Whilst I am mulling over the future of Think Defence, the National Audit Office has released their long awaited report to the 2012 Carrier Strike reversion decision, or in other words, the CVF F35 Switcheroo
[browser-shot width=”550″ url=”http://www.nao.org.uk/report/carrier-strike-the-2012-reversion-decision/”]
The Ministry of Defence acted quickly once it realized, in early 2012, the extent to which its 2010 decision to procure the carrier variant of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) had been based on immature data and flawed assumptions. In May 2012, the Department announced that it was reverting to procuring the short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) variant of the fighter. In a report published today examining that 2012 decision, the National Audit Office has called for the Department to introduce a degree of consistency in decision-making not previously apparent in the Carrier Strike programme and to work within the financial and capability assumptions underpinning the decision, if it is to deliver value for money.
By February 2012, the estimated cost of converting the aircraft carrier for the carrier variant of the JSF, requiring the ship to be fitted with catapults and arrestor gear (‘cats and traps’), had increased by 150 per cent: from £800 million to about £2 billion. As a result, the Department estimated that, over the next ten years, the STOVL option would be £1.2 billion cheaper than the carrier variant. This difference halves to £600 million over 30 years.
Another key factor was that the carrier variant option of the JSF could also not be delivered until 2023, three years later than the planned date of 2020. The Chief of Defence Staff judged that, in the emerging security environment, such a gap in capability would be undesirable. When the Department reverted to the STOVL option, it announced that it would deliver the Carrier Strike by 2020. However, a week later, it delayed investment in Crowsnest, the helicopter based radar system making up the third element of Carrier Strike, meaning that the system is not now scheduled to be fully operational until 2022, two years later than the carriers and aircraft.
Resolving the future of the Carrier Strike programme (comprising the Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers, the Joint Strike Fighter aircraft operating from them and Crowsnest) was central to the Department’s efforts to balance its ten-year equipment budget. When the implications of the 2010 decision became clear, the Department acted quickly to put in place a unique, streamlined approvals structure, with focused attention from senior officials. This was crucial to the pace of decision-making.
The Department expects to write off £74 million as a result of the reversion decision; but this cost could have been ten times higher if the decision had been made after May 2012.
Successful delivery will require the Department to manage significant affordability and technical risks. There are cost, schedule and technical risks across the JSF programme over which the Department has limited control. The highest risk phases of carrier construction and integration are yet to come and the Department must successfully conclude complicated negotiations with commercial partners.
Today’s report notes that the carrier variant of the JSF has a greater range and payload than the STOVL variant and would have provided a more effective strike capability. However, STOVL creates the option to operate Carrier Strike from two carriers, providing continuous capability. By contrast, the carrier variant could operate from only the one carrier installed with cats and traps and therefore could provide capability for only 70 per cent of the time.
Pick the bones out of that one but in the meantime, some selected reading from Think Defence towers on the issue;
This one being the most up to date, so if you only read one, read this
Others
- Looking Forward to an F35 Future – Part 3 (The Promise)
- CVF Aircraft Launch and Recovery Equipment FOI
- Making Sense of the F35 Decision
- Reasons to be Cheerful – Part B
- Why I Joined the Dark Side
- Forward to Plan B
- F35 – Back to Plan B
- Arse, Meet Elbow
- That NAO Report
- How Do You Solve a Problem Like Maria and/or CVF?
- SDSR – Analysis #05a (Carrier Strike)
- A French Affair
- Too Expensive to Cancel
- CVF Rumour and Sigh*
- Thoughts on CVF
- I Am Puzzled
- B or C
And my all time favourite post on the subject
mmm, we do seem to have spent rather a lot of time discussing this one:)
A Summary of the Decision Making Process
On the decision itself, summarising from the first linked post;
- For some reason, the NSC’s Option 1, by far the most pragmatic option was rejected
- Liam Fox and the Service Chiefs were dazzled by the Strategic Raiding fad and prestige of operating a mini me USN style ‘proper carrier’
- Liam Fox allowed the switch decision to proceed based on estimated costs because he could not resist scoring a political point over the previous government
- Liam Fox did not have the balls to defer any decision until after the SDSR deadline and so went forward with cost estimated prepared in weeks
- The Civil Service failed in its duty to provide some measure of decision making governance
- The Service Chiefs had the same cavalier attitude to information assurance and ignored all the previous work that consistently pointed to STOVL as being the most sensible option
- The Service Chiefs were tempted by the delights on offer from the F35C
- The RAF, specifically, saw an opportunity to simultaneously protect Typhoon and get a Tornado replacement at the expense of operational flexibility
- Everyone was prepared to ignore the realities of the F35B development issues because it fitted their agenda
- Phil Hammond, to his great credit, stood up to the Service Chiefs and demanded a rigourous analysis, the same rigourous analysis that should have happened, and in fact, did happen many times before
- Phil Hammond made a brave decision to revert
- There are still a whole gaggle of bitter and twisted people who just don’t get it and are prepared to put in jeopardy the programme(s) to further their agendas
The only one who comes out of this debacle well is Phil Hammond
The Guardian
You may have seen the article this morning from Nick Hopkins of the Guardian
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2013/may/10/navy-jets-cant-land-hot-weather
This is exactly the reason I started Think Defence, to counter complete and utter nonsense like that headline.
I’m about to lose all my friends (if any), but here goes:
1 Both the Dark Blue and Green factions here are re-fighting their last good war – in the first instance FI; in the second GW1, 2 and the Stan.
2 The difference is that without a serious Navy we would have lost the first, and nobody would have helped us out…
3…without our contribution the Cousins would still have won GW1 and GW2, made a mess of the post war period in Iraq and cleared Afghanistan of AQ and the Taleban, but then after years of expenditure of blood and treasure pulled out leaving the place to an uncertain future.
4 Emphasising the Dark Blue allows us to undertake campaigns that we have to (like FI in my opinion) and some possibility of leading and building European Coalitions in the years ahead…
5…emphasising the Green makes us better and more efficient auxiliaries for the Cousins – but leaves us unable to do much else – even if we really need to
As far as I can see – and operating at the scale we now do – those are our choices; bar the minimal self-defence option generally championed @IXION.
Don’t like it, but that is where we are…a level of independence in military terms…or the equivalent of States 51 through 60…
Really, really Gloomy and now highly unpopular…
Hope you dont mind posting a link here, but I did a quick synopsis over at Pinstriped Line – http://thinpinstripedline.blogspot.co.uk/2013/05/cvf-nao-and-lot-of-missing-capabiliy.html
Its a scary picture of a report – not just for the RN, but the RAF too.
The replacement of the LPH is a fascinating conundrum. It really is required to offer balance to the amphib force. Operating the second CVF as an amphib is sub optimal for a variety of reasons.
I honestly think we may see her being asked to soldier on at a reduced tempo (only used for major exercises, actual ops) for as long as possible. Some navies managed to operate some really old beasts :)
Well aware of the problems in crew currency etc that this will present.
Wise Ape,
you look to the past. I don’t much care for the conclusions of the last couple of SDSRs. I lived through going to an offensive war in the Gulf in 91 with a political imperative to be geared up for the Cold War, so the amoebas in Whitehall are demonstrably not able to get it right. I look to the future.
You show me how such a significant spend on a single capability within the defence budget is appropriate for future threats, and maybe we can have a conversation.
” The original concept was a bit half arsed- I thought that the day they said we were getting 2 not 3″ – At last something we can agree on! All the talk of helos on CVF is because we know there will be no Ocean replacement and we’ve already lost one LSD while the LPDs have no hangar – so where else are we going to put them? If you’re advocating a new class of amphibs then do carry on otherwise talk to your own strawman.
@RT – Shame on you, man in your former position to be asking that. Carrier striker as part of our expeditionary warfare capability has been a central plank of the last two SDSRs (which were not written by elderly Admirals or carrier-junkies btw). Do try to keep up man! Must be the cumulative effect of all that bobbing up and down on horseback. Can’t be good for the brain.
NaB
Just adding to your reply to JH, A great deal of planning and research went into the original decision, it was assessed that that option was what the UK and RN could realistically have and operate. The design itself is another matter, but the decision was certainly never taken on a whim (a la 2010).
I would love an all bells and whistles carrier, or 3 “super invincible”, but the time for that discussion was around 1998.
Like climate, lol, there is a lag time – we’re feeling the effects of decisions taken a while back. Makes me wonder what impacts the decisions taken now will feel in a decade or less…
Ixion,
Damm it here was me thinking we were getting s 65k tonne carrier that could be at sea with 36 F35B a squadron of Merlin ASW. An AEW capability protected by advanced T45 and T26 escorts with an astute class SSN in associated support.
I cannot imagine how useful thst BG could be, oh wait actually i can!
@RT
The thinking is that Carriers allow us the capability of doing things differently and better.
The Political will to intervene with a large long term land presence anywhere that is not a direct threat to the UK is minimal.
Public opinion even less.
Having said that the capability is retained to rotate a brigade on an enduring basis.
What you can bet the farm on is that.
1. Every legal/resolution hoop will have been jumped through.
2. We will examine far closer the scale of what we undertake.
3. We will expect far more participation from our NATO/EU allies.
In a European context only ourselves and France can supply required complex systems such as Carrier strike, SSN, stand off cruise missiles etc. A few more countries have some amphib capability, Spain, Italy, Netherlands but loads can provide ground forces, all previously named plus Germany, Poland to name but 2.
Given the fact that the planning assumptions and political will see us operating in a coalition it makes sense to shape our armed forces to provide certain capabilities and reduce European reliance on the USN.
“I’m sorry captain she canna take no more!”
Elephants! Elephants! Big shiny white: (with apologies to the old Pepsi adverts): – CapabilitydestroyinWASAWPYKfantasyfeedinglookatthesizeofmyship ELEPHANTS.
Nellie and Dumbo were sold to the general public, and to the general political classes, by the RN establishment:- as CVF:- as half arsed (but still usable) Nimitz type fixed wing carriers. OH YES THEY WERE! Very little of any of the published material before the cheques were signed said anything about some super LPH or some such. With the good reason that had it done so the project would never have got of the ground.
We were told 36 F35 fighters/bombers on 2 ships. of 65,000 tons with self defence capabilities, armored bulkheads etc etc. With at least 8 T45 and frigates- a Britsh RN carrier battle group, capability.
What have we got (or at least we are told we are now going to get: -10 years late and so stupendously over budget, that the people concerned should be put up against a wall and shot?
Well its not even half arsed anymore. its more like the pimple on one arse cheek. A floating tin shack with 12 count em a whole 12 of the f35B.
But that does not stop the carrier junkies, oh no that’s just a reason to extol their ‘flexible capability,’* as these lollipops start licking themselves, and dragging everything, and everyone else in to help with licking.
Future helicopters will be sized for elephant carriage, how long before the RN get told – you can’t have that kit as it cannot be deployed from an elephant, all RN surface combatants will be defined by what can they do to protect the Elephant. (Elephant singular note as we are still along way form having the cash to keep 2 going. You know the 2 that were the bare minimum to maintain credible capability back in the mists of the late 90’s).
The original concept was a bit half arsed- I thought that the day they said we were getting 2 not 3. and as strike carriers, and the 36 planes per ship were marginal.
I looked in vain for the fleet train needed to actually supply these shiny pachyderms for any kind of serious long distance mission, realized it was not there, or ever likely to be.
I was forced to conclusion that they were a vanity project for old admirals, who wanted trouser cred with the spams, and could not forgive the French for building a nuclear powered carrier when we could not. (Ok the French one turned out to be the biggest floating Turkey in modern history but at the time who knew)?
NAB
We could have had the capability we are now getting, for half the price twice as quickly, and even 2 or 3 ships had we started with a 12- 18 aircraft design. I has been done by other navies. And although the Americas are a silly price a UK version, based on polish / Scandinavian, built 35,- 45,000 ton hull, would have cost nothing like as much. And probably been a damn sight more usable.
*Flexible capability:- Encyclopedia Ixonius :-
A state of circular logic in the mind of a carrier junkie that refuses to recognize that what we have ended up with is nothing like what we were sold. But because it’s a CARRIER; and your not a proper navy if you don’t have one, and other navies will laugh at us in the changing rooms, it is to be forgiven everything.
Every paper tiger must be waived to justify it’s acquisition; Anything than can be stuffed into a 65,000 ton hull, must be done so in order to justify it’s existence.
@ John Hartley
The us specifically built the much larger Forrestol Class super carriers as they found that th midway size was not optimal for fixed wing aircraft. e built the QE at there 65,000 tonne size because after exhaustive study we found it to be the best fit for STOVL operations. Yes a smaller carrier than the Forrestol can do CTOL ops and yes a smaller carrier than CVF can do STOVL ops but they are less than optimal. As is frequently pointed out on this site steel is cheap and air is free so what would really be the point in a super CVS if costs were similar to CVF and our own research showed it was less the optimal. Given the chances of us getting an new LHD or LPH are near zero I think we will be very glad of the size of CVF even when she is operating less than the three squadrons of F35 b originally planned. That extra size will be very useful for troops and helos.
NAB
If you think the current QE/PoW/F-35B procurement is fantastic, then that is your belief not mine. I can at least disagree without being rude.
You are right in that I am not a Naval Officer or ship designer.
I can however see, that ships fall into broad categories. It is then that what type of carrier the Nation needs should be decided.
Do we want to carry on with STOVL? If so , the Invincibles proved too small for a decent sized airgroup, so logic would enlarge the design while still being able to use the old existing locks on the Panama canal, while keeping it to 800 ft in length, lets it get into those smaller ports, denied to larger ships.
If we want a Midway sized ship, then it is logical to use & equip it the way the Americans used their Midways in the 1980s. So cats & traps & a decent sizes balanced airgroup. The Midway example is more capable, but more expensive than the “Super Invincible”. This is a decision that should have been made in 1998 & then stuck to.
All these changes & postponements, have just cut capability while adding cost. QE maylook impressive, but now the Treasury has stripped out all the armour, bulkheads & subdivision, how survivable are they in a real fight?
Logical replies would be better than insults.
Has anyone (not on TD, but in the wider defence world) ever answered the question “Do we need the things, or would the vast cost of the system (boats, jets, Crowsnest) be better spent on something different, or was it all merely a political device to bung some work at the last Prime Minister’s favoured Scottish shipyards?
Of course, that is all now a moot point, as we are building / buying the things, but I’m still struggling to understand how useful they are going to be in the future. My main worry is that it will all become a self-licking lollipop – we will design our defence policy around the fact that we have a maritime capability and too small an intervention capability on the land, and not look at the actual needs that our defence policy should be addressing, which might be hundreds of miles inland, and not conducive of bombing the crap out of the natives, but rather supporting a complex peace enforcement with land presence.
In short, every time we do a Falklands, we will need the things, but that is only about once a century. Every time we do something else, we won’t, and that is about annually.
Just to add a bit more.I wouldn’t get too bogged down worrying about the sortie rates on their own.more important is what effect you are trying to achieve. More concern are fh, more often it’s that that is the driver. Might well, in some cases, be better to fly fewer sorties but of longer duration. You might well be working with allies who provide support you need, might be other ops going on at the same time as yours in the same aor. Sortie rates are important, but they aren’t the be all and end all and they don’t tell you a great deal on their own.
“If we wanted a STOVL carrier, we should have built 3 “Super Invincibles” i.e. 800ft long, panamax width (110ft).
If we wanted a Midway size carrier, it should have been CTOL.”
Sorry John, my rant thread now. You don’t understand the first thing about aircraft operations at sea or ship design for that matter. WTF makes you think that your CVS on steroids is remotely related to Panamax or to the operational requirement? The size issue is largely unrelated to STOVL / CTOL. The reason the ships weren’t designed to CTOL was partly to do with organisational vested interests and equally to do with perceived technical risk. You may wish to ponder whether a panamax beam is actually credible for a ship of that size over the proposed life, given payload uncertainty, damaged stability requirements and through-life growth. You’re of course entitled to your opinion, but reading lots of Jane’s publications and being handy with Gary Google does not automatically endow credibility.
Simon – Topman is correct, 3 sorties per day over any length of time is pushing it for a number of reasons. IIRC NATO planning assumptions used to be about half that for any sort of sustained operation. The actual modelling of sortie rates is a complex amalgam of equipment, real estate, systems, people and procedures, not to mention the sortie itself, in terms of purpose, duration, non-organic systems and effect. If it makes you feel better, by all means model away, but don’t expect anyone with actual knowledge and experience to take it seriously. The model used in the design was (if memory serves) called Sailor, which was a vastly more complex version of something DERA used at the back end of the 90s, whose name escapes me now.
@Simon without sounding condescending fj need a lot of maintainance. 3 hours per day would be a lot. Look online at the figures for day to day UK flying. It all depends on how often you want to Carrey on the op how many hours on station etc. 6 hours per day per airframe is very short term.
Sounds of very rigid material creaking under unbearable strain as I try not to go off on one, It will snap in a minute
Much more of this worship of the Wompom (look up Flanders and Swann), style Elephants. Of the variety of Elephants can do this… and that… and the other. And rant will happen… I am on rant condition 2…
Mainly coz when you challenge it’s omnipotence, a different Carrier junkie up and said “well it was never supposed to do that, no one EVER said it would do that”.
Hi Simon, about sortie rates
– a much modelled and exercised topic in the USN
– consistently, over decades, they have found that you have to plan “pulsing” into the plans of using carrier air
– the maximum sortie rate starts to fall off quite badly after the first 2-3 days (MBTF is only partly the reason as no one wants the F in it)
Well, they used to have to luxury of just swapping out the carriers in the “front line”
@Simon – absolutely right – and it is also what we have; so what about some positive thoughts about the benefits of being the only European Navy with a new carrier in terms of @Chris B’s coalition building strategy? Or thinking about how we sell the benefits of getting both to sea? Or keeping the build programme going so we can replace Ocean and achieve at least some economies of scale? (That was a special thought for @x and others – you know who you are!) Or how it might support a Light Cavalry Regiment (in Red Trousers) undertaking land operations in support of a recently landed Royal Marine Commando?
A surprisingly positive Gloomy…
Isn’t having to go to work a nuisance – means I always seem to arrive late at TD’s carrier parties. Anyway, I largely agree with Bob, so much so that I’m wondering if I have developed dissociative identity disorder! I’ll know if I start using the royal “we.”
This “muddled abortion” might just be pretty useful though.
If you picture it with 6 jets stashed on the aft starboard pad, and two ready to go on the runway with 4 Chinook ready to drop 200 Marines in a single wave on spots 2-5 to the port side, a Crowsnest Merlin poised on spot 1 and a couple of ASW Merlin operating from the forward starboard area it starts to look like a Sea Control / Commando Carrier with a much heavier “hit” than USS America.
I am fed up with the whole saga.
If we wanted a STOVL carrier, we should have built 3 “Super Invincibles” i.e. 800ft long, panamax width (110ft).
If we wanted a Midway size carrier, it should have been CTOL.
Now we have an expensive, muddled abortion of both. Any change will add cost & delays. No wonder the Country is in such a state if this is the level of our decision making.
We should have made a proper decision in 1998 & stuck to it.
Perhaps this is the start of my rant thread.
Topman,
Thanks for your input. I was thinking 3 sorties of 2-hours each (6 hours per airframe per day). If you think a month is too much, then how long? Two-weeks (~90 hours on each airframe)?
I’d certainly expect to field 12 jets in a normal squadron putting only 4-hours per day (2 sorties) on each, which I guess should bring it to about 120 hours each month before a frame-swap, but I was under the impression that Harrier was a little more reliable than the “supersonics” giving a greater MTBF?
@ George
:) CVF will bring a lot. It is a shame it is has been tarnished by politicians playing silly beggars and those still looking for an FJ to knock out important Soviet targets 50 miles or so behind the lines.
@Simon seems a bit high I’d be surprised if you could get 3 waves of 8 (or combination) everyday for a month out of 8 fj regardless of type.
NaB,
Sorry on two counts. 1) Didn’t realise you meant sustained, 2) Didn’t realise you were talking about the 10 jets only.
No worries about the “pop”. It’s taking me ages to extract information from various sources. I’ve even done my own computer model of flight deck movements to prove/disprove the CVS/CVF/CVN sortie generation rates… not that they work yet, but I don’t see the following being unrealistic for a month of operation, do you?:
8 SHAR at 3 sorties per day = 24 sorties per day sustained.
6-9 Merlin/Sea King ASW = 12-16 sorties per day sustained.
3 ASaC = 5-6 sorties per day sustained.
I’m only going on historic evidence and a statement made by the USMC that 12 USMC AV8-Bs are expected to deliver 40 sorties per day. But I’d expect that is at full-tilt with hangar and on-deck maintenance over a couple of shifts.
I am all at sea with respect of the technical issues here…I built my Airfix Kits very badly because I wanted to get them into action, mostly in combined operations against the Hun…however a number of points do strike me:
1 A big flat-top is very useful for all kinds of things…F/J, helicopters, embarked Marines, evacuees…it is a versatile platform…would have been more versatile if designed and built with cats and traps from the off, but it wasn’t…so that ship has sailed.
2 It is however expensive, and a useful target for cuts in public expenditure…and the politicians who make those decisions know even less about defence than I do and care much, much less…the only thing on earth that is actually real to any of them is winning and keeping office, and all their decisions are about that.
3 Thus they might cut CVF to save money or embarrass their political opponents if they think it will help them get or keep office…
4…but they will not under any circumstances on earth say “we think CVF was an expensive wrong turn, so we have decided to scrap or sell it…and then find yet more money to change direction completely and build a different sort of RN/a much bigger RAF with many more fast jets/many extra Army Brigades with modernised kit”…
5…and what they are much more likely to say is “CVF is a white elephant; the service Chiefs are useless for letting us buy it …scrap it and cut defence by 50% for the lovely cuddly DfID”
It therefore seems to me that it behoves those who disagree that defence is a waste of money to think about ways in which even elephants can be useful, even if they might have picked a different pet…because no likely political process that scraps it will redirect cash into their pet project or favourite service; it will just cut the cash and the capacity permanently.
Think on, as we say in these parts
GNB
But then one of us has been involved in understanding what needs to happen to generate sorties and how that translates to deck ops and one of us hasn’t. Not meant as a pop, just a statement of fact.
You can suggest 50/day all you like. The facts are that even a CVN running round with a CVW of 75+ cabs could only generate 120 sorties per day on a sustained basis. the surge trials have demonstrated an ability to do over 200, but that required more manpower and some interesting ways of getting deck space. That’s a ship btw with over 6 times the number of f/w aircraft available and more manpower than you can shake a stick at, plus with a deck designed to accept a large number of aircraft. As opposed to a ship that was designed primarily to operate helicopters and a handful of f/w aircraft and for which even the additional deck area at fly 1 did not overcome the inherent restrictions of the overall design.
It depends entirely on what you’re trying to do both with your aircraft packages and your alert posture. As an example – I would not be surprised if a force of 10 SHAR or GR7 if launched in pairs every hour might be able to sustain that launch rate for 24 hours, getting you close to fifty sorties. The limit there would probably be down to the inspection & maintenance (as opposed to servicing) requirements on the cab, plus the availability of aircrew and the ability of the ship to man the deck, the FDO, Flyco, squadron office, SE store and so forth on a 24 hour basis and that’s before we get to whether you have to arm/re-arm / de-arm the cabs.
Whether those forty-odd sorties would generate any military effect is another question entirely. There’s c0ck-all use in launching cabs for the sake of it. Critical mass comes into play and with that comes demands on space, people, facilities etc that may not be apparent at first look. That is why the ships got bigger between 1998 and 2002. It’s not that they were carrying more aircraft – it’s just that a better understanding of the pinchpoints and likely impact on manpower requirements drove a bigger ship to get around them while achieving the required sortie rate.
“CVS with a mixed SHAR/GR7 CAG.”
30? Someone’s doing something wrong then! I’d suggest 50/day is more like it, especially after the forecastle was filled in.
X – I think you and I are on the the same wavelength – the flexibility it brings is incredible.
@ Mark
Voyager the aeroplane is fine. I meant the PFI contract. Sorry. I should have been more precise. I couldn’t remember the name of the company when I was bashing away.
CVS with a mixed SHAR/GR7 CAG.
As I understand it, the CQ requirement for USN aviators (once trained) is 10 day and 10 night launch and recoveries, which they tend to do in a couple of days as they embark, basically by arriving at the ship, trapping and then getting shot off again to do a circuit before trapping again until the requisite number of launch / recoveries accumulated. I have the old RN standard kicking around at home somewhere as well.
By no means weeks and weeks of training to stay current contrary to the assertions of some. BUT – once CQ’d you stay embarked for the deployment, which may be where the reticence comes from……
Initial training will of course be more intrusive, but that is essentially achieved through a combination of practicing carrier approach and recoveries to a land-base followed by periods of at-sea recoveries on an available deck. I suspect a judicious use of USN training pipelines (at a suitable price) would provide an acceptable solution, as it appears to do for the MN. The cousins will probably be glad of any additional throughput/cash to offset their fixed overheads.
@ Simon
I will try not to. I am seeking help for my problem. For example I only eat plane (sic) crisps now and avoid ones that taste of helicopter. :)
@ Chally
I honestly don’t see the problem some have with CVF. Well I do it is because all they see is jets.
Um. It is easy to see how CVF will be used at a broad strokes level,
1) Support of USN CBGs: Just as the Invincibles were intended to be used in the Big One as screening assets. Pingers, baggers, and local CAP.
2) Support of USMC: F35b (Ours’ and the Cousins’) providing CAS and CAP. AEW. Extra helicopters for the assault.
3) With Le French: 24 F35b plus 24 Rafale isn’t to be sniffed at. The FJ not being able to land on each other’s decks is a non-issue. If either ship weren’t there then the other wouldn’t be able to land on anyway so………
4) UK-only: Eg those Islands again. If the FAA kicked Argie backside with 30-ish SHAR what could we do with 24 (or 36) F35b? Plus (hopefully) AEW, every escort fielding Sea Wolf (Sea Ceptor to come), and with Sea Viper making Sea Dart look like a rocket in a milk bottle. Actually that orbat would scare most nations. Yes it lacks a bit of depth. 12 T45 would be nice, more T26 than we are getting, etc. and so on as has been said here thousands of times before, but you get my point……
If CVF set sail with 12 F35b, 8 ASW, 4 ASaC, 8 Junglies, and a clutch of Wildcat it would be enough for most emergencies. If not we swap out what isn’t needed and add in what is needed.
Mark,
Is “invisible” a typo. ‘Cos I like it :-)
Invisible
Illusion
…and…
Ark Removal
x
Well not really danger at all. There is no way none at all the raf would have taken close to 15 sqns worth of harrier and tornado sqn and decided I know we will buy a carrier and ctol aircraft. It would have been develop the replica aircraft and the option would poosibly have been taken to upgrade the few remaining harriers and run on invisible. Nor does the uk require going to that level of carrier capability. The uk contribution to Libya or any other operation since the Falklands has not in anyway been affected by not having a cvn style carrier or even considering having enough for a sustained capability. As for France using there carrier prob because the navy have introduced rafale first and are further on in its service experience than the airforce and it was available and I think worked up had that carrier been in one of its frequent refits what would have happened. Did the French carrier stay out thru the duration how did there carrier get on in mali? As for the Italians well there role may have been similar to the us marines one.
You say voyagers a cock up. Well I’ll disagree there the aircraft itself is fine infact the cheapest most capable availble the mode we have choose to pocure it by most certainly is.
And uavs, satellites cruise missiles artillery ect haven’t really eaten that much into the mission tornado was designed or required for. Nothing you have covered could have done southern watch or the role it carried out in Libya.
@ Topman and Bob
I took surge to mean brining extra pilots and aircraft onboard as well as in 1982 when RAF pilots came onboard with zero carrier training. How long does it take to work up flight crews for CATOBAR operations. Even trained naval pilots need something like 30 landings to re-qualify for a new tour let alone airforce bods who have never been to sea.
“Not a ship struggling to range 10 cabs and launch more than 30 sorties / day.”
Which carrier is this then? Garribalidi?
“People get far too hung up on definitions made by Politicians who could probably not explain the difference in any case. The primary mission of CVF based assets will depend upon the mission and the threat. From this the make up of the TAG will be decided. This can and will vary.”
Absolutely spot on and the primary rationale behind the size and aircraft capacity of QEC. Would have been nice to have f/w AEW, AAR and ASW/ASuW, but the principal requirement is to have a ship capable of carrying sufficient numbers of aircraft to be useful across a range of scenarios. Not a ship struggling to range 10 cabs and launch more than 30 sorties / day.
@Simon
50% fuel faction is fairly optimistic in my opinion to start with depending on the weapons bays. To fit the proposed mission profile someone gave (the Taranis dropping 2,000 pound bombs) it would have a payload of 4,000 pounds or so which would have it 22% payload, 28% structure and 50% fuel. A lot of what I say is presuming a payload similar to that of an X-47. Now if you want to drop the payload faction to that of an X-47 then certainly you could probably get a similar range to it on the smaller platform and possibly somewhat better since we are pushing less structure through the air.
But if we presume that payload is a similar faction to the X-47B on the Taranis then it is probably sized to carry a couple of 500 pound bombs right now. That would give you the range you needed and allow for the smaller platform but it is not really a replacement for a manned aircraft in that case which is the problem that was being addressed. Nor is it really a heavy strike asset.
The other problem is a huge number of components (com equipment, a lot of radars, ECM equipment, target designators ect) don’t shrink just because you have a smaller platform. If you want to carry a SniperXR type targeting system it will weigh what it weighs regardless of your platform size for example. The computers on a 44,000 pound UCAV are likely no bigger than those on an 18,000 pound one. ESM systems don’t change weight because you have a smaller platform. You may get by with less capability to save weight but otherwise these fixed weights really can start to add up.
Right now everything on the Taranis sounds great. It has not flown yet and it has not been mission-equipped yet. The lesson we know from history is that almost every aircraft ever developed looks lovely when it is a demonstrator with an engine and aerodynamic form. Then you start stuffing weapons and full mission systems in it and they become like a pregnant wife. They gain weight and get bigger. If this thing is going to do what everyone wants it to do then it is going to get bigger unless BAE has outdone everyone else in the world by an order of magnitude when it comes to UAV design.
x,
Please don’t try and sell CVF as just a big “value for money” LPH ;-)
Mark said “If the decision had been taken in the 90s to roll harrier and tornado replacement together we would not be building aircraft carriers at all.”
That is the danger phrase isn’t it? It is so loaded because every sees that phrase and thinks CVN, 80 cabs airwings, with a half dozen Tico’s and Burkes orbiting it. I think some here have to look past that image. Look at the advantages of being able to field and service a large number of helicopter from a platform that can pace with USN groups. Helicopters aren’t a panacea, but they are the ultimate force multiplier. They operate at human scales as well vast heights and distances. What other vehicle can carry a pallet to a grid reference and carry a radar kilometres into the air? I am still amazed at the synergy between helicopter and frigate in the ASW role.
Manned aircraft will be with us for a long while yet. But I think we are missing something if we don’t recognise that cruise, PGM, and UAV are eating into GRA envelope. Why can’t the Army commander or RN commander have control over his own strike, CAS, etc. assets? It is events on the surface that dictate where air power is needed. Perhaps we need to define what air power means? A shell flies through the air but is fired from a gun, so is that airpower? If CAS effects can be delivered by a PGM fire mission from a gun why should we buy an aircraft whose costs would cover 500 PG munitions?
Lastly some have us to look beyond the Cold War. Our defence focus goes beyond this,
http://www.thetravelempire.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/Europe_pol981.jpg
and now, as it was before 1900s, is this,
http://www.mapsofworld.com/images-mow/world-map.jpg
Operation Ellamy didn’t show us how flexible land air power is, on the contrary it did the opposite. It showed how “we” struggled to operated at the edges of our own continent. Why were the Italians with all their Tornados operating a carrier off Libya? And the French why was the CdeG at work? Sorry the closer you are to your target, given the short range of modern jets, the more sorties you will generate. If the two nations closet to Libya needed carriers what about us? And what if France hadn’t been keen on action in Libya and close their airspace to us? What then? Actually to argue that airpower is the tool of modern warfare that everything else hinges off, and then to argue that having all that power operating off a platform closer to the point of need makes it some how less effect, actually it is detrimental to how efficiently that power is exercised, is to me slightly flawed. As Chinese cash is already influencing politics in Africa will we always have that convenient airfield in theatre? As we start to compete for resources mid-ocean where then that convenient airfield? And if the future of conflict is war amongst the people will we need huge large amounts of FJ power anyway? Invinvibles worked post Cold War, Ocean has been worked to death, and so having more of the same on a larger scale can only be a good thing. And lastly lets factor in something else. Voyager is a cock-up. When that contract expires CVF will still have decades to run. For all its faults, and as I said further which weren’t entirely the builders’ fault, CVF will be good value for money.
Simon,
Sending an aircraft to drop a bomb on a target is a strike mission. Being able to fly further and deliver more or bigger ordnance makes you more capable at strike missions. Being able to fly further for longer makes you better at no-fly enforcement.
Bob,
“Unfortunately the UK primarily used the Invincible class, post cold-war, for strike. Strike is what CVF was designed for. Sorry to burst the bubble.”
Well if you think “primarily” then so be it. I was under the impression Bosnia, Sierra Leone, and Iraq were predominantly no-fly enforcement with FA2. 6 x GR7s is hardly “strike” ;-)
If we look at the way carriers have been historically used then it is dependent upon the threat. WW2 carriers were used to carry out strike missions vs other carriers whilst ensuring that strike missions from the other carriers did not succeed so they were also doing Fleet Defence.
In the Falklands the Carriers role was primarily Fleet Defence during the Gulf wars and Former Yugoslavia carriers could concentrate on strike or CAS or recon as the air threat against them was lesser.
People get far too hung up on definitions made by Politicians who could probably not explain the difference in any case. The primary mission of CVF based assets will depend upon the mission and the threat. From this the make up of the TAG will be decided. This can and will vary.
Jeremy,
My apologies. To answer your point though, RAF flies F-35C too, joint Force F-35C = problem solved.
Breguet Range (cruise climb) = (V/sfc) . (L/D) . ln (Wtakeoff/Wempty)
So with a V of 600 knots, an SFC of 0.81 and an L/D of 12 (assumed)…
If 50% of the aircraft TO weight were fuel and it comes back without dropping it’s ordnance that’s a range of 6161nm.
3000nm is considered intercontinental.
Simon,
1) Unfortunately the UK primarily used the Invincible class, post cold-war, for strike. Strike is what CVF was designed for. Sorry to burst the bubble.
2) Yes, we all know what Harrier did, F-35B is not Harrier.
3) If there is enough time logistical capability to produce a base capable of operating F-35B then there is enough of both to produce a longer runway.
“Do you have anything to back up that the additional operating costs of CATOBAR operations are minor compared to STOVL? Everything I have seen indicates the costs are far from minor which is why we stopped doing it in 1979.”
The UK stopped conventional carrier operations in 1979 because the Ark Royal was worn out (with replacement cancelled over 10 years previously) and because we had decided to concentrate on providing two main capabilities to NATO – an armoured Corps and RAF contribution (12 FJ sqns) to 2 ATAF in Germany, together with the major contribution of ASW capability to STRIKFLTLANT, which meant ASW helicopters, escorts and submarines, plus Nimrod.
None of the resultant force structure was really supposed to do anything else, which is why we were lucky with Corporate.
The requirement for defence now is vastly different and based on defending our wider interests in Europe and beyond, which is why contrary to belief of some, carrier air is required.
Some indication of what the minimum requirement for flying hours is can be gained from this latest dit.
http://hamptonroads.com/2013/05/budget-squeeze-forces-navy-cut-flying-hours
which indicates that your normal carrier air wing pilot averages 25 hours per month, but taht the minimum required to maintain flight safety proficiency is 11. I would assume that the latter does not involve remaining deck qualified. Carrier qual requirements can be found in the NATOPS manuals.
@Bob
You misunderstand what I mean by surge. I am speaking to pushing RAF planes out onto carriers if you need more fixed wing assets. Not strike packages.
@Martin
I think Bob is a bit nuts with his fervor here but I do think he is right to caution about the state of the Taranis and over reliance on it as a cure all for the future. I don’t think it is all that close to operation and it would take a fairly major miracle to put it in active service in 2020.
A few major things have to happen to get a combat version into major service.
1. If the range is really intercontinental it will have to be a lot bigger. The X-47 and Phantom Ray are incredibly similar aerodynamic platforms (all three are flying wings) with fairly similar thrust to weight profiles and similar SFC for the engines. The X-47 will take you about 2,100NM’s.
I am going to say with pretty good confidence that the current Taranis version that is about 40% as big is not going to have intercontinental range yet. In fact it probably won’t do 2,100NM’s. The math on this is fairly simple. Really. The engine will burn 0.81 pounds per hour per pound of thrust of gas. That means it would burn the whole MTOW in 5 hours. 5 hours at 600 NM’s gives you a range of 1,500NM’s. At a realistic fuel fraction of .2 to .4 you are not going even that far.
An intercontinental range would to me say you are going to need something at least half the size of a B-2 (if you take out the crew and some carrying capacity for weapons). Certainly you can’t bend the laws of physics to make the current one go that far.
2. I think that at some point when the thing starts to fly people will have to admit it is not supersonic. Simply put the aerodynamic shape is not much different form the X-47B which is a subsonic aircraft. The X-47B has a T/W of around .36. The Taranis has a T/W of .36. I don’t doubt that in a dive both the X-47 and the Taranis could probably hit supersonic speeds. But sustained straight and level flight without an afterburner? I don’t see it.
If that is really a capability desired on any production variant that means more thrust which brings heavier engines and more fuel consumption. Again this thing has to get a lot bigger to really do what we are asking of it.
The point here is that Taranis really is at this point basically a demonstrator. To make anything like the stated program capabilities you need something a lot bigger. That means a lot of structural work and then more testing of all that work as well.
@X
‘I never really bought into UK carrier strike. For me CVF has always been about sea control and amphibious warfare support. I have no problems with a fast, large, LPH that can host fast pointy planes that can carry missiles’
Totally agree!
Whatever the intention may have been at the start these ships and the aircraft they will host are going to be mostly about fleet protection and limited power projection ashore, which isn’t a bad set of capabilities to end up with is it!
@Martin
‘Nothing wrong with Typhoon in the strike role which really says if it can do it for five years why not longer. Why do we need the F35C at all’
Exactly, you can only really justify a NEED for F35C or a similar long-range strike aircraft if you first call a complete halt to any further Typhoon development and the idea of UCAVs bringing a niche strike capability to the party further down the line.