1discussionboards.yuku.com/topic/18814#.T3NDT9ny9-w
@Jim
Just shows the lunacy using ultra complex ultra fighty FJ for the logistical task of fuel lifting.
Bet we could get half a dozen CATOBAR mini tankers into service for less than $1.6bn. Same airframe could also do COD and lots, lots more besides.
Or we could even buy a few more Voyager A330s (without the silly Air Tanker contract) if that would keep the land basing lobby happy.
@IXION
You do not seem to dispute that the actual percentage is fairly small (particularly compared to what Typhoon and other projects have been gobbling up). The total for the ships includes what a conversion should cost (somewhere between £600 and 700M for PoW). It (rightly) does not include some of the costs associated with the aircraft operating costs (eg traning), which belong with the aircraft and have nothing to do with the ship.
There are sensitive elements of the design that we do not wish to see go offshore. Having dealt with Korean shipyards, I can tell you that they make fantastic ships of high quality. That doesn’t mean you would want to release your Defence Standards to them. As for European shipyards, you are talking about a very limited number with the actual capacity to build something this size (Fincantieri, Blohm & Voss, STX St Nazaire, Navantia & possibly Odense). Again, there are some Defence Standards involved that we might not wish to divulge.
I have no idea where your assertion re 12 aircraft comes from. It is perfectly possible to get 40 aircraft on the ship at some stage in the next fifteen years. Your assumption is coloured by a presumption that the current planning assumptions is written in stone. No figure for F35 purchase has yet been made. All the noise about “50” is unofficial pure speculation.
Re other components. Correct, we do need a capable AEW aircraft. The French seem to be capable of getting by with a slack handful of E2C. They also use Super Etendard for tankers, but apparently rarely. Something that does need looing at, but not insurmountable. Do we have to buy them right this second? No.
@The Mintcake Maker. I believe Sea Gripen is a drawing board aircraft for which the perceived primary market (unless the Indians go back on their Rafale or Mig29K orders) has just disappeared. Right now, Sea Gripen is higher risk than F35. If you want a low-risk option, it’s FA18E or Rafale.
@ Jim
I think 27 SH is a little bit on the unrealistic side. Going by the aussie deal we could get between 12 to 14 Super Hornets for 1.6bn usd. However we could get 10 Growlers for that money, which could of cousre use current AAR devices and provide a 4 plane EW flight for the active carrier. Of course this would then be an extra plane type in service and in an even smaller amount than my Naval grippen idea so unless we came to some sort of agreement with USN like our airseeker project I can’t see it being viable.
@ Not a Boffin,
clearly you had a seat at the table when the various options (that concluded with 2 CVF + fast air being “the winner”) were being made, as did I although not until 99-2003. I’m curious about what sort of scenarios were used to generate a total of 100 launches / recoveries being a requirement, thus driving everything else. At 40 jets per CVF, that’s a minimum of 2.5 sorties per day per aircraft, and I don’t think the USN ever manage to generate that. Certainly by 99-2003 the scenarios were much more modest, and mainstream thinking was moving towards a “swing-role” capability based on the Wasp class, now of course likely beaten on capability by Juan Carlos. Of course, at that time, expeditionary warfare was all the rage, with FRES being a good example of the sort of “go first, go fast, go home” thinking that specifically ruled as a least attractive option the sort of heavy war fighting for which all 3 services need top end kit.
(without spilling any secrets – no need to outline which SAGs were used)
My lack of support for the CVF/FJ programme is not based on a hatred of carrier air, simply my prioritisation of that capability being somewhere fairly low in the pecking order against competing priorities. I’m not remotely concerned with the size of the CVF – it needs to be big enough to do its’ job, and not too big that it cannot get into the right sort of harbours or through the Panama / Suez canals. Steel is cheap, and air is free I think they say in the Navy. So whether it is 20, 30, 50 or 100,000 tonnes is not a concern of mine.
@X
The point about projecting power is that we either do it, or don’t. If we don’t, then defence of the UK is the current requirement and the current threat justifies a AD capability, a coastal patrol and counter mining capability and a very limited army.
As for the RAF and Army projecting power, the limits of that are becoming abundantly clear for the Herrick draw-down. Pretty much all vehicle cargo has been shipped to theatre by sea and then driven through Pakistan. The majority of the sustainment logistics (fuel etc) is also coming through Pakistan where “someone” has demonstrated the capability to cut that link at will if they don’t like what is happening. My point is that this is a serious worry and why trans-shipment through Russia for all our vehicles is being secured for the withdrawal, creating another hostage to fortune. If it was so easy to project power by air alone, surely we would be doing it right now. We’re not. We can’t even guarantee to get personnel changeovers (or even Celebs to entertain? the troops) delivered by air. How on earth do you think serious logistics for fuel ammo and water for any sort of sustainable force would work by air? That is a fantasy requirement and led directly to the FRES fiasco, where airportability and the required level of armoured protection could not be met.
Any force supported only by air over long distances must by definition be light and will also be essentially immobile as it cannot sustain any substantial vehicle (or helicopter) support.
@Jim. The tanker “development” may again be misleading. this will probably depend on whether the F35C has wet hardpoints and a suitable fuel management system. Provided the addition doesn’t permanently degrade the LO capabilities, that’s not a drama. Your buddy tanker lives in the recovery pattern. The $1.6Bn figure quoted, does not appear to have been provided by LM and bears the dreaded caveat “mooted in Whitehall” which is hooching with people who understand how to cost these things. However, the basic point is correct, you wouldn’t want to use F35 for that, as Peter Elliott suggests. Personally, I’d be looking very hard at AMARC in Arizona, where there are currently 60-odd low fatigue time S3B airframes. These could do tanking, COD and wait for it, Maritime Patrol (ASW and ASuW) which I believe we have another ongoing requirement for. Admittedly, they could not do all the Nimrod could have done, but they could make a substantial contribution across the piece. 20 frames ought to allow for a respectable UK MPA, training and carrier-borne tanker/COD/MPA force.
@ ArmChairCivvy. The EPP capital budget figures are from the MoD Annual report / accounts. The QEC numbers are those most recently given as the programme costs.
@ Jim
Bear in mind that Cdr Nigel Ward is “Sharkey” Ward and seems to have gone rather nuts in his old age. The figure he quotes is likely complete bollocks that he’s made up along with the rest of his ravings on costs.
Re: Typhoon costs
Typhoon costs of reportedly £20bn are spread over about 25 years themselves and include R&D. The £5-7bn cost of 2xCVF is just for producing them – no R&D. But really it’s whole life costs that should be important.
Right!
I welcome (NaBoffin) to put someone like IXION in his place.–Can’t have been bothered to argue with someone with no regard for facts (carriers, being the case in point)
Now, this stuff about “cash” budgets that do not differentiate between assets (like carriers, lasting 40-50 years) and “other” stuff… where do we go from here?
@ Not a Boffin
Thanks. Much as I thought.
RE: Typhoon costs of reportedly £20bn are spread over about 25 years themselves and include R&D. The £5-7bn cost of 2xCVF is just for producing them – no R&D. But really it’s whole life costs that should be important
– absolutely right
– I think NAO came to £38bn overall,Tiffie whole life, but that does not negate the point being made (and I will have to go back and check that the 38 is not just in my mind)
@ArmChairCivvy
I’ve seen figures of ~£38bn for through life costs, but they’ll likely have changed with the reduced aircraft buy. There’s also lots of other things in there like base maintenance and overall which are flat costs whatever we have – but the accounting method in the MoD means these costs are divied up per aircraft.
Re the cost of a Nimitz carrier.
In July 2010, defense sec, Robert Gates moaned the US could no longer afford these $11 billion each carriers.
@James
The dstl work that generated the 100+ sorties reported in early 1999 off the top of my head. The 40 aircraft requirement predated that by a couple of years based on HL OA studies.
The USN undertook a number of battle experiments & exercises in the early noughties, specifically aimed at upping their sortie gen rate. ISTR Nimitz’s CVW which was a 50TACAIR wing managed to get over 200 sorties per day for about three days, so it can be done. The lessons were I believe rolled out into their CVW generally. That said, now that they have lost the KA6D & S3, they may not currently be capable of that, but the ships and personnel certainly were.
I’m surprised at your assertions regarding Wasps / Juan Carlos. Again without going into detail on SAG scenarios (which are largely pointless anyway – too much detail required to make them work, which takes a long time to generate and then the detail tends to skew the requirements) I was looking at high sortie rates throughout the 2003-2007 period. Certainly all the OA I saw in the mid-noughties was supportive of 70-90 sorties/day and the logistics scaling was being done on that basis. Of course by 2003, it had also been proven that a bigger ship was better – one of the nice things about QEC is that the switch to F35C or even an FA18 lease is possible at all. With a small STOVL ship if F35B gets canned, there is literally nowhere to go. The Spanish and Italian navies may have just recapitalised their air-capable assets for another ten years FW capability tops.
Based on that, I’d speculate that you were either in Dstl, AWC or EC(DS), although as I say, the “requirement” as outlined in Assessment Phase work does not tally with a “Wasp”. Good thing too now the SAGs are going to have to be re-written without Uncle Sam!
Not having a pop, just surprised that our experiences are so different.
i have read not a boffins posts about CVF on another thread, he’s good!! BTW there’s no-one called T*****G on here. (luckily).
@ Not a Boffin,
I’m not so sure about the Nimitz surge to 200 sorties/day: I’m sure it has happened once or twice, but not as a matter of routine. The USN have an aspiration to achieve that per day with their new carriers, but that is spread among 90 air platforms of all types. See http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/cvn-21/ For us to achieve 100 sorties a day would be stretching things, I think. Nevertheless, those sort of numbers would have looked good on one of the “Towers of Power” spreadsheeting exercises that go on in the MB.
I was the HQ LAND senior rep on the panels, so (I hope) dispassionate about whether capabilities were delivered by CV or land-based assets. I found in my years that there were very often great overlaps in between maritime and air component capabilities in terms of effects delivered, particularly as 90% of the world’s population live within 200 miles of the sea. Land capabilities were – relatively – much more playing in the sandbox on their own, so the capability tradeoffs tended to be internal. IFPA vs AH-64D, for example.
What I never understand is the attitude of “we either have CVF and project power across the globe, or we sell everything and sit at home”?
We have no CVF now, but we’ve just done Libya and are doing Afghanistan. We did both Gulf wars, Bosina and Kosovo without CVF. We’re fighting pirates off Somalia and drug trafficking in the Carribean. We’re keeping the Falkland Islands free from Argentine oppression. We run a CASD.
Why must it always be CVF or bust?
Chris B,
it doesn’t have to be. Some senior Navy people made it that way, forced it through at huge cost of time and effort. They were successful.
They will reap a bitter legacy in terms of other naval capabilities left unmet (MPA just the first), and have destroyed relationships and goodwill with the other 2 services for many years, so I am told by a couple of 1* ex-colleagues (one green, one light blue, both separately).
Completely unnecessary, and I feel sorry for the future Navy.
James, the RAF moved Australia to get the last carriers cancelled, forgive me if my heart does not bleed for them.
http://blogs.channel4.com/gary-gibbon-on-politics/pm-calls-for-more-checks-on-joint-strike-fighter-contract/18700
James sounds like the inter service rivalry is alive and well in the ivory tower of mod, good will and all disappears out the window when the next planning round comes round.
Not a Boffin
How can you assert we are/should be getting 40 aircraft per carrier stating that was the assumption made in planning …
Then when it is pointed out the whole current published (and I do say published I have no inside track, I can only go on what is published), talks about sending them to sea with 12; start saying (in terms):- no figures for F35 buy have been given.
So it as likely to be the publicly discussed 12 per carrier as 40 then isn’t it?
8-12.5 % of the annual capital budget for a single item is huge fixed cost, it does not sound like a lot, but it is fixed and assumes the capital budget will not be reduced. AS you say it will be the biggest single item; and as I get very tired of syaing does not incude all the support items that will have to come with it’ in order to make it remotely effective.
Where is the budget for AEW and tankers? That will have to come out of the same buddget as well.
Sorry I do not buy the old ‘secret govt secrets that are very secret don’t you know old boy’
For not buying forign.
Korea builds the basic hull, and then it tranfers to UK for all the secret stuff.
ACC
Thanks once again for the little dig. Always welcome.
When it comes to me taking the p*ss out of the carrier junkies my view is the old:-
‘I laugh in order that I may not cry.
Please feel free to put me in my place with some ‘facts’. Seriously stop sniffing on the sidelines and put the boot in…
All
Just for the record I will repeat I am a supporter of the idea of serious carrier air power if you want to get into full on force projection world wide.
But that means three CVF Carrier Battle groups each with at least 2 T45 and 3 or 4 T26, with tankers and fort style supply vessells and 36 off F35 or whatever per ship. So we have one ready to go, to stay on station at the big troubel spot, (wherever) at al;l times, with the fllet support train/ supply forces to keep it there, and amphibious capacity to back it up.
Maybe we could get away with two. But far from ideal.
One CBG without all the proper support, is just Sea going willy waiving, – one with 12 aircraft on it just a status symbol.
Still it’s omly going to cost 12.5% of the procurement budget and it’s not like we need to buy anything else like say a new nuclear deterrent is it.
Sorry even more spelling mistakes than usual in the last post – will go to bed now…
So once again short term cash problems scupper the best laid plans, with a good dose of incompetence and general b*ggering about.
So how about this for a potential “short term” solution?
If we say the MOD overestimated the costs and the USN underestimated them, then if we split the difference and add that to the lowest estimate then the cost of fitting PoW (hopefully Ark Royal) would be £1.4bn. So how do we make savings for that?
Firstly I believe that the RAF operate 5 squadrons each or are aiming for 5 squadrons each of Tornado and Typhoon? (Somebody please correct me on this). Since Typhoon is being integrated with most of the weapons available for Tornado then with the drawdown of forces I would disband 2 squadrons of Tornado , leaving them with 8 frontline fast jet squadrons (5x Typhoon, 3x Tornado) + OCU squadrons.
Next the MOD should order a few more (3 to 4) F-35c to show commitment to the F-35 project but announce that we will defer the order to until the next parliament in order for the first F-35c squadron to stand up to replace the first Tornado squadron in 20xx with all Tornados replaced by 2030. The FAA would receive its first 12 plane squadron in 2030 also. This leaves us a gap of 11 years to fill with something.
So instead of the government agreeing to order a batch of 40 F-35c at a cost of £3.6bn (£90m current estimate I believe), the government orders 24 Super Hornets as an interim measure like the aussies for £2.04bn (£85m including support costs) saving approximately £1.6bn, which is enough for PoW to be converted in build plus a pay for long lead items for QE to be converted to EMALS. If the SH was ordered today we could have ready by 2016/17:
1x 12 plane squadron (F/A-18E) and integrate it with a USN carrier Air Wing for training for 2 years prior to PoW launch
1x 6 plane squadron (F/A-18F) and integrate it with Aéronavale for 2 years prior to PoW launch
After PoW is launches she would routinely embark the 12x F/A-18E and the 6x F/A-18F’s would be used as a HQ and training squadron, embarking regularly for training i.e. to keep qualls up to date and in case of a Libya Mk2 the HQ squadron would embark with a few spare a/c (for use in the strike role) taking the total number of fast jest available to the Carrier Air Wing up to 18/20 Fast Jets (the French routinely deploy with 16).
As for a possible AEW solution. The MOD have said they want to fund a seaking replacement so let’s assume a budget of 800m. I agree with others on here and think that a S-3 solution could work. Back when they were nearing the end of their service the USN ordered a study to see how much life and cat”n”trap cycles left in them, and how much would it cost to enable this. I can’t find the link for this at the moment but the figure was something like $2m to replace 8 crucial parts and that added another 10,000 cat”n”trap cycles I believe. Therefore taking into account of inflation and the fact that these parts would have to be milled new as the spare stock have since long gone. I still think it should cost more than $10m to replace the worn out parts. Buy the best 20 airframes including the 4 that were converted into mini COD aircraft. Fit the normal S-3b with 2 LM Vigilance pods on the wing hard points and have to AEW operators in the back. Same size crew as Merlin but it has better range, altitude and endurance. The COD US-3a would be fitted with AAR refuling equipment and used as COD tankers. This should mean that 20 S-3’s should cost about £800m or £40m/$62m a go.
So PoW would regularly sale with 12 to 18 Super Hornets, 4 S-3b AEW, 2 US-3a COD tankers, 4 Merlin ASW aircraft and 2 Lynx (or HM1Merlins) ships flight/plane guard. To give an Air Wing of between 24 and 30 aircraft. This is comparable to an average CdG air wing
Sorry for the longish post. Its probably very pie in the sky and totally un realistic but I did say it was a plan for the short to medium term and it does seem to fit in the budget.
@ IXION,
but what are the 3 x CBGs for? What are they going to do? What are the threats that justify their existence?
No one in the Navy camp ever answers that question, possibly because there is no defensible answer.
That’s the problem.
Ok time for another rant. I cannot help but think all the talk of using the CVF as a general purpose carrier with a small number of JCA, transport and ASW helicpters etc is in someway creating the spin which the Governemnt is going to use to cover the fact that the CVFs are not going to be truely effective Carriers with the ability to dominate a large area through its airwing. Yes these other capabilities are nice but we would have them regardlessby default. The key to power projection with carriers is the offensive and defensive punch of its airwing. That is the CVBGs reason for being. How effective would a Nimitz class carrier be with the same airgroup or even the CdG. For the significant costs of the CVF programme to be justified the CVFs need to have sufficient assets to operate at their full potential as Carriers not Amphibious ships. Anything less just show what a cock up the whole programe has been and a waste of resources. IF other programmes have to be cancelled so be it. It existing equipment needs to be withdrawn, so be it, we will have 40 odd years after the CVF s are operational to rebalance our armed forces. Post 2015 the CVF should be the absolute priority for the MoD. The Army is going to take at least a decade to recover from Afghanistan so this could be stretched. The RAF will have to accept that it will be reduced to the Typhoon force and most importantly the Government of the time would have to realise that we cannot conduct anything but small scale elective operations at most for a period of time.
@Not a Boffin
Welcome to Think Defence Not a Boffin, good to have you here. Am away at the minute so wasn’t able to reply immediately.
Let’s have a look at a few of your points…
CVF Domination of the Equipment Plan
This is the first point on which I disagree, sorry, because you are not joining the CVF with costs for any aircraft that fly off it. I can see where you are coming from and in one regard, you are right, but CVF and JCA are inextricably linked and so I think they should be viewed together. If you note from my post I used CVF as an example of the domination of major sexy projects, there are others. It is this domination or ‘big project centricity’ that beggars the rest of the armed forces so I DO NOT say that only CVF, but it and others. I suspect the word dominating is a matter of semantics anyway, if it is 12.5% as you say then when taken across the entire programme it is certainly significant.
Use and Size
I certainly agree that the size of the ship would have been predicated on reams of operational analysis and other staff work, so the tonnage is almost irrelevant to discussion because as you point out, there is no direct link between size and cost. As others have pointed out the old adage of steel and air is a good one, however not entirely correct. As size increases so does drag and so does engine power for a given speed I would imagine, plus extra costs for all sorts of internal size related systems. That said, I think for what they do the size is right.
However, size also has a political element, these being the biggest ships ever, needing extra dredging and cranes etc. so that is worth noting because it is what people point at when being critical, silly I know, but it is a consideration.
It is interesting that the analysis that generates the sorties that generates the sortie rate that generates the number of aircraft will be over 20 years old by the time they get into service. Just consider that for a moment and then consider the changes in effectiveness of the aircraft, weapons, changes in likely ROE, defence planning assumptions, potential enemy capabilities, the political dimension and all the rest of the million and one things that have changed since then.
So, I would question that analysis, not for its efficacy or completeness, but for its relevance against today’s defence planning assumptions and the other things I have mentioned.
The interesting question for me on this particular issue is does that analysis stand up to today’s realities, did the Hurricane come from a requirement issued just after the Armistice?
I do not think for one moment that an America class with a dozen F35B and a collection of other aviation assets can in any way be characterised as a baby carrier and if I was on the receiving end I would not be thinking it wasn’t a ‘proper’ carrier either. Yet again, we need to think sensibly about likely operations, that sortie rate will be a once in a couple of decades event (I know we can’t predict the future and it is nice to have the ability). I would wager that we would use CVF much more with 12 F35 plus rotary than we would 40 F35.
Isn’t effect more relevant than sortie rate?
Projecting power is such an overused phrase and to be honest, it is usually used in the context of ‘only the Navy can’ just before having a go at the Army or RAF. It is not binary as you say, we either do or we do not, I just don’t think it is as simple as that. Just because a force, in your example, is light and with limited tactical mobility does not mean it cannot be used to ‘project power’
Shades of grey I think
On a final point on sortie rates, isn’t the sortie rate KPP for the F35B higher than the C?
Tanking
Not sure I would class that one as a myth, especially in today’s safety environment with the MAA being so alive to these issues. I think it is generally accepted that conventional carrier operations need some form of recovery tanker should the flight deck become unavailable due to equipment malfunction or damage, it kind of makes perfect sense to me as well.
Do you think the MAA would sign off on going against the experience of other operators unless there was a very good alternative?
How that is delivered is open for debate, whether it be some sort of support aircraft or a buddy pod.
As others have said, rolling vertical landing is designed to increase the bring back weight but should the deck of STOVL CVF be equally unavailable then in a typical task group at least there are options for recovering a very expensive aircraft and equally expensive pilot, an undamaged section of CVF deck, another vessel etc. Yes, this might result in dumped weapons and fuel but is that not cheaper than dumped weapons, fuel, aircraft and pilot?
With CATOBAR, unless there is another aircraft carrier with the same recovery capability then aircraft, pilot, fuel and weapons are in the water, unless a diversion to land is possible.
Again, refer to planning assumptions, we assume there will be instances where the UK is alone and our friends in France and the US are somewhere else. If we therefore want CVF to operate according to those assumptions then we need the ability to keep a returning F35C in the air long enough to wait for the CVF deck to become available or divert to somewhere else.
That tanking capability does not necessarily have to be carrier borne either, another point well made, but that seems rather a dangerous fudge to me and negates some of the advantages of operating from the deck of a ship, if we have to absolutely rely on land based tanking, well, I think you know what comes next.
We have discussed the S3 before but I think someone mentioned the reason they are not a serious consideration because they don’t have the life in them for carrier operations, even though their airframe life is relatively low and we all know the pitfalls of thinking a quick upgrade to an old airframe can deliver low cost low risk capability, Nimrod anyone!
Has COD become a requirement now by the way, can an S3 shift an F35 engine?
So to summarise the refuelling issue, you might be right that the risk could be accepted but I would disagree, this means whatever we rely on to do it means additional cost somewhere.
AEW Aircraft
On AEW aircraft, we seem to have managed quite well with what we have had, a low cost and versatile piece of equipment, introducing yet another boutique aircraft type just so when can get something more than we have but the same as others is yet another extra cost, I agree that we don’t need to do it immediately but 2016 is rapidly approaching so it’s a rotary solution or capability gap, would you take the gap in trade for a fixed wing AEW capability?
I don’t think I agree with your comment about almost all of the other vessels in the Navy being pointless without CVF, save for SSK (did you mean SSN), MCM and OPV. By the time it comes into service we will have been without fast jet carrier strike for nearly a decade, I am assuming therefore that during that decade we can tie up the Type 45’s and Type 23’s to save a few bob because there is no point to them?
As Ixion points out, it is fine to say we must have these things, avoid ‘Baby carriers’ and pull our weight in a European context but at what price, seriously, at what price. The defence budget is not getting any bigger any time soon, that is a reality.
Above all, we need to get back to a balance of capabilities, it is no good having 2 CVF and 40 JCA each if that leaves the coffers empty for everything else.
@SI
I have heard almost every combination and permutation of who is pushing which variant and why but if you are right then yet again, service politics is screwing with actual defence issues, sad, depressing and annoying.
But let’s not be thinking one service or the other is not doing exactly the same thing, not buying that one I am afraid.
If your US friends are laughing perhaps you might point them to their own contractors across the defence spectrum, they are every bit as bad, as we all well know. CVN 78 will be in the water at roughly the same time as CVF had an initial design authorisation cost of $2.9b and a build cost of $8.6b. The USN’s 2012 budget had $10.25b for construction of the next one, CVN 79.
The programme is seeing about 10-11% cost inflation for the first two and just over 25% when compared to initial estimates.
As long as we get the decision right, I don’t care who we piss off to be honest, relationships can be recovered.
I think there is little chance the F35B will be cancelled but accept the point about going up a blind alley, as you say, CATOBAR at least gives us a few options.
Maybe we should have a side bet, my outside one on Rafale and yours on a cancellation of F35B
@Jim
Not sure I would credit your source on costs as ‘credible’
As for why we need the full blown CVBG, well that depends on how you aspire to act in the world. If we aspire to be able to electively conduct military operations, airpower is a critical pillar. Land based airpower can only go so far and is often inefficient in the number of sorties required to get “x” amount of ordonnance on target. Currently our foreign policy seems to be to act a “Little America”. IF we want to be able to act decisively and speedily, Carrier aviation is really the only game in town for most operations. In a nutshell the arguement for the RN havine 1-2 CVBG is the same as used by the USN and Frence Navy. Current discussions on the CVF seem to revolve around the fact that they are going to be built so how can we use them. THis is the wrong way around! On the flip side if we are not going to conduct elective military operation then we do not need the CVFs at all and should not bring them into service.. The middle ground is like bringing in a new SSBN and saing we cannot afford to equip it with SLBMs but we can still use it as an SSN as it can carry torpedoes.
Just a quick few links to move things along
http://www.defensenews.com/article/20110328/DEFFEAT04/103280304/Harrier-Ops-Making-Case-for-F-35B
http://blog.usni.org/2011/03/31/must-every-carrier-be-a-supercarrier/
On a side note, what are the engine handling facilities going to be on the CVF? What were they on the CVLs? Bit hte USN and Frence carriers nave the equivilent of and areo engine maintenance bay and test facilities on board to allow engines to be overhauled at least to what was referred to as secondline. Our curretn support contracts are nearly all “Power by the hour” where complete engines are delivered from industry to the units called “Depth” and only limkited maintenance is carrier out along with installation and removal, at the units called “Forward” I think. If this is the case then a CVF will only be able to carry a finite number of spare serviceable engines and have space toi store unserviceable ones. Sure the RFAs could carry additional engines and cross deck them via helicopter but is that an ideal solution? What is needed is a COD capability if we want to maintain the efficiency of an airwing.
TD.
The article could be seen as making the case for a full Carrier . It begins with the statement that have a carrier on station would have been best but one wasn’t available so the next best solution was for the Amphib carrying harriers.
Lord Jim.
you’re gonna have a problem with the F-35’s engine then.
its too big for our current COD.
Our? :)
Well the solution is fairlu obvious, If the USN need a new COD then, assuming we have CATs etc we should purchase a limited number for the role and or kit out the CVFs with adequate engine maintenance and test facilities.
James
Good point
MY Point is IF and that is the point IF! You want a British armed forces that can place, a reinforced Brigade with air cover in one hit pretty much anywhere on the planet, near the sea. (As hinted at in SDR, and I will not go into the double speak and contradictions contained in it and subsequent pronouncements about multi role brigades etc).
And you want the ability to reach out and destroy against near peer enemies airpower likewise; then CBG would be the best tool for the job IMHO.
The fact that land based air power and forward deployment could achieve some or much of the same against less peer enemies does not preclude us from doing it the CBG way for them as well- if you got it uses it.
BUT as I have said, I do not support the elephants because they are now not even half baked. The original Staff requirement cut the effective Air power and other requirements, (Remember all that stuff about armour that was dropped); of the CVF to the point of making it a military joke.
Since then we have just kept cutting functions and capability, and then numbers.
The carrier junkies view through special rose tinted specks, (available from the RN and MOD free of charge), because they remember the original requirement, the original numbers, (along with the original numbers of t45/t26/tankers fleet support ships etc,) and think it will restore the RN and by extension the UK to some form of tatty superpower.
It’s really an extension of the
‘Big Car small Dick’
Penis substitute, scenario of paunchy middle aged types reliving their supposed youthful pomp and impressing the ladies with their 7 year old 7 series BMWs.
TD made a good point “Has COD become a requirement now by the way, can an S3 shift an F35 engine?” solomon despite the recent media hysteria the F35 engine can fit inside the Greyhound, it just needs a different package crate. However we do not have any Greyhounds, our only COD type aircraft are Chinooks or Merlins. Would the engine fit inside them? Do we need another airframe, V22 would be the only other choice if we go the F35B route, but that looks smaller inside than the Chinook, so would that work?
http://mobile.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-28/pentagon-approves-lockheed-f-35-for-continued-development.html
Morning all. COD is not there just to deliver engines, nor do engines have to arrive by COD. One of the drivers for the Heavy RAS requirement was to be able to transfer engines…..
All of these extra capabilities needed – COD, AEW, refuelling, etc.
Just because we are busting the bank on CVF + F35 does not mean we need to keep busting the bank on extra kit. How did we manage before? We’ve got helicopters for COD and AEW, so they can do the same job. We didn’t have refuelling before, so for a few years we can do without again. Perhaps when the Navy have stopped spending most of the defence budget on their over-inflated ambitions, when the RAF and Army have had a chance to update themselves, then the Navy can ask for some refuelling. Until then, stick with land-based refuelling or learn to do without.
@IXION: the reason carriers are so emotive is because we’ve actually required them in living memory. Have we ever *required* Storm Shadow, for example? We spent a billion quid on that, and the only use we’ve made of them is to bomb a very few fixed targets we could have safely dispatched with LGB’s. CVF is not a 7 Series, it’s a largeish MPV: always the most impressive of cars IMHO :-)
@TD: the reason why we don’t want to lay up our T45’s and T23’s is because they are all we have left to fulfil our defense requirements at the moment. They aren’t enough, but there’s nothing else :-(
Having a tanker up whilst conducting flight Ops is essential for safety so having ths capability is a must have for a conventional carrier and adviseable for a STOVL carrier doing high intensity Ops. Land based tankers are not always available especially on short notice Ops.
AEW&C is a must have regardless of what platform is used, for any form of Carrier Ops.
COD is vital for extended Ops. Yes Helicopter can be used for VERTREP within a Taskforce but they cannot deliver personal, spares etc out ot a Taskforce operating far out. BEfore the Falklands is brought up, we vere only a couple of weeks from having to pull the Taskforce back through wear and tear.
Of the three COD would have lowest priority but the other two are essential if we are to seriously get back into the Carrier game.
Returning to engine transfers if we do end up with the right support vessels for the CVF then yes there should be sufficent space to correctly store spare engines and allow them to be transferred by Helicopter but remember an Engine in its Transport Stand is the size of a Range Rover at least and weight almost as much so the ability to handle these on board and RFA needs to taken into account when building the things.
But my point of view stands, we need to prioritise the CVF post 2015 at the expense of other programmes, equipment for all three services to get the full value from them. IF not we are just wasting out time and money on a half baked solution. My comparison of buying a SSBN and yet using it as a SSN stands.
This particular model does 38 miles to the gallon, too, RE “a largeish MPV: always the most impressive of cars IMHO :-)”
Carrier days were costed at half a million in 2003 money. If we end up with a spare (one crew only?), then the price will go up somewhat. The impact of capital costs, any variation in the estimates, will be dimunative over a 40-50 year life.
The important aspect is CEPP and its place in the overall defence strategy. As James has pointed out, the concept seems (so far)to be half-baked, and it simply beats me how we can make the right plane choice without the context.That is both the expensive bit…and the effect delivered.
Sorry, IXION, for my choice of words. I should have written down what I was thinking: a year or more of fact-free sniping at the carriers. But! it turns out you are a fan of carrier power, and only pointing the criticism at the faulty implementation in UK’s specific case
– sorry for the misunderstanding
James “keep busting the bank on extra kit” like Typhoon, Nimrod and FRES. No one branch is blame free.
Lord Jim,
the Navy will have to learn to do without AARs. They did not factor those costs in, they are not in the budget now, tough titty. “Essential for safety”. Not. A risk, like anything else is in life.
We’ve got helicopters for AEW and COD. Make do. Learn to live with the rest of us.
I don’t want Britain to be back “seriously into the carrier game”, because it is not an important part of our defence strategy. So I am deeply relaxed about taking a few savings.
I can understand some upset from green personages over the poor material state of the Army. But the RAF really? How many billions has Typhoon cost? And somebody in a light blue suit must have had hand wot was it £9billion FSTA is going to cost for bugger all capability? Nimrods costs went up year on year and every time they went up there was a cut in the number of airframes. Money that was being spent concurrently with CVF spending. And wasn’t the likes of Jaguar sacrificed for Typhoon just as we were in the midst of two land wars. The RAF sacrificed a recently updated attack aircraft to keep in service what despite the rewriting of history is still basically an air superiority fighter. From the period after the Falkland casualty replacements entered, T23 builds to one side, up to the proposed build of CVF in 98 the navy had more cut from it post Cold War than either of the two. Not saying Typhoon is crap and that the RAF doesn’t need tankers (even though the deal is crap) but you can’t say the RAF has hadn’t substantial money spent on its systems.
Jim,
it is not about individual projects (I am only familiar with FRES of the 3 you list), it is about a holistic and balanced capability. If we get our thinking right across all three services, then we won’t make expensive mistakes like FRES or CVF, and we won’t run the risk of the Government cancelling a capability (Nimrod) when we’ve spent 95% of the money.
@ James
Where would you spend the CVF money? Let say all of a sudden the cash spent on CVF became available where would you put it?
And seeing as without the US the British Army’s ability to conduct operations is a bit limited do you think we can rely on them on the future? I mean we can’t really call Afghanistan or Iraq examples of expeditionary war can we? More like “package holiday” warfare. I know the Army consumes a lot of curry but do you really want the future your service being the US Army’s Ghurkas?
ACC
My posts re elephants are fact free because so many of the ‘facts’ have changed – See TD’s post.
If you criticise them from one point of view a carrier junky will say
‘please do not set up straw man it was never intended to project an amphibious force into the Indian ocean.’
Followed up by a post from a fellow carrier junky a month later saying,
‘We NEEED Elephants if we are ever to project a force into the Indian ocean….’
Just one example.
I did not think I was sniping, I thought it was a full on assault… :)
By the way, anyone keeping up with the incisive defence journalism from our friend in Bastion
https://twitter.com/#!/haynesdeborah
@TD: just DM her and suggest a room when she gets back, already :-P
And another thing lets not forget which service will probably end up flying F35x when it come into service. And won’t more have F35x to be purchased as we approach Typhoon’s out of service date? Again not saying the RAF doesn’t need the ‘plane, just saying you can’t say the RAF isn’t having money on its systems.
@ TD re twitter and photo in first “tweet”
Would it be unChristian of me to suggest she has been in that position more than once in her trip to Afghanistan? It isn’t like she can knit mittens and socks to bring comfort to the lads on the front line is it?
PS: I have never visited Twit before. I think for the likes of dear Debbie there should be a special service whose name has had the i substituted for an a……
Another question does F35B still need to land via SRVL. If so does it need an angled deck?
X,
clearly, a pair of JCs painted grey, together with an appropriate air wing including some F35Bs and a squadron of AH, in addition to existing hels. They represent a huge step up from the old Lusty class, and are appropriate for our needs and doctrine.
Plus another JC, painted white and paid for by DFID, in an international aid / hospital role. To be available as a hospital ship in times of war.
The rest on other defence needs that are also higher priority than making good on some gin-sozzled Admirals’ Nelsonian dreams. Most will be long retired and some dead before their abortion of CVFs ever get into service. Signed off in 1996, not in service until 2020. F**king expensive then, unaffordable now, defence-destrying expenditure in the future. WTF?
The army’s had its budget and spent it no point blaming the other two services if it now wants other things. just like the other two services.
James you can have helicopters or f35 on jc not both and not while it has troops on board.
The Army doesn’t have a budget to spend.
TD @ 12.54
Your two articles are very interesting but all they show is –
1) How far the mighty have fallen.
2) Six F35Bs is not enough.
3) The LHA is a fat, slow, limited Essex.
4) The PC upgrade is stealth CivEng to the DoD / USN.
5) We missed the Harrier big time – what would AR brought to the party.
Now some comments –
Cost inflation in aircraft if not checked will kill all carrier aviation including the USN “Big 9/10/11”.
Even in its GF guise – how come a complete failure as a POTUS gets a carrier named after him / elections contested 1 – elections lost 1 – it is still a 50’s throwback with its 5K crew.
Just what do they all do?
More of the same means that the numbers will fall over time.
Any thing mechanical that moves and works to a planning horizon of over 30 years should not see the light of day. Not just a USN issue but planning for 2062 is the same as trying to guess today from 1962 – madness squared.
The quicker the USMC spot the PC upgrade the better.
Then they can build to 36 / 39m beam and look towards a 270m x 48 / 54m wide flight deck and a displacement of 55K.
The next step would be to ban all talk of GTs / nuclear and call the nice people at Wartsila to rustle up a fully electric powertrain running to 90MW for 24kn+.
If it means 6 or 8 gensets spaced throughout the hull then why not.
The issue then comes down to the cost – 3 figures.
Hybrid – Containership hull / PSV + AHTS robustness – £400mill basic hull + warload / sensors.
Navantia build efficiencies / Spanish build – £1bill all in?
US build efficiencies / MIC greed – £2bill all in at least.
Figures are Q+D – back of a fag packet.
I have limited info on putting a floodable dock into an existing hull.
Bay class / Endurance class suggest it can be done without breaking the bank.
This would allow 3 levels in the hull –
1) Dock – 60m+ x 22m + heavy vehicle deck – 6/9m high.
2) Dock airspace then Flex Deck – accommodation and light vehicle storage – 6m high.
3) Hangar deck (180m x 24m approx) plus service bay and accommodation at the front – 9m high.
Accommodation – 500 crew / 600 air group / 1,000 troops?
Looking at 30K-m2 approx for 2.5K crew max?
The only constraint in all this would be the new PC locks and the envy of the USN “super carrier mafia”.
Mark,
Not so. JC can embark both held and FJ, as the Spaniards have proven. Clearly, not vast numbers of each, but a total of 22 roughly split between held and FJ.
Not sure what you mean about the Army having had its’ budget and spent it. No service has a budget for equipment – it is all held centrally and then allocated to capabilities. If you mean all the UOR vehicles, that was Treasury money (and by direction, most of those UORs are going to be left for ANA).
What the Army does have is a fleet of vehicles in core service that is on average 26 years old. All of the 432s / Bulldogs are well over 40 years old. The CVR(T) fleet is 35-38 years old.
The Army and the RAF are the two services which have done most of the operations in the last 20 years since the Cold War ended. Not the Navy, and certainly not spastic carriers. Defence Planning Assumptions predict that trend to continue. So it is a good question, why are we buying this pair of white-gold plated elephants?
James they have put chinook merlin and f35b or anything of the equivalent size on the same ship? There requirement is Blackhawks/nh- 90 and harriers of which we have none. It’s more like us trying to stick chinook on ark royal in 2003.
No by army budget I mean apache, bowman and it’s multiple iterations the warmed over Hermes 450 the support vehicle pfi, the desire to maintain an entirely full time army, warrior upgrade and it’s look alike fres sv along with Many other things.
Obviously the many standing patrols and significant deployments of naval personnel to afghan and Iraq tar pits didn’t happen nor the presence of ocean and invincible class at every major operation carried out is lost on you regardless of how well you think they did there were still there.
@James
You have already head my view on your plan for a pair of 27T JC based carrier/amphibs. I think @Mark and others agree with me that it is just too small.
Your plan would probably work based on FBOT’s draft specification for a 55T USMC carrier/amphib – but the question is: would this cost much less to build and operate than the UK’s currently planned combination of CVF + Albion operating one on one off?
My guess is if you crunched the numbers they would come out about the same.
Peter
Mark, sust a quick note on vehicles
The Support Vehicle (MAN trucks) isn’t a PFI, is this the one you were thinking or the C Vehicle and Heavy Equipment Transport PFI’s with ALC and Fastrax?
Both PFI’s have saved quite a bit of money and delivered better capabilities to be honest, one of the very few PFI’s that seem to have actually delivered on the promise!
Also on Army capital projects, don’t forget FIST (or a convenient non BOWMAN bucket for BOWMAN cost over runs), Wildcat and Trojan/Titan/Terrier
Despite this, I think it fair to say that whatever the reasons, the Army have been the ‘poorer relations’ to the other services in terms of core equipment spend.
@ James
But what other defence needs that is what I want to know?
@ Phil
It doesn’t have a budget labelled “Army” but it does call on various funds and allocations for various projects. I would say that is a budget. It would probably be better if CGS and 1SL and what ever the light blue chap is called if they had budget of their own. Isn’t that the way the US works?
@TD
Thanks for the welcome. A number of replies in no particular order.
With regard to the sortie gen rate. It is the sorties generated that provide the effect. The more you can generate, usually the more effect you provide.
You are correct that “the requirement” is now between 10 and 15 years old, depending on which part of it you are looking at. Since then the changes of which you speak are more, rather than less likely to require capable air intervention. The US are withdrawing from the European theatre, RoE mean that we actually need the capability to visually ID potential threats before they can commit hostile acts, proliferation of more sophisticated threats increases the stand-off distance required to undertake this ID. All of these point (for a naval force) towards organic air for the basic mission of defending a maritime force or other shipping. All the Defence Planning Assumptions you talk about assume various levels of Combined force support. However, these assumptions will now also change and not (as has been the case over the last 20 years) in the direction of a reduced contribution to any operation. Or do we just assume that we (UK/Europe) won’t do that type of operation any more? As I noted before, who is going to bring the big boys capability to the party in the future?
As for Power Projection being a navy only activity, there’s a famous old quote (forget by who) that goes “the Army is a projectile to be fired by the Navy” – in other words complementary. It pre-dates air forces so the RAF need not feel slighted. The objective of the navy is not to do the whole thing themselves, but to enable via sealift, airpower and amphibiosity where necessary, the other services to get to the battlespace at extended distances from the UK.
As for light forces, I would love to see an estimate of the effect that could be delivered and the support required.
The point on tankers was not that we don’t need them, but that an artificial distinction is being made between CTOL and STOVL enablers based on a false assumption. BTW, if you know what the F35B thrust value in the hover is, then you could probably guess how many other decks in a maritime force might be able to take one – or several as would be more likely in any large scale recovery serial.
As for the coastal navy or bust, again it depends on what we wish to do in the world. You correctly point out that we have taken risk on Carrier Strike since last year – in fact we have taken risk on maritime ops since retirement of the Sea Harrier. There are those who believe that T45 is the only AD asset required. A half decent OpFor exploiting our likely RoE would show that up fairly quickly (and potentially expensively). The fact that we have “got away with it” thus far does not make it a credible posture. We have not required Air Defence of the UK for 20-odd years now – does anyone seriously suggest that we “can” Typhoon? Or Sentry? Had the Libyan forces been more organised, particularly in terms of their air force, Ellamy could not have happened (or at least not without much more effort from the US). One reason why Syria is being ignored is because they have a relatively effective air force which we have no means of countering at present. I’m not by the way suggesting we get involved there, but it is difficult to see why we did one Op and not another when the causal factors are pretty much the same.
As for the “size” element, you’ve identified one of the causal factors of the delay and cost escalation. When originally costed (the report is sat beside me) the two 40000 te ships were £2.8Bn all in in 1997. That estimate was probably a bit light, but not by much. In 2001/2 the price offered by the ACA was £3.2Bn the pair. Between 2002 and 2008 when the order was finally placed, I’m afraid the other two services used the size as a stick with which to batter the project – one because it represented a threat to their fiefdom and the other because (post 2003) they had a war to fight and found themselves ill-equipped to do so once the combat phase was over. In that time the cost has virtually doubled – entirely due (standfast the cats issue) to delays incurred by inter-service politicking.
@James
The tower of power games sound like fun, but not particularly productive. Who was the rep from Fleet? Can’t have been COS(AVN)or COS(CS) in that time, as he was a strong supporter of the 40 a/c ship.
There is a fundamental issue with the MoD budget that probably needs hauling aboard. Naval equipment (and RAF equipment) for that matter is always going to be more capital intensive than LF equipment. On the other hand, land forces are more costly in terms of maintenance and personnel.
By my estimate (since 2000) the Army have had the following programmes funded either by EPP or UOR : WAH64, Bowman(!), Watchkeeper (and it’s UOR), Warrior Upgrade, FV432 Upgrade, Mastiff, Jackal, Wolfhound, Ridgeback, Warthog, Panther, Husky & Foxhound. Plus a number of smaller cat C and D procurements for body armour, counter-IED, crew-served weapons etc.
The RAF have had Typhoon, A400M, C17, Chinook (Mk 3, Mk3 fixes, Julius and Mk6), Sentinel, Reaper. GR7 to GR9 (oops!) and unfortunately MRA4, which apparently still had significant airworthiness issues.
The RN have had T45, Astute, LPD and LSD(A).
A significant proportion of these are protected vehicles for use on TELIC & HERRICK, but with limited future elsewhere. It is absolutely right that they should have been bought even with that limted utility. However, as far as I am aware, these vehicles have not been victims of CVF funding (as that has only really started to bite in capital terms since 2009). Nor was the shortage of suitable vehicles in the early stages of TELIC & HERRICK down to CVF. In fact, had FRES been specified to include the types of threat being faced as well as the fantasy airportability parts of the requirement, that programme might have gone ahead and delivered something other than red faces all round.
The shortage of assets in theatre is also nothing to do with CVF, but if we are honest, everything to do with the refusal of the Treasury (particularly under the Great Financial Genius) to fund assets in theatre during a war. The weasel words about percentage increases in flight hours for helicopters that came to symbolise the MoD wrt Herrick are also nothing to do with CVF. They are relevant, in that something like 50% of the UK SH force (SK4 and Puma) was unable to be deployed on Herrick without upgrades. Of the remainder (Merlin 3 and Chinook) less than ten airframes could be supported in theatre by 60-odd frames in service, albeit that there are the special Wokkas (not the mk3s) and that some Merlin were on Telic. Again, unlikely that this is due to CVF either, but definitely due to lack of forethought as to what we might have to do.
The RN is trying to shape itself for what it might have to do in future. It is not w1lly-waving for the sake of it and has sacrificed much in order to maintain the future capability. The “balanced” maritime force requires Organic Air, Amphibiosity and SSN, complemented by RFA and escorts. This is no different to armour complementing mech inf, artillery, airmobile inf, engineers and other CSS. Or Air Defence, AWACS, Ground-based radar, PD SAMS, Rock Apes etc. All of these elements complement each other. they are not either/or options.
If these forces become unbalanced, then you’re basically paying for high-capability kit like the amphibious fleet and T45 that you won’t be able to use in a high-end environment because you haven’t got the other pieces (eg Organic air). You only have to run a fuel calc to work out how many aircraft you need to maintain on a land base ata limited distance (even with AAR) to discover it’s about three times that required from a ship in area for the same posture. As noted before, who else is going provide the bits we haven’t got?
It all comes down to what we wish to do in the world. If we wish to project power, then we need to do it properly. If we don’t, then defence of the UK base is just fine.
@Chris B – we did a number of those ops with a carrier and some would have been done more easily with a carrier. CVF is the next carrier. There is no other carrier design waiting ready to be built instead. In any case QEC is probably about 50% complete, 90% fabricated, with PoW 5% and 15% respectively.
Like it NaBoffin.
Fact is we effectively now have the ships. We will also get some FJ to fly off them. We will eventually get enough to surge 40 at sea if we have to.
What we ought to be concentrating on now is the non-sexy enablers that will join the dots. Small peices in the jigsaw that will create layered, all arms, force projection in a variery of scenarios and without America providing an umbrella. Land and sea based. Joint services. Cost effective force multipliers…
Not a Boffin,
there were two FLEET reps on my time on the panel. First 2 years was a Commodore from MWC, second 2 years a Capt RN who (I think) ran N7 in FLEET itself. Can’t remember either of their names – the second fellow was a good friend of a JSCSC colleague of mine, John Kingwell who I think is a one star now and commanding the Ready Task Group. I last saw John when he was commanding Argyll, so a few years back.
I don’t dispute your points, it is merely the prioritisation given to CVF and FJ over what I believe to be higher priorities. But in the end, people are paid to make decisions, this one has been made and is not going to get unmade. It has however been criminally mismanaged at every level from start to finish, and the combination of gross cost overruns and the discovery of a £38 Bn hole means that there is nothing at all left for other programmes. FRES was originally costed at around £16 Billion for roughly 4,500 vehicles. The chances of anything more than a couple of billion actually being budgeted for a very limited number of vehicles seems remote.
Not a Boffin – “the Army is a projectile to be fired by the Navy” I think a remark by Baron Fisher of Kelvinstone possibly when he was CinC Portsmouth and sitting on the Commission on reform of the army post Boar War that resulted in the Haldane Reforms.
Wonder what Fisher would think of TD’s SIMMS concept?
@ Peter. Agree entirely. No reason why we couldn’t pool with FR for elements of supporting these enablers. There are European support companies for F16, why not E2, C2?
@James
Capt’s initials weren’t DJ were they?
I do appreciate the frustration you guys must feel when you do a decades worth of ops and then get told to regenerate / recuperate, but without any significant kit funding. My brother-in-law has just finished a Herrick tour and feels much the same.
The real scandal is that the Black Hole was entirely avoidable. The deferral of projects year-on-year was done to fit RDEL and CDEL limits in the MoD budget that were according to the Treasury “inviolable”. Literally a couple of billion more per annum spent in the mid-noughties rather than deferring would have sorted most of this, as a significant proportion is delay-related escalation.
I did find the Nimitz surge evaluation btw (see link : http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/4500002800.pdf). It was longer ago than I’d thought, but certainly confirms 200 sorties a day is achievable for a Nimitz.
@ Not a Boffin – “It all comes down to what we wish to do in the world. If we wish to project power, then we need to do it properly. If we don’t, then defence of the UK base is just fine.”
Precisely, and if that arrives no-one will be laughing (except the treasury) because all this requires is in the region of:
five brigades (four mech/one Cdo)
five fighter squadrons (four EF2000/one F35)
twelve ships of the line (three T45/six T26/three LHD)
Remember the cost of the carriers was delayed for two years by the previous government, nothing to do with the MoD, cost us an extra £1.6 billion. http://www.theyworkforyou.com/debates/?id=2012-03-26a.1142.1
Quite a few of the comments on this thread have spoken of future actions and procurement in terms of forth-coming decades, forty years springs to mind. What is the general consensus on the state of the global oil supply upto and including 2052?
Personally I think we’re going to be up sh*t creek and no amount of paddles are going to make a difference.
In a previous comment I said that CVF should have been nuclear powered, this being the reason why, it would help future proof us against future oil restrictions.
Jim @ 2.58
You keep plugging this line and this number but have you ever stopped to consider what this number represents?
For a start it seems a kitchen sink number to scare the children.
The £3.9bill baseline number was generated after the thumbscrews were put on BWoS.
They were looking for a lot more and they never forget.
£1.6bill is the equivalent of paying 57K people the average full time wage including employer NICs for a year.
That is 28K people for two years.
That number is not sustainable –
It reeks of MOD cronyism, criminal cost control and weak political leadership. No-one comes out of this smelling of roses apart from BWoS’s management bonus pool and their net margin.
However the really galling part in all of this is the recent MARS contract that has the build work going to Korea – BWoS couldn’t be bothered to bid as they did not have the capacity.
And that from a company that built the Waves at two different locations.
Until the giant vampire squid that is BWoS has been removed from the throat of the MOD this will keep happening and we as taxpayers and servicemen will suffer.
The CVF programme is a train wreck because of many things –
Asking the Fiesta design team to build a 44 ton truck.
MOD complete lack of programme management and cost control capabilities.
RN – willy waving / fox in a hen coop / the great driving out the good – complete lack of leadership.
I go back to the great escort carrier scandal of 42 / 43 – CVEs and MACs – where the RN couldn’t cope with others having better ideas than they had and acted like spoiled children.
A CVF is a £500mill ship.
The rest is padding, profiteering and prejudice.
Not a … @ 1.45
Giving the MOD resource based accounting was like giving a 4 year old a box of matches.
They haven’t a clue how to use it and their potential for great damage.
@ jedi. I’m not quite sure if you’re suggesting that force is for defence of the UK or whether it’s your power projection (I assume the former). Your naval force there would be next to useless for defence of the UK. Some SSK, minelayers/MCMV and OPV fast attack should be fine.
Not sure what 3 Cdo would be doing either, or the F35 squadron.
@Ace. The non-nuclear decision was made circa 1995, based on the difficulties (costs) the USN were having with their CGN disposals, our issues with a high-level waste repository (still not sorted 20 yrs on) and the perceived cost. AFAIK it was never studied in detail beyond that. Funnily enough, some of the nuclear SQEP issues the submarine industry is seeing now might have been addressed by a new reactor design. It would also have made the relative prospects of Rosyth and Devonport very different….
@Ixion
Sorry I didn’t respond to your post on why not Korea or similar. The “secret” stuff as you put it is not kit. In many cases, details of the construction of the hulls themselves are classified, as with a little bit of knowledge you can work out what is needed to defeat a particular hull structure / armour combination (don’t believe everything you read about QEC….).
That kind of makes it difficult to release steelwork drawings to allow people to build it. Other equipment also have Defstans associated with them, not necessarily “SECRET”, but often “RESTRICTED” or above. This might be a particular type of cable shielding, or a shock performance standard for a pump or switchboard. No shipyard can easily source this without the necessary clearance and so you don’t get the kit you need. Before people start on “commercial standards”, they are all very well if you fully understand what you’re getting. The commercial standard davits fitted on HMS Ocean should provide a cautionary tale in that respect.
People often talk about getting the basic hull built overseas and then brought to UK for outfit. This works for some simple-ish merchant vessels where outfit density is low, but for a high outfit density warship it would cost a fortune in manpower. As a rule of thumb, fitting a large -bore pipe to a unit in a fabrication shed takes 1 manhour, in a block pre-outfitting takes 8 and if fitted one the ships hull is complete it can take 16. There are thousands of large bore pipes on a ship that size. Access issues should not be underestimated and that’s before I even start on the sparkies running long cables through multiple compartments.
Should those ships be costing £5Bn? No – but the overhead associated with the contract has contributed to this, not least the fatuous decision by the MoD to extend the build period 2 years to stay within CDEL control limits (sorry Jim, it wasn’t just the government).
The government had the chance for a more realistic price in 2002 and blew it.
@ Not a Boffin – “I’m not quite sure if you’re suggesting that force is for defence of the UK or whether it’s your power projection (I assume the former). Your naval force there would be next to useless for defence of the UK. Some SSK, minelayers/MCMV and OPV fast attack should be fine.”
The former.
I’m totally agree on your suggestions, i was only talking about big ticket items rather than important items.
Basically a super-sized danish navy.
@FBOT – Don’t agree with some of your assertions regarding the w1lly-waving element. That was the symptom the former CE of the Warship Support Agency championed, but discovered he was wrong.
The single biggest problem is that MoD has no real idea of how to cost anything, artefacts, programmes or risk, so tends to fanny about questioning trivia while other things are left unaddressed.
You are a little unfair on the design team. The actual arrangement of the ship is very good (standfast a couple of areas) and it will be able to operate aircraft more efficiently than anything we’ve ever had before.
I am the last person to defend BAES. Personally I think the QEC design and build should have been £3.5Bn the pair or thereabouts. However, much of the overhead is imposed by MoD, mostly unwittingly.
@Jedi – for Sea Denial you don’t need any of those big ticket items. What are the LHDs doing?
As to what our grand strategy for security is I would offer the following as aims:
Be one of the ones people listen to.
Be one of the ones people want to say “yes”
Be one of the ones who is allowed to say “no”
Be the umbrella holder not the umbrella croucher.
I take the view that if we cut back to home defence only (QRA, coastguard and national guard) then sooner or later someone big and nasty would come and dump all over us and we wouldn’t be able to so a thing about it. Especially once America’s back is turned. So we need to stay out there making sure everyone knows we mean business.
The means to achioeving this are: Conventional force projection via CVF, Astute, and a small but capable expeditonary Army and RAF; crebible nuclear deterrant, probably Trident for the foreseeable future; Permenant seat on UN Sec, probably by allying with the likes of Brazil to expand the club.
To afford these things I propose: better, shorter procurement exercises with fewer cock-ups; more force enablers; fewer pointy assests but all kept ‘theatre ready’; more joint force elements, not only tri-service but also with trusted NATO allies.
The fact that USA is pulling back from Europe acutally gives UK and France space to grow our role and our influence. It also allows us to make the political case for maintaining defence budget share plus annexing a good slice of DfiD.
Finally we should be looking at other EU partners who could be persuaded to subcontract some of their treaty obligated defence spending to us. It is no secret that UK and France are the leaders on EU defence, so why not recognise it as an EU specialism and channel more of the budget direct through our programmes? Sounds radical but if they are serious about giving up their economic sovereignty via a stability pact they also need to look seriously at how the EU is going to defend itself without substantive American support. There is more than enough moeny in the EU to fund modest sized but extrememly capable armed forces. We just need to get it channelled through the right programmes – which means Britain and France doing on defence what Mrs Merkel has just done on economics: take a good grip and sqeeze hard.
@ Not A Boffin – “for Sea Denial you don’t need any of those big ticket items. What are the LHDs doing?”
The same things the thetis class and the absalon’s do in the Danish navy.
@NotaBof
Actually, if you think of the worldwide picture, there are actually very few countries that product their own ships, the capability to build to spec and not off the shelf is actually a rarity, and I would say, a privilage. It might seem that having home grown ship building capacity has been taken as a norm and not a luxuary.
Most countries buy from others and if they have no problem with it, maybe Opsec isn’t really that big a deal anyway.
Not a … @ 4.37
2002 was the weak BWoS design – very 70s.
Thales got the gig and they went for a cross-breed.
Biggest mistake is the GT / MSD mix.
Don’t know why they went down this road.
It should have been all MSD gen sets.
Second biggest mistake –
Also the 280m hull limit struck again.
Haven’t the RN heard of dredgers?
Building ships to suit the existing docks was wrong in 1912 and it is wrong now.
Threaten to send them commercial or worse to D/port would have sorted it out in minutes.
330m x 42m x 9/10m much more usable than 280m x 39m x 10/11m.
Regarding your point about the MOD not knowing the cost of anything or how do contracts work in the real world.
I have to agree, the ignorance shown at times is shocking.
Right up until the point that an asymetric Iranian puts you on the bottom of the perisan gulf.
“maybe Opsec isn’t really that big a deal”
And that changes the majority of the planet’s procurement processes, how?
Not a boffin
You are clearly ‘In the industry’ and I am not, so I have to bow to your vastly superior factual knowledge.
However I am not sure that the laws of physics and engineering change much as you travel east either to Poland or Korea.
For the sake of getting the ships cheap I would be prepared to have the world know about the shock loading of our pumps,- I suggest, also that the Carriers structure will be something that any experience marine engineer could have a good guess at.
Also don’t the Koreans build their own Arliegh Burke types so presumably they know about security.
They’re not serious about getting into strife with the likes of Iran.
“And that changes the majority of the planet’s procurement processes, how?”
@PE
And Iran can hack into DSCN and Lockheed files easily?
Just because Country X builds Y type of ships does not mean they’ll post the hullplans on the internet. In fact, they’re probably even more fanatical to keep it close held. Local monopoly and profit. Very good motivators.
@Observer
Actually I’m sure there is a whole industry out there of people trying to hack into each others’ files and if you knew the right people in Russia or China you’d probably be able to buy the blueprints of any warship afloat.
My response was perhaps slightly tongue in cheek. I agree with OpSec in principle for a major project like this but I suspect the prime motivation for building in the UK was in fact to keep Labour voting metal bashers employed.
An interesting thread, one of the better ones on this subject.
@ NaB was there ever a discussion about building QEC abroad, if so how far down the path did the plan go?
@PE
There is also the desire not to lose the ability to shipbuild, though with the inefficiencies in the system carried down over, there might be some need in restructuring and modernization.
As for deckplans, I’m sure you can get them almost anywhere, hardly only China or Russia, even if it is from civilian camera shots to youtube during Navy Exhibitions.
@Topman
I’m going to put money on “Died a quick death. Probably didn’t suffer.” :)
Or “D.O.A”.
@ Jedi
Do you mean sea control or sea denial?
Another possibility is tech transfer in lieu of cash. If there is an agreement for transfer of tech, there is a possibility of a ship being built at less than cost. The company earns by getting tech which they can hock as upgrades to the region and recoup their losses from there, the buyer gets ships at a discount.
Another side effect is if tech gets intergrated into regional warships, any Coalition operation is going to have you working with allies whose equipment is on par with yours, or maybe even slightly better, not having a substandard second line backup.
And good news is that 1) Fixed price. Overruns? Too bad. Suck it up yourself. 2) You can sue for delays.
Its all about risk isn’t it. South Korea is our ally now, and will probably continue to be in the future. You wouldn’t want to go round that loop, quick revolution, and suddenly find yourself lining up AGAINST the ships that are ‘slightlly better’ than yours.
“working with allies whose equipment is on par with yours, or maybe even slightly better,”
I forgot just how many fireworks the Sejongs carry. 48 land attack missiles and 16 ASM as well as the AAW stuff. Wow.
@x
Just read the wiki for Sejong. Pretty chunky piece of kit. Only thing missing is mention of a fancy towed sonar array, so they should be a bit careful if there is a North Korean SSK around!
I think anything from the North will be heard nice and clearly. The Sejongs also carry an ASW missile too. Weaponry wise that is what Daring should be carrying…… :(
Hmmm, haven’t had a good look at the source and how valid it is, but… hmmm…
http://theaviationist.com/2012/02/08/f35-typhoon/
@ Stephen
One interesting part of that is their decision to shut their Typhoon line.
Presumably as Typhoon orders dwindle there will be an element of ‘last man standing’ and whoever can manage to keep their production line open for longest will sweep up the scraps in terms of any last minute orders.
@FBOT. YOu may be right about the year, it’s so long ago now. However, the price offered was for the Thales design, project managed by BAES.
As for the GT, I can’t see your point. To get 60MW in MSD, you’re talking some very chunky donks, which probably wouldn’t be able to go where the Trents do, which would complicate the uptake, hangar and weapons lifts deconfliction no end and cause serious problems on the tank top.
@Ixion. The laws of physics don’t change. What does change is the threat you design against. Take for example Lloyds Rules for Commercial Ships. The scantlings that those rules output will ensure the ship should (if operated & surveyed correctly) retain sufficient strength against wave loading and local hydrodynamic pressure. Now take Lloyds Rules for Naval Ships. In some instances, depending on the loads that are input (and guess what they aren’t in the Rules) those Rules will output scantlings way in excess of what the commercial ship rules require. What do you think the difference might reflect? How easily do you think that knowledge was gained? What might an opponent do if that information becomes available?
I’m afraid that we really do need to retain that sort of knowledge and design skill onshore and actually it also makes sense to build the more complex stuff onshore as well. The MARS tankers are a red herring, there is very little equivalent content in there.
In fact, if you want an example of MoD incompetence, the fact that it took them eight years (and umpteen studies) to realise that :
1 – building what were essentially commercial product tankers with a vastly different @rse-end and slightly higher speed in the UK was not good value for money (hence Korea)
2- there were no commercial designs that could easily be modified to meet the requirement. So,
3 – The quickest and easiest way to get what you want is to pay a consultant to produce a feasibility design and then get an efficient commercial yard to build it for you.
The fact that having come to that decision and with a negotiating team in-country examining best and final offers during a shipbuilding recession (just think what that means in terms of price…..), the MoD pulled the tender again (2009 I think?) because of the RAB control total in the budget illustrates the problem. It really isn’t BAE taking the p1ss (although they are undoubtedly not making a loss), it is a MoD so constrained by it’s own lack of capability and stultifying processes, that it is utterly incapable of making sensible decisions. Incidentally, the MoD I am talking about resides primarily in Westminster, not Abbeywood, as I believe Bernard Gray may be discovering to his surprise………
@PE
Under wiki RE: Sejong
“MTeQ towed array sonar system”
And I just took a look at the weapons fit…
128 launch cells… + externals…
They were not joking when they said heavily armed. This was close to the proposed design loadout for an arsenel ship I had in mind. In this case, even better, no need to redesign the wheel. Buy from them in the future? Might be an idea worth looking into.
I expect they wouldn’t want to transfer advanced technology like that to riff raff like us :-(
Oh well, T45 might get a few more gadgets on it eventutally. Lets hope none get sunk by the argies/syrians/iranians [insert nutcase regime of choice] before that happens. Sigh.
@ NaB
Very true on commercial vs military standards. But for some rules modern commercial standards provide a good starting point. For example the Albions are built to Lloyds Fast Cargo ships standards with uprated fire fighting equipment.
NaB @ 7.48
I think you need to go back over your figures.
Once the choice had been made to go with the Thales design the first offer from the BWoS led ACA was £3.8bill for the two. That was £1bill over the MOD budget – cue knashing of teeth.
As for diesels, I stand by my assertition that GTs should not have been chosen, MSDs are the way to go.
Currently – from memory – we have 72MW of GT power and 42MW from 4 MSDs.
That provides 80MW motive power and 26knots downhill with the wind at our back.
Consequently my thoughts are that the ship is underpowered.
The GTs are wrong because they have high fuel consumption and they are not space efficient.
Putting them above the main deck to save trunking / space just makes them vulnerable to incoming.
Adding armour causes top weight issues and negates their big strength of being lightweight.
My thoughts are that an eight engine room set up would do the trick.
Put in a Wartsilla 16V38 genset @ 12MW plus a smaller 12V26 unit at 4MW.
Total weight of installation: 8 * (200+60) = 2080 tons for 128MW installed.
Up the motive power to 100MW and we have a more mobile platform.
Currently N+D have 720 tons of MSDs plus the two GTs.
Also the MSDs would have been cheaper MW to MW.
Regarding your comments about build standards I fear you are putting too much faith in the differences between paper standards. We have used Commercial Standards before, as noted previously the Albions are quoted as being based on a commercial standard with limited local upgrading.
Not sure what this proves apart from the fact that if the yard leadership has little knowledge, experience or imagination then any standard is going to be expensive.
Consequently the whole CVF programme is a complete farce.
It is the blind leading the deaf in a quest to teach a 5 year old to re-write the bible – too much, too soon.
Better to have went with a mild steel prototype even to the extent of buying a second hand container ship and getting medieval on its erse with a blow torch, an angle grinder and a gang of Polish / Glesga welders.
Once it has served its primary purpose – practice for the CVF design team it could have been stripped of its fixed wing equipment and used as an Ocean replacement for 10 years.
If we looked at the advantages of using/modifying the structural elements of a container ship we would soon see the advantages and the durability of the design – the Ladder frame main structure –
2 x 20m deep main longitudinal girders and deep transverse bulkheads every 15m which generate a huge strength very efficiently. They are a great first step to building the long boxy hull needed to make the CVF a success.
280m x 39m x 10/11m is too small.
330/360m x 42m x 9/10m for 90K tons full load is the way to go.
As for scantlings I fear the CVF is getting a showing up from the Zumwalt. Our design looks like an egg carton compared to the manly framing of the Yank.
FBOT, Technically you are very astute, operationally you really do not get it. The Carriers are the size they are as that is big enough to do what we need them to do. it also allows them to get in and out of Ports and on and off of berths that they would otherwise not be able to. Gas Turbines are getting more fuel efficient, the 45 can do 32 kts but can do 7000Nm at 18kts. They are also more comfortable with having their speed altered more often.
Damage control on the LPDs is full military spec, allowing breakdown into 3 seperate sub citadels, strengthened bulk heads normal water tight military doors etc. The commercial aspects were power plant and propulsion etc.Funnily enough using commercvial diesels for direct electric drive. They could not handle the heat or the cold and gave continous problems until the whole propulsion system was effectively overhauled.
NaB @ 7.48 – Part 2
Regarding the situation with the MARS Gang of Four, just what are we getting apart from a new class of facelifted / sandblasted Waves?
I just cannot see why we didn’t ask Govan for a couple of Wave repeats with a nicer superstructure. It could even have been sold as a bit of JMK style reflationary public works.
If anything the MARS programme is an even bigger disgrace than the CVF programme as the MOD went mad on buying in every sort of consultancy and service and doing very little itself.
Also the designs are second rate and derivative.
We should put a roof on them to allow them to work as emergency carriers in a MAC sort of way.
They would have made better looking patrol boats if we had done it.
You know it makes sense – more helos for anti drug / anti pirate patrols.
If it had been the Dutch or the Danes who introduced them then the RN would be on the phone to the MOD quick enough to add them to their wish list.
All PATS @ 11.58
You are letting the tail wag the dog.
In a previous life 100 years ago you probably put forward the argument that 90′ was big enough and who would pay for the new docks.
The carriers are too small.
It is quart into a pint pot mentality and it costs money.
Big and simple is better than small and complicated.
We are building a CVF not a cruise liner, who cares if it cannot do meet and greet in Peru or Brazil.
As for GTs you just don’t get, they are very inefficient across the majority of their output range, even in their green zone they struggle to get within 20% of the fuel economy of MSDs.
And these are MSDs that handle a number of very demanding work schedules powering large cruise liners and fast – 26 knot – ferries.
As for the LPDs, they mimic the RN / MOD to a tee.
Too many chiefs and not enough Indians.
They can control a division but can only carry a couple of companies.
FBOT “who cares if it cannot do meet and greet in Peru or Brazil” You just made my point for me, You have no concept of the importance of soft power or defence diplomacy etec etc. You look at Ships as a serious of numbers and drawings with no idea about how a warship operates or what it has to achieve.
A ferry or cruise liner may touch the throttle once very day or every hour or so on a cross channel ferry. I am merely stating fact as someone who was there that the MSD commercial diesels on the LPDs were incapable of operating the way warships do and could not cope with extreme heat or cold for prolonged periods.
The carriers are not too small, they are big enough to do what we want and need them to do.
The lift capacity of the LPD is not fantastic but I have seen 1700 people squeezed onboard(leaving Beirut). The fact that you seem to think that having good C2 facilities is a bad thing pretty much makes my case. After all if you cannot carry a Brigade why be able to control one? Not as if troops will come from other sources?
@ Not a Boffin
The RAF have had Typhoon, A400M, C17, Chinook (Mk 3, Mk3 fixes, Julius and Mk6), Sentinel, Reaper. GR7 to GR9 (oops!) and unfortunately MRA4, which apparently still had significant airworthiness issues.
The RN have had T45, Astute, LPD and LSD(A).”
And:
– Harrier upgrade as well,
– Merlin,
– Lynx Wildcat,
– Sonar 2087 and Artisan for the Type 23,
– River Class patrol boats,
– Echo Class survey vessels,
– Wave Class tankers,
With CVF and Type 26 on the way.
P.S. just for X, a good picture showing the layout of the Sejong. Click the picture to zoom in. Surprisingly enough its the one at the front with the Korean flag flying above it…
http://www.c7f.navy.mil/imagery/high-res/2012/03-March/120306-N-DB801-819.jpg
Forward mounted main gun, SAM missiles behind that, Rolling airframe CIWS jobby behind that, SPY radars around the bridge (a Sampson would look so much better…), a pair of quad ASuW missile launchers facing in each direction in the middle (because why have 8 missiles total when you can have 8 in each direction?), exhausts, what I’m presuming is a pair of sat com dishes, then a Goalkeeper CIWS on top of the hangar, followed by another set of missile cells which I believe is the ASROC and the TLAM (Korean versions of both) positioned to sit vertically in between the double hangar (each of which is capable of handling a Super Lynx or Seahawk).
Jealous much?
Wild Cat is a combined Army and RN order, Merlin comes in a green format as well. Artisan is a radar system with a total cost of 100 million for the entire fleet. The wave Class tankers replaced vessels that had been in service since the mid 60s. The river class are on a lease and the DEFRA contract pays a significant part of their running costs.The Echo boats replaced the HEclas which again had been in service since the mid 60s.
So whilst you are correct that these projects came in, the major non shared ones were replacing vessels nearly 40 years old.
The army has probably been served worse in terms of major equipment projects but the heavy equipment that they have has proven to be unsuitable for the COIN Ops they have conducted and with a complete lack of a credible conventional threat it becomes difficult to justify replacement of some systems.
Chris B, Interesting placement of the aft Silos, love to see how they fitted them around the hangar space. The dishes you say are Satcom look like old fashioned fire control radars which I do not think they are. Satcom is nearly always enclosed.
Hi PE,
Perhaps your ref was to the hypothetical 55kt vessel in “My guess is if you crunched the numbers they would come out about the same.”
– but QEs and AMERICAs indeed cost the same
@ APATS
re; Sejong hangars.
From the rear end you have two hangar doors, one on either side of a central section on top of which are the silo doors, so one can only presume that they built the hangars around the missiles!
re; the navy projects.
I’m aware that Merlin and Wildcat are joint. The purpose was to indicate that the list previously posted included things like the Harriers that were joint projects, and also went through a raft other projects while trying to portray the Navy as the poor, under appreciated cousin that never gets any sweets.
As for replacing vessels that are very old, that’s fine, but that argument applies as to much to a lot of the army and air force kit listed.
Again its the double standard that I don’t like. Replacing old warships is fine because they’re old, but replacing old vehicles or planes is not?
@Chris.B: yeah, it’s double standards. But both the RAF and the RN would make the point that fatigue will eventually make their platforms unusable, whereas vehicles can be persuaded to struggle on with a new drivetrain for example.
The Army did repeatedly shoot itself in the foot with the boondoggle that was FRES, making the same error the US Army did by wanting an integrated solution full of immature high tech, instead of getting a vehicle that worked and adding systems as they became practical. Funding endless research with “system integrators” is great for a politician, who assumes your current run rate will extend forever :-(
@ APATS –
http://jedibeeftrix.files.wordpress.com/2010/08/navy_utility.png
“In British naval doctrine, ‘presence’ is defined as the exercise of the use of naval force in support of diplomacy in a general way, involving deployments, port visit, exercising and routine operating in areas of interest. The purpose is to declare interest, reassure friends and allies, and to deter (convince a potential aggressor that the consequence of coercion or armed conflict would outweigh the potential gains).”
Hi NaBoffin,
RE ” some very chunky donks, which probably wouldn’t be able to go where the Trents do”
– early on there were spaces reserved for two more Trents (but not for the airflow, that would have been a later design change)
– I wonder if those spaces have been used up as by now the EMALS power requirement is a known (not an approximate estimate, requiring reserves to cover the margin of error)?
@ Chris B
Thanks for that image. At the moment it won’t load. Joys of having Sky Broadband. I seemed to have surrendered getting everything all the time for occasionally super speed downloads and no data limit.
As for equipment and the RAF. I wasn’t saying the RAF shouldn’t have stuff. It seemed to me what was being said what the RAF had had nothing while the RN had a lot. As you seem to say on balance they have both done quite well, it just seems we are short those extra few bits to just make good into best.
@ FBOT
My understanding is that for a ship over about 8000tons displacement the volume needed within the hull for “motive power” is roughly the same whatever system you choose; it is just that that volume is distributed through in hull in different arrangements. Steam large boilers, turbines low in ship medium uptakes and intakes, reserving gear boxes and medium bunkers. Nuclear reactor (and boilers) and turbines low in ship, no uptakes and intakes. Gas turbines low in ship, but big intakes and uptakes, big gearboxes but no reserve, and big bunkers. MSD diesels, more prime movers distributed through the hull bottom, small uptakes and intakes, meidum sized bunkers, and gear boxes. And so on. Even on electric ship if you have lets say 8 gen sets in 4 machine spaces and gas turbine generator at 01/weather deck level all those spaces combined will rough out; it is the flexibility with electric ships. I may give you moving the motors to pods may save a bit of space.
What I am saying is it doesn’t matter what system you choose for a big hull you are going end up with a system of X for a speed of Y over a given distance Z. (Nuclear to one side.)
I do like the way you think. :)
ACC said “EMALS power requirement is a known ”
It’s vapourware I tell you!!!!!!!!!!!!! :) :) ;)
All PATS @ 12.37
You military types don’t do irony, do you?
We cannot get a rowing boat into Peru or Brazil at the moment.
As for soft power I fear the SIMSS discussions of the past 18 months just weny over your head.
Sending a Bay or a Wave to do patrol just shouts weakness / can’t be bothered / not even trying to the rest of the world. Yet we continue to waste money paying BWoS to tell us things we should have known in the first place. The MOD’s first responsibility is the defence of the UK not the shareholders of the UK’s MIC.
Now on the basics of ship design.
Design the ship to do its basic job – CVF that is the launch / recovery / support of its aircraft.
Did the DoD ask for a new design of CVN when it realised its size would preclude some port calls?
Consequently get a grip.
The CVF is too small due to basing / dock issues.
These were part of the design process in the 60’s and they are with us now.
It is a bad case of the tail wagging the dog.
It was the same 100 years ago – 1912 Build Programme – and we do not seem to learn lessons very well.
Jedi @ 8.51
Is that diagram homemade or official?
As for the content not much to argue about.
The ships available to carry it out – now that is another matter.
@ All
Of course with nuclear no fuel is needed either. Though a carrier will still have tanks for AVCAT. And could in theory use other voids to carry “bunkers” for accompanying surface ships.
I cocked up my last sentence,
It doesn’t matter what system you choose but to achieve a speed of X with a conventional hull of size Y you are going to end up with “motive power system” that takes a volume of Y.
I say conventional hull because I have been looking at pentamarans. BMT have a design for (approx) 1000TEU design that can do 25kts on 25MW. And can reach speeds of up to 41kts. 1000TEU is like carrying 2.5 Darings somewhere. The ship it self isn’t much bigger than a Daring length wise. A pentamaran would allow Sampson to be really high up too; I imagine another 20 ft at least over T45.
Re: Port visits and auxiliaries as “patrol boats”.
He does have a point. When the Bush visited Portsmouth she wasn’t secured alongside in HMNB Portsmouth was she,
http://dalyhistory.files.wordpress.com/2011/05/sdc10228.jpg
And though auxiliaries do the job, and do the job well, they don’t look the part. We live in a age where the natives have the internet, where jeans and Nikes, and have Western aspirations. Their politicians and military leaders aren’t tribal chiefs awed by the awesome power of the white man’s smoke pole. Plus the MoD buys auxiliaries to do a specific job.
I think I was once read that the RN quite liked sending the Cats to the South American station because even though they were a slow diesel frigate the two Mk6 mounts made them look rather fearsome…….
X @ 10.49
My thoughts are that MSDs are in the lead regarding space efficiency but not out of sight.
Consequently happy to work to your rule of equivalence.
That means that location becomes important.
Looking at naval shipping with a draught of 6 – 11m.
LSDs are great but they are too tall, they would stick up through the main deck.
Consequently their 5-7% economy premium is not available.
GTs located above the waterline / main deck are Exocet fodder.
I fear that this is a big weakness of the CVF design.
The are vulnerable to fairly small scale incoming.
They are less durable than MSDs in the first instance but putting them in the trad engine room would be a big help. Sticking them up to underneath the funnels is a big bulls eye painted on the ship.
If they are not underneath the funnel then we are wasting a lot of space with the trunking.
Given the ability of your average yahoo mentalist to think on the fly this could be a big issue.
Finally your “vapourware” – going rate seems to be 20MW for a launch every 45 seconds.
We have 112MW installed – approximate.
The motive power is 80MW – 4 x 20MW motors – far too slow.
Consequently we seem to have some power to spare.
You have to ask though if EMALS isn’t fitted what would we have used the power for?
Finally regarding steam Wartsilla can get an extra 10-12% of installed power turned into usuable work if you fit their optional Eco / heat recovery package. It seems to be a heat exchanger installation to the exhaust but Maersk seem to love it. From what I have seen they seem to generate steam to turn into electricity.
Very nifty.
@ FBOT –
the diagram comes from this:
http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Journal_201008_Blackham_and_Prins.pdf
@ FBOT
Re: vapourware
I was taking the mick out of myself. I know there is spare power in the system for EMAL launches.
RE GTs
As for GTs on the weather deck/flight deck/01 level well to be honest I think they are probably safe there than buried deep inside. A missile will go for the centre of mass. I would suggest if the enemy were strafing the decks of CVF the game would probably be up anyway. And then there are effects of large explosions. When you hear damaged reports from WW2 and read things have been “knocked off line” they really do mean knocked off. Explosions can lift heavy equipment ever so slightly fracturing components. Contacts can be broken. Circuit boards rattled. Not for nothing are you told to brace yourself athwartships and not on bulkheads.
RE: Ports and CVF
I have some sympathy for what you say on these too. I wondered about where CVF would be better based in Southampton if space could be found. When you ships bigger than CVF plying up and down Southampton water or watch QM2 pirouetting around about to dock I do wonder if there were options available. Portsmouth down the road. There seems a lot of space around the various docksides for any buildings.
Same with the H&W dry dock. Most large scale engineering projects are one offs with the workforce coming together to do a job for the necessary duration. There is no need to maintain a workforce per se for refits.
Don’t know. Not saying I looked into any of it to deeply.
RE GTs:
What I was saying was the GTs on the weatherdeck/flightdeck/01 level would be better protected from the effects of explosions.
X @ 12.05
That is the issue.
I don’t think the GTs are buried deep inside.
I fear they are far too close to their exhausts / funnels for comfort.
If they are not then we have the issue of trunking to deal with.
Instead of being vertical it is now horizontal and taking out a huge chunk of usable space around and below the hangar.
Big issue for me – I fear an upmarket Russian A/T weapon.
If it can take out a Merkava it can take out a GT above the waterline.
@ FBOT
I think the odds of somebody planning to snipe at CVF with an ATGW are too long. A planned attach perhaps when transiting the Suez perhaps? The Egyptians mount large scale security operations for Western warships transiting the canal. But far, far too remote. Deep inside they are probably close to where a missile would hit. Closer to where the shock from a torpedo would hit the hull. Closer to any fire or flooding. When I first heard about putting GTs up high in a combined uptake/deckhouse arrangement I was actually struck by what a good simple idea it was. I am surprised you aren’t worried about things dropping off aircraft being a threat to them.
@Chris B. Sorry had omitted the OPV and SVHO – thought they were pre-2000. The Wave’s were and hence not included. the purpose of the list was not to make the RN look like the poor relation – I’d already noted that ships tend to be more capital intensive than most other assets. The intention was more to demonstrate that the Army / RAF had not been “starved” of funding by CVF.
@ACC – I think the “allocated space” for additional Trents is another urban myth. I’ve never seen a GA with them in. In any case, I don’t believe that the EMALS power demand will make any significant difference. There’s the best part of 30MW available above and beyond the maximum propulsive load with all generators on line.
@FBOT. You appear to be getting some of your info on the programme from Richard Beedalls excellent Navy Matters site. I must confess it’s so long ago now, that I sometimes strugfgle to remember, but I do recall a price gap of around £400M in 2003 or so. In any case, it’s of little relevance now other than to illustrate what delays and indecsion can do to cost growth.
Now, to the ship design elements. I’m afraid your preference for MSDs (irrespective of loading profile) is somewhat impractical. I can assure you that eight machinery spaces (plus AMRs and motor rooms) would be a little challenging to layout, while avoiding conflicts with magazines, lifts, uptakes, bunkers etc. In any case, the power limitation is on the electric motors, not the generators, so you’re not actually going to improve speed. Vertical integration on a carrier is one of the more challenging aspects of such a design.
I’m not sure where your assertion of a 280m dock limit is coming from, nor indeed the comment about Devonport. Perhaps you are confusing the putative length limit for getting into Devonport (“round the corner”). One thing is certain – QEC will not enter Devonport.
No 1 dock in Rosyth is actually 300+m long, so QE has not been designed to a particular dock constraint. The overall design is commensurate with the aircraft operating profile it was designed against. Personally, I’d like her to go a little faster (30 kts for CTOL ops would be good), but although there will be limitations imposed on operational flexibility by her speed, that doesn’t make her cr@p.
Your preferred size is presumably based either on a set of Nimitz dimensions or one of the larger post-Panamax containerships out there. I can’t quite see why you believe a containership should be the basis of some sort of conversion. You should be aware that most internal traffic of stores and personnel in a carrier (or LPH for that matter) is a combination of horizontal (which a containership does not allow) and vertical movement. The other thing that warships tend to be high on is “outfit” – something that is singularly absent in containerships. You seem to be implying that shoehorning what are very complex interactive capabilities into an empty shoebox will in someway help a design team. I’m afraid this is very far from the case – conversions are nearly always messy, expensive and end up delivering less than the requirement.
Not sure about your point on Albion’s commercial standards. One of the reasons that ship was so expensive was nothing to do with standards and everything to do with 3D CAD models. VSEL (later BAE) had just implemented the CADDS5 design & manufacture suite in Barrow and used the LPD as the guinea pig to make it work. Unfortunately, getting suitably experienced folk to operate the system was a major problem. This led to the detail design process falling way behind the production schedule and also needing to recruit non-marine draughtsmen would could use 3D packages. falling behind the production schedule meant that as the ships were being erected on the berths at Barrow, significant amounts of local hotwork had not been done, because the design information (position, size, marking etc) did not exist. If you’ve built ships you’ll know that this is the very last thing you want – hence the build cost of the class went trhough the roof. The MoD and VSEL team were daft enough to put up a couple of slides at a RINA conference in 97 that let slip what was happening. Some muted hilarity ensued from those who had built ships. The use of non-marine draughtsmen led indirectly to the issue with the LPD HV system, where extensive elements were specified as hovaing only IP23 protection, in an environment where the Navy fights fires with seawater and/or AFFF. Again, not really to do with commercial standards, more the draughtsmen in question being unfamiliar with naval practice. You should also be aware taht the various Classification Society Rules are not just paper, but do in fact mandate sign off of drawings, surveys and inspections throughout build and later life, depending on the notation being applied. The development of Naval rules by Lloyds, DNV and ABS among others will not produce perfect ships, but they will ensure that at very least, the correct design loads (inclduing classified elements) will be applied in the correct manner and that system designs will be properly specified and operating modes considered.
I’m not quite sure either why we would want a re-run of the Wave class. At the time, (ten years ago) we paid £160M each for something that in terms of capacity (20000 cube product carrier) the going rate was US$30-40M. Now as explained previously, you are buying more than a product carrier in term sof accommodation, flightdeck & hangar, speed and RAS rigs. But those additional factors do not equal 7 or 8 times the price. Although the NRE would be minimal, I dread to think what they woud cost today.
The MARS tanker design is actually a good reflection on BMT, who spent a lot of time trying to get the MoD to refine their requirement, designed against that, tweaked it as required and then went away to find a way to build it cost-effectively. They persevered in the face of truly special incompetence from the MoD (again primarily the Whitehall bit). I struggle to see where they are “second-rate” or “derivative”.
Finally, as for the Zumwalts. I’m afraid, if ever there was a ship design that is going to cost the earth and deliver little, that is it. 14000 te displacement, driven almost entirely by the bizarre wave-piercing tumblehome hull design and costing well in excess of US$4Bn each. There’s a reason taht programme is capped at three hulls and it isn’t that they provide enough capability to compensate for reduced numbers. I haven’t seen the scantling drawings for the class (doubt they’re available open-source, but happy to be corrected), but I would be surprised if they are radically different from QE.
Sorry this appears to be a bit of a rant against your ideas, but I’m afraid some of them are just technically incorrect.
I love urban myths – they are so much better than reality.
However, Richard Beedall in his Part 18 of the CVF saga tells us “By Summer 2004 sources were indicating that the CVF machinery was likely to use two Rolls Royce MT30 gas turbines alternators sets (although if required three or even four could still be fitted), plus probably four diesel generator sets – varying sizes are being considered for these, ranging between 7W and over 12MW.
By March 2005 it became clear that preferred configuration has solidified on 2 x 36 MW MT30 gas turbine alternators, 2 x 10 or 11MW diesel generators and 2 x 9 MW diesel generators. Total generating capacity was to be about 110MW at 11kVA, some 80MW of which will be consumed by the four 20MW electric, two driving each shaft. The Wärtsilä EnviroEngines range though to be a leading contender for the diesels. ”
– three, or even four, can only hold if there is/was space (reserved, of course not empty, but allocated to secondary & reconfigurable uses)
– I believe the main aviation studies had already been done (fixing the hangar space, deck, and coming up with that unique two-tower arrangement)
@ NaB
It was me who mentioned Lloyds not FBOT. And yes I know what a cock-up was made of the Albion build and design. But saying that they aren’t bad ships and they are still built to Lloyds whether the build was cocked-up or not. It is still doesn’t mean that as a starting point for a ship like an LPD that sits between frigate and destroyer and the auxiliaries that Lloyds’ (and other commercial classifications) can’t be exploited.
Did they really do that in that presentation? Wow. There is dropping a clanger and then there is dropping clanger with well prepared visual aids!!!
Hi FBOT,
We had this discussion ” needing to recruit non-marine draughtsmen would could use 3D packages. falling behind the production schedule meant that as the ships were being erected on the berths at Barrow, significant amounts of local hotwork had not been done, because the design information (position, size, marking etc) did not exist. If you’ve built ships you’ll know that this is the very last thing you want – hence the build cost of the class went trhough the roof” a while ago.
– I could not lay my finger on the root cause
– but I did point out that the price was “out-of-bounds”… twice (for each!) the price of Ocean
ACC said “three, or even four, can only hold if there is/was space (reserved, of course not empty, but allocated to secondary & reconfigurable uses)”
Exactly. And as I said above CVF seems to be a very “full” ship.
There were some funny outcomes of the CAD Albion class farce. For instance 2 cabins down from the Commanding Officers cabin there is a door which when opened is the same size as the single cabins on either side but contains precisely 1 toilet. CAD simply dropped it in.
NaB @ 2.02
The phrase can’t see the wood for the trees comes to mind.
Good old fashioned frontier gibberish would be another.
Selective quoting, straw men, partial answers – they are all in there.
My biggest fear is that you actually try and build ships for a living.
And even worse you try and build them for the MOD.
Your insularity, lack of vision and self delusion is shocking to see in black and white.
I only have time to offer comment on a couple of your points so I will start at the last – the Zumwalts and their heavy duty framing compared to the CVF.
There are many reasons why the Zumwalts are very expensive but the size and scale of their main framing is not one of them. My point was the variety of framing in the hull sections in comparison to the near uniformity seen in the CVF sections as they have been built.
My thoughts here are why?
I would have expected a greater variety of sections in the CVF build.
That is apparent in the Zumwalt build but is missing in the CVF.
Has the CVF been designed like a big T45?
The Fiesta design team building a44 ton truck?
Is that the right thing for a ship 8 times it’s displacement?
In the auto world that idea would have been laughed out the office.
Finally your comments on the use of MSDs – 8 combos of Wartsila’s finest.
One 16V38 @ 12 MW and one 12V26 @ 4MW.
One question here – what law of physics stops you having 80MW motive power?
Is 20MW max some sort of rule?
Did anyone tell the designer of the Hood / 1943 Eagle?
Regarding space you don’t seem to understand the tech.
They are very space efficient – the 16V38 genset fits comfortably in a 15m x 5m x 6m space.
Fitting all 16 MSDs in the hull would be easy –
The CVF already has four 38s installed.
4 sections – 72m hull length and it is all tickety boo.
Arrange two below the front island.
Arrange two below the rear island.
Plenty of space for military stuff in the other sections.
Just how big is the automated magazine / weapons load handling system?
Is it a single or multiple system?
How big are the standardised containers in the system?
6m or 8m long?
3m x 2m in CSA?
2T or 4T payload?
Finally regarding circulation – what do you need?
Surely vertical only in the machinery spaces below / near the waterline?
Limited horizontal movement below the hull main deck?
Hangar sections – 14/15m high would have a service tunnel below the hangar floor.
The trick would be to arrange as many movements as possible in one plane only.
Part 2 later.
ACC @ 2.44
Who was running the show at BiF when all this happening?
I have heard about the Astute FE debacle but nothing regarding another CAD shambles.
I fear we have BL / Rover Group design practices / attitudes in action.
We can’t do / use what we have now properly.
But if another new technique gets into the trade press we will drop everything and give that a go.
Even though we know nothing, have no experience and we have lost the manual.
Finally why CADDS 5?
Was it naval friendly?
Got to go.
@X – we’re agreeing furiously. LPD was built to Lloyds Commercial Ship rules, because at the time she was designed, the Lloyds Naval Rules didn’t exist. The main differences between the Naval and Commercial ship rules are that the NSR allow for inclusion in the Rules of certain military-defined loads and environmental factors. In terms of the ship structure, you see some difference, but not a game changer in terms of cost.
For US CV/CVN visits to Portsmouth. they never come in due to draft restrictions. Quite happy sitting out on Charlie buoy. been on two or three over the years, always interesting.
The point re H&W is that other than the dock, there is very little there now, it’s more a heritage site, cum business park. There is no large scale steel fabrication or outfit facilities any more. More importantly, there isn’t a large enough core workforce to anchor the project. H&W also somewhat blotted their copybook in the 80s and 90s with RFA Argus and Fort Victoria – not least by letting the latter get bombed by PIRA during build.
Attractive though it sounds, the idea that QEC is a job-creation scheme for Labour voters is a myth dreamt up by various people to suit their purposes (be they Conservative MP, RAF or Army). The shipyards are usually (but not exclusively) in Labour constituencies, but if they had really wanted to use the ships for that purpose, they would have ordered them long ago. Gordon Brown spent most of his time obstructing them ISTR.
@ACC. You can’t compare Ocean with LPD in any sensible way. Aside from the inclusion of the extensive and expensive C2 suite aboard Albion (which wasn’t included in Ocean), if you examine the two ships, the compartmentation and outfit density in LPD is astonishing compared to LPH. This is largely due to the LPH size being driven by its aviation facilities which left plenty of room for the other elements it had to carry, whereas the LPD was driven to the absolute minimum dimensions feasible during the NAPNOC negotiatons with MoD. High outfit density tends to equal high cost as it is both expensive in terms of material and difficult to build in terms of access, hence high labour content.
The LPH also has very cheap and simple marine systems, which have caused a number of other problems, whereas LPD has the first RN diesel-electric plant, which incurred modest additional cost.
@FBOT
Oh dear. I did stress that I was trying not to be personal. I’ve been specifying, designing and building ships for 25 years, by no means all for the MoD. What do you do for a living?
NAB whereas LPD has the first RN diesel-electric plant, which incurred modest additional cost and also caused huge problems!
Oceans plant has never really been fixed, hence the anchorage off Malta sans power during OUP. Yet Albion drifted in the Gulf of Mexico sans power during warm weather trials and Bulwark spent approx 15% of her 2006 Op Deployment with only a single shaft and even on 2 could manage no more than 6 or 7 kts in extreme heat.
Simply buying commercial diesels and dropping them into a warship is a proven failure. For the RN anyway.
@ NaB re H&W
Yes I know there are lots of problems with H&W. What I was driving at more was that these ships need supporting infrastructure that in its self is a major engineering project and I was just casting about for possible not probable solutions. Drydocks are big and surprisingly complex so H&W is I think was worthy of just a little consideration. And I agree about a workforce for the refit. That is why I said a CVF refit being a major engineering project doesn’t need a core workforce to build upon. The nature of work we are told today is transientry, especially for professional and skilled artisans. Belfast is safe now. I don’t see there would be much of a problem attracting a workforce who would be happy to work their for 3 to 5 years. Many sub-contractors work away for anything from 1 to 2 years or longer. But as you said there isn’t much there now and as I have just there is a need for infrastructure. Perhaps there are political considerations too? Refitting a warship in Ulster though good for the whole island’s economy would smack of flag waving. Even though supposedly we are now in a time of peace and all Unionists. That is European Unionists!!!
Hi NaBoffin,
RE “You can’t compare Ocean with LPD in any sensible way. Aside from the inclusion of the extensive and expensive C2 suite aboard Albion (which wasn’t included in Ocean)”
– the aside aside (granted, that is meant to say), my point of departure is always military utility: I assert that we would be better off with just one of those ( to command the brigade we do not -?? – plan to land, may be someone will come along). And then by having spent the cost of the second one on three Oceans, not just one
=> James’ss bde across the shore line (oops, that’s the 3 CDO… never mind, we’ll use the three LSD(A)s and the Points for the Army to come in and so a proper job, further inland
two more, on top of the one invested in, this “the cost of the second one on three Oceans, not just one” was trying to say
Why cadds 5 indeed is a gd question. While they says its a 3D cad system it is only in the very loose sense a 3D cad system and pretty crap for anything complicated and designers hated it. The much more powerful and expensive system catia v4 would have been available as bae were replacing cadds 5 on both nimrod and typhoon with catia v4 around that time.
H&W are building a number of wind turbines as well as doing some repair work on ships with the two main dry docks (with 2 Goliath cranes already in place) and the covered dock hall remain in commercial operation they did attempt to get the carrier build contract but were rejected. There last ship anvil point left early in the 2000s.
@ACC
Three Oceans and an LPD? That’s getting dangerously near @James’ wet dream of three Juan Carlos LHDs.
;-)
@ APATS
Oh I agree. I know just how badly Oceans generating plant did when she was at Fleet week some years ago. The logistic support for that ship is appalling (by which I mean the technical documentation, training packages etc), never mind the umpteen chinese pumps. As for whoever designed the STP without means of isolation, they ought to be sentenced to a month in 7G heads!
I knew the LPDs have their issues as well, but suspect that its the services to the plant (or possibly the design points specified) that are the problem rather than the actual donks in this case.
Ah well, when F35B is canned and the USMC suddenly realise they need some QEC in a hurry we can offer them H&W as an assembly location. That should annoy all those Irish-Republican-American congressmen!
I’ve done something on the CVF and UK shipbuilding programme. Please take a look!
http://thinpinstripedline.blogspot.co.uk/2012/03/cvf-and-quiet-success-of-uk.html
Jim30
Nice to read a piece on the positives of manufacturing in the uk.
@ ACC
The command and control facilities aren’t about the embarked force more about the “total” force that will be under command in theatre. As the anniversary is nearly upon us consider that in the Falklands there were RN amphibs, RFA LSL, and STUFT troop transports. You are right the RN can’t lift a brigade on its own. But it has to be able to command and control a brigade sized force. the fact that CC and lift are co-located is more to do with convenience and cost than anything else. The RN used to have command ships, we don’t any more.
(That is why some argue for CVF because in theory in deepens the defended allowing civilian ships and dare I say RFAs and even amphibs without sophisticated defences more protection by pushing the threat further out. Removing CVF just pushes costs further down. Instead of buying an LPD or whatever with a CIWS you end up buying a PDMS too. And to spread the risk more hulls. It is the hi-lo mix idea I suppose; there has to be a certain amount of capability to get the job done the decision is, is that capability shoved into one platform or spread around.)
X, “I think the odds of somebody planning to snipe at CVF with an ATGW are too long.”
I’m sure the Israeli navy thought this right up until the point Hezbollah hit one of their corvettes with an anti-ship missile in 2006.
If the Iranians are willing to supply them to Hezbollah to hit the Israeli’s, then I guess they’ll jump at the chance to supply any terrorist organisation willing to have a pop at us, especially with a highly prized target. They don’t have do much damage, just hitting it would be worth a fortune in PR.
@ Jim30
Stop being cheerful, you will go blind!
@ All
I don’t know why I rattled off that last paragraph in brackets. Trying to teach gran to suck eggs again…
@ Jim30 – thank you for that link, good read, and very positive.
Ace Rimmer, the Israelis were seriously negligent, every time that thing turned on its acquisition radar it lit up the EW suite like a xmas tree. Obviously the SAAR boats EW and AAW capabilities suck.
@ Ace
I was thinking more of somebody deliberately setting out to take out a GT. I think much of the surprise about the Hezbolhallalalalalllla ASM attack was more in the mind of the media. Israeli intelligence picture north of their border on big ticket items isn’t that scant. There is a big difference between a quasi-nationalist-para-military organisation in its own territory possessing a large weapon and somebody planning a terror attack. Saying that I am the person who wanted the MoD to give the FIDF Javelin to stonk anything approaching Stanley; but that was more about willy waving than practicality.
@Jim30
So what chance any export orders then? Either for CVF or for T45 or T26, or even Astute? That would be the proof of a flourishing successful warship building business with lean, mean, world beating costs.
Not sure it will happen – too much national pride and pork barrel involved across the globe. Also as menitoned upthread some of these countries now build better escorts than we do. We could of course sell building licences for CVF to upcoming allied powers. Candidates for some or all might be:
Australia, Canada, Brazil, South Korea, Singapore, UAE, USMC ;-)?
Probably not India. They already have a partner in Russia and are keen to do as much as possible themselves. Lets not get into bed with the Chinese or Russians ourselves either. Japan and Taiwan might be seen as a bit too provocative to China and also they’re more America’s allies than ours. France of course have already bought the design but seem in no hurry to build it.
The AT missile incident? The Israelis turned off their AMS because it was “generating too much noise.”….
I’d say that was an “oops”.
As for targetting specific parts inside a ship, good luck to that, you’re firing by guessimate and estimation, not to mention you have absolutely no idea if the part you want to target is there in the 1st place, scale picture drawings on the net being notoriously off kliter at times.
More likely, they’ll settle for a hit and treat it as a propaganda victory ala Cole.
@PE
Take Singapore off the list of CVF builders. We’re not that crazy, the manpower demands will be instant death even with automation and our independent escorts and raiders will end up with their feet nailed to the floor (well… sea) around the carrier. That doesn’t increase power projection, it decreases what you can project.
BTW it wasn’t an AT missile, it was a Chinese Yingje (Eagle strike) anti-ship missile. I mentioned it once as an example of how CIWS was outclassed by newer missiles? This was one of the ancestors of missiles designed to outfox CIWS.
@ Jim30 re Pinstripe
That was very good. Another thing I go on about is building SSNs and how difficult it is. But I never really thought about it in terms of carriers. Look at the Chinese. Look how long it is taking them to come up with something. You could say they are working through the concepts of carrier ops. But they haven’t got far. Same for India too.
… why did I read anti-ship as anti-tank…??
Sorry, cross-eyed. Going to “uncross” my eyes now. Night. :(
Not really following the technical back and forth on the engines, but if the propellors are turned by electricity instead of a big long metal shaft, is there anything to stop the power cabling being laid along the outsides of the boat, and thus being able to cut a very large flap in the back of CVF for some proper landing craft to get in and out? That might improve a bad situation with these CVFs.
Wow, we tickling the 500 comments mark, good stuff everyone, great discussions as ever…
Sorry for not joining in much, been away, so, some comments and questions
NaB, defence planning assumptions are what they are, you can’t ignore them and they have gone down since project CVF started, that was my point. I can’t ever see them going back up in scale either, can you?
Effects are not about mass, a couple of examples off the top of my head of air delivered land forces effects, Entebbe or the US intervention in Panama. Massive effects, light, air delivered forces. Not saying sea delivered can deliver less mass, but mass and effect are not the same.
The decks able to recover an F35B(s) might be few, but it would be more than none, the alternative in a sovereign operation, and that is the point I am making. In extremis, STOVL gives us more options either afloat or on land.
Syria is not being ignored because they have better air defences than Libya, it is a lot more complex than that and by inference, are you saying that a fully tooled up CVF with 40 F35’s would make things different, come on. We are ignoring Syria because of Russia, the desire to bleed Iran and a whole host of other complex geopolitical factors, nothing whatsoever to do with their AD capabilities
I am with James, the UK has given too much priority to the major project, sexy pointy shiny stuff in RN and RAF and not enough to the non Gucci kit across all three but I guess we will have to have an amicable disagreement on that one.
Finally, someone mentioned who ate all the pies, was it the Army, RN or RAF. In terms of people, no contest, of course it is the Army but when it comes to kit, they have definitely been the poor relation but having said that, is the A400 there for the Army or RAF, is LSD(A) for the RN/RFA or Land forces. These arguments get sort of silly but here is the rough and ready major projects list from the last decade, the same decade we have been on constant operations.
Army
Wildcat
Attack Helicopter
BOWMAN
C Vehicle PFI
Falcon
FIST
FRES
GMLRS
High Velocity Missile
Indirect Fire Precision Attack
Light Forces ATGW
NLAW
Soothsayer
Support Vehicle
Terrier
Trojan/Titan
Watchkeeper
Warrior Upgrade
RN and/or RAF
Harrier upgrades
JCA
Military Flying Training System
Successor IFF
Astute
CEC
CVF
LSD(A)
MARS
MASC
Merlin HM2 Upgrade
Naval EHF/SHF Sonar
Sonar 2087
Sting Ray Life Extension
Type 45
A400
Advanced Jet Trainer
ASRAAM
ASTOR
Brimstone
C17
Chinook
Eagle (E3 upgrades)
FSTA
Hercules integrated support
Meteor
MRA4
Paveway IV
Puma upgrade
Tornado upgrades
Typhoon
Typhoon Synthetic Trainer
You might want to compare costs on that lot, bringing the Wolfhound, for example, into the discussion, the slack handful of them, seems rather amusing compared to the costs of Typhoon and Astute, just sayin like.
Finally, no, honest this time, I am going to ask some maritime engine related questions for FBOT and NaB to haggle over.
Number 1
Would you consider that the power generation and propulsion systems on current and planned ships are innovative; are we at the cutting edge, a sensible place just behind the latest trends or far too conservative. Was thinking about things like hybrid engines, diesels, podded propulsors, that kind of gear.
Number 2
This is a T26 related question, in the never ending trade offs between cost, capability and commonality, would lifting the same power and propulsion systems off T45 make sense for T26. I always tend towards having ruthless commonality in my thinking across major systems but recognise commonality can go too far and cause too many compromises, losing more on the swings than roundabouts.
@TD, I think replacement of major pieces of kit is cyclic. FRES is the current army one but is not going to well. The fact that since D plus 21 in 2003 the Armies large and expensive pieces of conventional kit have been shown to be unsuitable for the COIN type operations being conducted.
That is not their fault but there does have to be some form of prioritisation of what will be replaced to deliver what sort of effect. For instance we reguarly discuss a single fast jet fleet and TLAM is only available for submarines, James refuses to understand the concept of layered Air Defence yet the army has 105MM, 155Mm self propelled and MLRS? Rationalisation given the decreased conventional land threat?
You are correct in your Syria poltical theory but wrong to think the very capable air defence network was not discussed at a recent study day we had. Would 40 very capable F35s make a difference, well yes they would actually. Not a decisive one on their own but a nice asset for the CTF, definitely.
Fair point on Syria AD APATS, perhaps I was too strident but I honestly think their military capability has little bearing on our posture when taken in the round
some good stuff on the f35 on sols blog
http://snafu-solomon.blogspot.com/2012/03/f-35-will-be-one-helluva-fighter.html
I’m a little late, but anyway…
APATS: “A ferry or cruise liner may touch the throttle once very day or every hour or so on a cross channel ferry. I am merely stating fact as someone who was there that the MSD commercial diesels on the LPDs were incapable of operating the way warships do and could not cope with extreme heat or cold for prolonged periods.”
Large ferries berth and unberth in some cases every couple of hours. That’s a fairly intense workout for the machinery. Cross channel ferries dash across at whatever their service speed is, usually close to top speed and easily matching an LPD’s 18kts. I don’t know how different the machinery operating regime on an LPD is from an RFA, or what different manoeuvres you might try to pull, but RFAs somehow manage a lot of the same, if not all of it, with in some cases entirely commercial machinery.
Issues with heat or cold – did they meet the specification? MoD has a habit of specifying performance below what they damn well know ships are actually likely to experience on operations. Hence the likes of the hot water package for Bays operating in the Persian Gulf. Commercial vessels operate successfully in all the same environments that the RN does – but they have been built and specified to do so.
It sounds to me like the LPDs’ problems that you note are specific to those ships rather than a general problem with employing “commercial” technology.
APATS,
I don’t refuse to recognise the concept of layered air defence, merely question the wisdom of providing at least a fourth layer on top of the existing 3 layers, when so much else remains unfunded.
From the inside out in a CBG / Task Group scenario:
Last resort weapons such as GPMG / mini guns / 20mm. I won’t count that as it is all a bit spray and pray!
CIWS on most platforms
Sea wolf on T23
T45 as a complete system
Plus complementary capabilities such as AEW extending the surveillance area, and thus increasing reaction time and the chances of successful engagement.
…to which some posters have desired a further layer of F35* flying a CAP, at a capability cost of somewhere over £11Bn. It has to stop somewhere, this insane self-protection racket that the Navy runs whereby they burgle money in Whitehall using dodgy data and assumptions, supported by low politics. Incredibly, some posters want a third CVF with air wing.
Does anyone know which offensive land-attack weapons are due to be fitted to F35*, and when? All of the info I can find only relates to F35* air to air capabilities.
@TD
You appear to be wilfully ignoring how the DPA have developed over the last fifteen years, which is essentially saying the ops remain the same, but Uncle Sam will be relied on to do more of the “difficult” stuff.
UK / European interests have not changed over that time and are unlikely to do so in the medium term. However, Uncle Sams interests and commitments have – and very publicly. That means that the DPA, which usually lag a little bit will change.
So, who is picking up the slack?
@TD
Your light force effects. Entebbe (1973?) was hardly power projection and certainly not against any sort of capable OPFOR.
As for Panama – again, not a particularly capable OPFOR and didn’t half the US Army helos launch from a big deck carrier?
Finally, for the layered air defence debate, one assumes you are aware of ROE limitations? Do highly capable SAMs offer flexibility in that situation? Are you familiar with the axiom “kill the archer, not the arrow”?
NAB @ 3.21
In your efforts to explain the differences between Ocean and Albion you make my argument for me regarding the high cost of the CVF.
Albion and the CVF have been designed with the RN’s “Quart into a pint pot” philosophy which as you explain ramps up the cost due to build inefficiencies and non standard components to fit the system, not into the space it needs but the space it is given.
That is why a CVF based on a containership hull form and structure would be a cheaper option than the current design even though it would be bigger, weigh more and have more installed power.
As for the current build I think that too little fitting out is done in the assembly hall and too much is done in the dry dock.
Much better to do a bare hull as the first step and then fit fully equipped “cassettes / modules” into the hull voids. The hull would provide most of the strength so that the “cassette” framing could be lighter.
Returning to previous issues –
The squabble over the £1bill price hike in 2002/03 was very well reported at the time.
BWoS lost the design competition but kept the role as project lead – very strange as this was noted at the time.
You mention that the motors limit the motive power / speed – why?
280m length limit – Two RN carrier projects 50 years apart come in at the same length – looks like more than a coincidence to me so why?
My thoughts are that basing / dry dock limits are in force.
If that is correct then it is the tail wagging the dog.
If P/mouth can’t handle anything bigger then the gig of home port should go elsewhere.
That is where the D/port comment comes in.
25 knots is crap for a frontline expensive carrier – 28/29 should not be an issue.
She is slower than the Hermes and she was a wartime austerity design on 2/3rds power.
My alternative CVF is not a conversion.
It is making use of an efficient build form and using it to make the design larger, simpler and more capable.
As mentioned before we need to get into true modularity – fitting out the ship in slices or “cassettes”.
The main strength of the container ship platform is its strength – ladder-frame layout / 2 longitudinal girders at 18m deep / full depth transverse bulkheads at 15/18m centres – and it’s volumetric efficiency.
330m x 42m WL / 72m FD x 9/10m would be a step change improvement to what we are building.
Plus it would have been cheaper.
And no issues about space and the need to compromise.
CAD stuff – something badly wrong with the engineering leadership not the CAD monkeys doing the work.
BiF have a bad habit of trying their hand at any new assembly technique they read about in the press.
They boasted about the improved productivity they had managed to achieve by assembling the sections of the Astute hull by standing them up on their end.
This is the project that is years late and billions over budget but they have managed to increase their productivity by copying the actions of others – Aye right, pure PR churnalism at its worst.
MARS – just what are we getting?
Have we just re-invented the wheel?
Why did we need a new design, a new design contract?
Waves – expensive? BiF strikes again.
Govan has a record of turning their hand to most things – last 20 years has been a cruise ferry, LNG ships, Ocean, Rocket Ship, Wave, Bays so they would not have been that far away if they had been allowed to build a realistic speck.
Shameful that given our economic situation we gave away RFA work to Korea. If shipbuilding is reduced to RN only then it is finished, if there are no exports then it begs the question –
If we are not good enough for anyone else’s navy why are we good enough for the RN?
Time to nationalise the shipyards – make them crown assets and rent them out to efficient and effective shipbuilders on a class by class basis.
BWoS don’t employ 3K workers on the Clyde, they hold hostage 3K human shields.
Finally about me – I am an amateur interested in naval history – Majestic class to Majestic class.
Always asking the question why were some RN designs not the best given our history and investment.
My background is Mech Eng plussome CAD and then into IT and Finance in the Auto industry.
My last two roles mean that I can spot technical specialists and engineers talking techno babble and spluttering excuses at 50 paces.
It was very good practice to spot the games that get played by the MIC, the MOD and the services.
Observer @ 6.18
On the subject of S-S missiles why is CIWS not fit for purpose?
Is it all CIWS or just V-Ph?
Regarding the new upmarket stuff you mention – how do they work?
1) Wave height right till impact?
2) Wave height then climb and dive – the haymaker trajectory.
When do they start their S/S final sprint?
When would they start to climb if they are a No. (2)?
My thoughts are that they are pretty useful pieces of kit but not really game changers.
Finally the Wiki right up about the Indo/Russian design talks about the missile being able to pick its victim from clutter – building / ship – so can missiles work out there target as it approaches a group?
Some earlier posts suggested that the seeker unit just picked the middle of the biggest target.
I think they are better than that, any thoughts?
FBOT, lots but only some I can share on here. ASMs come in a variety of forms, they fly a variety of profiles at a variety of speeds. They have various different seeker heads, both by type and by variants of type, e.g different wavebands for radar seeker heads.
Suffice to say that there exsists a publication that lists all the ones we know about and specifies ship specific procedures to counter the threat.
These may include aspects to present, courses to steer and ranges to stop mvring at. They are designed to optimise the chances of a kill be it hard or soft kill.
As for CIWS, we do not have point defence turbo lasers, the preferred option is to kill the launcher or launch aircraft, if not then engage the missile at long range, then soft kill, then PDMS, if you get round to saying “Phalanx to AAW auto” then it is seriously 2p 50 p time.
APATs is right, there is a variety of profiles available and most are programmable. What makes the new high speed missiles so damably hard for CIWS like Goalkeeper or Phalanx is that the missile does not vapourise when hit. At ~Mach 1-2, even if you hit the missile and kill the warhead/guidance, sheer momentum would still carry the round/fuel booster into the hull. A good reference might be the Antrium Phalanx test incident where a “killed” test drone hit the water and bounced into the hull of the ship, causing damage and a fatality.
Long story short, 20mm-30mm rounds don’t have the mass to knock high speed missiles off course if the missile itself has enough momentum.
@FBOT
I’m not going to go point by point, we’d be here all week and I hope we both have better things to do.
You persist in believing there is a 280m length limit, when Rosyth is capable of larger, apparently based on a comparison between CVA01 and QEC. Portsmouth is undergoing a significant capital dredging programme to allow the ships in,including straightening the approach, so your assertions about some sort of limit don’t add up. As for Devonport, I repeat, QEC will never enter the base there because it is too big.
With regard to the electric motors. Your suggestion that fitting lots of medium speed diesels in place of Trent would allow higher speed is limited by the power of the motors fitted, not the generators. I’m sure you know that the ship generates thrust from two propellers, which are in turn powered by four electric motors, powered by the generating plant. The motors fitted can deliver 40MW per shaft. To increase speed you’d have to fit additional or more powerful motors. Re-reading you posts you have alluded to some sort of motove power limit in places, so perhaps you do get it, but have not expressed it clearly.
As for “not understanding the tech”, I’ve stood next to a couple of Mr Wartsila’s finest during FATS and commissioning (both engine only and with generator) and specified them in a number of designs. I think I may be a little more experienced in working them into a design than you, or am I mistaken?
To containerships and outfit “cassettes”. You clearly stated that you thought buying a second hand containership and letting of bunch of “glesga” welders get medieval on it’s erse would provide a CVF prototype. If that’s not a conversion then I don’t know what is.
You also seem to be under the impression that a large containership of the dimensions you mention can somehow have “cassettes” fabricated and inserted into it to produce a better carrier quicker and cheaper. You still haven’t explained how those dimensions were derived and then continue to assert that QEC is somehow a quart in a pint pot. I can tell you from both drawings and the physical article itself that this is far from the case. The outfit density of QEC is comfortably lower than that of LPD – partly as the dimensions have held throughout the design iterations.
As for “Govan has a record of turning their hand to most things – last 20 years has been a cruise ferry, LNG ships, Ocean, Rocket Ship, Wave, Bays so they would not have been that far away if they had been allowed to build a realistic speck”. How many of the people who built the ferry, LNG ship, SeaLaunch Commander etc are still there? I may know some of them…….What constitutes a realistic spec? Are you suggesting that the MARS ships are in some way unrealistic? Can you support that assertion with evidence? Based on the answers to the above, would you in your “finance” role be comfortable awarding Govan a contract?
You seem to think I’m a defender of BAE – far from it. We tend to call them Big And Expensive Ships for obvious reasons. I remain clear that we are paying too much for the ships, but that is largely due to two factors. First the inability of MoD to cost accurately and independently, which would force BAES to justify their costs and perhaps identify where they are taking the p1ss. Secondly, the endless delays and politicking in MB between the services and the Treasury. At the end of the day, the shipbuild is going well and we should get two capable ships if the MoD doesn’t miss the open goal in front of them.
I’m glad you’re interested in naval history & technology – so am I, it’s not just my profession. However, I would never dream of pronouncing on other industries based on what has been described as “Wiki-engineering”. Have you ever been aboard one of HM’s grey war canoes for more than a walk round the upper deck? Or other navies?
@ NaB
While we have a professional here what do you make of Maersk’s container ship based AUXILIARY (just to make sure we know what we are talking about!) No substitute for a proper warship, but I can understand how easy it is to play fantasy ship designer because of all that volume. Personally I think concepts like this only work for USN as they have the assets to protect them. Or small navies in low threat/less than war situations the Malaysian Navy’s anti-piracy container ship is the example.
Not AB
I hold no brief for FBOT and frankly have never understood his figures (no insult intended FBOT I just have never understood some of them).
However…
I also have never understood some of the figures for design factors considered necessary for warships.
You do not have to be a loudmouth, amatuer, dyslexic, armchair dabler like me to ask:-
‘Why does a coat of grey paint tripple the cost of a ship’?
As you are in the business perhaps you can help me with a question I have posed several times.
(BTW this is subject to me working from published wikipedia style figures so may be comparing apples with oranges).
Why can You build a Queen Mary 2
A single
One off design
High speed
Ocean Going
Gas turbine powered
Hugely Luxurious Gin palace.
Built to the highest civilian standards.
For £500 Million in the water.
A ship twice the size of the Elephants, when the Elephants are a series of two, so should be some cost saving there as well, and they are going to cost double that each!
Why not just buy two of them and ‘Get medieval of their arse’.
Bearing in mind the most sucessful conventional carrier class in history were the british light carriers, built to largely civilian standards and only given up by their owners when jets just got too big to opperate from them.
Particularly if the Elephant’s designs are not that ‘Dense’?
There is also the considerations that many outside the navy and some in it, who think her majesty’s grey war cannoes are maybe that way, ‘because we’ve always done it that way. In particularly the T26 debate has been between those in dark blue who’s answer to every Naval question is
‘What kind of frigate do we need’?
Not whetehr we need one at all.
In
NaB @ 8.53
As noted above I have a lot of experience of engineers / techies / SME’s talking self indulgent, fat and happy, insular techno babble and you sir are talking …
The question do you work for the ACA, possibly with a P/mouth connection?
I say that because in ther discussion we are having are partial, slanted and forcede when it comes to quoting my comments – it as if you don’t want to engage in the usual rough and tumble dialogue that passes for conversation on here.
Or it mat be that I am poor at communicating …
Now to start with my thoughts that you have commented on –
Going a bit Glesga with a containership – when is a conversion not a conversion?
When it is a Q+D mild steel prototype to get the project in the water as quickly as possible.
That is the idea behind getting hold of a 300M long containership, putting in rudimentary aircraft capabilities and starting to sort out the CATOBAR issues we have.
We use it to sort out the flight deck arrangements in real life, we use it to train the deck crew and the pilots.
If we do it right we retire it from CATOBAR service and use it as Ocean’s replacement for 10 years.
The two production vessels would use containership hull forms, construction arrangements, build economics but they would not be containerships.
They would use the containerships “ladder frame” construction technique – two large / deep longitudinal girders with deep transverse bulkheads at regular intervals – in addition to the double bottom and the longitudinal girders that are part of it.
Details on the Maersk / Containership plan –
One example to suit 40ft containers the bulkheads are at 15m/50ft centres.
Very Q+D analysis – open to improvement
In the CVF design to suit 16V38 gensets the bulkheads would be at 18m/60ft centres.
Other changes to the Maersk type CVF would be the use of a 25m wide central equipment space flanked by two 7-8m wide A/T spaces seperated by a wide bulkhead.
Fuel tanks on the outside – engines / stores / magazine on the inside.
The hull would be 22m deep / 10m draught max.
The hangar / flight deck slices on top would be 15m high.
Looking at a hull length of 330m / 360m approx.
Hopefully that provides a better foundation to my ideas.
Now onto your other comments –
Length @ 280m – both now and in the 60s.
Too much of a coincidence to me – two different designs / two different aircraft types same length.
Specifically as the current design would benefit from another 30m ext of the bow / – cheap steelwork so not a cost issue and it would increase the speed of the velocity challenged current design.
Dredging 1 – Increased draught of the CVF.
Dredging 2 – Easier ship handling / less tugs?
Now onto motors – why do they have to be 20MW units?
If we need speed and you admit it is an issue why have we not change the shaft arrangments?
Three shafts was RN trad for A/C’s up to 41’ish
What was wrong with 4 shafts – too complex although less draught?
Two shafts and two pods – Trad / Mod for 28 knots?
Good to know that the CVF is not a quart into a pint pot.
You still have to explain what happened to the build efficiency of a low equipment density design.
The cost would suggest that it is anything but.
As for the cassettes – Looking at 15m x 25m x 8m.
To keep TD involved they can be 1/2 or 1/4 units if that makes for easier handling – 12.5m / 6.25m widths.
Finally onto Govan, they have a history of being pretty flexible that has generated corporate knowledge which still exists even if some of the people have changed.
That is what is missing at the MOD where their favourite band is “Orange Juice” – Rip it up and start again.
Finally, finally love the bit about Wartsilla.
I knew a group of engineers who told everyone they knew about cDPFs and that the car solution would not work on light commercials.
That too me was NIH writ large and guess what they failed.
I was left to pick up the pieces and find the extra resources / budget to fix the job.
Therefore I am wee a bit wary of engineers dismissing the opinions of others.
Consequently aff yer high horse ya rocket.
@ FBOT
Haven’t you figure out who he works for yet?
Is it me or does CVF appear to have no bow (and aft) thrusters?
Must admit I was utterly gobsmacked the first time I saw QM2.
X @ 12.37
Right I am away down to Ladbrokes to see if they will start a book …
Just back and look what I have found –
Babcocks – 2/1
BMT – 3/1
BWoS – 4/1
MOD – 5/1
Contractor / Ex MOD – 5/1
Wartsilla – 10/1
I think it is one of those too. He isn’t MoD.
Observer @ 7.29
What is the incoming mass of a naval S-S missile?
The longer the range the less the mass, the residual fuel load will be smaller.
As for countermeasures I still think the V-Ph has its place especially if you add a slave 35mm / 40mm turret to extend the effective range out 4km.
At 600m/S you then have 11 secs effective to take it down.
The situation you describe is one reason I would advocate bigger hulls and more 19mm shipbuilding plate.
As for the future a low level trajectory and it is partial reactive armour and 70’s style Russian tank anti missile contraptions.
Haymaker trajectory and I think it is either a predictable flight path or a huge loss of KE making it easier to track and deal with.
Does high maneuverability mean a high loss of KE?
Will the maneuverability come from small / big control surfaces or some sort of low cost thrust vectoring?
From a quick google / wiki trawl I can see that a lot of money has been put into increasingly complex and expensive anti ship fireworks so there must be an angle to them making sense and being a very viable weapon system.
Consequently the threat they pose need addressing.
However I am wary of the attitude that says kill the archer not the arrow – with ranges of 200km you are going to struggle to stop every archer.
TD,
I’m staying out of the CVF/B/C/MAC ship discussion, but spotted your engineering q’s, so wanted to contribute to that.
I truly believe the RN is a long way ahead of many navies with regards to propulsion. Type 23 was a world first diesel-electric drive and is still second to none. The US still use separate COGAG drives and turbine generators rather than medium speed DG’s, and have much poorer fuel economy. We have consistently pushed the boundaries of modern propulsion in warships and auxiliaries (LPD, Wave and Bay) and are among the most efficient ships in service. T42 was a fuel hog, and Type 45 is an unfortunate break in that pattern. The main generators, the Trents, are not designed to be removable – either a MOD or BAE decision on the ‘promise’ that they were lifed to the ship’s life. The motors were COTS rather than custom, and because nobody did their measurements they don’t fit side by side in the same compartment. Instead they are attached to shafts of completely different length in separate compartments, a fudge of truly epic proportions which, when I mentioned it a year or so ago, was universally accepted by many here as a wonderful idea. Shall say no more. T26 just needs ordinary, proven CODLAG drive. Use the latest generation of electric motors, improved/more efficient GTs (or just one as per the Meko), better designed gearboxes and commercial diesel generators. An updated version of the T23 drivetrain. Simple, proven, low risk, reliable, dependable, inexpensive to maintain, efficient, adaptable and exportable. And fit for task.
Podded engines and other funky propulsors are all well and good, but are just not necessary. Warships are designed for high speed manoeuvrability not low speed, for which straight shafts and rudders work fine, are cheap, reliable and dependable. Being able to turn on the spot in a harbour is certainly a nice to have, but it introduces a system that is a) more expensive, b) more complex (and thus prone to more failures) and c) less resistant to damage than a straight shaft. Since the UK (by all accounts) is obviously completely unable to design anything vaguely warlike, look across the rest of the world – nobody else uses pods, propulsors or other alternatives for exactly those reasons in their warships. Besides if you know what you’re doing you can berth any ship and turn it on the spot without tugs or thrusters.
Thrusters are another nice to have. However, we are all able to drive our ships without, thanks, and again they are another element that could go wrong, break or frankly incur additional service costs and spares. The apertures also introduce additional flow noise which is unwanted, and because tugs are available in every port there is simply no need for them. Gold plating.
Thanks SI, so you think the benefits of commonality across the frigate/destroyer fleet would not be worth pursuing because the starting point (T45) is not so good?
This means two completely different systems in place on T45 and T26 which as you know is anathema to me but can see your point about not wanting to standardise on a mistake.
Interesting stuff, its an area I know bugger all about, like most others :)
SI @ 1.27
I have to ask why GTs at all?
They are inefficient, involve complex trunking, less resilient and they are expensive.
Why not go the whole hog and stick in 4 MSD Gensets.
The extra 200/300 tons should not be a showstopper.
On your point for shafts and rudders I think that shafts are not the way to go.
Pods are simpler – self contained unit that pivots – and more space efficient.
The alternative is a motor / shaft / rudder – more complex and heavier.
If the pod system is a bit fragile then what about a fixed pod with extra bracing to the hull?
It would save a lot of space and cost in the hull.
Or what about a 4 pod arrangement?
2 fixed / 2 pivoting?
Straight out of cruise ship equipment catalogue?
Don’t the Juan Carlos use pods?
http://media.defenseindustrydaily.com/images/SHIP_LHD_Canberra_Class_Concept_Cutaway_lg.jpg
Surely for ships like amphib’s where they could be working in crowded anchorages (look at the pictures of some of the Cold War Norwegian exercises in fjords a lot of big ships in small a space or small Third World ports) pods are an advantage.
I note that other NATO ships like the Cavour and some Danish frigates have bow thrusters. I thought one of the drivers for saving at the HMNBs was to cut back on ship movements? A ship that can dock herself with only minimum assistance from tugs would contribute to those savings. I can do a FBOT and say that I detect here is more the RN saying we don’t do that more than there being a real reason!!! ;) :) Saying that I know from watching the ferry scene bow thrusters can be problematic….
Podding and engines usually don’t mix well. After some time, alignment will shift causing speed differences and a bit of wobble in holding your course.
@ FBOT
Why GT? They spin up quick…..
Azimuthing pods/thrusters have specific benefits for amphibious ships. From the middle of paragraph two onwards, SI is talking about (or at least his statements are valid for) fast pointy things of the DD/FF variety, not auxiliaries or amphibious ships for which different considerations apply.
@FBOTs
RE: Mass of missile
It’s not only the mass, it’s the v. KE = MxV2
The Goalkeeper did a test with results that only showed a kill at 300m starting at 1.5km with HV missiles. Any further away and you have round droppage, so the Pk (Probability kill) is even worse. So I’d say CIWS is only accurate up to 300m. If there was a missile pair, the second one would hit, and even so, there might still be enough KE in the 1st to hit as well.
SS-N-22 is 4.5 tons, Mach 2.2 (~720 m/s)
You’ll have to do the maths yourself on how far the missile will still coast even if it got hit, I’m about to go zzzz…
You might also want to wiki up the Granit missile and it’s guidance system. It’s interesting.
@ FBOT re GT
And power to weight ratio. I should wait to comment I am doing three things at once.
@ Anixtu
Sorry I thought we were talking about ships in general. I had mentioned CVF’s apparent lack of bow thrusters further up.
When the pod breaks down in an operational environment, how do you access the electric propulsion motors to effect a repair? With a diesel-electric shaft installation, you can get at the motors. With pods, you can’t. Wartime considerations and battle damage repair are not an issue in the cruise industry.
Merchant ships have transverse thrusters largely to save on harbour tug expenses. There are space/performance/noise penalties for having thrusters that have to be balanced against any savings on harbour towage. Most warships (especially the fast pointy kind) aren’t likely to be required to berth at austere port facilities without available tugs. Overall, bow thrusters don’t make a lot of sense for FF/DD/CV, as SI sortof said.
I suspect the Danes expect to berth in odd little place up north – Faroes, Greenland, that sort of thing – in less than conducive weather. OHPs have a retractable azimuthing thruster up forward. Any other FF/DD fitted with thrusters?
The new Norgy frigates have a bow thruster,the German F125s will have, La Fayette does, The Ozzie Hobart class DDs will have. Horizon has some sort of thruster arrangement. Agree with SI ref T26 propulsion. Using existing T23 configuration and more modern Dgs and Gts along with an updated hull form you should end up with a Ship that is super quiet, massively long legged and can sprint to 30kts plus if required.
I forgot the reason for a thruster on OHP – single screw ships are a lot less manoeuverable than twin screw.
Interesting that BTs are becoming de rigeur on FF/DD, I was not aware. Evidently the cost/benefit has changed, or the priorities of the buyers.
Thanks Anixtu, my point exactly. Not explaining myself very well.
FBOT – as usual you haven’t read a word I’ve written. Fixed pods with extra bracing? LMAO!!
TD, I think the cost savings are difficult to realise when you have two classes of warship with such different requirements – T23 quiet and efficient vs. T45 high power and speed.
x – the Bays have azipods, and the LPD’s do have thrusters – Ocean had hers removed, I think. But what’s the point in pods? I can hover a ship perfectly well thank you on two shafts alone – it isn’t exactly a challenging skill, just one you expect a halfway competent seaman to have. As I thought I wrote, they are all nice to haves but bear risks and additional costs that in our case are rarely justified. You might as well put swivelling wheels on all four corners of your car. Funky and great for parking, but not a lot else…
APATS – yep, and cruise efficiently at 15 if not sprinting.
Oh, and FBOT, why GT’s? As a maritime expert I thought you’d know that turbines are more efficient at high power outputs than diesels. You also do not want to be hanging around waiting for diesels to come online when there is a torpedo inbound – the exact reason why T23 has GT’s at all. On average we change our diesels more frequently than we change GT’s.
SI, how do you control the bow when hovering with 2 shafts only? I admit you can hold position but will have little influence over ships head.
SI “But what’s the point in pods?”
Are you talking strictly FF/DD here or are we extending to LxD?
Nitpicking, the Bays have azimuthing thrusters, not azipods. 1) “Azipod” is a brand name but regardless of that, 2) the generic use implies motors in the pod, Bays have a Z drive arrangement with motors in the hull.
APATS, you hover bow into wind and tide. Also works for helo & dock ops. We do it all the time. Ani, FF/DD and yes, nitpicking. Azipods are fitted on Echo/Enterprise though.
@FBOT
If I don’t answer all your points it’s because “As noted above I have a lot of experience of engineers / techies / SME’s talking self indulgent, fat and happy, insular techno babble” which is the level of argument you wish to engage in. Very much a case of Mr Pot & Mr Kettle I’m afraid.
You still seem unable to justify your dimensions with any sort of evidence as to what is driving them (ie why 330m is somehow more effective for the QEC requirement) in any way shape or form. You also dismiss actual evidence that there isn’t a length limit imposed (note the point about straightening the channel in the Portsmouth Capital dredge and think what that might mean – it isn’t less tugs) as a coincidence that you just don’t like. Again that’s not debate it’s I’m afraid blinkered ignorance.
If you want a hint as to why CVA01 and QEC end up round about the same length, then think about whether the aircraft have radically changed in size/weight and whether requirements for CTOL launch and recovery in terms of end-speed, g-limit and engagement speed have changed radically….
I won’t comment further on your “conversion that isn’t a conversion” when it plainly is, although I’m intrigued by your suggestion that the designers need help and would again ask for your evidence that it is somehow deficient. If there is one aspect of the design that really is going to work, it is the aviation arrangements. An awful lot of work went into them, including significant amounts of advice from NAVAIR Lakehurst.
You may wish to examine the provisions of MARPOL with regard to your placement of fuel. It’s also not a particularly good idea to have a high fire risk space (your engine rooms) with a large amount of fuel surrounding them.
Now – stand by for a shock. I tend to agree with you about the shafts. I have already said that I believe the ship is slower than it ought to be (particularly as we’re now hopefully staying CTOL). However, that decision was taken and we will have to live with it. It doesn’t mean the ship won’t work, it just means that there will be certain operational limitations (PITA rather than show-stoppers) in certain wind conditions.
For info, the Thales (actually BMT) design originally had podded drives as well as conventional shafts. They were deleted on cost and risk grounds in favour of a two-shaft arrangement. Personally would have preferred four conventional shafts but there you go. If you want to know why they’re perceived as “risky”, check out some of the issues cruise operators are experiencing with them and then think about how they would behave under undex loading. Pods can and do work, but they have their issues.
Your faith in Govan is touching, but given that most of the staff were paid off after Sea Launch Commander, not what I’d expect from someone paid to take hard financial decisions. You may also be interested to know that they nearly capsized one of the Waves in dock during sea trials. The photos are a bit disturbing……They also managed to leave a cherry-picker in one of the cargo fuel tanks when the tank was boxed up and didn’t notice it until a clanging sound was heard while the ship was at sea on trials.
Which bit of “I have used wartsila in a number of designs and actually stood next to the hardware” is proving difficult for you to understand? Not quite the NIH syndrome you ascribe to me…
Anyway, enough of this, I’d quite like to answer Ixions questions re Queen Mary 2.
To summarise – you can’t provide evidence for your “design” dimensions, you can’t explain which bits of the MARS “speck” are “unrealistic”. In fact you can’t even say whether you’ve actually been on a warship of any kind for more than the upper deck tour.
It’s not a high-horse I’m on, but a platform of engineering fact and evidence. I contend sir that you are engaging in techno-babble and from a position informed only by Wiki. I’m always happy to engage in a technical debate when it’s evidence-based. If you can back up some of your “opinions” with “facts” we can try again, but until then, stiff ignoring I’m afraid mate.
Oh and your bookies list is incomplete……
Si, That is what I meant, you cannot decide the direction of the bow! I would call it psuedo hovering but then I am nit picking as well.
Hi SI,
Four-wheel steering just funky for parking? Subaru did not think so
“The SVX featured a water cooled horizontally opposed 6 cylinder engine. Just like the Porsche 911 Turbo did. But then they one upped the 911 by throwing in all wheel drive as standard equipment. (All wheel drive is a very pricey option on the 911). Performance wise the 911 was a little better, (mainly because the SVX was bigger and heavier). But the SVX was priced at about half of the 911’s price tag, so it blew the 911 away in the bang for the buck department.”
– agree all your points relating to ship design, though
@Ixion
The QM2 analogy is one that has often been made and in fact MoD were made to study it at one point a few years ago to try and understand the CVF costs. Unsurprisingly, MoD didn’t like the answers.
I don’t have a huge amount of time so will try and keep this brief. The principal causes of the cost differential can be summed up as being down to either the decision-making process or differences in purpose of the two ships. I have already alluded to the effect the indecision in MoD has had on the CVF cost, but to really understand it you have to understand the contrast between MoD and Cunard.
When Stephen Payne was given the job of designing and project managing the QM2, Cunards board had already decided they wanted a new liner and had a budget figure in mind. He was therefore free to crack on and concentrate on getting the design and specification right to meet both the requirement and the budget. At no stage did the Cunard board suffer a fit of the vapours and start to re-examine whether they wanted a ship or whether to start an airline or a limousine business. That means although he surely had to justify any changes to the requirement or budget, he could get a decision within days if not hours.
Contrast that with the MoD and the position Ali Baghei (an ex-Govan man funnily enough) and his successors have had to deal with. They had a requirement and a budget, but had to re-justify that on an annual (or more frequent) basis to a number of different bodies, none of whom could actually make a decision without spending weeks or months trying to understand what they were doing. In many cases, the people forming the decison-making bodies were actively hostile to the very idea of CVF and could delay decisions or push them “upstairs”, where the highly competent bunch of politicians were supposed to make the decisions. As an example, I remember Mr Baghei being incandescant when told he had to spend some of his budget (and time) revisiting whether CVS could be SLEP-ed to accommodate what is now F35B. At least two studies had already been done and shown huge expense for residual capability. He just could not understand that until these studies had reported, the DMB or Treasury (I forget which now) would stop further work on the project. Those studies took months by their nature.
Now – when Stephen Payne had his design and specification worked out, he could undertake a tender exercise with a shortlist of suitable yards, choose the one he thought offered the best price and get started on contract negotiations. Again, if he needed a decision, he could get one within a short time.
Contrast that with the MoD. During the period 2003 to the contract award in 2008, the MoD continually used the CVF contract as a stick with which to beat the ACA, based on the “Defence Industrial Strategy” remember that? Essentially the DIS mandated that the remaining shipbuilders (BAE Ships & VT) consolidate into what became BVT. Having done that painful thing, the MoD and the pollies then prevaricated further, to the point that the yards were running out of work and it was by no means certain that MoD would place a contract at all. Not an environment for trust – hence the cancellation clauses that BVT insisted on writing into the contract. All of this takes time, costs money and employs capital (which with RAB budgetting incurs further penalties). More cost escalation.
Once on contract, Mr Payne could work with Chantiers on a professional basis, with the shared objective of getting the ship delivered to a mutually acceptable price and standard.
With MoD – no sooner had the contract been signed, then due to the annual attempt to match spending totals, the in-service date was slipped by two years. If you’re BVT/now BAES, how are you to fill that two year gap? The answer is you just slow the pace of delivery, without losing any of the workforce. Sensible? No, but you’re going to need most of the skilled people and you can’t really shoehorn anything else into your yard programme.
The whole gestation of CVF has been a catalogue of delay and dither, which has led to a culture of mistrust between the ACA and MoD (not at working level, but at board level). There is a huge amount of cost escalation therein. Just putting a 6-7 year delay causes cost escalation of 25% (based on the Treasury’s own planning figures).
Now to the technical issues. QM2 is indeed a very complex ship with a high-level of outfit content. However, she is not designed to survive particularly high levels of damage compared to CVF and that does change things. I’m not just talking about enemy action btw, there is a fundamental difference between the philosophy behind the SOLAS (Safety of Life at Sea) regulations and those applied to warships. In the case of a grounding, the SOLAS requirements essentially provide for the ship to remain stable long enough for an abandonment. Costa Concordia was (allegedly) damaged beyond her design standard, so it was no surprise that there was chaos. Warships are designed around a philosphy of accepting damage and where possible repairing it to restore a level of capability. This means a lot more in terms of the subdivision of the ship, the redundancy / duplication of systems and provision of repar facilities.
Fires are known and accepted hazards aboard ships, they happen. SOLAS provides for boundaries to contain or resist fire spread, again, ultimately to allow abandonment. There are “Safe Return to Port” elements within SOLAS that should provide for electical and propulsive power, together with the ability to provide life-support for crew and passengers. I imagine that will be getting a looking at after the Costa Arcadia incident.
In a warship, the philosophy with fire is to fight it, extinguish it and then restore capability. Again, this brings certain standards and requirements to the system fits.
A warship is also exposed to threats, so you have shock protection, blast venting, COLPRO (the ability to isolate the ship from external contaminants such as fallout, chemical or biological weapons) and so forth. You also have to ensure the large quantity of explosives aboard are safe from initiation sources. Someone once wrote that you wouldn’t start out to design an airport on top of a city, which is on top of a munitions dump, but that is exactly what an aircraft carrier is. All of these factors add cost and complexity to be the design and specification process and the equipment fitted.
All of the above doesn’t mean that we aren’t paying more for QEC than we should be. But these factors contribute most of what you have as cost diff between QM2 and a sensible price for QEC (should have been £3.5-4bn the pair). The remainder you can probably place at BAES door, but the cold hard facts are that with the ships in build, we are where we are. Hopefully, the CTOL vs STOVL debate will pan out staying with CTOL, but to be honest, I’m past caring now. We have a shipbuild in good nick, I hope they’re allowed to continue.
Hope that answers your question. Will deal with frigates another day.
Is this a fact “It doesn’t mean the ship won’t work, it just means that there will be certain operational limitations (PITA rather than show-stoppers) in certain wind conditions” when one considers
– EMALS having a throw-weight of 25-29% higher than what the carriers have had before
– the acceleration is more controlled
(picking up rather than one mighty jerk and the same force through the whole length of the catapult)
– so the two together should (?) compensate for the wind-over-deck conditions, instead of just steaming into the wind at 30+ knots?…and running out of steam in the process (OK, someone will quote the kilos of steam for the catapults not being a significant penalty relative to the generation)
@ NaB
Thanks for post @ 6:21pm
Hi NaBoffin,
That “Just putting a 6-7 year delay causes cost escalation of 25% (based on the Treasury’s own planning figures)” is a very moderate estimate, must be in inflation adjusted money?
Compare with the RAND study about the cost per unit building the two with concurrency that did not dictate more investment than for building one vs. varying the gap (I think 3 quarters more tightly together or the gap 6 quarters longer, on a sliding scale):
– could save 25% of the second
– could make the second 80% pricier
I don’t know what is happening with the gapping, and the savings side is of course purely hypothetical as the investments would go in to manufacture carriers on an industrial scale (7 Astutes can be called “industrial scale”, though)
Acc
The wind over deck will most likely be more of an issue for recovering a/c at max landing weight as opposed to launch weight.
NOT AB
Thank you!
And I mean that. It is the first time someone has actually stooped to explain it to me! Nice to know that I was barking up the right tree.
I am sure (and indeed expected it it to be so), that the construction of the hull and the safety systems and redundancy required for a warship, would add considerably to the costs.
However I am also sure that if you take out a a thousand cabins, casinos, swimming pools bars etc you also save a lot two.
I have always suspected that the two would go a long way to cancel each other out. Hull wise; (Leaving aside the small matter of the aviation facilities:- principaly lifts catapaults, workshops etc)’ it would be a wash
Given the inevitably huge cost of the latter items, it is still interresting that we could/should have had the pair for less than £4 billion!
If we had done it right, Leaving aside the small matter of crewing and aviation again, the evidence seems to be (and this is a seperate item of contention); the F18 would be about two thirds the cost of F35, we could have had three elephants -then we would have been talking.
http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120331/DEFREG02/303310001/Pentagon-Confident-F-35-Buy-Schedule?odyssey=tab|topnews|text|FRONTPAGE
Hi Mark,
So, is speed actually an issue?
ACC, someone will have done the calculations, based on a dead calm day in the Arabian Gulf with temperatures in the low 50s. What is the max load that the aircraft can be launched and recovered with. The answer I am guessing is classified.
APATS, if the decision is for B, we’ll have a new discussion, and all of this becomes a matter of history (like the A-12 or the navy version of F-111; the latter the previous attempt at having a perfectly good interceptor for the Air Force as well as a long-range attack plane for the Navy – all from the same airframe)
Acc
As apas says it maybe in very specific/rare events when operating in particularly hot areas. All current f35 preformance kpps are against pretty stringent parameters usually involving tropical condition and engine degradation conditions. The only uk specific ones were in relation to the stovl a/c. The uk cv requirement most likely would follow the us navy. Operating cats and traps with significant helicopter movements will be the uks to work out.
Exactly Mark, another risk we seem to be taking with the F35C, mixing fast jets and rotary
@ TD, RE “risk we seem to be taking with the F35C, mixing fast jets and rotary”
– that has been on my mind (meaning that I have not seen any credible source to explain how big a constraint that can be)
– also, I have not spotted the rationale (yet) for the island to be formed of two towers; was it perhaps that with VSTOL (the confirmed assumption when the design was being done)you could have dedicated the two different ends to rotary and jet (without having to do the separation through the use of time windows)
TD, mixing fixed and rotary wing aviation is not a risk, it is a complication. nothing more and nothing less. It requires a bit of mission planning and fore sight, not rocket science.
ACC, The front Island is for driving the Ship! e.g the bridge.
Apas admiral hussein considers it a risk which may limit operation performance and said so to the defence select committee.
Hi APATS,
If this is it “The front Island is for driving the Ship! e.g the bridge” I should have asked a couple years back, rather than kept thinking about it
@Ixion. You’re welcome – just be clear though, converting ships to be carriers is a non-starter other than utter expediency as per the wartime MAC and escort carriers. The costs of conversion as opposed to design for purpose are horrific. I’m reasonably sure QM2 isn’t twice the size of QEC either. Don’t confuse gross tonnage with displacement.
The comments about speed refer primarily to wind-over-deck during recoveries, as Mark has pointed out. If you’re trying to move your force in a particular direction, having to chase the wind to get sufficient relative to meet the recovery requirements of the aircraft might be a PITA for winds of certain strengths from astern. Just means you have to turn off your MLA and work up to a speed in the opposite direction from where you want to be going. Doesn’t stop you operating, just means you have to do more manoeuvring than you might like.
Most carrier operators mix fast jet and rotary as a matter of course. There’s no particular risk to it – you just have to maintain a spot clear of f/w operations.
The two island configuration is for a number of things, but primarily to reduce EMI/EMC issues with the radar and comms gear, allow good separation between propulsion plants (uptake routing) and optimise view of deck for flyco and view of bow for bridge (manoeuvring of the ship). Nothing to do with f/w r/w deconfliction.
I understand what “Beware jet blast and rotars” means now. It means don’t operate FJ and helicopters from the same deck. Silly me thought it meant watch for these two hazards on a flight deck operating fast jets, turbo props, and helicopters. Well this place is a font of knowledge.
Mrk, with the greatest respect, Admiral Hussein is a Weapon Engineer and could never accept the fact that the clever master race and aviators can cope with such a complex issue!
I think we should just dispense with both the B and C and go with this :)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f7Lu6LEQ0zo&feature=player_embedded
Chris B, How many hours maintenance would you want that thing to have had before you strapped yourself in it and took off again?
Great find Chris, we really were bonkers weren’t we
That only solves half the problem we need something like this built to a scale of 12in to 1ft
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=57Rb98xizGk
I am off to ring Maersk to see if they have a spare container ship I can go Medieval, sorry, I mean convert to carry these system. 12 carrier navy here we come…..
Between us X we’ve got this whole aircraft carrier thing nailed.
@ Chris B
Too true. But have you seen the cost of grey paint?
I might go for some warm pastel shades instead…
I think we should go all camouflage.
Dazzle patterns make a comeback?
Exactly. Or something infinitely more sneaky and no doubt more expensive.
Which leads me to an interesting question; why don’t warships have camouflage?
I think some of the Scandinavian inshore vessels still do. for those operating further out, grey works quite well but with the increase in electro optical devices it is just not worth it. Belive we played around painting an SSN blue a few years ago to make it harder to spot from the air in shallow water.
I suppose with IR imaging and radar etc. Still, if I was on one I think I’d feel a little bit safer knowing it was painted in some elaborate, if ultimately pointless, camo scheme.
Chris,
I think you just summed up the zeitgeist of the modern Swedish navy :)
X,
Are the boys in and out of Lakehurst watching this? If not, they should be:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=moBd9-srBsA&feature=related
x again (and Gareth Jones wherever you are at this hour),
If you want to find out exactly how much dust there is on your laptop, take an hour and watch this:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PnAapmeQfcg&feature=relmfu
Hi APATS,
RE “I think some of the Scandinavian inshore vessels still do”
– it comes from the tradition of being ready to disperse not just the air force but the navy, from their regular bases
– so not for out at sea so much, but mooring against (blasted) rock faces, and the job being finished with camo nets. Can’t have too many of those, to be able to depart swifly. IR camo nets have been standard issue for at least two decades
– used to be up to full-on destroyers, with stores available behind steel doors… quite a prominent feature on a rock face so I believe that scale (resupply) has been done away with
@ Jackstaff
I have sat through the Eagle film more than once. It is more of interest to me for social history reasons than anything to do with sharp-and-pointy-planes. It is rather good isn’t? :)
@ Chris B
I am OK with camouflage as long as it isn’t bleedin’ stealthy. Again I ask if anybody has seen the biscuit barrel please inform the ship’s office.
To be honest I was hoping for commercial sponsorship for CVF. One of Dame MacArthur’s boat had a different paint scheme on each half of the hull so dependent on which beam a photo the boat appeared to be painted overall in her sponsor’s colours. Tesco’s red, white, and blue scheme would look quite patriotic on one side and I was think we could Sky to do the other side as their vans always look colourful. And once we are up and running Goodyear are happy to conduct deck trials with one of the little airships……….
One of the things I am having trouble with is this “Going Medieval” business. I have put out job adverts for metal bashers (emphasis on the bash) in Norman French, Anglo-Saxon, and Latin put so far the response has been poor….
NaB @ 5.11
I fear your latest post is more of the same.
Slanted, partial and forced with an ability to come over obtuse that must have taken years of practice.
Starting with the hull – 330m is desirable because it will be more flexible allowing greater separation between take offs and landings.
The current 280m hull makes this very difficult – mixed mode at best.
I have questioned the hull length being limited to 280m, you mention that work is ongoing but hat is only a partial answer – money could have played a part.
Typical scoping meeting –
What do you want – 300m hull.
What can we do at the moment – 260m hull.
What is the cost of the change – Re-locate half of Portsmouth.
However we can do 280m for £300mill in new wharfs and dredging.
Well OK then.
Three months later agreement at the 280m length.
My thoughts are that the hull is too short and would benefit from an extra 30m.
Given the work needed to get the 280m hull into Portsmouth, cost limitations scuppered anything bigger.
As for USN involvement I look forward to their new CVNs coming out with a 280m hull.
Now the obtuse bit and your lack of understanding of how the platform / component set / build economics of a containership can be used to build a CVF without the CVF being a conversion of a containership.
I tried to explain that you could use an actual containership / Maersk to build a Q+D prototype but that the actual production vessels themselves would be designed as a CVF but using the component set / technologies of a Maersk to bring it in at much reduced cost.
All though it has been mentioned you seem oblivious to the example of the 1942 light fleet carriers that used a civilian platform and component set to build a very successful and long lived class of aircraft carriers
Obtuse Part 2 – 330m hull includes 72m of machinery spaces – why would you locate the fuel tanks next to them?
Probably looking at a hull with 14 main sections – 4 are machinery spaces – so there is scope to make sure everything goes in the right place.
Now onto the subject of shafts you were right – I was shocked – that we agreed.
Pods may have issues but they are a developing technology.
The benefits out there for a simpler build and hull form are too big too miss.
Consequently for naval pods – watch this space – see what the Spanish / Danes / Dutch do.
Regarding Govan I think you have got things a bit wrong.
When things went pear shaped Govan still had a workforce.
BWoS used them as pawns to get some leverage over the MOD / TB.
Consequently the corporate knowledge was there and is there.
As for the mistakes – the man who has made none has never built anything.
In the round they are saints compared to BiF and their BL/Rover Group management.
When it comes to my comments on the Waves / MARS I think it is Obtuse time No.3.
My main point relates to what we are getting with MARS?
How do they compare with the Waves – would another build not have been more efficient?
You mention the cost of the Waves – you mention £160mill ea / I was looking at £100mill approx – my question is why were they so expensive?
BWoS build economics / BiF lack of talent / Unrealistic spec.
If the spec was OK why did we need to re-invent the wheel with MARS and the BMT design contract?
If the spec was not OK and BMT did some thrifting then my point about an unrealistic spec on the Waves stands.
Finally the “NIH” syndrome or Obtuse No.4.
My point related to engineer arrogance, that only they had the magic pixie dust to get things done. You have it over your Wartsilla experience and they had it with their NIH attitude to a very workable cDPF solution.
QM2 – interesting.
My thoughts are that it is a more complex build than the CVF.
Probably a more complex operation as well – they have to deal with the public the CVFs don’t
Your comments back up my contention that they are just big boxes with a low outfit density.
A/C’s are simple – black box them – Aircraft launch / recovery / service and re-equip.
The hard part is dealing with the politics, the hidden agendas and the egos that surround them.
My problem with the current CVF build is if it is a big box build what happened to the Big Box price?
The costings make Railtrack / Network Rail look good
Now where did I put my Ladybird book on naval S-S warfare?
NaB @ QM2
Interesting sorry about the SLEP incident.
I fear your mate got caught up in the ” Law of Three” and didn’t know how to handle it.
You could call it Design Re-use.
Spend the time designing a new cover, looking for new pictures and re-writing the first technical chapter to make sure it included all the appropriate buzzwords with comment from a new bloke with a lot of letters after his name.
No need for any real work, the first report will have done all the hard stuff, the second will have added focus and the third is just window dressing for a generalist management that wants to feel involved and important.
Finally – Any thoughts on the build economics / design efficiency of the JC1 platform?
They seem to do all the Naval stuff you talk about but at a significantly lower cost – just saying like.
NOT AB
Sorry I should have been clear- I do not favour conversion fo existing ships, just modification of existing designs, that are then build from scratch that are big enough to do the job. So new QM2 but top half built to form carrier.
However there must come a point where the Mersk E design is so big you can do pretty much anything with it. Does not matter how ‘Efficient’ it is surely… It would/ should be cheap.
X et al @ the past two days
Response time – what can a GT do?
Is this number from start up or from idle?
Now regarding a torpedo attack – what is the current procedure?
Identify it early, put on the burners and run away to get out of range?
If this is the case is a torpedo a cheap area denial weapon?
Sort of moveable mine?
What are the numbers behind a top of the range torpedo?
20km @ 50 knots?
30km @ 40 knots?
@Ixion
Your design derived from a container ship sounds suitable to the really big Aviation RFA that @James was calling for.
Big enough to embark all the rotary force needed for an expeditonary brigade: Chinook, Apache, Puma: the lot. As an RFA the ship itself would be sparsely crewed and not at all ‘fighty’ in a naval sense.
If ever used in dangerous places we would have to assume that it would have DD, FF & CVF all around it.
The advantage of this is it allows you to fill the CVF with FJ and naval fighting helos like Merlin and Wildcat, which in turn provide the layered air, sea and subsea defence to keep the Avaition RFA (and the rest of the ARG) safe.
Only issue is the lack of flexibility. A big LHD has a medical facility, vehicle deck, landing craft and accomodation for embarked personnel so would be more flexible and get used more often for disaster relief etc. If we decide replace the Albions with two big flexible LHDs then need for a big Avaiation RFA will be much less clearcut.
If there’s money for a new RFA ‘connector’ then we’d probably do better to invest in some sort of seabasing barge that allows the Points (or any other commercial ro-ro) to offload from the roadsted and over the beach.
Of course you could argue that if we have BOTH the seabasing barge AND the avaiation RFA then there’s no need for RN Dock ships at all. All the rotary goes on the Aviation ship and all the vehicles come by Point.
An all RFA amphibious force protected by the specialised RN fighting ships.
@ Peter E said “all RFA amphibious force protected by the specialised RN fighting ships”
No. The RN amphibious ship role is to take its main weapon, its embarked force, into harm’s way. To use the correct terminology a RN ship’s captain “fights” his ship. Even once the forces has disembarked the ships role is still, just like a frigate or destroyer or a submarine, to inflict violence on the enemy.
The role of the RFA amphibious ships is to carry stores into theatre into AOA in what could be termed perhaps relative safety. Some of those may be of the self loading variety, but the master of an RFA has a different set of responsibilities and his ship a different role. Just because a Bay is grey and has a dock doesn’t make it the same (to the RN) as an LPD.
some of those stores
@Chris.B
Thanks for the link to “Winkle Brown” landing on the rubber deck. Went on a bit further and watched the links to Hermes and Victorious. Lovely to see Scimitars and Sea Vixens. What an aircraft a Scimitar could have been if developed beyond the Mk1.
@X
Probably agree with that, which is why my preferred replacement for the Albions would be two LHDs and not the RFA solution sketched above. Also more flexible for peacetime role etc etc
The connector barge should possibly be assessed separately. It could be a huge force multiplier. Assume we need to deploy 3 Brigades for a 3 motnh war: 3Cdo, 16AAB + Something Armoured. The first two we might be able to deliver by sea and air. The third will realistically need a port. Deny the port and we can’t deploy.
If we can get tanks / IFVs off the Points and over a captured beach-head then our strategic options in that sort of situatuon increase many fold.
@ Peter E
Dude you have to agree because that’s the way it is!!!!!!!!!!!! :) ;)
To be honest over the years the idea of LHD has begun to leave me a bit cold. I like the Juan Carlos but I would be tempted, reasonable money no issue, I would prefer a fettled Karel Doorman that could carry 8 fast LCU; basically these are supersize Enforcers. They have hanger space for 6 NH90s. If operated in pairs or even threes there would be more helicopter capacity than we currently deploy regularly on amphibious exercises. Three of these ships would allow us to land a battalion over the beach in one wave.
HI PE,
A good scenario. The first two being so light (exc. for the flying tanks), I think James’s worry about getting a bde across the shore (not through a port) is quite something to think about… and map the current assets against, to find out the gap
@Peter Elliot
“Assume we need to deploy 3 Brigades for a 3 motnh war: 3Cdo, 16AAB + Something Armoured. The first two we might be able to deliver by sea and air. The third will realistically need a port. Deny the port and we can’t deploy.”
Errm…
Mobile Landing Platform
+ Afloat Forward Staging Base (solomon has a nice video @SNAFU)
+ Point-Ro/Ro-vessels
+ CVF
For what should we need a LHD?
@FBOT
“QM2 – interesting.
My thoughts are that it is a more complex build than the CVF.”
Building the CVF is not complex, developing the equipment is. The most complex thing seems to be to find a government standing to her words and procuring the vessels on schedule. We are nearing 50% capital cost.
We started with a damn good idea back in 98, then did nothing for 6 years, then achieved Main gate, did nothing for another 4 years, then issued contracts, issuing another delay… and costs soar, because Thales and BAE calulated to have corporate capital bound for 6 years while we are nearing 12.
Maybe, this whole project is just intellectually a bridge too far for Lord Barhams and Jackie Fishers heirs?
The other issue with LHD is because of how they look. Some witless politician might come over all 1970s and decide to scrap the CVFs and make do with a bit of mini-carrier STOVL.
At least if our future amphibs look like overgrown frigates and not malnourished carriers then our elected leaders might be able to tell the difference!
@McZ
The LHD are needed to deliver 3 Cdo, their support assets, and 16AAB’s rotary forces. Fighty ships for a contested entry. LSDs carrying sustainement stores for those formations.
All the Armourd Brigade are on the Points or other hired Ro-Ro. Unless we equip ourselves with a connector barge that is where they will stay, while the Marines are Paras are sliced up by the enemy’s armoured counter-attack.
So I agree: we need landing connector just like the Americans are currently experimenting with. Not to replace the fighty ships that the first wave use, but a simple, cheap logistic unit for getting the follow-on forces and sustainment off their sealift and onto the land.
@ Peter E
The Corps was jumping in and out of helicopters well before the Parachute Regiment became the Army’s primary helicopter force. I think many line regiment soldiers would also say that jumping in and out of helicopters isn’t much of a skill. In fact I will go a step further and say 3Cdo probably has greater “ownership” over its helicopters than 16AAB has.
Peter Elliot, considering you can put 24 Ch2 on one Bay and use LCUs to offload them (hopefully new fast LCU), then consider that Royal on the beach is going to be Javelin equipped, F35 from CVF gains air superiority and you have a few Apache operating in support, tack on a bit of NGS then I would suggest that any enemny counterattack is going to be in serious problems. if we are attacking somebody (on our own) that can overrun that then we have done something wrong or had faulty intel.
PE: “If we can get tanks / IFVs off the Points and over a captured beach-head then our strategic options in that sort of situatuon increase many fold.”
“Unless we equip ourselves with a connector barge that is where they will stay,”
“we need landing connector just like the Americans…”
Mexeflotes.
Not sure where to start. Thread is F35 and MOD credibility. Lots of talk on CVS/LPD/LHA etc. Up to date on most things aeronautical but not sure on ship acronyms, and really not clear about army Squads/platoons/companys/batalions/regiments/brigades etc. Can anybody give me a quick rundown on numbers, e.g. numbers of the above, company =100 etc or not.
Sorry to be a plank but I’m not military just father ex RN (27 years) and inlaw ex RAF. No Army experience at all !
Hi APATS,
Yes, the missing bit:”you can put 24 Ch2 on one Bay and use LCUs to offload them (hopefully new fast LCU)”
– what happened to it, after the very impressive trials?
@Kentish Paul,
The numbers are incredibly light: take the Parachute Rgmnt @1650 official strength, and you get a bn dividing by three (interesting, the third one is the SFSG, and that should be a state secret)
A RM Commando (bn) I think is officially 800 as they need to be able to get ashore to fight @ that feather-weight 550-odd strength
The best thinking on this is the RM Coy concept/ strength, which should be adopted across everything where the AFVs do not make up for the numbers through the enhanced mobility/ protection/ fire support (not from afar, but just from behind you)
4 = fireteam
8 = section
16 = multiple
32 = platoon
120 = 1 company
3 x 130 + HQ + support = 650 or so = 1 battalion
3 x battalions + engineers + guns + cavalary = 4,500 to 6,500 1 brigade
1 third of a brigade = 1300 = 1 battlegroup
2 or more x brigades + support troops = 1 division
2 divisions or more = 1 corp
2 or more corps = 1 army group
That was roughish.
Of course RM runs to Commando 21
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commando_21
Above was basic Army.
Thanks x, for the latter
– the former factors in (heavily) the AFV (tank +IFV) factor
A Company that numbers less than a score is a misnomer ( it should not be much above that, either)
Going by your quote:
“120 = 1 company
3 x 130 + HQ + support = 650 or so = 1 battalion
3 x battalions + engineers + guns + cavalary = 4,500 to 6,500 1 brigade
1 third of a brigade = 1300 = 1 battlegroup”
you can get the numbers to go for (approx.)
– coy 144
– with “your” structure bn 780
– bde = a non-existent concept… we will soon see if one emerges (again, officially, should be c.6500)
– a third is no way to go about it, I gave a thorough rationale what an AFV-heavy battle group, when one of those are called for, should look like
— came to 1900; x 3 = 5700, 800 for the bde overhead and staying power (as in logistics, ISTAR and the like)
I forgot,
10,000 to 15,000 division
20,000 to 30,000 a corp
@ ACC
My numbers are very rough. Just for an idea. Over the last 60 years the British Army has fielded a variety of formations whose strength varied.
X, We tend to call formations by the most politically expedient name. After all if we said that we would only have an enduring Brigade sized op but have 9k personnel deployed it would still be called a Brigade! Damm i am getting cynical.
That “We tend to call formations by the most politically expedient name” is exactly it; but
– if you call a companay by any other name, all your officer training goes down the drain
– a bn might be too blunt a tool, for the job, but regardless there will have to be a nucleus to a battle group to be quickly formed (be it A/AI/MI/LI or otherwise, and that icludes methods of initial delivery: from planes, jumping off helos, across the shoreline…)
@ Apats
You will be telling me next RAF Squadron Leaders don’t command squadrons……
The Army seems to “like” multiples, companies, and battlegroups these days and as you say indeterminate named formations.
As for enduring ops that 9,000 always seems to be always soldiers with the occasion mention of light blue bods. Call me cynical but…..
@Anixtu
Up to what sort of sea state can a Mexe be used?
The incoming logistic ships are not going to be at all fighty, so the transfer won’t necessarily be happening in a nice sheltered cove.
Mexeflote can be used in a sea state equal to that specified for MLP.
@Anixtu
So do you reckon we already have sea basing sorted, without buying any new fancy kit at all? Points, Mexes, job done?
That’s good news if its true and will make the Americans a jealous when they realise we already thought of it! :-)
“Mexeflote can be used in a sea state equal to that specified for MLP.”
Peter Elliot, who mentioned sea basing? I thought we were discussing the insertion of a capable brigade level force over the beach?
X @ 6.10
How things change.
Didn’t a division have to be 12 battalions to be fully formed.
Wasn’t a division without 3 brigades considered “light”?
Am I old fashioned in thinking an Army Group was a group of armies?
We have grade inflation in our schools.
And we have formation inflation in our army?
Finally is Afghanistan a 3 battalion gig of boots on the ground?
I woner what WC would have thought of the 9K in theatre.
The thousands come out to get fed.
Only hundreds have guns.
Paraphrasing I can’t find the original quote.
Didn’t it relate to the 8th Army in NA in 41/42?
Fbot
The army has only ever had about 7000 personnel deployed to Afghan the rest are from the airforce and navy and less when the marines deploy. It does make you wonder about there force generation capability that has had them so stretched these last years.
Gentlemen
For info, the offload assets you’re talking about were being looked at under the name Expeditionary Deployable Port Infrastructure (EDPI) – what a gobful. The practitioners are 17 Port & Maritime Regt RLC who live in Marchwood. They also do a fine and very unappreciated job.
The Mexe is a very good piece of kit. There is a rough US equivalent that goes under the broad name of Navy Lighterage. However, you will find people who’ll tell you Mexe’s can operate in upper SS3. They may be able to move in that, but interfacing with ships is something else entirely. In actual fact, the sea state is less important than the local wave height and period – closely related, but not quite the same inshore.
Big issue if you really want to do Logistics over the Shore.
NaBoffin
You seem to be saying that Mexe on its own is not quite chunky enough to be used reliably for offloading a Point in the open sea.
Are you aware of any other piece of kit that 17 Rgt could use do do that job? Either current or planned?
I have to admit I was envisaging something a bit bigger and chunkier that could dock a Point on one side and landing craft on the other, and just drive the vehicles across from one to the other.
Not a Boffin, are you sure your moniker is not a spoof. Things do not “interface” with Ships, they berth, or come alongside but interface? Local wave height and period? It is to do with local conditions, ability to provide a lee, location of door or dock and bloody good seamanship!
McZ @ 5.13
What CVF systems are difficult to develop?
Most of the stuff should be catalogue or civil COTS.
As for the procurement train wreck my thoughts are that the issue is a lack of leadership and credibility at the MOD.
The Treasury based on past experience would trust the MOD to get the shopping at Tesco.
Also your timeline is a bit too simplistic.
The 98 design ambitions were not what we got.
The ship has grown over time till it hit the 280m “wall” so beloved of UK A/C designers.
I fear we are not just scoping / designing / building a CVF.
We are training a whole new generation of designers and engineers as well.
When will the MOD learn that you need to carry a residual expertise, in house and active in between projects?
Getting BWoS to do it for you with multiple feasibility studies is wasteful and lacks focus – T26 anyone?
PE, sounds like a ramp support pontoon. ;-)
Mark @ 8.18
Tricky Dicky played a blinder for Dave the Rave.
He stopped in its tracks any thoughts GB / PM had of trying to play the Khaki election card in 2010.
Quite shamefully how the media lapped up every word about the military covenant / strategic over-reach / lack of resources only to shut up instantly once the ConDemNation got into DS.
2010 SDSR – 10 % savings / 30% reduction in capabilities.
Spun as a victory for our brave men in the Forces.
FBOt, today you have told us that a floating hotel is more complex than a ship that operates fixed and rotary wing aircraft, carries multiple classes of explosives, has weapons onboard, has to move it all around and act as a hotel for the personnel at the same time. Has to be able to seal itself against Nuclear and chemical fall out and conduct damage control.
I hate to ask but what is wrong with type 26?
@ Peter E
This is SS5,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IPijhPxR8Uw
SS3 isn’t calm but is far from rough.
Look at this pic off a well known British defence website……
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/MEXEandLYMEbay.jpg
And think about how the sea pushes on those flat surfaces. And how the wind pushes against not just the mexe but more importantly the load (as it acts as a lever around the cog/metacentre.) All good clean fun. :)
@ FBOT
My point exactly about numbers and formations. What I hammered is what I use. I am not thousands out. And as I am not involved does it matter? I am closer than most average men on the street or most politicians for that matter. When I take notice of numbers in Afghanistan it appears (and Phil will pop up and gives us a truer number) that army deploys 4 x battle groups (1300 x 4). So with camp followers that takes up to about 6000. Then we have the RAF and RN bods on top both of which have between 1100 and 1500 in theatre. Altogether that brings up to 9000. I do wonder if this is where the 4 batts per brigade for MRB has come from. And I do wonder whether there will be any operational difficulty when 4 batts are used in manoeuvre over 3 batts. Dare I use that very old fashioned term and say a “line” of 4 seems to be over extended. We need some green chaps to comment.
So – @x, @Anixtu, @NaBoffin
Do we or don’t we have the ability to land an armoured brigade from Point Class ships over a beach-head that has already been secured by our Amphibious forces?
Between them can Mexe and any other pieces of portable pontoon, lighterage, fold-up ramp etc that we have down at Marchwood do the job?
Maybe @TD can offer a view – it sounds like the sort of subject he likes. Seems to me at least as important as how many armoured brigades the army should have.
Force enablers more important force numbers?
All PATS @ 8.39
Looking after 23 grades of fuel / HE / propellants is a lot easier than trying to look after 2-5K people who walk through your door every 7 days.
With the CVF you know what you are dealing with.
You have time to train and you have a lot of support.
Not saying it is easy but it is worldwide endeavour.
There are more navies than cruise lines.
FBOT, flight ops, secure encrypted comms, asw, asuw, aaw threats, 3 dimensional battlespace management, moving and flying fixed and rotary wing aircraft and you compare it to being a hotel. Mate you crack me up.
PE et al @ mexefloats
The Flensberger website has PR photos of the Points looking to take onboard trucks / LandRovers from a Mex on what looks to be the open sea.
When I saw it I thought it was staged.
However the photo is their and the inference is that transfer is possible.
Peter Elliot, is this a different question? Armoured or mech infantry? How much of the lane space was used for units already landed to secure the beach? Do we include Ch2/IFV landed as part of the initial follow on forces? Are the infantry already landed to secure the beach rolled up into the brigade or remain seperate? it is not an easy question to answer without more specifics.
All PATS @ 8.54
That is what a CVF will be getting paid to do.
If it was difficult you would not be recruiting at 18.
Ships – The QM2 / big cruise ships are more complex to design and build than the CVF.
Crews – The skill sets are different but I would contend that the QM2 crew is under more pressure day in day out.
When the bullets start flying, that is a different matter.
But then again conscription has in general raised the IQ and the skills of the forces in 2 world wars.
I say in general because the RN was in good shape in 1914 – apart from Tiger / Monmouth / Good Hope.
Not a green chap but will comment anyway.
Surely in either defence or attack depth is used rather than a pure linear formation? So your line would actually be a line of 3 with 1 in reserve, or in certain situations perhaps 2+2. In an manoeuvre situation those arrangements give the ability to respond to events or enemy action.
Presumably if the if the terrain or the siutation demanded something different then the Division or Army commander would change the Task Org to suit ie break his 2 x 4 Brigaes down into a 3-3-2 or similar?
“Dare I use that very old fashioned term and say a “line” of 4 seems to be over extended. We need some green chaps to comment.”
FBOT, Funnily enough that is what a floating hotel gets paid for as well and where and when do they recruit their highly skilled, bar staff, pool attendants, waiters, childrens entertainers and cleaners from? same place we recruit figher and helicopter pilots? weapons engineers, warfare oficers, linguists, comms technicians, battle staff etc? You have never been on a warship habe you? A CVF will have daily flight training ops, will run man overboard and damage control drills, crash on deck exercises, warfare serials, it does not cruise around until the action starts. On the other hand the pressure of Mrs Johnsons shower pressure being low must be overwhelming and as for table 4s steak being underdone!
Popping up!
5 battlegroups, BAG, Police Mentoring, FR Sqn, ASGp, CIED TF, Artillery Regiment, Signals Regiment, Logistics Regiment, Medical Regiment, Engineer Regiment, Equipment Support Battalion, Provo Coy, and the JHC element.
Pops back down.
@ Peter E
Yes and no! You can do anything once. But you just think how many heavy vehicles there are in brigade, the speed of mexe, etc. etc. Anything more than SS3 and the game is over. LCU perhaps is a different matter. To move a regiment of tanks would take take two Bays alone. And that would be without AVRE to support them and other chunky kit. So probably to be on the safe side you would need 3 bays. 1 x armoured infantry battalions would take just about the same amount of ships; the difference being not worth consideration. And an armoured brigade used to have 2 x batts of infantry; perhaps even 3. And that is bare bones stuff. What if you wanted a regiment of SPG and all their vehicles? And then there is the logistical train for the whole shooting match. Not for no reason do USMC MEU only have 4 tanks. Your best bet is to capture a port and use the Points.
APATS
Its a fantasy scenarios so easy to bend the story to fit the argument, but for the sake of discussion this is what I had in mind:
Its a 3 brigade force. All the lane space in the available Landing Ships was taken up by the vehicles associated with two lighter brigades (3 Cdo & 16AAB). They are now ashore and have secured the beach head and immediate surroundings, maybe even an airstrip, but no port.
An armoured brigade of say 3 Battle Groups (1 Tank Rgt, 2 Warrior Battalions + RA, RE etc etc) is now needed ashore to drive inland to secure the main objective. This brigade is embarked on the Points or some hired Ro-Ros.
We have the landing craft from the landing ships. We have some Mexes. Can we get the Armoured Brigade ashore?
All PATS @ 9.13
The 650 crew on the CVF will be dealing with equipment and systems.
The QM2 will be dealing with systems, equipment and people / customers.
Finally one gripe of yje CVF crew size.
Why does 10% of the crew have to be food related?
That is 69 out of 650.
Maybe the RN are wanting to get into the cruising game.
Seriously do they need so many to do silver service in the wardroom?
No wonder the Treasury gives the RN / MOD such a hard time.
@ Peter E
Dug this up for you. Now when these bods are going about their drill the centre board is down. But the rudder which also stops helps to resist the wind is out of the water. And the hull of Pico is slightly more refined hull than a mexe (though still quite flatish). And yes loads don’t move. But note how much the hull can be made to move. Note how calm it is too. Now imagine that digger as a great big sail on a flat bottomed steel box in seas similar to those in that other YouTube video I posted.
(For the record I hate Picos. Orrid things.)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zeNLgvxnZRI
Does help if I post the video.
@X
I see where you are coming from: but so does the enemy. The only port has been denied by mines, blockships, hostile population or whatever.
Where I started this discussion was to suggest that some sort of cheap, simple barge that allows us to unload Point Clas ships quickly onto fast Landing Craft could be a big, big force multiplier.
Fbot
What about the 1000 air group and other personnel do they not need feed by the ship also
@APATS – local conditions are defined by wave height and period. The difficulty in interfacing (what you need to do to transfer cargo) is that different sized platforms respond in different ways to varying frequencies of waves and their own inertia (damping) depends on their size. Taking a “lee” position is all very well, but it doesn’t necessarily stop some fairly interesting relative motion issues. Waterplane area (lxb) determines most of your response, damped principally by your mass (displacement).
Shots of Points & Mexes offloading are by no means staged – it is often exercised. However, it is heavily dependent on what the local wave conditions are at the time. Open sea can be flat calm, but “sheltered” waters can be pretty bouncy too….
@PE – I very much doubt that we could offload an Armoured Bde off the Points – partly because I don’t think they have sufficient LIMS (linear metres) in the first place. The LIMS requirement for 3Cdo exceeds that for our existing amphibious shipping, before we sold Largs Bay, so I doubt that an Armoured Bde (which is much more vehicle heavy) would fit in all six, let alone be do-able over a beach. You would also need the fuel, food and ammo to support that unit, which is several thousand tonnes.
But that is not the “point” (sorry!). The idea behind the Points was always to provide a reliable core source of lift for follow-on formations to offload primarily through a port, “austere” or “well-found”. The same terminology is used for airports.
What we found on TELIC was that we ended up offloading in corners of ports, away from linkspans or similar (as the US were using them all – seriously!) and so the idea that we would need to do more (not necessarily all) over a beach or similar seemed like a good idea. Hence EDPI. Unfortunately, seems to be on the back burner atm – out of sight, out of mind.
We can currently do sea-basing for between a Coy grp or full Cdo (eg 40, 42,or 45, plus some of CHF and CLR), depending on how many ships we’re prepared to commit, nothing more.
FBOT
Are you on a windup?
Thanks NaBoffin
Thats kind of what I suspected.
To be contraversial I would be happy to see an Army Brigade cut if it got us this improved EDPI capability. As has been pointed out by others for Fast Jets an Armoured or Mechanised brigade sitting on Salisbury Plain is will deterr no-one if we can’t deploy it.
Airlift can’t move a serious armoured formation so it has to be by sea. While the Points are our primary sea lift commercial RoRo exist in numbers and could be hired in an emergency.
The port facility is the choke point particularly if the enemy knows we are coming – so we need to be able to bring our own. Cheap, austere, unfighty, and more use to us than a Brigade sat on its hands in the UK unable to get to the party.
NABOT that is what i meant it depends on experience, conditions, and what you are offloading it is not a formula, I have done it several times, with good and bad results none of which you can predict with an equation!
FBOT I echo Phil, April fools traditionally finishes at midday.
Not A Bloke On Tour?
“NABOT”
@ Peter E
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lighter_aboard_ship
http://www.msc.navy.mil/inventory/pics/capefarewell2.jpg
@ Not A Boffin
I am still waiting for your professional evaluation of the Maersk container ship axillary.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xn5v7tEBYn4
APATS – agreed – you can’t predict it with an equation. What you can do however, is get a feel for the scale / feasibility of the problem when trying to set a requirement. That requirement is aimed at making it easier for the people who have to do it.
@PE. Getting the offload assets into theatre is always the problem. Barges, extra landing craft, linkspans, doesn’t matter which, they all need to be transported – usually some distance to theatre.
Sorry NaB I pressed add while still typing.
Please can you give your opinion?
@ Jackstaff
That video of the launch and recovery was fantastic, cheers for posting that. Some of that engineering is simply brilliant, especially the simplicity of it (in concept).
@X
The Maersk stuff looks great and will doubtless be giving FBOT a big hard-on. It would be great for the Aviation RFA I mentioned up-thread but is likely to be out of our budget once the USN have finished loading it up with all sorts of flash capabilities.
I am talking about a very simple platform to connect up the sea lift we already own (or could hire) with the landing craft we already own.
An RFA based on the lighter-aboard-ship looks like a better bet. As NaBoff says we need to get lots of of landing craft to theatre in the first place. If the ship can then double up as an interface between the Points and the Landing Craft then we could be in business. Make it nice and big and it should be stable enough for the Points to moor up on one side and the LC to come and go from the other.
Just one un-fighty RFA and suddenly we can put tonnes and tonnes of kit ashore at a beach of our choice and a high operational tempo. Game changer.
Peter Elliot, your scenario at your we are offloading a division in the end.
NAB the answer to your question is a seamans eye and command judgement! What we get paid for.
@ Peter E
I can understand where FBOT is coming from with his ideas. But I also appreciate the professional are well professionals! This back and forth here reminds of Boeing and winglets. In the US every year their is a show or convention for those who build and design their own aeroplanes. Apparently it was this show where Boeing engineers picked up the idea (copied, stole!) the idea for those small winglets you see at the end of jetliner wings. You know the ones that force the air back into vortices to provide extra lift I think. (Lets see if Mark will pop up with a proper explanation!) So you have an example of professional engineers learning from the keen amateur. You can’t escape the fact that container ships are very, very efficient load luggers. If you consider it is often costs more to move something up the UK that it does to bring it from China. And it is possible to believe that volume can solve a lot of problems. When you are onboard a ship, especially a warship, and you see how pipes, equipment, cabling, equipment, or whatever has to be “manipulated” into place to fit the ship’s form you can see how somebody would think that fitting the same equipment into a very big, very square box would make life easier and cheaper. Especially if that big box was fitted into a large strong hull. So yes I can where FBOT is coming from. Said it myself that CVF shouldn’t really cost much than the some total price of T45, QM2, and a large container vessel. And you can’t blame a concerned tax payer taking issue with how is taxes are spent. But that doesn’t mean some stuff as NaB has pointed out is just wrong. My last thought is sometimes professionals fall out too and have radically different ideas,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cx55u_LT-BU
And this is always a good view,
http://www.nfb.ca/film/defender
X, Paragraphs mate.
@Peter Elliot
Does this help?
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2011/04/a-floating-container-port/
Bloody hell
I jump on a plane for 10 hours and in my absence the conversation turns to Mexeflotes
As some might know, Mexeflotes are only slightly behind ISO containers and bridges in the top rank of things I like to obsess about.
Can I humbly suggest you raid the TD back catalogue
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2011/04/a-trip-down-mexeflote-lane/
Where you will see a picture of the Points doing a spot of unloading onto one, I am sure I read that they were used for doing ship to ship equipment transfers mid ocean in 1982 down South as well, now that must have been hairy
There is also a picture of one heavily laden in what looks like rough water, some of the comments are worth reading on that post as well
For an expansion on the Mexeflote and a bit more around floating bridging equipment, one could do worse than check out the 20 part series on UK military bridging
Part 11 is on floating equipment, including Mexeflotes
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2011/12/uk-military-bridging-floating-equipment/
Another one of my favourite subjects is over the shore logistics
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2010/05/ship-to-shore-logistics/
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2010/12/the-future-of-the-royal-navy-11-logistics-and-support/
The ones above aren’t that good actually so be kind
As as Ant has just mentioned
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2011/04/a-floating-container-port/
Finally to round things off, a spot of history
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2009/06/d-day-after/
TD,
Streuth, boss, that may actually qualify as a Mexegasm.
PE et al.,
A floating lighterage is, potentially a game changer. Carriers or not (and myself I think ‘not’ isn’t an option any more than deploying BAOR to first day of battle positions without heavy armour to screen and fix was an option) the post-Germany, post-sandbbox Army’s mode of deployment has been forced back, by a wide combination of circumstances, to a “descent” model. That’s not the same as storming up Sword Beach but does mean it needs to be 1) a place of the Forces’ choosing, and 2) may well mean avoiding obvious or poorly defensible civilian port facilities. So I’d put all of the following up the list from T26:
– Two or three more Ports
– One of these mexe-station/floating container port jobbies or more depending on specs and contracting
– Two Karel Doorman-style JSS as Fort (I) replacements, removing the command facilities on the Dutch model and replacing them with expanded hospital facilities (so that, between them, you have a replacement for Argus’ PCRS role.)
Yes, a 3 brigade Division, which is the most we can expect to deploy on a single op. Not an unreasonable tasking given, as mentioned above, that the Army is now based on our home island and we’re not planning for war with Scotland or Wales.
Equally think about if we deployed only 3 Cdo, but had to sustain them at an operational tempo in a far off place for months on end. The Bays are too few and will have to stop for maintenance at some stage. We will need a way to get the Points in on the action.
I just think its not an unreasonable tasking to be able to do that. By having one ‘Connector RFA’ we can transform all the Points to have funtionality of the Bays. What’s not to like about 6 Bays for the price of 1?
“your scenario at your we are offloading a division in the end.”
As regards the use of Mexe for this task I glean the following from the discussion above:
Its slow – in terms of getting a large formation ashore at an operational tempo
Its ‘hairy’ – even Mexefans admit using one of these out in the open sea is a dodgy business
If the weather gets at all rough you have to stop – again OK if ther’s no other option but not something to rely on when planning.
So I reckon the main tool is Landing Craft: some organic to the Connector RFA and possibly some borrowed from the Amphibs after they have offloaded all their own lanes.
Jackstaff “Two Karel Doorman-style JSS as Fort (I) replacements,”
Look to the 2005-2011 plan for MARS: http://navy-matters.beedall.com/mars.htm . Two almost like-for-like replacements for old Forts to support CVF and three JSBL ships “to support a full medium weight brigade ashore” replacing the new Forts.
But the plan has been scunnered by the cuts to MARS, merging 2xFSS + 3xJSBL into 3xFSS.
@ Peter E
You should also consider beaching larger vessels,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:040326-F-0193C-021.jpg
Beaching reduces unloading times by a good percentage.
And amphibious vehicles for example the USMC AAV can carry 4500kg.
I can’t speak for other LST types, but an LSL configured for beaching could only carry about a half or a third of the full load by weight. May have been an LSL specific issue.
@X
I’m trying for force multiplication: ie making our existing commercial spec Ro-Ros (Points) much more useful without having to scrap the lot and build something fancy to a special spec. Keep it simple. Keep it cheap.
If the Connector RFA is a big COTS Flo-Flo then the orgainic landing craft could perhaps be made much bigger than well-dock ones. Alternatively the big Flo-Flo it could be used to deliver @TD’s floating port and inflatable casueway into theatre.
That could be assembled in a couple of days and give a rapid ‘drive-ashore’ capability without anything floaty having to shuttle between ship and shore.
A rational defence procurement driven by strategy would surely invest in such a capability, cutting back teeth arms as necessary to pay for it. Teeth Arms marooned in the UK are not the future.
@APATS – Didn’t think I’d asked a question mate, but yes without a seamans eye it can’t be done.
@X – Sorry have only just had chance to have a gander at the Maersk promo vid. I had seen a much earlier version presented at some expeditionary warfare conference about six years ago which was a little different, but not massively so.
Looks great in MechSim and if all works as advertised would be a great capability. However, the devil (as he usually is) will be in the detail.
A couple of things to note. Pretty much all containerships of that size are powered by low-speed donks (typically 90-120 rpm). Those donks really dislike operating for sustained periods at anything other than their design rpm / power range, which means that your ship is going to be running around doing 20+ knots if you want the propulsion plant to remain happy. One of the primary purposes of naval forces is to loiter often at low to moderate speeds in particular locations. These ships will have some difficulty doing that – not necessarily insurmountable btw, just a noticeable PITA.
The transfer of heavy cargo between ships at sea is something the US (and UK to some degree) have been looking at for nearly 10 years. One of the US concepts is called skin-to-skin cargo transfer. They (ONR) were originally looking at it to shift TEU between ships with some rather complex crane systems as well as vehicle transfer. The TEU transfer element may have been binned by now, it’s a few years since I was engaged with it so I’m a bit unsighted. The MLP programme which is keeping the best shipyard in the US going (NASSCO), is (I think) aimed at static transfer from their pre-positioned Ro-Ro ships (LMSR) rather than from container vessels. These were built for purpose and therefore have MS diesel geared fits which give a little more flexibility in operation. Whatever your plant, if you want to do anything other than static transfer, you’re going to need quite a bit of sea-room.
One other thing that will be difficult to transfer from MechSim to reality is the provision of life support services to the (I assume extensive) Embarked Military Force on the ship. A containership is usually crewed by 20-30 people and life-support scaled for that number.
These container ships typically have a power generation capacity of the order of 8MW which is usually limited in distribution to the deckhouse and holds adjacent to the deckhouse for reefer containers – ie there isn’t usually a shipwide distribution system. Now again, this isn’t insurmountable, but it is another complication.
All the modules shown for accommodation (including gyms as per the big-deck LHD) will require power, water, sewage, air con, fire-detection and extinguishing systems. Those systems will have to serve each set of modules in an individual container hold if you want to avoid running services through the hold bulkheads. Now some or all can potentially be provided in individual containers. But then, where is the fuel kept? How transferred to the gennies? Switchboard locations? Galleys – extraction of heat? Provision of cold storage? Storing routes?
Where does the accumulated waste from 1000+ people go? How treated? How moved around the ship for eventual disposal. You’ll notice that I’ve not even got onto military requirements yet, such as where does the EMF ammo get stored? Do we add COLPRO? What about briefing rooms, ship-wide comms for basic safety, let alone operational information. External comms?
This sounds like a completely negative rant against the concept. It’s not intended to be that in any way shape or form. I’m just trying to outline the “difficult” bits that have to be cracked without even getting into the survivability-type issues that might also have to be addressed, depending on appetite for risk.
If Maersk have actually designed and costed all the modules shown, taking in all the issues listed above, then I’d be interested in seeing them. I suspect they haven’t, other than perhaps a SWAG. If they have, I expect them to be a bit more eye-watering than people may be thinking. To the point where when you do a balance of investment a purpose-built ship looks more attractive.
Off the top of my head, this has only been done once, for real, for any great length of time and the UK did it. RFA Reliant (ex MV Astronomer). A post-Falklands conversion, she operated for a couple of years in the mid-80s, including standing by UK deployment in Beirut. The lessons learned from that ship were that while it provided useful capability while we were waiting for Argus’ conversion, there was a lot of water ingress to the various containerised elements and that the life support arrangements were unreliable.
Personally, I think these type of concepts have a place, but the situation where you would need them is where you needed hulls in a hurry and could not wait for a purpose built ship. That pretty much spells major war to me.
Hope that helps, one of these days I’ll post a short answer.
@ Peter E said “Teeth Arms marooned in the UK are not the future.”
You are preaching to the choir. In the future A commando battlegroup (MEU) at the point of crisis able to land across the beach with a port will be of measurably more worth than an a well armoured brigade sitting on Salisbury Plain. Being “there” will outweigh mass and firepower. Oddly this is high end warfare while HMG is more interested in these stabilisation/COIN operations; the Army will get into theatre because the Americans will have done the heavy lifting. We can’t supply kit but we can supply troops; HMG demonstrates the UK’s resolve by putting are soldiers, sailors, and airmen into harms way. This is the “we have always had access to bases and host nation support in the past” school of “power projection” that is so often talked about here. HMG doesn’t want an army it wants a heavily armed gendarmerie to support its overseas aid programme.
Today is the 30th anniversary of that war. And I know one of things that comes upon on sites like this is the topic of “could we do it again?” We are not the US and we aren’t cash rich for a certainty. But as we struggle to decide what we want or what capabilities we need I don’t think it is to bad a measure or objective to say we need to be able to send a brigade (not division) by sea to somewhere on the globe and get it supplied for 3 months. I would say that means about 20 ships and about 6 billion in costs. About half a year’s overseas aid or contributions to the EU.
If all you are looking for is another helicopter platform with accommodation below decks have you considered a Point class in the same way Atlantic Conveyor was used. It has a large deck space which without knowing the dimensions may be useful. See image
http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-NqgjHG6YPhY/Td-vgyVYctI/AAAAAAAAAWU/GlWaKxBS5wg/s1600/Hartland+Point.jpg
@ X / PE and others,
I’m fully onboard with the “Brigade afloat” concept – not necessarily as a permanent feature, but we should have the grey ships to do it.
Strategically, we are going to have the vast bulk of our Armed forces UK-based (I hope that we will retain Cyprus SBAs and a base in Brunei). For all of its’ faults (and insane solutions such as air carriage), FRES had an essentially simple idea at its’ heart: “Go first, go fast, go home”. A Brigade quickly deployed nips out problems that would require a Division to solve if we react too slowly. Civil wars in particular can flare up quickly.
As the FI proved, and many other scenarios indicate, we cannot rely on port facilities, at least in the early stages of an intervention. At the higher end of contingencies, any intervention will need to be capable of deploying a Brigade initially in order to achieve local effect. Ergo, we need to be able to put a Brigade ashore without necessarily using a port.
At the higher end of contingencies, we are going to need at least light armour in the initial Brigade, even if the bulk of the Brigade is Cdo or Air Assault. So the Brigade coming ashore needs linear metres and ship to shore transfer capabilities to handle future vehicles up to say 30-40 tonnes.
I don’t know what the capabilities of the existing RFAs are for handling vehicles, so these rough numbers are culled from my 1998 copy of the Staff Officer’s Handbook:
Armoured Battlegroup: 1500 linear metres.
Light Gun Battery: 400 linear metres.
Light Infantry role Battalion x 2: 600 linear metres each
Aviation Regiment: 1200 linear metres
Brigade C2: 250 linear metres
Brigade CSS Battalion: 1500 linear metres.
And accommodation for around 6000 men.
So all up for an intervention Brigade around 6000 linear metres. You could probably reduce that to 5000 by taking some calculated risks and ship-basing various functions (especially aviation) even when the main force is ashore.
That to me looks like a pair of JCs for the 2 light role battalions, a biggish ferry for the manpower of everything else, with a CH-47 capable helideck for ship to ship transfers, and whatever type and numbers of RFA works for carrying all of the wagons. In addition, whatever types of LC* are needed for getting the wagons over the last mile and onto the beach, or into a small port that may have been seized by the light battalions but which does not have the draught or facilities for the big RFAs to unload directly.
You could probably also embark 6 or so F-35Bs and the airgroup needed if you displace some of the light role manpower onto the ferry for the transit to theatre.
We’ll have a ready to deploy Brigade in the UK on one week’s notice, so we need the ships within one week of a UK port for loading. That does not sound too onerous to me. But as we are already buying the pointless monstrosities, I’ll assume the CVF is covering all of the flying duties not organic to the Brigade, such as FJ and CH-47.
That gives us a competent and flexible Brigade into the Gulf in 17 days, West Africa in 12 days, through Suez to the Horn of Africa in 15 days, or the FI in 20 days. No port needed at the other end.
@ James
A Point class RFA is quoted as 2,650 lane metres, so you would be talking about 3 of them for a brigade with some space left over for extra stores, or 2 at a squeeze with an LPH available.
CVF + DD + FF provide a security envelope of layered sea, air and subsea defence and hopefully some close air support as well.
Albion and the Bays would be used put a Commando battle group ashore, seize the beach and secure the immediate area.
The ‘portable port’ or ‘Connector RFA’ would then be needed to unload the Points quickly over the captured beach so the brigade could deploy.
Only the last bit is not aleady in our current core budget.
Remember gents that the Staff handbook figures are for vehicles only, not POL, ammo etc (although that is often DROPS palletised). I think you’d probably want more than a light gun battery for a Bde-sized formation, RA regiment is more usual. There don’t appear to be any RE elements in James’ formation either.
Suspect you might want your bulk or consolidation ammo away from the rest of the units until offloaded.
James, the book you want is BR 9400 UK Amphibious Forces Handbook, especially Volume 2, but it’s no good for informing an Internet debate.
@ NAB,
the SOHB figures include close support squadrons RE battle grouped, but I should have been clearer and mentioned that. All LIM figures include vehicle mounted logistic supplies: 3 days of supply on Battlegroup logistic vehicles, a further 4 days on Brigade CSS vehicles (i.e. there’s no loose pallets or fuel bowsers that need a vehicle to shuttle run them around). Does not include water though.
The reason that the SOHB figures are all inclusive is so that tired staff officers don’t make a mistake and forget to include things when planning movement or deployment.
The Brigade CSS unit would typically have medical, repair and provost functions, as well as general transport.
I’ve just written a long screed in response to Peter Elliott, but realised I could shorten it by saying “the Albion class is too small. You can only embark 1/2 a battalion on each. Sell Albion and Bulwark and Ocean and replace with 2 JCs”.
My final solution for this force was 2 x JC and 4 x Bay. Based on current assets, we’d need 4 x Albion + Ocean + 4 x Bay (or 2 x Albion, 2 x Ocean, + 4 x Bay)
What could we sell Albion, Bulwark and Ocean for? £500M all up? 2 JCs would cost us around £800 million even at Australian prices, perhaps £600-700 million if we don’t need to rebuild all our docks. So for £100-300million extra we can get the world’s best single task force amphibious capability that delivers a combat power streets ahead of a USMC MEU. Once ashore, the Brigade is fully mobile, and supportable for a week at combat rates of consumption before any further logistics are needed. I imagine a Point class could carry about a month of supplies for this sort of force, and could follow up a few days after the initial landing.
In comparison to the CVF budget, that is seriously good value for money.
Anixtu,
no doubt, but I stopped wearing green 8 years ago. I would not be able to get a copy!
James
I happen to agree that we should have had three LHD-type vessels instead of an LPH and 2 LPD. That would actually allow a Cdo group (inc CHF lift, ASRM, CLR element and Arty) to be deployed as an integral unit, with the other two ships plus LSD(A) allowing buildup of most of 3Cdo Bde if required.
Unfortunately, that opportunity was lost in the late 80s / early 90s when the shape of todays force was decided. However, recent ideas for the eventual replacements have looked much more favourably at LHD solutions.
Howveer, I’m afraid that the chance of getting anything like what you propose for the existing ships. Ocean is (literally) a bag of bolts and any ship survey would quickly find that out. The LPD are in better nick, but have still got the best part of 10 years clocked up.
The price we’d get depends on what folk are prepared to pay (see GR7/9 sale). Frankly, if we got £150M for all three I’d be surprised.
The Aussie programme is priced at AU$3Bn, which is just shy of £2Bn in real money. I’d be careful about the EU360M price you see in Wiki. It likely does not include everything.
@James
Long screed not required: I agree the Albions are too small. The thrust I was making is how could we quickly regain the capability to land a brigade _without_ spending a fortune changing all our ships for better ones.
Imagine you are the Chancellor of the Exchequor and you are offered the choice of: (a) Buy two big new flat topped Amphibious warships plus a Bay to replace one we just sold off. At the same time retiring, scrapping or selling 2 Landing Ships that are not worn out; or (b) just buying a few floaty pontoons for 17 Rgt RLC and a Commercially available Flo-Flo crewed by RFA to carry them around on.
Which would you go for?
@ NAB,
I’ll bow to your knowledge of the used ship market! Shortly before you arrived on TD, there was a comment by someone with knowledge of the Australian Abbey Wood, who stated the public costs of the Canberra class also included all sorts of costs for infrastructure and new builds of docks, plus operating costs for the first few years that we fund from RDEL not CDEL. In trying to compare Aussie apples with British pears via several conversion factors and discounting subsidies by Spanish Government of the original JC, we arrived at a UK price for 2 JCs of about £1 billion which after a while no one argued too much with. However, it’s not official, and you could well be right about it being higher.
@ Peter Elliott,
aah, the money. Yes, you are correct. However, with the once in 3 generations rebasing of most of our land forces back to the UK, I think we should also look at how we deploy them. Clearly, for any large scale operation it’s going to be STUFT all the way, as per various Gulf and Afghan shenanigans in the last 20 years.
Unusually for a Cavalryman, I’m concerned about the delivery of amphibious power. My instinct (I won’t rehearse all of the arguments here) is that we need the capacity to put a lightly armoured Brigade ashore over a beach, but not into the teeth of opposition – that would be stupid. I’ll fully accept that others have much greater knowledge of floaty boats than I do, so it would not be for me to produce a credible fleet to support the aspiration. If I say JC, it is because I saw a Youtube video and it looked to me like just the ticket. If the real professional judgement is a Bay or a Point or a Flo-Flo or a ro-ro, I’ll accept that.
For me the exam question is therefore:
Light armoured Regiment, probably FRES hulls.
Combat aviation Regiment, AH-64D
2 x light role Battalions
Combat Support as per normal ratios, less most of the guns*
Combat Service Support for a pretty austere week.
(all up about 6000 LIMS and 6000 men)
All capable of going over an undefended beach in less than 24 hours. Fly over or drive over, or a combination.
What’s the staff answer in terms of shipping from our friends in the Andrew?
Damn, forgot the footnote.
* Why not so many guns? ROE for indirect fire, availability of other bomb-droppers with decent ISTAR in the form of FJ on the CVF and AH-64D, general desire for the ruddy Royal Artillery not to muscle in on everything and then bang on and on and on about it forever, as though their contribution was useful.
There’s an old Army joke about the fact that the Royal Engineers and the Royal Artillery share the same motto and battle honour of “Ubique”, or “everywhere”.
With one it means they have been part of every combat action for centuries, and is a mark of honour. With the other, it means “all over the ruddy place” and is not a mark of honour, more a description of behaviour and general incompetence.
@James
Good definition of the question.
Just on fire support it occurred to me the other day that with clever kit like Spike NLOS now finding its way to platoon level the days of the humble mortar might be numbered. Indirect fire, ROE etc as you said above for the guns.
Views?
Tin hat on / jacket at the ready / taxi waiting outside …
Can anyone help with some numbers?
Where were we pre SDSR – Amphib capability?
Troops / formations / equipment?
What did we have?
What did we need?
What did we want?
Post SDSR where are we?
What do we have?
What can it do?
From what I read here the best we can hope for is –
Aviation ship
Albion Class
Bay Class x 2
My thoughts are that we are sruggling with the last mile or five.
All we would have is 6 x LCU Mk10.
With the hope that this can be upgraded to 6 x PasCat in the near term.
Is this enough?
A PasCat has 20/24 lane metres.
Even if we can get the Points to ship to other assets we still have to get the stuff onto the beach – that looks like a bottleneck to me.
Therefore an idea – angle iron engineering / VFM / civil component set as you would expect.
What happens in an operation – Q+D analysis.
Wave 0 = Insertion
Wave 1 = Helos
Wave 2 = Fast LCTs
Wave 3 = Tug and barge system.
The barge would be big – 150m x 25/30m x 6m ballasted – 1.5m / 3.5m for landing
They would have a 30/50m floating causeway / mexflote contraption to get to the beach and aid unloading.
This would be added to the bow for the final aproach.
Using an upmarket ramp carried internally would be more costly and use up cargo space.
The barge would have 2/3 pairs of small jack up legs to be used once beached to make sure the vessel was steady and level.
Although a barge it would be enclosed with a hull shape to allow ocean transits.
Looking to put ashore 1K tons of stuff.
The basic design would be able to accommodate 1000 lane metres.
The really nifty part would be the ability to combine leading to a pier 300m long with the ability to accept a “Point” class direct and allow the Wave 4 stuff to drive off.
Stuff still up in the air –
Tug and Barge – Acceptable for ocean voyages?
If yes what sea states would it be able to cope with?
One tug or two?
If no do we add cheap refurbished diesels – ex Rail – on building?
Would 5 – 15MW for £5mill off E-bay be enough?
Life span of 10 years.
Potential to last only one opposed landing.
Consequently bare bones spec – back to hammocks?
What would the speed be –
12 / 14 knots Tugs?
14 / 16 / 18 Self powered?
What would be the budget for stuff like this?
What would be the cost economics for stuff like this built in the UK / Korea / Vietnam?
Consequently any thoughts?
I got the idea after seeing TD’s quick build jetty picture.
Post on wind ups / CVF catering / Astroturf / MSD response times to follow later.
Any comments on the above idea would be appreciated, even including any of the “Abominable No-man” / Excel Engineer variety.
When I have been theorising about LASH I have wondered about what a loosely think of as a collapsible tug. Same dimensions as the barg but with retractable propulsor, uptakes, bridge struture, etc. At up to 300t would be a fair sized tugs. Each LASH ship could carry 2.
@FBOT
I reckon you are on the right track – although I wouldn’t necessarily put any actual cargo on board. The six Point Class RFAs plus hired STUFT give us plenty of sealift. It literally is that last mile to the beach we need to focus on. The main issue to me is working out the most cost effective way to pack up and carry around a ‘portable port’. For which not being a marine engineer I can only speculate:
It’ll porbably look like a Mexe on steroids: a set of really big, chunky pontoons round a central hub with a long roll up casueway to the shore. Rather than spend money making something like that fit for ocean transit perhaps we’d be better hiring someone like Dockwise to pick up the bits and put them down where they’re needed?
No legs, you just drop anchor, unroll the floating causeway to the shore and you’re in business.
PE @ 4.32
The use of a Dockwise shipe may have legs, literally as even 18 knots would seem to be beyond a cheap and cheerful powered barge.
However I would load it with cargo as our Wave 1 capbility looks weak – not enough stuff on the amphib squadron itself and a beach lift of only 6 LCUs
Consequently one or two “Assault Barges” turning up with 2K tons of stuff would be a huge step forward.
Cargo Capacity –
150m x 25m x 6m / ballasted = 12K tons.
150m x 25m x 1.5/3.5m beach = 4-5K tons.
I think it would be a difficult job to get 2K tons of cargo onboard at these draughts.
However worth a go.
Regarding how it would look, I would go for the WW2 LST lok with high sides and a covered cargo area.
You could use the main deck as a forward operating base for helos.
Finally to my mind you need legs for stability / usability / durability.
You could have a competition to design the cheapest solution – lots of construction hydraulics?
The last question is how much would the budget be?
£10mill for the steelwork?
@ James – “My instinct (I won’t rehearse all of the arguments here) is that we need the capacity to put a lightly armoured Brigade ashore over a beach, but not into the teeth of opposition – that would be stupid.”
Without any professional knowledge whatsoever this is exactly what i believe we need too.
“If I say JC, it is because I saw a Youtube video and it looked to me like just the ticket. If the real professional judgement is a Bay or a Point or a Flo-Flo or a ro-ro, I’ll accept that.”
Agreed, which is why i tend to keep my nose out of the technical/tactical discussions. :)
This is precisely the EDPI debate that was undertaken about six years ago and may still be going on in the requirementeering margins.
Trouble with Dockwise is securing availability. DTMA at Andover and SALMO IPT at Foxhill deal with them regularly (too regularly if you consider what Salmo use them for!).
The trouble with the barges etc is that your SoA is sub 10kts once you have secured the asset (assuming it’s chartered).
As usual the US have the top-end kit, look up Elevated Causeway System (Modular) – ELCAS(M) on Gary Google. But it’s a beast to transport and erect – beyond the current scaling of 17P&M.
We looked at a system based on several modular construction jack-up barges linked by modular bridging to reduce the effects of tide, current and waves. Trouble is, to do a causeway properly it needs to protrude quite a way (certainly several tens of metres) from the shore to allow for tidal range, ship draft etc. All of a sudden there’s a significant kit and caboodle to take with you. Assembling it in situ is also time-consuming and has safety issues.
None of it is insurmountable and indeed the kit to do it is out there now. However, it is big boys civil/marine engineering and requires time and bodies to transport to theatre and put together. Personally think they’re great bits of kit – but could we get them to theatre in time to be useful?
The US Army also left two hoofing great jack-up barges at Hythe when they left in 2002 (300ft long each). They’re still there as part of Hythe Marine park. EC(DSR) were interested in them for a time, but again, RAB and the limitations of getting them in theatre conspired against them.
@FBOT
Just been reading what went into a Mulberry Harbour.
Ours would be much smaller scale but to borrow the terminology I think we would need one ‘spud’ pierhead unit and a good long ‘whale’ casueway sitting on ‘beetle’ pontoons. I read that the ‘spud’ did indeed have legs for stability so will go along with that.
Don’t think we can afford ‘phoenix’ concrete breakwaters or ‘goosberry’ blockships so will have to make the ‘spud’ good and big and solid. Really beef up the anchors for our ‘beetle’ pontoons too in case it comes on to blow.
Regarding the first wave let’s not confuse this project with Albion replacement which is at least 10 years off. I want this project to reek of the cheap and cheerful COTS engineering you love so much. Therefore I think we need to accept that first wave will be just enough bootnecks to secure the beach and its immediate surroundings, enabling 17 Regiment can get to work assembling the landing pier.
If there’s any space left on the Dockwise ship after loading up with floating rafts of ‘Spud’ , ‘Whale’ and ‘Beetle’ pieces then we can stick a couple of extra landing craft on or a couple of tugs. Can’t hurt.
Thanks NaBoffin
This link seems to describe ELCAS (N)
http://usfleetforces.blogspot.co.uk/2010/08/navy-elevated-causeway-system-modular.html
What is worrying is that to get a useable asset seems to take a lot of people a long time
“Altogether, the exercise at Little Creek involved over 200 Sailors, alternating 12-hour shifts for a total of 60,000 man-hours and 13 days to complete the 750-foot causeway.”
Can we come up with something less gold plated that will be ‘good enough’? @James set us the target to get his brigade ashore in just 24 hours.
@ Peter Elliott,
I’m a fan of the old 2 inch (or whatever that is now in mm) mortar.
Massively quick into action, without going through the radio or complex fire orders.
Hugely intuitive, point and fire. I’ve seen people get so good with it they can put a round into a tennis court area out to around 500m with the first shot.
Smoke is so much better when it is on your enemy, not somewhere in between you.
Packs 3-4 grenades worth of HE and splinters in one round. Better than 40 mm AGL anyway.
You can fire it off its’ little baseplate from the glacis plate on your Challenger or Warrior.
Rounds relatively inconsequential for a platoon to carry. That’s “relatively” when the PBI beasts of burden are already carrying 60 kilos of mostly batteries for the radios / ECM and ammo for the MGs.
Above that, yes I do think that NLOS missiles are better for platoons and companies.
But we don’t want to get rid of Battalion mortars – it’s the one indirect weapon the CO has got that is capable of inflicting both shock (through barrage) and harassing endurance (1-4 rounds a minute for ages). NLOS is all about precision, mortars about area effects, and you probably want both. NLOS does not do smoke or illumination either.
I once came up with a design for localised RF jammers to be mortar launched and float down on parachutes with a springy 6-way set of legs so that it could carry on jamming after floating to earth. Perhaps 30 minutes of battery power, enough for a BG attack to be launched. Won me the course prize at Shrivenham, and even in those pre-UAV days there was an idea about putting an el cheapo video camera on board (we were then struggling with Phoenix). The boffins at DERA in those days looked at the idea and said it was all workable, except the electronics would get smashed by firing stresses, and they were probably right. However, these days, with solid state electronics is that still the case? My MacBook Air with SSD drive boots up in about 2 seconds, and that is not ruggedised at all.
Plus, you can’t burn the sods out of the bunker with NLOS in the same way you can using WP in indirect.
NaB @ 5.12
You just make it too easy.
Look at the Yacht Express, she nails it in one.
She can do 18 knots so she can show A+B a clean pair of heels.
She has a carrying capacity of 5K tons.
Consequently the concept has legs.
Next question would be “Point Class” style PPP / rental arrangment.
Run 4 / Keep 2 local?
Then you do the analysis –
1)Self powered / ocean capable vessel / Bare bones fit out.
2)Limited capability / ocean transported / tug pushed the last 5 / 10 / 15kms.
Need two for every full on Amphib operation?
Wave 2 / Day 2 transporter so the threat level will be reduced compared to the previous waves.
Brought in under darkness?
Finally what would the budget look like?
What cost level could be supported?
What other uses could it have?
£20mill each for Option 1?
Wave 2 = Fast LCU / PasCat ie Fast LCT.
Wave 3 = Tug and Barge scheme.
Sorry for the confusion.
Sorry for not understanding my own terminology.
Finally my idea is not a modern day Mulberry it is just an attempt to
1) Get more stuff onto the beach quickly.
2) Get the stuff of the Points and onto the beach.
Umm,
off the wall thought.
how about a sacrificial old ro-ro (well used, 3rd hand).
Drive it deliberately at the beach, lift the nose up and bash down the front ramp. Just like I’ve seen several hundred times in Dover and Calais on the P&O. Would need a couple of BARRVs and trackway rolls carried on board to make good the first 100 yards of sand. Otherwise it is empty on the wagon decks, so it becomes a “through through” pontoon.
I’m assuming you’ve previously helicoptered in some local protection.
Bingo. 200 metres of usable metal length.
Might need a shallow bottom to make it to every beach, but that’s what we’ve got charts and SBS Ninjas for, to pick beaches we can get to.
At the back, some form of mating arrangement so a Point can pull up behind, and disgorge the wagons through the old rust can and onto the beach.
Post ENDEX, drag it off the beach with some tugs or leave it for the local scrappies.
£5M per single use?
Hi FBOT, for your assault barge along these lines:
Cargo Capacity –
150m x 25m x 6m / ballasted = 12K tons.
150m x 25m x 1.5/3.5m beach = 4-5K tons.
we could buy Sir Galahad back from the Brazilian navy:
Length: 460 ft (140 m)
Beam: 64 ft (20 m)
Draught: 15 ft (4.6 m)
17 knots (31 km/h) (max)
Capacity: 400 troops
3,440 tonnes of supplies
@ ACC
I already tried to get Pete to buy a brand new LST off the Koreans. He wasn’t interested… :)
Would be interested in what you lot think of those links I posted a little earlier, ELCAS is there, as are bits and pieces on elevating barges, FIPASS and a few other bits and pieces.
Maybe I should do another post on the subject?
Thoughts and feedback as ever, welcome
For those who understand the terminology, Yacht Express and the other Dockwise FLO-FLO ships are usually known as ships, not barges. They are capable of speeds in the mid to high teens, whereas FLO-FLO barges are not (<10kts, depending on the tug).
The FLO-FLO ship availability tends to be measured in some weeks for Yacht carriers or months for the heavy lift ships because they are booked up solid at very high charter rates – ask DTMA Andover or Salmo. I have, when proposing that we do that very thing. DTMA tend to book theirs at least three months in advance of exercises to ensure availability. If you can wait for about a month for a ship to maybe become available, come to the UK and load cargo, then they can indeed transit to your desired area of uppity wog bashing in the high teens. Trouble is, by then your window of opportunity for action is usually over or requires increase in scale.
PFI issues were also examined. Trouble is, the degree of availability required tends to be incompatible with the target market. What that means is that no-one will offer you a contract for their yacht transport or more importantly for your large artefact transport if you're likely to try and ditch the cargo at short notice, because the MoD need you right now.
Personally, I think there's a case for something like the US Ready Reserve force, where small numbers of specialist ships are kept in a relatively high state of reserve and can be activated within a week or two at most.
However, no apparent appetite or money for that in the MoD atm.
@james: I suspect the only issue with the sacrificial ro-ro would be ensuring it made it to the beachead :-)
That being said, I wonder if a ro-ro could rapidly deploy some form of rapidly built jetty: perhaps a 200m long line of M3’s with automated station keeping fitted out of the stern gate with a Mexeflote added at the end to interface with new ro-ro’s as they arrive…
@ wf,
clearly, I’m no naval expert. However, I’ve spent my fair share of time crossing the channel, normally to give those Sloaney girls in London their fortnightly dose of red trouser goodness while spending 8 odd years posted to BAOR. So I know my ferries….
If we crossed Not A Boffins’ knowledge of naval architecture with FBOT’s desire to get medieval with some blow torches and Glesga welders, with my desire to be amphibious and TD’s desire for frugality and not re-inventing the wheel, we could jointly come up with something.
Ro-ro hull with flaps and ramps at both ends. The longer the better, the shallower the better although @ NAB is going to rule on some minima for good ocean going sea-keeping.
A pair or two of FBOT’s hydraulic legs towards the back so that once it has beached itself, it can to an extent control the angle of dangle and left or right tilt as the tide comes in and out.
Some form of village bicycle rear entry arrangement at the back, so it can accept all sorts of other ships arriving and mating with it, whatever their type of ramp. I imagine the Andrew will have all sorts of good ideas about that, now they’ve got the choice of both men and women on board.
Update to my earlier post: instead of being empty less a couple of BARRVs for the voyage down south, it could instead be full of “Beach Opening Detachment RE” who would be the first to drive ashore and make good the beach with trackway et all before the rest of the Brigade passes through.
@ wf
google Newport class LST
…you could deploy some form of “mega Mexe M3” out of the back of the sacrificial ro-ro, giving once lashed together and onto the ro-ro a 50×50 metre floating floating dock.
Not going to do the full mental maths, but on the face of it that would give enough displacement to support at any one time an MBT and the weight of a biggish ramp from a Point or something similar, lots of lashing points for the incoming ship, and enough up and down flex to cope with reasonably lumpy seas.
Fascinating subject and some pretty revolutionary ideas.
On a side note, James fascinated to read that ROE is a problem for artillery when you want T45 and Sea Viper to engage contacts at 70 NM plus or even out of sight over land.
@james: so, RFA Red Trousers it is then. RFA Brown Trousers if it all goes wrong :-)
c8000 lane metres to clear over 24 hours, probably from 3 ships for a brigade. My ferry experience says 2 hours per ship: say 4 due to air raids and broken down vehicles. The book says 16 M3’s can bridge 200m, but that’s over a river. However, if you can connect the rigs on the ship, that would make the issue easier to solve…
APATS,
;)
you make an assumption that I have trust in some 23 year old jet jockey to make some sensible choices. I don’t. If he (or these days she) is commissioned into the RAF, halve that level of trust and place it on negative outlook, like the credit agencies do for whole countries these days.
Plus, I have always subscribed to the “if it flies, I hope some f*cker kills it quickly” school of thought, so I am vastly accepting of barrage fire at spurious radar contacts. I applied that judgement to all aircraft, whether owned by the enemy or nominally friendly. Don’t want the f*ckers anywhere near me, because they are an accident waiting to happen. Better safe than sorry.
Now, being sensible, ROE for indirect fire is becoming increasingly problematic. You cannot reinvent physics or weather, so shells of various calibre’s have an unpublished tolerances section in the Joint Targeting Cell playbook. It does not matter how certain every other part of the system is, if the wind / temperature / range / pressure is not within tolerances, it does not get fired. I came across this repeatedly in Bosnia in 95.
For some reason, BAE Systems and Thales’ finest air platform mounted ISTAR systems operated by said jet jockey are exonerated from this calculus. Makes no sense to me, particularly as said jet jockey will normally be arriving from a frantic hi-lo-lo approach, will not have any sense whatsoever of the local situation as it has developed over the preceding hours, has bugger all experience of military life in another service, has about 10 seconds to acquire a grid reference on a targeting system, looks at it in VGA quality black and white from 4 miles away while flying his/her plane, and has the sole doctrinal responsibility to confirm “target acquired” and to listen to a command of “release” uttered by an observer he/she has never met, does not know where they are, nor cares less. Plus, he/she is probably thinking about updating his/her Facebook page on return to base.
It’s a crazy world.
Wf,
happy to have the front of HMS Sacrificial Ro-Ro painted red (you could name a whole class after various Princesses – Diana, Eugenie, Fergy, Beatrice – all of whom perform the national Ro-Ro duty very well indeed while no doubt lying back and thinking of England).
Indeed, you could also paint the back half brown so the Andrew know where to aim the mating ship,perhaps with a golden rivet for the bulls eye.
But those are technical details the Navy will decide.
@ james, ST kinetics do a video camera on a parachute for the 40mm UGL.
@FBOT, not sure if i’m on the songsheet but i live on the coast and we had the MV resolution putting the bases for those “ever so useful” wind turbines! could be used for transfer from big boats to little boats.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GF1Sge2oSWQ&feature=related
James, love it. We are a bit better than that, during OUP we had spotters flying on MPA who had release authority but I was really gettin at Air engagements. The pilots have thorough mission briefings and are very aware of the situation.
Without CAP what you have is a radar contact and it goes something like this.
All positions AAWO air investigate new unknown bearing 345 range 80Nm. New unknown 1234 bearing 80NM tracking 165 speed 400knots height 30k feet not squawking on IFF. roger all positions AAWO unknown 1234 now suspect 1234 based on not following airlanes and not squawking IFF, read warning 1.
No response to warning 1 , Roger Missile Director AAWO cover suspect 1234, read warning 2.
No response to warning 2. You then read warnings 3 through 5 and look at ROE, has it demonstrated hostile intent? Do you need hostile intent? You have an unknown radar contact.
Now your 29 year old AAWO has a decision to make. All positions AAWO suspect 1234 now hostile 1234 based on non response to warnings, continues to close the force. MD AAWO take hostile 1234, not he does not ask the CO as the CO will be on the net and command by veto. MD AAWO birds affirmed birds away hostile 1234. Splash hostile 1234.
They have engaged and killed a radar contact at 40NM. due to no CAP they never even saw it.
I write this as it is exactly the process that USS Vincennes went through when it shot down the Iranian airbus as the warnings reader had the frequency set to military instead of civilian GUARD.
@paul g: stroke of genius! I knew I was forgetting something: a ship with the potential to be an instant pier. We don’t need the full depth potential, but if we can provide a stable platform for a ro-ro to dock to, the rest of the path to the beach can be something floating :-)
@james: would RFA Flora be too cheeky? Plus red sorta brings to mind Thoresen and the Herald of Free Enterprise….
Paul G,
these days there’s enough good mini UAV solutions to not need the complexity of something tube launched. Handheld chucker model RC airplanes will give you lots more than a small calibre round. They’ll get shot down aplenty, but they are cheap. What they do worst of all is announce your interest in a certain area.
I am however intrigued by the Go Pro HD cameras you see on sport parachutists helmets, mountain bikers, skiers etc. I think they are now coming in SSD versions, and what I am imagining is a small (2 x fag packet) version, horizontally split. The lower half has battery, SIM card and a small motor to turn the upper half through 6400 mils either way. Possibly 3 mini levelling legs, each about an inch. The upper half has the Go Pro HD lens / SSD / recording gubbins, a small antenna, plus a small motor for vertical rotating for the lens through -100 / + 1600 mils. All enclosed in realistic woodland / rock camouflage.
Hand-emplaceable, also air-droppable in an emergency with a micro drogue chute to ensure it lands properly on its’ arse, can sort its’ legs out and get transmitting, probably only one frame per minute is all that is needed. Frames transmitted to a passing UAV or proper aircraft, downloaded to local HQ automatically based on GPS data. If you can fire them stealthily from mortars out to 8-10 mms, so much the better.
Doing the data calcs, you’d need about 3.1 kbps for 1 frame / minute upload @ VGA, and perhaps 800 bps for some basic orientation instructions. Not hard to provide.
Should come in around £500 per unit, unless BAE get involved in which case can the programme as it would become unaffordable. We’d buy two, and immediately place one on the shelf wrapped in cotton wool.
wf,
I saw the Free Enterprise on its’ side a few weeks later. Sad sight, let’s not forget there were some who died. Not a topic for any joke I would make, nor you I am sure.
I have not met Princess Flora. Tell me, is she comely…? Is she worthy of some red trouser attention?
(I jest. Mrs J has me firmly shackled dow, not literally, but you get the point. Can’t quite remember what it was I saw in her, other than the large country home, the doddery parents and no siblings)
Huge ;) on that just in case anyone gets the wrong end of the stick…
@ James – “Indeed, you could also paint the back half brown so the Andrew know where to aim the mating ship,perhaps with a golden rivet for the bulls eye.”
Thank you, a hearty chuckle issued forth after reading that.
APATS. Send again in proper BATCO. Key setting 4 Tango.
I think you are alluding to inadvertent blue on blue or blue on white? Yes, a problem. Was there not some civilian airliner flying from S Africa to Brazil that nearly got slotted by the Falklands Task Force in 82?
However, to be serious, the Army would very genuinely like the RAF or FAA to (1) ensure no ones comes to bomb us and (2) stay the f*ck away from the local area, if possible. If we want CAS, we’ll get the AH to do it, as at least they speak the same language.
James, I was merely illustrating the massive advantage of having CAP. As for AH CAS, who stops the 40 year old MIG 21s from shooting them down and then dropping some Napalm on you.
@james: yes, the Herald was something I wanted us to avoid, hence no red :-(
No idea if Flora was a princess, but she was comely enough and had the poshest accent I have ever heard. Given the state I was in the next morning, I wasn’t sure if I should class her as an enemy or friend :-)
Air coordination within San Carlos was apparently “over here the FAA don’t fly unless they have landing lights on”, giving everyone else carte blanche to blast away at fixed wing
APATS,
the very expensive Typhoons, operating at least 200 miles away from me, ideally bombing the crap out of the MiG airbase so they don’t even take off.
What else do we fund the RAF for? If the Army is being threatened by 40 year old MiG 21s, I want a f*cking refund for the last 40 years of light blue spending.
There’s 3 reasons for the RAF to exist. (1) is to keep the enemy away from the close contact area. (2) is to move the self loading freight around the world to achieve defence objectives. (3) is to provide the Queen’s Colour Squadron to various village fetes and theme parks to do the fairy dance that they call drill while dressed in their Ruritanian fantasy uniform.
(4) is certainly not to land their Puma in the wrong field in South Armagh to pick up an Army patrol after 5 days of bashing through blackthorn hedges, to engage in a Mexican stand off with the patrol commander over who is in the right field or not, and then to fly off and whine to the Brigade Commander when the patrol engages the helicopter with Schermuly flares to get a bit of ginger up them, when all that was needed was a 100 metre hop over the blackthorn hedge into a field already cleared of any danger. Particularly when the patrol commander gets carpeted for upsetting the poor little dears.
(5) I also want all RAF Movers to be shot on sight, but that’s more personal and may not pass unopposed through all staffing levels.
James, Love you love of the RAF, what about in some African hell hole where we evacuating UK citizens? Plus bombing airbases is no substitute for having fast air overhead.
Nobody i know would oppose number 5!
@ James
Are you telling us in all your to’ing and fro’ing around the globe on MoD business you have never trapped a female RAF type personage?
James is on a roll tonight! :D
X,
gulp.
There was a scheme in the mid 90s whereby the 3 services swapped military lawyers so to avoid accusations that defence lawyers in courts martial were somehow browbeaten by the single service chain of command and didn’t make the best defence possible for the guilty bastards they were trying to defend.
In 1 Div, we ended up with 3 RAF lawyers, 20 of whom were somewhat female and one of whom was a ginger bloke, so was rightfully ignored by everyone.
I do confess that I learned some military law that year, and also the delightful fact that for RAF women the dress regulations still include suspenders and stockings under female mess dress.
There is a now very worldly wise RAF lawyer (actually, she left the RAF about 5 years ago) who also understands the true meaning of guile, reconnaissance, shock action and indeed firepower that only a cavalryman can bring to the battlefield.
What else do you get up to on an Easter weekend when the whole HQ mess empties out apart from the Divisional Duty Staff Officer (on extras, yet again, this time for cocking up the NATO CFE inspection programme that saw 4 Russians arrive unexpectedly at Hannover Airport to inspect a Medical Regiment for nuclear missiles), and an attractive young lady lawyer on her first military posting after leaving legal school and a couple of days at Cranwell find themselves sharing a dinner for two in the splendour of the old Officers’ Mess of the SS Liebstandarte Division?
Not 20 RAF lawyers, but 2. D’oh.
APATS,
“…bombing airbases is no substitute for having fast air overhead”
Oh yes it is. Indeedy. So long as the RAF can navigate from their own airbase to an enemy one (hmmm – we’ll let that pass), it would be far preferable to having them there than “overhead”. you may have missed out on the part where through experience of the RAF, I trust them about as far as I can throw them. I don’t really care if the feeling is mutual. I don’t want them over my head, because as sure as eggs are eggs, something will go wrong and some spotty youth called Kevin with the spatial skills of a ninja but the intellectual judgement of a slug is going to pull a switch and drop 2,000 lbs of crap on my head.
isnt that why we have joint air controller now though?
@TD, James hatred runs deep. I actually fins it quite amusing that an ex cavalry officer, an organisation renowned for sharing the single brain cell they have is so harsh on fighter pilots. maybe it is due to the fact that they pulled more girls?
APATS,
RAF fighter pilots can pull all the girls they want, mostly from the NAAFI or the back end of Wigan Pier if they felt scrubbed up and self-confident enough, and have the 10 and sixpence she costs in their back pocket. As the Cavalry were not in any form of competition for those girls, it meant nothing.
;)
As for the single brain cell, we’ve had that now silver-mounted for 400 thousand centuries. If it was good enough then, it’s good enough now..
I’m not sure why, but APATS’s angst about RAF pulling power has brought this old “back of the Bedford” troop song into my mind. Not anti any other service, but..
(To the tune of “Men of Harlech”)
Men of Harlech, stop complaining,
Wales was built for troops to train in,
And it’s always f*cking raining,
Welsh girls have big tits”
(Repeat for another nine verses, each slightly different, getting cruder and cruder)
Then we’d start on an Army version of “The Good Ship Venus” as covered by The Sex Pistols, but our version (which I’m not going to debase TD’s blog with) was not very complimentary to the Andrew. I can’t remember past the first half dozen verses, but I think there were a dozen or so.
And then, in case we had not upset enough sensibilities, we had a version of “Tie Me Kangaroo Down, Sport” that went by the title of “Bestiality’s Great, Mate, Bestiality’s Great”, which we’d try to reserve for town centres and to really bellow out.
Stick your log up a dog, mate, stick your log up a dog….
Now, I really hope that the RAF and Navy had equally vile and anti Army songs. I’d be grossly disappointed if not.
a sub friend of mine was equally scathing about skimmers, gotta love the rivalry. :D
one brain cell is enough, in my experience blokes with too many are like a lighthouse in the desert, incredibly bright, but no fu*king use to anyone.
I dedicate that to the people i met in my time who couldn’t wash, wake up on time, always say why and were just generally an admin vortex. All spread over the three services and all had a hat full of qualifications.
(mainly crabs though) ;-)
APATS,
The much admired Lt Gen Sir John McColl was the Chief of Staff of 1st (UK) Armd Div at the time (94-96). When he left, he was lunched out of the Mess on a very boozy Friday, an event that overran by a dozen hours and became a dining out. He was at some point asked to make a speech, which he did.
At the tag end of his speech, he offered some insights and advice to his Divisional staff officers. I was surprised to discover that in his view, I was the one officer who in his career to whom he had awarded the most extra duties (probably guilty, M’Lud), but who had provided him with the most enjoyment in commanding and – shining point in my career, such as it was – was the “one officer in this Headquarters whom I can rely upon the take the Queen’s bayonet to the Queen’s enemy, and stick it violently into his stomach, no questions asked”. There’s not much higher praise, at least not in my book.
He also advised me to “get married to a good girl, and settle down”. I found myself in some confusion and doubt as to what a “good girl” was, because my definition of “good” probably was not the DS answer, unless the DS valued sexual athleticism, a private income, and an attractive sister as an insurance policy. Anyway, as John McColl would have predicted, I didn’t take his advice.
APATS,
True enough about horsemen but the difficulty with James, maroon in the plural though is trou may be, singular though the brain cell in the pewter regimental decanter made with captured French tableware melted down after Dettingen may be, I’d still pay a fucking mint for the man’s memoirs.
James,
Well, I do know that a particularly, ahem, colourful version of “The Foreskin Fusiliers” was popular among the green death I’ve known, with reference to your old service. And I once charmed my wife (a red-haired half-Texan, half-Glaswegian whose immigrant dad was a USAF colonel — another skein in my often transatlantic life) with a top-to-bottom of “The ****ing Great Wheel” while we were first seeing one another; “Bestiality’s Best” is also a favourite from uni rugby — the gnu is a remarkable animal :) Your comments about Wales are apposite, especially the last one. As a statistical sample I offer a now-Old Bristolian law student gone on to work for an NGO. But in no way would I be able to reach the verve of prose in recollection as you did with your RAF lawyer. I believe we have now hit on the new recruiting campaign for the Royal Armoured Corps. It could lift all, ahem, boats, even the Chav Cav :)
And that father-in-law of mine, who spent his career as an air-rescue and special ops heli pilot (chiefly on the old Huey, which from a few joyrides I can tell you really is five thousand parts “flying in close formation,” I do not envy the ride with the uppity Puma drivers), holds precisely the same view of the fast-jet boys. Just sayin’.
All of which is to say that, when I showed up to comment about efficient use of ship space and LIMS for RM battlegroups opening and holding beachead for a follow-on (think we’re all on the same page in the hymnal with JC/Canberra) and to bang on again about my prescription for junking the MRB in favour of something like the Yanks’ Marine Expeditionary “Brigades” (commanded by a 2* which rather gives the game away.) Then it turned out to be far more interesting listening to James hold court and APATS deliver some well-deserved stick. (“On” a ship indeed. Yes that was another thread but really ….) I will say that any future Opfor confronted by RFA Fergie plowing into the short end of the white sand should be proper *****ing themselves. Perhaps this is an excellent opportunity to bring back ship’s figureheads. That should about do it at a stroke ….
Also, from my (mostly) dear old sapper granddad, now of blessed memory (switched off gently by a massive stroke at ninety-bleeding-five a couple of years ago, hope I got those genes) from a simpler time:
“There once was a barmaid from Sale,
on her chest tattooed prices of ale;
whilst on her behind,
for the aid of the blind,
was precisely the same
but in Braille.”
An elegant limerick from a more civilised age, as Alec Guinness once almost said :)
It looks like Canada’s patience with the F-35 programme may be about to run out.
http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/story/2012/04/02/f35-auditor-general-report.html
Thanks clinch,
They would not be setting up an independent Programme Office if they wanted to cancel at this stage (it being within the Dept of Public Works is probably for being used to count in bn’s rather than anything else).
No wonder the pre-meeting to the partners’ meeting in Australia was held in the Canadian embassy in DC, not the likeliest place without special circumstances…
What is the score now
– Norway to put the proposal to their Parliament
– Australia holding back (from any more than the two on firm order)…I won’t mention the UK (we’ve got three!)
– Israel getting theirs from the USAF slots reallocation, to speed it up
– Japan negotiating by refusing to renegotiate
Anything else? BTW, the unconfirmed new US under-sec signed a purchase order for all the three types, so the Italians informing their Parliament about the $80m recurring manufacturing cost for the “A” were making a pre-announcement beyond the LRIP batches (LM would need to absorb any difference)
@ACC
You mentioned Japan there. This is another piece I read, speculating on what the Japanese should do about F-35. Within the piece it says, “From a rational perspective, the JSF program (if it continues) might produce a cost-effective fighter-bomber that Japan can make use of, somewhere in the mid 2020s, but that is far too late to replace the F-4 Phantoms.”
If that is the case is the UK realistically going to have two emty carriers floating around until the mid 2020s?
http://www.japantoday.com/category/opinions/view/japan-and-the-f-35-what-to-do
Hi clinch,
Quite a nice but general overview article you linked to. Boeing tried to tap into this aspect of it with Japan “Factor in the announcement that Mitsubishi Heavy Industries will assemble a full-scale test model of the ATD-X as the basis for the fifth-generation Shinshin fighter, and future considerations become complex indeed” by offering to transfer the line for the aircraft that exists in one prototype, over to Japan lock, stock and barrel.
It still is the reason why Japan wants F-35s and wants them plenty quick. Not because there is an imminent threat, but to learn enough to be able to polish their own stealth jet and start producing it before the domestic industry goes totally moribound.
Thanks ACC
I’m still wondering what the UK is going to do if that article is correct in its assessment that F-35 will not be available until the mid-2020s.
@Clinch: I wonder if India would let us build some STOL LCA Tejas fighter jets… :) BAE could pimp the avionics / sensors and RR the engine and hey presto we can sell it back…
http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120331/DEFREG02/303310001/Pentagon-Confident-F-35-Buy-Schedule?odyssey=mod_sectionstories
To put the 1.5tr value into perspective it’s like asking the raf in 1957 to tell us how much it will cost to buy maintain operate and keep up to date the entire 2000a/c hawker hunter fleet in 2012 and in 2012 year prices. It’s a nonsense number.
The f35b marine corp IOC software package is planned to fly this year. Canada IOC will depend on when it buys planes. If it pull out more workshare for those that stay.
@Mark
Looking at the the variant costs in that report, if the UK does switch back to the B variant for the carriers, I wonder whether there may be a temptation to offset the higher price tag for the B by buying A for the RAF.
Clinch
Certainly a possibility I guess. More likely they’ll balance the ship convertion cost emals buy ect against the price difference between b and c
One thing that may be significant re the cost of the various F35S is that Cameron has asked the Treasury to check the numbers. The MoD is no doubt looking at just it’s own budget, trying to balance it, can’t, and saying that buying a handful of F35Bs is what can be paid for out of the kitty. The Treasury meanwhile can look at the overall cost/benefit to HMG i.e. take into account the Corporation Tax revenue from BAE/RR/Cobham/Smiths etc. from the whole F35 project. The RAF once said all the F35s would be free if the tax revenue on the profit share were to be taken into account. Maybe this is what Cameron needs to know before the decision is made? Hence asking the Treasury to work out the true cost/benefit to the country not just to the MoD? Possibly means we might get F35Cs after all otherwise why ask the Treasury to do the numbers?
Waddi
Or it stops the politically damaging leaking( not a peep since it went to the treasuary )and tells the children(mod) to stop fighting amoung themselves.
A good and valid point “The Treasury meanwhile can look at the overall cost/benefit to HMG i.e. take into account the Corporation Tax revenue from BAE/RR/Cobham/Smiths etc. from the whole F35 project. ”
If that wasn’t the point, Treasury could add very little to redoing the project costings (would be on par with the Public Works Dept starting to account for and project F-35 figures in Canada’s procurement of it).
@ACC
Or to put it another way becuase the the “C” costs are capital heavy and front loaded it will bust the MoD cash budget in the 2015-25 period, but looked at longer term is still more cost effective for HMG becuase of fewer planes and cheaper whole life costs.
Remeber this is the same period that Vanguard replacement will be hitting the MoD’s cash budget.
Maybe this is the payoff for Trident coming into the defence budget. Politically Cameron accepts that the MoD will get to spend more cash in 2015-25 than is currently projected, and that this is actually the best value thing to do.
Such a decision needs to come with a Treasury stamp on it so it can be presented as an ‘efficient investment’ rather than a ‘project overspend’.
@ NotABoffin re Container Ship Conversions
Yes I appreciate there are big problems slowing running those large cathedral engines at slower than optimum efficiency. Carbon fouling, over lubing, heat exchanger inefficiency, turbo inefficiency etc. etc. I see the Maersk concept as perhaps a LMSR on the cheap for medium power states like the UK. Unloading at the other end may prove problematic as has been discussed above. There may be scope for a fast ship for replenishment of dry stores of other smaller auxiliaries say out to the CVF group at 25kts and back. Who knows with growing Chinese influence ports may not be open as often to RFAs in the future.
As for working out of containers. I have never seen that as being realistic proposition. On the whole I am not advocate of modular anything. The only way I see conversion working is to build structures in the bays akin to the accommodation modules found in the offshore oil/gas industry. Basically cube shaped ships that can’t float! I see conversion as separating mission from hydrodynamic considerations. As I said above there has to be some saving (even if the savings are lost somewhere else) from fitting equipment into a large regular cube shape than trying to fit the same equipment into a “smaller” volume where the hull (and other considerations) drive how equipment fits. A large container ship obviously swallow the volume of say a T45 with ease; by volume of T45 I mean the accommodation, electronics, etc. not the hull. Obviously the volume within laterals is a bit smaller than overall hull volume.
As for power, fuel, water, and sewage etc. Well I wouldn’t advocate piercing the bulkheads between container bays except for shafts. A ship like Emma Maersk needs about 80Mw which is sizeable power need but not huge. Taking my structure within bay model I don’t see “huge problems” with spreading generators through a huge hull and building an all electric ship. Especially with modern advances in using DC current to transmit electric. And especially if the container ship followed the layout (if not the size, definitely not the size) of the new Triple E with two shafts. Of course this arrangement takes care of running cathedrals slow. Similarly if the engines/gen sets are plumbed in to existing ships tanks and voids I don’t see too much problem in moving fuels about. And if other fuels are needed surely they are safe in a specialist tank in a module high up in a huge ship than just being a few feet away in a small hull.
As for damage control and survivability. I don’t think there is a such a thing as an unsinkable ship. But as I have said above spreading power production through a big hull must help. The size must help too not just for buoyancy but allowing fires to be tackled from more than one direction. Size also means you can have larger pumps too for fire fighting; bigger compressors for BA air. Having separate modules would stop the spread of smoke; discrete damage control systems in each module such as sprinklers. I will spare you my whackier ideas such as filling the bottom three/four tiers with empty TEU containers filled with oil drums and foam or aerocrete.
Hi PE,
I think you are hitting these budget perversions (if they are “nails”) on the head:
“becuase the the “C” costs are capital heavy and front loaded it will bust the MoD cash budget in the 2015-25 period”
– B, despite being more expensive, does not carry that £ 1 – 1.8 bn extra overhead to get started
” Trident coming into the defence budget. Politically Cameron accepts that the MoD will get to spend more cash in 2015-25 than is currently projected, and that this is actually the best value thing to do.”
– I think that will be fudged over one more Parliament (why is the V-boat life extension kept so well under wraps?)
– if he won’t get re-elected… well, not his worry then
The real squeeze (Crowding out) will be in the ’20s, when the Vanguard replacement construction starts (if it will; maybe we’ll get quite different boats for the long lead items, which are not insignificant in cost, on top of the design costs)
And, yes, 25 % cheaper over the life F-35 operating costs… may be, may be not; I don’t think that study is in the Public Domain
Now Treasury can’t hold on to the staff with financial skills, they have the youngest average of any department (and that showed in the handling of the Banking Crisis; could show again someone just doing the spreadsheets. Compare: One dept says we’ll have to get the banks hold more capital. The other dept says: we’ll have to get the banks lending more to smaller – riskier – corporates. Policy making politico says: Great ideas – that’s the policy then, without detecting any contradiction)
– let’s just wait and see
Or he hopes to win the 2015 election outright. Once those pesky LibDems are out of the picture Trident decisions can become a lot simpler.
“- if he won’t get re-elected… well, not his worry then”
Or, one of those pesky LibDems [if he does not win outright, and will have to deliver on defence] forced his hand, and therefore “had to” go for just a couple of tubes behind the sail
– btw, the Americans are going to do some of that, so don’t worry about writing off all [of our part of] the cost for the CLC design
ACC @ 12.48
What is the cost pa of the ongoing Astute programme?
When it – finally – comes to the replacement of Trident what are we hoping to achieve?
Polaris was a cut and shut job on a SSN.
Surely the next SSBN should be a cut and shut job on the Astute Mk2?
All this talk of big budgets is a self fulfilling prophecy.
Efficieny and economy go out the window and it becomes organised theft from the working class.
More and more – Aldermaston to the fore – it just looks like a make work scheme for nice middle class chaps and chapesses in the south east.
For the sake of reference. Ocean: 830 troops, “40 vehicles” whatever that means in linear metres (pro rata 298), 4 LCVP, 6 heli spots.
2x LPDs: 256 troops, 500 linear metres (described as 67 vehs), 4 LCU, 4 LCVP, 2 heli spots.
3x LSD(A): 356 troops, 1150 linear metres, space for 1 LCU or 2 LCVP, space for 2 Mexeflotes, 2 heli spots.
3450 linear metres in the Bays; 1000 in the 2 LPDs; 298 in the LPH for 4,748 in the amphibious ships. (Pity about that Bay!)
16,500 in the six Points, if you can find means to unload them.
ACC @ 12.48 – Mk2
You repeat a common misconception regarding political direction towards the banking sector.
The two issues you raise are not contradictory.
When then Global Credit Crunch kicked in the private sector started to hoard cash where it could.
That meant for the able bank borrowings went down and bank deposits went up.
That is where the increased capital levels from the bank should have come from.
Regarding banks they follow herd instinct and raise their criteria for new borrowing and shakedown the existing loan book to call in loans / reduce overdrafts and generally cause mass murder among the lame.
It is this second part that was on the agenda for the politicians, they were trying to stop the banks adding to an already bad situation.
The banks are only looking after themselves but their actions will just make things worse as the paradox of thrift goes corporate.
@ ACC – “Or, one of those pesky LibDems [if he does not win outright, and will have to deliver on defence] forced his hand, and therefore “had to” go for just a couple of tubes behind the sail”
Might be a good result, a twelve boat fleet based on classes of four might provide a much healthier industry for design and manufacture of submnarines.
@ FBOT
Eekk! I always thought they were somewhere near you… what am I going to do now, RE
“More and more – Aldermaston to the fore – it just looks like a make work scheme for nice middle class chaps and chapesses in the south east.”
Hi Jedi,
Indeed “Might be a good result, a twelve boat fleet based on classes of four ”
– how dis you arrive at the first four? Might be more than that, the Yanks have been at it for a decade and are a decade away from launching the first (of the new design)
– and this would redeem the old sins, designing very big (and therefore expensive boats) if we do
move from two-tier to one tier fleet, with some diffrences in the spec
Alex @ 2.04
Figures from before suggest a mobile / medium brigade needs 6000LM’s for all their kit so we are a little bit out for an all in one lift.
That is one issue but another for me is the ship to shore element – wil 6 LCUs be able to deliver this equipment in a reasonable time?
I think they have 22/24LMs each so we could be looking at 200 ‘ish round trips or 35 each which would keep them honest for 2 days with double crews?
The PasCat should help but I think we are a bit light on heavy ship to shore.
Interested to see how much a Bay can handle.
To get 1150LM’s out of that hull it must be on two levels.
Any idea the width of a military Lane-Metre – 3.5m to handle the width of a Warrior.
Civil LM’s are 2.3/2.5m for cars and 3.0/3.3m for trucks.
Working some my numbers on this weeks great idea – SPAB
Self Propelled Assault Barge to the great unwashed.
Looking at 2200m2 cargo deck space so 750LM’s with a basic spec.
This can be improved if hoist able decks are installed to take the LRs and the PGs.
Isn’t that Ocean’s overload figure?
@ AAC – my statements are predicated on having a single SSN/SSBN hybrid type with four tubes (Common Missile Compartment) aft of the sail.
Follow DK Browns advice of classes of four for maximise technological efficiency.
Have twelve boats with a 24 year service life to have a new design every 8 years (DIS).
Hi Jedi,
You should have said so…
So “my statements are predicated on having a single SSN/SSBN hybrid type with four tubes (Common Missile Compartment) aft of the sail”
how many of the Astutes as well, before switching over… to keep the whole thing ticking
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/defense/index.jsp?plckController=Blog&plckScript=blogScript&plckElementId=blogDest&plckBlogPage=BlogViewPost&plckPostId=Blog%3a27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post%3a77626f47-3e4e-4a75-99be-604b211bdf73
Bet the F18E/F is looking more and more attractive….
x: yes, it turns out.
Hybrid SSN/SSBNs. Worst idea ever.
@ Alex
You have to be careful about having too many Royals in one place at one time. Beer fights, appalling renditions of Zulu Warrior, and they have an odd propensity to take their clothes and fight with rolled up kip mats. Nothing to do with Ocean’s size……… :)
@ ACC – “how many of the Astutes as well, before switching over… to keep the whole thing ticking”
However many as needed before CMC becomes available…….?
@ Phil – “Hybrid SSN/SSBNs. Worst idea ever.”
I have a problem, it goes like this:
1. to maintain an industry that can design [and] manufacture nuclear submarines we need to have a new design every eight years and to order a new submarine every eighteen months to two years.
2.1 since we can’t afford to do a new design for every boat we have to find an optimum that allows us to maintain design currency, but SSBN massively distorts spending profile and thus finely balanced sword-edge upon which we wobble.
2.1 since we can’t afford to maintain a large fleet of nuclear boats we are forced to either massively extend the drumbeat of manufacture…… or retire boats well before their time to make way for new ones.
3. With a ~11 boat fleet, the combination of trying to fit loads of new designs into a manufacture pipeline that stretches out boats over years means it is almost impossible to keep a viable submarine industry.
Now, one answer is to say; “lets scrap nuclear submarines then!” However, the SDSR mandates a submarine based nuclear deterrent and SSN’s, and the DIS mandates submarines as a strategic industry, so how do we square this circle?
DK brown likes classes of four.
12 boats = three classes of four.
give them a 24 year service life and you have one popping out every two years and a new design every eight.
It is efficient given that we exist on the very extreme margins of what is a viable industry!
How would you square the circle?
Jedi
I would square the circle by doing the following:
Is the deterrent a vital national defence asset?
If so, invest in PROPER SSBNs and accept cuts elsewhere. It is either vital, or it is not.
If not, get rid of it. Gone. No need for it.
Imagine one of those hybrids stalking the Belgrano…
And also, in general, I like the old RN concept of flotilla’s. I think we should be building incrementally improved vessels at a steady state, say one every 18 months. Obviously every now and then you’d need a fresh sheet of paper but that fresh sheet could still build on previous work. Each ship would be slightly different but I believe that that is the case now and since we are down to so few ships I can’t see it being a massive problem.
Would keep industry going, would reduce risk and we’d have better and better vessels.
A utopian idea?!
Freeze the designs. Sack the designers. Keep building Astutes and Vanguards with very minor evolutions for ever.
“How would you square the circle?”
My background is risk management & speciality global projects. A few brief observations. Context is all. As international big ticket projects go, there is little evidence that we in the UK are any worse than our international brothers. Not saying UK MOD procurement is good, just that globally it is piss poor. Are there reasons for this? Yes, inter-service rivalry, political expediency/short termism and poor project (buyer) expertise. Re the F-35 program & carriers. Obviously, from a risk management perspective 1 carrier is stupid. Either have 2 operational carriers or none (not rocket science!). Re the F-35 program. We will buy F-35, as we are level 1 partners. Just a matter of which one’s. Street common sense suggests that the US Navy/marines are impressed with the Harrier for a reason. And this is not a natural tendency. Ergo it must be an effective piece of kit, as opposed to something which looks good on paper (like the raptor). This together with the old adage, don’t put all your eggs in one basket, would suggest that we should buy both the F-35B and the F-35C, with the concomitant flexibility. My humble opinion
@Phil, nothing wrong with a hybrid design. I agree that mixing nuclear and conventional roles would have to be treated carefully… Israel has conventional subs with nuclear tipped cruise missiles…
I personally think 8 is the appropriate number for a single warship design split into 2 batches. 8 T45 + 8 T26 is a perfect example – with a 2 year drumbeat giving an expected operational life of approx 30 years.
The MHPC should also be 16 split over two designs, as with a larger patrol boats to replace the P2000’s and Scimitars.
I think it is important to start with a clean piece of paper every 15 years or so, otherwise you are not necessarily getting the best of experience or technology. What would you prefer a T45 or an evolved T42?
I know that all subs want to be quiet, but is quietness not the main design driver for a SSBN? Bugger all point in spending £50 billion on a deterrent if it rattles like a sardine can and can be detected by Russia or China.
I can imagine that differing use purposes for SSN and SSBN may also change a number of other design factors. SSNs need to have fantastic ISTAR to go hunting, may need to move very fast, adjust depth rapidly etc. SSBNs need to appear invisible, move very slowly or dive extremely deep to sit on the bottom for weeks on end not moving, etc
(I have no idea about submarine operations – I may be just deluding myself as to how they work. And please no one let any secrets out of the bag)
Hi Repulse, a no-brainer:
“What would you prefer a T45 or an evolved T42?”
And the thirty year life… carrier 40-50, being just the hull
But how would see it (T26 announcement, following on from the November decisions just to arrive):
– Once that’s done, RN frozen out to 2035 (save for MHPC or TD’s SIMMS…or a mix, I can get the letters in the right order for the latter more easily}
@ James
Where the SSBNs go the bottom is far, far too deep for them to sit on the bottom by a long way.
X,
I’ve always thought it takes a special kind of person to work on an SSBN. Ignoring all qualms about what it is there to do (“Armageddon and My Part In It” presumably being the autobiography title), the thought of just drifting around incredibly slowly for months on end would drive me nuts.
Unlike SSNs where they can practice attacking ships or firing torpedoes or evading helicopters, all of which sounds like fun, the SSBN crew just concentrate on hiding. They don’t even know if anyone is actually looking for them to put a little frisson in the air. I imagine that once a day they get some message to say “no nukes needed today”, but apart from that, just drifting around. I imagine they have some champion chess players and Sudoku ninjas, because I really can’t imagine what else they do. The boat is probably pretty bulled up though, as even polishing brightwork is more interesting than looking a the ceiling.
I do realise that I have probably traduced generations of SSBNers, but really, what do they do all day, apart from just be there?
…although I suspect that when the British and French SSBNs bumped into each other, completely unaware of each other’s presence, there was a rare uplift in the excitement level.
@James: So to give the submariners something to do, maybe there are some (passive) something-ographic sensors could be fitted to the next generation of SSBNs? And the National Environmental Resources Council, DEFRA or such like could pick up part of the bill. Worth a try surely.
@ James
Well think of it this way. I think “driving” 16,000t of boat at up to 25kts blind relying on wizard’s box of gubbins and little pings to tell you where you are with a few dozen nuclear warheads sitting on big tubes filled with rocket fuel sitting amidships, a nuclear reactor, and a few hundred kilos of HE in the bow probably occupies there mind enough.
My favourite myth is that bomber sailors have to allow their eyesight to re-adjust after a patrol because they have only had to focus on things close by. That and there is only plastic cutlery, plastic glasses and mugs, and paper plates aboard so if somebody goes mad they can’t be used as weapons…… :)
TD et al – The SeaBase Booster Club
Regarding getting stuff off the Points and onto the beach, struggling to get my idea of 2 x SPABs @ 170m each plus 100m of Mexflote / causeway to shore to work on shallow beaches.
Lucky to have 5-6m draught at the end of the “pier” plus the Point would have to reverse in to get its stuf off.
Consequently the SPAD is looking very good for a low cost tank / APV humper but not as a “Point” unloading system.
Consequently how can we do a SeaBase quickly, effectively and efficiently?
I suggest by using a 2nd hand oil tanker.
Big, stable, cheap and readily available in varying sizes.
Fully ballasted they have a low freeboard allowing vehicles to be driven on and off easily and quickly while the deckspace would allow vehicles to be stored until needed.
As always a lot of angle iron engineering / getting all medieval with a blow … will be needed to get the vehicles on and off as both the “Points” and the “Bays” appear to have only limited transfer facillities.
Looking at some sort of hinged wharf / loading ramp attached to the hull sides to be lowered down when in SeaBase mode.
However the size of the oil tankers available – 150K tons dwt – means that there is space and stability reserves to build and then use the substantial ramps and causeway contraptions mentioned above to allow a speedy transfer in both directions.
One question is size – Large or jumbo?
Large = 150K tons dwt: 275m x 48m x 16m draught / 22m depth.
Does 14 knots @ 55 tons per day.
Jumbo = 300K tons dwt: 330m x 60m x 21m draught / 29m depth.
Does 15 knots @ 75 tons per day.
Interestingly can produce steam – lots from a big kettle and some from an exhaust gas economiser.
Finally the huge size of these vesels and the deck space available means that any number of tasks can be assigned to them.
Aux oil tankers / replenishment vessels – use 10% of their existing capabilities.
Multiple decks – some for vehicles / the top one for aircraft / Helos.
This would just be a “mild Steel” prototype.
Q+D conversion to prove out the concept.
The production version would use the VLCC platform / component set / build economics but would be optomised for the job in hand –
Multiple shafts / multiple engines – 18 knots.
1 shaft / LSD @ 25MW + 2 pods / MSD @ 12.5MW each?
Superstucture / bridge – better scale and positioning.
Better vehicle handling arrangments – cut down hull aft / built in ramps?
More streamlined hull / bow profile for 18 knots.
Optimum size – 360m x 54m x 18m draught / 24m depth?
Home port it to Loch Long as Portsmouth would have a nervous breakdown.
Space for CATOBAR arrangements / phone number of a SAAB salesman?
Well deck arrangements / drive through amidships?
Consequently any thoughts?
Has this idea in this manner been discussed before?
Welcome to TD KingRio
@FBOT
You have gone American!
I asked for a simple, cheap way of getting vehicles off a Point and onto a beach. You have designed a swiss army knife naval ninja citadel. All that is missing is vertical launch tubes for ballistic missiles.
@James’s RFA Fergie would probably meet the spec.
Buying 1 big flo-flo ship from Dockwise would probably work too. It would sit at Marchwood until required then be used to deliver 24 extra PASCATS on demand. The beauty is that after you offload the Pascats you simply de-ballast the ship again and use the deck as a giant pontoon to cross deck the vehicles from a line of Points on one side to the PASCATS on the other.
No medieval engineering or mild steel prototypes required.
PE @ 9.59
Agree on the need for a very large Dockwise vessel.
Big enough to get Nellie or Dumbo home is they come a cropper would be my standard to work with.
However struggling to understand how it all fits in regarding the big issue of Point to Shore logstics.
What type would it be – Mighty Lifter or Yacht Express?
Where would it sit – 20 / 40 / 80 / 160 / 320 kms offshore?
My thoughts were 240kms at least away from the coast as the ship would be very vulnerable when static.
How does the Point offload as is – side door onto Dockwise?
What would be the freeboard of all this / sea state capabilities?
I think it is a very nifty solution, the Dockwise technology is very versatile and capable but I think that it is too specialised and limited for this basic task.
However if it was the only way to get a large Dockwise ship into the RFA then it might be worth it.
Finally the cost of a Dockwise style vessel?
What will the going rate be for a PasCat?
10 yr old tankers are under $20mill at the moment.
SPAB’s looking cheaper by the day if the dumb sections come from a Chinese barge yard or we steal their design and give it to the Roumanians.
Just in case you haven’t heard about it,
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/The-US-Navys-Mobile-Landing-Platform-Ships-06525/
They have some on order. Ring them quick and they might build you a pair.
This is what you are after,
http://img708.imageshack.us/img708/2296/mlpimage01.jpg
I was thinking something the basic shape of ‘Transporter’ but we should ask NaBoffin which one they usually hire for ship recovery and buy that. Save some hire fees at any rate.
Operational concept is to stop as close to the coast as possible to keep the Pascat shuttle runs short and the offload tempo high. Remeber we chose an undefended beach and ‘Wave 1’ of ninja-bootnecks has already gone ashore. We have both T45 Sea Viper and Carrier Air Cover to protect us from incoming.
Points appear to use a great big stern ramp so mode of operation after arriving off the beach is as follows:
1. Anchor ship. Ballast up and lauch Pascats
2. De-ballast.
3. Points line up along the sea side and drop their stern ramps onto the deck.
4. Pascats line up along the shore side and do likewise.
5. Offload Brigade to shore as quick as possible.
6. Pick up Pascats and sail away.
As regarding sea state I have 2 basic working assumptions: (1) the bigger the dockwise ship the more stable it will be and (2) Landing craft are supposed to be propper seaworthy vessels so should be able to cope with more than a Mexe can. Not scientific but there you are. If the sea is a bit rough you could take 1 Point at a time to minimise the risk of them smashing into each other. Presumably you moor them to bollards on the dockwise ship to make the whole contraption a bit more stable. Really need a sailor to tell us how to do that bit.
Yeah, just like the MLPs the Americans are building.
One of those please!
OK – so the gold plated USN version is $500 million and carries just 3 landing craft.
Ours needs to cost a fraction that and carry two dozen Pascats. Other than that its pretty much the same idea.
@ Phil – “Imagine one of those hybrids stalking the Belgrano…”
If you keep an active nuclear deterrent then no, the boat with the sunshine stalks nobody, that is a tasking issue with appropriate doctrine to follow.
“If so, invest in PROPER SSBNs and accept cuts elsewhere. It is either vital, or it is not.”
I’m happy to agree, let me know when you have convinced the Treasury that the distortion in Defence spending is worth it. This may seem academic to debate, not so much when we are questioning whether we want conventional power-projection [or] a nuclear deterrent.
@ Peter – “Freeze the designs. Sack the designers. Keep building Astutes and Vanguards with very minor evolutions for ever.”
While fun to imagine, it does not meet the stated requirement of a submarine industry as a strategic asset.
@ Repulse – “I personally think 8 is the appropriate number for a single warship design split into 2 batches.”
Happy to be argued otherwise, but is an eight year design schedule meet the needs of super hi-tech submarines, and even if it did is it a viable answer for a navy that can support twelve boats at most? You’d need nucelar subs with a twelve year service life to meet the eight year design schedule……….?
I thought these Pascats were of a similar size to the LCU Mk10? If I remember properly one LCAC needs the same space as 4 LCU. That second ship image I posted could in theory carry 24 Pascat. And what is $500million about £330million. That’s about 6 F35. Cheap as chips.
@ Peter Elliott,
I like your thinking, so long as we can still call them the Princess class in memory of RFA Fergie who’s had her 24 hours of glory on TD now. Still think she’s a brilliant concept though.
I think you’d need to consider some tactical and technical issues, while still trying to fit into the 24 hour timeline. Tactically, you probably don’t want everything in Points all crowded up together, and technically, you are probably only going to have 2 lanes on the beach, not half a dozen.
Still doable within 24 hours I think. The key will be how many wagons these PACSATs can take at once, whether they need chocking and chaining (1/2 hour job for Challenger on a Bundesbahn flat car, 15 minutes for the Warrior or below wagons), or is it all combat risk and rock and roll? Plus distance to the beach, and amount of time spent ramping up / down at either end.
You’d want to get your armour ashore quickly to beef up the battalion(s) that got helicoptered ashore, but no logistics. Then the forward repair teams and a medical centre, then the infantry logistics for 24 hours, then the armour logistics, etc. At some point the RMP are going to want to send some people ashore so they can wave glowsticks at disembarking vehicles and helpfully point the way up the beach (clue, it is higher than the water and in front of you).
Loggie staff officers love planning those sorts of inane details (used to bore me to tears), then changing their mind about some specific wagon and asking for a complete unload followed by a reload in a slightly different order, to which the answer was normally “poke off” and the loggies whining about G3 snobs.
On a serious point, if we ever did this for real in say a Falklands 2 campaign, you’d need to get the load on order sorted before leaving Marchwood. Can’t do it at sea unless the Points have got some sort of internal hoist and slidey overhead crane to move stuff around.
PE @ 11.17
Forced landings – some level of opposition some way above Somali yahoo mentalists so there is a threat out there.
Stir in the naval S-S discussion of the weekend with Mach 3 swarm attacks, 700kg warheads and 300km ranges and the possibility of using torpedoes from fixed positions on the coast means that I have a different starting point.
The SeaBase is the connector between ocean going civil based transport – “Points” + STUFT – and the more capable RFA ships with specific Amphib and defence capabilities to take the cargo to the shore or near shore.
Consequently keep this point of transition out of harms way as much as possible – 160 / 240 / 320kms from the coast.
The weak link in all of this is not the SeaBase itself – heavily ballasted with water / lots of marine grade plate / few systems onboard / lots of CIWS + A/M stuff – but the “Points” and STUFT vessels which will be under pressure in a high threat environment.
Plus the low speed / dead stop transfer then takes place close to the shore making them all more vulnerable during this element of the operation.
On the Wave Scale this would be Wave 4, in nthe big scheme of things to aid a tactical move away from the coast.
Wave – = MI6 / Active and Passive.
Wave 0 = Insertion / Underwater knife fighters.
Wave 1 = Helos / Ground based knife fighters.
Wave 2 = Armour + Mobile.
Wave 3 = Bulk + Heavy.
Wave 4 = Resupply and Reinforce – We are going to a Dance.
Regarding LCU / PasCat lift I have suggested that a number of non amphib assets have a well deck for flexibility. This would allow various Colonial Sloops and Global Cruisers to carry a selection of smaller specialised vessels closer to the action.
That would mean that we had more than 6 of these units to start with as this I think is the bottleneck with our existing forces.
Finally what level of opposition would make a brigade Amphib operation not possible or the casualty level too high?
Mach 1 land based naval S-S, Mach 2, Mach 3?
X @ 11.48
One LCAC = 2 x LCU / PasCat.
Similar lengths, totally different widths.
Thanks FBOT,
two or four (for the same dimensions) is a huge difference.
Gareth Jones posted a link to a good study of the connector efficiency (US Naval College) that showed LCAC as vastly superior, also giving a true over-the-horizon capability to reduce vulnerability
– don’t be fooled by the concepts (x had two nice links); in the real world it has been deleted from the MLPs
@Jedi, I meant surface ships when suggesting batches of 8. I agree, we should have 12 SSN (inc SSGN-N hybrids) for a viable drumbeat of submarine building.
understood, and naturally agreed.
@ FBOT
I realised I used the wrong number when I posted. I was thinking about the San Antonio’s having 2 LCAC. So my 2 LCAC became 4 LCU and so on. It was late.
Going back to RFA Fergie, ro-ro ferries normally have large and wide vehicle decks that run side-side and through the whole ship. sometimes there is a central wall so you get left and right decks, but they are still long.
Could we not have some form of pre-assembled pontoon for about 70-100 metres? Carried in the vehicle deck, ready to go. I’m thinking some form of bastard love child of a line of M3s and a Bailey bridge. When Fergie rams the beach, then spool that little baby out of the front. That would give you some useful extra extension.
Did you not google Newport class LST when I said?
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/8d/US_Navy_960329-N-8167A-050_LST_taking_on_U.S._Marines_and_hardware.jpg
James @ 9.13
I have had similar thoughts on this to span the 50-100m gap from the SPAB to the beach @ 0.5m deep.
My issue is not so much where would you put it but how would you move it, what span / section length would be involved and how would you get it out the bow doors?
The longer the span / section length the heavier it will be and the more awkward it will be to get out the bow doors.
Another alternative I came up with was a “Wagon Train” arrangement of wheeled sections of varying deck height towed out of the vehicle deck and over the ships own internal ramp by some sort of amphib tractor / bulldozer.
The last section has a backward facing ramp to link to the ships ramp while the tractor unit just unhooked and makes itself useful by building a track in the sand to aid the exit of the cargo.
I think there must be a nifty answer out their somewhere.
Failing that and it is the trad solution of pushing a 50m’ish mexeflote style pontoon up the beach and get used to 0.75 / 1.0m deep wading.
@ FBOT,
you need a BARV, or perhaps 2. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BARV There’s some words in that article about “tractive force”, which to me imply dragging ability in sand.
A pair of those, plus some medieval engineering, and some ideas cribbed from X’s Newport picture a couple of posts above, and your hydraulic legs at the back for some post beaching stability, and I think that RFA Fergie is back in consideration.
I expect the real Fergie will be getting excited as she reads this crowd-sourced solution, and expecting an invitation to the re-launch. She’ll be wanting her toes to be sucked next.
Waggon train? What you want then is a combination of
M3 and LARC-LX…….
http://snas.nbcuni.com/content/public/7/6/d/9/1e47841b40d2c33f619bc23f52d240dd/garage/1e68941f40d2c3417804a31ca07a6759.jpg
http://img1.afv-news.com/2012/02/HF071G.jpg
@x: I did, but I don’t think it fits the requirement. I’m certainly looking at a way of rapidly installing a temporary 200m jetty to which a vanilla ro-ro could unload over. Beaching LST’s are fine for the cargo they carry, but we need a more generous solution for the Points and STUFT.
I shall look into some form of mini MV Resolution that could act as the fixed end of the jetty. Next step: look for some form of temporary breakwater to protect ro-ro without station keeping equipment while unloading. Giant HESCO filled with the aid of an air lift dredge mounted on the platform perhaps?
This must be a fun company to work for,
http://seatruk.com/index2.ivnu
If you look carefully at one of X’s links to the US concepts, you will see
-“Giant HESCO filled with” three of these bouncy balls on deck
– and next to them, the same sort of thing that the previous class used to have permanently fixed to the bow
@wf
There is a reason why amphibious ships are complex don’t you know? ;) :)
That is why I favour LASH.
To help deliberations along this is from Gabby’s site,
http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.co.uk/2011/05/point-class-ro-ro-ships-getting-forces.html
@x: lets buy one of those, put a promenade deck on top with a bar, and ferry commuters up the Thames :-)
@ACC: interesting
X @ 9.55
To be picky I think that the Newport is a Wave 2 – vehicles direct to beach type of vessel.
The ramp can only span a horizontal distance of 30m and looks very 1950s to me.
My thoughts are that a modern day equivalent would be all hydraulics and folding sections.
From what little I know about our equipment and capabilities our Wave 2 effort is LCUs from Bays.
My thoughts on a SPAB – Wave 3 – equipment direct to a prepared beach would need to be better than the capabilities of a Newport. Specifically more stable – jack up legs, ballasting plus water scouring bow – and greater volumes and the ability to link together to form a pier.
Wave 4 – This would be point class cargos “SeaBase’d” onto Bays / SPABs for short term force expansion / reinforcement using the existing Wave 2 + 3 capabilities.
Wave 5 – This would be medium term cargo handling on the beach.
All jack up rigs and dredging to get the Points / STUFT directly unloading onto a pre-fabricated pier.
Wave 6 – Captured port.
Please note that Wave 10 is part of the EU’s Economic Assistance Area – full 6 lane motorway with its own “E” number direct from Rotterdam / Brussels to the capital.
I am confused then. You want to unload Points at sea for the assault phase?
@x
Looking realistically at the UK budget I think the number of ‘waves’ FBOT outlines are a luxury for us.
I think we can afford no more than 2.5 actual fighting waves:
Wave 1 – as many bootnecks as will fit on Albion
Wave 1.5 – the balance of a Commando Group from Bays
Wave 2 – A medium brigade from 3 Points
The job of the RM Commando is to secure the beach and surrounding high ground to make it safe-ish for the Points to approach and unload.
I think we can make the case for EITHER ‘RFA Fergie’
OR a ‘cheapo MLP’ type sea transfer platfrom but not both.
Always keep hold of the force multipliction argument. 1 RFA to enable 6 Points. That’s the sort of maths needed to get past HM Treasury.
X @ 11.04
Is that comment aimed at me?
Trying to speedily catch up with all this army power projection stuff.
I though we don’t have enough lift to get a full brigades worth of kit onto what we have –
Aviation ship / Albion / Bay x 2.
That is why I put forward the SPAB as a low cost force multiplier carrying stuff direct to beach in Wave 3 after the initial assault.
The next step is how do we get the Points / STUFT vessels involved and how do we get their equipment onto the beach. Not sure what will be on the Points / STUFT – reinforcements / 2nd brigade / supplies / support? – but we need to get it ashore.
I think FBOT is worried the Points will get Exoceted if they come too close to shore.
I say if that happens CVF and T45s have not done their job right.
@ Peter E
I know what he is driving at. I thought he wanted to unload the Points on the cheap without a port. If you have got to the stage of unloading big vehicles, even without a port, the closer you are to the beach the better. There is a reason why the Newports were built like that as a way to get heavy vehicles ashore but keeping the hull as far as possible to prevent beaching. The Soviets went the other way and went for small light vehicles that could swim ashore. Further Soviet practice was to drop a kedge anchor on the way in so they could pull themselves off the beach. As a halfway house the USN/USMC used to deploy AAV by driving them off the rear ramp of Newports whilst underweigh straight into the sea. The vehicle would completely submerge and then pop up like a cork.
PE @ 11.15
Using my terminology –
Wave 1 – Helo aided assault.
Wave 2 – LCU / PasCat aided assault.
Repeat until the Amphib group is empty.
The soldiers will empty first as 6 LCUs / PasCats will have their work cut out with the vehicle park onboard.
Wave 3 – SPAB direct to “prepared” beach.
That means the fighting is some way – 2 to 5 Kms – inland and the ships will not be under direct fire allowing them time to attach the Mexeflote pontoon and do a final run in.
Given what others can carry and their spec the SPABs would be cargo heavy / people light.
As noted previously I would keep the Points / STUFT vessels away from the beach until the reinforcements / Support Brigade were doing there stuff.
Catch 22 so that is why we need a “SeaBase”
The issue is them how do we get these capabilities at an affordable cost.
I have offered a SPAB at a target price of £20mill + military comms.
Looking at a 2nd hand VLCC derived prototype / Q+ D “SeaBase” with a budget of £50mill all in.
PE @ 11.19
It is 155mm stuff that I am worried about.
The Bays and the Albion will be so many Kms off shore to lessen the risk.
Ship to shore – fast LCM aka PasCat to help widen the gap while getting stuff ashore.
The SPAB is built to be cheap robust and fairly inert so that 155mm stuff just goes through it till the counter fire sorts out the problem.
One hour run in from the amphib group to the beach including Mexeflote hook-up would need on-shore support so that is why it is Wave 3 and not Wave 2.
How many LCU or Mexeflote or PASCAT could you stow on the upper deck of the Point? Is the answer “give the Points a bigger crane”?
PE @ 11.19
Naval style S-S missile attack – land based / 50 km inland.
Since its Holy Week – Feast of Cana tactics – save the best till last.
Send out the old, the lame, the useless to wear down the AAW stock on the T45.
Then unleash the beast – swarm style, upmarket USSR style big boys to do the damage.
Will they run out of scrap iron before we run out of AAW missiles?
@FBOTs
Or go Chinese and use Ballistic missiles on the ships? Recycle the scrap for cash, just kill the ships right off.
BTW, Harpoon has 120km range, Tomahawk hits the 1k mark. The problem is finding the damn targets.
@ Alex
If you go to that link to Gaby’s page you will a diagram and legend that gives lane meters for the upper deck. The beam measurement is also on that page too. I will leave you to do the arithmetic The crane has a lift of 40t.
Back in WW2 one of the main jobs of the LSTs were to carry LCTs into theatre as deck cargo. To launch them they greased the rails and pushed them over the side. There is a less well known feature film about D-Day and its uses stock documentary footage that shows a LCT being unloaded. Film its self is garbage but worth it for those 20 seconds or so.
Actually, forget I said that, just checked the Wikipedia page for the LCU Mk10. Quite the capability (radius 600nm and 14 days’ independent ops), but 236 tonnes. That’s a ship in its own right.
Has anyone tried ro-roing between the Points and the LCUs (because they’re ro-ro at both ends)?
Oh yes craning stuff over the side at sea isn’t a trivial evolution even if the hull is protected with fenders or mats or what have you.
Observer @ 11.59
Amphib group – how far off the coast do they sit?
Close to aid cargo transfer / Far away for protection.
If you find you have an amphib attack ongoing then finding out where the ships are takes on priority No. 1.
If you have an enemy amphib group 20 / 30 km of your coast I don’t think you will have much trouble finding them.
Follow the LCU / PasCat if you like.
The issue of range then helps the land based forces.
They are to be used for coast defence.
You hide them 100 Kms inland in a warehouse / quarry / derelict school.
The naval force is not going to find them all.
@ Alex re 236t
That is why I mentioned the crane could lift 40t……!!!
That’s what makes a ruddy great flo-flo so attractive.
You can use if BOTH to carry a stack of LCUs into theatre AND as a great big pontoon for unloading at sea.
PE @ 12.17
How much is it going to cost?
How vulnerable is it going to be when all the stuff is transferring?
How far off-shore is it going to sit?
How does the stuff get to the shore?
Transit time and system capacity?
There are of course 2 variabales to sytem capacity: (1) how fast can you shift stuff across the deck from Point onto LCU and (2) how long it take for the LCU to go ashore, unload, return and be ready to laod again. Number (1) will be fairly constant. Number (2) is variable.
The further out to sea you sit the safer you are from big scary missiles and 155mm shells BUT th loner number (2) takes. Given the 24 hour unloading target is fixed the further out you sit the more LCUs you end up needing.
Swings and roundabouts. The staff officers can graph it all out and someone with lots of gold on his unifrom gets to make a ‘squeaky sphincter’ decision on exactly where to drop anchor.
As for cost the Americans are spending USD 500 million on each of their MLPs.
I reckon that you will reckon that we can build a cheap and cheerful version for a lot less.
@ Peter E re stacking LCU
I have had similar whacky ideas too. Two tier dock structure. Ballast down to launch the bottom tier. And then continue until the next deck is submerged and launch those. A couple of things to consider though is one the time it takes to dock down. And two weather and sea conditions whilst the evolution is under way. Could take a while .
When I said ‘a stack’ I didn’t necessarily mean one on top of the other :-)
What I meant was you could carry lots of them compared to a well dock ship.
Lots of them enables you to unload comparatively fast from a comparatively safe position.
a fringe benefit of britain’s participation in the F35 program:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/9185080/Japan-and-Britain-set-to-agree-arms-deal.html
@ Peter E re stacks
Oh right! I again that is why I like the idea of using LASH ships.
@ Jedi
How many tanks can F35 carry to the beach?
PE @ 12.34
I struggle with the MLPS / SeaBase when the ship to shore is handled by a LCM sized vessel of any description.
On the one side you have a Point / STUFT – full sized RO/RO with civil capabilities and capacities – with a LM figure that would make your eyes water.
On the other you have a military system with a very low cargo capacity. It could be a LCU / PacsCat / LCAC or something in between. They don’t mix well to my mind.
Looking at a standard 2 hr cycle time:
LCU = 24 LMs – 70 tons – 10 Kms ship to shore – 120 journeys per Point = 6 units / 40 hours.
PacsCat = 24 LMs – 45/55 tons – 25kms ship to shore – 120 journeys per Point at least = 6 units / 40 hours.
LCAC = 40 LMs – 60 tons – 40 Kms ship to shore – 70 /100 journeys per Point = 6 units / 28 hours.
Big issue here is that they may have the speed but their range is very low so re-fuelling will become an issue.
All this depends on the load, is it size or weight limited.
The distance / cycle times can be mixed and matched to suit circumstances.
Distance offshore is a risk assessment however from the hub of a wind turbine tower you can see a Point at 50-60 Kms so targeting just got easier.
Cheap and cheerful 155mm = 30 Kms +
Upmarket 155mm = 50 Kms +
Compare and contrast with a more substantial Ship to Shore vessel:
SPAB = 1100 LMs – 2000 tons – 100kms ship to shore / 8 hr cycle time – 3/4 journeys per Point.
Bay = Similar to the SPAD but needs ship to shore.
@FBOT
How far offshore do you push the transhipping point before you say: sod it, we’ll just come all the way from Marchwood in a Bay/SPAB?
Unfortunately you then end up buying around 6 new RFAs instead of 1 and @James goes mental with you for sucking up the entire procurement budget _again_
If you reject use of LCU/LCAC/PASCAT as being too slow and fiddly then the only cost effective answers are either RFA Fergie or Grandson-of-Mulberry. For both of those the Points have to come within about 100m of the beach itself, so hard hats on.
@ PE / FBOT,
the exam question is “over an undefended beach” – I would interpret that as being a beach where previous Int and ongoing STAR indicates there is no-one within say 12 hours of being able to dislodge a couple of light role battalions who helicopter in (poss initial battalion) or come ashore on the infantry landing craft. To do that, the enemy would have to produce a full brigade onto the scene in less than 12 hours. I would expect those 2 battalions to be able to form a perimeter perhaps 5 kilometres deep.
Once the armour starts coming ashore, things look safer, and I’d look to push an armour screen forward of the perimeter by another couple of kilometres, so you end up with a safe zone. Only then start unloading any logistics.
5 or 7 kilometres of perimeter gives your landing craft safety from any direct fire, but not artillery. Can CIWS take out shells in flight? Should be able to do so, so you may want a couple of escorts close in shore. Useful fire support with the 4.5 guns as well.
Timings, I’d see something like this:
H-1 Ninjas swimming in to mark the beach.
H-Hour: Assault battalion on helos over the beach to a 2 km perimeter. Maintain an airborne anti-armour reserve of a Squadron of AH, send other AH pairs forward to act as ISTAR. Rinse and repeat with the AH until the armour is fully ashore and established.
H-Hour – H+2: 2nd Assault battalion on infantry landing craft, push forward to meet initial battalion, then expand forward to 5 kilometre perimeter.
H+2 – H+6 armour and artillery ashore on PacSats (Estimated 40 x 40T vehicles, another 30 lighter vehicles for the guns and ammo). Push forward to form 7 kilometre screen.
H+6-H+24 Loggy shit happens to unload the rest of the force.
Doable? Should be, but not if the embarked force getting into PacSats is more than 3 miles offshore. Too much transit time for the landing craft otherwise.
@ X – not sure what you mean?
What the hell?! Where has 43 Commando come from?! Looks like the unit strength makes it a proper Commando. Am I the only one this is news to here? Very interesting. Didn’t see that coming.
@ Jedi
I think we left F35 about a zillion comments back.
@Jedi
I think he’s teasing you for trying to talk about F35 on a thread which is OBVIOUSLY all about ship-to-shore logistics :-)
@ Phil re 43 Cdo
Yes.
Just to over use the football theme from earlier, Bill Shankly once said “football is a simple game, complicated by idiots”.
Go back to fundamentals for a moment. For me no nation except the US, and maybe France, has it’s naval priorities in order. Will the risk averse Spanish or Italians ever use their carriers in their optimal role? It’s my belief they are, like CVF, vanity projects with little strategic or tactical value, (CVF deploying with only 12 of anything fast onboard is tokenism imo).
Obviously naval planning at a technical level is hugely complicated, but at a strategic level, while high stakes, it isn’t, from my perspective, rocket science. If you’re the top Admiral (hopefully) your political boss will let you know what his government wants you to do, your job then is to tell him what you need to do it. While I doubt the UK is alone in over obligating, and underfunding it’s navy the gap between those two is much wider than most, with history likely playing a large part.
I don’t think it’s over simplifying things by putting it like this:
1. Does Britain need CVF/JCA?
Yes! Britain has territories and interests overseas that it is obligated to defend. Weather we like it or not, you need air cover to do that and if we’ve learnt anything in recent years it’s that lots of our special relationships aren’t 100% reliable.
2. Can Britain afford CVF/JCA?
The consensus appears to be generally no. In which case, if we can’t afford a carrier capability at all then we need to stop pretending we are a world power, gradually shrink the navy of everything except that which keeps us in NATO, and concentrate on getting our economy in a position where we can fund a navy to protect it’s interests. I’d love to think that is what’s being attempted at the moment but my faith in politicians doesn’t stretch that far, instead I see more of a John Nott 2.
More generally, we all know what is needed for any naval effect.
You want a projection capability, then you need large deck carriers with ample fast jets onboard and enough AAW/ASW assets to provide the number of task forces you require. Do you want a true amphibious capability? Then you need enough LPH and LPD to do the job required, as well as plenty of ro-ro and replenishment. Admittedly, getting those assets from the drawing board to the high seas is the hard bit but the thought processes in what we need, and why, shouldn’t be. All the inter service bickering, lobby groups, political clusterfuck’s etc are just complications by idiots.
Phil FPGRM upheld the colours and traditions of 43 Commando – all they have done is change the name the men etc were always there.
More on 43 Cdo FP Gp RM
http://www.navynews.co.uk/archive/news/item/4251
Now how is it that the Rear Admiral only has one medal, and the matelots marching along are dressed in romper suits instead of something smarter like the RM?
James @ 1.50
Thanks for giving me some indication what force and equipment level is involved.
As for your suggestions I can see a couple of issues –
Amphib force – Gang of Four – Aviation ship / Albion / Bay x 2 = 6 LCUs / PacsCAT for ship to shore lift.
The issue is loading and unloading times not transit time.
Consequently they are going to need more than 6 hours to get the stuff you mention to land.
Not a huge amount more but nearer H+12 than anything else.
Will the stuff you mention allow Batt 2 to be mobile as it lands?
Or will it have to wait for the stuff off the PacsCats?
Next up is the “Loggies” – how much stuff do they need and where will come from?
Is it part of the stuff on the Gang of Four?
I think that this is all too soon and will compromise the war stuff lift from the sea.
We cannot carry, transit and unload anything substantial?
Better to leave any building / assembly until the first brigade is ashore?
Better to have the SPABs come in to a defended / prepared beach and deliver direct to the beach at 2K tons per hull. The timing would / should be flexible so it could be H+12 or H+24, whenever the opportunity arose.
Regarding ship positioning is closer safer?
They would then be visible to less of the coastline not under our control.
Which brings me to the local response –
Police run away.
Para-military police start to become nosey?
Local small scale military presence – do they tactically withdraw or do they stand and fight till they run out of ammo and then melt away?
However all this would be street theatre compared to the real response from the air and from afar. What would be expected?
Missiles?
Guided bombs?
Artillery?
What could the troops cope with and what would the ships cope with?
Would being close to the shore now be a disadvantage. This where it all starts to get complex.
The locals work out what is happening.
And they work out where you are and what you have got.
Staying close to the shore is not now an option and the work needed to get a Point to the beach is too much to do in such a short space of time.
Direct delivery = H+72.
SeaBase delivery = Then until D+28.
Points to the shore = Then until D+90 / Mission success.
Well cool. Although I wonder if it’s a nod as to how important the Gp is likely to become now re: piracy ‘issues’.
@FBOT
“What CVF systems are difficult to develop?
Most of the stuff should be catalogue or civil COTS.”
Really, if developing a carrier from scratch would be that easy, I wonder why China as No 1 shipbuilding nation is not pouring them out like crazy.
The systems of a warships have to be robust and redundant, to start with. They have to follow the current fashion of lean manning, where the QM2 has between 1500-1800 Filipinos aboard.
If we accept roughly a billion for building each vessel and look at the original price-tag, it would be somewhere between £500-800m. Changing to CATOBAR adds around 50% that number.
The rest are capital costs, and delays are the main drivers of those. If QM2 took 12 years from concept to keel-laying, she would be equally costly.
“Send out the old, the lame, the useless to wear down the AAW stock on the T45.”
Errm, yes. Or no. As we have 6-12 F-35 aboard CVF, we use cheap-and-cheerful ASRAAM/CAMM or METEOR for the harder lot. T45 can concentrate on missile defence.
@Peter Elliot
“So I agree: we need landing connector just like the Americans are currently experimenting with. Not to replace the fighty ships that the first wave use, but a simple, cheap logistic unit for getting the follow-on forces and sustainment off their sealift and onto the land.”
What fighty ships? Albion? A hypothetical Mistral or JCI?
An MLP has triple the parallel landing-craft handling capacity than any of them. Lot’s of space for defensive weapons. The only advantage a LHD offers is a floating hospital. Even if we discount the possibility of a Afloat Forward Staging Base, which is basically a standard-container vessel; the MLP has a 80K sqft mission deck.
Why should it not be possible to launch the first wave off them?
McZ @ 2.59
China is spending a lot of money and time developing a CVF because of two things –
National pride
Wants to be like the USA.
She cannot afford to be seen to have failed, she has to get it right.
The PLAN wants to have what the USN has, they want to be seen as equals.
This is the big step – carrier aviation – and again pride and “Face” comes into it.
For us on the other hand we have proved that we can do carrier aviation in its various forms.
We know what is required and now we can work to make it affordable if we wanted too.
Consequently we can be flexible, we can push efficiency and affordability , we can be radical if we want too.
We have seen al a aspects of carrier aviation.
The highs,the lows – the good, the bad. And the ridiculous.
We know civil works – 42 light fleets.
We know austerity is good – MACS.
We know imagination is key – post war triplets – AD / SC / MLA.
That is our advantage if we chose to use it.
Once the Chinese Treasury has worked what are the real costs of carrier aviation and what is MIC padding and PLAN willie waving things will start too change.
As for the stuff about Amphib AAW I think you have your rose tinted specs on. Most of the stuff you talk about is brochure wear until 2016/17.
And then you make my point for me …
The lame, the old, the useless – that is their missile stock, not their air force.
And of course the Spratleys and Taiwan. But more Spratleys.
@James
Can you give the Ninjas a bit more time before you hit the beach? Something along the lines of 48hrs would be nice for recon. Any less and there is a chance of missing something nasty, and it is 40km of land to clear.
H-2 for Naval Divers marking the zone. Just in case. Mines can really slow things down.
Maybe close up Wave 1 and Wave 2 to 1hr difference? And some light armour in Wave 2? If you’re going to push the perimeter out, you might need some armour if you hit something a bit tough.
The basic plan looks good, though hectic. For the vehicles though, I would try to trickle them in instead of waiting for a single wave. Once every 15-20 min sounds good, instead of clustering around the ships waiting for the others. Some poor armour commander’s going to have his troop scattered over hills and yonder though, so he’s probably going to have to be 1st in to co-ordinate.
Alex: “Has anyone tried ro-roing between the Points and the LCUs (because they’re ro-ro at both ends)?”
You put a ramp support pontoon in between.
These MLP things are just very large self-propelled RSPs.
@ Observer,
Ninjas can have all the H minus time they want, subject to the caveat that the longer they are there, the greater the chance of discovery. But deeply relaxed about giving them extra at that end of the timeline.
Armour on shore is always more effective than armour on a landing craft, so yes, get them ashore as soon as possible. It mary pain APATS, but even with a single shared brain cell the cavalry can react and be flexible enough to cope with these sorts of things. I would however want to get 3-4 minimum onto the beach at the same time for the first wave, just to give mutual support and some fire and manoeuvre.
As for “hectic” my plan looks slow and lazy to me. We were doing twice that in UKMF back in 86, and you have no idea at all of “hectic” until you’ve done a Brigade battle run in BATUS. The most important of the 3 sweeping hands on a cavalryman’s watch is the second hand. For all of their GPS precision, the RAF tend to work things by minutes and the Andrew by hours. I called in a Harrier strike on a live fire exercise once which was 30-40 seconds late for weapons release and therefore pants – I had to artificially slow down my squadron so we did not arrive on the objective to personally welcome the bombs.
I want no false conversions of that doctrine to treating girls to a good time. I’m just saying.
@James
The hectic part wasn’t the speed of a cavalry charge, it’s the fact that the top has to be co-ordinating 3 different waves with different force compositions at 3 different locations with 3 different possible situations. Your C3 has to be really top class to juggle all 3 plus CAS plus Naval assets.
It’s doable. Just remember to stock Panadol. And delegate a lot. :)
And I totally agree on the armour, speed, protection, firepower. They can react to contacts on the perimeter, pull back, and reinforce another point at good speed, or worse case, provide long range fire support in lieu of artillery. And why I prefer a trickle of armour into the field is when you need them, you really need them, 4-6 in the AOR now is worth more than 40 in 2 hrs.
Stupid question perhaps but,
For all this talk of putting brigades over the shore etc, and the equipment needed for it, how likely is it that we would actually do this in the near future?
A brigade sized job I mean.
@ Chris B
much more likely than we’ll ever need a CVF, far less 2. History suggests, and Defence Planning Assumptions agree.
Various gin-sozzled Admirals, thankfully now retired go “Ga-ga, but it’s all f*cking sexy and what Nelson would have wanted, ga-ga” in intellectual response.
You only have to listen to the contrasting responses to the very idea of “Trafalgar Day” and “Waterloo Day” to realise that the Andrew are literally 200 years behind in human evolution.
Waterloo Day – a bit of a Bank Holiday for those Regiments who were there, bit of Officers vs Cpls Footy, Cookhouse puts on a barbie, All ranks thrash in the evening.
Trafalgar Day – World’s Second best Navy comes to a grinders, church services, lots of stupid bosun whistling, rum in tea, Maritime Warfare Centre issues some new and ridiculous epistle, and 55 various Captains RN gather at Dryad to get maudlin and raise a glass to “The Immortal Memory”, all of which would not be so bad if the buggers didn’t go back to the desk jobs in Whitehall the next day and start playing fantasy fleet with a hangover.
And while I’m on the subject, how is it that the RN has 92 Captains, and lots more senior officers as well, with about 15 proper boats in the fleet? I used to think the Army was bad for over-officering, but the Andrew is really taking the piss. Christ knows what I’ll discover about the street cleaners. That’s tomorrow’s job.
@James
Maybe it can’t be helped, after all, a single ship has to have a huge amount of behind the scenes staff needed to get all the parts working. Off the top of my head, you’d need:
Maintainance and repairs
Food
Fuel
Ammo
Manpower and training
Strategic oversight (aka The Big Picture aka “Where should we put a poor ship Captain”)
That is at least 6 departments, all of which need to at least be able to talk to ship captains on an equal footing, so 15:92 (1:6.1 ratio) doesn’t sound so bad.
McZ, a few posts back mentioned CAMM, what do you think its commercial prospects are?
I am aware that the Evolved Sea Sparrow Consortium (which curiously includes BAe through its Australian branch)was looking into possible upgrades to ESSM, with an active ESSM being one of the options.
Such an upgrade could rain on CAMM’s parade petty effectively in technical terms, whereupon it would come down to overall system costs?
@ James – “Trafalgar Day – World’s Second best Navy comes to a grinders, church services, lots of stupid bosun whistling, rum in tea, Maritime Warfare Centre issues some new and ridiculous epistle, and 55 various Captains RN gather at Dryad to get maudlin and raise a glass to The Immortal Memory”
James, you need to accommodate yourself to this fact for it is exactly how the public recognise the contrast too, and that changes how gov’t willingness to resource a defence function along with public willingness to see it used.
We are an island nation you know!
I am not just being provocative due to my naturally cheeky nature, it boils down to politics and the army just doesn’t have the bottom.
As Max said, there was an element to the blair wars of the army looking for its falklands moment, and lets be honest, they didn’t find it.
I watched that Max Hasting’s documentary last night. At the end they showed one of the pony club regiments parading with pointy sticks. Really quaint. I bet afterwards they all trooped back to their barracks and shared a meal of oats with their horses.
As well as more admirals and captains than ships well you have to recognise intellect and character somehow. If they can’t have a ship at least they can have the rank…..
It’s not a stupid question, Chris.B. Putting a brigade over the shore. Much of our expeditionary experiance has involved soft entry of forces, rather than fighting our way up a beach. It could be that we’d do quite well with just a few large RORO ferries in the RFA, and STUFT, rather than bother with the expense of Royal Navy well-decks and commando cariers.
All about balance of risk though. We’ve gone for years without a heavy long-range bomber, and we’ll have gone about 40 years without a large carrier by the time the QEs are steaming about, and the country hasn’t collapsed so far (yet we have taken part in many joint operations where those types of assets have been extensively used). Amphibious forces at significant scale have rarely been required, either by us or by partners during our adventures.
That’s true BB. Unfortunately as a lot of us here have pointed out, the budget and building plans are committed, and changing them midstream is more trouble than it’s worth. So now the problem isn’t what to build, it’s how to use them for best value.
What I’m thinking is that we already have a fair bit of Amphibious landing kit now. Given that we’re not likely to use it that much, or on any really massive scale, is it really something that warrants as much attention as it’s getting?
I agree that F35B was the correct choice for the UK…
However, CVF and F35B are mutually incompatible in terms of performance and budget.
One should either go for LHA/LHD/Wasp/America/etc with F35B or CVF/CdG/Nimitz with F35C.
The only mid ground is Sea Typhoon on STOBAR which would not give us much in the way of strike or CAS capability.
Therefore, because we are stuck with CVF we should go for F35C. The only other option that I can see is the even more embarrassing option of selling both CVF and building 3-4 Wasp/America.
No. ;)
But it does give us something to whine about or this is going to be one boring site. :P
@Chris B. I must admit that I too question our need to keep our amphibious forces, especially in preference to our carriers. I guess it’s a question of money… again.
As for mitigation of risk I think that the last 40 years has shown that we only really need RN escorted RFA vessels (such as Bay) along with carrier air power (either to support a landing or deny enemy air operations). I think this covers Falklands, Afganistan, Libya, etc.
After all, it’s the LCU that does the assault, not the LPD!
Simon, a LCU is not really seaworthy, the LPD is to stop it from sinking in rough seas. No LPD = no LCU.
Observer: Yes, but our LSLs (Bay) can also harbour an LCU. My point is that we don’t really need Albion or Bulwark, especially when you consider that 1 x Albion cost about four times as much as 1 x Bay.
The last time we needed LPDs was the Falklands and that was because they were (at the time) the only ships that could operate LCUs. The Round Table class logistics ships physically had to beach to offload, and they got shot to pieces if I remember correctly.
About the CVF and the F-35B being mutually incompatible, that is a fallacy, a CATOBAR carrier can operate F-35Bs too, which is why I keep mentioning that mixing the two programs is a really …messy thing to do.
A carrier should be able to operate ALL carrier capable aircraft, not only a specific type, be it F-35B or C. If you want to choose B for launch platform flexibility, so be it, but it should not affect the carrier design purpose, which is to maintain as many types of carrier aircraft as possible.
Think of it this way. If you were to design a carrier, no F-35 X,Y or Z, how would you go about it?
Conversely, if you were to select a F-35 variant, without consideration of a specific carrier, how would you decide?
I would probably go CATOBAR and F-35B.
Simon, and what happens if that one LCU were to suffer a mischief? Remember, the Albion may cost 4x more, but it carries 4 landing ship type craft as opposed to the one you mentioned. And there is also the problem of firepower concentration. Dropping a platoon at a time off a beach is much more likely to result in a lost battle as opposed to dumping a whole company on the beach in a single wave. Less chance of defeat in detail. And having only one LCU cuts out some support tactics. I’m not sure how the RN does it, but one of the tactics that was taught to us was for one light LCU to do a fast strafing run on a beach to probe for return fire (recce in force) while the another stand off to mark locations for suppression while the rest unload. Once the ground force takes over the supression role, the other 2 unload. You can’t do that with just 1.
Observer: when I say incompatible, I don’t mean you physically can’t operated the F35B from a CATOBAR carrier, I simply mean it is a waste of money to do so.
It’s like the US Navy building a 6-billion dollar Nimitz and then operating AV8B’s from them… a waste.
I don’t think any nation has ever designed a carrier without also considering the aircraft that will operate from them. They are both inextricably intertwined.
Observer Said:
Simon, and what happens if that one LCU were to suffer a mischief? Remember, the Albion may cost 4x more, but it carries 4 landing ship type craft as opposed to the one you mentioned. And there is also the problem of firepower concentration. Dropping a platoon at a time off a beach is much more likely to result in a lost battle as opposed to dumping a whole company on the beach in a single wave. Less chance of defeat in detail. And having only one LCU cuts out some support tactics. I’m not sure how the RN does it, but one of the tactics that was taught to us was for one light LCU to do a fast strafing run on a beach to probe for return fire (recce in force) while the another stand off to mark locations for suppression while the rest unload. Once the ground force takes over the supression role, the other 2 unload. You can’t do that with just 1.
Simon Says:
I agree with you in that Bay cannot offer the level of assault, but let’s be realistic, what nation would put 120 men in an LCU and aim it at 10-12 knots at a soft white sanded beach nowadays. It’s suicide. This is not the 1940’s any more!
You’d use the LCU to offload vehicles and equipment that is physically too heavy for a chopper to lift. This would only happen after the beachhead has been secured. The main body of the assault force would come vertically from copters at a lot faster rate than any LCU or LCAC can manage.
In my opinion (and this is genuinely only my opinion):
Perhaps I’m missing something?
@Simon: buying some LVTP’s would be a lot cheaper than sending everyone in via chopper. Still think a couple of companies would be very useful…
@wf: yup, that would also work, and as you say, a LOT cheaper, but still suffers the same problem in that they’re cannon fodder until the beachhead has been secured.
I tend to assume the enemy has similar firepower to us in these situations and a single Apache would annihilate and armour as soon as it beaches.
Perhaps this is where I’m misguided – assuming they actually have a credible defense.
Choppers are a lot more vulnerable to damage. Good for short hops across the line, but for long distance, I’d rather walk. At least I won’t get splattered if I fall down. LCUs don’t fall from the sky when hit, with the loss of majority of the people on board.
Assuming they have credible air defence of course.
BTW, what you term suicide, some term SOP. Just depends on how good you are. *swagger, swagger* :P
@Simon: well, I see it as a way of getting onto a beach when there some lightly armed troops only: a single GPMG would make a Falklands style LCU assault suicide, and even a LCVP or hovercraft would be nuts. We’re never going to get all the helicopter resources we would like, so on a value for money basis, it looks better than buying 3 more Chinooks to get say 50.
If SOP is “Standard Operating Procedure” then your following statement “Just depends on how good you are” is what I worry about :-(
I didn’t last five minutes last time I went paint-balling. Perhaps that’s my concern – I’m lousy at dodging bullets.
I think what we’ve discussed brings us back to the topic at the top of the page (sort of) in that without air cover an amphibious assault is SOP.
1. SEAD – to get rid of the defenses that you just killed my copter with –> Carrier.
2. V-ASSAULT – because I now can –> Carrier/LPH.
3. LSL/LCU unload from RFA vessels with Apache cover.
Need carrier, jets and assault copters on LPH.
@wf
That is why the strafe/suppress tactic is so important, to detect and chop up machine gun nests, that and lots of smoke at the landing points. Naval support helps a lot too.
As for a heli-rappel/heli-drop, you need a big clear space which can be hard to find. The safety clearence for a Puma IIRC is about 225m. This is not only blade width, but also anti-collision, you need space or things will go bump.
@Simon
Keep head down and don’t stick it up in the same spot twice. :)
But you got the gist of operations, mutually supporting systems and people, not Rambo-More Blood part VII. By the time anyone hits the beach, LURPs, Recon, Commando and STORM teams should have already been in field for about 48 hrs, marking targets, clear zones for helidrop and doing route recce, and Naval Divers would have been busy marking obstacles, minefields, wire and defence.
I like this “recce in force” strafe/suppress tactic but think it’s a little outdated to think that neutralising the gun emplacements will permit a landing.
I’d still be concerned about anti-armour missiles, RPGs, bombs and anti-personnel devices on and around the beach – all of which require a covert recce beforehand – again, leading to the point that there is no actual horizontal assault. It’s merely an unloading process once the beach has been secured by air power and NGFS.
@Observer: do you really mean 225m clearance for a Puma landing? Is there a decimal point missing?
@Observer: I’d sent the last message before yours popped up.
@Simon
No, 225m. Very big clearence. This is to prevent collisions or a sudden strong gust of wind from blowing a chopper into another (in an area surrounded by trees, suddenly clearing TTL in strong wind conditions, there is actually a physical “knock” as the wind suddenly hits). It is also to account for helis coming in on a “slope”, not a hover and decend. Hover and decend is fairly rare, maybe on embarking, belly loading or rappelling. Helis also fly and land in formation. The ground spacing reflects the formation spacing as well.
Ahh, it makes more sense if it’s for an entire formation. Any idea how many copters in a formation?
Is this generally similar for other copters (Sea King / Merlin) or just the Puma?
The reason I ask is because of the superstructures on board copter-capable ships such as Albion. You can’t really land any more than 45m away from something that would mangle the old rotors a tad if you drifted a bit.
So let me get this right…
In the jet-less and copter-less world we’d do the following:
1. Insert covert recce teams from Astute.
2. Recce teams mark targets.
3. Tomahawk from Astute takes out big targets, NGFS from Daring takes out others and the special forces sabotage or destroy the others.
4. 4 x LCU and 4 x LCVP turn up at the beach from Albion flushing out enemy gun positions beforehand.
5. Credible force landed and beach taken.
6. Bay tips up with reinforcements.
@Simon
More or less so. Why you would want a semi big force 1st in is just in case the NGFS failed to take out someone here and there. With luck, the strafing is redundant. But luck? Best to make your own. :)
“Ahh, it makes more sense if it’s for an entire formation. Any idea how many copters in a formation?”
How much space you have? :)
I suspect that the formation intervals are a bit big, it was written during peacetime for training, so I’d expect a large fudge factor.
Oh, now I remember, the clearance is also for ground equipment and people too. Translation: Keep clear of landing helicopters :)
This is for the Puma. The UH-1H has a safety diameter of 125? 175? Think it was 175m
So a puma with a 15.5m rotor diameter needs 175m to be safe think you need to think about that some more.
Mark, you know why those air displays of aircraft flying close together is called “stunt flying”?
aye but me thinks you maybe confusing meters with ft
We don’t use Imperial.
Of course I could be wrong, it’s been 10+ years since I did a LZ briefing, and the last time I flew on a Puma 3 years back, I wasn’t the one doing the paperwork. Might want to ask James for clarification.
What are the LZ figures you remember?
See the problem now, the approximate figures I remember are for night insertions.
http://compass.seacadets.org/pdf/nrtc/cb2/14235_ch3.pdf
Fig 3.2, 150 feet in radii in addition to rotor width + a bit of fudge factor. That’s about 300 feet extra + rotor = ~115m. Between 2 birds, that’s probably about the same. This is the UH-1H one I think.
@Chris B
What I was thinking when I started the discussion that morphed into ‘landing a brigade across an undefended beach’ was as follows:
a) We now have only enough amphibs in the high readiness fleet for a single Commando group.
That’s not actually very much. Any viable striking force will probably need to have brigade level strength. Our maximum deployable strength for a short op will probably be a 3 brigade division – and that will fill all 6 Points plus a lot of commercial ro-ro STUFT.
b) The single Commando landed amphibiously will have as pretty its first task to seize a useable Port. (Either for a follow-on force or for its own sustainment) That seriously cuts down our flexibility and makes our likely points of attack kind of obvious to the enemy.
c) If the enemy denies the Port by mines, blockships, a hostile population or other asymetric action then we a buggered. If they line up a strong defence on all the beaches near ports we are also buggered.
d) We have plenty of lane metres available in the Points for either insertion or sustainment. If it could be done CHEAPLY then enabling these existing ships to unload over an undefended beach is force multiplication. It also restores our tactical freedom to choose the site of our landing in a place the enemy does not expect.
What then also emerged during the discussion was:
e) All our Brigades will be based in UK. If they are any use they will have to deploy their equipment by sea. Only being able to deploy a single battlegroup across the beach doesn’t match our strategic posture.
f) Even where there is a port it very quickly gets clogged by lots of shipping (notably US Shipping) so being able to sustain over the beach is a big help in coalition ops too.
So overall the argument is as much about logistic sustainment and tactical flexibility as about the need for brigade level amphibious assaults.
UK House of Commons status report on F-35. There’s a download link for the full report.
http://www.defencetalk.com/f-35-uk-house-of-commons-issues-status-report-on-jsf-41419/
Just in case any of our legislators are not fully up to speed on critical national defence issues ;-)
“We now have only enough amphibs in the high readiness fleet for a single Commando group. That’s not actually very much. Any viable striking force will probably need to have brigade level strength”
I have been saying that for a very long time! :(
Observer
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-21-38/image435.jpg
@Jedi
Let’s accentuate the positives: we came up with at least 4 solutions that would solve the problem without breaking the bank:
1. Replace the Albions with bigger and better ships (But only when they are worn out.)
2. RFA Fergie – a cheap, improvised drive-through pier.
3. A mini mulberry pier delivered to theatre on flo-flo
4. A cheap and cheerful MLP consisting of a big ‘Dockwise Ship’ RFA and lots of PASCATS.
Thats a lot of options, at least some of which could plausibly be improvised in a hurry if absolutely necessary.
We also discovered from NaBoffin that these issues are somewhere on a back burner projects at MoD so have not been ignored altogether.
@Mark
Not it. 35m is way too low for the LZ point spots, it was in the triple digits.
Off the top of my head the flight deck on Albion and Bulwark is something like 70.5M by 28M and have seen 2 jungly sea kings operating simultaneously.
Different protocols APATs? On a flight deck, I don’t think they’re given much of a choice, on land, they have the space to play around safely, and flight decks usually are clear of equipment on 2-3 sides unless someone is floating off the port/starboard side in mid air. On land, those bloody infantrymen can be anywhere :)
Another point to note is that pilots have limited view of the rear, there is a ~60 degree blind spot caused by the main body. That area is a no go zone, the CH-47 being an exception as the ramp is at the back and even then, the pilot’s dependent on the loadmaster. At sea, on a rear flight deck, that space is empty sea. On land, it has to be cleared.
PE @ 9.16
You forgot the “Glesga” version of the MLPS –
Large second hand oil tanker / welders with blowtorches / lots of overtime.
As noted before if you were so inclined you could stick a Q+D flight deck on top.
Have a look at the video in the link, at one point not how close the 2 junglies and the chinook are. In my experience it is to do with pilot capability and good control of the LZ rather than some formula.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OJpnwaBu3o8
lol at “good control of the LZ”. The pilots never listen to us or look at our flight marshal, they simply plop themselves where the marker is and to hell with your hand guidance.
Guess they don’t like the Army telling them what to do.
It’s worth noting that the MLP has been proposed as the most dispensable asset in the entire US military inventory, the first thing to cut :
http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2011-10/400-billion-dod-cuts-heres-one
In short – it’s a $6bn TCO to do stuff that can largely be done with the Improved Navy Lighterage System (ie barges). Even if you don’t have a USNI sub, the comments are worth a glance.
I see we’ve gone back to the fighter-bomber sub thing again. Without repeating too much of what I said on the recent Astute thread – just because a system can perform different roles, it doesn’t have to carry all its weapons at the same time. A Typhoon doesn’t carry Paveway when it’s on QRA, and nor would every fighter-bomber sub carry ICBMs instead of Tomahawks. Yes there are some issues with the fact that they could be carrying instant sunshine even when they’re not, as I discussed in that previous thread, but that’s just one of the things we would have to live with just like you could in theory have Typhoons optimised for different roles like Tornado F3/GR4/GR1a/GR1b. But we’ll sacrifice that deviation from perfection in return for several £bn of hard cash.
Even the US is heading in the fighter-bomber direction with the Virginia Payload Module, so it’s hard to see how we could possibly justify dedicated boomers ever again. For smaller countries like the UK, one-role SSBNs are going the way of the bomber plane and tank destroyer.
Going back on topic, Bill Sweetman has written a good piece for DTI on the leaks and counter-leaks about converting CVF to cats. I’m with him in being rather cynical about it all, and that it’s far from the done deal that some newspapers thought it was. It’s interesting that AFAIK we’re still waiting for the official announcement of PR12, no?
@ El Sid
I completely agree about the next gen SSBN’S. With the amount of pressure the rest of the defence budget is under I just can’t see how single role subs can be justified (maybe with more money, or the MOD not footing the bill it would be a different story).
Everything else is indeed going the very sensible way of flexible and modular. We can have the best of both worlds, with more hunter killers on a regular basis but with a residual ability to carry nukes built in.
As for the problems. Well it can’t be that hard to make a large Astute/Vanguard successor. Have a boat load up nukes every couple of years on practice deployments to keep the rest of world aware of the capability retained, and the rest of the time we don’t carry them and make the concession of telling ports of call that this is the case.
Yes this is all a compromise and far from ideal, but really….do we have a choice?
El Sid, The Virginia payload system allows the launch of an ICBM. The main argument against SSNs acting as SSBN was that to go towards a Cruise based Nuclear system increased the chance of an extreme response and escalation of teh situation as the enemy would never be quite certain what type of warhead was attached to the missile until it went off.
During GW1 the Israelis didnt know what sort of warhead the SCUD missiles were carrying until detonation.
THe US did well to control their response.
The decision upon whether or not we maintain CASD will be a political system and the decision on which type of sub carried nuclear wepons will be of a similar nature. Even if we go to an expanded SSN type submarine with a coomon missile compartment, the chances are that this will certainly not be retrofitted to existing boats anytime soon and so we will still be in the same position ref classes as we are at the moment.
@APATS – we’re talking at cross purposes. I’m not talking about nuclear cruise missiles. Horrible idea, it’s the worst of all worlds.
I’m talking about something where the boat is based on an Astute, but with an insert along the lines of the VPM. I know that already there’s a lot of commonality of systems between the boomers and attack boats, I’m just taking this to its natural conclusion. You’d end up with a “class” that looks something like a pint-size version of the Ohio class, a mixture with eg 4 carrying ICBMs in the silos, and 8 subs having the silos each filled with 6-7 (non-nuclear) Tomahawks. You wouldn’t be able to instantly switch from one role to another, but in the normal run of things you wouldn’t want to. You would have the option to switch from Tomahawks to ICBMs if the political situation changed over a period of years. It’s not like a Typhoon doing air-to-air in the morning and bombing in the afternoon, but nor would the differences be as great as between F3 and GR4. Perhaps the closest comparion would be the GR1a and GR1b – not much difference in hardware so maintenance and spares could be unified, but with very different mission profiles.
Not expecting to refit existing Astutes with a CMC – it’d be nice if the CMC was sorted before Agamemnon and Ajax are built, but it’s not likely. Even so, I’m happy to wait until after we’ve replaced the Vanguards and only start building new subs with silos of Tomahawk (or Perseus?) in 2040 or whenever.
Little problem?
(Source: British Forces Broadcasting Service; posted April 5, 2012)
A fleet of supersize refuelling planes meant for the RAF have hit a huge setback: they don’t work on British jets. Tests have revealed the giant new Voyager air-to-air tankers are not compatible with RAF Tornados. The connecting pipes, which join aircraft together in flight, leak when fuel is pumped through them.
It is a massive setback for Defence Secretary Philip Hammond and the MoD, which signed a £10billion deal with makers AirTanker for 14 Voyagers.
Some inside the MoD are starting to fear the Tornado issue could delay delivery of the entire fleet. Nine of the planes are due to be in service as early as 2014.
The Voyager is a military version of the Airbus 330 and has a dual role as a troop carrier capable of transporting 400 soldiers.
-ends-
@ Aussie Johnno
That sounds like one of those niggly problems that puts lots of unexpected cost into a programme.
If the tankers work with other jets, the it would appear to be a downstream problem with the Tornadoes. Maybe something in the chain of couplings and pressure valves on the Tornado fuel system, would be a guess, but probably an area to explore.
Moves cost out of the programme and into the Tornado IPT. How expensive might it become to do all of the trials and tests, and then to re-fit Tornado with upgraded pressure valves, and then to reverse engineer all of that back upstream to the tankers and to re-run all of the safety and engineering tests?
Sounds like the curse of the mighty Tonkas fuel system strikes again! May need to vary the fuel pressure delivery on the tankers pods. Long live the vickers fun bus.
@ El Sid – “You’d end up with a “class” that looks something like a pint-size version of the Ohio class, a mixture with eg 4 carrying ICBMs in the silos, and 8 subs having the silos each filled with 6-7 (non-nuclear) Tomahawks.”
Exactly!
“Tests have revealed the giant new Voyager air-to-air tankers are not compatible with RAF Tornados.”
Tornado out of service from SDSR2015 onward………..?
Aussie Johnno the same story from the MoD
Air Tanker Voyager planes
The Sun reports that the RAF’s new fleet of tanker and transport aircraft have been hit by a setback after it emerged the plane, known as Voyager, had encountered problems during air-to-air refuelling trials.
Voyager is due to enter service with the RAF in its transport and aeromedical roles in the coming months. The aircraft have already refuelled Tornadoes and once trials are successfully completed, full RAF air-to-air refuelling training will begin.
Nine fully operational aircraft are due to enter service within the next two years with the in service date of mid-2014 on track. There will be no capability gap as a result. If industry fails to meet its obligations the MOD will expect to recover any additional costs.
Says they had already refuelled them so does not appear a huge problem. They way I read the story in the Sun (well known tabloid, not famed for accuracy) is that the problem was with the tanker. One solution mentioned was take the nozzles off the old Victors.
So the topic of this thread shoudn’t really be “The F35 and MoD Credibility”, it should simply read “Mod Credibility – Yes/No”.
How about this for a solution:
1. Build CVF as STOVL (no increase in cost).
2. Buy 12 x F35B (~£1b)
3. Operate as assault carrier (12 F35B, 6 ASW, 4 ASaC, 12 assault, 6 Apache/Lynx).
4. Convert to CATOBAR when we can actually afford it.
5. Buy 24 x F35C.
6. Deploy 24 x F35C plus 12 x F35B if necessary, otherwise deploy F35B on next generation LHA that replace Albion and Bulwark.
Obviously we’d procure additional attrition aircraft too.
?
the problem at the moment lays with the pod. The same probes on tornados have no problems on the tristar or 10s. It’s not all time just sometimes. Although i’m surprised with the leaks in the mod this hasn’t come out sooner!
Topman
Are the pods pumping to fast for tornados system or only in certain flight profiles. As for the leaks I have though it would have been in the new year message but then to this point as with most a/c program’s the problems tend to stay private.
Simon why not just buy the b version if the 130 mile range difference is important for land based deep strike then add conformal tanks to typhoon. The b version has 14k lbs for weapons we’ve never put much ordnance on a fighter jet and I doubt we will in the future considering the primary weapons will be paveway 4 or brimstone.
@James
And of course once the cost of the tanker mods has been pushed into the Tornado ‘jam jar’ it might just encourage MoD to withdraw Tornado even earlier.
What the RAF should do is get some jerrycans and pass them out the back door
Totally off topic I know, but any news on when the RAF is going to get a version of Paveway IV with range extension kit? After all if Libya showed the brilliance of Brimstone it also showed how useful AASM is.
A spot of this perhaps TD
http://static.ddmcdn.com/gif/world-war-i-flight-timeline9.jpg
I can just hear the MAA sucking their teeth and and talking about a risk matrix
Pa story on the tanker a bit more balanced
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ukpress/article/ALeqM5iqqZc5DldcPaGyTNUFKCZvHnpnpw?docId=N0135451333622017224A:
last paragraph tells the story.
Mark
As far as I recall the F35B cannot carry the weapons necessary for effective SEAD missions (max is 1000lb JDAM, only a 500lb Paveway can be carried – I think?). In addition adding conformal tanks to a Typhoon means we’d need a STOBAR carrier, which I guess could also operate the B flavour, but still means spending money on mods to the flight deck of QE and installing wires and drives.
Basically we need F35C to provide the full bredth of mission capability from CVF.
F35B will be perfectly adequte for CAS and CAP, but lacks the legs for deep interdiction and lacks the internal payload for SEAD. This means we’d still have to resort to the old tactics for SEAD (special forces, NGFS, etc).
Simon
I may not have made it clear typhoon would not be on a ship. A lot of the argument for the c version is on the lack of range to replace tornado. Thats looking at land based deep strike, typhoon with conformals and 2 storm shadow covers that mission. An F35B flying from a ship with storm shadow may also cover a mission where sea basing affords closer to target than land basing.
The RAF has pretty much 4 weapons for ground targets Paveway 4, brimstone, Paveway 3 and storm shadow. No matter if we buy A, B or C the paveway 3 and stormshadow are an external carriage on f35 the internal 2000lb weapon is an american JDAM which we dont have. Paveway 4 and brimstone are planned both internal and external. Paveway 4 has already done pit drop testing on f35. The 2 internal ground pylons on F35B are rates at 1500lbs and a succesor to paveway 3 may be able to do reduced to that weight.
The recent SAR http://www.aviationweek.com/media/pdf/F-35Dec11FINALSAR-senttoCongress3-29-2012.pdf gives an over site on the 3 aircraft and this http://defense.aol.com/2012/03/30/f-35-total-costs-soar-to-1-5-trillion-lockheed-defends-program/ suggest US per hour costs im not however sure how they arrive at that figure or if it relates to mod world accounting.
@Mark – don’t forget that weapon inventories don’t stand still. In particular, you can add SPEAR Capability 3 to the list as being intended for internal carriage, which will probably end up being used as a HARM replacement among other things. Just generally, once the F-35 is with us, more weapons will be designed around what can be fitted into the internal bays.
I’d guess those figures are total cost per hour of the aircraft (ie including capital costs), but not including external things like the airbases needed to support them.
Good stuff here, will have to go back to the links provided
@ Simon, share your concern about SEAD capability
@ Mark, as per el Sid, more will come
– e.g. the maker of JASSM has confirmed that it can be carried internally (it is for penetrating sophisticated AADs, and the study was undertaken as Australia is a JASSM user, but there is a long way to an integration plan; However, for JSM there is an integration plan, being in sw IV but a hot debate rages regarding getting it onboard earlier… just wait for the announcement: what the the good old Vikings get in return for “going first”)
Sorry to jump the gun (have not read the stuff linked yet)but comparable per hour costs have been done against f-18, and the comparator has moved from 0.8 to 1.44 (which is not far from the change in unit price in production, but what happened to “being designed to be easy to support”?)
against F-16, not 18 (sorry for the typo)
Mark,
I had a feeling you may say that (about Typhoon not being on CVF). Surely though, Typhoon based 4000nm away would provide very few sorties per day. I doubt they’d manage one each so the numbers that are required to achieve what can be achived by a dozen F35C on a carrier are enormously expensive – they immediately pay the cost of the carrier! However, I’m sure you already know this.
In addition, I don’t think Typhoon is the right platform for SEAD – it’s a very high risk mission that requires either a gung-ho low-and-fast Tornado or more subtle stealth to reduce the risk.
The USA will use F35B for CAS and F35C/F18 for almost everything else. We don’t have that luxury, we need it to be able to do multiple missions.
I’m sure there are others here that have a better idea of how many targets are likely to need removing in order to support an invasion. Perhaps tankered Typhoons with low sortie rates will suffice, but even it they will, I wouldn’t take that risk for the sake of a couple of £billion.
I agree weapons inventories don’t stand still. There is nothing what so ever to stop the b version doing sead or any mission the other f35s will do. We will have a envelope with f35b which we will design future weapons around I agree with el sid on that. The future weapons are reducing in weight and all variants of f35 have 2 5k pylons. The b in my view looses nothing really in weapons capability on any current of future mission the uk will do if you look at historical fighter missions of any kind. The b version range is comparable to the f18c/d and f16 with external tanks it’s not that short ranged and thats on a stovl flight profile, over 450miles off a aircraft carrier 90 miles of a cost does for me all we as a country needs. Typhoon covers the rest and in the longer term it will be replaced probably by the a version. To me a no brainier full flexibility full use of two carriers and ease of integration with helicopter operations and having excellent complimentary capabilty with typhoon offer a much better capability than weve ever had.
Mark,
I understand your point, but must disagree with your statement about the B not losing anything in terms of weapons capability. Simply put, it carries 1/2 the stealth payload of the C. That’s a big difference when taking out hardened targets.
The other thing is that it’s not just range that B suffers from (I recently read that it currently only manages a combat radius of 380nm making it even more useless) it also suffers from poor endurance – this means more airframes needed to maintain air presence for CAP and CAS.
However, I think we’re both in agreement that we should go for a squadron or so of F35B with your tankered Typhoons or Daring providing SEAD with Storm Shadow / SCALP Naval… for the time being.
Perhaps things will then change and a new jet will be available (I doubt it) or I can modify CVF for CATOBAR and buy 24 x F35C and you can stick with what you’ve got.
I think 50% agreement is pretty good ;-)
Simon
It does not lose any stealthy payload in uk service. That’s the point I was making in the first post. As for range the figure you quote is not correct if you read the recent pentagon report I linked current estimate range for f35b on stovl profile with 2 AMRAAM and 2 1k bombs is 464 nm
Mark,
You indicated that you’d design “future weapons” to fit. The same applies on the flip side of the coin too. I can also develop new weapons for the F35C delivering double the capability.
Whichever way you look at it the F35C offers and will/can offer more stealth payload than the F35B, making it a more viable platform to deliver future SEAD capability.
Mark,
Which Pentagon report link? The December 31st SAR is the only link I can find.
Cheers.
Can’t find any decent source for my 380nm claim – I read it in arrse.co.uk, a comment by tekirdag. He/she claims it was in a report from the 6th March this year, but there’s no evidence. Sorry.
Mark & Simon “the estimated combat radius of the short-take-off variant, which is being developed for the Marine Corps, is 15 percent lower than the original JSF program goal even though the aircraft is slated to carry fewer weapons than originally intended.”
That will be the difference between the two numbers you are quoting.
http://www.defpro.com/news/details/33113/?SID=57f6edb6fae9052df9e3c58d31a4ba3e
Something else to consider is that Harriers had to return with 15% fuel to land, presume the F35B will be the same. This will obviously reduce the radius further.
B vs C debate
My thoughts are that we have to go with the “C” version – the F35 is to the UK a full on, expensive, heavy fighter consequently we need the best and most capable version that meets our varied needs of RAF / RN use.
If we have issues with CATOBAR then that suggests that it is the process to blame not the equipment.
Regarding the reduced flexibility of the “C” vs “B” in RN hands then that just shows how we are trying to deal with the symptom and not the root cause. We are heading towards a 6 squadron RAF regarding the fast jets and this is considered to be acceptable as long as the fast jets are the right fast jets.
The right fast jets are expensive, advanced on the spec sheet heavy fighters so that the RAF can “willi wave” with the best of them. No matter their effectiveness or their flexibility as long as they are new / big / expensive then job done.
The RAF are on an ego trip, a very expensive ego trip and we will all suffer.
Typhoon + Harrier vs Typhoon + Tornado is not the issue and never was the issue.
The issue is MOD efficiency and effectiveness and its costs structures / VFM or lack of it.
The issue is MOD / RAF unit cost of deployment.
Sort that and everything else falls into place.
Given the money going into the RAF are we getting VFM?
How do we compare to other countries or is the AF scam international?
We needed to keep the Harrier our only light fighter.
It would have given us another dimension regarding flexibility.
It would have “packed the batting” regarding CVF aircraft complements.
One question I do have is the payloads / weights of USMC Harriers of a Wasp?
How do they compare with Harriers off an Invincible?
We should have kept the Harrier.
We should have run the Tornado run down like the Jaguar.
We should keep the Typhoon on a close leash – If it can’t sell overseas then why should we buy it?
My thoughts for the future is that every RAF fast jet / UAV should be carrier capable.
Sticking £5 sorry £10bill – forgot about BWoS inflation – in a field in Norfolk is the prime waste of resources regarding the MOD at the moment. Even FRES has more credibility and usefulness.
Does anyone know what the official Typhoon numbers and stated capability will be in 2015?
Simon the SAR report is done buy the program office and pentagon.
Suppression of enemy air defence is a mission that will change from missile base to electronic or more standard ordnance. What your talking about internal is carrying a air to ground bomb of which we have only paveway 4 be it b or c. Any future weapon could be heavier up to 1500lb on b or 2500 on c but it will be a single air to ground weapon on both aircraft for the bunker busting capabilty that is the only difference.
The original radius for f35b was 550nm since reduce 15% to 464nm. That range is assuming flying from the deck in hot conditions a 5% reduced thrust engine and a 2 % fuel flow reduction and landing with full internal weapons fit and necessary fuel. In other worlds an actual real world mission. That is a kpp and as of 1 April this year is being meet
Seriously?
The original program goal for F35B was 550nm? Even the basic Breguet range equation would have given the two finger salute to anyone from Lockheed trying to claim that. What was the original F35A/C goal? 800nm?
It makes sense in terms of the 15% thing, but I’ve never heard or read of 550nm being a goal. Ho hum.
However, it’s a good thing you’re right. 380nm would be no better than Harrier II.
Since you seem to be in the know… any idea what the F35B mission profile is for 450/469nm?
Re F35B vs C. Not feeling smug yet, but it’s a good start.
http://defensetech.org/2012/03/26/uk-might-stick-with-the-f-35c/?ESRC=sm_deftech.nl
This is becoming more amusing as the days tick by.
It’s a real shame our defence is run by accountants. They should stick with what we NEED, not what we can AFFORD – obviously there’s a limit to this idea, but equiping the Army with Ford Fiestas instead of Warrior is a bad idea, even if it does turn out very slightly cheaper!
Happy Easter.
I’ve just realised… when I say accountants, I mean inept accountants. Mediocre accountants would keep things in budget a little better.
Off topic, but BAe appear to have prevailed!
(Source: Reuters; published Apr 3, 2012)
LONDON — British defence contractor BAE Systems said a contract to build 48 Typhoon aircraft in Britain for the Saudi Arabian air force had been signed but changes to the price of the deal had yet to be agreed.
BAE had expected changes to the terms of the deal to be signed off in 2011, but it warned in January this year that talks over proposed adjustments to the final assembly of the last 48 of the 72 Typhoon aircraft would continue into 2012 and could hit 2011 profit.
The proposed changes — such as the creation of a maintenance facility in Saudi Arabia, the addition of new capability to some aircraft and the formalisation of price changes — could affect the price of the deal.
The Salam deal to build a total of 72 aircraft was signed in 2007 and is worth around 4.5 billion pounds ($7.21 billion), with the first squadron of 24 already delivered to the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF).
“The contract for the final assembly of 48 Typhoon aircraft in the UK has now been signed and final assembly has commenced at our Warton facility, discussions are ongoing with regard to the creation of a maintenance facility in Saudi Arabia and the formalisation of price variations,” BAE said in an email sent to Reuters on Tuesday.
“In terms of … conversion to Tranche 3 and formalisation of price escalation, good progress has been made with budgets approved in December 2011 through the royal decree. Negotiations on price escalation will continue into 2012.”
(end of excerpt)
Probable implications:
A reduction of MOD annual spend on Typhoon for the next few years as aircraft from the UK production line are diverted to the Saudi’s. Good for your gov’ments black hole.
Extension of the UK peroduction line life from around 2016 to atleast 2018.
The down side, a slower build up of RAF Typhoon numbers with Typhoon’s still being delivered late this decade.
@ Aussie Johnno just above,
On points 1 and 2, oh, I hope so. On the third I’m afraid so. Although frankly, in an RAF fast jet fleet dominated by Typhoon cadging some of the German and Italian shortfall (agreements be damned, the Germans and Italians certainly have when it comes to industrial output for Eurofighter) to replace done-in Tranche 1s would not be unwise. More of my “RAF learns to take its Typhoon-flavoured cod liver oil and like it” approach I’m afraid :)
On a sourer note:
http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/story/2012/03/26/pol-f35s-fighter-jets.html
For those wondering if there’s a deeper context than parties bollocking one another, that smell in the air is the exhaust from the Avro Arrow. Think TSR.2 is still a measure for sore points in domestic defence politics? Let some of the folk this side of the Atlantic (the one I’m on these days) explain the science….
On a matter of substance with regard to the above DND documents, the Arctic issue is a live one in Canada (hence, as ACC said somewhere upthread, the confab at the High Commsision.) Which is a real failure of foresight in DC, where it seems military-iundustrial greed got ahead of an excellent chance, in a straitened fiscal climate, to outsource quite a lot of North America’s Arctic security to Canada in return for the resources therein. (All of that’s if they’re right — even if so it’s the kind of problem that could be solved neatly in the past by two aircraft types for meaningfully different jobs, except when your full budget’s been gobbled down by Lockheed Martin with no signs of a tactical chunder.)
@jackstaff
Sounds like a software issue – it doesn’t really change the selection of the platform (i.e. the actual aircraft design).
I’m sure something will be sorted before the planes are actually delivered in any operational numbers.
Perhaps I’m deluded ;-)
Anyway why should the Canadian procurement be any different to anyone else? The STOVL version doesn’t take off in the required 550ft, the CATOBAR version doesn’t catch the wire – which I’m told is quite important!
Is anyone getting all excited yet, surely the big old announcement is due any time soon!!!
More to the point, does anyone actually care which one it is as long as the numbers look right, F35C or B.
I still stand by my comments that this decision cuts to the very heart of the MoD’s credibility and they need to get this one spot on.
This article has worked up some figures based on an assumption that the UK is set to buy 150 F-35s. Anyone think it’s accurate?
“The UK is set to fork out £15 billion, or $24 billion, for the American Joint Strike Fighter program, whose total costs are set to exceed £900 billion ($1.4 billion) over the next 50 years, making it the most expensive military project in history.
The JSF stealth fighter jets, also known as F-35, are being developed and assembled by Lockheed Martin in the US. The JSF program is partly funded by Britain and seven other “partner nations”.
Each F-35 Lightning II stealth fighter jet will cost the UK around £85 million ($136 million), plus an extra £16 million ($25.6 million) for each engine.
All in all, America’s closest ally intends to buy 150 fighter jets for about £101 million ($161.6 million) each plane, although that is a substantial discount on the cost price.”
http://rt.com/news/f-35-british-cost-billions-590/
I seriously doubt that we’ll buy anything like 150 of ’em. I would be surprised if we ever get into three digits.
Getting excited, TD? It’ll be like Christmas; lots of nervous anticipation, but ultimately disappointment once we’ve found out what we’ve got.
There’ll always be the box to play with.
I dreamt last night that we bought 52 of them. Two squadrons and a training / reserve. The question that disturbs me the most was why did I dream about F35!
If we stick with the c version to remain credible well need to hear how they plan to integrate the ship this gives an excellent overview of what’s required http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/in-focus-why-the-uks-carriers-will-not-be-airfields-at-sea-370186/.
Clinch I think those numbers are on the high side unless significant support contracts are included. With f35 it will all depend on when the planes are purchased. If I’m a betting man I’d say the initial batch will be 66 f35b. I would also like to see the cost offsets for buying the b against the conversion of both ships and differences in maintainance costs cause I suspect the break even point is quite a number of years of service.
Mark, All he did was talk about how a carrier works and then say “It is different from an airfield”. My response was No Sh#t Sherlock.
“More to the point, does anyone actually care which one it is as long as the numbers look right, F35C or B.”
Nope, “b”, “c”, or sopwith camel, don’t care so long as we buy enough that we can surge one carrier to full capacity (36?) in the event of an-island-that-must-remain-unnamed style scenario.
@Mark
Your point about the integration is very valid. Even the CATOBAR version of QEC will be very different from a Nimitz: fewer planes, crew of just 700, 2 catapults not 4. Its not enough simply to say: copy the USN. It will be fscinating what sort of sortie rates we propose to generate and how it will all be achieved.
@Aussie Johnno
I see the Typhoon delivery schedule as a significant plus. It enables us to meet our contractual and industrial need to buy a large number of planes while keeping the operational costs down by wearing them out sequentially. Scrap and build. I’d rather have a stock of around 100 mature design planes with low airframe hours at the end of the build cycle than a mixed bag of 250 of various batches and blocks with fatigue present thoughout the fleet and not able to afford crews for them all.
The longer we can keep the UK line open the more mature the design becomes, so the more useful the late productions batches will be. Also the more chance of scooping up late export orders.
“The down side, a slower build up of RAF Typhoon numbers with Typhoon’s still being delivered late this decade.”
I think you’ll simply hear the words “Grandad, do you remember when you were operating Buccaneers from Ark Royal, well, can you give me a hand…”
Peter, et al,
Give the RN some credit on the subject of tackling the development of a future CATOBAR deck capacity. We have been embedded with USN carrier operations teams for some years now, and have been developing operating procedures, limitations and risk analyses for the most basic of air wing embarkations. A proper workup procedure for the ship coming out of build, sea trials and eventually to workup. Flight deck design has been studied, and is being studied exhaustively to figure out the numbers and locations of aircraft parking spots, weapon routes, etc. I don’t have a detailed knowledge of the true scope of these studies but they are very much at the forefront of the Maritime Warfare Centre’s priorities.
We’ll be ready for basic ops. Advanced will come only with practice and real toys. I would imagine that we will work up using French or USN training facilities instead of trying to grow our own carrier training capability.
Peter Elliott says:
April 10, 2012 at 4:11 pm
– without pasting all of that in, I quite agree
Now, the dynamics of it? The transition
– Tiffies vs carrier-based
– Tiffies vs Tornados: deep strike, interdiction and CAS (anyone who has read the posts long enough will have noticed that I assert the RAF trying to intermingle the deep strike and interdictiction terms in the strategy documents, so that they can claim to be able to do both)
– Tiffies vs (when Tornado all gone, and how many was it again of the) F-35s over and above the carrier air wing?
Without addressing anyone in particular:
-yes, sure “Give the RN some credit on the subject of tackling the development of a future CATOBAR deck capacity. ”
I programme management that goes into Issues, ie. the things that can be handled within the financials, manpower and expertise assigned.
Risks (to the same programme) WOULD BE THOSE THAT ARE OUTSIDE OF THE LIST: they have struck many a times already
Fingers crossed…
Well I’d settle for around 100 each of F35 and late batch Tiffy from 2025 onwards. Realistically only 1 squadron of RAF F35 and the rest FAA.
In the period 2015-25 we will need more Tiffies, possibly around 150-200, to cover the drawdown of Tornado taking place before significant numbers of F35 are available. Providing conformals and Storm Shadow have been fixed by then I don’t see that as a major drama.
The devil will of course be in the detail. Long debates can be had about the relative merits of the oldest, least capable T1 Tiffies vs the newest of the Tornados vs the logistical savings of eliminating a type.
The best technical solution will probably be a messy compromise, which I why I expect we may end up with some politician saying: “sod it, just withdraw all the Tornados on 1 June 2015 and have done.”
Peter,
I agree with your numbers more or less.
I also think that the 150-200 (Tornado/F35 plug) you speak of would be provided by the T1 Typhoon. I really don’t see us buying any more than the 160 we’re currently commited to, it’s just how we use the old airframes (attrition, OCU, air-defence, etc).
This lack of money is a real pain.
Can anyone provide a link for the F35 A/B/C mission profiles… please.
Simon,
I’d say LM and US DoD (particularly in the bowels of Dept. of the Air Force and Dept. of the Navy), beyond the usual round of slanging matches around Aviation Week or DefenseTalk (which are more a pain to slog through for the useful bits than open-source Google Fu) are the likeliest targets. There’s even a bit of that on Wiki, at least the bare bones (and really, as wf IIRC brought up a few threads back, one of the drawbacks with Wiki is not itself but the primary sources on which it draws — if someone like RUSI or Jane’s or a typo from the clerk-corporal at MoD/DoD/DND produces a howler it lives forever in the Wikiverse.)
In advance of tomorrow’s (today’s, for most of the crowd here) beginnings of SDSR v. 1.1: This Time It’s Personal (otherwise known as PR12) I’d like to take a quick late night tour of two options for the Carrier Enhanced Strike Projectile Magical Mystery Tour. Starting from the question “Like? What would I *like* to see happen in a not-completely-fantastical world?” I would like to take two examples so we can reckon backwards towards the possible:
Option 1: Super-Group
This assumes an approach OGH has brought up once or twice before, a trend of the RN towards a single-task-force structure, and weds it to a general consensus in this thread, one I liked already and have become an enthusiastic cheerleader for along the way. Structured so:
1 x QE with “cats and flaps” and proper fast jet presence (2×15, making 30 surging to 36 by field-stripping the OCU of instructors and sweating the spare squadron pilots if things get ugly)
2 x Canberra clone LHDs (more embarked squaddies, vice aircrew, than the Spanish version, would need to have well deck configuration examined for the small but important differences in dimension between the LCM-1E around which they were built and British LCU Mk 10s)
1 x JSS (Karel Doorman make, with that nice steel-beach ramp in the back that we can figure out how to marry up with transfer to LCUs, to fully use the extra 2000 LIMS it offers for EMF kit)
1 x Wave-class tanker (additional to the JSS because of the task force size)
Guarded by a 3/3 mix of T45s/frigates and an Astute SSN (ability to surge a second Astute)
It’s one task force, afloat at best 180-200 days a year but able to work up and deploy in emergency year-round (you’ve got the second QE in extended readiness, and even if an LHD goes in for refit at least you could float a battlegroup as needed.) Gives you escort protection for a proper carrier air group plus a brigade-minus shaped around two full RM Commandos plus 30 Cdo Signals (3 Cdo’s current HQ formation) and light support, c. 2600 pax and (between LHDs and JSS) 3600-plus LIMS for their associated kit. There’s your entry air cover (carrier jets and LHD helis) plus two battalions of green death for lodgement seizure and expansion, a force that could do a whole run of small-scale contingencies by itself or execute the mission mooted in the thread so RFA Fergie and her sisters can crash ashore leading in delivery of a proper Army force for ops ashore. Eggs in one basket, but a good basket.
Option 2: Adaptable QEs
If we back up and consider shoulda-woulda-coulda with the CVF project, what are ways to maximise the versatility and effectiveness of the ships themselves? In this case (NB this is not a direct commentary on the hulls under build, although it’s relatively early days yet and perhaps some or even all of this could be done with investment of effort, it’s first and last a thought experiment) I’d take the extant design or near as dammit and:
– Work to increase hangar space and/or RN operating parameters to permit an air group of fifty, composed of:
2×12 CATOBAR fast jets (F35C? Rafale? Like TD’s “outside bet” I’ve always been struck by the fact that “tempest” is a perfectly reasonable loose translation of the French word “rafale” …)
6 x ASW Merlin
4 x something workmanlike (Osprey? New-build S-3s? Time, gentlemen, please?) with 3 as AEW and 1 COD
12 x CHF Merlin
4 x Wildcat/Apache (former are navalised and have larger combat radius, but it does come down to politics and chasing sexy kit)
This gives you, in the one hull, a highly capable modern iteration of the Audacious-class model (Eagle/Ark) and an Ocean-successor LPH
– Second mod is, over and above the berthing for ship’s complement (up to c. 1600) for crew/aircrew/a dash of flag staff, austere accomodation for 600 embarked RM and their personal gear
You then work to run two task groups, each formed around:
1 x QE (as rethunk)
2 x Bay (need to figure out rough-and-ready ways to bodge a second LCU aboard, which would surely break rules and possibly conflict with design tolerances, but it would be good to keep a 4-LCU minimum)
1 x JSS (keeping command facilities as aboard the Dutch models in place of the Albions, and taking roughly half of the lane space to create a much larger hospital capability)
2 x T45s (surge to 3)
3 x T23/T26
1 x SSN (surge to 2)
Each group is then a versatile fleet carrier/LPH hybrid, the remaining auxiliaries to deploy a light RM battlegroup of c. 1300 pax, and escorts/SSN. The condition of this, of course, is that you need both carriers in service, and it builds pressure (glass of something strong and soothing for James, please) to lay down a third carrier (swapping 3 Vincis, Ocean, and 2 LPDs for half that many QEs) so two could really be maintained in service at all times. Also requires going all-in on a carrier fighter-bomber buy, with 1 squadron each of FAA and RAF on each carrier working up and down with it (4x sqdns total in service.)
Given those two scenarios to achieve some genuinely useful effect, it may actually be cheaper to follow the “Supergroup” approach with a pair of big de-risked LHDs riding alongside the one active carrier and its air wing, rather than building for two, even lean, groups.
Reality of course is a completely different matter — I suspect Boxing Day will be a real bugger after “Christmas” tomorrow — but reckoning from those possibilities I’ll be interested to see what turns up.
Honestly, I’ve looked at the various resources you indicated for the F35 mission profiles and there is nothing that comes close. The nearest I’ve found is a Dutch requirement. I don’t trust the ramblings of people on forums.
Are we really all commenting on the F35’s capability without really knowing what the capability actually is? Surely some of you know?
Without knowing the mission we cannot compare the F35B (USMC MP) with the F35C (USN MP).
For example, I’ve been writing a computer program to simulate these missions and cannot make C have a longer range than A unless the mission changes. It simply takes more than 8890/8390 (6%) more fuel to push those bigger wings through the sky with the given AR (aspect ratio).
On a similar note, the maximum speed of C cannot be as quick as A, so there’s another difference that is not published (more drag from bigger wings, but with the same engine).
@Simon
Blame LM. This is one of the cases where the toy itself “wooo.. stealth…” drove considerations as opposed to operational needs. The F-35 is probably not considered as a “we need x, design something for it”, but instead is seen as an “upgrade in capablilty” to roles already played by traditional fighters, hence the very general purpose of it’s nature (air superiority version, carrier version, VTOL version etc).
This is excabated by the fact that the design itself is still subjected to change (e.g redesign of wing roots for lower weight, more stress resistance etc), and hence the capabilities can change too. There may be a few planes out, but at this stage, F-35 is still pretty much a test plane, abet a fairly mature test plane.
jackstaff,
As for the rest of your post…
Your option 1 is very similar to what we will actually get:
1 QE
1 LPH
1 LPD
2 LSL
+ various other supply and logistical support ships.
However, I think we’ll go one of two ways with regard to LHDs:
1. Not build them at all, rely on RFA LSLs and build single Ocean replacement LPH.
2. Build cheaper (Ocean-like) versions that aren’t designed to carry heavy loads (use Bay for that).
This is why I like your adapted Bay in option 2, it fits the bill quite nicely.
Observer,
I’m starting to agree about the design ethos from a UK point of view, but surely the Americans designed it for a given requirement, even if that requirement was F16/F18 but with stealth.
The daft thing is that if my above presumption is true (or nearly true) then it’s proof it’s no good for us. We never bought the F16/F18/etc to upgrade with stealth – the only one is AV8B + stealth, which we currently think we can live without for a decade.
Simon the information for which your looking regarding mission profiles is very likely classified you may get some information but it would not be entirely accurate. The range difference between a and c is only about 30miles the aspect ratio improvement helps a bit but in a fighter induced drag will only be around a 1/4 of its total drag in subsonic cruise configuration which makes the breguet range equation a little less accurate. Also the lower wing loading with the bigger wing should reduce the required angle of incidence at cruise on the c model also.
RE ““tempest” is a perfectly reasonable loose translation of the French word “rafale” …
– Dassault had to consult a thesaurus as they had already done “ouragan”
@Simon
It’s worse. The design philosophy of the F-35 is the same as the old “Freedom Fighter” program, a cheap copy of a fighter with less sensitive tech for use of the US’s “allies” (or proxies depending on who you’re talking to.). So, no, there was no overriding “mission” for it, other than to be cheap and safe to lose to China/Russia etc.
The big facepalm and lol is that with the shuttering of the F-22 line, the “cheap, less capable” F-35 is now the frontline fighter for the US, which means that the design considerations suddenly took a 180 and they now have to push it to cutting edge for increased capability, which is why I take great delight in watching Congress squirm as they end up with the results of their own “Congressionally mandated level of stealth etc”.
I’ll be honest and say that the F-35 is a bit of a Frankenstein’s monster, it tries to be a bit of this and that of everything, part of the original purpose. I’m sure it’ll finally be produced, but how it’ll perform is still a question mark, though I suspect it won’t be as good as if it had a mission design purpose from the start.
RE ” Build cheaper (Ocean-like) versions that aren’t designed to carry heavy loads (use Bay for that)”
– I would tend to go for more units as opposed to the concentration on bigger (favoured by most so far?)ships, fashioned on Canberras and their Spanish cousins
– the price to pay would be undoing some of the good work done by RN in slimming down crewing requirements; I take it that more units would skew the ratio of total crew to total landed force?
Mark,
I guess you’re right – about the information being classified.
I have typical Cdi for A at 0.0046, B at 0.0050 and C at 0.0047 – so, as you say, not a lot in it. AR is slightly better for C, but it cruises at a slightly higher Cl (due to a lower cruise speed and 14% higher mid mission mass).
Hi Observer, a lot of truth in what you say.
Read this, though, to see how the F-35 systems effort fits in with UCLASS and strategic bomber coming hot on the heels
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/02/secret-stealth-bomber/
Observer,
I agree with your Frankenstein analogy.
Personally (this includes my calcs) the F35A is a pretty decent jet and will reasonably replace land-based F18s and F16s. If they’d cut and run with just the A, they’d have a cheap jet and the project would have been a major success.
@ jackstaff, with ref to your plans, much has been made of call me dave’s visit to japan where he signed a deal for military cooperation, mentioned several times this could help with MPA (ie the xp-1) however don’t forget they some nice blueprints for a fairly big helicopter carrier (already in the water and sea proven) and a big helicopter carrier!
The big one i like, because it has future proof written in hangers and lifts able to take chinook, V-22 and CH-53K (the new one) seeing as we are paying BAe £127million just to muck about with pen and paper for a design for T26, if it’s already done isn’t that a massive saving, i realise we would have to pay to use the design but i bet it wouldn’t be 127m! No well deck but hey can’t have everything.
(and designed for F-35, just to stay on thread topic)
Simon
I think were getting into areas that get very difficult to predict due to a large amount of information that simply isnt available in the public domain. On your cdi the numbers seem slightly low to me, there more in line with a f16. The a/c design point is not in the public domain but some info on the net indicate a cruise of around 0.9m @ 30kFt.
Mark,
You’re right, there are too many variables to muck about with the reverse engineer the range. e.g. I’ve just shoved in a wave drag fudge and the Cdi leaps massively.
The thing is that whatever I do to the simulation the B does ~75% of the A’s range and the C does ~90%. I just can’t get C to give me the range.
Oh well, I’ll just give up.
Simon,
I dunno, I’m well impressed with what you’re trying to do and not entirely surprised the numbers get funny. Particularly given some of the open source stuff on Dave C’s load and aerodynamics that would seem to indicate more limits on range (did LM wave a magic wand and factor buddy refueling without telling anyone? Wouldn’t put it past them; what shouldve crossed people’s minds when LM got the tender was, this is the same company that gave the world the F-104.)
On the CV/LPH split, if they did it I wish to God they’d do it properly. In other words, QE with an angled deck and conversion *now* (rather than prevaricating as an excuse to kill or sell the ship as in SDSR 1.0), PoW with the jump to recover allied VSTOL, back quarter of the flight deck (vehind the elevator amidships) blocked off for vehicles and a stern ramp bashed on (carrying ca. 30-32 helis would be fine) and a real effort to create uniform density (the US gets 3000 berths incl 1800 jarheads aboard the smaller frame of a Wasp class, surely such an LPH could get just over 1000 crew/aircrew, reckoning from QE ship’s crew and a beefed up version of Ocen’s aircrew, plus ca. 1600 EMF aboard. That would be a “supergroup” combo worth having. And might even play into BAE’s hands as you start to think, when one of these goes into refit it’s a massive capability holiday, so which subtype should get a spare (third build overall)?
Paul g,
Well sussed — I’ve wondered about the 22DDH myself. Lots and lots of room in that design to do more than the MSDF plans to, and future proofed just as you say. (I’m also a big fan of the Hyugas, for MSDF anyway, they are exactly the “through deck” cruiser/squadron leader for ASW the Vincis were first meant to be, and just what the Japanese needed. So they know how to actually design for operational purpose.) And God, don’t get me started on the £127m etch a sketch :) Another good thought on your lines would be asking Daewoo, “while you’re on about MARS, how about knocking off a pair of beefed up Dokdos?” Fast, well deck, carry the load the Albions should’ve done, helis aboard, etc.
Simon
You do seem quite keen are you involved with the industry in any way or a student of aero/mech engineering or is this just general interest.
Hi Simon,
Admittedly the total-life-cost estimates have been raised because the commonality between the versions is less than originally envisaged, but how would cutting the total production by up to a third make the jets cheaper?
– all and more can be achieved just by pushing the A into mass production and leaving the other two carry (also price-wise) their own complications?
RE “If they’d cut and run with just the A, they’d have a cheap jet”
Jackstaff / Paul G
Not sure politically we can buy a pure LPH just now or people will be asking why the QEC that we’ve alredy paid for can’t do the job?
Something with a dock to replace the Albions is therefore much more likely. Only question is how much aviation facility can we load on top of the dock before bean counters get the wrong idea and try to scrap the QEC and rely on the dock ships for air cover instead?
On the question of crush loading the QEC with either people or airframes or both I think we have to look closer at the design assumptions.
Presumably the way we expect to generate high sortie rates with a crew of just 700 is by streamlining and automating the servicing and re-arming process. While on paper you might be able to fit 50 planes and 2,000 people on board I suspect that that would bugger up those cycles becuase there would be planes and people in the way. As a result all that extra resource may not generate the increase in sorties that would be needed to justify the cost – at least in peacetime.
The USAF would possibly have had a cheaper jet.
The USN and the USMC would each have had to develop something else. How much that would have cost is un-knowable, so the total value calculation to the US taxpayer is very hard to do.
RE “If they’d cut and run with just the A, they’d have a cheap jet”
Hi paul g,
RE “(and designed for F-35, just to stay on thread topic)
– the conspiracy theory about the Japanese being so much in a hurry to get their A’s is that they would, by actually operating them, get the confidence to order B’s for the new carriers (sorry, destroyers)
My “cut and run” comment was with the benefit of hindsight, so not a reality. The trouble with the project is that the viable A is being plagued by problems with B and C.
You’re absolutely right that the Navy and USMC would have needed to start another project, but it may (or may not) have been cheaper to NOT have all three models affected by design changes due to requirements on others, if you get what I mean.
The thing that’s laughable is that the mighty US have fallen into an LM trap, similar to the BAE trap we fall into all the time (all the eggs in one basket).
I think they’re actually in a worse position on procurement to ours becuase
(a) The tradition of throwing resources at every challenge is deeply ingrained in the military
(b) Congressional ‘pork barrel’ politics is built around securing big value military spending in particular localities and the executive / legistative split hard-wires incoherence into the system.
(c) On a macro level the strategy of out-spending their rivals has been successful for the past 100 years. In that context lots of people just won’t understand the need for a more VFM approach.
(d) The fiscal crunch is only just starting to bite them, unlike UK and EU where we are now several years into austerity.
(e) When a procurement fails they don’t have the option other countires have used of buying OTS from an allied superpower.
“The thing that’s laughable is that the mighty US have fallen into an LM trap, similar to the BAE trap we fall into all the time”
PE,
Sortie rates are indeed the potential problem — if that were done I suspect the official reasoning would be versatility and reduction in hull numbers with attendant personnel/maintenance costs. But mostly it’s a thought experiment, like your Air Force-only F35. To maintain the proposed 1800-strong EMF two of BAE’s own sketch for an LHD (basically Ocean as it always should have been, and someone needs to have a word with them about maintaining Ocean’s level of airgroup) would serve, a pair of them would slot into my “Option 1” just fine. But that’s a small task force, for minor raid actions, semi-permissive evacuations, and the like, not a full-on beachead seizure. And BAE’s Ocean mk 2 is a sketch at the moment, based on models in service yes but with development yet to come. With the Canberras development’s largely done but for adaptive changes and unit costs would draft behind three already built and not having to lug a hull across two major oceans for fitting out. Take the ski ramp off ’em so the engineers can explain, using slow, small words for the pollies’ benefit, that this means they can recover STOVL aircraft but not launch them with a full war load. And then you’ve got a two-battalion brigade-minus entry force again(which could be reinfed rapidly by dropping Spearhead in with them once A400 is on line.)
Simon,
The trap with LM is because LM and BAE are, these days, very similar beasts: not so much “companies” as we’re usually given to understand and work for but hierarchies, predatory and basically feudal at heart (ie rent-seeking and power/status-grabbing) that sit atop a mound of equity used to devour a wi range of defence-related, smaller companies that actually designed and built stuff and ran facilities and had supply chains and sold systems to the competitive market. They were assimilated, Borg-like, because each littler company’s ongoing contracts would be “expectation of future profit margins” for the big beast which builds share value which builds the paper equity to buy more stuff and wheedle parliamentarians/congresscritters and revolving-door the gold braid types and on and on. And the LM, beset with hubris, actually tried to design and build something within its original, home division (LM aerospace) whose fairly toxic approach to design and sharp-practice sales 1) produced the epic fail of F-104 and 2) caused LM to be beaten into near extinction among the next generation of American fighters by General Dynamics (until LM, like BWoS, got into the defence-sector corporate raiding game.)
ACC,
I suspect that’s exactly right, actually, about Japanese aircraft choices. Like the fact the Konngos are called “cruisers” at home but “destroyers” in any statements to foreign press.
PE,
Your numbered points move on, nicely, from the problem of LM-as-LM to the dysfunction of the American defence mindset. When you have to deal both with “bad emperor” (LM) and “bad system” (Pentagon procurement culture) you’re pretty well ****ed.
Jackstaff @ 9.41
Surely the Ocean Mk2 could be designed on the back of a fag packet?
What are the issues BWoS need to deal with?
Looking at 240/250m x 36m x 8-9m.
45MW would provide 23 knots plus.
The joker would be 10K-m3 of liquid storage.
Handy to keep the T45’s topped up.
Maersk hull construction ideas with twin skegs.
Bit of complexity with the need to fit in a 60m x 18m x 12m well deck.
However nothing that would need a Nobel Prize.
Any thoughts on a possible budget?
£150mill for the civil hull plus £50mill for the warload?
@Jackstaff
Over on the MPA thread I suggested defining a standard set of hard-point interfaces for podded sensors and on-board computer workstations. That would allow separate procurements of the airframes and mission systems.
This was not just for the operational efficiency and flexibility, but also to let small, nimble, hungry suppliers back into the military procurement game.
If done right you could re-boot a whole commercial market in high technology mission systems that are not dependent on high end aeronautical knowledge or ‘command economy’ industiral strategy. Boutique capabilites able to be fitted on demand to any one of 3 or 4 differnet sized transport airfrmaes.
Wouldn’t work quite the same for Fast Jets becuase the aeronautic performance is so critical to the mission, but the procurment and integration of smart weapons from various different suppliers is a similar principle.
FBOT Is it to have a dock? The 45s have very long legs already so not sure we need to make it a tanker as well? The dimensions you propose make it almost as long as an America class and beamier. In fact it is beyond current PANAMAX size and with the expansion being a total cluster I am not certain the benefit of the extra 4m beam is worth it. You are looking at 40k tonnes plus, I am guessing the RN are looking at 25k or less.
All PATS @ 10.24
Well deck = Dock.
T45s = Anything RN with GTs is not longlegged.
In the Country of the Blind the one eyed man is king.
They are better than the T42s but they are not good enough.
PC lock sizes – If the USN / USMC got with the go-go world of Central American civil engineering they would cry over their plans for the “America”.
They have a fat slow Essex on their hands.
The PC lock size issue is being sorted as we speak.
Regarding size, why is it the determining factor?
Do the RN / MOD never black box their requirements?
What jobs has the ship to do?
What resources do we have available to do the job?
Size should never come into it.
All the MOD / RN should be interested in is the “Five C’s” –
Cost / Crew / Consumption / Capabilities / Capacities – that is all that is important.
You and the MOD live in the one dimensional world where size = cost.
In the real world things are different.
FBOT T45 will do 7k Nm at 18 kts and sprint to 33.
Everything I have read says the Panama Canal project in big trouble.
No I live in an operational world where an extra 15k tonnes of spaces and 3m worth of draught doing nothing generally means I cannot drive my Ship somewhere I want to.
As for capability, yes we want an Ocean replacement, in fact we may want to add a dock. A Juan Carlos would be ideal.
All PATS @ 10.59
The T45 is hampered by its range.
It cannot make the FI on one tank of fuel at 18 knots.
If it had gone with MSD’s then there would not be an issue.
Greater range = Greater flexibility.
Regarding your 33 knots claim – why?
Is it so that it can run away from torpedoes?
PC Expansion programme – Looking OK to me.
Any issues then it is the Civils who will have to sort it out.
And anyway why would the RN need to send Ocean2 through the PC anyway?
Are we going to get all fighty with Peru?
Your comments regarding the JC1 suggest that the RN / MOD total lack of vision and imagination is alive and well.
If you think that the JCI represents your thoughts on an ideal Ocean2 then I would hate to see what you think is a poor design.
FD = poorly dimensioned and laid out.
Stability = looks a bit top heavy / slab sided to me.
It would be interesting to see the figures if water gets in on one side.
Panamax dimensions = Slightly old fashioned, overtaken by events.
Extra beam / volume would make for a better platform.
Consequently interesting first step towards a low cost but capable and versatile ship but surely not the destination.
As for the issue about draught – we are talking STOVL / Helos / Fast LCMs.
Just how close to shore do you want to go?
Looks a very manufactured point to base the suitability of a design on.
If low draught is king – why not 6m or 4.5m?
My last question to you if the JC1 did not exist what would you do?
Hi FBOT,
The Waves do 18 knots, no pit stop in Gib required.
If you want to have the “defenders” placed optimally in a task force steaming ahead at 18+ knots, then a sprint speed is required?
– like the destroyers used to be the fastest (to get in between the torpedo boats and the capital ships… well, to destroy)
– or, when all the sensors were still onboard, the ASW dashing to where-ever it was believed they needed to be (in relative position)
The wording must show that I am not an aspiring naval historian?
ACC @ 12.00
You make my point for me.
If you sort out the T45 with MSDs and a realistic unit cost of production you send two fighty hulls to the FI not a one club golfer and its own personal service / filling station.
If the RN went for a 14K mile range then their deployments could be a lot more flexible.
The T45 is AAW, an extra 5 knots is not much help when the incoming is 600mph at the very least.
Consequently I am sticking to my “run away from torpedoes” assertion.
Hi FBOT, RE
“The T45 is AAW, an extra 5 knots is not much help when the incoming is 600mph at the very least.
Consequently I am sticking to my “run away from torpedoes” assertion.”
– more like 15 knots extra, wasn’t it? And all about relative position (if there is any information about the threat). If the real “instance” of threat is coming in at 5 m above the waves, then where you are positioned would be of utmost importance?
– have you read the Coyote missile trials (by the French, but the same missile as ours)? A pity they only bought one (they tested the sea skimming mode, I think, not the go high and dive).
ACC @ 12.40
There are claims the T45 can do 33 knots.
I have no ideal what is to be gained by any speed above 28 knots’ish.
This is here I get my 5 knots from.
28 knots = 32MW / 4 x MSD Gen sets.
1000 tons of oil gets you 14K mile range.
The effort would be worth it.
FBOT, Ships do stop for other reasons you know. Fresh food, Ships company run ashore, a bit of Defence Diplomacy but of course in your number crunchiung world actual operational patterns are irrelevant. Draught is not King but unrequired extra draught and size is not helpful.
AS for criticsm of the Juan Carlos you are of course careful to be non specific. i chose it as it exsists already would do the jib we require it to do and save us the inevitable BAE design farce which I hate as much as you.
Whatever we get must have the ability, to supply the required lane metres, to operate LCU Mk10 and any potential replacement. Be able to operate the LCVP. Be bale to fly and maintain Merlin, Chinook and Wild Cat and be able to fly CH53 and Osprey.
It should have the C2 capabilities to allow the Amphibious Commander to operate from and ideally a good self defence capability from both surface and air threats.
Speed should be 20kts plus and range 10k NM. It should be able to carry 1k troops.
That is what we need it to do and the Juan Carlos is a pretty good starter for 10.
We are not the US we do not have hundreds of helos to try and fit onboard.
My recollection is that the T45 has an exceptional range. Having a quick look at Wikipedia (I know not a great source – but readily available) – maybe one of the experts can get some more realistic numbers. The Arleigh Burke class shows a range of 4400nm @ 20kn vs the T45’s 7700nm @ 18kn. Even allowing for some ropey data – that’s a big range advantage over a current US design.
As to speed – one of the primary purposes of the T45 is escorting the carrier. Since the carrier will have to turn into the wind at full speed (i think around 25kn for QE) quite regularly, its important that the escort can get into a revised position to cover the carrier as rapidly as possible. If the T45 could only do 28kn, she would only have a 3kn speed advantage over the carrier. Additionally, they might be escorting a french or US carrier that can do 27kn and 30kn+ respectively.
That’s all apart from any work on their own – if they need to get to location say 500nm way, the extra 5kn could get them there 2.5 hrs faster.
On range – my understanding is that the navy will avoid running a ship anywhere near empty at almost any costs – so the range on a tank of fuel is not all that relevant. there’s no point in getting to the Falklands with less than half a tank (assuming the Argentine’s might be there and you can’t refuel) – you’re going to need to top up as close as possible to the Falklands (Ascension?) and ideally have a tanker with you – you certainly aren’t going to be refueling in any south american port given the current diplomatic climate. Greater range really means less time between fuel top ups.
d’oh! – sorry – correction to above! – “less time between top ups” should say “more time between top ups” or “fewer top ups”
If we’re looking to design Ocean2 then we need to define what she’s carrying.
How about:
4 LCU (750t ish)
4 LCVP (50t ish)
1500t AVCAT (2 weeks of ops with 18 copters like Ocean)
100 Pinzgauer (400t loaded)
That’s 2700t total warload.
If we need 8000nm range that means a ship of about 32,000t and about 37,000t for a 10,000nm range.
These are big ships and really the domain of the US.
We’d need to somehow cut back the requirement and that’s either less aviation endurance or separate LPH and LPD/LSL.
Alternatively perhaps Ocean was actually total overkill and we can live with a weeks “coptering” and rely on somehow getting a tanker to the coal face every week.
Actually, if we wanted to design Ocean2 I should have posted that on a completely separate thread. Sorry.
All PATS @ 5.58
As I have noted before you are the MODs “Abominable No-Man”.
Where others see opportunity and progress you see problems and negativity.
Range – 7K vs 14K?
This is about flexibility, you keep the same sailing pattern as before but in extremis you have a more capable platform needing less support.
As for the JC1 how much more specific do you want my criticisms to be?
The FD is poor – inefficient / narrow / not very flexible.
It loks top heavy – 115ft hull depth / 24 ft draught and 90ft+ to the FD on a beam of 105ft.
I would be interested to know the stability reserves and how they cope with a hull penetration below the WL.
In fairness the Mistral appears to be worse in this respect.
My thoughts are 120ft hull depth – 30ft below / 90ft above – on a 120ft beam.
That would be my starter for 10.
More info would bring in the CVF hull form – 130ft beam – into play if it be shown that design re-use and build efficiency could be factored into the thrifted Ocean Mk2 design.
You could call this the “Chevaline” gambit to protect the CVF if it ran into trouble – offer up multiple targets that look the same.
Simon @ 9.55
Where are you getting your range numbers from?
What is the fuel consumption – TPD – at 14 / 18 knots?
What powertrain are you planning to use?
FBOT Absalon is powered by Diesles only and at 6,300 Tonnes she manages only 9,000Nm at 15kts whilst topping out at 24kts. So how on earth do we get a diesel set up for an 8k tonne destroyer to go 14k NM and still sprint at 30kts plus?
I am not sure I am unduly fussed about the detail of ship designs once the principles have been decided.
If it’s 7 or 9 thousand tons or powered by 60 or 70 MW. If the decision is to ‘go big and go diesel’ for unarguable benefits simplicity /COTS/hydrodynamic efficiency, and fuel consumption/ range, then I’m cool with the details.
However, If you feel that ‘only’ bespoke High tech, relatively small gas turbine powered stuff, is good enough that is philosophical argument, about naval power (OK one which ends up with destroyed ships and dead sailors when we get it wrong, so it’s kinda important).
32,000t (230m long, ~2000t DIESO) is just scaling HMS Ocean up from 1500t of stuff to 2700t – I guess it’s a little over the top since Ocean actually carries 1500t + 150t copters + ~200t vehicles, but it’s on the safe side.
At first glance Juan Carlos fits the bill in terms of size but it maxes out at about 2700t when the weight is placed as low as it can be. An LHD operating with 2700t would need stability with 150+t moving around upstairs and on deck.
37,000t (240m long, ~2800t DIESO) is HMS Ocean scaled up by the extra fuel required.
With half a dozen tanks and heavier AAVs we’ll end up with Wasp.
All diesel powered direct drive at 15 knots cruise.
PS: it’s an estimate so +/- 10%.
All PATS @ 1.50
Why does it have to be 8K for an AAW destroyer?
Have the Koreans made a mistake aiming for 10K full load?
Can you not understand the concept of “Black Box”?
Worry about what resources you can put in and what it can do rather than worry about whether it it meets previous outmoded and inadequate design criteria.
The issues are –
Cost
Crew
Consumption
Capabilities
Capacity
The “Five C’s” if you like, sort that out and the size / shape are secondary.
When it comes to RN AAW No’s 7+8 – Improved T45s I have put forward the viewpoint that we should be working to
£125mill for the basic ship.
The warload would be extra – Sensors / £200mill budget + CMS / £50mill budget plus VLS @ £500K per tube.
Design re-use and volume discounts would help push these these numbers downwards.
Crew = 150 plus 50 reserves for a shooting war.
Consumption / Q+D = 36 tons per day @ 18 knots / 14K miles @ 18 knots.
Capabilities = T45 and then some / 30+ knots
Capacities = 96 AAW tubes + 48 land attack – both Sylver and Mk41.
The split would encourage price competition both in the tubes and also the munitions.
Sort that out and who cares what size it is.
FBOT I think the question is can a destroyer (of whatever shape/size) go 14000m unrefueled and sprint to 32 knots at the same time without comparmising everything else?
Topman @ 4.52
Help me out here, what is the fuel load on a T45?
The issue is that all ships in the RN above 5K tons should be able to do this.
Finding 600m3 in a hull should not be a showstopper.
If it is then RN’itis – Quart into a pint pot – strikes again.
Why does it need to sprint to 32 knots?
What sea state does this need cover?
We have an 8,000 Tonne Destroyer, that is why I asked. It will probably grow to near 9k tonnes in its lifetime. The Koreans do have a 10k plus DD it is powered by 4GTs so my question remains about how we get the performance from diesels? How much space and how much fuel would we need to carry?
AS for 150 plus 50 reserves? Have you ever even seen a watch and station bill?
144 launch tubes? I wish we could afford to put the missiles in them.
As for size and shape being secondary, RCS is slightly important and once again, we like to be able to berth them in certain places. ECMP? Established berths in dockyards without rebuilding the place. Air is free and steel is cheap but extra bulk for the sake of it is not required.
The 45 has room for another silo and may well get it.
I agree with SI that BAE are worthy of nothing but contempt but as an “expert user” I do get slightly pissed off at your constant criticism of things that you have only read about. We sometimes take a painful and expensive way to get there unfortunately but the kit we end up with is generally fit for purpose and compares well with what else is in service world wide.
‘Why does it need to sprint to 32 knots?’
To change position rapidly on operations. It would need GT I would think, due to the abaility to accelerate rapidly. You can go from idle to max NH in seconds. The rest of the questions I don’t know I’m not in the Navy.
Anyone know if they are the same redesigned Trents that go in QEC?
Topman, No they are WR21 in the 45. though they are based on a Trent. http://www.rolls-royce.com/marine/products/diesels_gas_turbines/gas_turbines/wr21.jsp
I estimate something like 900t fuel in Daring for 7000nm range at 18knots if that helps.
That leaves at least 300t free for other variable loads (Asters and aviation fuel).
All PATS @ 5.03
I see that NaB gave you the RN “Obtuse” baton when he decided to spend more time with his AstroTurf.
We are talking a ship that would be the size of a Bay, consequently basing is not an issue.
Design 1 – 199m x 27m x 6-7m / 16K – 20K tons full load.
Design 2 – 220m x 32m x 7-8m / 24K – 30K tons full load.
You have to wonder how we survived when we had 13 Counties / 10 Towns and a battle fleet to support.
As for crew, the T45s work with 190, we need to work with fewer going forward. That is the slope of RN crewing practice. Any P2P war fighting would involve a bigger crew using reserves to beef up the peacetime numbers.
The TA goes blue water?
MSD response time – idle to MCR is 60 seconds approximately.
I have seen power / time curves that work to 30-40 seconds but playing it safe.
GTs are not instantaneous so any ideas on their response times?
As for Motive power – looking at 8 units – 48MW to 72MW installed motive power.
That is 800 – 1200 tons in weight
And 2K – 3K m3 in space.
FBOT, You want to install 8 Diesels and cut manpower at the same time? You are suggesting a 16-20k tonne destroyer? We had bigger dockyards and used to leave some Ships at anchor. We now have slightly stricter rules on separated service etc. The Bay Class tend to spend a bit of time at Marchwood and Portland. basing a whole class of 200m 20k destroyers would be an interesting exercise and we certainly couldn’t use it down South.
Daring went from rest to max in about 2 mins during trials.
What would teh extra size do to turning circles and manouverability, weapon arcs during an FBA raid, FIAC attack or ability to conduct a TCM.
Sorry but why? Would I love mk41 and land attack caobility, yes, to do it do I need a 20k tonne ship, no!
All Pats – Part 2
On your other points –
RCS – not an issue, use existing techniques and it will be a quarter the target the Albion is.
Fit for purpose – Until a real shooting match starts.
The RN is losing the benefit of the wake up call that was the FI conflict.
We are going back to the post war RN attitude of preparing for the war we want to fight not the one others will make us fight.
The T45 programme was nothing short of shocking.
The CVF debacle suggests we have learned nothing.
And then we have the corporate welfare that is the T26.
The RN has a long history.
Unfortunately the current situation suggests mediocrity is now its default setting.
All Pats @ 7.04
Type 42 was 3.5K tons standard and we know how that turned out.
The T45 is 6.5K tons standard and we have half a ship.
Consequently the size of the T48 is not the issue it is what it can do.
You need to lose the “Quart into a Pint Pot” mentality.
Will you only wake up when someone else does it first?
JF must be doing 6K rpm at the moment.
The T45 displacement is 7350T standard and she is 152M long. We have a silo on the bow and room for another silo, though the gucci gym would suffer.
You blithely quote that the RCS will be a quarter the size of an Albion, why, how? It will still be a lot bigger than a Daring.
How on earth can you comment on fit for purpose when a shooting war starts?
We cannot afford nor do we need a 24k barge with 4 missile silos 4 engine spaces with 8 diesels, which can fit on 4 berths in Pompey or Guz and cannot even go into ECMP.
The wake up call from the FI was improved internal DC procedures and the importance of a MR gun. The importance of The SSN and air power. I never remember the bit about 20k tonne destroyers.
I don’t know what this Fat Bloke is trying to do; I left him
– with a naval history challenge that he rose up to (can’t say handsomely, as he did not then recognise the looks of the ships)
– he also never got back to the benefit of speed/ spurting, when you are defending the Task Force (of course, AAD lets you think there is no need to spurt, but the reality is otherwise… 5 m over the waves…radar range … und-so-weiter, as they say)
All PATS @ 7.41
Starting with the terminology – T45 = AAW vessel.
We call them destroyers through habit and nothing else.
T45 = Twice the size / displacement of the T42.
It is still only half a ship as compared to other first rank AAW ships in other navies.
Consequently do we live with our own mediocrity or do we try and improve things?
You can live with your own standards but I want to move things on.
How many times do we have serving RN / MOD on here staring in wonderment at what others can do and blindly asking for the same. They never seem to understand what they need or what is available until someone else does it and then the best they can do is ask for the same.
The RN is now a collection of followers when once it was a collection of leaders.
Then comes the defensive tirades of you don’t understand / you are not qualified to comment / were special / what about X or Y or Z? Time after time the comments come when in fact the RN is bollock naked and dancing in the proverbial street.
And right on cue comes the comments about being fit to comment on the next RN shooting war – well I can comment becauses the current gaps in RN capability are so big even an interested amateur like myself can spot them.
You talk about RCS.
It would be at least 400% better than the Albion because the Albion is such a poor design with regards to RCS. 10 years improved knowledge allows these things to happen if you keep an open mind.
Well the whole premise of the technology is that size doesn’t matter or more accurately it is not the primary concern – shape and surfacing is the primary concern.
Next you will be telling us that the B2 was a failure compared to the F117 as it was so much bigger.
Finally looking over previous numbers on the “T48” –
Looking at 199m x 27m x 5-6m = 15-16k tons standard / 18k tons full load.
60MW motive power for 30 knots+.
Looking at 2 T45 shafts / skegs + 2 pods.
Finally, finally love the comments about the “barge”.
I take it that your viewpoint 100 years ago was –
Why do we need all these guns / why no VTEs / isn’t 18 knots fast enough?
All Pats @ 7.41
You are a shyster pure and simple.
You talk about ECMP and how it would be out of bounds to the T48.
You talk rubbish.
Just how did a Point class manage to dock there?
FBOT, All you come out with are numbers from a calculator, you have no concept of how things operate, what they have to do or how they do it. You refuse to answer points directly and simply come out with more numbers from your spreadsheet.
The B2 is a stealth wing design, a smaller stealth wing would have a smaller.
“The whole premise of technology” Well sorry but we are talking about warships not fantasy designs.
We do have capability gaps and we are budget driven but the overall package is pretty good and only going to get better.
The difference between you and serving staring in wonderment serving personnel is we actually understand the capabilities of both our own and foreign platforms, we have often exercised with them and seen both unexpected advantages and limitations. We also get to read and know things that the general public do not.
So 45 is half a ship compared to what? Remember the T23 was launched without a command system, it will finish its life as the most capable multi role Frigate in the world. the 45 has room to expand, Sea Ceptor will allow quad packing to increase the amount of misiles covering out to 19NM for pop up or undetected attacks, allowing more Aster 30 to be carried. Hopefully we will get another Silo, possibly a Mk41.
What we do have is the worlds most sophisticated and capable radar/command system.
You obviously have no concept of the advantages of being able to visit places in a 150/160M 8-10k ff/dd with a 7-8M draught that you cannot in a 20K capital cruiser. That is fair enough.
i could take you more seriously if anyone in the world was building the stuff you talk about but at the moment you know better than all of us.
FBOT, on the RO RO berth as a special move with extra tug support and they are smaller than your proposed T48! See difference between us is I have driven ships in and out of Mare Harbour.
The F-104 was very far from being an epic fail. The USAF wanted big tactical fighters like the 105 so showed little real interest in the 104 but NATO and a host of other nations did and it was still in production in the 1980s.
All Pats @ 8.43
And so it goes on – you are trudging through the trees looking for the forest.
The T23 as the most capable multi role / GP frigate in the world when it finishes its RN life 2020’ish – total insular tripe.
If it is so good why are we building a new design?
Regarding the T45 it has no redundancy – one hit in the right place and bang goes the missile silo. Single point of failure – schoolboy howler – compare and contrast with the USN and the East Asians.
World leading radar / command / control system – if it is that good why aren’t we selling it to anyone else?
What about the BMD dimension, vapourware at best while Aegis does it for real.
Finally I have answered all your points as best I can, that you suggest otherwise means that you ignore them because you do not like my answers.
I will line up with FBOT on this.
ROK, Japanese and American AAW destroyers are bigger that T45 (and getting bigger with every class). (OH I know they are GT powered but they use those horrible inferrior US GT mostly in bolt in power eggs, not the wonderful UK ones).
They are bigger for a reason. increased hull capacity, stability,and hydrodynamic efficiency. The maths is inescapable. trying to go fast/long legged is harder the smaller the ship is.
The larger the hull, the more you are likely to be able to use COTS diesels, to get the power required, they are cheaper to buy, run, and easier to get bits for when they go wrong.
THe RN does not see it that way.
BTW IF uk RN docks are too small to handle ships that are no bigger than cross channnel Ferries or short sea RO RO ships, then it needs bigger docks! Coz that’s the bays the points the waive class and and ocean f*cked then.
And another thing…
The Rn’s arrogance about ship design and requirements Is such that
DZP Class
F100
Horrizon
Caviour
Are all crap and not at all suitable for a ‘Real Navy’ After all we are not bloody Belgium You know.
FBOT, well what about Point and Ro RO, no comment?
We are replacing T23 as the hulls are old and with new Gts and DGs we can make the propulsion system even better. 997, Sea Ceptor, DNA2, Merlin and 2087 will migrate to T26. Name a better frigate than a T23 with Sea Ceptor, 2087 and Merlin?
Cost has limited us to a single silo at present, as for single point of failure, a big ASM hit can result in mission kill on any DD there are numerous places other than the silo to hit.
We do need to get a second silo up and running as per the Japanese, Korean and US, the European nations seem happy with a single silo.
Aegis does BMD for real, keep reading those press releases mate. Yes it is further ahead in development but in terms of potential no competition, and as for why not selling them, not my department but we are comfortably ahead of aegis in capability, anti jamming etc.
All PATS @ 8.47
Trying saying that to a Dover ferry captain, he would just laugh out loud.
It could however start another round of the TD perennial favourite – does the RN need thrusters – bow / stern / bigger?
Mare Harbour is so big you could practice “spurting” in there with plenty of space to spare.
Finally I have to ask where did Hermes / invincible lay up when they were down south? What will the CVF do – miss out the FI entirely and do a jolly to CT / S/town?
Stanley
Mare Cove – big bit?
Regarding the future – a couple of extra bits of concrete and steel and the jobs sorted.
And one more thing…
This is where the exasperation with the serving types is real. The Radar -constrol system on the T45 is apparantly very good, good enough to sex segulls ay 70 miles etc. Just what has that got to do with the ship the size of HMS Belfast being ‘small’
All PATS @ 9.20
You make it too easy.
I have only 2 words in answer – SpoF / SpoB.
Looking at 210m x 32 x 7m for 23K tons displacement.
I fear in their company the tug driver would be redundant.
There are no issues with getting the T48 onto the pier at the ECMP.
And as I have noted earlier expanding the quayside would be very straightforward if required.
Consequently no issue unless you want to make one.
FBT, Mare Harbour is not Dover and no T45 does not have bow or stern thrusters, would I have them on a destroyer, possibly. An ASW platform, definitely not. They create noise. Mare Harbour is a decent size but you have to take the fact that a normal day sees 25kts of wind blowing through it and 45 to 50 is not uncommon. (not in you spreadsheet?) I could spin a dit about how I got it wrong with the wind one day but what do I know you are busy practicing “spurting”.
The biggest problem is the gap as you enter, CVF will not enter Mare Harbour.
Ixion, a Kongo is 9m longer than a 45, 0.2m less beam and 1.2m less draught, it has a range of 4.500Nm at 20kts. The big new Korean job da da the great is 14M longer, same beam 1.25M less draught range 5,500Nm. Arleigh Burke is 4M longer, 1M less beam and 2M extra draught, range 4,400NM.
All have similar top speeds, stability, well classified but similar. range see for yourself so ixion?
If you insist that we can take a 32m beam 24k tonne ship through the kelp beds and then teh gap into Mare Harbour on a routine basis given the prevailing weather conditions and that there is loads of room and ability to expand the naval berth then who am I as someone who has actually driven ships down there to disagree.
Calm down chaps, its only the internet your know :)
Have a look at this
http://www.mentalcrumble.com/blog/2012/4/12/help-anyone.html
APATS
T45 is 152.5 Metres long
Japanese
Hyuga 197
Kongo 161 that 30 feet longer but whose counting.
ATAGO 170
Do Da the Great Is indeed 14 metres longer.
Weighing ships starts all sorts of arguement,s but some of these ships are dammn near 1 1/2 times the tonage of the T45 the lightest 1-2000 tons heavier. ZUMMWALT may be a floating disaster, but the logic of the projection requirements pushed it up to 14,000 tons
AS for range all of the above meet the requirements of their makers. None of whom have pretentions to WASAWPYK. RN still do.
Heres a fact for you, over a run from say San Diago to Tokio there is not a ship in the RN that can keep up with modern Container ship doing 25-26 knots over 4,000 miles; Or the nameless isles at high speed.
All the above contries take the basic AB kit and make there own ships underneath it- the Atago in particular being interresting for simply putting the radars a deck up to improve performance.
In effect the west and it’s allies across the whole Aastern Pacific; Countries a bloody site closer to the new international boggy man China. (Fightening the shit (and therefore money for Elephants) out of politiians for the use of). Sorry I meant the major new maritime threat to UK security .. Have adopted a single Radar and opperations system, As have the Spanish the Norweigans and the Australians, etc- a system that must defacto be very adapatable because its on about 7 different ships.
A System that the RN apparantly thinks is crap.
No I have never driven or battled HM’s enemies from a ship. BUT ‘we have always done it this way’ is a reason to listend and consider the opinions of the experienced, BUT that would mean no submarines, no aircraft carriers, no ssm’s etc.
Sometimes we should go back to basics and ask what we want to do. is the ship the heir to a 400 year old naval tradition, or is it simply the floating container for a series of weapons systems.
OH and if we are operationaly taking 7000 tons ships into shallow waters close to shore, then we are doing it wrong!
APATS
Dredge the harbour.. everyone else does.
Fat Bloke on Tour,
Is what you’re looking for simply HMS Ocean? 1500t DIESO + 1500t AVCAT with 8000nm range at 15 knots.
Just fill her AVCAT tanks with DIESO and you’re good for 16000nm (at 15 knots – 12500nm at 18 knots).
She’s handle like Ocean though, so not really a destroyer. Stuff 4 x Olympus in there and you’ve got Lusty, capable of near 30 knots.
So that leaves ~400t (guessing) for ~200 missiles and launch tubes littered over the deck.
Pretty expensive, I’d guess £2b?
Ixion @ 10.33
Points to ponder US vs EU.
All of the really big box ships do EU to China and not US to China because the port infrastructure on the West Coast can’t deal with the Maerk E class and the MSC split superstructure class because they are too wide / big.
Moral of the story is that the infrastructure of the US is very 50s / 60s while the EU is much more up to date and always improving. Not sure how this has come about but I don’t think it will change anytime soon.
Interesting to see the split in state spend – R+D / capital investment – between civil and military in the US and the EU. I think that the military focus in the US will mean they pay a heavy price with failing civil infrastructure.
The US has the tech but it comes at a huge price.
I fear the EU military pay heavily as the US sets the standard and the cost levels and we have to try and buy what little we can afford.
The costs of the MLPS floating base are as close to a joke as it is possible to get without crying.
@TD – we’ll there’s a nice couple of destroyers!
@james et al: updated article on America class LHA.
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/the-usas-new-lhar-ship-class-carrier-air-amphibious-assault-updated-0870/
Note the cost in 2012 dollars: 3.2B. Reverting to a well deck variant costs up to 4.4B. CVF doesn’t look quite so expensive all of a sudden :-)
Hi FBOT,
It is called competition, as in “Moral of the story is that the infrastructure of the US is very 50s / 60s while the EU is much more up to date and always improving. Not sure how this has come about but I don’t think it will change anytime soon.”
On a separate note, you’ve hit the nail on the head:
Interesting to see the split in state spend – R+D / capital investment – between civil and military in the US and the EU. I think that the military focus in the US will mean they pay a heavy price with failing civil infrastructure.
The US has the tech but it comes at a huge price.
I fear the EU military pay heavily as the US sets the standard and the cost levels and we have to try and buy [“]what little[“] we can afford.
wf,
Well if the F35B gets binned that’s one massive waste of money.
Ixion, you are aware that Hyuga is a destroyer as Japanese, constitution forbids LPH or any type of carrier. first time I have read anywhere arguing that T45 is too small, I notice that makes every single European AW ship too small as well but no mention of that.
Next time I have to race a container Ship I will keep you helpful info in mind. Container ship racing has always represented a threat I have been interested in. What is the range of a 45 at 25 kts, do you know? Sprint ahead and refuel?
Where did I ever say the SPY radar system was crap, the countries you named actually use different variants of the SPY in conjunction with different LRSR. for instance teh Spanish F100 class still rely on traditional target illuminators, the Norgy FFs have a mini SPY system.
Why is is so wrong that we actually have a better bit of kit?
A 7,000 tonne ship inshore? Not if it is going alongside.
Simon @ 11.00
With that post a BWoS bean counter will get a good nights sleep tonight.
Please start your figures with zero based estimates – what is the component / contribution cost of the changes you want to make.
Same ship – different powertrains.
Let’s say GTs twice the cost of MSDs.
That does not mean that everything else on the GT ship is twice the cost of the MSD ship, just that the prime movers of the powertrain are twice the cost.
All to often in RN / MOD costing exercises the fact that 10% of the components / systems are expensive MOD / fighting spec does not mean that the whole entity should be costed as an expensive MOD / fighting spec standard.
Your example highlights the MOD cost inflation mentioned above –
Just what is the warload?
200 VLS tubes at £500K a go – £100 mill for cash.
Next up is the powertrain – 90MW at £1mill per MW – £90mill
Then there is the sensor / CMS install – £250mill for Sampson?
Then you have a bare hull – Ocean Mk2 – £150mill max.
Cost of vessel = £600mill max.
MOD costings –
Ocean = £150mill new – bare hull = £75mill / Engines + war load = £75mill.
Ocean Mk2 = £500mill new / 15 years BWoS inflation + 50% more capable (down to Wartsila + 100ft hull extension).
Bare hull = £250mill / Engines + war load = £250mill.
Ocean Mk2 AAW / LA Global Destruction platform = £1.38bill
Engines + Sensors / War load = £250 mill + £440mill.
Hull = £690mill – Same as the Engines + Sensors / Warload.
No reason for this beyond that this is always the case – platform history tells us this.
Next up comes the continual changes demanded by the RN / MOD for no good reason.
Then comes the spec change to the VLS tubes to make them EMAL sorry ArcLight / Anglepoise Lamp compatible, looking at £200mill for the tubes themselves and £440mill for the rework.
Current cost of a Ocean Mk2 – Global Destruction System £2.04bill and rising.
Sound familiar?
@FBOT
I’m sure your 20KT cruiser would be a superb modern battleship and combine all the best features of most modern destoyers and frigates. It would be able to get into enough harbours and do what it had to do and get around the globe not too much refuelling.
I’m not too sure it would achieve the UK’s strategic objectives. For me these need a mix of Carriers, Escorts & OPVs. For flexibility the carrier groups will be better with multiple smaller escorts. The OPVs, or SIMMS clones, just don’t need to be as fighty as what you are proposing.
I suppose what I am saying is that your 20KT cruiser is a great Global Combat Ship, but I don’t really believe a propper GCS is a strategic need. Give me escort hulls and SIMMS instead.
@ TD
You realise you’ve just blinded me with that link to Mental Crumble.
@ The Sejong the Great class destroyers,
It’s an interesting old ship that one. For the equivalent of about £600 million per ship you get 80-AAW cells, plus another 32-cells for land attack and still have 16 spare for ASW defence.
Plus two helicopters.
I wonder what one of those things would be like carrying Sampson aloft, with a pair of Merlins tucked away at the back, and an engine fit out more along the lines of Daring to boost the range.
Mighty impressive.
FBOT seems to love accusing others of having a “Quart into a Pint Pot mentality” whenever they disagree with him. At a glance, his numbers are nicely round. Too nicely round. As in “not RL, from a spreadsheet/blindly guessing” round.
There is a reason why S.Korea’s modified Burke is a monster, it’s their version of a pocket battleship, not really an escort (role, not class tonnage). The RN focuses more on real escort duties/ship protection, which concentrates more on ASuW/AAD instead of packing enough firepower to try pound Pyongyang flat. Nothing comes for free, what are the compromises the JtG class makes for what it has? Agility? Speed? Cost? Only people with a bias or agenda will tell you “X is so great, there are no tradeoffs!!!”. Question everything.
“Only people with a bias or agenda will tell you “X is so great, there are no tradeoffs!!!””
Like Carrier Junkies….
INCOMING!!! TAKE COVER!!
Chris B, There are definitely trad offs related to the Carriers! The argument is, are they worth it?
Observer @ 4.52
From what I can gather you have connections with the RSN consequently it is interesting to hear you big up the T45 and its performance / powertrain / mission profile when the local contender on a much smaller displacement follows a path much closer to my thoughts on the T48.
Therefore the RSN shows that diesels can be used as prime movers in upmarket / fighty naval vessels.
So the question has to be asked – has the RSN got it wrong with diesels or is your defence of the T45 just kneejerk RN love?
Why does the RSN not need to “spurt” when it is the defining characteristic of all RN escort vessels?
Consequently are you a “spurter” or are you not?
PE @ 1.16
Can we please move away from the big is expensive vibe that characterises a lot of the comment on here.
Cheap is not always small.
Big is not always expensive.
The design I put forward for RN AAW hulls No. 7 + 8 is based on the template I used to try and provide a SIMSS vessel that was big on patrol, a bit fighty and very flexible.
SIMSS = 148m x 23m x 5m+ / 8K tons + standard and 10K tons approx full load.
Looking at 18MW motive power for 23 knots+.
The issue is not the size it is the cost.
HMS Clyde standard sensor load, £10mill of weapons and the total cost would be £65-70mill max.
As noted before the ship would use the PSV / AHTS component set, platform technology and build / cost economics
“X is so great, there are no tradeoffs!!!””
True.
APATS
WASAWPYK re range and speed.
Chasing Container ships…. One o the jobs these things are suposed to do is protect our ‘Globaly engaged trade’ which is carried by … Container ships. How does a t45 protect a ‘convoy’ (To use an old fashioned term) when it is slower in open ocean cruising (and in practice not much faster in top speed) than ships it is supposed to be protecting- I think it was the USS bainbridge that used to boast it was the fastest ship int he USN- It wasn’t in absolute speed but would only race over 2-3000 mile distances when being nuclear powered it did not need to refuel, so it won.
RE Radars etc.. For the purposes of scaring the crap (and therefore cash for elephants/F35, Fres etc)out of the military and economicaly illiterat politico’s The panda at the house on the corner has replaced the bear next door. that those who actually live next door to the panda have adopted a particular system is significant– ok it’s like ford focus some have the basic some have the top model but it’s roughly the same car….
Our Radar kit is I am assured better, but what’s that got to do with the ship it is screwed too?
If its comming alongdide – I still suggest you dredge the ports, the proposed ships are not ‘handymax or africamax size’ so should fit in most ports
You guys are probably still going on about the Korean concuction, but pound for pound I think the RSN version of Lafayettes are the most capable ships around (really should be the Haminas, but they are sort of a “coastal navy special”)
RE: Conoy escorts. Traditionally range/endurance was considered more important than speed as convoys can only move at the speed of its slowest vessel (for that reason they did organise/class convoys by speed?). The post-war RN did intend to produce a seperate series of convoy escorts (ASW, AAW, AD, etc)based on the Type 12 common hull but with diesels instead of steam turbines. However, in peace time fleet escorts get more money/attention so apart from the Cat/Cathedral classes they were scrapped or combined into the fleet escorts (Type 12, 12M, 12I).
Ironically, the diesel escorts were very good at colonial/MSO duties due to their long range; I often think “what if…” the diesel anti-submarine convoy escort had been built and evolved like the fleet escorts into something like a Leander – helicopter, twin 4.5″ gun, PDMS, very long range?
Hi GJ,
That is the “Floreal”? “evolved like the fleet escorts into something like a Leander – helicopter, twin 4.5″ gun, PDMS, very long range?”
– instead of a twin gun, a single 76/100mm (but fast firing) and a couple of Exocets
BTW, this MHPC is probably not going to be much of “P”… but we will see. As long as we get a self-deployable MCM fleet, I will be happy
@FBOT
“From what I can gather you have connections with the RSN consequently it is interesting to hear you big up the T45 and its performance / powertrain / mission profile”
I don’t recall doing that. What I recall doing was to point out that
1) different roles for ships play a part in the ship design. It’s self evident, unless you wish to explain how it’s possible to use the QE-class carrier as a LST. They could always try to can-opener the prow. :)
2) that you may be making a mountain out of molehills
and
3) your numbers may simply be imaginary guesswork.
And as for diesel vs GT, diesels are for “spurting”, GTs don’t pick up as fast from a cold start. Standard tactics for RSN ships, even frigates, is to dart out from behind obstacles, fire a spread of missiles, then dart back behind cover, similar to attack helicopter doctrine. It was a holdover from the early days doctrine where missile gunboats and missile corvettes were used instead. This requires a system that can do fast start (out from cover)/stop (aquisition/firing)/start (back behind cover)/stop (idle). If you’re cruising in the open sea for most of your mission, GT might be better.
@ ACC – Pretty much. the requirements for convoy escort and sentry frigate/coast guard cutter are very similar. There may be a difference in sensors/weapons but with modular systems/bolt-on units/”fitted for but not with” these days thats not a big issue.
Shipbucket image of a Leander like diesel colonial sloop:
http://s669.photobucket.com/albums/vv51/novice99/RN%20Postwar%20AU/?action=view¤t=Dieselcolonialsloop-1.png&sort=ascending
I was just flipping through the cost figures for the Type 23s, at ~100M pounds per, they’re pretty good value for money, so I’m not sure why people are complaining about their cost.
The Darings at 1B per is a harder sell, but 1B is still approximately in the ballpark for a ship of that displacement. Think it could do with a few less popguns and more shipkillers though.
@ X
““X is so great, there are no tradeoffs!!!” – True.”
You still haven’t found the biscuit tin mate.
Hi Observer,
Yes @ 100m a pop, the eight that have the 2087 (I posted the price not long ago) and
– the previous refits have been cheap
– now the new radar and SeaCeptor… that can’t be cheap , but will be worth it
Excellent value for money!
– howabout the rest of the class?
– I am totally lost as to which six got the super-dooper sonar, and which two got the two extra kits
– a pity that the AAD number is six; were that number 8 with these 8, then whatever the remaining 19-16 are/ were would not be that important (Fort’s converted to arsenal ships?)
To bring this post back to the F35C/B/A etc, some questions
Is not the Uk as the only level one partner in the whole F35 programme committed to buy 138? Otherwise wont BAE loos it’s manufacturing rights?
On current US estimates, it looks like fully capable F35Cs wont start being available toUK post 2020 and at that only 6 earmarked for UK carrier ops?
Is this not a big problem, aircraft carriers need a fully equipped air wing to be effective.
Would a more forrdable way forward be as follows?
60 F35A for the RAF
60 F35B or C for the Royal Navy
or just give up on the F35 totally, which will probably end BAEs aircraft production and go for 60 Super Hornbet only for the RN and leave the RAf withall Tranche 1,2,3 Typhoon and that ends the issue with huge political consequences!
MOD procurement process is obviously not working and hasn`t since the 1960s, too much short termism, political micromanaging and interservice rivarily, added to which is an over the top emphasis on complex bespoke systems which dont fully deliver what was intended.
@ ACC – “(Fort’s converted to arsenal ships?)”
http://www.nps.edu/academics/gseas/tsse/subpages/1993Project.html
@rec
I’ve been thinking along similar lines for a while.
I think the price and expediency of the Super Hornet is undeniably attractive but that it should only be seen as a back up choice to the Lightning if it becomes too problematic and expensive.
I do however completely agree that the RAF has spent tens of billions on it’s Typhoon’s, so at the very least it should be made to fully utilise them as it’s primary fast jet.
I also think that the most Lightning C’s the navy is ever going to need in service is something in the 40-60 ballpark. This means that either the RAF doesn’t get any Lightnings at all (which yes I know they would go crazy over) or they are placated with a promise of some Lightning A’s to be delivered at a later date.
This seems to me to be most workable and economic way of doing things.
@Challenger
If we only have a CATOBAR Carrier available to use from 2020 then aircraft delivery from that date is no big deal. Regardless of the airfrmae chosen there’s always going to be a learning and ramp up period.
If we want a stop-gap it should be a swift rental of some “B” to use on the on the STOVL carrier from 2016-20. As happens I suspect we will just become a very regular hosts to USMC Harrier squadrons during that period.
If we are seriously worried about the “C” delivery schedule and talking about a CATOBAR alternative then doesn’t Rafale have a more promising long term development path than F18?
@Peter Elliot
I take the point about Rafale vs Hornet, however I think that is a different discussion from what was really on my mind, not to mention a decision that I hope and believe we will never have to take.
I am more interested in the numbers and mix of Lightnings that we end up with. At the moment the plans seem to be to have a large squadron of 40-50 airframes by the early 2020’s shared by both the RAF and the Royal Navy ( please correct anything I get wrong!).
Instead this is what I would like to see happen.
1.Have the RAF fully operate it’s 160 Typhoons and give the fleet the planned multi-role capability so that it can in part replace the Tornado.
2.Procure 40-60 CATOBAR Lightning’s for the navy around 2020 to eventually operate from both carriers and provide a real maritime strike ability.
3.Placate the RAF over this decision with the promise of more UAV’S and the eventual acquisition of some Lightning A’s once the money is available.
I am sure their as holes in this idea and I’ll get shot down in flames for some of it, but to me this is the only solution that makes sense in terms of cost and capability.
@Peter Elliott: the Rafale is being produced at a rate of 11 a year. How much development do you think can occur when it’s primary customer can afford that little? The USN will probably be taking deliveries of Super Hornets until 2018 given the delays on the F35C, and they will be in service until 2040. No contest!
@Peter Elliot,
I wrote a note to Mr Cameron suggesting that France and the UK shared the two QE and CdG (one active for each nation) and in return for the 1/2 QE we loaded them, they loan a couple of squadrons of Rafale.
Never heard anything back!
As for prodution numbers, that may go up due to the Indian MRSA project.
It’s the cheapest possible solution that secures our carriers as CATOBAR.
Actually I think we’ve badly underestimated our government’s ingenuity it seems that David Cameron has come up with a quite brilliant source for aircraft for the carriers:-
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-17710598
should save a fortune. All we need to do is get them cleared for Stormshadow.
Simon @ 7.44
Cheapest way to CATOBAR is second hand F/A18s.
They might be A/Bs or C/Ds but the USN owe us one after the Great Harrier Give-away.
if money is tight then we need to start using our brains.
What cost a second hand fleet of A340s to do our tanker / frieght / passenger duties?
Bigiain,
Strewth, that’s everything sorted. Perhaps there’s a few destroyers at the bottom of the sea we can recondition too (albeit made mostly out of coral).
FBOT,
How can 2nd hand F18’s be cheaper than paying nothing/zero/zilch to the French in return for the loan of 1/2 a carrier?
Observer @ 4.52 / 1.49
Your comments support my argument regarding MSDs vs GTs although I don’t think this was the intended thrust of your posts.
Regarding escort vessels and above – I want the RN to get rid of GTs and move into MSDs as prime motive power.
Service feedback was that the RN needed GT power / fast responses for “Spurting”.
That is fast / rapid / short duration tactical actions to allow the escorts to best protect the assets under their charge.
They said no to MSDs because these units could not do “spurting”.
Questions were asked abot reaction times of the engines involved –
MSDs = 40 secs from idle to MCR.
MSDs = I got the figures from a Wartsila paper.
GTs = No figures were returned.
GTs = You mention 120 secs from ignition to full power.
Now the RSN run a modern 3.5K ton frigate solely on diesels – HSD units running at 1000-1200rpm.
You mention these are used for fast reaction times and you mention GTs wont do as 120 secs is not good enough.
Consequently your analysis / argument / figures from RSN vessels / tactics go against the collective wisdom of the RN service viewpoint on here.
Your argument supports my viewpoint – GTs are in the main finished in most naval vessels, diesels are the way to go. My emphasis is on MSDs: 500-600rpm but HSD units like the RSN MTU installation working to 9MW per unit are certainly worth a look.
My question is if the RSN can do “spurting” on diesels why can’t the RN?
Finally my designs are not guesswork.
They are empirical designs based on what is already out in the real world.
The numbers for my SIMSS ship are based on the hull form and powertrain of the very real world Flensburger 2200. Other sources and influences are the RSN handy sized LSD and the ever growing PSV / AHTS technology platform and component set.
Consequently no more cheek please – more focused analysis of the questions to hand would be appreciated.
@FBOT
“GTs = You mention 120 secs from ignition to full power”
Are you sure you got the correct person? I can conclusively say that I’ve never said this, I don’t know the specific ramp up time for GTs.
As for the engine, there are pros and con. The RSN is designed for long idle times followed by intense periods of action, a litoral ambush fleet in other words. The RN and especially it’s escorts are more for blue water fleet/convoy protection, and their engines are going to be working most of the time. In this case, GT may be more efficient. Different tools for different jobs. Just because they don’t carbon copy your thinking does not mean that they’re not thinking, it just means that they place greater priorities on other factors than you do.
Monday the 16th (yes, not Friday the 13th)
– the 5 Treasury-led work streams
– double and triple checking (on what; on each other may be?)
will report on the F-35 version choice, and Project CVF as it will be impacted by the options
Now, I am sure they hire very good people to the Treasury… but they can’t hang onto them for very long
– we are going to see a fireworks of spreadsheets; who is checking that the things that matter to capability are actually driving the spreadsheets?
Observer @ 8.55
120 sec ramp up time – Fair cop guv, I will go quietly.
The quote is out there, just not where I thought it was.
Regarding fuel economy MSDs are far ahead of GTs right across the output range, the gap closes at the top but it is still substantial – 10% at least.
HSDs are in between – no exact figures to hand so its all from memory (fading)- although I think they are closer to MSDs than GTs.
The issue with the RSN 3.5K ton frigates is that they have done a job the MOD / BWoS / RN say couldn’t be done on a ship twice its size.
To my mind it is sloppy analysis, collective inertia and a desire to keep RR sweet with another round of GT orders.
I fear that GTs are seen by the RN as hi-tech, white heat of technology glamour engines while MSDs are seen as slightly trade / smelly / flat cap and overalls type of units.
Propulsion snobbery would be my way of describing it.
You have to wonder when the RN will realise that RR has quite a range of HSDs / MSDs in their catalogue and they would probably be happy to make the switch.
You have to look at high speed ferries and the fact that GTs have been run out of town with HSDs now running the show.
GTs are as dead as disco as a Naval mainstream prime mover.
The problem is Naval tech is glacial compared to the profit driven Civil sector.
Isn’t the main reason for Gas Turbines their light weight (or high power to weight ratio). Load is still a premium on a warship.
Surely the sensible way is for diesel cruise and GT sprint when/if it’s needed within the class of vessel being designed?
Simon @ 10.08
Tell that to the RSN and their 3.5K ton frigates.
GTs are OK in a world of STs and 1950s diesels.
The maritime world has moved on and they are not part of it.
RE “You have to wonder when the RN will realise that RR has quite a range of HSDs / MSDs in their catalogue and they would probably be happy to make the switch.”
– just take a look who is buying MTU (good old RR, to broaden the options; not sure if the transaction completed)
– Wartsila is still out there
I guess you’re more in the know than I but I’ve just had a quick “google” sesh and those MTU you speak have about 1/20th of the power to weight ratio of a (for example) GE2500.
They’re certainly better than they used to be (1/100th by the looks of things), but if you consider putting MTU on Lusty (75Mw) you’d wipe out the load allocation for all her ordnance (~200t).
I guess it all depends what you want/need to have. If you’re willing to sacrafice some armour/weapons/system/etc for a diesel power plant then fine – I see the RSN are using a lot of composites so probably can.
Totally out of my depth here, but warships long & sleek
… payload at a premium (fuel is also payload)
RE “about 1/20th of the power to weight ratio of a (for example) GE2500.
They’re certainly better than they used to be (1/100th by the looks of things), but if you consider putting MTU on Lusty (75Mw) you’d wipe out the load allocation for all her ordnance (~200t).”
@ACC: “if you consider putting MTU on Lusty (75Mw) you’d wipe out the load allocation for all her ordnance (~200t).”
Air is free, steel is cheap, so getting your volume back is no problem. Last time I can think of a case where “too big” was a complaint about a RN warship would be HMS Mersey/Orlando (1850s, wooden). “Too small”, OTOH, crops up all the time.
So the big questions I’d want answering are how MSDs stack up against GTs in terms of life-time costs (especially the manning component), MTBO/MTBF, and shock/damage resistance.
Simon @ 10.43
The 200 tons you talk about is an extra 40mm in draught.
The Invincible class took on more weight when the “Ski Jump” was invented and the CIWS was fitted.
Consequently it is an issue but not a showstopper.
The benefits of MSDs also need to be looked at – space efficiency with a much reduced intake / exhaust trunking, better fuel consumption / lower capital costs and a much more robust installation.
If the RSN can put a full diesel powertrain into a 3.5K ton frigate with a heavy warload then the weight issue is well on the way to be being sorted.
AMcL @ 11.58
MSDs vs GTs – Lifetime costs?
Capital costs are lower.
Fuel costs are much lower – GTs only get close / 10% at full load.
Manning costs – MSDs are Civil proven with full remote operation.
GTs are probably very similar though the RSN frigate has a very low crew count.
Not sure how it’s powertrain fits into this specific but it must be part of it.
MSDs = Civil tech / plenty of installs and a large reservoir of corporate knowledge.
GTs = Mainly naval installs so the body of corporate knowledge will be less.
Reliability = Not sure but the numbers must be out there.
Durability = My money is on MSDs – both install and core unit though the turbos look to be its weak link.
Shock = All down to the mountings?
What is the GTs top RPM rating?
How are the diesels in terms of maintenance? I know the GTs can be hauled out the ship whole and replaced in a matter of hours with a new engine. RR take away the old one and refurbish it for use again. In the event of catastrophic failure on a diesel – I assume (given its size/weight) it would be impossible to remove and would have to be overhauled in situ with a consequent loss of ship up time. In commercial fleets, this would be relatively rare occurrence and the cost of ship downtime could be tolerated. In Naval terms – you may not be able to afford the downtime for tactical reasons (rather than cost)
FBOT, sorry mate but you’re comming off as rather schizo on the topic. First you claim the RN doesn’t know what it’s doing when it uses GT engines, then you turn around and impute the RSN doesn’t know what it’s doing for using diesel piston engines (Not diesel-electric). Does your ideal marine propulsion system involve nuclear rockets?
@Simon
It’s not only the composites that cut weight, they took out a lot of life support when they cut down the crew requirements through automation. Even then, there is still no hull mounted sonar, though I’m not sure if it was deliberate (500t OPV comes with inbuilt sonar).
There is also the consideration that the Daring vs the Formidable, Daring is 50% longer, 50% wider, more than twice as heavy and still ~15% faster. That is quite a good performance, though it does accelerate slower due to the engine and more mass. So it really is tradeoffs regarding the engine. Higher top speed vs faster acceleration.’
From the way FBOT makes it sound, you’d have thought they lined the crew on the top deck, gave the sailors oars and asked them to start rowing.
Observer
Play fair I do not (as I have said before totaly agree with FBOT, But I do concur with his reasonings for some aspects of warship design.
There is an expressed tendancy to say ‘we need a ship this size’, then say ‘how do we get the necessary power in it’.– answers for weight and size reasons – GT.
If we started with what weapons do we want? How far and at what speed to we want to carry them? THEN asked what size ship can we have commercially built,and powered to do that? We would I suggest get a different, probably cheaper to build (a bit),cheaper/simpler to maintainhull wise(rather more), and cheaper to run fuel wise ( a lot), bigger design.
WE would loose the ‘sleekness’ of the pure sea warrior design and it would be bigger and harder to park. (although I do agree with FBOT on this, if the RN is having trouble parking t45, coz it’s so big, i suggest it hires some commercial short sea ferry captains who park ships 3 times the size on a dime every 3 or 4 hours….)
All I and I suspect he is asking is why not look at the other way of doing it, sure we would end up with a (and here I. am guestimating), say a 7000 ton t26 and 15,000ton t48.
Everyomne do stop comparing fearless with t45 severe case of comparing apples with oranges. Compare t 45 with, do da the great class or atago’s…
Can I put in a vote for the Meko Valour class (althoug i would put in less power use diesels and loose the ‘warp drive’.
yes seriously they call it that, I suspect some German marketing type had an orgasm when he/she realised you could make that acronym in English from the compnants. Cummon who would not want to be ont he bridge an announce ‘Warp drive number 1 (slight pause) engage!
Observer, do not know how quickly the RSN frigates accelerate but a 45 will be passing their max speed in 60 seconds and still accelerating. They also have very short legs at 4, 00NM, so in order to increase this they would have to have more fuel onboard increasing the displacement and further affecting performance. So you put another heavy diesel in and continue to chase your tail.
Extra propulsion units mean extra engine spaces which mean extra watch keepers, fixed fire fighting systems, fixed eductors etc.
For Ships where speed is important it must be either CODLAG (T23) or modern efficient GT and electric propulsion (T45).
For larger ships where low 20kts are enough then Diesels or Generators supplying electric drive are a good option.
BigI @ 2.49
Look at the real world.
HSDs / MSDs live in the go go world of civil shipping.
HSDs / MSDs live in the glacial world of naval shipping.
Civil = MSD / HSD powertrains both direct and hybrid.
Their utilisation rates are much higher than naval.
Their service and refurb costs are must lower and their timelines are much tighter.
They are used in some very demanding operations.
Consequently the real world answers all your questions.
Finally you answer one of mine – GTs being sent to RR for service and repair – that the lifetime costs are much higher. Constant back and forth to RR is very expensive, the move to diesels will stop all this.
Observer @ 3.12 / 3.27
Please re-read my stuff as you have got it 50% wrong.
I rate the RSN for putting a 36MW direct drive HSD install into a 3.5K ton frigate.
I also note the reasons you give for the decision – response time or in RN terms spurtiness – and I suggest the RN could learn a lot from their initiatives.
Looking good for powertrains, flexible warload and crew size. My thoughts are that it would be easier to turn a Formidable into a full on first rank AAW platform than it would be to turn a T45 into a flexible / GP platform.
For one thing the RSN would do it for less money.
Now onto the specifics – published data – T45 vs Formidable.
RN booster club performance figures are not worth a bucket of warm spit so be very careful with all the talk of T23s at 34 knots and T45s at 33.
Very little context is given –
What was the displacement – Was it light / standard / full load?
What parameters were involved – Measured mile / both directions / single run going with the tide / flow?
To me the figures don’t add up.
And they don’t add up across a number of comparisons.
Formidable: Direct drive / 33MW for 3.2K tons = 10.3MW per 1K tons displacement.
T45: Electric drive / 40MW for 7.35K tons standard = 5.5MW per 1K tons displacement.
Interesting to see the “spurtiness” in real life.
Regarding speed I think both the RSN and the RN are playing it cute, they are giving the gallery the figures they think they want to see while keeping the real numbers in the background.
All PATS @ 10.04
You are living in the past.
FBOT, RN booster figures! Who do you think you are? They are true and correct figures. Actually done and measured. The fact that you do not think we know the difference between speed over the ground and speed through the water and would seek to use such to obtain better figures says it all.
Where did the word spurtinesss come from it is certainly not used in the service?
No comment FBOT on the fact that the super duper diesel Frigate only goes 4000NM?
For the people on the subject of a T48, I do not think revolution is needed but evolution. The Ship is already built in sections. Adding an extra section to fit another 48 cell sylo in would be relatively simple. Use the existing spare silo space for a 24 cell Mk 41 sylo. CAMM can quad pack so you can use the 2 48 cell silos for 36 Aster 30 and 48 quad pack CAMM and all of a sudden you have 72 Aster 30 and 96 CAMM. Not sure what sort of cell the NSM will fit in but if it can fit in the Mk 41 silo then you could have 12 TLAM and 12 NSM. A massive increase in capability from a simple extra section. of course we could never afford to fill the Silos unless we were at war.
Having calmed down now I should say that I had not heard the claim of a 23 doing 34 kts. I did know that the ones coming out of refit with the a couple of Mods and the new paint were topping 30kts.
APATS / FBOT,
I don’t really follow all of the conversation on engines and speed, but from this red-trousered land lubber, is there not also a consideration about what the sea is doing? i.e. if it gets a bit lumpy, does that not affect performance? Long slinky boats against short stubby boats? Does the RN also design ships for expected sea states (a bit like Army equipment is designed to work in various climactic conditions, but not at the south pole)?
James, The sea is a harsh mistress. yes Ships are designed to be able to do X knots in SSY. of course it depends where the sea is coming from, e.g are you travelling into it, down sea or is it on the beam. Ships should also be able to operate in cold and hot climates. One of the issues with the Albion class was that the propulsion and steering system hated really hot weather.
The synchrodrives would trip and the oil in the steering gear needed to be cooled or it disentegrated.
Just thought I throw in this link (it was the one I got details from). Just read the conclusion – it’s a kind of “I dunno really”.
http://media.bmt.org/bmt_media/resources/29/Paper7.pdf
All PATS @ 12.00
Get a grip, you really need to be able to sift through the MOD / RN PR rubbish and get to the issues to hand.
Mach 3 cricket balls – MOD / RN PR spin.
T23’s doing 34 knots / T45 doing 33knots – Same.
The T42 – 38MW direct for 3.5K tons standard / 4.2K tons full load / L2B @ 8.7 to 1
The T45 – 40MW electric for 7.35K tons standard / 8K’ish full load / L2B @ 7.3 to 1.
Lessons are being learned.
Too slowly for my liking but they are being learned.
Consequently the T48 will be 16K tons – just a matter of when.
Is it 2015/18 or 2035/40?
Simon @ 2.34
Interesting report.
Any idea on the date?
Looks a bit out of date – 2002/04?
The analysis looks a bit partial and forced towards GTs.
The area factor is only a partial measure, trunking volume should also be on the agenda.
GTs in civil fast ferries was all the rage when oil was less than $20 a barrel.
The big Stena units took them as it allowed them to carry 38 ton trucks as well as cars.
That was 15 years ago and the market has moved on.
Fast ferries use HSDs to go for the car and coach market while the trucks are pushed towards big Flensburger style 22 knot units with MSDs and huge open spaces for commercial vehicles.
These ships – civil Point Class vessels – are incredibly efficient, flexible and cheap.
It is easier to make them more robust and survivable than it is to make Naval vessels flexible, efficient and cost effective.
FBOT Unlike you I do not rely on MOD press releases. I actually know the people involved! So when you do not like something you simply write it off as lies and spin? Why would I sift through press releases when I can not only look at the raw data but actually understand it.
If we have a type 48 and it would take a major war for us to get one in the next 25 years it will be 10k I guess. What we may get if the threat increases is a T45 Batch 2 stretched to fit another 48 cell silo in. 96 AAW Cells giving 72 Aster 30 and 96 CAMM, a 24 cell silo for NSM and land Attack.
I thought there was space for T45 to take a 60 cell VLS in place of the current 48 cell silo?
And I can’t see how the design would be stretched. An extra module aft surely wouldn’t have enough depth to house missile if the silo structure wasn’t to protruded above flight deck level. Can somebody confirm if the hull amidships is a constant parallel in section for 50ft or so because it doesn’t appear to be and I assume to prevent sagging (or should that be hogging) and keep machinery spaces at the same distance this is the only place the design could be stretched. I suppose stretching the ship in the middle could allow a mini-silo for SeaCeptor freeing cells for larger ordnance up for’ard.
Back to the F-35.
Todays Mail on Sunday has a small item saying we are going back to the F-35B. It will be spun as good news for RR as they will build the lift fan.
X, There is space for a second silo, the number of cells vary depending upon who you speak to. I am assured by people cleverer than me that an extra section in a stretched version would be possible. I nodded and agreed as I am want to do when Engineers explain in great detail something i only wanted a yes no answer to.
X @ 5.45
I think that a T42 stretch would make sense.
Another 15m section slotted in before the bridge would allow another silo as described by All PATS above.
Not ideal but it would be a huge step forward.
As for hull flow lines and the like it would need some CFD work but it would / should not be a showstopper.
You raise the issue of Sea Ceptor, can I ask how it compares with ESSM as to my untrained eyes it looks a bit shortlegged.
SC – Goes out to 25km, some say 30km – ISD is pencilled in for 2016?
ESSM – Goes out to 50km now.
Do these missiles do the same job?
What will SC have that will make ESSM users envious?
Where will ESSM be in 2025?
All Pats @ 6.09
Is there space for another silo in b existing hull?
What size would it be?
Does the existing raised form of the silo have space for another 2 – 2×4 Sylver units.
The view from the bridge would suggest there is space at the front of he raised silo bodywork.
If the answer to the above is no – there is no space in the existing hull for a second silo – then the stretch is the way to go and it will generate the space for a second silo.
Any idea on the mix of SV30s / SV15s / SC quad packs?
If the SV15 as dead as disco if the SC works as well as the brochure says?
Last time I did any reading about this it was room for 2×8 cells (obviously 16, bringing the total to 60) being installed between the current silo and the gun. The plan would be to stick Mk.41 in there, so you have 16 TLAM.
FBOT, I had always thought we should have used the US SM and ESSM missiles with our system on 45 but we have gone for Aster and it will develop.
Sea Ceptor is a much smaller missile than ESSM which allows quad packing in existing T23 silos. It also makes it far easier to lug around and mount in its ground role.
As for range, neither is really a force AAW weapon though if you stay close to the HVU you can provide good cover for it.
Is the range difference of 19NM versus 27Nm crucial? Not really both are a major step ahead of current PDMS systems.
Chris B, yes some people say 16, others 24.
FBOT Silo is raised as if it was to be replace by a Mk41 silo for whatever reason the spare space below would allow it to fit.
The mix of 15/30 will be mission and money dependent! yes I agree that if choice is 1 aster 15 or 4 CS in one tube it is a no brainer.
@ APATS
Aft the flight deck or amidships? Or somewhere else such as SeaCeptor cells in a re-arranged hangar structure? The hull looks curved from stem to stern.
http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v647/Jsweeneypm/t45-accomodation.gif
http://store.fleetscale.com/images/source/daring_2008.jpg
I think Sea Ceptor is actually very well suited to PDMS. The range may be less, but it goes to the radar horizon for low level threats, which says it gets as many bites of the cherry possible against the most dangerous threats, eg sea skimming ones.
FBOT,
I would suggest that cutting and shutting a thirty-year-old hull would take more than an inconsequential amount of hydrodynamic analysis*.
Structure, service routing, EMC, CBRN proofing would all be affected.
The mania for re-fitting extant vehicles with new gear is a good way for absolutely guaranteeing that either we have the same systems for all eternity or our next actual system is:
A) very, very expensive
or
B) built abroad by someone else (and therefore carrying at least a 30% premium due to the lack of tax income)
We’ve already seen this with AFVs. Faffing about with FRES has led to the native AFV industry collapsing, being bought up and then vanishing to be replaced by new companies set up by foreign corporations.
Meanwhile our soldiers have been trundling around the place in 1960’s steel boxes, 1980’s aluminium boxes and 1950’s 4x4s.
*plus, the writing off of complex analysis as one of the tools used is a dangerous simplification.
Mr F @ 8.27
At times I do wonder …
T42 hull extension = What happened between batch 2 and 3.
T45 hull extension = Wish list to get them a wee bit more fighty, hulls No 7 + 8.
As before the issue is non trivial but not worthy of a Nobel Prize.
However I agree with your main point, treating weapons systems as some sort of military “Triggers Brush” is an exercise in futility.
It encourages cost creep / gold plating in the original design and wastes time and effort as we try to paper the hall through the letterbox.
The MOD lack vision, leadership and common sense in equal measure.
@ACC
You raised the issue up-thread about why Europe’s civil infrstructure, especially port facilities, seem to be better than those of the USA.
Could it be something to do with the fact that most of Eurpoe had its civil infrstructure so comprehensively mashed up during 1939-45?
Such a level of damage couldn’t be fixed in just a few years. It probably took 50 years of investment for Europe to get back to a ‘mature’ level of civil assets, meaning that we were doing ‘exceptional’ scale projects into the 1970s and 80s. By contrast in USA nothing got smashed up in WW2 so the ports they are using today are either built in the footprint of what went before or were incremental expansions rather than green field / blue sky projects.
The political legacy is also that European governments are more open to public infrstructure projects both as direct job creation schemes and as economic stimulus.
Such things are probably seen as a bit ‘socialist’ and therefore un-american over the pond. Not sure whether that was despite or becuase of the public infrastrucure works in the 1930s ‘New Deal’. The libertarian wing of the American right can be a bit funny about anything that smacks of ‘big government’.
“Moral of the story is that the infrastructure of the US is very 50s / 60s while the EU is much more up to date and always improving. Not sure how this has come about but I don’t think it will change anytime soon.”
X @ 7.17
Interesting stuff.
Need to try and work out how much of th hull is given over to the powertrain.
Pods suddenly look very useful.
At the risk of opening up old wounds the T45 looks a bit cramped.
Either that or the crew is too big.
FBOT,
That report does indeed look 2002-ish and certainly GT biased. However, there’s a nice list of stats for various engines including the one from the Formidable frigates. The thing that sprang out was the lack of difference in SFC between the diesels (e.g. MTU 20V 8000 V90) and the GTs – not a lot in them. I must admit that I was surprised to see the weight of a Trent at 26t – I guess that’s total installed weight since the engine can’t be any more than a few tonnes.
Something that others can verify is that you talk about intakes and exhausts and seem to imply that a diesel’s would be smaller. From what I remember a diesel is an “excess air device” (that’s where it gets its torque from) – a turbo diesel even more so. I’d therefore guess (and it is only a guess) that the intake for 40MW diesel is larger and heavier than a 40MW GT.
I still stand by my original statement that I don’t see anything better than diesel for optimum cruise efficiency and GT for sprint.
Last thing. You said:
“These ships – civil Point Class vessels – are incredibly efficient, flexible and cheap.
It is easier to make them more robust and survivable than it is to make Naval vessels flexible, efficient and cost effective.”
I assume you are a ship architect then? My knee-jerk reaction is rather different – they are simply different beasts. It’s like comparing a 40-tonne truck with a tank.
Perhaps what you say is right, if so I’d expect the (cheap – ha!) T26 will be turbo-diesel powered.
As we appear to have a number of budding naval ship designers who believe the current designs are not fit for purpose perhaps they could enlighten the real professionals how they’ve been doing it so badly wrong all these years http://www.rina.org.uk/hres/QinetiQMar12.pdf so the future ships are much better!
@ FBOT
T45 has “low density” accommodation fitted out to a high standard. They make even T23 look cramped. Jed would probably get agoraphobia. I see nothing wrong in sailors having good quality messdecks.
To make up for getting this thread off track – USA plane plans:
http://defensetech.org/2012/04/12/dods-30-year-aviation-plan/
Mark
Would love too but I am confused about what the ships we have/ are promised are designed to do.
If there are any ship designers on site would love toget the chance to ask questions about how they are like they are.. Coz to a layman it does not make much sense.
nice big double page schematic of T45 in mail on sunday live magazine today,have to supply your own drawing pins though!!!
ps the freaks have attached to a falklands 30 piece, twats
@Gareth
Interesting doc. What I note is how the USN are clearly not fully sold on the F35C. Why else would they be talking so loudly about other options for F18 replacement?
They seem to be saying that F35C will not be in service in any numbers until 2030, by which time it will be obsolete, so the remianing F18E/F will have to be replaced with something else. The subtext is they just don’t trust a joint programme to deliver them a useful aricraft?
Also interesting that C2A will be out of service long before E2D, so their respective replacements may not be linked.
All the ‘buzzword bingo’ about Sea Basing suggests the USMC have got their paws all over it so it could yet be V-22 for the COD role.
PE,
Though I’m also a fan of V-22 COD potential I fear that may be getting ahead of ourselves. At the same time, however, USN wariness about Dave C (the aircraft that is :) chimes with blog traffic on the subject the last couple of years and what I’ve heard from a couple of friends of friends down in DC. I think the level of USN trust in LM is close to craterously low. Here again context is key — just as the F35 debate in Canada has been possessed by the ghost of the Avro Arrow, plenty of serving sceptics and retired bloggers tied to USN remember the A-12 very clearly. USAF and USMC have nowhere else to go (tho “Big Navy,” I suspect, see F35C as a club to beat USMC aviation with, forcing them into CTOL aircraft to beef up the Nimitzes’ air wings off the USN balance sheet.) But the USN is very definitely waiting to see what Boeing offers down the road. And so, frankly, should the MoD. I would stick with F35B, say let’s overload the serving QE to run a combinded baseline fleet carrier (ca. 20-24 fastt jets) and LPH off that big hull. But there are, evidently, still real issues with B’s load carrying, bulkhead cracks in the early test batch, and blast-radius issues on VSTOL operation (no deck-melting thank God) that could compromise running fjs and helis off a ski-jump carrier at assault tempo. So the well looks poisoned both ways: the airframe still having trouble (just not automatically fatal trouble, guess that’s progress) is the one ramping up production soon enough to matter, if its not killed by politics first, while the one with the better development record ( less the arrestor mess) won’t see service in numbers for the time it took to go from F-101s to F-15s in the old school US R and D community.
What this tells me is that the wunderwaffe of JCA is fucked. Put cat and trap on QE now, especially if they can be physically moved on to PoW when she rotates into service. Buy fifty Rafale from Les Neigh bours for 2×15 in squadrons with the FAA, to live with the duty carrier and work up and down with it. Let it be a living example of the failure to take a post Cold War hint and redesign Typhoon for Rafale-like mission breadth (more built in swing-role from the start, navalised variant.) Run a two-canard fleet and get in on the ****ing ground floor either working on a *solely bilaterl* project with Boeing or designing a rival. The problems of first-day air (still favour standoff bombardment coupled with counter-battery ambush) and killing PAK FAs (if they don’t just turn out to be the MiG-23 of the low rcs world). I should say that, for the various other efficiencies of cost, and the fact they’re built to do more classically CAS work I would like Dave B to work. But things are as they are.
Would love to contribute to the T45 threadjack but that’ll have to wait a few hrs.
Paul g,
I’ve got some spare pins if you want.
On a side note — reckoning back to GMT it’s hours at most now, I suppose. Any chance of Carter’s report re: the Army as well? Spoonful of sugar from one to spin the cod liver with the other (since the dose could go either way here…) ?
Either way it’s a late evening here on Pacific Daylight so as Richard Burton used to say in the movies, Gentlemen, I’ll see you after the flame war :)
The times say they have learnt the chiefs of staff have unanimously requested changing from f35c back to f35b. You can read the extract at the link
http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/
F35b bk1 the uks first f35 has flown at lockheed martins fort worth plant
http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/the-dewline/2012/04/uks-first-f-35-flies.html
MM just had to go and buy a times as I do not subscribe online. interesting that the little Graphic cites the F35C as too heavy to operate from the French Carriers. A quick bit of google shows the ~F35C as 14,500kg empty with a max TOW of 31,800kg compared to the Rafale M 10,200 empty and max TOW of 22,200kg. The F35C is indeed a much heavier aircraft.
I then though but what about the E2 they fly, more googling shows that to have a max TOW of 26,000kg.
So if we go C we cannot use CDG, priceless, we never thought of this until now?
No doubt it will be a fudge. One thing to consider will the B still be around in the 50 years the carriers are predicted to last. If not and there is no more STOVL planes in the pipeline the carriers will have to be converted to cat and traps sometime in the future probably at double the cost.
All PATS @ 8.24
Can Dave the Rave ever recover from this?
His Commando comic performance about “Cats and Traps” is the stuff of legends.
However as much as I would like to lay all the blame at his door, where does this leave LF / Service chiefs?
Is this a VC10 moment – partial briefings to suit a personal agenda?
Or is it just proof positive that the MOD is not fit for purpose / totally useless?
Regarding the weights issue – what drives the weight limit on the CDG?
Arrestors – what they can contain?
Catapult capacity – what they can launch?
Deck space / length – what they can re-launch if the arrestors fail?
Finally the weights issues highlights the basic flaw in the F35 plan.
It is a full on heavy fighter replacing a flexible but limited light fighter.
There was / still is a place for both and it is only RAF Willi waving that is stopping it.
The RAF at 6 squadrons of fast jets stops being a viable operation.
We now have a service running at 6K personnel per fast jet squadron.
That is just a joke.
FBOT, I think the real mistake made by HMG was the announcement we were switching to the C variant. They should have announced that they were conducting a study to ensure the correct choice was made.
That however would not have allowed them to ridicule the labour parties choice of F35 B.
So strike 1 to the Government.
The service chiefs then instead of saying, wait a minute C is too heavy for CDG and this will be expensive simply said yes please we get the gucci one.
So strike 2 to the service Chiefs.
I am really interested to see what the final final decision is and how they try and spin it.
I am afraid I do not know what drives the weight limitations on CDG.
The RAF do a lot more than simply fly fast jets.
Should we ditch the F35 and wait for the 6th generation naval fighter being designed in the US.
Buy the F/A-18 or the Frogphoon to use off the carriers in the meantime. That would no doubt cover the cost of converting both to cat and traps.
All Pats @ 9.13
Fair point on the extra duties carried out by the RAF.
However fast jets is their lifeblood.
Take that away or reduce it to an irrelevance and they are out a job.
All the other stuff can just be handed over to the other services or a flying version of the RFA.
35K people to handle 6 squadrons of fast jets – national scandal.
I have noticed that the Phoenix ThinkTank are now calling the QE and PoW “Pocket Supper Carriers”. We all no doubt remember what happened to one of those Pocket Battleships in WW2, stayed in port most of her life then sunk by the RAF.
Jim @ 9.28
My thoughts are the F35C.
If we are going to buy a new heavy fighter then it needs to be the one with the greater abilities.
Since it is going on a ship the “A” is out the picture.
Next is to TQM the CATOBAR issue.
You know what you need, you know what you want and then you work overtime on the cost of that quality.
If the published cost of two 2 EMALS and a next gen set of arrestors sitting in containers waiting to be fitted is £480mill (from memory) – why does it cost this much?
180m of electric catapult and 3 bits of intelligent string should not be that expensive.
How many tons of stuff are we talking about?
Does this include a fraction of the R+D cost?
If yes who are we paying it to – GA did the work under contract to the DoD.
How does this compare with the current spec – steam and plain Jane arrestors?
What would be the cost of going second hand – off the Enterprise / America?
Regarding the here and now – we should do a mild steel prototype and rent some F/A18s to get us started.
If it really is a choice between having 2 VSTOL carriers available guaranteeing one available at all time before 2020 or 1 conventional carrier in 2025 it is a bit of a no brainer.
I wonder if we may see another massive change of tack with an F35B buy to allow for an air group for 1 VSTOL carrier perhaps a total of 36 onboard for a crisis.
Then look at a F35A buy for the RAF to replace GR4 as they come out of service.
FBOT, the problem with trying to go steam cats and traps is that we are using electric propulsion, the US conventional Carriers used Steam Turbine s and the CVNs obviously produce loads of the stuff. So we would have to put a steam generation system in place and more problematic apparently the means to route that steam to where it is needed. the steam cats and traps system is also very large. Trying to put that in a Ship already being assembled was described to me as nothing short of a nightmare.
Much has been made of the f35b “lack” of range but if you look at were we have operated since 1980 all targets we hit are within it’s range from the land or a future cvf operational location. I also doubt we will ever put ordnance on the jet to get anywhere near its mtow it really is the correct decision if it’s the one taken. Conformal tanks on typhoon for tranche 2 and 3 would cover range issue on typhoon IMO
@ APATS re Steam Generator
Much further up I did say that. I said a steam gen of the size needed would be about the size of a single decker bus at least (“boiler” only) and that from the scant information to hand about CVF layout it seem no margin, even within a 65000t ship, had been left for such a fit out. (I also speculated about the less than modest space need for trapping gubbins.) At the time I was wondering how much forethought had been put into EMALS; I think this was when I referred to the latter as vaporware.
X what happened to them being built as future proofed to take cats and traps. At the design stage there were only steam cats etc. Even if they were planning ahead with EMALS in mind the space should be there for them or was that something else BAE were wrong about.
http://www.key.aero/view_news.asp?ID=5047&thisSection=military
Interesting.
Interesting rants..er…comments here :P
FBOT, learn a little more about the junior service please.
I like the idea of splitting the order like Italy… but its as likely to happen as the RN buying V-22’s…
With all this delaying over what type will mean severe delays on the carriers themselves, and you cant blame the builders for that this time; we need a decision sooner as I can see it slipping = more sacrifice of the RN’s other assets.
Though Sir Humphry on his blog did a good post on the status of the Carriers themselves;
http://thinpinstripedline.blogspot.co.uk/2012/03/cvf-and-quiet-success-of-uk.html
“X what happened to them being built as future proofed to take cats and traps. At the design stage there were only steam cats etc. Even if they were planning ahead with EMALS in mind the space should be there for them or was that something else BAE were wrong about.”
This.
This is what I couldn’t understand about all that money being spent recently on investigating how cats and traps would be integrated into the design, because supposedly they were built with cats and traps in mind from day one. Surely all the design work had been done already and space had been allotted in order to “future proof” them in case cats and traps became a reality.
All PATS @ 9.57
Please get up to speed on the ability of MSDs to generate steam using a waste heat recovery system.
Maersk are specc’ing the kit to produce electricity.
We could just focus on producing the right type of steam.
Failing that we go for an industrial boiler.
The CVF was designed to accommodate CATOBAR.
Either we made a punt on EMALs being available or we designed in steam.
Now I think that all the talk about th CVF being designed for CATOBAR is MOD / BWoS box ticking / wishful thinking – fag packet design at best, wilful deceit of the politicians at worst.
As for your talk about routes – what is the issue – where else were we supposed to put the catapults? The Audacious class managed it, the Yanks manage it and the French manage it so why are we special?
Mike @ 11.57
The RAF are fast jets or they are nothing.
All the rest is a self licking lollipop or it is roles that can be done for others by others.
Chris B @ 12.08
Nail on the head time.
Either they were designed for CATOBAR or they were not.
If not then someone has a lot of explaining to do.
If they were but it was a fag packet / box ticking exercise then someone has a lot of explaining to do.
More and more the CVF is looking like organised theft from the working class.
I dont think the cat and traps were ever considered as fitted for but not with. I think the future proofed meant a space volume and weight growth allowance had been left for future design and integration.
Organised theft from the working class? It’s many things but that’s an odd thing to say.
X @ 10.26
Regarding the inefficiency of the CVF design – alarm bells started ringing for me when it was announced that they were buying 80K tons of steel – that is 40K tons of steel for a 65K full load design that supposedly has a growth allowance built in to that figure.
I just don’t know what they are using all this steel for?
Given the equipment needs of a CVF – magazines / material handling / service bays / engines / electrical kit and the rest the figure for the hull appears to be out by a factor of 2’ish.
Then you have all the fluids, the stores, the crew and the consumables.
Finally you have the warload, the aircraft and the RM stuff.
Something is wrong here.
The JPN can put a fully equipped 245m hull in the water at 22K tons.
The USN can put a fat, fully equipped 255m hull in the water at 40K tons full load.
Something is very wrong.
‘The RAF at 6 squadrons of fast jets stops being a viable operation.
We now have a service running at 6K personnel per fast jet squadron.
That is just a joke.’
And I thought it was us that were suppossed to be FJ obsessed ;-)
FBOT, the problems with the routing of steam for a steam cat and traps design is that the ship is already being assembled and the sections have been built. Cats and Traps were always going to be EMALS which obviously someone expected to be a lot further forward than it is.
I am not certain what you are getting at ref amount of steel, are you inferring we are selling some on the side?
The new japanese destroyer exists only on paper and they are saying 27, 500 full load and America is 47k estimated.
More decks perhaps?
I also thought the RAF had more than 6 fast Jet Squadrons so I trawled in Defence of the Junior service and finally made a phone call. So here we are.
Operational Squadrons
31 Sqn GR4 Marham
617 Sqn Gr4 Lossie
12 Sqn Gr4 Lossie
2 Sqn GR4 Marham
3 Sqn Typhoon Coningsby
11 Sqn Typhoon Coningsby
6 Sqn Typhoon Leuchars
Training Squadrons
100 Sqn Hawk Leeming
208 Sqn Hawk Valley
OCUs
15 Sqn GR4 Lossie
41 Sqn Gr4 Coningsby
17 Sqn Typhoon Coningsby
21 Sqn Typhoon Coningsby
All PATs @ 1.38
Thanks for the reply.
My point about the CVF is that it appears very inefficient weight wise.
40K tons of steel for a ship that weighs 65K tons full load does not appear to be correct.
The number appears very high and appears to leave little for anything else. One explanation could be that the 40K tons includes some form of armour or protection but even that would only explain some of the discrepancy.
The steel figure was a much publicised order to Tata – 80K tons.
Regarding the fast jet number that is where we are heading to.
I thought Nat the current figure was 8.
My comment about a self licking lollipop covers the training element and the OCUs.
One question on OCUs are they individual pilot conversions or do they support unit conversions?
Regarding basing I fear we are concentrating our resources too much.
We really do have £5bill of stuff sitting in a field in East Anglia.
All Pats – 2
The JPN ship is 22K tons standard.
The Wasp is 40K+ tons full load.
Given their FD numbers and their hull size the make the CVF look like a porker.
‘One question on OCUs are they individual pilot conversions or do they support unit conversions?’
What does the last bit mean? ‘support unit conversions’
@ APATS, just for info; there’s 9 Sqn at Marham as well and 17/41 are OEUs not OCUs.
Topman, my bad was going to blame the info I got but I had written down 9 Squadron and forgot to type it in. AS for OEUs and OCUs, I was told they were OCUs and even the RAF website lists them as such. Though with my logical brain on I can see that you would then have one OCU and one OEU per aircraft type.
FBOT I have never really taken any notice of the amount of steel as a percentage of displacement.
QM2 at 345M weighs in at nearly 150k tonnes.
The old 325M Kitty Hawk Conventional carriers were 82k tonnes full load at 326M .
As they are the only conventional class carriers ever built that are as big and in fact bigger i thought they prove a useful comparison. Kitty Hawke 251 Tonnes per metre, QE 235 Tonnes per metre.
Perhaps there is something about a large conventional carrier that sees a high displacement versus length.
CDG comes in at only 161 Tonnes per metre but she is a very low design.
@ FBOT
Their Lordships wanted a strike carrier pure and simple. They wanted something they could park at a reasonable distance off the enemy coast plus a margin for ordnance range (I suppose SS being the weapon of choice) and all other stuff came a distance second (ships are so flexible don’t you know?) I still can’t understand why if the RN wants to follow the USN slavishly the one capability they have we don’t have and we could do with is the ability to launch TLAM (or SS or both) from an escort. What “we” wanted was a Mega Cavour. Just double the lift figures for the Cavour for airgroup and that’s what we are going to end up with anyway. CVF should on paper be able to lift a significant amount of troops; just as the Invincibles have an LPH role. The difference though with Cavour (as with Ocean) the accommodation space for marines has been optimised for their use. A CVF Mega Cavour could carry a whole commando plus vehicles plus the ability to off load those vehicles dockside down ramps. The other missed opportunity is not fitting CVF with SeaViper; Cavour carries Aster 15; on a ship twice the size space could have been found for Aster 30 and cruise missiles and God only knows what else. Don’t get me started on sea control.
X, Don’t start it, you and Cavour, James will be here in a minute on Juan Carlos! Cavour has not yet been modified to take f35B.
Does every kg of steel ordered from Tata end up in the final ship? There must be some wastage in terms of offcuts etc that ends up in the scrap skip.
Even if the offcuts are sold back or somehow netted off I bet for a boasty press release the higher gross figure would be given out.
“40K tons of steel for a ship that weighs 65K tons full load does not appear to be correct.”
Anyway, back on the F35
This from Twitter, speaking at a RUSI conference
Amos: From what I understand, this isn’t yet official. But if Royal Navy does go to Bs, we in USMC will support them as requested. The B “is a personal thing with me. That’s a Marine Corps airplane.” I pay very close attention. Had issues, but we’re moving out here
CNO: I’ve talked to First Sea Lord abt 5 times in last 2 months. We will continue to help train Royal Navy pilots as we’ve agreed. No change
Anyone for raf pilots traIning with the us marine on ex uk American modified gr9s? That could be quite priceless as a headline.
@ APATS
I know about Cavour not being F35b. And I also appreciate that their is a difference between an LHD playing aircraft carrier (sea control) and a carrier lifting troops in a secondary role. I just think “we” have missed a trick. It seems to be “full” for such a large ship there doesn’t appear to be much spare volume. And the hanger (apart from height) looks modest. At least I didn’t harp on about having space for a BrahMos battery…. :)
Hi x,
The Russians had all these “Cavour carries Aster 15; on a ship twice the size space could have been found for Aster 30 and cruise missiles and God only knows what else” on their carrier (the size matches, too).
– they took them off, to increase the deck space available for aviation ops
– now all they are missing is planes that can take off both with fuel and a useful weapon load (… sound familiar?); That will come with the next refit (they have one carrier…everyone seems to have problems)
Except: the Dassault design that has TOW 117% above empty weight and is multimission capable; now the F35C is 119% above empty weight and also multimission capable
D.C. & Co must have the 5 reports for reading by now, and tomorrow’s Parliamentary channel is likely to break the definitive news before anyone else
@ ACC
Well with only 6 (so 3?) T45 available at one time, the limited number of airframes available for CAP, and the fact that CVF will always sit at the centre of any task group I think the idea of CVF carrying SeaViper has some merit whatever the Ruskies did or didn’t do in the past. There might be SIGINT considerations I suppose. But if the escorting T45 sits at the centre of the group it will be able to be tracked. And CVF was marked for SAMPSON anyway. One of the reasons why the Japanese in WW2 ignored RADAR in WW2 was because it could be detected from further out than was it actually useful for and if memory serves they lost. As I said I was joking about BrahMos. Or was I………? :)
http://cencio4.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/cvh-550-cavour2a.png
http://i420.photobucket.com/albums/pp282/mezzimilitari2/cavour2/cavour-chinomar-f061.jpg
X, Why sea viper? Why not Sea Ceptor, infinitely smaller and less complicated system. Could get 64 in that Silo you showed on Cavour, it is for self defence anyway. Force protection is the job of the F35 and T45.
Well, this looks then increasingly like my “Option 2” somewhere up before the 1000th comment.
X,
I gamed out something not totally unlike that. Starts with assuming a single carrier/phibs task force is the most we’ll get out of Geddes Axe 2.0. Then there’s the matter of available aircraft space aboard the QEs, for which forty is the round number within design tolerance. Mer et Marine, whoare reasoanbly savvy, think you could empty a QE out and then go back and put 45 Meriln aboard without overload. Let’s assume the real figure is 42-44 depending on airframe size. So you go ahead and overload slightly (pacify the keepers of doctrine by making sure only helis do overflow deck time.) You could load out:
24 (2×12) F35B
12 CHF Merlin (the next gen junglies)
4 something rotary (Merlin? Osprey?) With three AEW and one light COD
6 ASW Merlin
That bumps you up to 46. But since FAA support manning is generally leaner than the RAF and roughly half your air wing are helicopters (less staff intensive) I suspect, and really would welcome correction, that you wouldn’t need more berths for the air wing than the proposed CTOL strike wing manning. That leaves you (after VSTOL crewing + air wing) about 200 ship’s complement berths. If, as it was apparently suggested at some points in design, you shove in austere bunks for 600 RM, you could carry 800 green death aboard. Where does their stuff go? You build a pair (one th the task force) of those JSS clones. The command/meeting space aboard becomes additional medical and you keep the 2000 LIMS (nearly two Bays’ worth) of vehicle/kit space with the nice steel beach setup at the back to offload on LCUs. Task group is then:
1 QE mod as per
2 LPDs (pay off Ocean, fight to keep the crew slots/specialisations to get both Albions back in the water; load up full to 405 EMF each)
1 JSS clone (major medical and kit for the RM nwho have bergens and bayonets aboard QE)
3 each T45 and T23
1 SSN
Then you have two dozen fast jets and an RM battlegroup (handful of loggies on the JSS, handfuls on the destroyers which have bunks for marines) afloat. Being wafus the fast jets would work up and down with the task group as carrier air wings are won’t to do, rather than penny packeting. (You could even do TD’s buy of 45, with 24 in squadrons, 12 spare, 9 OCU plus help from the jarheads.) Needs must you leave the phibs/EMF behind, press the OCU for every instructor and unassigned new graduate, sweat the squadrons’ “spare” pilots, and get 30-32 airframes aboard for a semblance of “strike configuration.”
And the defining characteristic, the driving one (if Dave B will come right) is that it’s the fudge that costs least money overall.
Also, the QEs should absolutely have CAMM at least, as PDMS, to do less would be dangerous given their putatively restored assault role. And the T45s need the FFBNW sixteen cells up between the current housing and the gun for TLAM. Tomahawks are going to be the “bombardment guns” as opposed to beachead NGS) for at least another fifteen to twenty years. And before building a camel by putting in Mk 41 let’s talk to the SYLVER blokes about whether A70 really can take TLAMs, and not just on paper. So you build T45 towards something with a proper hull sonar, Merlin, TTs, Harpoon, 40 Aster 30, 32 SC (quad packed), and 16 TLAMs. That’s much more like a whole ship. And yes, an 8/8/8 split of T45/ASW frigate/SSN would be very good. For the rest Their Lordships will just have to 1) limit global expectations so the RN can concentrate its strength where needed and 2( put up with the return of the light (preferably minesweeping) sloop….
X,
I’ve heard wild stories of revised manning rotations to put up to five Darings at sea not just to retake Those Islands but as a “normal” surge capacity, ie when you’ve got a task group afloat. Sounds a bit like jam tomorrow but if our resident matelots have anything besides peals of laughter in response itd be useful info for assessing these decisions. (The fleet still needs Dubious and Doubtful, though. Or, better yet, ride the public fancy with the T45s and build a second, stretched set with towed 2087 and a second silo for land attack and ASROC as your task group escorts and use the first batch as “C1” in company with SSNs if there’s a sub threat. Their Lordships would shrink back in horror at the drop in quantity of fighty hulls but they’d be bloody useful fighty hulls. Hard as nails David indeed…)
Also, from our folks who know, given Dave B’s issues acting as a load-hauling strike aircraft, what would happen (also in terms of space and weight penalties given the putative mixed role of assault/commando carrier) if you went ahead and built with the angled deck? This is a new generation of STOL albeit, as F35, a bloody heavy one, I don’t imagine numbers I’d base on Harriers or even the failed Yaks have any relevance.
APATS,
now that La Presidenta has decided to actually go ahead and nationalise YPF, and the Spanish are outraged (see BBC News story tonight), with lots of bombast about protecting Spain’s national interests, maybe they’ll lease us JC and some of their Harriers for a couple of years to tide us over until CVF is ready. That’d be fun, and with Spanish bond yields today going above 6%, they do need the money in Madrid.
Someone put a link to an old steam catapult training film. Watching it, I thought it would work with compressed air instead of steam. Cars shot through the air in action films are usually propelled by compressed air cannons. You can use electricity to drive the compressor, so no need for steam generation/trunking.
F-35
B replaces USMC Harriers.
C is new USN strike aircraft.
USN needs new dogfighter to replace F-18, post 2025. Perhaps an F-35A with LERX, thrust vectoring engine & C landing gear?
@ APATS
Yes SeaCeptor would be a good fit. And I agree the escorts job is to escort. But as I said with 12 to 24 aircraft how will a 24hr CAP be maintained? How many AEGIS ships does a US CVBG have? At least 2 probably 3, and quite a few times 4. Operating as a missile ship and aircraft carrier would be awkward. But seeing as the RN sent Invincible to sea outfitted with SeaDart and CVA was supposed to be SeaDart equipped too I assume the RN have worked out some of the problems. I would also go for CVF with SAMPSON and CEC………
@ Jackstaff
Yep. I tend to think about CVF being home to half a commando (2 companies + HQ) as the heliborne portion and the rest of commando (plus support) being located in re-jigged Karel Doormen. Seeing as the San Antonios can host 750 marines and the Bay (the Enforcer design is ancestor of the KD design) can carry what 300 I think KD could carry 600 to 750 without too much trouble.
I would go with your airgroup too. But I would base the COD helicopter on one of the RFA’s. I would go 6 AEW/ASaC and 4 ASW.
James,
I’d like it even better if they were “keepers” after, then you could eventually fill up the second QE with 2 sqdns FJ and support aircraft and run two mixed Carrier/ARG groups on a minimal number of hulls which would *really* be cooking with gas.
Evitita did something even more foolish than the YPF business — she spurned Brazil. I find that intellectually comforting bc I’ve always maintained that, while Brazil might eventually be more problem than solution in Southern Hemispheric politics (and that could still turn a positive direction) it won’t be because of Those Islands. Brazil was happy to take up the regional line on outside “interference” because its the regional great power. But if Argentina forgets for a moment that its contemporary role should be as client to brazilian patrons, they’ll (they being Brazil) cut their old southern rivals short in a heartbeat. Unfortunately those early-20th century dreams of Argentine glory die hard. Since they were never realised they always promise jam tomorrow.
Is a dogfighter necessary, or have missile finally reached the stage where they can do the ‘leg-work’?
Can an F16 or F18 out-fly an F35 with HMS and high off-boresight missiles like ASRAAM or AIM-9x?
80,000 tonnes of steel for CVF is on-par with most other large warships. Vince was sold as 10,000 tonnes of scrap steel.
It also depends what you include as “steel” – hull, taps, saucepans?
Besides CVF is a 75,000 tonne design so I’d expect 37.5 thousand tonnes per ship min.
X, You do not always have a 24 hour CAP. Certainly not when cruising normally. If you were to enter an area with a higher threat then you would have tailored the air group to match. Areas of tension like the Gulf are covered by a variety of assets not all organic meaning the picture on Link 16 is generally pretty good.
Enterprise transited Suez with 3 Arleigh Burkes and a Tico 2 weeks ago.
@ APATS
I am not bothered about normal cruising I am concerned about abnormal cruising…..
Perhaps one of the flyers here can comment on how many airframes are needed to have 2 available. Doesn’t each QRA station here in the UK require 3 squadrons to have 2 airframes available at all times just sitting waiting to go? If there are 2 in the air, 2 on deck waiting to back-up the CAP up, and other ‘planes coming and going from other jobs an air group of 24 will be under some strain?
If the air threat is such that CAP isn’t needed to such an extent surely that is an argument to go with missiles? If we say SeaViper costs £500million a copy what is that 10 or so F35 but without the cost of AVCAT and pilots etc. One of the arguments used by HMG for a reduction in AAW assets is that T45 outperforms T42 by several factors. Of course the counter argument is that a hull can only be in one place at one time. If CVF has to be there why not let it carry some of the AAW missile work? Can we afford to send 2 T45 to defend CVF. What if there is another emergency elsewhere? What if an ARG needs escorting?
Not going to worry about it. I am just shooting the breeze as the Yanks say. I am sure CVF will be a big asset I just wonder if where their history is written whether it will be a catalogue of “if only’s”
PS: If there is a situation where CVF needs 2 T45 doesn’t that suggest that the poo would have hit the fan big style and that the emergency would be global in nature so we would need other assets elsewhere?
X, A slightly confusing post.
I blame films but Carriers do not generally drive around with 2 F18s and and an E2 overhead constantly. In face short of the Taiwan straits they do not do so anywhere.
The whole Top gun of 2 in the air two at alert 5 4 at alert 15 is a war time footing.
As for QRA, ref the earlier post, we only have 3 Operational typhoon squadrons full stop so no we do not need 3 squadrons per station to provide the 2 Nort and 2 south QRA kites.
Aircraft are not only for xmas or CAP, the F35 can perform strike missions, CAS, Escort for CSAR and CAP. the posture and amount of aircraft is varied dependent on threat levels.
If te pooh hits the fan big time and we need 3 type 45s to escort CVF we either have a big regional and contained conflict or we have a global conflict.
in the first instance we would probably be acting in concert with our allies and in the second we definitely would be.
The RN has provided an Escort for recent CDG deployments, the French amy be persuaded to reciprocate for routine deployments.
@ X ‘Perhaps one of the flyers here can comment on how many airframes are needed to have 2 available.’
It depends on how long you want to sustain it, how far out, how often, other taskings and so on. And such things as ‘how many’ do you include total fleet figures etc?
Ball park answer for shooting the breeze ? About 8.
Surely current falklands qra would be what could most easily be considered a carrier cap. Pilots rather than total airframes are more an issue for 24hr cap and access to aar asset.
The typhoon force did last year support 3 qra taskings and the Libya op at the same time.
@ APATS
I know F35 is not just for CAP that is why I am saying about work load. As for UK QRA I could have sworn there 6 squadrons (72 aircraft) to provide 4 QRA aircraft (north and south).
@ Topman
So that is 8 to have two on deck ready to go? How much does that change if there is say a 45 minute sortie for 2 aircraft per watch? Plus the two on deck ready to go just in case.
@ X no not that many 3 and 11 and coningsby 6 (plus 1 soon) at Leuchars. A/c numbers not sure as they are still being delivered I think it’s 66.
No that’s 2 up, but like I said don’t take it as gospel there’s a ton of other things to factor in.
If you were doing that I would think sorties double that + would be more effecient.
CAP and CAS are very similar.
You multiply the number of aircraft by the number of sorties per day and again by the aircraft endurance in hours (for the given mission) – this gives the total air hours.
You subtract 24 (‘cos you need that “on station”) the remaining hours you then divide by the number of sorties and the number of aircraft. This gives the “transit time per sortie”. You then use the cruise speed of the aircraft to determine how far out you can do the CAP/CAS.
Sorties per day must be continuous/sustained sorties.
Generally 6 jets are required (min) for cover over the ship, and for the F35B 10 will given you cover “projected” at about 200nm on the main threat axis. Buy 12, have 2 spare, generally allows CAP/CAS at 50% of the range for that aircraft.
@ Topman re 72 or 76 for QRA
I think it was an AFM article on the RAF Future FJ where I got the figure from. I don’t know enough to make stuff up so I must have got it from somewhere!!
Oh well not to worry. :)
@ It might well be more, I don’t the number of the top of my head. 6 might be the total number (soon to be) Typhoon sqns 4 operational plus oeu/ocu.
Typhoon numbers at start of May last year:
47 in frontline and 25 in sustainment. 4 were in the Falklands. 8 were in Italy/Libya.
Simon @ 8.11
Where are you getting your numbers from?
CVF designed out to 75K tons full load – does the Treasury know?
From the dimensions made public – 280m x 39m x 11m full load.
65K tons looks a much more plausible number.
75K tons would take the draught out to 12.5/13m.
There are much better hull forms out there to make use of this weight.
Consequently I think you are well off regarding the steel requirements for the CVF.
Surely we did not buy steel and then pass it on to the supply chain to build taps and bunk beds?
Consequently can you support your contention that the CVF hull will contain 37K tons of steel?
I feel you are way off by a factor of 50% plus.
FBOT,
Sorry, the 75,000 tonnes thing was a “back of mind” thing. I thought it was a pubic knowledge end of life displacement figure.
It’s akin to the 19,000t Invincible class ending up as 22,000t.
Perhaps not. It’s just that 80,000 tonnes of steel for both ships was not particularly surprising to me.
Simon @ 10.17
The need for all the dredging planned for Portsmouth now all makes sense.
It was cheaper to go deeper and not longer.
Wrong decision to my mind better to have went longer and a bigger FD / hangar.
Still think 40K tons for the hull / structure is ridiculous.
Q+D analysis / fag packet number would have the hull / structure at 20K tons possibly more.
For one thing the heavier the hull, the smaller the warload.
FBOT,
I agree, the fag packet analysis puts QE at 20K tonnes of steel (~100,000m2 at one inch thick).
But since many warships are built from 2 inch plate, I would assume QE is similar or uses structural corrugation througout the design to provide similar (or better) protection.
Just look at the closeups of some of the blocks – there’s a lot more steel there than just the boxes.
Something else that may be worth pointing out is that it’s usually more efficient to go towards a draught of 1/2 beam, than to lengthen a ship. It increases internal volume quicker than the increase in wetted area (and therefore drag).
I guess that’s where they’re heading – after two (…) reballastings.
Simon, I really do not know where you got the draught being half the beam from? The only warships that approach this are Frigates and Destroyers with a large bow mounted sonar and even then that will only be at the sonar dome. For larger war ships the draught is nowhere near half the beam. large merchant vessels draught is generally a quarter of the beam.
Simon @ 10.48
We have a ship booked currently to be 65K tons full load.
We have figure which suggest that 40K tons of steel have been bought for the ship.
That would suggest that the steel is going to be used for the bare hull of the ship and asociated structure.
This only the start of the build process and the ship has to be equipped, powered, fitted out …
This in itself is a huge exercise and that is before we get to the crew and the aircraft.
And then there is the warload, the fuel and the stores.
Looking at other ships, going on past experience 40K tons for the bare hull of a 65K to ship is not credible.
It that was the case then the level of design efficiency is shocking or the waste from the fabricating side is criminal.
APATS,
“towards…” – rarely getting there. And if it did approach 1/2 beam it would likely be a semicircle rather than rectangular profile.
The point being that the most efficient growth is nearly always down (increased draught).
Simon, Efficient if you are simply concerned with how much you can fit inside. with a warship the reason for growth is almost exclusively to do with fittings that requires space on the upper deck. Larger flight deck or hangar, extra space for guns, sensors or missiles.
APATS,
We’re talking about the difference between start-of-life and end-of-life. This load increase rarely involves adding length, or beam – just draught, which happens to be the most efficient.
Simon, when you bolt extra stuff onto Ships they get heavier and therefore deeper, e.g Type 42. When you become serious about upgrading a ship you make it longer in the next batch as that is the only way that you can fit the extra kit on. The load increase you talk about is to do with stuff that is often fitted for but not with so extra air in the original build is now filled with kit or swapping out items of equipment for heavier items of equipment that go into the existing space.
Your point seems to be that putting more stuff on a Ship makes it heavier and therefore draws more, well yes that is pretty self explanatory my point is that when designing an upgrade or batch 3 of an existing Ship what happens to fit stuff on is that it is stretched.
So i guess we are actually comparing apples and oranges. Of course without a major structural overhaul a ship that gains extra equipment and weight over its life will become heavier. there is no other choice.
APATS,
I agree with your point about the “next batch”. However, we’re not likely to have another “batch” of CVF – which is what we were discussing.
If you read the thread Mr FBOT cannot believe that the CVF is 40kt of steel, I pointed out that perhaps we should look at 40kt of steel against the end-of-life displacement of 75kt (which I thought was common knowledge).
I think the only undecided point is what proportion of a warship is hull/steel. My answer is 50%, FBOT thinks 25%.
Any ideas?
Simon, It is not something that I have ever really thought about or asked about before.
Hi Simon
April 16, 2012 at 9:33 pm,
A lot of ship building stuff has got in-between, but your formula makes sense
– have you “back tested” it against the Libya Op a/c numbers, distances and sorties?
ACC,
No, primarily due to various statements about Typhoons going in a Mach 2 with three in-flight refuelings and 5-hour missions, which tends to skew the results. I.e. no idea how many “missions” one airframe would manage, what the actual cruise speed is, etc.
Eight Typhoon were deployed and I seem to remember reading that went up to 10, probably as more and more hours piled onto the airframes.
Sorry, not much help.
ACC,
Just shoved some figures into a spreadsheet for the Libya op.
Going on the “five hour mission” thing and a cruise speed of 500knots (standard air defence radius of 750 or 3 hours CAP). Oh, and two of these sorties a day (which is pushing things a little) I make 8 jets managing to project CAP at 500nm, and as I said with 10 air-hours per day I’d expect to need a couple more soonish.
I think 500nm is just enough to patrol the air over Sirte from Gioia del Colle?
ACC, the problem with attempting to use a formula for Libya was the number of Aircraft involved. The daily ATO ran to pages and was produced by ACC in Izmir so the Uk assets were simply part of the effort and were used for missions when and as required by the ACC.
Hi APATS,
Simon’s formula came up with (when based on the actual number of UK aircraft):
– deny the airspace, right up to the coast line
– persecute targets of opportunity, but again not really inland
– so no proper strike missions, out of that number
How do we translate this to a minimum carrier airwing, on a sovereign mission (doing it without help, other than perhaps Istar and AAR from other UK assets)?
ACC,
Please bear in mind my figures for the Typhoon in Libya are very finger in the air. Best case could be 1000nm radius if the outward journey is a whole tank at Mach2 for 50 minutes!
As I said, it’s difficult to use my formula when the aircraft are being tankered because (as was the case in Libya) each airframe is really doing 3-4 sorties in a single sitting.
Also I agree with APACS in that we didn’t need to maintain 24-7 cover – there were many other squadrons out there.
As for your final question about a minimum carrier airwing, I think you need to define what you want to do. I’d suggest that Cavour (8 F35B + 12 Merlin) is about the minimum sensible carrier and airgroup at the mo, as she’s simply a F35B capable, slightly scaled up version of Vince/Lusty/Ark.
She could probably cover 1 battalion at 200-250nm whilst defending the sea from subs and other ships.
Hi Simon,
You are of course right about tankering, but the hop from Libya to a future carrier op – roughly on the same scale (but involving a landed element) – was an attempt to bring out the utility in circumstances where tankering would only be available “in extremis”, ie. for preplanned longer range strikes
RE “As for your final question about a minimum carrier airwing”
– there must also be a benefit to turn-around times from flying off an optimised facility, rather than a tented village?
ACC,
No offense intended, but I’m not sure I understand.
Are you trying to do the Libya operation from a carrier? If so, I assume you are aware that the Libya op consisted of over 150 jets from various nations + tankers + copters + whatever the USA actually tipped up with.
Or are you asking if the entire UK capability could have done it alone? If so, my answer is no, but yes if we could have put everything in Italy.
Typhoon Libya by Peter luff http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmdfence/950/950we06.htm
Well there we go…
10 Typhoon giving 4 sorties a day (between them) with 31 support personnel for 6-months.
Just goes to show you don’t need to do much when there’s a dozen nations working with you.
Any idea what is meant by frame-swaps?
Is this swaps from the sustainment pool?
Looks like it Simon. They’d have to swap some craft out to replace those that were pulled for maintainance, which may be why there was 0 swaps initially, then maintainance requirements kicked in.
Fair enough, so the stats at the bottom of the report indicate (if you’re pessimistic) that one airframe is good for 20 of these sorties (or 100 hours). Multiple by 1.5 if you’re optimistic ;)
Seems to concur with the USN Nimitz surge analysis and general rule of thumb.
Mark @ 10.33
You couldn’t make it up.
Typhoon – not practised A2G for over a year?
Typhoon – 21 days from alert to bomb drop?
Typhoon – 10 aircraft delivering 4 sorties per day?
Why do we bother?
The lunatics have taken over the asylum.
The “All must win prizes” attitude looms large – awards for breathing.
31 support personnel up close – how many were left behind in the UK?
Now what was the hotel / car hire bill?
FBOT,
Hang on, the sortie rate is what was required. I’m sure the same aircraft could have delivered 40 sorties per day for a week before needing 100% swapout. It was a long term campaign so the rate of use was extremely reduced.
The analogy I always think about is the Le Mans 24 hour race. A car that should last 20 years and do 200,000 miles can be totally destroyed in a single day simply because of the rate of use.
@FBOT
It’s easy to criticise, but if they threw you into the job, will you be so free with your complaining?
In the spirit of Karma, I wish you would end up with a boss that has a similar attitude to what you have shown so far. It would be very amusing and ironic. And well deserved.
Gabby’s been reading the RN yearbook and picked this one up “the studies for CEPP have come up with a LHA capability estimate. The CVF is described as embarking a Commando battlegroup (no less than 600 men) with a squadron of 12 F35C, at least 12 between Chinooks and Merlin helicopters and 8 Apache”
– so now we can reverse the calculations and see what could be sustained from this kind of airwing
– to make/keep the Apache useful, the transiting distances for the jets will be v short
– the airwing has not been nuanced to make an allocation for AEW and ASW (the latter can always be assumed to be done by/from the escorts)
Observer @ 12.47
What were doing?
Was it PR or was it a real job?
The swaps would be to balance airframe hours over the fleet. Others here would have a better idea but I think only 6a/c were declared to NATO. Remember that 3 qra were also maintained during this effort with only 2 sqns full up an running and 1 still standing up in a Scotland I thought they did quite well.
@Mark
Airhours balance is a possible swap reason too, but not in this case I suspect, as the first 2 months, there were no swaps at all.
@FBOT
Ask the Libyans. The RAF may have done a job, good or bad, but I can definately say you were never near it. So, NO. YOU didn’t do nuts.
Observer @ 1.54
Blow it out yer erse ya rocket.
You are not really into trying to work things out for yourself are you?
Taking all those orders has severely reduced your ability to think.
Given all we know, just where were the Tornados?
@FBOT
Neither are you “working things out”, you’re just looking for excuses to complain.
“Given all we know, just where were the Tornados?”
Another reason to complain FBOT? You simply don’t stop do you. At least, rocket that I am, hot air only comes out through the end it’s supposed to. You, on the other hand, are very well balanced.
Calm people calm, There were 12 Tornados deployed as wellas the 10 typhoons, the parliamentary answer was Typhoon specific. sortie rates and missions required were controlled by a US 3 star who ran the air campaign from the Nato Air HQ in Izmir Turkey. basically we had more assets than targets a lot of the time so no aircraft was operating at anywhere near their max potential sortie rates. The planners rotated aircraft and missions to keep people employed ensure rest and obtain the best platform for specific missions.
@ FBOT
‘Why do we bother?
The lunatics have taken over the asylum.
The “All must win prizes” attitude looms large – awards for breathing.
31 support personnel up close – how many were left behind in the UK?
Now what was the hotel / car hire bill?’
What’s all this supposed to mean?
@ Obs
‘Airhours balance is a possible swap reason too, but not in this case I suspect, as the first 2 months, there were no swaps at all.’
It still may have been for that reason especially if some airframes were ‘fly hard’ then rotate them back. I don’t know what level 1st line are cleared to on Typhoon, the contract might mean they had to be sent back to the UK.
Topman @ 2.40
The tone of the letter was self congratulatory in the extreme.
It read like a Typhoon fan boy wet dream where ever step forward is lauded like a new world record.
From what you and others say the Libya operation turned into an international willi waving competition where everybody strutted about in their Sunday best trying to out-shine the competition – a bit like the rescue operation to Haiti but with bombs.
@FBOT
‘From what you and others say the Libya operation turned into an international willi waving competition where everybody strutted about in their Sunday best trying to out-shine the competition – a bit like the rescue operation to Haiti but with bombs.’
I’m not sure what I’ve said to give you that impression. What was it?
Observer @ 2.14
Rocket – Yes – More heat than light / Lots of noise but little direction / Very reactive with very little feedback.
Yes, Rocket describes you well.
Topman @ 3.35
Sorry, got you mixed up with All Pats and others.
FBOT, It was anything but an International willy waving contest, the number of airframes available allowed the Air Component Commander to operate them at lower sortie rates than they were capable of. Very well controlled and professional.
@FBOT
Ha! Even your definition of “rocket” is screwed up and negative. Grow up. No one here accused the Libyan intervention of being a willy waving competition but you. Of course, if you don’t have allies, imagine them up or attribute words to them that they didn’t say.
If I wanted to listen to whining, I’d go play with my nieces and nephews. They, at least, have the saving grace of looking cute.
“If I wanted to listen to whining, I’d go play with my nieces and nephews. They, at least, have the saving grace of looking cute.”
I’ve got two nephews and one, maybe two nieces I’ll trade you. Can’t decide on them yet. I’ll take one Nephew for my two and a straight swap on the nieces?
@Chris
You mean… I’ve to then listen to whining without the saving grace of cuteness??!!
I suspect a scam.
:P
Me? Never…. honest as BAE I am.
Ah s**t.
“These are not the droids you’re looking for.”
“These are not the droids you’re looking for.”
“You may go.”
“You may go.”
“What’s up?”
“No idea, that weird guy just came up and started talking.”
“Poor you, you always got the nutters during shore leave.”
ACC,
Following the comment about Gabby/CEPP, they should follow my advice from [April 6, 2012 at 9:03 am] that will save us a billion or so in the short term.