Whilst I am mulling over the future of Think Defence, the National Audit Office has released their long awaited report to the 2012 Carrier Strike reversion decision, or in other words, the CVF F35 Switcheroo
[browser-shot width=”550″ url=”http://www.nao.org.uk/report/carrier-strike-the-2012-reversion-decision/”]
The Ministry of Defence acted quickly once it realized, in early 2012, the extent to which its 2010 decision to procure the carrier variant of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) had been based on immature data and flawed assumptions. In May 2012, the Department announced that it was reverting to procuring the short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) variant of the fighter. In a report published today examining that 2012 decision, the National Audit Office has called for the Department to introduce a degree of consistency in decision-making not previously apparent in the Carrier Strike programme and to work within the financial and capability assumptions underpinning the decision, if it is to deliver value for money.
By February 2012, the estimated cost of converting the aircraft carrier for the carrier variant of the JSF, requiring the ship to be fitted with catapults and arrestor gear (‘cats and traps’), had increased by 150 per cent: from £800 million to about £2 billion. As a result, the Department estimated that, over the next ten years, the STOVL option would be £1.2 billion cheaper than the carrier variant. This difference halves to £600 million over 30 years.
Another key factor was that the carrier variant option of the JSF could also not be delivered until 2023, three years later than the planned date of 2020. The Chief of Defence Staff judged that, in the emerging security environment, such a gap in capability would be undesirable. When the Department reverted to the STOVL option, it announced that it would deliver the Carrier Strike by 2020. However, a week later, it delayed investment in Crowsnest, the helicopter based radar system making up the third element of Carrier Strike, meaning that the system is not now scheduled to be fully operational until 2022, two years later than the carriers and aircraft.
Resolving the future of the Carrier Strike programme (comprising the Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers, the Joint Strike Fighter aircraft operating from them and Crowsnest) was central to the Department’s efforts to balance its ten-year equipment budget. When the implications of the 2010 decision became clear, the Department acted quickly to put in place a unique, streamlined approvals structure, with focused attention from senior officials. This was crucial to the pace of decision-making.
The Department expects to write off £74 million as a result of the reversion decision; but this cost could have been ten times higher if the decision had been made after May 2012.
Successful delivery will require the Department to manage significant affordability and technical risks. There are cost, schedule and technical risks across the JSF programme over which the Department has limited control. The highest risk phases of carrier construction and integration are yet to come and the Department must successfully conclude complicated negotiations with commercial partners.
Today’s report notes that the carrier variant of the JSF has a greater range and payload than the STOVL variant and would have provided a more effective strike capability. However, STOVL creates the option to operate Carrier Strike from two carriers, providing continuous capability. By contrast, the carrier variant could operate from only the one carrier installed with cats and traps and therefore could provide capability for only 70 per cent of the time.
Pick the bones out of that one but in the meantime, some selected reading from Think Defence towers on the issue;
This one being the most up to date, so if you only read one, read this
Others
- Looking Forward to an F35 Future – Part 3 (The Promise)
- CVF Aircraft Launch and Recovery Equipment FOI
- Making Sense of the F35 Decision
- Reasons to be Cheerful – Part B
- Why I Joined the Dark Side
- Forward to Plan B
- F35 – Back to Plan B
- Arse, Meet Elbow
- That NAO Report
- How Do You Solve a Problem Like Maria and/or CVF?
- SDSR – Analysis #05a (Carrier Strike)
- A French Affair
- Too Expensive to Cancel
- CVF Rumour and Sigh*
- Thoughts on CVF
- I Am Puzzled
- B or C
And my all time favourite post on the subject
mmm, we do seem to have spent rather a lot of time discussing this one:)
A Summary of the Decision Making Process
On the decision itself, summarising from the first linked post;
- For some reason, the NSC’s Option 1, by far the most pragmatic option was rejected
- Liam Fox and the Service Chiefs were dazzled by the Strategic Raiding fad and prestige of operating a mini me USN style ‘proper carrier’
- Liam Fox allowed the switch decision to proceed based on estimated costs because he could not resist scoring a political point over the previous government
- Liam Fox did not have the balls to defer any decision until after the SDSR deadline and so went forward with cost estimated prepared in weeks
- The Civil Service failed in its duty to provide some measure of decision making governance
- The Service Chiefs had the same cavalier attitude to information assurance and ignored all the previous work that consistently pointed to STOVL as being the most sensible option
- The Service Chiefs were tempted by the delights on offer from the F35C
- The RAF, specifically, saw an opportunity to simultaneously protect Typhoon and get a Tornado replacement at the expense of operational flexibility
- Everyone was prepared to ignore the realities of the F35B development issues because it fitted their agenda
- Phil Hammond, to his great credit, stood up to the Service Chiefs and demanded a rigourous analysis, the same rigourous analysis that should have happened, and in fact, did happen many times before
- Phil Hammond made a brave decision to revert
- There are still a whole gaggle of bitter and twisted people who just don’t get it and are prepared to put in jeopardy the programme(s) to further their agendas
The only one who comes out of this debacle well is Phil Hammond
The Guardian
You may have seen the article this morning from Nick Hopkins of the Guardian
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2013/may/10/navy-jets-cant-land-hot-weather
This is exactly the reason I started Think Defence, to counter complete and utter nonsense like that headline.
Bob I think in this context surge relates to extra pilots and aircraft over and above what’s expected to be on board.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-22474019 – a small look inside HMS Queenie.
Bob,
1) I completely agree that “smaller bays means smaller weapons and less weapons. That is an inescapable fact.” , but you can take that to the extreme and say that F35C is not big enough to do a proper bombing run, so it’s pointless. However, the reality is a difference between what we want and what we need. I subscribe to “sea control” over and above this silly “strike” business so value F35C for it’s endurance, not it’s weapons bays.
2) So? So, the point is that Harrier was used (I have no idea why) on Fearless in ’82 and also shipped south on container ships. Could even have been used from the container ships. The point is it demonstrates some of the flexibility you rapidly dismiss.
3) If there’s time and a logistical supply chain that can provide for a proper airstrip then I absolutely agree, F35B will NOT be operating from austere fields, but, if there isn’t time (or the required logistics) then a forward based F35B sitting aside a fuel truck with a tent for maintenance of a few bits and pieces might seriously compromise any advance an enemy might think of making. It also allows deeper pentration into hostile territory than the 460nm limit immediately implies.
I’m all for the F35C and CTOL/CATOBAR CVF but to dismiss the undeniable benefits and USPs of an alternative is short sighted.
The “surge” argument is another of those that does not stand up to critique. A CTOL carrier can launch aircraft almost as fast as a STOVL one (EMALS has cycle time of just 45 seconds). Rapid launch also requires aircraft to be ready to launch and CVF will carry so few aircraft it is effectively a non-issue anyway.
IXION,
Not really, if it has to be B then it is a wasted opportunity and the UK has ended up with a lesser solution than it could have had (I am not advocating another switch- that is unaffordable) but ultimately the B option will provide a capability far greater than the Invincible class with Harrier ever did.
I was highly critical of the reversion decision at first but reading here has convinced me it was the right call for the Royal Navy given where the project had gotten to at that point. Without rehashing the whole thing I think it has some positives (surge ability, short-term affordability) and some downsides (the main one IMHO being missing out on things like the E-2 and UCAV’s designed for catapult launch) but is overall a pretty reasonable decision for the UK.
When it comes to the F-35B I suspect Challenger is right. The UK will get about 70-90 B models before it has to make a decision on Typhoon replacement. I suspect that that replacement will be the F-35A (or whatever conventional land variant replaced it) at that time for commonality sake (the two variants share a huge number of major components even though they have many differences). I am less convinced that a system like Taranis will be ready to be a Typhoon replacement as opposed to a supplement in that timeframe.
My feeling on UAV’s is that the next generation of combat oriented UAV’s will be what amounts to unmanned F-117’s. Basically strike aircraft that carry a couple of bombs and are at their best hitting pre-set targets. They will obviously have some real-time re-targeting capability but I think that people will be circumspect about trusting their com links with the things in a high ECM environment and thus won’t go all in on things. They will do a few other things but I think the above will be their main combat role. They will then slowly evolve from that but software development will be slow, expensive and painful for more dynamic roles.
I think military forces, being pretty conservative, are going to want to see UCAV’s perform well in a limited spectrum before they consider them full replacements for manned aircraft. So I think you will see a manned Typhoon replacement.
martin,
Your post is riddled with nonsense, not least the old “through-deck cruiser” myth (the treasury knew exactly what the invincible class were as did the entire cabinet). A technology demonstrator is a million miles from being an operational aircraft and as interesting as Taranis is F-35C will do more being a bigger airframe with a wider range of roles. F-35B (previously F-35C) is now the Tornado replacement, whatever comes in the 2030s, more F-35s UCAVs or a some combination of the two, will be the Typhoon replacement.
Bob
So were agreed….
If it’s got to be the B rather than the C, then its a dog of a concept and we can scrap the Elephants completely… as a waste of money….
1) “However, MBDA acknowledges that the UK’s recent decision to revert to the short take-off and vertical landing F-35B “brings some challenges”, as the type’s weapons bays are shorter than those found on the carrier variant F-35C”*
It is not just weapons available today, it is future weapons, smaller bays means smaller weapons and less weapons. That is an inescapable fact.
*http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/pictures-mbda-sharpens-spear-missile-design-for-f-35-integration-373453/
2) So? F-35B is not Harrier and one instance 30 years ago is hardly representative of an actual requirement
3) The infrastructure required to support F-35B means it will not be operating from “forward austere” airfields. As happened in Afghanistan, a runway will be built.
x,
“I never really bought into UK carrier strike. For me CVF has always been about sea control and amphibious warfare support. I have no problems with a fast, large, LPH that can host fast pointy planes that can carry missiles.”
Me neither.
The more time I’ve spent on this site, the more I’ve realised that sea control (for presence, defensive and offensive) is the main justification for carrier(s) – even though I’ve tried to find other options I keep coming back to a carrier ;-)
@ Bob
The £ 1 billion FOAS budget was liquidated in 2010 but this was not to buy any hardware merely to look at what could fill the requirement. The UCAV work being done under FOAS was transferred into the FCAS. Ok it’s not as yet designed to produce a UCAV but Tarranis is pretty much as close to a UCAV as anyone any where has come at the moment. There is no reason why Taranis cannot be considered a prototype rather than a technology demonstrator. It has bomb bays and full stealth coating’s. Personally I think its easier to get a technology demonstrator threw the treasury than a prototype. Its not dissimilar to the threw deck cruiser.
If we can get a UCAV in 2030 why waste money on an F35C replacement for Tornado in 2023 or later.
Personally I think we should just go full steam ahead on Taranis now and get it into operation for 2020 on our own.
Does anyone know when the first flight will be. They seem to be keeping it close to the chest. Was suppose to be Q1 2013.
Bob,
“It’s not just 2000lb JDAMs. It is multiples of smaller weapons, and larger stand-off weapons as well as any others introduced during the types 40 year service life. Smaller weapons bays greatly reduces payload flexibility especially in the context of low RCS.
F-35B will not be operating from the back of an Albion class.
Jaguars, Phantoms, F-16s have all operated from motorways, so can F-35C.”
1. So how many Brimstone can F35B and F35C carry respectively?
2. I guess Harrier didn’t operate from the back of Fearless then in 1982?
3. As for the Jag, Phantom and F16… I’m talking about forward austere basing not the odd takeoff and landing. I’d suggest even Gripen would struggle in reality.
Bob
No we wouldn’t and we wouldnt even be involved with f35. Perhaps a mistral type vessel or extend the invincible class but no way the navy builds 2 65k tn carriers for two 9 a/c sqns of sea harrier.
Care to name a nation outside if the USA who operates a sustained at sea conventional carrier capability.
@ Bob
“The additional operating costs are minor, it was the capital costs that killed the switch.”
Do you have anything to back up that the additional operating costs of CATOBAR operations are minor compared to STOVL? Everything I have seen indicates the costs are far from minor which is why we stopped doing it in 1979. I agree the capital costs were what killed the project but only because the monkey that made the decision could not see further than five minutes into the future.
“It’s not just 2000lb JDAMs. It is multiples of smaller weapons, and larger stand-off weapons as well as any others introduced during the types 40 year service life. Smaller weapons bays greatly reduces payload flexibility especially in the context of low RCS.”
The trend for weapons since 1944 has been for them to get smaller. So why would this change in the next 40 years?
Also if we ever did need to drop those 2000lb JDAMS on a bunker deep in enemy territory and it just so happened the Americans were unable to fulfil that mission then we stick them on our nice new Taranis UCAV. I bet we could get an entire fleet of them for the £5 billion cost of carrier given the prototype was only £126 million.
martin,
No it is not alive and well, the procurement budget was liquidated in 2010. Taranis is just a technology demonstrator and no true UCAV is planned for operational use by the UK until 2030-40.
Mark,
Yes we would be building carriers, and far more than one nation can do it. STOVL is the best choice now because of the conversion cost- it should never have been the decision though.
Topman,
Yes, operated. NATO used to do frequent exercises using West German autobahn’s as runways. Correct though, it has never been done in a conflict scenario and is virtually irrelevant today.
@ Bob
“sustained its desire for a dedicated Tornado (first manned and then unmanned) replacement until it was finally killed in 2010.”
It’s still alive and well in the FCAS. First test flight due any day now.
@ Simon –
Did you read the doc? It seemed to imply that there’s little chance of ever operating QE and PoW at the same time. There’s only likely to be one crew.
Also, what’s wrong with Typhoon for strike between Tornado and “the next one”?
Under today’s budget there is only one crew but it’s possibly even with todays stretched budget to find £60 – £ 70 million a year down the back of the couch to get both ship’s into operation.
Nothing wrong with Typhoon in the strike role which really says if it can do it for five years why not longer. Why do we need the F35C at all.
If the decision had been taken in the 90s to roll harrier and tornado replacement together we would not be building aircraft carriers at all.
One and only one nation can afford to devote its resources to conventional carrier operation to an effective sustained capability. No one else needs requires or has the cash to do it that’s why stovl is the best choice to deliver a credible capability.
“The date no-one is mentioning here is 2007 (QEC Main Gate).
This was when the decision was taken to ‘optimise’ the ship design for STOVL, which presumably consisted of delteing the space allowed in the original design for CATOBAR equipement.”
There was no deletion of space allowed for CTOL equipment. The only “change” to the ship has been the deletion of the 2.5m x 50 x 3m deck edge extension to port which allows recovery of E2C on the last wire, at full slew to port and full extension of the wire. That is a relatively small bit of steel to fabricate and put on.
The design itself was (and remains) adaptable. The thing people haven’t hauled aboard is that the detailed production of drawings for all the EMALS/EAR systems and compartments was not contracted for and was therefore never executed. It isn’t difficult, it just takes time and money which MoD were not (at the time of Main Gate) prepared to pay for, given the preference for STOVL.
You don’t say to the Alliance at contract award, “please build our carrier as a STOVL ship, but we’d like you to produce all the drawings and then build it with £600M of EMALS/EAR equipment that we don’t think we’re going to use and a significant amount of additional power distribution cabling and with two empty channels 100m long in the deck and their associated seating etc etc. Oh and better pay Converteam to change the ships power management software so it can fit EMALS/EAR in case we change our minds “. Quite rightly the Alliance would come back and say ” we can’t do that unless you make a decision one way or the other and in any case it’ll cost you big-time”.
The design remained adaptable post 2007 and still is. The point is that once you start building it, the cost of changing it increases considerably.
The interesting thing about the conversion cost breakdown is the “installation” cost and the other “add-ons”.
The equipment cost at £577M is credible. CVN79 EMALS cost from US data is $879M, which if you halve it and then add 30% or so for non-scaleable items ends up at £380M. The EAR system (same source) ends up being about £120M. Add a bit for uncertainty etc and I can believe £577M.
I’m a bit more sceptical about the £150M for technical assistance. This is explicitly included in the contracted equipment costs for CVN79 and is nowhere near $220M/£150M, so not convinced with that one.
£134M for VAT? Is that us paying VAT to our own Treasury, because something is coming in as FMS? How does 20% of £577M get to be £134 anyway? More like £115M.
£675M for installation. Assuming the vast majority of that is labour, it starts getting a bit silly. If you assume £100/hr inc overheads (which is broadly double what the rate should be), and assume 1700 manhours per man year, that’s just shy of 4000 man years to install the system. Now aside from the small matter that there aren’t 4000 people working on the ships at Rosyth and it shouldn’t take all of them a year to install, a more credible figure might be three hundred people working full time for two years, tops. That indicates you should be looking at less than one-sixth of that figure. To put the “installation” labour of 6.7M manhours in context, an entire Type 23 frigate took somewhere between 2.4 and 1.9M manhours to build from scratch. RFA Fort George took less mnahours to build from scratch.
Ditto the “Conversion Development Phase”. Using the same rates you end up with just shy of 1000 manyears for the design and project management of the conversion. That’s not far off the total to design and manage the build of HMS illustrious back in the early 80s.
370 man years to test and commission the system? Again, a team of 20 commissioned all of an entire T23 (weapons, hull and machinery) over two years, so a certain degree of inflation here, which adds to the £234M of inflation that apparently wasn’t accounted for first time round and I suspect would be applied across these rather high labour figures as well, so you would expect it to drop significantly.
Not that it matters, the decision is made and will not be changed barring a catastrophe with Dave B.
@ Bob
‘Jaguars, Phantoms, F-16s have all operated from motorways, so can F-35C.’
Do you mean operated or just taken off from?
I can’t think of many ops that have taken place with a motorway as the runway.
@Martin
‘A British JEF operating 2 CVF’s in LPH and strike carrier role will be quite a force to reckon with and something that no nation other than the USA will be with in a light year of matching.
Also we are forgetting that the real replacement for Tornado is a combination of F35B and FCAS based on Taranis UCAV. I think that combo will be significantly more effective than a manned F35C’
Well said! Plus the RAF should really be focusing on squeezing a lot more of the potential capability out of Typhoon first, and planning for it’s mix of F35B and UCAV’s second.
I think we can reasonably expect to see something between 70 and 90 F35B procured (before a Typhoon replacement is considered), if for no other reason then to meet the contractual expectations as a level 1 partner with the American’s. Personally I think if we do see the above kind of numbers then we should recognise the potential in a fleet of that size and think ourselves lucky!
Oh and yeah why the heck can’t a few Sea Kings lumber on into the 2020’s, half a dozen kept going with spares from the others would suffice to keep some residual capability going. They are sturdy beasts that have already been around for ages, what difference will a few more make!
Are we saying, consciously or subconsciously. that the carrier problem * is really all about replacing Tornado? It seems to me to be so. Forget Harrier (as in RAF GR) as if we factor that in we might as well as start talking about a Jaguar replacement too.
1) Typhoon supposed OSD is 2030. No doubt that will be extended. But that date is all we have to work off.
2) What do we mean by replacing Tornado?
2a) Do we mean another strike, reconnaissance, CAS aircraft? I think given UAV, satellite. PGM delivered by artillery (both naval and army, gun and rocket), and cruise missiles of variety of flavours mean that is to narrow remit for an aircraft procurement project.
2b) Do we mean furnishing the RAF with a second fleet of jets to see them past Typhoon OSD date? I am lead to believe by my readings here that Typhoon is multirole and F35x will be too.
I not the Italians have just taken delivery a refurbished Tornado.
I never really bought into UK carrier strike. For me CVF has always been about sea control and amphibious warfare support. I have no problems with a fast, large, LPH that can host fast pointy planes that can carry missiles.
* Setting to one side the other political reason why costs jumped a billion or so even though the project was on track.
“I am just trying my best not to be a smug bastard
Back to earth though, what was the cost of conversion studies, 70-100 million
What could that have sustained or purchased?”
Harrier, of course.
The 70-100 million is a low estimate, and does not include intangibles that the MoD can’t track. It could well be only half the real cost.
Simon,
It’s not just 2000lb JDAMs. It is multiples of smaller weapons, and larger stand-off weapons as well as any others introduced during the types 40 year service life. Smaller weapons bays greatly reduces payload flexibility especially in the context of low RCS.
F-35B will not be operating from the back of an Albion class.
Jaguars, Phantoms, F-16s have all operated from motorways, so can F-35C.
martin,
The cost of converting the CVF class mid-way through build makes the case for the B, had these ships have been designed from the outset for the CTOL variant this would not have been a problem. The additional operating costs are minor, it was the capital costs that killed the switch.
Prior to 2010 the OSD for Tornado GR,4 was 2025, so certainly not “f**ked”
Finally, no UCAV until 2035 based on current plans.
Martin,
Did you read the doc? It seemed to imply that there’s little chance of ever operating QE and PoW at the same time. There’s only likely to be one crew.
Also, what’s wrong with Typhoon for strike between Tornado and “the next one”?
ACC,
Simple, CTOL JSF to replace both Tornado and Harrier. What happened instead was the RAF sustained its desire for a dedicated Tornado (first manned and then unmanned) replacement until it was finally killed in 2010.
@ Bob – If F35 C was chosen as Tornado replacement then we would be really f**ked as Tornado is out of service from 2018 and F35C would not be available until 2023 at best. That would be quite a gap having no carrier strike or any other strike aircraft other than Typhoon for at least 5 years.
The extra cost of operating CATOBAR aircraft pretty much makes the case for F35B. Also not sure if anyone has noticed but there is not going to be an LPH or LHD replacement for Ocean. CVF STOVL allows us to operate large numbers of helicopters as well as F35’s. That’s quite a benefit if the only trade off is a shorter legged flavoured of F35.
A British JEF operating 2 CVF’s in LPH and strike carrier role will be quite a force to reckon with and something that no nation other than the USA will be with in a light year of matching.
Also we are forgetting that the real replacement for Tornado is a combination of F35B and FCAS based on Taranis UCAV. I think that combo will be significantly more effective than a manned F35C.
Bob,
Completely disagree on that lot. Sorry.
It’s unlikely we need to carry 2000lb JDAM inside F35 – we don’t use them now.
650nm against 460nm is true – we could really do with that along with the extra endurance it brings.
Can’t see an F35C operating from the deck of Albion if necessary for a quick refuel and rearm.
Can’t see an F35C being forward based from a motorway.
@ Martin
Stop talking common sense. That there are still Sea Kings flying in Europe and we have lots ourselves to provide other spares (though I bet the MoD have been quietly flogging off spares) you can’t factor that into your decision making. A future system still on the CAD box costs nothing to run, is endlessly configurable, and yet can still attract millions in profit, I mean funding…
Also,
“at the expense of operational flexibility”?
This gets trotted out on a regular basis by STOVL fetishists but when pushed on what they actually mean they always buckle. The truth is that F-35B will fly further and carry less than F-35C, that hardly sounds flexible to me. Also, CVF will not be able to operate the majority of the carrier-borne aircraft in the world today, also not flexible.
The UK STOVL fetish comes from Harrier. Harrier was an accident of history forced on a reluctant RAF by the air ministry and on the Navy by the end of its big carriers and now the decision not dump the type in 90s means that its legacy is the UK primary future strike aircraft is less capable than virtually every other western country’s. But it’s ok because it is “flexible”.
Bob,
Completely agree!
Now, how can we get the current (and potential future) bunch of clowns out of Downing Street and cleanse the higher echelons of national bureaucracy.
I for one am sick of these pillocks wasting my money.
…seems I’m in a bad mood today :-) – no, not really.
So true “replacements merged in a single conventional take-off and landing aircraft. This decision should have been made in the 90s instead of the RAF/FAA clinging to 3 separate types of aircraft (and thus 3 separate replacement programmes) even as the UK fell from having 32 squadrons of fast jets in 1990 to 12 by 2008.”
– what would that have made the type at the time? We would still be flying it
Once again the real reason for this cock-up is ignored. The ships should have been CTOL from the start with the Harrier and Tornado GR.4 replacements merged in a single conventional take-off and landing aircraft. This decision should have been made in the 90s instead of the RAF/FAA clinging to 3 separate types of aircraft (and thus 3 separate replacement programmes) even as the UK fell from having 32 squadrons of fast jets in 1990 to 12 by 2008. The carrier debacle is a symptom of chronic miss-management and failure to undertake any sort of credible long-term planning since the end of the Cold War.
The date no-one is mentioning here is 2007 (QEC Main Gate).
This was when the decision was taken to ‘optimise’ the ship design for STOVL, which presumably consisted of delteing the space allowed in the original design for CATOBAR equipement.
It was this decision which locked us into the F35B and which ensuring that F35C or F18E/F would never be an economic propsoition. Essentially after 2007 we did not have an adaptable design.
The notable point is how few people (including important people like the Service Chiefs, the MoD and the Secreatary of State) seem to have understood this in 2010.
@ – Yeah, made in Scotland from girders :-)
We, as a nation (and I am thinking “England” here) need to accept the size of our cut-cloth
You as a nation, if you’re thinking “England”, aren’t building any carriers at all.
Crowsnest perhaps, a 5 or 6 years extension to the Sea King support contract and training pipeline”
Its still beyond me why we can’t just keep Asac7 flying until 2022. There must be more than enough sea king parts kicking round the rest of the fleet to keep a handful going for an extra 5 or 6 years. Malaysia operates Sea Kings from the 60’s (not very well mind you) and I bet they have not been looked over half as well as ours.
Crowsnest will be great to have eventually but at present what seems to be offered up is not much of a transformation if any at all over Asac7.
Also with the still planned but hopefully to be scrapped decision to bin Sentinel in 2015 surely Asac7 capabilities over land will be more vital than ever.
@ Fluffy Thoughts
“(and I am thinking “England” here)”
So what do the Scots, Welsh and Northern Irish get to do.
@ Simon
“…Unlike the carrier variant, the STOVL option has scope for both carriers to operate the Joint Strike Fighter…”
Its because the £ 2 billion figure was just to convert POW. They put it at £5 billion to convert both and as we don’t have 50p let alone £5 billion spare that meant only getting POW into service as a carrier. With STOVL we can have both carrier’s operate F35B.
OK, I’ll show my hand (for what it is worth):
Dave-B will be 120 ordered (based upon a simple 40/60) split. It will be key to UK engineering and I have ouigied Hammond’s spreadsheet. Crowsnest is not a key importance to QE-class: Flying the seven five-dwarves from St Helena (for example) is enough.
I’d rather bin the RBS-Voyager contract then extend SK ASaC. Funds are available. Despite the dire times (UK GDP “only” grew 0.8% Q-on-Q to Apr 2013 – :rolls: – so we are struggling) there is money within the budget….
It
“When the Department reverted to the STOVL option, it announced that it would deliver the Carrier Strike by 2020. However, a week later, it delayed investment in Crowsnest, the helicopter based radar system making up the third element of Carrier Strike, meaning that the system is not now scheduled to be fully operational until 2022, two years later than the carriers and aircraft.”
is aptly named, as in my native language ‘like a crow’s nest’ is an expression for an untidy sight, i.e. a total mess
ACC
Well the move to a more modern gun and strike length silos gives potential for both. Of course only if we actually get them.
APATS, RE ” surface strike will be incorporated in T26″
– surface/ shore/ or both?
I am just trying my best not to be a smug bastard
Back to earth though, what was the cost of conversion studies, 70-100 million
What could that have sustained or purchased?
Crowsnest perhaps, a 5 or 6 years extension to the Sea King support contract and training pipeline
Makes you wonder
“Liam Fox and the Service Chiefs were dazzled by the Strategic Raiding fad and prestige of operating a mini me USN style ‘proper carrier’”
Lol, you think that isn’t what we got?
Or that two carriers, rather than (n)one, is somehow more global guardian?
“…Unlike the carrier variant, the STOVL option has scope for both carriers to operate the Joint Strike Fighter…”
Can anyone see WHY this is assumed? 70 extra crew doesn’t cut it for me. It’s not enough of a difference! I bet is based on that total cock, madeup, incorrect, £2b to fit cats-and-traps to the second hull. £2,000,000,000 for something that is installed on nearly every modern roller-coaster in the world – I don’t think so!
Nearly got carried away there ;-) So I won’t mention that there is no costing for Crowsnest vs E2 included. Funny how they left out the other integral bits of the solution.
And… £30,000,000 for the ski-jump – someone’s having a laugh!
I think figure 12 sums it all up. F35 is central to the whole decision… why, oh why then hasn’t the decision to replace Tornado and Typhoon been closely coupled with the aircraft choice for the carrier? I assume it hasn’t been closely coupled because if someone thinks F35B will make a good Tornado replacement then I’m emmigrating.
Also, reading between the lines… we’ll end up with 72 F35B (48 sooner, 24 later). The ideal number to maintain 4 front-line squadrons of 12 – 2 for RAF and 2 for FAA (all owned by RAF) – the same model as JFH.
FF,
Yes to an extent they were but that was during the cold war. When the RN was seen as existing to provide ASW support to the USN. Both the threat and our capabilities have changed a lot.
APatS:
Weren’t CVS vessels designed for ASW? When Lusty goes that role – if it still exists – will be filled by Ocean, no?
Sorry about the ambiguity about 6″ plans. I beleive it dates back the ‘The Washington Treaty, 1923 [?]’. Light-cruisers have 6″; heavy ones are bigger….
Another factor was the serious doubts at the time that the B model would actually be built.
So we cocked but not as badly as we could have.
FF
Why do you think the LPH will be used for ASW?
Not sure we have any 6″ plans, surface strike will be incorporated in T26
The Dave-C is the aircraft we probably require; Dave-B is the correct aircraft for our composition. I feel it would have been easier for us to have crash-landed the C under FAA auspices and have then farmed the wreck out to the Light-Blue; but having the ability to land-vertically upon various platforms gives the Royal Navy that little bit extra. [Awaits painted-surface issues….]
We, as a nation (and I am thinking “England” here) need to accept the size of our cut-cloth: With Lusty on her last legs it is apparent that our LPH will now be tasked with sub-hunting. Whether Ocoean or her elder-cousin has undertaken their designed roles for the last decade-or-so if neither here nor there: We are desparately short of the right paltforms for the “twixt-and-between” years.
Dave-B and the QE-class begin to address these issues. With the Type 45s due to morph into light-cruisers (but when do they recieve their 6″ requirements) with the addition of Harpoon only the Type 23s look out-of-place. I’m seriously thinking a cap of nine T26s (and a similar number of Venators as C2s) would be preferable. If only we had the money and the sailors….