Whilst I am mulling over the future of Think Defence, the National Audit Office has released their long awaited report to the 2012 Carrier Strike reversion decision, or in other words, the CVF F35 Switcheroo
[browser-shot width=”550″ url=”http://www.nao.org.uk/report/carrier-strike-the-2012-reversion-decision/”]
The Ministry of Defence acted quickly once it realized, in early 2012, the extent to which its 2010 decision to procure the carrier variant of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) had been based on immature data and flawed assumptions. In May 2012, the Department announced that it was reverting to procuring the short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) variant of the fighter. In a report published today examining that 2012 decision, the National Audit Office has called for the Department to introduce a degree of consistency in decision-making not previously apparent in the Carrier Strike programme and to work within the financial and capability assumptions underpinning the decision, if it is to deliver value for money.
By February 2012, the estimated cost of converting the aircraft carrier for the carrier variant of the JSF, requiring the ship to be fitted with catapults and arrestor gear (‘cats and traps’), had increased by 150 per cent: from £800 million to about £2 billion. As a result, the Department estimated that, over the next ten years, the STOVL option would be £1.2 billion cheaper than the carrier variant. This difference halves to £600 million over 30 years.
Another key factor was that the carrier variant option of the JSF could also not be delivered until 2023, three years later than the planned date of 2020. The Chief of Defence Staff judged that, in the emerging security environment, such a gap in capability would be undesirable. When the Department reverted to the STOVL option, it announced that it would deliver the Carrier Strike by 2020. However, a week later, it delayed investment in Crowsnest, the helicopter based radar system making up the third element of Carrier Strike, meaning that the system is not now scheduled to be fully operational until 2022, two years later than the carriers and aircraft.
Resolving the future of the Carrier Strike programme (comprising the Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers, the Joint Strike Fighter aircraft operating from them and Crowsnest) was central to the Department’s efforts to balance its ten-year equipment budget. When the implications of the 2010 decision became clear, the Department acted quickly to put in place a unique, streamlined approvals structure, with focused attention from senior officials. This was crucial to the pace of decision-making.
The Department expects to write off £74 million as a result of the reversion decision; but this cost could have been ten times higher if the decision had been made after May 2012.
Successful delivery will require the Department to manage significant affordability and technical risks. There are cost, schedule and technical risks across the JSF programme over which the Department has limited control. The highest risk phases of carrier construction and integration are yet to come and the Department must successfully conclude complicated negotiations with commercial partners.
Today’s report notes that the carrier variant of the JSF has a greater range and payload than the STOVL variant and would have provided a more effective strike capability. However, STOVL creates the option to operate Carrier Strike from two carriers, providing continuous capability. By contrast, the carrier variant could operate from only the one carrier installed with cats and traps and therefore could provide capability for only 70 per cent of the time.
Pick the bones out of that one but in the meantime, some selected reading from Think Defence towers on the issue;
This one being the most up to date, so if you only read one, read this
Others
- Looking Forward to an F35 Future – Part 3 (The Promise)
- CVF Aircraft Launch and Recovery Equipment FOI
- Making Sense of the F35 Decision
- Reasons to be Cheerful – Part B
- Why I Joined the Dark Side
- Forward to Plan B
- F35 – Back to Plan B
- Arse, Meet Elbow
- That NAO Report
- How Do You Solve a Problem Like Maria and/or CVF?
- SDSR – Analysis #05a (Carrier Strike)
- A French Affair
- Too Expensive to Cancel
- CVF Rumour and Sigh*
- Thoughts on CVF
- I Am Puzzled
- B or C
And my all time favourite post on the subject
mmm, we do seem to have spent rather a lot of time discussing this one:)
A Summary of the Decision Making Process
On the decision itself, summarising from the first linked post;
- For some reason, the NSC’s Option 1, by far the most pragmatic option was rejected
- Liam Fox and the Service Chiefs were dazzled by the Strategic Raiding fad and prestige of operating a mini me USN style ‘proper carrier’
- Liam Fox allowed the switch decision to proceed based on estimated costs because he could not resist scoring a political point over the previous government
- Liam Fox did not have the balls to defer any decision until after the SDSR deadline and so went forward with cost estimated prepared in weeks
- The Civil Service failed in its duty to provide some measure of decision making governance
- The Service Chiefs had the same cavalier attitude to information assurance and ignored all the previous work that consistently pointed to STOVL as being the most sensible option
- The Service Chiefs were tempted by the delights on offer from the F35C
- The RAF, specifically, saw an opportunity to simultaneously protect Typhoon and get a Tornado replacement at the expense of operational flexibility
- Everyone was prepared to ignore the realities of the F35B development issues because it fitted their agenda
- Phil Hammond, to his great credit, stood up to the Service Chiefs and demanded a rigourous analysis, the same rigourous analysis that should have happened, and in fact, did happen many times before
- Phil Hammond made a brave decision to revert
- There are still a whole gaggle of bitter and twisted people who just don’t get it and are prepared to put in jeopardy the programme(s) to further their agendas
The only one who comes out of this debacle well is Phil Hammond
The Guardian
You may have seen the article this morning from Nick Hopkins of the Guardian
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2013/may/10/navy-jets-cant-land-hot-weather
This is exactly the reason I started Think Defence, to counter complete and utter nonsense like that headline.
APATS, yes, 3 or more links = possible spam = moderation !!
My last post came up as ” awaiting moderation” weird.
Is it because I included links??
@Ixion
The Japanese have treaty limits that do not allow them to build a Carrier. they would build one in a minute if they could.
They do their best to get around the issue by building things like this.
http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/hyuga-class/
Which are to be followed by an even bigger “Destroyer”
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/19000t_class_destroyer
The Germans are a “continental” power and have never operated a carrier.
Of course we ignore the fact that Brazil, India, Russia and China are all planning on expanding their Carrier capability.
Or the arctic? we have no business in the artic it ‘ belongs to:-
Russia, the Spams, the Canucks, Greenlanders and Pos a bit to the Norgies.
NATO article 5?
This transited the NW passage last year and it is only going to become more open as the ice melts.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MS_The_World
Of course operating a carrier means that you do not have to actually operate as close to the area over which you want to exert influence.
It is a long way from any usable land mass to Antarctica.
McZ,
try thinking about any single year – with the possible exception of 1982, although that is debatable – when we would not have been materially better off with a greater amphibious capability at the expense of carriers. You may go back to the birth of carrier aviation. I do not believe you will find any such year.
@ IXION
“Total nautical fuckwit”. I nominate the last 4 Chiefs of the Naval Staff as joint winners, which is a bit of a shame for the Andrew that their professional Heads of Service were so stupid. Their collective output is that we are going to have a largely useless carrier with F35
BCCB inlargemediumsmall numbers, and only one of the ruddy boats which no one really wants, nor no one actually needs, and without an airborne radar for several years.What the hell are we going to do with PoW? Sell it to a Hong Kong consortium to turn into a gambling hotel?
MCz
But what do the carriers do to help any of this?
How do they ‘protect the Caribbean’ It is Uncle Sam’s back yard.
Or the arctic? we have no business in the artic it ‘ belongs to:-
Russia, the Spams, the Canucks, Greenlanders and Pos a bit to the Norgies.
They have all the valid claims under international Law:- and only a total nautical Fuckwit would try and operate carriers in the north west/ east passage! Unless of course the Elephants are at least ice strengthened???
This is the ‘we are globally engaged’* fallacy again. Because we are ‘globally engaged’ we have to stand ready to armed to the teeth to police it all…
* What is everyone else?
The Germans and the Japs are apparently not globally engaged in that they do not need elephants despite their much larger and more export lead economies.
Once a century? Well carriers got used a lot 1939-45, then Suez 1956 was a political failure, not a carrier one. Wilson scrapped the new carriers in 1966, just as HMS Eagle was providing instant air cover for Zambia, following UDI in Rhodesia. Then the 1982 conflict. Then Sierra Leone. RTs rant over former Yugoslavia, but that was a political fault to not provide precision weapons for the Harriers & prompt/clear engagement rules.
@Red Trousers
“In short, every time we do a Falklands, we will need the things, but that is only about once a century. Every time we do something else, we won’t, and that is about annually.”
For someone obviously being involved in acquisition and the required strategic planning assumptions, this is remarkably naïve.
Yes, annular fighting in inner-Asian crap-holes stood high on the 2000s national agenda. Apart from the fact, that we retire in 2014. All conflicts of luxury, where we CHOOSE to muddle within Pashtun etc affairs, with blurry goals to achieve, in an country being as far from being crucial to national interest as the dark side of the moon, on the road creating a highly radicalized fifth column within the UK. A decade full of strategic debacles.
Falklands and the Gulf War were conflicts we were FORCED to fight, but with obvious, clear defined goals. We were prepared at least to achieve our goals. Five years later in both cases we wouldn’t, because of all that “rubbish” in our inventory had gone.
That’s the reason why we do the one thing all year, and the rest only every 20 years or so.
What’s worse: the same people criticizing HMG for poor defence equipment planning, while in the same stroke underwriting to the failed 2000s strategic concepts. Rather than the principles which served us so well straight from 1650. And it’s not, as if the primary theoretician behind those principles, J.S. Corbett, hadn’t described how precious and important a mobile and well-equipped “green” backbone is.
As long as we retain overseas territories, we have to be accustomed to protect them. We continue to have close defence ties east of Suez (and if we had anything like the strategic guts of our ancestors, we would be courting Sri Lanka, Burma and indeed Indonesia to come aboard). The whole Caribbean is an extension of Canary Wharf. The Arctic (and in fact the Antarctic) will be a political minefield for the next decades to come.
In any of these cases there is a central thing lacking: strategic depth (“no territory to exchange for time”). This depth has to come from the only places where we can expect to find ourselves to be firmly in superior numbers and / or capability: sea and air space.
There is nothing about carrier junkies. It’s all about force composition and being able to make a comeback, if the first line of defence fails. Nothing is secure, when it comes to security.
To me the French cutbacks are big wake-up call. As much for the fact that they are still ducking the big issues rather than taking a realistic view of what they can afford and what we (jointly) need to achieve.
We knew about the Pacific Pivot. And after Libya we all hoped that the Europeans might be able to get our act together to field credible joint capabilites in the ‘back yard’ of the North Atlantic and Med. But we now seem further away from that than ever.
Some of the minor allies are willing but Germany and France just do not seem to be at the races. And the ongoing trend of Euro integration is likely to leave us outside whatever tent those two end up living in.
If we want to be setting the security agenda for the region (and rather us than Russia or Turkey) it becomes clear that it will need to be a UK led endevour. Which means two servicable carriers, which means 3 deployable squadrons of F35B, which means Typhoon with all missiles integrated, conformals and AESA, which means Crowsnest, which means ASW-MPA, possibly combined with a Sentinel replacement, and more Atlas, Voyager and C17.
In some ways the situation we have got into gives us opportunities. We can do a hell of a lot to repair the capability of our forces before we have to think aboubt expanding the footprint of the teeth arms.
We’d love to see 30 ships, 12 subs, 300 Fast jets and a dvision+ at readiness to deploy.
But actually most of us would settle for 19 ships, 7 subs, 200 FJ and a Brigade+ at readiness _provided_ they are all at Full Capability and properly suppoted by robust, modern and effective Logs and ISTAR.
The whole question of spending and tax does need to be looked at again. UKIP are an interesting crew and probably will not be around in their current guise in a few years time. But their impact on the political landscape could last a lot longer. Consider the Canadian example and some sort of alliance or reverse takeover with the Conservatives could be possible before during or after the 2015/17 election/referrendum cycle.
As for diplomacy and allicances we must clearly remain on good terms with our near neighbours. Even the Spanish. And everything we are doing with Oman, UAE, Somalia and Sierra Leone looks promising. But the most interesting relationship going forward could be with Brazil, who have the wealth, ambition and critical mass to become a key ally, as well as the geography to dominate the South Atlantic in the same way we sit in the North.
Lots of different views on this thread. I really don’t get those that criticise the carrier capability. Here is the third opinion on the matter.
Let’s start with the carriers
A worthwhile capability that could be disbanded but not without disbanding defence of our territories. Any suggestions that smaller carriers could work is true but ignores the studies for the best option.
The CVF has been built by British industry and, for once is not over budget behind build, rudderless and off specification. The money wasted and the delay is entirely political – unlike say the astute which has had various factors in play. The biggest being lack of relevant experience.
It may not be armoured but I understand it is more so than speculated and compartment/bulkhead design is extensive when you consider the blocks are nearly all self sealed. Having been on the QE I can tell you it is impressive and I believe represents good value for money.
The planes are very different to our usual purchases, we are used to buying fighters with lumps of concrete where the radar fits, and storing our kit in climatic hangers while we decide whether we should train some pilots or sign off its airworthiness. The F35 should work out of the bag. The industrial and technological benefits are top draw.
The catobar fighter debate in my opinion was the right decision made at the time, it leaves a problem for future unmanned craft but building a third carrier would probably be cheaper.
Hopefully I have covered the why, what and the U turn. Now to my view on the planning and philosophy.
Is there a tendency for us to forget The marines when we compare our capabilities and needs to the US? Cap/cas is so amply provided by the Service we seem to have an utterly muddled approach in comparison.
Whilst reading the thread I also felt we sometimes feel we can do too much with one piece of kit. The T45 is an ADD the QE is a sea control/ floating air field, I would worry if it was used in San Carlos bay as some sort of amphibious cas enabler.
Finally the tanker pfi contract should be cancelled, it shows I complete disregard for the military’s need, is too expensive and a mess for political reasons on industrial.
I am great fan of the mod working closer with industry like they have done with both the missile programs and the ship building contract, the fsta contract is the odd one out and should feel the pain.
We rely too much on the Americans, they are reliable but they quite rightly wish us to do more, the Europeans are just too unstable to depend on in my view.
Think Spain, Greece, Portugal and Cyprus were all very different not that long ago. Italy is a fairly corrupt place, it is not hard to imagine a very different Europe in ten years time. The French are our closet European allies together with the Dutch, but I feel we and the French Work together because we dare not keep up with our neighbours ‘ the Jones’s ‘
Ok John I can see there’s no chance of getting thru as you’ve made your mind up.
Mark
A small weapons bay + limited range, will reduce the number & type of missions the FAA can perform, if it is stuck with just the F-35B.
John
So your complaining about f35b because it can’t carry internally weapons we don’t have and will not in an likehood ever buy. As for being dismissive of buddy buddy tanking yep I am pointless for anything other than ctol deck landing operations.
F35b is decried as lacking range well in comparison to f35c maybe in comparison to other aircraft not really. I am ambivalent to ctol carrier operation not convinced we desperately need them see how they can be useful. But to go that route would have required a sea change in thinking and should have seen a buy in by all services and an enormous change in major procurement and industrial decisions in the 90s. A change prob requiring the FAA to give up control of fixed wing aircraft and the airforce selecting something other than typhoon and industry accepting we would not be involved with f35. The training fleets would also have had to change. We would need more than 2 carriers imo and to pay for it the decision of should we go SSK or SSN would have to have been reconsidered.
@ RT
I said nothing about physical courage not being important.
X,
if physical courage is not a part of your perspective, then I don’t know what takes its’ place.
Perhaps there is another, however. A colleague of mine commanded a T23. He said during a table top exercise that his ship went where he wanted it to, and it was not a democratic decision. Quite right, but it was a bit Captain Bligh. You need to keep the boys onside, and inspire them a bit so that you are on the same team.
Mark
Public data on the F-35 (for example Air International, May 2011) says that the F-35B cannot carry internally the 2000 lb GBU-31 JDAM nor the AGM -154 JSOW, while the A & C can. While the UK may not use these exact weapons, it does show that the smaller weapons bays of the B , will limit what can be carried.
Given the limited range of the B, I would not be so dismissive of “Super Nounou”. It means Rafale M can reach targets beyond the range of the F-35B.
Well John hate to break it to you but if we had the f35c we still couldn’t use the uk 2000lb internally . Both the f35b and c requires external carriage and the use of this weapon by the uk can be counted on the fingers of 1 hand since 2000 if you go by release data which or may not be accurate.
So the numbers of carrier capable aircraft are roughly consistent between the two countries it should also be noted that unfortunatly 5 off the naval rafales so far delivered have crash in accidents. As for buddy buddy refueling who cares its exclusively for recovering aircraft to a ctol carrier. 6500lbs off load wouldn’t even fill half the tanks of any carrier capable jet in western air arms.
Well if I have read the French white paper right, CDG is spared from cuts. The Aeronavale will have 58 Rafales. 32 had been delivered by April 2011. All F3 swing role standard. No sharing with the airforce nonsense. Flottille 12F carried out a validation firing of an ASMP-A in Nov 2010 from a Rafale. The French have Super Nounou buddy refuelling, giving an external fuel load of 6,500 litres.
F-35B has smaller weapons bays than the conventional A & C. So larger 2000lb bombs /NSM missiles can be carried internally by the C , but not by the B. Thoughts on QRA by missile. A missile cannot go up & have a look, while a manned fighter can. Do you really want to blow an airliner apart with a missile, which turns out to have not been hijacked , but just had a dodgy transponder/radio?
@ RT
Well I have different perspective on things.
X,
“…But we are not all the same. And environment is a big factor.”
Yes we are, and no it is not.
Your video looks like some quite good nautical fun. Anyone in the Queen’s pay should not be worried about that sort of thing. If they are worried, well they are probably not reliable when the chips are down. “Frit”, as they wisely say in the East Midlands, and nobody wants “frit” people around them.
I sacked a Trooper from my Troop a couple of weeks after officially taking over (and myself only a few months after leaving Sandhurst). He just had no physical courage at all. He was a blancmange. This caused some consternation in the Squadron, but I stood my ground, and I was proven correct when 7 years later, he was roundly suspected of being a coward in the face of the enemy. He was not working for me then, but employed as the SSM’s driver, and absented himself and his vehicle from a checkpoint when there was a bit of shooting. He should have been drummed out of the Army entirely, but I had not the power as a newly-minted 2Lt to do so. But I was correct.
@ RT
Well good for you. But we are not all the same. And environment is a big factor.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=axW2XUhrjbo
X,
none of the local environment ever bothered me, nor did I ever think much about terms of service. People who did worry about whether they were hot, cold, wet or whatever, and then drip on about it are rather boring, and clearly not very committed.
I have in the past spent close to a year in a desert, several weeks in a muddy ditch in South Armagh, a couple of days behind the bins behind a grotty fast food restaurant in west Belfast, a few months on a ship, 6 months sharing a metal box called a Corimec with a socialist Sapper. Who really cares about those things? It is an environment, you get on with it.
Mark said ” I don’t think I’ve mentioned pointing and laughing at the rn.”
Never said you did. It is the general mood I get from some quarters in the defence debate sphere.
@ RT
There is a difference between an exchange as part of a long career, like you time in the Bristol, and a career spent at sea. Look at it another way. Some choose not to join the Army because they don’t want extreme camping on a two way range. Are you really saying that you can’t expect to factor in working environment into career choice? Are you saying an 18-y-o doesn’t weigh living in a messdeck with little room (even with modern accommodation standards) no window constant noise in steel box that is moving in 3 axis against a barrack room being away from home 6 months away from home with a window in a building on dry land that doesn’t move and shore leave (or whatever the RAF have) every weekend?
X,
…nobody joins the RAF to go to sea..”
Probably correct, but I think that it’s their problem if they think that way.
I had 20 odd fantastic years in green, and would repeat that without a murmur if I had my time again. But I’d have been equally happy in the Andrew I suspect.
I now find myself advising and guiding an 8 year old***. I don’t want to constrain his ambitions, but if anything expand them. If he wants to join the Andrew, well good for him. Even if he wants to be a Kevin. Or a racing driver, or big time banker. What I won’t settle for is him doing something ordinary. If he does, I’m going to send him a bill for the outrageous school fees that are being termly bled from me precisely so that he can do something extraordinary.
*** and indeed a 13 year old young lady, but she’s already miles ahead of me. She’s going to be a vet, or a great artist like her aunt. She also has more self-confidence than anyone else I’ve ever met, and the brains and talent as well. And she looks like her mother, so she’s got a great future in about 10 fields. Up to her.
x
Gunships and indeed apache type helicopters are great if you somewhere like afghan or post invasion Iraq were there is next to no air threat to them. Indeed that’s why 2 sqns of tornado have been converted to reaper. And for reference a sceptre guns costs about the price of 3 typhoon a/c and are built as gunships only. Horses for course certainly I don’t think I’ve mentioned pointing and laughing at the rn. As you mention airbase been closer and the vast majority of uk jet operating in gw2 operated closer to Iraq that a carrier would have allowed so I fail to see your point justifying one over the other.
Very true apas. Rt c130 could do it a400m certainly can we have decided to procure neither option. I’ve thought for some time a330 should be seen as a Tristar replacement with a400m as a vc10 replacement sort of 8 of each in the aar role. This of course ignores the fact the vc-10 needs replacing first which may lead us back to the offer made a decade ago to take a310 as our aar tanker.
RT I’m sure you know about rover and the very latest tv style litening 3 targeting pods which have changed cas interaction out of all portions to what it was even 10 years ago let alone in the Balkans. Your desire to remove pilots and jet ect is rather predicable but you would have thought the army has learned after the shambles they made of not only apache pilot training but sadly repeated with watchkeeper.
RT said “my point was more to do with the organisational construct, not the performance of the Harrier as a platform. If you have the same organisational construct with F35B, you’ll get the same result. The fact that the planes came off a CVS and not a proper airfield is not really here or there (at least from the end user’s perspective).”
The point I am driving towards via all points is that we have three overlapping areas of interest. And I think by pushing the discussion towards what FJ flies off CVF it hides the true discussion. Or the question that should be addressed.
1) Is CVF just about FJ? No it is about helicopters for a whole slew of purposes and UAVs too.
1a) The CVF FJ discussion seems to revolve land ops yet there are other reasons why we need it such as air defence and even anti-ship etc. etc.
2) Are new technologies available to deliver support fires to the Army? Yes. Everything from modern AH to GMLRS to mortar PGM to gun PGM too. Heck why not a drone carrying a SDB?
2a) And that is without looking at the R part of GRA which is mostly about supporting the Army in the field.
3) This is Storm Shadow too…
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B0tiw5Ii1Xc
SS will be one of whatever-follows-Tornado major weapons. We are about to build a new escort. And if I suggest that it would be better spending the cost of 2 jets to extend the hull of that new escort to take an extra VLS, and then the cost of another jet to fill it with SS (or similar) so we have one platform that can do many tasks manned by one group I am met with heaps of derision but nothing coherent in response just the normal “the RAF fly things; aeroplanes are special” rhubarb.
Future Army doesn’t need a GRA replacement in huge numbers if at all if somebody else can supply the capability that is missing. The RN has needs for FJ beyond mud moving; I still maintain nobody joins the RAF to go to sea; pilots yes different matter, but maintainers no. And the fly in the ointment seems to be what follows Tornado and who flies it. Too many flies in that last sentence. No follow on to Tornado means no follow on to Typhoon. And finally seeing as QRA accounts for what 36 airframes or so and I keep getting told here that there is no threat to the home islands well will need QRA post 2030 if we can have lots of drones and missiles. A few land based Sea Viper units anybody? Perhaps even Sea Viper out at sea on a platform? I wouldn’t be without QRA but some here really need to make their mind up about threats and assets to meet them because there is a lack of joined up thinking.
RE ” Actually, what’s the difference between a loitering munition and a long endurance weaponised UAV? Interesting crossover.”
– one is recoverable and the other is not
Recoverable for “targets of opportunity” and unrecoverable when you know the target(s) is/are there, and just need to pin them down?
– crossover is always needed, but really we are talking about a mix of both (with arty/ rocketry/ AHs and eventually FJs in it, too)
– back to one of RT’s favourites, battle field ISTAR. The saying is that we have more feeds available than capacity to synthetise them for action… wonder where we are with that now?
@ RT
“Once you’ve got 24 hour loitering endurance, a pair up there doing lazy 8s, another pair on the ramp ready to go, do you really need fast jets at all?”
Its a good point but we would probably have to assume that FJ’s swept the airspace clean for the loitering munitions to hang around. They might not be manned FJ’s but they are going to be some form of aircraft.
@ GNB and Jedi
“4 Emphasising the Dark Blue allows us to undertake campaigns that we have to (like FI in my opinion) and some possibility of leading and building European Coalitions in the years ahead…
5…emphasising the Green makes us better and more efficient auxiliaries for the Cousins – but leaves us unable to do much else – even if we really need to”
Yes, I have said the same myself in times past.”
One might argue that most of the missing capabilities we rely on the cousins for are in-fact light blue. Can’t think of many green or dark blue capabilities they have that we need short of number’s.
Martin,
my point was more to do with the organisational construct, not the performance of the Harrier as a platform. If you have the same organisational construct with F35B, you’ll get the same result. The fact that the planes came off a CVS and not a proper airfield is not really here or there (at least from the end user’s perspective).
“Getting to the target” is a more interesting question. I think that in the next 10 years we’ll see a quantum leap in performance (endurance, really) of loitering munitions&&&&. THAT is going to be an interesting dynamic for selection of the next generation of FJ, if there is one. Once you’ve got 24 hour loitering endurance, a pair up there doing lazy 8s, another pair on the ramp ready to go, do you really need fast jets at all? (For battlefield work, that is. Other uses for Kevins still exist)
&&&& Actually, what’s the difference between a loitering munition and a long endurance weaponised UAV? Interesting crossover.
@ X
“I just don’t see how we can do “expeditionary air” with just 9 tankers without resorting to that get out of jail free card oft waved here of “coalition efforts” (read the Americans)”
Agreed that’s why I would like to see a fleet of 30 or so A400M’s in RAF hands all equipped as Aerial Tankers. I think that gives us the maximum flexibility and more of possibly the most useful platform.
@ RT – very interesting point about the Dutch F16. Might it have been useful to have a fully loaded CVF with F35B’s near buy that could have got to the target very quickly with the right kind of weapons? I am not trying to be flippant here just trying to see what the real issues were. Obviously poor performance of harrier, bad communications and an even worse political situation all combined to these events.
@ Mark
“my interest is to see what happens in the Falklands post 2014”
An AAR capability on A400M makes the FI much easier as we would only need to station one A400M instead of the present VC10 and C130.
@ RT
“knowing nothing of in-air refuelling, is it something a C-130 can do to a FJ (I assume they can match speeds). That would be cheaper, if possible, than sending one of the Voyagers down there.”
There is a KC 130. This was used by the Argentines to refuel the Super Etandard’s to attack the taskforce resulting in the loss of Sheffield and Atlantic Conveyor. Luckily they only had 2.
X,
in my opinion, CAS is far better done by AH operated by the land force, than by FJ operated by a sister service. Closer and much more reactive, also the same doctrine, TTPs and often comms. Also the sheer kinetic difference of FJ and a land battle means that it is extremely hard to talk and FJ onto a target.
I might be out on a limb, but from my perspective I don’t want to see any Kevins trying to interfere in the close battle***. Let them sort out the enemy’s air force at a considerable distance away.
*** I spent 15 years seeing very unsatisfactory results from Harriers trying to do CAS. As soon as the Army got AH, it was just so much better and more efficient.
Mark,
I agree we do need something down there and it is an awful lot of aircraft for the QRA birds. Imagine we had an aircraft that could do the AAR, provide a long range heavy transport capability and operate from austere strips :)
Mark, APATS,
knowing nothing of in-air refuelling, is it something a C-130 can do to a FJ (I assume they can match speeds). That would be cheaper, if possible, than sending one of the Voyagers down there.
OTOH, I dimply recall some discussion on TD about the Voyager contract being completely insane and stopping the MoD from doing its’ own AAR. Is that the issue?
@ Mark re tankers
My point, hypothetical, is if the “airfield” is closer to the point of need then we wouldn’t need as much as AAR to support expedition air. And if we used turboprop gunships to deliver CAS we wouldn’t need as much AAR. There are as you rightly pointed above out lots of things missiles, drones, and guns can’t do, but those technologies are advancing and eating into GRA. And the bits we don’t do, well surely somebody else can be bring to that party? This discussion isn’t about pointing the finger and laughing at the RN and politicians, but what follows Tornado and ultimately what follows Typhoon.
@ APATS
I can’t see Voyager at MPA which leads me back to is 9 enough for day to day operations.
Apas
That’s the question I’ve not seen an answer too. They need something down there but voyager is a lot of aircraft for the qra task only.
@ GNB – ”
4 Emphasising the Dark Blue allows us to undertake campaigns that we have to (like FI in my opinion) and some possibility of leading and building European Coalitions in the years ahead…
5…emphasising the Green makes us better and more efficient auxiliaries for the Cousins – but leaves us unable to do much else – even if we really need to”
Yes, I have said the same myself in times past.
@Mark,
Are we going to see a Voyager permanently based at MPA? Maybe we could rotate them more regularly as they could then form part of the air bridge?
@ RT
It is fine. I did ramble on yesterday.
Rt
I would guess that was why the gr harriers were upgraded to sniper targeting pod and the mk107 engine.
John how many naval rafales will the French have how often will the cdg be at sea, f35 is tactical nuclear capable. By the way what is the deep strike ordance you think the uk can fit to f35c that it can’t fit f35b?
x if there was a big expeditionary operation we would have use of 14 aircraft. As for 9 being enough well we deployed I think 6 tankers to gw2 my interest is to see what happens in the Falklands post 2014. Your tanker ships have a prob can’t refuel planes in the air nor is the cost comparison you make consistant, before you say carriers make that go away on coalition ops the main customer is the us navy which was why uk aar was requested for initial afghan ops.
X,
I don’t think that it was me with the 20 line limit; I’m pretty sure that I said 700 lines was what I found un-dealable with.
However, I was a couple of bottles of mid-grade Chilean red down range at the time. I might have been saying anything! I’d better go back to check.
@ Martin
I just don’t see how we can do “expeditionary air” with just 9 tankers without resorting to that get out of jail free card oft waved here of “coalition efforts” (read the Americans). I think I am right in saying we need tanker support for QRA and training here in the UK, a tanker down south, and the rest will be available to fly from CAIT. Does 9 real cover that? If land based air is to be the other pincer in the UK expeditionary tool kit 9 seems thin.
I think FSTA payments for a year equal roughly the cost of buying one RFA tanker and operating for it over a decade sans fuel for repleshiment. Somebody mentioned the lack of supporting RFA for CVF above. I suppose after building say an additional 4 fast tankers, 4 Fort replacements, and say a pair of fleet support tankers, you use the next 17 years FSTA payments to run CVF.
It has been pointed out here that many we have faced with our awesome Western war machine enemies don’t have a navy. Well many of them in reality didn’t have a functioning airforce either. And if chasing AK47 wielding tribesmen around hills in dusty corners of Third World is the future of warfare for Britain perhaps more drones, more PGM, more AH, and some fixed wing gunships a la AC130 may be a better solution for “us”? Of course suggesting giving up FJ for lesser platforms is less palatable here than say, suggesting say, the RN gives up AAW destroyers for OPVs. I see a recurring theme here. The first four of those alternative CAS capabilities can be operated by the Army and doesn’t need a RAF CAS FJ (aka Tornado / Harrier/ even Jaguar replacement.) I feel this general discussion really is nothing to do with carriers and their FJ capability or who flies them or their configuration, but what replaces RAF Tornado and manoeuvrings by the Junior Service to protect their parish.
I read somewhere a few weeks back that somebody in the US had proposed scrapping A. Don’t think it will happen. But it would be funny if we ended up with F35b and F35c…
RT said “b. The whole tragedy of Srebrenica could have been possibly avoided if either the NATO ”
Loved to know what came next but stopped reading after 20 lines. As you didn’t get your point across does that mean you are as bonkers as me? :) ;)
Martin,
there were 2 problems with Harrier in Bosnia:
1. Completely unintegrated into UN command. In order to drop a bomb you had to go up multiple steps of a UN command chain, then sideways to NATO, then down the NATO side to the pilot. That’s not a fault of the aircraft of course, but rather the UK choosing to place it under NATO command (for political reasons, I later heard. I had a significant rant about that at FM Sir Peter Inge who was CDS at the time and came to visit my boss the French Commander UNPROFOR).
2. The UN ROE required a spectacular level of confidence in target identification, and the Harriers had inadequate sensors. Therefore, when we did drop bombs (not often) we tended to use USAF F16s which did have good sensors. Someone on TD will know which sort of sensors they were, but it is not material to this discussion.
Two little points of possible interest, dragged from the memory banks:
a. The Harriers operating off CVS apparently had to drop unused ordnance before landing, so the financial cost of each mission was pretty high.
b. The whole tragedy of Srebrenica could have been possibly avoided if either the NATO / UN “dual key” approach worked better, or the Dutch Air Force had fitted guidance on their dumb bombs. What happened was we had “eyes on” HUMINT and SIGINT tracking the advancing Serbs, and several pairs of USAF F16s ready to bomb the crap out of them, but a big political argument ongoing between my boss Janvier, Akashi, and Admiral Smith who was CINCSOUTH in Naples. Took about 6 hours for me, Akashi’s main assistant (a crown prince of Jordan) and a brilliant Canadian 2 star to get them all to agree to bomb. Even UN New York got involved at one point for a legal opinion. By then the USAF F16s were out of juice, and replaced by Dutch F16s. The dumb bombs of the Dutch F16s fell about 2-300 yards away from the first Serb tank, and the Serbs thought we were bluffing, and sped up their advance. If we’d killed the Serb tank, as we wanted, it might have given them pause for thought.
Keeping this short, so as not to bore fellow posters.
NAB
Be as rude as you want, I still think the QE/PoW/F-35B position we are at now, is less than ideal. France will be the prime European carrier power as the CDG will have a decent number of Rafale (with buddy refuelling) & E3D AEW + tactical nuke capability.
As to the strength of the QE hull, well lets hope we never have to find out. My rant is that all future RN combat surface ships should have hulls rated for light ice, as we may have to fight resource wars in the polar regions in the coming decades.
I do think the QE class could come right given the right resources/backing. I know no one else agrees, but I would still investigate the STOBAR option. OK, you do not get the sortie rate of a Nimitz, but does the UK really need that? Would it really be the end of the world if QE operated a Sqn of F-35B for short range/rough weather missions, plus a Sqn of STOBAR adapted F-35C for long range/heavy strike? A few STOBAR adapted Goshawk for training would be handy.
Oops this is getting long.
I will finish by saying I have no problem with PFI if it gives a good deal to the taxpayer, but the Voyager PFI seems very expensive for half equipped aircraft.
@Martin
‘purchasing more Typhoons really does not seem like much of an answer either’
‘Does you figure of 100 jest assume that the Tranche 1 Typhoons will be removed around 2016?’
I can’t speak for Sir H (sure he will be along eventually) but I believe the official OSD for the tranche 1 Typhoon’s is 2019, although their have of course been rumours that they will be retained a fair bit longer.
I can’t see that many problems with the idea of buying a few more to top up the fleet. By the time we get to around 2017/2018 the production line will be slowing down, but hopefully still active through further orders from the UAE and others. Costs would be stable and weapon integration should have at last made some progress.
I think the first step is to really define what our fast jet needs are and how many airframes it takes to get the job done. The next step would be to see how many F35 we want to buy or can actually afford. If for instance we could identify a need for 200 fast jets but only decide to buy say 70 F35 because they are ruinously expensive then perhaps 23 new Typhoon’s to bring the fleet back up-to 130 and the wider force to the required number would be a good way to go.
Although it of course comes down to money (or more precisely the severe lack of it). Any-more Typhoon would only be realistic as a replacement purchase for part of the second F35 buy a few years down the line, and by then who know’s what the economic and political realities may be.
At the very least I want to see the trance 1’s kept around until the mid 2020’s to cover the gap between the removal of Tornado and any additional F35 orders and keep the fast jet fleet at around the 200 airframe mark.
@Martin tornado could go on longer than 2018 there are no reason from an airframe hours perspective. It’s having an upgrade now as well as a lep.
@ X on FSTA
I agree that this contract is a joke. Given that we already own RBS I am sure we could get out of it. I would like to see us purchase 9 of the aircraft installing the defence system and reinstalling the in-flight refuelling system. I would also like to see these aircraft have the booms installed so we could re-fuel our C17, A330’s and RC 135’s as well as USAF aircraft.
We could then purchase additional A400M’s to make up for the lack of cargo capacity and install the refuelling pods on them to give us an auxiliary AAR capability for fighting Libya style air operations where the transport capacity is not needed to move ground troops. Given that EADS sells A330’s like hot cakes and is desperate to sell more A400M’s I can’t imagine its a difficult decision for them to let us out of the PFI at favourable terms especially if we have the money guys at RBS by the balls. Total investment in the project was estimtaed to be around £2 billion to buy the aircraft and build the hangers etc so that’s likely to be the ball park figure to get out. The question of course would come down to shot term funding which we currently don’t have. Although £2 billion upfront to save £400 million a year (£ 300 million of which is suppose to be financing related costs) seems like a good deal ever for a cash strapped MOD.
Using PFI’s as with the point class RORO’s to provide extra capacity in time of war can be a great idea but trying to fob of AAR aircraft into the passenger market is just unworkable. Offering up the spare capacity to EU nations is also pretty stupid as its specifically when we are fighting with EU nations that we need the spare capacity. This way we just let them off the hook getting their own and end up just as reliant on US support in future.
@ Sir H
Its a very worrying picture you paint of the RN and RAF in the early 2020’s with only 100 or so aircraft and clapped out 40 year old RFA assets supporting carriers. It goes to show that we really have not yet felt the worst of the effects from SDSR 2010 yet. Even if we had the money today I doubt there is little we could do about it as we will not be able to procure more F35’s than we are already planning to do until 2017 at the earliest and purchasing more Typhoons really does not seem like much of an answer either. I doubt we can keep Tornado much past 2018 with out some major investment and number would be limited by then anyway. Does you figure of 100 jest assume that the Tranche 1 Typhoons will be removed around 2016?
@ All – Before we descend more into the the usual three service slagging much on a white elephant hunting expedition I just want to through my 2 cents into the ring.
As has been pointed out we are never going to conduct nor should conduct a large scale op on our own. The types of security issues we deal with today for the most part like Libya and Syria and of too little consequence to our security to merit a solo response.
If any major op is to be fought it will only be done as part of a coalition. However there are likely to be many future instance where that coalition will not directly include US forces. As one of only tow and increasingly one of one European nations which has any kind of defence budget the UK really needs to be able to field many of those capabilities that only the USA can. The CVF program will literally represent 50% of Europe’s naval air capability. As RT points out carrier air has only been essential in one op post world war II. If we are being honest this was probably the most important op since world war II for the UK. However there are at least half a dozen other instance from Korea to Suez to Belize were it’s been useful to have. I would say that makes a limited investment (and it is a limited investment) in carrier aviation worth while for the UK.
I think we should concentrate the rest of what we might call our discretionary budget on providing the C4 ISTAR, Strategic lift and AAR capabilities our European allies lack as well as retaining limited heavy forces capable of an opposed entry into hostile territory which proved so vital in Kosovo and GW1 and GW2.
I would also like to see our ability to conduct Electronic Warfare and SEAD increased which unfortunately we currently seem to be completely reliant on the USA for.
I think most of that is doable in the current budget but only if we retain a very purple outlook. Lest not forget we spend some £34 billion a year just on the core budget and that’s not an insignificant amount of money. Just look at what countries like Italy achieve with a third of that.
The Joint Expeditionary Force is a major step towards this and one that should be built upon. The UK should continue to build apon this approach and attempt to become the backbone of the European arm of NATO. Able to form a coalition for a medium sized op with our without direct US support.
This will bring us a massive economic boost in the years to come as we are likely to have to renegotiate our position with Europe and despite what UK pretends we have very little to offer for unfettered access not just to the European single market but the wider free trade agreements that Europe is and will establish with the USA and Asia. Its no coincidence that every German politician that has commented on the UK leaving Europe sights defence capability above anything else as what Europe would loose if the UK leaves.
@ RT – You frequently make the point about how useless harrier was of CVS in Bosnia. This real world insight is fascinating and very useful. I do however wonder if you draw the wrong conclusions in that harrier was piss poor for supporting land ops on any scale ( I don’t think anyone here could disagree with that especially FA2) and that there were insufficient numbers and ordination was all but non existent with ground forces.
However surely CVF and F35B is a way to address that. I.e bigger platform better jet more aircraft.