The Future of the Royal Navy 11 – Logistics and Support
Share by EmailThis is the final post in the series, a look at logistic and support issues.
With a reduction in fleet size it is logical that the Royal Fleet Auxiliary is also reduced. Recent announcements have confirmed the following
With a smaller surface fleet these requirements are correspondingly lower, and hence we have decided to withdraw from service the Auxiliary Oiler RFA Bayleaf and the Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment vessel RFA Fort George from April 2011.
Additionally the Bay Class amphibious support ship RFA Largs Bay will be withdrawn from service in April 2011.
Bayleaf was due out of service this year anyway although as one commenter notes, would have been extended.
The Leaf Class Auxiliary Oiler or Support Tanker is used primarily for transferring fuels between MoD locations and fuel replenishment at sea. Much of this fuel transfer role has been carried out by commercial operators and the class only has a single hull. Although MARPOL regulations prohibit single hull tankers they do make provision for government owned ships to be exempted, however, it is the government’s intention to be fully compliant so the Maritime Afloat Reach and Sustainability (MARS) programme is seeking to replace the existing single hull ships.
Withdrawing Fort George is a surprising decision because the Fort Victoria class are arguably the most versatile ships in the RFA fleet, as their recent pirate hunting and drug smuggler busting exploits show. They are also much younger than the older Fort Victoria Class and were not due out of service until 2019.
Singe Task Group Support
In looking to the future it is worth a recap on the present, the RFA is perhaps a little less well known than the RN fleet. The role of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary is to support the Royal Navy effort by supplying it with fuel, ammunition and other stores. It also supports amphibious operations and recently, has been filling in for the RN on security and presence related tasks.
The Fort Class (especially the newer (II)) are extremely versatile but they are single hull, likewise the Rover and Leaf classes. The only modern ships in the flotilla are the Wave Class which are more or less fuel only. This presents a problem because in order to support the single task group with dry/refrigerated stores and ammunition we need something other than a Wave class.
The Military Afloat Reach and Sustainability (MARS) project has had more lives than a whole herd of cats, on, off and on again. Most of the indecision has been driven by cost issues and delays around the CVF. Originally intended to replace the existing replenishment ships and provide a joint sea based logistics capability, the sea basing concept seemed all the rage in the US so as usual, the UK followed. We have gone through any number of industrial partners, wasted a lot of their time and so the choice of willing build or operation partners seems to be dwindling to the usual suspects.
Towards the end of last year it showed signs of twitching back to life with the Afloat Support (AfSup) directorate in DE&S launching a pre-qualification phase for the Fleet Tanker element but this again, seems to be on the back burner again. Instead of a single monolithic project it now comprises a number of single projects.
With such a rapidly changing RN fleet size and future plan it is not surprising that the RFA component has seen only faltering progress. With the TD proposal to configure the majority of the combat fleet of the Royal Navy into a single, smaller yet more powerful Task Group, the need to deploy ships operating in small groups or alone becomes diminished. As the fleet is transitioned to the Single Task Group and within the same time frame the Rover, Leaf and Fort Rosalie classes would be withdrawn.
Inter location fuel transfers would be carried out by commercial charter, there is some military rationale for retaining this ‘in house’ but not sufficient when measured against the likely cost.
When looking at replenishment requirements it is important to consider the demand. With a reduction in main fleet size and the likely improvements in fuel consumption the basis on which calculations have previously been made will need revisiting. As an example, the Type 45’s integrated electric propulsion system has proven to use less than a quarter of the fuel of the Type 42 and Type 23, on average, 35 cubic metres per day.
The first question to ask is could a single Wave Class (from a pool of two) support the Task Group with sufficient quantity of fuel and lubricants and in sufficient variety. I suspect not, even though they are very large, but it might be worth investigating. Working on the assumption that a single Wave would be unable to support the Task Group alone and in the interests of providing some measure of resilience, a need for additional vessels becomes clear. These would provide aviation support, solids stores and additional fuel.
OPTION 1: 2 Wave Knight Class and 2 modified Fort (II) Class
The Fort class fit this gap neatly but with the early withdrawal of one of them and the single hull issue they should be discounted. The older Fort (I) class definitely need replacing but the decision to withdraw the newer and more versatile Fort George is confusing. In line with the make do approach, could they be modified so that the fuel holds were double skinned and would this satisfy the relevant regulations?
Apparently, this option was considered but discounted; given the change in financial realities and reduction in fleet size/F35 could it be worthwhile to put it back on the agenda, it would mean reversing the decision of withdraw Fort George?
So my preferred option would be to make do and mend in the short to medium term.
This is the lowest cost option when looking at capital costs but depends on being practical.
OPTION 2: 2x Wave Knight and 2x Conventional Fort (II) Class replacement
Unfortunately this means that when CVF comes into service in the early 2020 period, the replenishment fleet will be between 17 and 27 years old, the Forts being the oldest, hardly suitable. Looking to this period the Wave Class will still have a good working life ahead of them but the Fort Class will definitely need replacing.
If we are to replace the Fort Class, assuming they can’t have their lives usefully extended, with a solid store focussed multi-purpose replenishment ship a number of important issues need to be resolved, besides capacity of course.
What would they need to do and have?
- Standards compliant Replenishment at Sea (RAS) equipment to support the Single Task Group and allied ships for various types of bulk fuel, astern or on the port or starboard sides, whilst in port or to a deployed force ‘over the beach’
- Dry, refrigerated and ammunition stores RAS. The ship would carry fuel but the main role would be solid support
- Potable water generation, storage and dissemination
- Support vertical replenishment
- Operate in hazardous conditions
- Aviation and comprehensive repair/maintenance facilities for up to 4 Merlin sized helicopters
- Extensive space for ISO containers
- Accommodation facilities for approximately 250 additional personnel
To the sweet shop, post haste!
Hang on just a minute there, this is Ebenezer ‘TD’ Scrooge with my obsession with commonality as a means of driving down cost.
OPTION 3: Create a new multi-purpose support class to replace the Forts, Argus and eventually the Wave Knights and Diligence
There is a debate about the nature of support ship design, should they be specialised or multi-purpose, or perhaps a bit in between? The Dutch/Canadian Joint Support Ship designs take the multi-purpose road and the Rolls Royce or BMT Aegir designs are more traditional.
Both Dutch and Canadian designs have a vehicle deck, RORO ramp and extensive accommodation, whilst this may suit the Dutch and Canadian forces I am not so sure it is suitable for the UK. Other similar designs include a well deck.
We already have a number of amphibious vessels and I would prefer the money be used for a more traditional vessel, perhaps investing in automated cargo handling systems to reduce crewing requirements. With our new found love in with France, we might even go dibs on the DCNS BRAVE proposal
On the other hand, there are obvious benefits to creating a single class of support vessels, ruthless commonality coming into play again.
Perhaps a viable long term strategy is to create a single class of vessels that can be used to replace the Forts and eventually, the Waves. By failing to specialise and making the ships more multi- purpose we inevitably increase the numbers required but would this necessarily be a bad thing?
It would certainly improve flexibility, resilience and compensate in the cost realm by having a single training and support pipeline. Instead of focussing on the capital costs we should look at through life costs, replacing up to 7 types with 1 will obviously create many opportunities for cost savings.
Something along the lines of a Dutch JSS could replace the Fort Class and eventually, the Wave class. Because of the difference in out of service dates between the Fort and Wave Knight Class the UK JSS would be obtained in two batches with the second batch having a greater emphasis on fuels rather than solid stores.
If we were to take this option the RORO cargo hold/s could be used for vehicles, containers or other stores. The modular hospital facilities covered in the previous post might also be deployed aboard this ship class and with a relatively large helicopter landing area would also provide valuable aviation training facilities, replacing RFA Argus.
Although it would not necessarily be ideal, if a cargo optimised JSS(UK) needed extra fuel capacity it could utilise ISO container tanks. With a containerised workshop system it might even be possible for one to replace some of the services provided by RFA Diligence.
The ships would also mesh quite neatly with a more comprehensive approach to containerisation.
BMT carried out a study in 2008 on the Future Operational Maintenance and Repair (OMAR) capability and described a number of options for this so called Cinderella capability, including custom designed vessels, converting commercial vessels, a modular deployable capability and finally an offshore barge that can be transported by a Float On Float Off (FLO-FLO) heavy lift carrier.
The study concluded that the offshore barge option was the optimal solution and made specific reference to the availability in the commercial sector of heavy lift vessels. The BMT study proposed a large (sized to be compatible with the Dockwise heavy lift vessels in service at the time) offshore barge to fulfil the OMAR requirement. This would be equipped with a range of cranes, workshops, accommodation for 200 persons, stores, aviation facilities and displace approximately 3,500 tonnes. It would also be equipped with some propulsion to support limited repositioning and station keeping. The heavy lift FLO FLO vessel would have a number of modes of operation; it could deploy alone to recover a damaged vessel, deploy the barge and withdraw or deploy with the barge, offload it, lift the damaged vessel for repair before returning it to the sea and picking the barge back up. Since then a number of other operators have emerged including Rolldock. We might also develop other barge derivatives, have a read here for an interesting look at using an offshore barge as an operating base.
This might be a candidate for a joint NATO capability.
Land and Littoral Force Logistics Support
The scope of amphibious and littoral operations is expansive; they may range from forced theatre entry to a small raiding force or non combatant evacuation and everything in between. This drives the need for flexibility and makes the resultant amphibious capability so bloody useful; the deployment of UK amphibious forces over the last couple of decades amply demonstrates this.
Although the UK has for a long time not been into the Saving Private Ryan opposed landing business the amphibious assault capability still packs a punch. The UK and French helicopter assault at Suez was the first of such as showed the way. No more storming well defended beaches but multiple vertical assaults to dislocate enemy forces and allow subsequent forces to manoeuvre to the objective.
Conventional wisdom dictates that CVF arrives, establishes air superiority and destroys selected enemy forces. This might also, of course, be carried out by land based aircraft. Reducing the threat level then allows amphibious forces to arrive and get within helicopter range, depending on the operation, these forces then enable the next wave and so on. The objective might be a suitable deepwater port which enables civilian charter ships to bring the bulk of the joint force supplies into theatre. This is of course a highly simplistic look at amphibious operations but it illustrates the thinking behind equipment selection.
Assault is carried out by the LPH (HMS Ocean) and LPD (Albion class) with the LPD(A) bringing up the follow on logistics support. The Point Class RORO ships from Flensburg (6 of) are operated as a PFI by Foreland Shipping, these and civilian charter ships provide the bulk lift to sustain operations at scale. The SDSR indicated a reduction in amphibious capability with a halving of the Albion, reducing the Bay class by 25% and only scaling for amphibious operation at Commando Group level rather than Brigade level.
In a previous post I suggested that littoral manoeuvre, security and capacity building should be a ‘capability plus’ area but achieving this does not necessarily mean high intensity operations in the littoral. With CVF likely to operate with a tailored air group of F35, Attack Helicopter, Merlin, Wildcat and Chinook, it will replace the role currently fulfilled by HMS Ocean. Although not ideal, the proposal for retaining the two Albion Class LPD vessels at alternating high and low readiness; is understandable. I also suggested retaining the fourth Bay Class LPD(A) as a joint RFA/DFiD operated humanitarian support vessel so this would still be available for amphibious operations with some notice.
The MARS Joint Sea Base Logistics vessel now seems but a distant dream but we would still need to support the Logistics Operations Group I defined earlier. If we took Option 3 above, replacing the Fort class with a new multifunctional joint support ship, this would be able to provide a wide range of replenishment, aviation support and command and control support functions for the LOG.
The overall TD concept of a smaller but harder hitting task group, forward presence and selected improvements lends itself to the multifunction logistic support approach. The short term transitional option is merely a stepping stone to an RFA that consists almost entirely of a single class of joint support ships able to equally support a task group, littoral operations group, an expanded forward presence deployment or any combination.
I am not 100% convinced by the sea basing concept and at an eye watering cost it seems beyond a single nation, unless that nation is the USA. All manner of expensive solutions have been suggested but some of the most expensive ones seem to be in the interface between the shore and ships, especially RORO and container ships.
The objective of many amphibious operations is to secure a RORO/container capable port. As vehicles get larger and heavier, the fuel and logistic support overhead of any deployed force is becoming larger. This means that amphibious capabilities either have to grow into expanded capacity or get smaller.
Amphibious logistics are simply about throughput, the ability to offload from ships, usually onto smaller ships/hovercraft and deposit their cargo onto shore, ready for movement inland. It’s a complicated, finely choreographed, operation that has to deal with many variables. This has resulted in many imaginative solutions and proposals, mainly from the US of course but in some respects the UK with its Albion/Bay/Mexeflote/Points capability has many advantages. The QinetiQ partial air cushion catamaran (PASCAT) demonstrator shows that the UK can still innovate in this area. The PASCAT concept from IMAA builds on the sidewall hovercraft from the sixties. As innovative as it is, it still doesn’t solve the problem of capacity, for that one needs a port, not a beach.
The earthquake in Haiti bought into sharp relief the need for port facilities, even the combined capabilities of a number of nations amphibious ships, serious capacity did not start moving until port facilities had been re-established. The allies faced exactly the same problem of logistics in 1942, when they started planning for D Day. Planners knew there was little chance of securing a deep water port, so basically built their own, the Mulberry, the remains of which can still be seen. The principle problems were twofold, providing a protected anchorage and some means to bridge the gap between the shore and a ship at anchor. Although amphibious transports were used, everything from the DUKW to the LCT, the Mulberry was instrumental in the success of the operation. A little known aspect of Mulberry was the US RHINO floating barge ferry.
Over the beach assumes there is actually a beach available, this is not always the case. A beach also needs connecting roads and for a sustainment operation would need stores and onward transport facilities. The US has a significant capability in this area (JLOTS) and are investing in a number of sea basing concepts.
A key component of JLOTS is the Elevated Causeway or ELCAS
Despite being very impressive for RORO cargo these still do not handle break bulk or ISO containers particularly efficiently, container handling is especially slow in comparison with established.
It is arguable whether any significant advances have been made since Mulberry and Rhino.
Instead of planning ever more expensive large scale hovercraft, PASCAT or T Craft, we should perhaps be concentrating here, improving a known and thoroughly unglamorous capability, yet one which is likely to be increasingly used. As it becomes easier to deny ports and push amphibious operations further away from within striking distance of such facilities the need to deliver actual real life bulk cargo, which means containers, into an austere location, will be more needed than ever.
Piers for use on beaches
This was the basic requirement laid down by Winston Churchill to the D Day planners, and the resultant Mulberry’s handled between 5,000 and 7,000 tonnes per day. Although the situation was of course quite different, one wonders what the transfer rate was in Haiti?
We always assume these are new problems that no one has ever faced before but in this case, again, we have been here before, particularly in the aftermath of the Falklands Conflict.
Based on technology and systems developed for the North Sea oil industry, the Falkland Islands Intermediate Port and Storage System (FIPASS) was designed to resolve a number of issues; port access, refrigerated warehouse space and personnel accommodation. Six North Sea oil rig support barges (300×90 ft) were connected together and linked to the shore via a 600 foot causeway. Four of the barges carried warehouses, with provision for refrigerated storage. In addition there was accommodation offices, which include a galley and messing facility for 200 persons.
The first cargo ship to use Flexiport unloaded 500 tonnes of general cargo and 60 ISO containers in 30 hours, by way of comparison, the same load, offloaded using Mexeflotes took 21 days
All this cost £23 million, or about £50 million in today’s money.
FIPASS is still there to this day, click to see a map or further details
The company responsible for FIPASS (ITM Offshore) developed the concept further but have since gone out of business, Flexiport is now marketed and supported by ASP Ship Management. One of the key advantages to using barges is they do not transmit any load to the sea bed, improving siting flexibility. Flexiport is designed to turn any coastal or river anchorage into a working deepwater port by mooring custom designed and built pontoons in sufficient depth of water to enable ships to lie alongside and connecting the quayside formed by the pontoons to the road system ashore by a prefabricated bridge or causeway.
Of particular interest is the container port concept.
Simulation has confirmed this can handle 150 TEU’s per hour and can be expanded to include accommodation, storage, repair, aviation support or RORO facilities. It is very flexible and quick to install, except for the causeway to shore.
[scribd id=32216166 key=key-29lq4hfc43e8x23uog7j mode=list]
The US has also been looking at improvements to their capabilities and as might be expected, have come up with some fantastic solutions but one of the lowest profile yet potentially revolutionary, is the Lightweight Modular Causeway System or LCMS
LCMS was originally designed to enhance interoperability between MPF, MPF(F), and JHSV, the wider programme even looking at PASCAT designs. The Joint Enable Theater Access Sea Ports of Debarkation (JETA/SPOD) Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) has demonstrated that a hybrid design, incorporating elements of land based tactical bridging equipment and floating causeways can support significant loads up to main battle tank weight. Although it is primarily designed for direct unloading of intermediate ships it could be combined with the Flexiport. The system is compact, allowing 120 feet of causeway to be shipped or stored in a space with a footprint equal to that of three 20-foot ISO containers.
From the official description;
Unlike other systems, the LMCS uses no in-water connections. And in contrast to the current causeway systems (ELCAS) can be deployed by seven trained personnel and be operational in approximately 3 hours. An equal number of personnel can recover the system in approximately the same time. The system is stored in a folded configuration with floatation bladders empty. When deployed, the system is sequentially joined, or assembled, and the floatation bladders are inflated. The bladder nearest the shore can be partially inflated as needed to provide a ramp-like entry and exit point. A unique feature of the LMCS is that the floatation bladders will not be filled with high-pressure air. Instead, they will be rapidly filled with only the volume of air suitable to provide floatation for the roadway system. This significantly speeds up deployment times and can be done with a pre-pressurised compressed air system (similar to that used to inflate aircraft emergency exit slides) or with a lightweight portable blower system that is smaller than a commercial vacuum.
LCMS has also investigated a powered system for dragging ISO Containers of 463L pallets along its length using a deployable winch system.
On its own it will also enhance ship to shore capabilities but as we mentioned above, the causeway from a Flexiport to shore can be a construction bottleneck, combining the two would yield significant benefits.
Instead of having to transfer containers, vehicles and break bulk cargo from container or RORO ships onto shallow draft lighters (JHSV etc) so than can mate with the LCMS causeway, combining it with a large Flexiport allows these deeper draft cargo vessels to unload directly, cutting out the middle man and supporting significant offload capacity in the early stages of an operation. Container and break bulk offload would use commercially available handling equipment
The standard sized offshore barge is in widespread use, designs are mature and there are many manufacturers. Usage includes floating pipe layers, accommodation, heavy lift cranes, power stations, ROV operation and salvage. Since the Flexiport concept was envisaged things have moved on considerably, dynamic positioning and other technologies have lowered operating costs and improved utility.
For other designs have a look here and here
Some have limited self deployment capability but in general are either towed or carried on FLO/FLO vessels.
One of the claimed advantages of the Flexiport model that uses these offshore barges is that they float; therefore no load is placed on the sea bed. Their size, anchors and ballasting will contribute to stability but if absolute stability is desirable there are other options.
Jack up or self erecting barges are used for salvage, craning and offshore construction, especially for wind turbines. This design could be used instead of the free floating type. If more mobility is required the offshore wind turbine industry has created a solution, the MPI Resolution, Discovery and Adventure. These combine the features of a jack up construction barge with a normal self propelled vessel. Although smaller than the larger offshore barges above they are much more mobile. Although much smaller than an offshore barge, because they sit on the sea bed, stability for load handling is assured and it is unlikely that anything above 100 tonnes would be handled anyway.
The first of the class was constructed for less than $30 million
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2pru-LCqDVY[
Using a similar design concept, the vessel could be converted to act as the Flexiport loading pier, with a container handling crane and a self deployable lightweight floating causeway.
Deployment time could be measured in hours not weeks, as with conventional methods.
Solutions can often be found in the offshore industry but we tend to ignore them and go off on tangents, designing bespoke military solutions.
This isn’t particularly clever, it’s just taking commercially derived proven systems and stitching them together for a non combat but vital application. The still in use FIPASS has shown the viability of such a system, ELCAS is in service, container handling systems are in widespread use, the jack up wind turbine installation ships are busy today, FLO FLO ships are in use all over the world so the only development requirement is the causeway between the loading point and shoreline. This only becomes a development issue if we want a quicker installation than possible using traditional pile driving and build and/or better sea state performance than floating causeways.
We already have a huge amount of expertise in designing military bridge structures using advanced aluminium alloys and the inflatable gap crossing systems used on land could be combined to create a rapidly deployed, sturdy and high capacity floating causeway.
All or most of the pieces are available today, all that is needed is a bit of glue.
Developing such a niche capability is perhaps not a good idea for the UK, alone although it would certainly meet my ‘capability plus’ test for something which we can excel at and which does not exist anywhere else. This would therefore deliver influence in a coalition operation.
However, a more pragmatic approach might be to develop it is a joint EU or NATO system.
Europe has a breadth of relevant expertise covering design and construction and some of the elements needed could take advantage of this expertise in the military bridging and heavy maritime lift, salvage, and offshore exploration sectors. It would also have a dual use, just as useful in a military operation as a humanitarian disaster response and chimes with the soft power ambitions of both NATO and the European Union.
The nature of this dual use, back room, behind the scenes, seventh echelon capability would also suit some of the European nations that wish to remain engaged but might have difficulty selling a more combat oriented participation in a future operation.
It’s just a thought but I wonder if something like this would be of greater benefit than the proposed MARS Joint Sea Based Logistics vessel.
Acronyms anyone, Joint Coastal Access System (JCAS)
This is therefore a proposal to create a multinational joint capability with the RFA/RN/RM/Army providing expertise as required.
######## OTHER POSTS IN THIS SERIES ##########
The Future of the Royal Navy 01 – (Context)
The Future of the Royal Navy 02 – (Tasks and General Approach)
The Future of the Royal Navy 03 – (Single Task Group)
The Future of the Royal Navy 04 – (Forward Presence Squadrons)
The Future of the Royal Navy 05 – (Equipment – T26)
The Future of the Royal Navy 06 – (Capability Plus)
The Future of the Royal Navy 07 – (Equipping the Forward Presence Squadron)
The Future of the Royal Navy 08 – (Equipping the Littoral Operations Group)
The Future of the Royal Navy 09 – (Equipping the Disaster Support Group)
The Future of the Royal Navy 10 – (Mine Countermeasures and Survey)
The Future of the Royal Navy 11 – (Logistics and Support)
The Future of the Royal Navy 12 – (Summary)
Category: Thoughts on the Future
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Excellent piece, good read.
thanks marcase
Yep, well done as per usual. What is disturbing about the RFA fleet is the lack of investment (how unusual…) I have RAS’d from, or worked on all of the except the Wave class, which had not been introduced when I left in the mid 90′s !
awesome post, should be a compulsary attendance lecture at the MOD if only to put a rocket up their arse and show them that thinking out of the box (terrible terrible corperate saying i know) works.
footnote the wind turbine ships have been working up here by me quite impressive to watch
I like the floating dock as an alternative to port dependancy, but it still needs to be secured.
I remain convinced that total amphibious capability in ground units and sea units should be able to surge to brigade-level………. even if those units are maintained in at half that level on a day-to-day basis.
1800 man battle-group at VHR
3 Cdo Brigade at HR
Yes, I agree, hence trying to come up with any excuse to retain Largs Bay but you do have to question what specialist training is needed to get on a boat and get off one!
Good stuff TD, I do like the way you’re prepared to look at the more obscure corners of military technology and look across to the civilian sphere, makes such a change from the hackneyed “we want our Harriers back” stuff. Probably could have split off the auxiliary article from the Mulberry stuff though?
I think the problem with supply ships is that the requirements are genuinely so varied. Even the USN seems to be moving away from the idea of one-stop-shop fast fleet replenishment ships (Sacramentos and their derivatives) to separate oilers + dry stores. I guess it’s maybe just too unpredictable to get the right balance between fuel and stores in one ship. Interesting fact about T45 fuel consumption – I knew the WR-21 engines were good, I didn’t know they were that good. Good example of how spending money on expensive destroyers can save money in a different part of the fleet.
So I don’t know what the right balance is – maybe we just can’t afford to go for anything other than integrated ships, particularly if we’re moving towards a more WR-21-rich fleet a JSS Batch 2 need not be so oily, and can be closer to Batch 1? At least this is one area where COTS should be pretty easy.
Rather than just think in terms of the existing fleet, we need to think about the fleet in 2025 – a part-time CVBG, mebbe a separate phib group, and presence ships dotted around the world. At a first approximation, I’d match one Fort replacement and a Wave to the CVF, one of each in mothballs to match the other CVF, and then ? one each for Albion and Bulwark?, plus several Rover replacements for the presence ships.
The other thing is that with the shrinking pool of escorts, the RFAs need to get used to the idea of spending more time on their own. They need to be more capable of defending themselves – and we’ve always skimped on point defences for our RFAs in any case. This is an obvious case for fitting for not with – and containerisation! Have an ASCG on all of them, space for a Phalanx mount or four, plus a “deck” Stanflex slot for FLAADS or a 57mm, and a “wet” Stanflex slot for boat handling or even a crate of minesweeping UUVs or sonar. Got to be easier to fly in a container than wait for a Hunt class to turn up from thousands of miles away, should an RFA happen to be what’s in the area when mines start popping up. It’s obviously not ideal, Jed’s probably already fizzing, but we’ve got to work with what we’ve got. Yes Stanflex, ASCG etc costs money – but a hell of a lot less than a £400m escort.
The helicopter capacity is obviously really useful – I’d have everything, even the Rover replacements, have helidecks capable of taking a Chinook and basic refueling capability, for use as an SAS/SBS transit if nothing else. The Wave hotel for 20 visitors is obviously something to continue with.
More left-field, and I know it’s mission creep, but the big helideck of the FV’s make me think of the UXV Combatant. Drop a short EMCAT down one side and you could have a useful floating base for ISR drones. After all, RFAs spend a lot of time away from the fleet, in ISR “holes”, and even when they’re with the fleet, it would separate out the naval UAVs from the manned fixed-wing stuff.
Why not use an RFA as a floatel for UAV’s although I also thought my Forward Presence Ship could also carry out that role. EMKIT has been developed on a shoestring but just works so all you would need is a recovery solution. Scan Eagle and a few others have shown this is all doable stuff and there is always the option for vertical lift UAV’s as well.
I like it, its not left field at all because if you look at the design evolution for the Fort class it was actually supposed to protect the T23′s
There’s nothing new under the sun!
Fantastic, realistic, useful concept.
TD – “you do have to question what specialist training is needed to get on a boat and get off one!”
while i take the point, we already have a Commando brigade, it is the obvious candidate for brigade level commando operations, even of the expectation is that it and the seaborne assets themselves will rotate on and off duty in halves under normal circumstances.
Great concept. At the start of the article you mention single/double hull tankers. What does this mean?
@ TD – Excellent post! Being effective doesn’t mean expensive.
Regarding the common class of Auxilieries I posted a link in the previous articles thread for an article which examined the links between different support ships (You have to scroll down).
http://www.europeansecurityanddefence.info/Ausgaben/2008/3_2008/05_Bohlayer_Ball%E9/Bohlayer_Ball%E9_Kaeding_ESD_0308.pdf
Would it be possible to have a common hull not only for the auxilieries but for HMS Ocean’s replacement(s)? At least some of the auxilieries could have enhanced Aviaton capabilities, with a through deck, and act as ASW “escort carriers”. And the UAV mothership concept I also liked to in the previous thread could be “added on” to a RFA vessel?
I am reminded of an old concept from the US of a fleet of only two hull types – a carrier of large objects/carrier multidock and a scout/fighter.
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA444499&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf
Hi TD, don’t like this kind of posting… nothing left to add!
Have to pick holes instead:
- from Jedibeeftrix “1800 man battle-group at VHR
3 Cdo Brigade at HR” which I agree with,
- going to your
“With CVF likely to operate with a tailored air group of F35, Attack Helicopter, Merlin, Wildcat and Chinook, it will replace the role currently fulfilled by HMS Ocean. Although not ideal, the proposal for retaining the two Albion Class LPD vessels at alternating high and low readiness” will leave half a Commando behind? I know that I am spitting hairs,and the lift capacity is still well over the declared, but just for the record…
RE “a more pragmatic approach might be to develop it is a joint EU or NATO system.” which I fully agree with, the “or” in it is quite important as there are both for long-ranged airlift ( I don’t call it strategic, as that could have different interpretations)
- the two have different command centres, funnily enough within a 100 km from each other
- nothing to do where the planes fly out from
- but everything to do with the different funding formulae (and the politics; who declares for what purpose)
Alex said “Great concept. At the start of the article you mention single/double hull tankers. What does this mean?”
In older tankers the ship’s sides and bottom were the sides and bottom of the tanks. In a double hulled tanker the tank is a separate construction within the hull; there is space between the tank and hull. In that way if the hull is broached the dirty ‘orrid stuff doesn’t spill. Back when the oil companies started to move the oil (and related products) in bulk there wasn’t really the profit margin (or the environmental pressures) to warrant the extra steel in making tanks. Double hulls mean twice the steel and twice the work to produce.
to move oil. Sorry typi, I mean typo.
Brilliant post, Think Defence
With reference to your comment concerning “any excuse to retain Largs Bay”, might it not be possible to use the argument that it could be retained in order to replace “RFA Argus” (which is an old vessel) as a dedicated hospital ship. “Argus” is the only example of such a ship in the fleet. The cost involved in manning and maintaining “Argus” could be used to keep the fourth “Bay” class in service. A new hospital ship was certainly part of the Navy’s plans until fairly recently.
You have come somewhat near the suggestion with your comment:
“I also suggested retaining the fourth Bay Class LPD(A) as a joint RFA/DFiD operated humanitarian support vessel so this would still be available for amphibious operations with some notice.”
According to a rumour thread over at Mil Photos.Net the Bay could be going down under………
Come on X, do keep up, we mentioned this over the weekend (I think) it is is in my ping/twitter feed. Check it out on the right hand column
It should be remembered that prior to the LPD(A) when the ‘Round Table’ class of LSL’s were in service, these vessels could be hard beached and discharge troops/vehicles etc ashore (always assuming a beach was available). With regard to a weapons fit if the vessel was ‘to be alone’ most none freighting RFA’s at that time (1966++)carried a couple of Bofors for self defence and some were fitted with type 182 decoy sonar, although none of this was rigged it could be in a very short time. So the idea of fitting modern armament onto the ideal Auxiliary is not so much a wish as catching up with the present day requirements. For many years the RFA was neither fish nor fowl and was a grey area of definition regarding legislation. Since the Falklands war however things have changed and everybody became a Reservist if things turned nasty.The pity is that now has everything is resolved there will be very little of the flotilla left to sail.
TD
Very interesting post.
Not very sure about the use of barges but the self propelled stuff with the jack up legs would be a great addition to the RN’s range of capabilities.
The jack up style of platform would be very useful in a littoral campaign as it would provide a large, robust and capable platform to support a fleet of smaller missile craft and also provide a base for helicopter operations.
On the subject of costs I think that a lot of the figures you see for existing rigs include a lot of money for the upmarkets cranes they carry. The basic hull is boxy in the extreme and the above deck facilities are industrial in nature with little marine spec facillities.
one issue I do have is speed, looking for 14knots minimum with a look at 18 knots a priority to reduce transit times.
Littoral combat would probably mean 8 rather than 6 legs for resilience plus a more hydrodynamic bow to aid speed.
Barge = 180m x 40m plus 20-30m for a pointy nose to be stuck on one end.
Next up would be 7 or 8 jack up legs and a helo platform covering at least half ship, 20m above the deck.
GJ @ 3.30
Any new build class of large RFA vessels would be a great opportunity to add some new capabilities.
Look at the second pair of “Forts”:
Wl: 210m x 30m x 10m’ish.
Look at the line running between the top of the forward superstructure to the top of the rear hangar, it would have been perfect to fit a large flightdeck at that level to support a basic air element.
Consequently with MARS the opportunities are even greater.
Wl: 250m x 36m x 10-11m = 45K tons.
40MW for 22knots+ loaded.
Space for 20K M3 of liquids and 3-5K tons of stores.
It would also include 2000m2 hangar.
Loading ramp leading to 1500 lane metres of vehicle storage.
If the money was there, how about a 800m2 well deck at the back?
The main issue is that these ships will be very capable and it would be huge waste to constrain them to last years thinking.
Some imagination and a ski jump and they would be a modern day Hermes.
Great post TD. Especially liked the Flo-Flo ship+barge concept, I’ve thought this was a god solution to the problems of at-sea repair, off-shore semi-permanent basing, disaster aid etc. Maybe something like this would interest the DFiD more than the redundant Bay (I know it doesn’t fit into your strategy though).
One question: surely with a floating pier / port, there must be a multitude of lines and anchors to keep the thing steady, which restricts the tying up of visiting ships?
My observations, broken down into points:
1) Bayleaf would have been extended until a MARS replacement entered service.
2) Leaf class have not been used for freighting much or at all in at least the last ten years. Primary employment is in direct replenishment support of operations/exercises.
3) Captions mix up Fort classes and functions. Fort (I) are dry stores only – no issuable bulk liquids. Harriers can fly off almost any flight deck. First auxiliary trials with a Harrier were on a Rover class ship. Do not refer to “Fort Rosalie Class” – no such thing. Fort (I), old Fort or type designation AFSH. Note that Fort Rosalie is a renamed Fort Grange, ostensibly to avoid confusion with Fort George. Likewise nomenclature for Fort Victoria and Fort George is Fort (II), new Fort or AOR.
4) No such thing as “Wave Knight Class”. Correct term is simply Wave Class as no distinction with the previous Wave class is required.
5) MARS exists and is being pushed forward, albeit slowly, and with a priority on the Fleet Tanker element as these are in the most urgent need of replacement. There was a recent announcement on the timeline, leading to hulls in service from 2016, orders in place by 2013 IIRC.
5) Claims for T45 fuel consumption are spurious and lack detail. During the entire period before handover to MoD, which was how long? How many days at sea and how many in port? Average speed? e.g. 4,100nm would be less than 12 days steaming at 15 knots.
6) Variety of fuel and lubricants is not an issue. All UK maritime units use the same fuel, same range of lubricants and aviation fuel. Quantity is an issue and the Wave class have relatively small cargo capacity compared to Leaf (c. 50%).
7) Double-hulling of Fort (II) not cost-effective. Quantity of work required and the subsequent substantial reduction in issuable fuel capacity. Fort (II) have substantially less dry stores capacity than Fort (I) and have high fuel consumption. Anecdotally, Fort (II) require a lot of their own fuel cargo capacity for self-replenishment, limiting the effective quantity that can be issued to a task group. Fort (II) configured to support CVS operations. No CVS = reduced requirement for Fort (II). Fort (I) larger dry stores (inc. ammunition) capacity more valuable.
Fort (II) are grossly, disproportionately expensive to run. They do not represent a “low cost” option.
9) AOR (i.e. combined liquid and solid stores) is a dead idea. Neither fish nor fowl, lacking sufficient capacity in either without a very large and complex ship with associated high cost. Small navies operate AORs because they rarely deploy significant task groups overseas and can only justify a very limited number of ships. The UK is not yet cut to the level of Canada, Netherlands or Spain and we require replenishment units in future to support CVF operations and amphibious task groups.
10) Proposed multi-purpose support ships do a little of everything, but not enough of anything. If you have a single class of auxiliaries combining the features of a replenishment tanker, dry stores ship and vehicle transport/landing ship, each one is disproportionately large, complex, expensive and liable to be employed inefficiently – e.g. no requirement for vehicle cargo so a large empty space unused.
11) But your proposal to concentrate on a single class of auxiliary is already inconsistent! You want two different classes with different emphasis. That is what we already have: tankers AND stores ships.
12) RORO spaces are an inefficient way to carry food or stores and unacceptable for ammunition or fuel.
You are, IMO, off in the wrong direction. MARS actually makes sense. Tankers for fuel, to urgently replace the Leaf and Rover classes and the liquid stores element of the AORs. Dry stores ships to support CVF and task group operations. JSBL with docks and a limited RAS capability to support amphibious groups and landings.
Moving on to some of the other comments:
13) “RFAs need to get used to the idea of spending more time on their own.” RFAs are well accustomed to operating independently. All classes since Fort (II) have been fitted to receive Phalanx and many, especially those East of Suez, are now actually fitted with the system – both new Forts, Wave Knight, Cardigan Bay, Lyme Bay.
14) “The helicopter capacity is obviously really useful – I’d have everything, even the Rover replacements, have helidecks capable of taking a Chinook and basic refueling capability” Except where it would be disproportionate to the size of the ship, that capability already exists. Many can take Chinook. All can offer a flight deck and fuel, except the Leaf class which were 1980s commercial conversions. “Rover replacements” will be included in five identical MARS Fleet Tankers of approximately Wave size or slightly larger.
15) “At least some of the auxilieries could have enhanced Aviaton capabilities, with a through deck, and act as ASW “escort carriers”.” Through deck aviation operations are not compatible with replenishment ships (see DK Brown, Vanguard to Trident) and all these “good ideas” add substantial expense. You’ll have a huge replenishment ship that pretends to be a not very good aircraft carrier. There is no budget for such boondoggles.
16) “Look at the line running between the top of the forward superstructure to the top of the rear hangar, it would have been perfect to fit a large flightdeck at that level to support a basic air element.” Right in the way of the Seawolf launchers, RAS rigs and funnels! Great!
And lots of lovely topweight to mess up stability. Those ships already displace 1.5x as much as a CVS at a time when CVF wasn’t even thought of. Don’t try to make a replenishment ship into something it’s not. Tack a few useful extras on, like the aviation facilities, boat facilities, accommodation, sure. But not all the £100,000,000+ extras.
Great comments anixtu and welcome to Think Defence
In response
1) post updated
2) I think I made that point but thanks for the reinforcement
3) I used the names Fort George and Rosalie class to try and make an easier to understand distinction but your comment is noted and corrections made
4) Thanks for the clarification, corrections made
5) I thought MARS was more or less a dead project and the requirement is being fulfilled by separate projects, I am sure I read something from the MoD to this effect
5) The link is an MoD one so I just took it at face value to be honest
6) Noted
7) Great comments about re fitting a double hull but I think I suggested another look in light of fleet reductions
Didn’t realise the fuel costs were so high but I wonder how they compare when taken in the round, comparing crew capitation rates and general flexibility
9) Did you read this post in the context of the entire series
10) I think I made the point about jack of all trades for replenishment ships and pondered on the debate between specialist v multi purpose ships and either option is worthy of consideration. There are benefits to either approach depending on how you look at the requirement I guess
11) it’s not inconsistent, they would be the same basic vessel with a change in emphasis so the cargo configuration might be slightly different but the propulsion and other systems would be the same, commonality where it makes sense to do so.
12) I realise there would be a loss of ‘efficiency’ but that is again, looking at it from a single task perspective. its the same argument and specialist v multi purpose. I of course ackowledge the down sides but wonder if the other benefits of being multi purpose compensate
The other points are on other commenters so will leave those
A great contribution Anixtu, thank you
5) MARS is alive, but not well. It has been broken down into Fleet Tanker (the highest priority element) with the remainder to follow later. There has been no change (yet) to the requirements, so we still expect to see 2 x Solid Stores and 2 x JSBL towards the end of the decade.
7/8) It isn’t just fuel costs, it’s maintenance and other factors. It is well known that they are the RFA’s most expensive ships to run, by a significant margin. Could be related to the extensive use of naval as opposed to Merchant standard equipment.
9) I confess that I did not, I came to this one first as it is an area of particular interest and so my comments are as yet not enlightened by your plans for the rest of the fleet and overall posture.
10) If I was in charge of future procurement for the RFA (if only!) and you offered me the option of acquiring the 10 planned MARS ships, or 10 JSS-type vessels built to to the same cost, I’d not think twice about taking MARS as currently planned. Small deployments such as APT(N), APT(S) and AGRT don’t require a stores ship to the degree that a CVF-centred task group or an amphib group do. If funds/hulls are limited, the dry stores and ammunition capacity needs to be concentrated with the task groups. Having part of your war stock of ammunition on APT(S) when the fight is in the South China Sea is not much use. However, see point 9 immediately above.
11) There would be economies of scale in procuring and supporting (parts, contracted maintenance, not so much training) ships with the same equipment or family of equipment, and I hope this is being considered for MARS, but I don’t see the benefit in having “slightly different” cargo configurations. All the current tankers have a limited dry stores (food and general gubbins) capacity, often (partially) containerised. Any task group worthy of a stores ship will also have at least one tanker attached.
Containerisation and unitisation is already largely how it is done and most RFA ships have provision to carry a number of containers – just look at photos of Waves, Leafs or Diligence. I expect to see similar or greater provision for containers on MARS ships.
I am of course burdened by familiarity with the status quo.
Thanks anixtu, so you are firmly in the ‘specialised’ camp for support vessels then
I can see both sides of the argument and I would tend to agree but I do think in a shrinking fleet different ways of thinking are worth pursuing
@Anitux,
The idea of a “ASW escort carrier” was intended to get the helis of the CATOBAR carriers as they interfere in the operating cycle. As they have to have auxiliary support anyway, I thought of maximising the assets we have. They could do the same for convoys and ASW hunting groups.
For operations away from the task force the large hangar space and welldock allow for great flexibility when combined With modular containers – hospital, troop accommodation, MCMV command and support, MSO, etc. If a through-
deck as shown in some designs imposes too much compromise versus the utility of mass take-off/landings then just have large hangar and large flight deck.
I saw this is the current issue of Ships Monthly,
ttp://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/The-US-Navys-Mobile-Landing-Platform-Ships-06525/
It is nice to see that the USN had been thinking about getting a big dock to sea. If it were me I would have some superstructure to provide a vehicle deck, accommodation, and a flight deck. All the civilian semi-submersibles heavy lifters I have seen have the bridge foward. That would make flying ops easier. Better to have a ship that carries 12 x LCUs at a couple of million a piece, than an LPH that can carry 12 x helicopters at 10,20 or 40million a piece.
9(Revisited)) Having now scanned the other sections, I could agree with Mini-AORs to support Presence Squadrons, leaving 3-4 Fleet Tankers and the one Fleet Tanker (Carrier Strike) + JSS and JSBL for task group support. But I do mean *mini* AORs similar to the type operated by some of the smaller European or Asian navies. Something between a Rover and a Wave with a greater proportion of solid stores. (BTW Rover type designation is AORL (AOR-Light), they have (small) holds for dry stores and an air weapons magazine). Intended to shuttle between operating locations of Presence Squadron vessels and their main bases/supply depots.
However, such an approach would require more ships, more crews and more money. Not a snowball’s chance.
The presence squadrons are intended to be self supporting without the need for replen at sea
That might change if we (have to) take steps down from the v big size most favoured by most in the discussion to the BMT Securitor 108m/ 3.5 kt (my vote), through to the Gowind just featured on the ping-feed (80-90m/ 1.5 kt
- RE “presence squadrons are intended to be self supporting without the need for replen at sea”
There is no such thing as self-supporting. You either replenish at sea or in harbour. Replenishing in harbour means less time on station. Taking endurance to the limits (maximising time between in harbour replenishments) reduces your ability to handle contingencies. Very much *not* how things are conventionally done.
I should have been clearer, sorry for that
The idea around the forward presence stuff is that it operates without a long log train so it is forward based, forward maintained and uses a vessel configuration that supports long endurance but the missions are security based, collaborative, not required to be at sea all the time and accepting of the lack of resilience/ability to handle contingencies. Replen would largely be done in port/s
The underlying concept is that of low cost and with that comes compromise that we accept
There is nothing to stop them being reinforced though and this reinforcement might arrive with its own logistics support
I think alot is going to depend on how the UK operates its CVF and associated vessels. Until that is decided the form and number of the next generation RFAs with the exception of a number of the tankers, is going to be up in the air and on past experience no deciion will be made anytime soon.
We need some of these for MARS. No need to spend money on another BAE cock-up. I bet in this Euro book cooking the Italians owe us more than the cost of one of these…….
http://www.fincantieri.com/cms/data/browse/news/000337.aspx
@ TD – Just thought this might interest you;
http://the-diplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2011/02/15/chinas-amphibious-power/