The Throughout the evolution of the Type 26 Frigate there has been a great deal of discussion and speculation about it’s export potential. Brazil, Australia, New Zealand and even the US have been linked with the Type 26 and yet not a great deal has been forthcoming.
The emergence of the Type 26 coincided with a new approach from the MoD that placed ‘exportability’ into the decision making process for investment in bespoke design and development. The general concept put forward by the MoD was if the nation is investing large chunks of cash in designs from scratch it had better have some export potential or else it wouldn’t be authorised.
This approach was included in the National Security Through Technology strategy published in 2012, click here to read.
In the past, the MOD has sometimes set its equipment requirements so high that the resulting systems exceeded any potential export customer’s needs or budget. As highlighted in the SDSR, we believe one way to increase the UK’s share of global defence exports is to consider export-related issues early in the MOD’s own acquisition cycle, while ensuring that our Armed Forces continue to receive the equipment capabilities and support they need. This approach was strongly supported in the Green Paper consultation responses.
There are some major equipment projects that will never be exported, Successor and Astute for example, or some crypto as another. For others, the discussion centred on how operational capabilities could be maintained whist still offering the same equipment for export in a competitive global market. It was recognised that exportability could not be tacked on at the end of the development cycle but had to be integral to the process from start to finish. Techniques such as modularity, open system exploitation and parallel development.
It also raised the prospect of compromising on specification in order to make equipment more exportable.
the MOD will adjust programmes, having considered the qualitative and quantitative benefits to be gained from exports, underpinned by robust market analysis of customer requirements in potential export markets.
A recent FOI release included a 2014 report from DSTL titled Embedding Exportability in the MoD which has a very interesting section on the Type 26, drawing a comparison between that and the Complex Weapons portfolio approach that has already seen some export success with the Common Anti Air Modular Missile (CAMM)
On Type 26 it said;
The Type 26 project team made an attempt at implementing exportability by identifying and consulting potential international partners/customers early in the projects lifecycle. This aspect was successful but did not occur early enough and there wasn’t a real appetite to compromise on UK requirements to accommodate export customers. The premise of achieving exports of the platform was also based on flawed market intelligence, leading to a poor export strategy.
Click here to read the full document, it is fascinating and complex subject with no easy soundbite solutions but at least on T26, the additional information is very interesting. It raises the same question the MoD has been grappling with for a very long time, should it compromise equipment specification (and thus, arguably operational effectiveness) for better exportability which offers the prospect of larger volume and lower overall programme cost. Or put another way, the balance between cost, specification and quantity.
And to think back in 2011 it looked like Australia/New Zealand and Brazil were keen and Turkey and Canada were giving it a glance.
It’s good that Sea Ceptor has already got a couple of orders and i’m sure such an easy to use and cost effective bit of kit will get more interest.
Same old story with the UK and complex warships though, we won’t compromise on requirements thus rendering the whole design too uneconomical or inflexible for any potential export customer.
Maybe it’s time to give up the pretense that high-end warship construction can be part of a commercial concern and confine something so expensive, specialist but uncompetitive to a nationally owned and run shipyard.
Although to be fair if the UK was prepared to buy 16+ T26 over a couple of decades then surely that would both sustain a larger workforce and skills base and result in a cheaper, faster built design? I mean by the end of the program T23’s were being churned out in 3 years and for a good price.
Part of the problem is clearly the government of the day’s continual contraction of the Royal Navy and the knock on effect this has on shipbuilding, from unit prices soaring to a loss of skilled workers until we end up in the pitiful state of struggling to launch a complex warship every 2 years.
Then again i guess that’s what you get when supposedly free market companies are actually horrifically reliant on state handouts.
A vicious circle, who know’s what the answer is.
Part of a story in today’s Australian newspaper.
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/foreign-affairs/british-foreign-affairs-talks-focus-on-security-and-ships/story-fn59nm2j-1227202874548
Remembering that work on adapting the F105 with CEA radars is also underway.
With Australia I think it will all come down to what happens with the AWD project, last I heard the government wasn’t happy with how the Australian Submarine Corporation was managing it, the option I heard was that BAE might take it on and thereby take over all major surface shipbuilding. If BAE is running the new frigate project then they are more likely to go with their design rather than the Navanti one, as a baseline.
BAE can’t get T26 to the position where the MOD will buy it. Costs a blooming before it’s even started and we are now talking about £450 million for a ship that we won’t even be buying a radar for.
While I was optimistic in the early days and now think there is zero chance of BAE winning nay international orders and certainly none for ships actually built in the UK.
The time has come for the UK government to step in an nationalize BAES surface operations and maybe the submarine ones as well. There is zero point in private ownership when there is only one company in the market and they have us over a barrel on capability sustainment and jobs.
http://www.scotsman.com/news/uk/shipbuilding-plan-secures-scots-work-for-25-years-1-3675418
Speech from Osborne on T26 calling for the building of one complex warship every 2 years and the renewal of the fleet every 25 years.
This would suggest 8 T26 and an eventual escort fleet of just 12. Certainly won’t sustain the current fleet of 19 warships.
Not much point in BAE building its frigate factory on the Clyde with numbers like that. One ship every two years is a pretty low rate even for a single yard.
I was under the impression the new frigate factory ,if they ever place an order to build it which is dependant on the gov placing an order for some ships or other its rumoured to want , was to build two at a time . That equates to four years on the stocks or half a yard empty building one every two years. In terms of exports I mentioned on another thread developing common NATO Standards on Naval vessels such as these to mostly stop the various manufactures charging governments for ‘developing new ‘ designs to achieve the same end saving the NATO tax payer money or more likely a better standard of ship for NATO sailors to operate. A long process I grant due to intransigence on the various parties but a more capable, more liveable and survivable fleet of ships for our sailors is surely a laudable goal and one our politicians should strive for as only they can make it happen. Industry and National Navies won’t :-(
RE” The general concept put forward by the MoD was if the nation is investing large chunks of cash in designs from scratch it had better have some export potential or else it wouldn’t be authorised.”
Japan takes a different approach: they plow in the money to cover the domestic requirement, but there is a formula for a share of profits, should any export orders materialise. This is how BAE supplying rear ends of F35 fuselages for Japan-built F35s came to nothing. The order has to go through a Japanese company, and they did not feel they could sign that clause (not enough initial profit after shsring, to warrant signing it), thus pulling out.
@Martin,
Agree with the surface part in this “The time has come for the UK government to step in an nationalize BAES surface operations and maybe the submarine ones as well. There is zero point in private ownership when there is only one company in the market and they have us over a barrel on capability sustainment and jobs.”
However, SEPP for submarines works well as it is structured on thru-life basis, making BAE less dominant. I.e. there is genuine negotiation, not just with the customer, but within the consortium as well.
@Monkey, where did you get the two at a time? Not doubting it, just interested.
Generally speaking, when concurrency between consequtive builds dips under a third any cost efficiencies quickly evaporate. NaB explained the reasons in detail, can’t remember what thread we were on at the time. A detailed study by Rand is available on the QE class (just one case, but a big ticket warrants more analysis… Who is saying that 13 x half a bn isn’t big? With my maths the sum comes out the same).
Same old same. One day MOD will learn about requirement spec but not anytime soon it would appear. If we can buy highly sensitive aircraft from overseas or consortiums there nothing special about ships.
Acc
Bae is supplying f35 rear fuselages for Japan as it is for everyone. MHI is/was looking to be a parts supplier to BAE on the rear fuse. Japan will have a final assembly line like italy.
Mark, good to hear that.
I have an inkling, though, that Japan will (within a decade?) come up with their own version. The hurdles should be less than for Israel who were disappointed with the access granted to software (not surprising if they are, at the same time, bettering the gubbings on Indian Suhois?).
@Martin: “Mr Osborne said: “Asked @DefenceHQ to look at potential to build a new complex warship every 2 years – renewing @royalnavy fleet every 25 years.””…
Interesting statement, based on the fact that he did not want to be drawn on an announcement on how many T26s would be ordered. If 12 is going to be the future fleet number the T26 in its current expected form is not going to fit the AAW need. Every 2 years is a broad statement and a fleet of 14 ships would be 1 ship every 21 months which I think is more likely. My prediction is 8 T26s.
This to me confirms that the 3 new OPVs will be kept in addition to the current fleet. We would need more though if we are going to avoid deep cuts to peacetime commitments.
@ repulse – what’s even more depressing is that this announcement is being held as a good thing. Obviously no one in the press has enough of a clue to pull the Chancellor up on this.
@Repulse
It’s so tragic it could almost be funny that after years of people clamoring for more cheap, low-end patrol vessels the RN could finally get some but that are inadequate for anything other than the simplest OPV role AND almost certainly offered in place of some much needed high-end frigates.
Worst of both worlds it seems.
I think the T26 really needs to be focused on export. Their is serious money to be saved, and made in the frigate space right now. Militaries around the words are looking at acquiring 30 new frigates so there is a lot of potential out there.
If BAE are only building ships for us, then I agree nationilize the ship yard.
Now is the time to make sure the ships are delivered at a low cost, and the government needs to place a big order. Buying all 13 will decrease unit cost, signal confidence in the design, which may encourage other to get on board.
Challenger, after so many years of clamouring for OPVs that we only need in fantastical parallel realities, it’s a case of ‘be careful what you wish for’. Looks like we’re about to get it.
25 years at one ship every two years is 12.5 complex warships for the entire fleet.
Is he suggesting that aircraft carriers and landing ships are not complex? If not, why do they take so long to build and cost so much money?
25 years at one ship every two years is 12.5 complex warships for the entire fleet.
Is he suggesting that aircraft carriers and landing ships are not complex? If not, why do they take so long to build and cost so much money?
@TAS
Absolutely, i really wouldn’t be surprised at this point to see the retention of the new OPV’s strenuously promoted during SDSR 2015 as a boost in ship numbers and capability for the hard worked RN whilst at the same time T26 will see an order for 8 ships with the other 5 ‘still included in planning assumptions’ but which of course will never actually get built.
Instead they’ll be dropped as quietly as possible in a few years after the RN has spent a while making do with 14 high-end warships supplemented by a few OPV’s only good for the lightest of UK based ops and maybe shoehorned into the Caribbean counter narcotics and disaster relief roles for which they are woefully inadequate.
@Simon
I don’t think they really know what they are saying anymore. A typical announcement that doesn’t actually say anything.
I suspect it’s yet again linked to the minimum requirement to keep the Clyde ‘frigate factory’ going. As long as BAE gets it’s cash and the workers keep their jobs then who cares about national defence or what the RN needs to fulfill what’s asked of it.
Funny how the government doesn’t give a toss when other companies who employ thousands of people go belly up. If it’s a major high-street retailer or a company like City Link recently it’s a case of ‘well too bad but that’s what happens when a business isn’t competitive or profitable’. Yet if it’s anything to do with BAE and shipbuilding they can’t throw bundles of cash at them fast enough.
Challenger,
BAE and the banks. They’ve thrown masses of money at the fat-cat bankers to make them even fatter.
I get you though, if it’s a minimum then it’s probably sensible for that minimum to be around 12 frigate type ships.
Challenger,
BAE and the banks. They’ve thrown masses of money at the fat-cat bankers to make them even fatter.
I get you though, if it’s a minimum then it’s probably sensible for that minimum to be around 12 frigate type ships.
@Repulse, Challenger
Another thread and another poster found a report saying that the three new OPV’s will replace the existing Batch 1 River class.
@All
Will the reduction in escort vessels allow them to be fully crewed? Anyone have any idea on the manning capabilities of the RN?
How would nationalising the shipyard save money, at least with a private company they have a chance (if they figure out how to write a decent contract) to offload some of the risk. What they need to do is figure out how to work with BAE and the other companies involved.
I would still love to see 6 of the proposed AAW version of the T26 in RN service. A second variant gives more choice to export customers.
Is taking kit out to make it cheaper for export customers, a devious way of downgrading RN frigates while dodging the blame?
Overseas,
The Fisheries Protection Sqdrn has been a way to protect (and train) RN manpower, another Ministry standing for the ships operating costs.
That they were bought outright so late in their lives (from a serviced lease agreement) points to an intention to sell?
Should we seriously consider a class of vessels such as the French La Fayette and Floreal class to complement a core fleet of the high end escorts and maybe get some export orders from these vessels and build full fat for the Navy only to use in a task group or show of intent.
@ ACC
Thanks, I didn’t realise the FPS running costs was paid outside of the MoD. RN should move a couple of the more cost intensive units to fisheries methinks.
Re the intention to sell, if that is the case it shows a fair degree of (fiscal) foresight from the RN.
@Shark Bait
“Militaries around the words are looking at acquiring 30 new frigates so there is a lot of potential out there. {…} Now is the time to make sure the ships are delivered at a low cost”
Naivety about BAE offering something at a low cost, without competition or pressure, aside…
In 2011, the governments strategy re T26 was to get other nations aboard and make it exportable. #1 rule to achieve exports? Show resolve and trust in the concept! Which directly translates into: placing orders early in 2012.
Did we place an order? Are we even consider building a frigate, or is the term “cruiser” more appropriate? And if the RN really needs a “cruiser”, why is it insisting on a cruiser-only fleet?
IMO, the problem is not falling down to 12-14 high-end cruiser-like vessels. The problem is the failure to develop a complementary low-end-blue/green-water force like the US, Spain, Italy, France and Germany are doing. Some here are arguing, MHPC will deliver this. All indicators are telling: MHPC is ill-conceived (much to the “H”-part) and inherently dead.
In a situation, where BAE has a suitable corvette-design up and running, which could be the “working LCS (TM)” – a basic fighting vessel built to a family, evolving in design and adapting more roles in process – we order 30mm-equipped oversized OPVs.
This is mainly the RNs fault, playing long-trained political football with the treasury. Khareef is too fighty; let’s build some incapable-of-anything boats; then, they won’t cut into T26 numbers.
We don’t have a lack in strategy, so often contemplated here; in fact, we have too many strategies, resolving around “handling the gov” and competing for funds. At least, Mr Osborne just started to execute Mr Hammonds job to make everyone settle for one strategy.
@mcZ
“This is mainly the RNs fault, playing long-trained political football with the treasury. Khareef is too fighty; let’s build some incapable-of-anything boats; then, they won’t cut into T26 numbers”
Or alternatively let us builkd some vessels of a type which we utilise on ops around the UK 300 plus days a year and also in the FIs and at the moment in the west Indies rather than introduce something that requires more man power, brings in new weapon systems which all involve huge amounts more money in terms of support, logistics and training and at the end of the day is woefully unsuitable for current and projected RN ops being neither fish nor fowl.
I wouldn’t read too much into Osborne’s statement. It’s not a million miles away from the drumbeat of the old Maritime Industrial Strategy that lead to BVT ships and then BAE Surface Ships. Nor does it necessarily mean 12.5 surface combatants for the fleet. If you put a 30 yr life on the T45, Daring doesn’t drop off the plot till the back end of the thirties. Short version is it’s an aspirational average throughput – but still doesn’t solve the problems.
The Clyde factory is supposed to be sized around having two ships in build concurrently. What that means is that you’ll have one ship structurally complete in the dock, undergoing further outfit and then test, STW and commissioning, while there is space for the blocks of the second to be erected in the other part of the dock. The sustainability bit is actually all about balancing off trades – you need the majority of the steel trades work done in the first half of the build, with lower numbers of outfit trades. that balance reverses as the ship becomes more complete.
I cannot for the life of me work out why some on here want to see the surface shipbuilding capability nationalised. Have any of you advocating this ever worked in a real nationalised industry? Look at DE&S (as was) for an example. Or even Dstl – that report (and I suspect I know the person who wrote it) is a masterpiece of generality, saying nothing of much import, other than “exporting is harder than we thought”. It’s not that the people are necessarily bad – it’s just that there is no incentive to actually get better. Succession planning would be an absolute nightmare to sort out because there is no incentive for the older guys to move on, so you end up with people who have great specialist knowledge, but no headroom to pass it on, so they become one deep. That’s not to say that BAES is the ideal solution – far from it – but the problem is organisational, rather than (as I suspect people think) profit driven. There’s a corporate outlook in BAES that basically means you walk into some meetings and they’ve brought three commercial staff with them, whereas none might actually be required. The MoD version of that is to walk into a meeting with a whole bunch of people, none of whom are actually empowered to make a decision. BAE force more commercial consideration than may strictly be required into the programme too early, which has MoD sucking it’s thumb and trying to decide who is in charge in order to make a decision – hence delay, which we should all know means cost. See T26 for more….
On standards and requirements. I can only think of a couple of areas where we might be more demanding than some. Specifically signatures and survivability. Those are real capability differentiators, but they cost money and actually you don’t want people (however close you are) knowing just how LO you can be (or not in some cases!). Someone mentioned NATO standards. There are shedloads of them – STANAGs to be precise, as well as Allied Engineering Pubs etc etc. The Naval Ship Code standardises a lot of the safety elements as well and is NATO-driven. Naval Ship Rules are also helping in this regard.
The reason why we don’t get export orders is primarily because the countries that would want to buy the sort of ship we need (long legged, survivable, good accommodation standards etc) all of which drive size upwards, in general either have their own industry to protect (France, Holland, Germany, Italy, US, Japan and possibly Canada and Australia) or are trying to develop their own industry (India, South Korea, Turkey, Canada, possibly Australia). There are off the top of my head about a dozen “western” shipyards capable of building such ships worldwide. BAES, DCN, ThyssenKrupp, Damen, Fincantieri, Navantia, GD BIW, HII, Mitsubishi and DSME, plus BAES Australia, one in Turkey. Then you’re into people like Cochin and GRSE in India, ST Marine in Singapore who are getting there at various rates. These guys will make life ever harder for the European concerns, because they can produce ships more suited to export requirements outside those “western” nations (smaller, lower manning, less likely to be truly deployable worldwide). The few export options for us would tend to require US combat system equipments, which is fine, but means that the T26 design ought to have been designed with them in mind as well as UK systems, which I don’t think it was.
People will immediately suggest a Eurobuild option as the solution to this, but it isn’t going to work like Panavia, Eurofighter, Airbus etc, because the volume isn’t there and actually, most of the development for naval ships is in the weapons systems and C4ISTAR, rather than the hullform and control system design and build. There is not the equivalent for a fifteen year design and development programme for a combat aircraft (or a transport come to that!) that could be offset by production recoveries.
That’s why what is required is a re-examination by the UK shipbuilding industry (and HMG). Industry has to be weaned off looking at MoD as sole source of income, but that means HMG being able to support industry by selectively waiving (or exiting) the EU competition framework for specific strategic industries, making decisions quicker (not easy when media-led “governance” witchhunts are prevalent) and being practical about developmental risk-share. Industry also needs to get sharper. That would allow a limited number of non-military contracts to flesh out the workload (we will never get back into volume commercial shipbuilding), which will also get best practice spread better across the industrial base.
If you want a light frigate to keep RN numbers up, then I think the Lekiu ships the UK built for Malaysia, would be a good starting point. Sure you would swap the Sea Wolf for Sea Ceptor & Exocet for Harpoon. Do straight swaps of other systems kit for RN in service stuff. OK the 57mm would be new to the RN, but the Americans have adopted it, so we would use the same as our biggest ally. It would do the same role as the Leander/T21, & they were sent into battle in 1982.
I don’t understand the hostility to BAE or the notion that they should do things without regard to costs and profits. The directors have a fiduciary responsibility to shareholders, they have to make money. When you have a customer that has problems making decisions and sticking to them then they will seek to manage commercial risk.
Putting the shipbuilding element of shipbuilding into the hands of the public sector might have some nostalgic appeal but if history tells us anything it is manufacturing industry and public ownership to not make happy bedfellows.
If you look at the build part of recent shipbuilding projects it seems to me BAE are pretty good, CVF in particular has been very efficient. The bit that we have problems with is getting to an agreed design. If there is a case for public sector ownership then it is in the design side but even that wouldn’t be a panacea as what would they be designing? Perhaps the answer isn’t actually who owns the capability but that it is used, kept fresh on a variety of projects, experiences new technology and techniques and generally, has a depth of experience and career path into which new people can be cycled through.
None of these would come cheap though
Which comes to Marks point, we seem happy enough to have killed off the UK armoured vehicle sector, we seem happy enough to get into international partnerships for aerospace systems and buy from foreign industry for others.
What makes shipping so different?
There is zero opportunity for export, as NaB says, our requirements aren’t actually that different from our allies.
So why do we need to protect shipping jobs in Scotland?
Just answered my own question there I think
@NaB: The wording Osbourne used was “renewing @royalnavy fleet every 25 years.”. Whilst I do not feel a fleet of 12 is on the cards a cut is definitely being discussed. The danger has always been with the navy going for an “all or nothing” strategy of fewer more complex ships it would end up with a single super warship that cannot leave port. Balance has to be the key, cutting a few FFs for more OPVs makes sense to me in a period of “peacetime” austerity.
NaB points to a lack of decision on the part of the UK Gov representatives who I suspect , attend , listen to response’s from previous questions , note the answers , ask new/revised questions and defer to a ‘higher authority’ in response to pressure to taking the project to the next milestone. I have sat in many such meetings where those who can make the key decisions deliberately do not attend sending powerless subordinates to represent them. In terms of the present discussion BAES can charge for the time they spend on these projects and thus have little incentive to force the issue. At present there is a reasonable overlap between any T23 having to leave service before a fully worked up T26 replaces it but to my mind having a squadron of mothballed T23 with life in them in reserve is a worthy aim but if said boats are thrashed to their limits they will just become a reefs off the coast.
@Jh there are lots of ships in the 99-110 metre range that would do. Personally for a presence patrol at some of our furthest outposts something like a Thetis class – long legged, robust,helo, even sonar. Would not look out of place in the atlantic doing TAPs. If we constantly pursue the high end route it is inevitable fewer hulls will result. We then either cut taskings or recognise we can do it with something lower end.
Does no-one else think that even if BAE came up with some kind of whizz bang does everything super ship that only cost 50mil a pop we still wouldn’t get any more than it takes to keep the Clyde yards ticking over?
Military capability just isn’t the prime driver, frankly I think it’s just about stone dead last nowadays, despite a few valiant efforts to the contrary. It’s no longer about how much we can get within the budget we have and more about how little we can get away having.
My ideal core Navy would be a 30 ship force where we replace one ship a year, 8 AAW Destroyers, 8 ASW frigates, 8 mid level GP frigates, 4 OPV’s (with a hangar), an icebreaker and a survey ship. The hull form and basic design could be reused across types if appropriate.
There is a problem with building 13 identical ships over 20 years, this is that the ship is designed before the building starts and then a small team is needed to carry out change work, but what happens to the rest of the design team, what do they do for 15 years until you start building up for the next project.
If the nature of operation calls for ASW and those other high end capabilities then accepting a lower spec means dead sailors so we need to stop thinking we can do high end combat operations on the cheap. So T26, like T45, needs to be at the top of its game to maintain operational utility in the most demanding scenarios.
All well and good, but the cost of doing so means there are fewer and will be fewer available.
There is no escaping the logical conclusion that if we want to maintain operational utility in the most demanding operations we simply have to do less with less
@EngineerTom: 30 globally deployable warships was the target up to the late 90s. The fact is that this is never going to be the case until the population is forced (by events) to get serious about defence. The best equivalent would be something in the order of 14 DDs/FFs, 12 OPVs (lite surveillance frigates) and the 4 survey craft (including the Ice Breaker).
@TD: Good in principle, but the reality is that there comes a point where a critical mass is reached and technology is no longer the answer. The risk is greater, one ship breaking down or having an accident or in the wrong place could cripple the navy.
I am a firm believer in a high end core, but around it a balanced force that meets the needs of the day. There is a benefit in having a larger number of less capable vessels as they can always be quickly up rated and the crew used as the core of a larger crew in wartime.
As APATS has correctly alluded to the UK doesn’t need a Corvette like the Khareef class it is nothing to do with being too fighty, an OPV is entirely suited to operations in UK home waters.
In the end it goes down to the difference between a modern OPV and Corvette!
Oman needs something that is fighty as in its neck of the woods there are a number of countries that have similar vessels and tensions are hot. What they don’t need is endurance, the crew of their Khareef class will spend more of the time dockside in barracks rather than sailing the high-seas. The crew facilities of the Khareef will not be suitable for long endurance operations.
The UK on the other hand has rather benign home waters with little need for anything particularly fighty, the crew of an OPV will also live mainly dockside and the crew facilities on the vessel are not optimised for long term operations.
Now you could build something like a Corvette with more endurance, better crew facilities and Diesel powered only, the French have been doing just that with vessels like the Lafayette class. But then you will find that you have something that is more of a Frigate and then it begs the question why not spend a bit more on it and get something that has gas turbines and other higher end systems.
@Fed
The facilities on an OPV are fine, in fact quite luxurious by comparison with other vessels, even the JRs being in 2 person en suite cabins. That however is a function of the fact that UK based River sails with 28-32 personnel and Clyde with just over 40.
Add in the extra weapons and sensors for a “Khareef” and you are up at 100 odd and that is just another reason why we do not need or want Corvettes. They are designed to provide fire power locally to their bases and not to support the sort of ops the RN conducts where fire power close to home is not required but the ability to deploy thousands of miles for months at a time is.
@Fedaykin, totally agree for UK waters. in answer to you last question, that’s the whole point, we don’t have a bit more money and GTs and high end kit would blow the budget. I don’t really like the term corvette and I only use Khareef as an existing reference point. I would argue that the French model ( ie light frigate with long legs) would allow us to retain global presence at reduced cost. Granted they are not ships that could go toe to toe with China, but they could cover at least FRE, APT (n and s) and anti piracy. A reduced high end dedicated largely to support CVF, in conjunction even with only our Europen allies would be a highly credible naval force against anyone.
@NaB “Specifically signatures and survivability.”
Quite interesting looking at the lengths you take to reduce signature, even down to cross section of dogging levers. Great level of detail.
As I’ve advocated previously on another thread, I think there was a missed opportunity with Batch 2 Rivers being based on the Amazonas design rather than a stripped down Khareef sans heavy weapons that simply aren’t needed for UK & BOT patrols or other UN directed peacetime constabulary patrols and goodwill missions.
What’s in a moniker? Rather than Adm Z’s dreaded corvette, or heaven forbid light frigate, read heavy OPV. Equipped with a helo hangar and engineering support, so that it can carry one when missions demand (e.g. counter narcotics/piracy), but other than that spec’ed like a River B2 (not Khareef) with in-service RN kit e.g. 2 x DS30M’s, Terma Scanter and EO pods for surveillance and gun control. Maybe ‘fitted for but not with’ Sea Ceptor. Air weapons mag? Fitted but not routinely used. Khareef presumably has one but 80% rule is for Wildcat with a 0.5″ gun or marine sniper for contemplated missions and not routine carriage of Stingray, FASGW(L) & (H).
Manning? Well as systems are as River B2 + helo – so River B2 manning + 11/12 (when helo carried) + a few = 50?, i.e. still pretty lean. That would imply there might be space in a Khareef for every matelot to have a cruise cabin each. Endurance? Well if bunkerage and other essentials can’t easily be increased on Khareef, several previous threads here have discussed forward basing. We have those specks of rock / lilypads at our disposal. Bahrain anyone? Rotation of crews not ships could be applied in this case too.
@PJF
“Maybe ‘fitted for but not with’ Sea Ceptor”
So just bolt on a silo and all the associated gubbins? What about the command system to allow a system like Sea Ceptor to function? Link etc
It si not like a shopping list in a supermarket, every single bit of kit fitted comes with requirements and consequences in terms of other pieces of kit, support, maintenance and personnel.
Addendum to previous post:
A stripped Khareef class as above would also be more cogent from a military industrial strategy point of view by keeping BAES in the customisable / affordable / exportable end of the market and keeping up a drum beat, alternating delivery with the ‘complex warship’ every other year perhaps, assuming they’ve got the talent to figure that one out.
One or two of the class might even be used as test beds for new emerging concepts (think NaB suggested something similar) e.g. Chemring Centurion, Sea Brimstone/SPEAR in order to iron out the wrinkles before they’re deemed mature enough for consideration to be adopted / retrofitted across the larger escorts.
APAS
Understood, emphasis in my comment above re Sea Ceptor is on the ‘maybe’, although River B2 is advertised as being fitted with CMS-1 (not sure whether the Sea Ceptor / Link ‘module’ will be installed on them, but there’s an upgrade path if desired as it’s grandfathered on T45 and to be adopted on T26 presumably), and shared infrastructure operating system.
@ TD and Engineer Tom
My issue with BAE is two fold. Firstly any job they do is cost + profit. That’s fine if you consider they add more value than the profit they take. Since BAE got into shipbuilding they have managed to run every project over budget. Quite frankly they are not very good at what they are doing.
As a Defence contractor they have zero desire to pursue commercial contracts and I don’t think the RN has a big enough fleet to keep a viable industry supplied.
T26 should have been a piece of piss. It was a great idea, build a new hull and transfer the mature systems across from the T23. Now BAE have screwed this up as well.
I am generally in favor of having free markets but there is little benefit in my opinion when there is only a single private company in the market. Especially when that company is a bloated defense business that has sold off all of its commercial activities and can only survive in markets like the US and UK with large government subsidies.
@ James – I agree that a stripped down khareef would have been a better option than an Amazon. With its better speed and a hanger it could have made a serious contribution to a stretched fleet.
‘alternatively let us builkd some vessels of a type which we utilise on ops around the UK 300 plus days’
‘end of the day is woefully unsuitable for current and projected RN ops being neither fish nor fowl.’
Really? the only sole RN operation at the moment is Kipion is it not, do we need a full fat escort for that tasking when we already have MCM vessels in the area? FI is covered by an OPV (where there is a belligerent threat) the Caribbean is covered by an RFA vessel 365 days of the year and when you consider that the last vessel we sent to Libya was a survey ship can the argument that every vessel we have should be high end in the current climate of trying to get more for our money be sustained?
HMS Dragon is also in the vicinity of the FI at the moment. HMS Clyde is the more permanent presence for EEZ patrol.
The Echo’s are very high end, commercial equivalents are eye wateringly expensive and their operators command large fees for their services. They were much needed to map the port areas in Libya to assist with reestablishing commerce, plus they added to our own hydrographic knowledge of the region.
Anything the U.S. military asks from an Ally for in spades is normally high end, which the Hunts and Sandowns clearly are.
None of the vessels described (other than Dragon) is particularly fighty, it behooves protecting these high end but less glamorous assets with fighty vessels in turn, n’es pas?
‘HMS Dragon is also in the vicinity of the FI at the moment’
For how long?
‘it behooves protecting these high end but less glamorous assets with fighty vessels in turn’
What did we send to Libya to protect the Echo class? Do we need a high end vessel for the everyday stuff? would a light frigate be good enough with a capability of escorting STUFT in a time of war, so as to keep our high end vessels for a task force etc?
@Martin
Completely agree with the above sentiments.
The desire to nationalize UK shipbuilding is an act of desperation, a reaction to the clearly ineffective state of affairs that doesn’t have a simple solution.
BAE operates a commercial subsidiary which has zero incentive to innovate or pursue commercial contracts because it has a monopoly on UK warship construction and know’s full well that the national policy is to preserve this residual capability at any cost.
And as you say it’s not even as if they are particularly good at it. The tensions between what they say they can deliver and what we actually end up with are glaringly obvious.
I would say though that it is a two way street. 15+ years of the UK governments of the day lowering the baseline, steadily reducing the size of the Royal Navy and down-scaling shipbuilding doesn’t exactly help.
Also the issue with T26 sounds more complicated than a typical BAE balls-up. A changing of the goal posts in terms of the ratio between weight and capability to try and produce an all singing, all dancing platform that’s under 6,000 tons must be a major source of the current problems.
All in all if the shipbuilding strategy was consistent with sufficient orders then we would still be dealing with a monopolized industry but it might at least work more effectively.
Have to say I agree that much of the blame for the current T26 schermoszzle comes from the failure of MOD to be an effective customer. Both in terms of understanding and fixing the requirement, being prepared to trade capability, scale and cost, and keeping to the timelines and workflow necessary for industrial sustainment. In that situation is it any wonder that the potential export customers have drifted away.
For me it comes back to a failure of any one party to own the design. Its worth noting that up to Type 23 HMG owned the design process, construction was then contracted to the shipyards. Even in Alliance working there has to be a boss and the Naval Design Partnership seems not to have a boss. The old fashioned title is Director of Naval Construction. But it basically means a career expert with job security who understands the subject and can knock heads together in the public interest. This doesn’t require nationalisation. But it does require government to grow up and take charge. And that is essentially a political problem.
@DN
“alternatively let us builkd some vessels of a type which we utilise on ops around the UK 300 plus days’
‘end of the day is woefully unsuitable for current and projected RN ops being neither fish nor fowl.’
Really? the only sole RN operation at the moment is Kipion is it not, do we need a full fat escort for that tasking when we already have MCM vessels in the area? FI is covered by an OPV (where there is a belligerent threat) the Caribbean is covered by an RFA vessel 365 days of the year and when you consider that the last vessel we sent to Libya was a survey ship can the argument that every vessel we have should be high end in the current climate of trying to get more for our money be sustained”
The FF/DD presence in the Gulf AOR fulfils quite a few functions and contingencies. Part of it is to act as the “MCM cover unit”. They also self deploy. There is an FF/DD “tasked” to the FI, its precise vicinity being intel driven but to suggest that the FI is only covered by an OPV is abject nonsense. The Caribbean is not and never has been covered 365 days a year by the RFA.
Echo visited Libya post conflict on her way home as a port visit and to do some survey work. that is what she does.
The kind of work the Echo’s do, often under the protection of the host nation:
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2013/10/ship-shore-logistics-14-expeditionary-port-access-concept-1-survey-munitions-clearance/
How long until Dragon is rotated out of the South Atlantic? No idea, nor which FF/DD will rotate in her place. It’s determinable from public information if you want to look at specifics.
The Bahrain extensions will mean more RN protection for the MCM and other vessels in the area, without relying on “someone else” covering them.
A couple of simple comments:
– “build a new complex warship every 2 years”: I think this is enough for a single yard. We in Japan are building one submarine annually, using the two boat builders, Kawasaki and Mitsubishi. Thus, each yard builds one submarine every 2 years. This worked well for more than 30 years. France did the same for Georges Leygues-class frigate, as well. I think making it a ship per 2.5 years would also work. It will be also much better than having long gap before Daring replacement takes place.
– British frigate for export: looking from Japan, T23 was a very nice frigate. I suppose it had the highest possibility for export among the frigates UK has built after Leanders. But still, it was too expensive to gain export sells (e.g. ANZAC…). I’m afraid the reason is simple: i.e. “Pound is too expensive,” caused by your very strong financial sector. Maybe your ship building sector is doing their best, but the currency causes the big difficulty. Anyway, I think the best case in T26 is to export only the design, while the ships are built locally, i.e. not in UK. Maybe Canada or Brazil?
– I think recently reported “growth” of T26 up to ~8000t FL design not only makes export less likely, but also the hull number to be reduced down to 8. This is nearly going back to the original design using the same hull of T45s. I thought the smaller (~6000t FL) frigate design once discussed would have been much better. In that case, there was a possibility to build as high as 12 vessels (but maybe not 13).
@APATS
‘The Caribbean is not and never has been covered 365 days a year by the RFA.’
RFA Wave Knight home from Caribbean
http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/news/2014/april/25/140425-rfa-wave-knight-home
Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) Wave Knight returned to Portland, Dorset, yesterday following a 15-month deployment to the Caribbean.
I should have said HMS Enterprise in relation to Libya.
More than 100 Britons evacuated from Libyan slaughter arrive in Malta aboard HMS Enterprise
Read more: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2714573/Royal-Navy-ship-preparing-evacuate-British-citizens-Libya-fighting-control-Tripoli-s-airport-kills-22.html#ixzz3QVbmDmQ0
The persistant presence is covered by HMS Clyde is it not? whether or not a FF/DD flits in and out of the waters is imaterial. If we had some light frigates we would not need either HMS Clyde or the visits by an FF/DD as that vessel would suffice, same goes for use as an MCM cover unit.
If we had had 12 Type 45 built fully fitted with multi role kit as originally planned then we would now be looking at a much lighter more exportable ASW frigate design.
But we didn’t which is why Type 26 is much more of a multi role Destroyer itself. Actions have consequences.
Clyde covers the EEZ, the FF/DD handles the patrol.
Presence of an RFA for a period of time does not equate to a patrol cover. The question is “Who’s covering?”.
@DN
You neglected to mention the 7 months the T23 was also on station. We used to have a Frigate and a tanker. On this occasion we were able to keep the tanker.
Enterprise was the closest available ship but she had plenty of cover.
‘Clyde covers the EEZ, the FF/DD handles the patrol.’
A light frigate could handle both.
‘Presence of an RFA for a period of time does not equate to a patrol cover’
I’m not advocating using an RFA for patrol cover, I’m suggesting building some light frigates in the same way the French have for the purposes of deployment’s such as the Caribbean, Falklands and Op Kipion.
@APATS
‘You neglected to mention the 7 months the T23 was also on station.’
I didn’t it’s irrelevant to my point about the RFA, It does however highlight the point about using high end vessels for policing duties, who are we deterring militarily by sending a frigate to those waters? If we built some light frigates (which may get some export orders) they would still have uses and would allow us to have a fleet of top end surface combatants for when they are required.
I think you’re associating the South Atlantic work with the day to day work around the Falkland Islands.
Clyde covers FI EEZ.
The patrol covers the South Atlantic.
If the patrol is north of St. Helena, they can’t SAR fishing vessels off Stanley, but they can still interdict military vessels in a short space of time.
Frigate/Destroyer for Patrol and OPV for FI EEZ with associated support vessels are the high-low mix currently suited for the region.
The fact that we had a T23 on station for 7 months is irrelevant? The high low mix of FF/DD and OPV is best suited to maintaing capability whilst covering tasking.
‘Frigate/Destroyer for Patrol and OPV for FI EEZ with associated support vessels are the high-low mix currently suited for the region.’
It does not mean however that the high-low mix requires a high end combatant in the high end of the mix, a light frigate would suffice.
‘The fact that we had a T23 on station for 7 months is irrelevant?’
Yes, as I explained earlier it is irrelevant to the point about the RFA.
‘The high low mix of FF/DD and OPV is best suited to maintaing capability whilst covering tasking.’
Apart from home waters where exactly do we send our OPV’s? There is nothing to say that the high part of the mix needs to be a full fat surface combatant in the roles stated. Who are we deterring militarily that it requires the presence of an FF/DD in the area of the Caribbean? you can still maintain capability with a fleet of light frigates to compliment the shrinking full fat escorts.
@DN
You claimed the Caribbean was covered 365/24/7 by the RFA and neglected to mention the presence of a T23 frigate for 7 whole months.
“It does not mean however that the high-low mix requires a high end combatant in the high end of the mix, a light frigate would suffice.”
Actually the powers that be disagree with this opinion of yours.
The Caribbean is currently being “covered” by an OPV with the prospect of its relief also being an OPV. The simple fact is that we are moving towards a high low mix of FF/DD and OPV. The OPVs are cheaper to operate and man than a “light frigate”, introduce minimal new systems and support apparatus and conduct the tasks that you would use a more expensive light frigate for which would cut high end escort numbers even further and not be used for tasks like Kipion and the FI are neither high nor low end but somewhere in the middle offering less capability than a 45/23/26 but costing lots more than an OPV.
Basically, they do not fit our operational profile.
From what APATS has said over the years, four ships will keep one deployed and one in UK waters, which can be ready to sail with the RFTG.
To me, this means we need 8 AAW and 8 ASW escorts so that we can sail the RFTG quickly with two of each and supplement/rotate them with the on-task and in-transit ships as soon as is realistically required and possible.
The fact that we only have 6 AAW escorts leads me to believe there is something else that can be sneakily done to make sure we can sail the RFTG and still maintain our tasking.
So we therefore need somewhere between 6 and 8 AAW and ASW ships.
What we might want is probably substantially more, but not actually required. Any tasking requirements that mean more than 16 escorts, should really mean building a ship dedicated to those requirements. So if policing the sea lanes from pirates in skiffs can be done with something else then great, as long as we actually need it and can’t use an existing escort (or RFA for that matter) for the job.
I’d very much like to examine our tasking and the physical requirements at the other end. For example, I can’t imagine we actually need a deployed ASW capability at the moment? Yes, we need a couple to be able to sail with the RFTG, but deployed and active?
From what APATS has said over the years, four ships will keep one deployed and one in UK waters, which can be ready to sail with the RFTG.
To me, this means we need 8 AAW and 8 ASW escorts so that we can sail the RFTG quickly with two of each and supplement/rotate them with the on-task and in-transit ships as soon as is realistically required and possible.
The fact that we only have 6 AAW escorts leads me to believe there is something else that can be sneakily done to make sure we can sail the RFTG and still maintain our tasking.
So we therefore need somewhere between 6 and 8 AAW and ASW ships.
What we might want is probably substantially more, but not actually required. Any tasking requirements that mean more than 16 escorts, should really mean building a ship dedicated to those requirements. So if policing the sea lanes from pirates in skiffs can be done with something else then great, as long as we actually need it and can’t use an existing escort (or RFA for that matter) for the job.
I’d very much like to examine our tasking and the physical requirements at the other end. For example, I can’t imagine we actually need a deployed ASW capability at the moment? Yes, we need a couple to be able to sail with the RFTG, but deployed and active?
Need them deployed and active to keep up the skills. e.g. Experience of filtering the biologic in a variety of environments for when you’ll need to do so in action.
It interesting reading the arguments over a British presence in the Caribbean.
It has always struck me that actually a frigate/destroyer, or an OPV, or a tanker/stores ship, or some combination of the above are all either unsuited to the task or much needed elsewhere.
I see it as a special case among the Royal Navies many standing commitments in that it’s wholly a constabulary/counter narcotics and humanitarian role.
The best solution would be a converted merchant ship (ala Argus or Diligence) RFA manned and specifically tasked to the role with facilities for a couple of helicopters and a boarding team, some fast boats and full to the brim with humanitarian aid.
A couple of OPV’s for the Falklands and actually the rest of the fleet could and should be focused on the twin pillars of a carrier/amphibious group and a presence in the Gulf. The Mediterranean should be an important area of focus but rather than the permanent presence of a frigate or patrol vessel which would have minimal impact a sizable RFTG exercising around the Med for a few months every year could keep us sufficiently engaged.
ToC,
Point taken, but again, they don’t need to be deployed to practice ASW – there’s plenty of subs lurking around the north of these pretty islands!
I’m completely happy if we just happen to provide ASW (or even just 2087) capability to wider NATO activities. That makes sense and gives a genuine reason why we need a deployed ASW capability.
Perhaps APATS can comment on how and what our T45s are actually used for… just general warships, or do they deploy to provide area AAW to a task force somewhere?
ToC,
Point taken, but again, they don’t need to be deployed to practice ASW – there’s plenty of subs lurking around the north of these pretty islands!
I’m completely happy if we just happen to provide ASW (or even just 2087) capability to wider NATO activities. That makes sense and gives a genuine reason why we need a deployed ASW capability.
Perhaps APATS can comment on how and what our T45s are actually used for… just general warships, or do they deploy to provide area AAW to a task force somewhere?
‘Need them deployed and active to keep up the skills. e.g.’
That’s what exercises are for.
‘neglected to mention the presence of a T23 frigate for 7 whole months.’
While the RFA was there for a whole 15 months?
‘Actually the powers that be disagree with this opinion of yours.’
The same powers that be who have managed the budget so well for decades and piss poorly managed our last two major ops, and who are now being forced to deploy OPV’s further afield because they have not managed to build the last two class of surface vessels on time and on budget and are failing to build the current T26 on time and budget which has in turn forced us to purchase 3 vessels that the navy did not want and will probably eat into the final T26 numbers. Are these the powers that be to whom you are referring?
‘neither high nor low end but somewhere in the middle offering less capability than a 45/23/26’
Is that not the point in having them and the reason the French use them? Not as expensive to purchase and run as a 45/23/26 but offering more of a presence and deterrent by way of better armament than an OPV.
How much have you ever forgotten?
Reading music, knitting, Latin, dead reckoning, Futhark, 3.14159 times table (very useful in a former life), countless stories (just realised I’ve read The Giver after watching the film), to name some I know I’ve lost ability in.
How many teams playing reserve matches only (“Exercises”) do well in the Champions League? None.
ASW and similar skills are not like riding a bike, if you want to be up to speed when you need them you must constantly practice them.
As for environment, the Norwegian Sea and neighbouring ponds my be teeming with Submarines, but if you chase a sub in those environments you only know that you know (q.v. Rumsfeld / Dunning-Kruger) how to (maybe) chase a sub for certain in that environment only.
What does it take to pick up on an Iranian midget sub near Bahrain? Does the freshwater pouring out of the Nile have an impact on your sets? Ever know how a MAD boom represents an oddity in the magnetic field in the Southern Hemisphere?
Easiest way to get to the top and stay at the top is to train, exercise, and practice out in the actual wild every day you’re out there.
So send your ASW frigates out on boring counter-narcotics / humanitarian missions / whatever and listen closely to the water while you’re out there…
@McZ, I totally agree with your statement on the khareef class and our OPV’s. Its madness!
However I quite like the MHCP, more specifically the back swan concept, they are small enough to be built at any of the yards in the uk which hopefully means they won’t be BAE built, and will stand more of a chance of being delivered well. The design seems reasonable to be, not a war fighter , but a large hanger and deck to launch unmand vehicle, to provide a variety of capability, including war fighting .
@APATS
According to MoD marketing, River B3 is intended to do anti-piracy and counter-terrorism. So, good bye, home waters, hello Manama and Djibouti! For those tasks, they will need a 70+ complement like their Brazilian brethren. And then, they would still lack any viable means to provide sustainable effects over the horizon.
I agree, we need a low end. But not too low. If BAE can convert the 4,000 nm Amazonas into a 5,500 nn River B3, then they can also take Khareef and convert them into a leaner manned (by omitting Exocet) and longer legged OPV. Then we’d have a real Holland-class/BAM/Floreal equivalent.
The RN is already spread thin with currently 19 escorts, and we are wearing down the remaining vessels very fast. To make do, we are employing hydrography and auxiliary vessels for major patrol tasks and alerts.
Optimistically, 13 T26 (aka “complex warships”), one every two years, clear and plain means: first delivered in 2020, last in 2046. All T23s will be gone by 2036 (if you want to believe this, I’m not), replaced by 8 or 9 new builds; T45 will be then gone by 2045, with a final surface force of 13.
The whole plan seems to be setting on longer service life, which from an engineering standpoint is orthogonal to low numbers and the inherent higher wear. IMO, this will break our neck.
Separate the payloads from the platforms. Go for an IPhone frigate common platform with a modular set of weapons and sensors with common interfaces. Then you outfit it for national requirements and allow the foreign purchaser to choose from an a la carte menu of releasable systems. Can’t be done? Check out the Danish Absalon and Iver Huitfeldt designs and STANFLEX systems – that’s only scratching the surface. Make a common platform and let the app designers innovate.
@ Gordan Evans Van Hook
The T26 is suppose to be able to do just that. However the cost of the platform is in the signature reduction and propulsion technology.
I have allot of respect for what the Danes have done with the Iver Huitfeldt design but I doubt I would want to try and hunt a Russia submarine in them.
Has anything come about from the Aussies studying the viability of the CEAFAR/CEAMOUNT mast & American kit being able to be fitted to the T26?
Sounds like the AWD hull option is the front runner for the RAN at the moment.
Bhodie, I think we will hear in March as the review of driving up productivity in the construction of that AWD (hull) class, going forward, is due to complete. Minister’s answers from a transcript of last June:
“And there’s been suggestions Minister that if we – and the impression I get here is what’s planned – consider building the Frigates on an Air Warfare Destroyer hull that those hulls would be too noisy for anti-submarine work, is that a fact?
MINISTER
That is exactly what the $78.2 million is set to find out.
The hull was originally designed by Navantia to be an anti-submarine warfare hull, so I’m reasonably confident that with the right construction, the right noise-suppression systems, it will be a very suitable hull for us.
But the essence of the Future Frigate program is the CEAFAR Active Phased Array Radar used in conjunction with the Evolved Sea Sparrow and the Saab 9LV Combat Management System, now that is all Australian product and I must say I am extremely proud of the manufacturers of those products.
We have seen a way forward for us to – for the first time – have an almost totally indigenous Command and Control structure that is world-class on frigates.”
Basically he is saying that it is the overall Australian content that matters (that combat mgt system was moved to Oz by Saab in 1990 – a clever move). If the F105 productivity can’t be assessed to be on the mend, I see a restricted competition coming up:
– ASC bidding F105
– BAE bidding T26
– Australian (Saab 9LV) systems as a given for both… ” you guys are the businessmen, we are the customer. Here’s the money and the must-have requirement. Sort it”
– a better line to take than micro-managing, which is a bad half-way house between competition and national(ised) industry. Too close to the latter, on that continuum, actually.
‘How much have you ever forgotten?’
That’s what exercises are for.
And what do you do between exercises? Or are you advocating a cycle of forgetting skills?
There are two simple reasons for Amazonas over Khareef, a) Cost, we could barely afford to buy one Khareef, and b) RN living standards, the JR’s on a Khareef live in 25 man dorms.
Is the problem with the MOD the lack of consistency, if they had a lead procurement team where the staff (including the technical staff i.e. RN personnel) stayed in post more than two years, then they could form working relationships and also might lead to fewer changes during the lifecycle of a project.
‘And what do you do between exercises?’
The same as you do between deployments.
The ‘technical staff’ for ship procurement should not be RN personnel. They should be naval architects. Driving a ship does not qualify you to build a ship or buy a ship.
@DN
Nothing prepares you for more than asking your team to perform a task for real, day-to-day, in a shifting environment.
If you believe you can achieve a best-in-breed level of ability through exercises, simulations and training courses alone, you crack on.
@TOC
‘If you believe you can achieve a best-in-breed level of ability through exercises, simulations and training courses alone, you crack on.’
Even listening to marine biology while searching for drug running speed boats will not get you that, nothing comes close to doing things for real in war time conditions. Exercises are just as good at preparing people as any other method and can be tailored to the task and be just as intense (especially if going against an opfor) and arduous.
Do you truly believe that or are you just playing devil’s advocate for the sake of good conversation?
@ PE
Technical staff was probably the wrong phrase, but the RN does have and needs to retain an influence over the ships being built, as they have the knowledge about how they will use the ship. The issue is when the RN personnel change the new guy will often have a different way of doing things and will influence change mid project.
ET, PE – its a long-standing problem, mostly caused by the pace of procurement. FRES has been the worst example, having been started (under different study names) in the late 80s and not yet delivered, but most programmes run for 6 or more years between the start gun and delivery – in that time not only do the personnel change, but so does the threat, the likely theatres and the technology available on the market. It was a bitter quip when Typhoon made ISD that it was the best Cold War fighter we had ever had (the Cold War having finished some years before). The real issue in my opinion is the slow march of procurement. If projects were brought into service, say, three years after the requirement was set, then there would be a much greater likelihood that:
1) The project kept the original requirements unchanged;
2) The MOD staff (civilian & military) would remain through the procurement;
3) The project would still be relevant & useful against the current threats;
4) The project would be considerably cheaper, being designed just the once.
Buying fast & cheaper would open the possibility of choosing whether to upgrade or replace or simply buy more of the same as time moved forward.
But it would never happen. So we just have to put up with the consequences.
@ArmChairCivvy
Thanks for that. I wasn’t aware the 9LV system was effectively Australian now, although it seemed clear the radar & weapon systems were going to be a “non-negotiable” for them.
Regarding CEAFAR, although nothing is ever released about it’s exact capabilities, I had heard (and take this with a big grain of salt) that it was about 85% of the capability of AN/SPY-1 with significant weight & power requirement reductions. Officially, the RAN has only ever said that it had “proven itself beyond expectations”. Whatever it can do, they seem pretty happy with it, backed up by it being a requirement for their future frigate.
@ Chris
‘Buying fast & cheaper would open the possibility of choosing whether to upgrade or replace or simply buy more of the same as time moved forward.
But it would never happen. So we just have to put up with the consequences.’
But would even want to? Looking at it from an aircraft angle, what sort of aircraft could we set the requirement, test, build and accept into service in 3 years? I honestly can’t think you would get a great deal, some sort of basic trainer?
@TOC
Why is it an inferior method? we have managed to launch operations on a nearly constant basis for the last two decades using just that method of training. How is using a sonar in peace time conditions in the Caribbean a better method of training over hunting a real sub on exercise?
Topman – OK so airframes take longer (as no doubt do ship hulls) but the laws of physics are fairly stable? In much the same way there is a discussion point above on whether T45 basic hull would do for T26 or whether a generic quiet hull could be designed early on for different ship/role types, I could see a case for designing the flighty bit of fast jets and testing them to make them available for roles downstream – much the same presumably as MRCA and EFA were generic before being made into separate aircraft for the buying nations?
Anyway its never going to happen so its entirely academic.
No argument from me for the need for 5 year rather than 2 year positings for the forces representatives to procurement projects.
Over and above them there is also a need for a very small number of subject experts, not necessarily service personnel, on 10 year or longer contracts, such as the mooted re-introduction of a ‘Director of Naval Construction’ for ships, and perhaps counterparts for each of Rotary, Fixed Wing and Ground Vehicles. This would give the necessary strategic overview of multiple different projects, their organisation, aligninment of out of service dates, and when to generalise and when to niche-buy particular capabilities.
@DN
What we do is simulate, train, exercise and put into practice the work daily, globally. That’s why we have a good reputation.
You’re suggesting we can stop at the simulation, training and exercising part and be just as effective.
It only gets you so far. If you want to be the best (When it comes to ASW in particular we do, right? Or did I miss a suggestion?) then you have to employ what you’ve learned for real: Get your metaphorical ears in the water and start listening. Why can’t you “see” the ROV that a salvager is known to be employing nearby? Are you able to track that biologic as they cruise away at 15kts? Can you filter out that vibration you only seem to hear at 5 degrees and a given salinity PSU? Have you been aware of that odd return your equipment is reading in this neck of the woods before, or is it something… new?
This is what @NAB and @APATS have been getting at with regards to us deploying our “high end” kit on “low end” tasks.
The crews are employing their training, developing beyond exercises, engaging in Sea Control wherever they are rather than acting as a Fleet in Being back in Port while the OPV’s motor along with a (comparatively) limited sphere of awareness.
From me neither
“No argument from me for the need for 5 year rather than 2 year positings for the forces representatives to procurement projects.”
In fact, it is another ” small” thing buried in the 10-year equipment plan text: end of mandatory 2 yr rotation, and being (becoming!) an expert for/over 5 yrs not held against you in promotions.
‘engaging in Sea Control wherever they are rather than acting as a Fleet in Being back in Port’
Why are you assuming they would be back in port? you could do two 3 month exercises with a small gap in between and get just as much benefit as you would a 7 month deployment. Everything you have listed can be done on exercise and against a real opfor and if you don’t improve with every exercise.
‘while the OPV’s motor along with a (comparatively) limited sphere of awareness.’
I did not advocate the use of OPV’s I said light frigates such as the French use.
‘No argument from me for the need for 5 year rather than 2 year positings for the forces representatives to procurement projects’
In the NEM is a plan for different streams of officer, those that rotate quickly now and those that will give stability to postings that need them to remain in post. Although I think the plan is that they sacrifice a route to the higher ranks in exchange for a more stable career. Don’t think it’s nailed on yet I suppose we’ll find out later in the year.
@ TD
Any plans for a post on NEM when it rolls out?
@DN
There’s the difference in opinion: Obtaining the same benefit from a 3 month exercise verses adding on a 7 month deployment (or similar).
The RN’s current method of Exercise plus Deployment of the same high-end equipment used the in simulation/training/exercise (T45, T23 ASW, T26 ASW in future, etc) earns more benefit by a league.
Apologies for the OPV/Frigate switch, not deliberate. A fleet of predominantly GP frigates with a handful of ASW variants skilling-up only via exercises still loses that valuable opportunity to apply your trade in the wild.
I value that practical edge highly.
How much are we talking to achieve this? Price of T26 hasn’t been fixed yet, ball-park would likely be the difference in equipment and workstations (capital expenditure amortised over life) over a GP version of the same platform. Shame the equipment is not more easily lifted from the ASW equipped vessels and dropped/plugged into the awaiting GP vessels when rotating.
Maybe @Simon can run a spreadsheet to see how many sets we’d need to rotate them across taskings in a feasible manner?
@Martin
“I have allot of respect for what the Danes have done with the Iver Huitfeldt design but I doubt I would want to try and hunt a Russia submarine in them.”
Actually the Huitfelds design (and to a somewhat lesser extent the Absalons) incorporates significant signature reduction/management, both acoustic, thermal and rcs etc… and were you to fit them with a modern high end TAS/VDS (for which they are prepared) , they could easily be a competent part of a anti-submarine screen for instance .
Though with their twin CP propellers ,mechanical gearbox and diesel propulsion machinery, they will never be first rate ASW vessels. But then they really are more the analog of T45 and not the T26.
@ACC
“But the essence of the Future Frigate program is the CEAFAR Active Phased Array Radar used in conjunction with the Evolved Sea Sparrow and the Saab 9LV Combat Management System, now that is all Australian product ”
I think the Americans and Swedes might take issue with that statement ;-)
@TOC
‘Obtaining the same benefit from a 3 month exercise verses adding on a 7 month deployment (or similar)’
The difference between the exercise and the 7 month deployment is focus. With the exercise you would concentrate on your core warfare skills at a higher tempo but for a shorter period. I know when the RN deploy they do some training with other nations etc but what is the intensity? out of 7 months how many months are at a war footing so to speak? anti piracy etc is fine but are the navy actually learning to fight the ship against a peer this way?
‘skilling-up only via exercises still loses that valuable opportunity to apply your trade in the wild.’
This would still be possible as the crews could rotate from the light frigates which would be doing a majority of the deployments in the same way as the FF/DD’s do now. I was envisioning two task groups one built around a carrier and the other around the amphibs.
Would it be possible to assign 2 T45’s to each one then have 2 in maintenance/deployed/surge.
How many T26 would we need to cover the 2 groups, 6 again? the standing tasks would be carried out by the light frigates so we would need 6 again (assuming the 3 new rivers do not permanently inherit Atlantic Patrol Tasking North)? It would be a benefit if the systems were modular.
@Bhodie
“Thanks for that. I wasn’t aware the 9LV system was effectively Australian now,”
Well strictly speaking it isn’t
http://www.saabgroup.com/en/Naval/Precision-Engagement/Weapon_Control_Systems/9LV_CMS_Combat_Management_System/
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/9LV
Though the version of it you use in OZ is developed by Saab Australia, as is the consoles, it’s still an evolution of the earlier Swedish 9LV systems and you can still get a purely Swedish version of the CMS today.
@MKP, re
“I think the Americans and Swedes might take issue with that statement ;-)”
I think the transcript missed one word (“it”) and the Minister was referring only to the last of the three, the 9LV.
How do the RAF fighter johnies keep up their air to air skills?
Exercises and simulators I guess
How do the RTR keep up their armoured warfare skills?
Exercises and simulators I guess
How do the RN keep up their ASW skills?
Exercises, simulators and trips to the Bahamas
Only teasing, I guess :)
When you have a minister speaking about procurement, what matters to him/ gvmnt/ party campaign is Australian content (Balance of Payments aspects of the policy).
He is basically saying to the domestic shipbuilders that if you are incompetent (productivity wise), don’t count on getting the order as we can have someone else build the hulls and stuff them full of Australian goodness (the more expensive bits). From the same transcript:
“The international benchmark is 60 man-hours per tonne, we set the benchmark for that program at 80 man-hours per tonne, currently it is running at 150 man-hours per tonne, now if that’s a fake emergency – well I just think that is the most ridiculous statement I’ve ever heard.
Getting back on track is essential to the future of naval shipbuilding, we want to get the program back up because it is potentially a very, very strong program.
Never forget that when we went into East Timor we had to have the assistance of firstly a British and then a United States air warfare destroyer.
This is a vital program.”
@TD/@DN
E-3D, RC-135, Sentinel R1?
Exercises and simulators and… deployments?
We don’t train our Sentry crew in exercises and simulators then send them up in a Voyager most of the time. Do we? ;)
Next time you have surgery ask the Consultant how many times they’ve completed the procedure in simulations, how many times they’ve assisted an experienced surgeon, and how many times they’ve completed the procedure themselves.
Inspiring… ;)
“Vasquez: How many combat drops?
Gorman: Uh, two. Including this one.”
They got on like a house on fire in the end
@TOC
Why are you assuming an exercise would not be as close to the real thing as you can get, and a deployment would give you a better level of training at a specific task? how many times do we hunt subs on Kipion? ;-) How many times has a crew fired a live sea wolf or harpoon on deployment?
For the distant future why don’t we get on board with the US on their replacement for the Arleigh Burke’s. They are multirole and not much bigger than a T45 , in the same way we got a work share on the F35 we could participate in that programme too. By the time the T45 needs replacing the USN will have had them in the water for years and have ironed all the bugs out of the hull and systems. Then as the T26’s need replacing we could continue with the same production run and have a fleet of vessels with a lot of commonality with our biggest ally.
Does anyone know the difference between the AWD and LPH projects at the moment in terms of how the two shipbuilders are viewed, I know they are in very different places right now, but I was under the impression LPH had got past it’s issues and was doing well, whereas AWD still had big issues. The point being are they going to build the new frigates in Australia and if so which yard would they go with?
I suspect you’ll find that your RAF fighter johnnies keep up their air-to-air skills with a significant number of 1v1 , 2v1 and similar sorties as part of their regular training regime from Coningsby and Lossie, possibly with 100Sqn as OPFOR – I don’t know – I’m sure Topman or similar will confirm / correct. Just like if you look at 736NAS flypro there are usually some AI or BFM sorties programmed in the week, usually with Freddie participation as well. “Exercises” as you refer to them might be more focussed with the aim of sharing force best practice (like the NATO TFM, Red Flag etc).
Not sure whether RTR do regular range work (as opposed to going to BATUS for an “Exercise” or doing a battle group ex on SPTA), but pretty sure that your basic infantry soldier does a fair amount of live fire practice on the ranges, which you don’t count as an exercise.
You can do some limited ASW currency with simulation tapes, but there’s only a certain amount you can do. ASW is known to be one of the more perishable skills and has been flagged as a major concern for the last decade or more. It’s also definitely a team sport and requires a lot of time to get right. There’s one other thing people tend to forget – live contact time with real OPFOR is generally limited outside actual operations for most forces. You rarely have land forces manoeuvring / targetting each other in peacetime because its f8cking dangerous doing that in proximity. Likewise in the air and on the sea surface and there are protocols in place to avoid unpleasntness. Doesn’t work like that underwater – not least because one side is nominally “undeclared”. You’re also getting real time intel on signatures which is always worthwhile.
Still, don’t let that get in the way of another “WIGS is just a jolly” thread. There doesn’t seem to be any recognition it involves a two-way transit of the Atlantic, playtime with the USN (see ASW teamwork) or visiting AUTEC, time in SouthLant or dodging tropical storms. It’s all obviously a big con by the RN to somehow avoid having light frigates, thereby getting more EPP money and screwing the pongoes – I guess………
On AWD vs LHD I think the issue might be that they’re building AWD in Australia in blocks, whereas the LHD was constructed in Spain (the island being the only Aussie built block). As I’m sure you’re aware, it’s more difficult to get a complex curved shape with all sorts of WT requirements wrong than it is an oblong block sitting on the ships upper deck. Plus ASC don’t exactly have a long track record in surface ship construction.
Indeed! Not much closer to the real thing… than the real thing.
No assumption needed.
Not sure the RN could live with ships designed around USN manning levels. They take a lot more people to sea than we do. The operating cost of a common design with them would therefore probably be prohibitive for us.
A joint design with our EU allies would make more sense militarily. But we tried that in the 1980s and 90s and it was a political fiasco leading directly to a lot of today’s problems. [Cost growth of T45 leading to numbers being cut and the multi-role equipment being omitted, leading to the current difficulty in defining T26’s role as anything less than a task group Destroyer] So don’t expect us to try that particular plan again really soon.
Of course it could happen simply by attrition. If HMG drops the ball like it usually does and countries like Spain and Italy continue to hit the buffers economically then the French and Germans could end up as Europes’s only military shipbuilders almost by default. Given a hard choice between buying our next surface combatant from either an American or a Franco/German design I would actually expect us to go with the Franco/German one.
@NAB
‘You rarely have land forces manoeuvring / targetting each other in peacetime because its f8cking dangerous doing that in proximity’
Happens on a regular basis in both the UK and Canada.
‘playtime with the USN (see ASW teamwork) or visiting AUTEC,’
How much playtime on a typical deployment, 2 months? less/more?
‘It’s all obviously a big con by the RN to somehow avoid having light frigates, thereby getting more EPP money and screwing the pongoes – I guess………’
1. I never said it was a jolly.
2. Never said it was a big conspiracy by the RN to screw over the Army.
How many T26 are the navy going to get? your part of the programme you should have an idea, is it going to be the 12 they want or less? and if it is going to be less what are the navy going to do about having less escorts, stamp their feet and demand more money (fat chance of that happening) or find other ways of fulfilling their standing deployments without hemorrhaging personnel due to constant times away?
The last part of the question is never even remotely considered or answered by the usual navy commentators, why is that?
Re:
“The point being are they going to build the new frigates in Australia and if so which yard would they go with?”
Not that simple. The submarines might be beyond the domestic skills base,however puffed up by contracts now delivered or almost delivered. For the subs to come from abroad (no hurry,as they can’t even man the current ones), the frigates will have to come from domestic yards. But will we see the great, forced consolidation game played out again: who will be the integrator, keeping the existing yards working and the gvmnt off the hook for another plunder?
“What’s that, sir? Hang on. I wasn’t in post for last year’s multi-threat exercise but I’ve got some notes somewhere covering the immediate action drill for situations like this…
Oh shit!”
Q. Why can’t the RN be satisfied with the same ships, systems and level of operational training as everyone else?
A. Because RN ships and submarines are deployed worldwide for months on end and can’t reasonably be expected to prevail over any potential adversary without having superior tactics, equipment and skilled personnel, maintained at their peak performance on a daily basis. 80% won’t cut it against an 80% enemy, much less a 90% enemy, unless prepared to accept inordinate casualties. Even numerical superiority won’t help if the enemy has better C4I, longer-reaching sensors and weapons or, in certain cases, chooses to indulge in asymmetric warfare, particularly the self-sacrificing variety. Whatever a ship’s primary task, every training opportunity is exploited. Units must be ready for the unexpected and be capable of dealing with whatever, wherever and whenever it appears, particularly if the cavalry is too far away to be of any immediate help. Sadly, it hasn’t always worked out that way.
@TD
ASW training in the Bahamas? Now you’re talking. Been there. Done that. ;-)
‘Indeed! Not much closer to the real thing… than the real thing.’
If you do not fire a live weapon at the target it’s a simulation and still not the real thing regardless. You are just rehearsing your TTP’s or in other words an exercise.
To improve retention and recruitment why aren’t their more ‘jollies’ I pretty sure most of our BOT’s , lets exclude the South Atlantic ;-) , are in sunny places surrounded by warm seas so why not make a deployment include a week, two week good will visit with plenty of time for R&R? If in the middle of a deployment to the nicer parts of the globe such a stopover would keep moral up.
DN – The “jolly” comment wasn’t aimed at your grid ref….
As for land forces in the UK or at BATUS – I’m very surprised we’ve got ISIS, Terry T, Ivan etc rotating through those facilities to provide a real (as opposed to exercise) OPFOR. Does Theresa May know?
The point I was making was that at sea you meet the real OPFOR and his kit – outside of any exercises – without much in way of restrictions. You don’t do that on SPTA or BATUS, you meet the exercise OPFOR. There is a difference – not knocking that kind of training at all, but you simply don’t get to play against the other side in the same way as you do at sea. Same applies in the air – you don’t do BFM vs foreign aircraft you may meet, you follow the agreed protocols.
As for time away on deployments, it’s for exactly that reason that specific deployments (APT and KIPION) are being extended to 9 months with “guaranteed” leave periods during the deployment and intervals between successive deployments are being implemented. As APATS and others included me have mentioned previously. Whether that does the trick is tbd, but at least the issue is recognised.
A BAE comment recently talked of at anyone time 2 ships under construction, I had hear elsewhere that to make the Frigate Factory viable BAE need a minimum of 12 Type 26s, Since their planning permission includes both their shipyards, it might be they expect to build some RFAs too?
oooohhhh, touchy :)
@All,
T26 keeps getting mentioned as a modular design, that when exported, the purchaser can swap in the radar, missiles, prop plant etc of choice. Over the last few years, we keep seeing potential customers fall off the plot and we all then moan about poor export sales. We could take a slightly different view… Sea Ceptor exported to NZ (is Brazil a done deal?), MT-30 exported to the US and Korea, and smaller stuff such as Salts RO plants to various civilian organisations. It seems a bit like the modular option left out has been the hull!
@DN (and others)
Not trying to cast the light frigate idea out without talking about it, but I really struggle to understand what one would actually look like. I get that it’s supposed to be something between an OPV and a T26, but I don’t understand what that concept really means. If we start with the RCOPVB2 as our OPV, what can we add?
A bigger gun? (How big? 50mm, 76mm, 4.5″, 5″?). Do we need a better radar for that make better use of it, or indeed any use of it? Probably, and definitely if it’s the bigger option.
How about no bigger gun, but a towed array (the old TAS tug idea). Again, which? If we go with S2087, we’re going to need a good bit more space for the winch etc, but also for the sonar display room. I’m sure other cheaper options will have pretty similar spatial requirements. If we do this, we are making our asset a bit more of a target, so we probably do need that bigger gun, or a CIWS/PDMS of some form. SeaRAM could do, or Phalanx or we could upgrade a bit and have Sea Ceptor. But that needs a decent radar. And so, in reality, does SeaRAM/Phalanx to get any real value out of the system (the better situational awareness piece). That will need integrating, so we need a Combat Management System, and an Ops Room. That means more power, more chilled water, more vent, more people to man/provide those things, more space for them, more galley space to feed them, more chefs, more fridges, more bunks, probably need some more power now to move this lot, more fuel to supply the endurance for said power, and more hull to put it in to comply with standards for survivability and habitability. I may have over egged my point.
What I’m getting at is I don’t understand what capability the French get with their light frigate (I’m looking at you, La Fayette). It seems to me to be a stretched OPV in reality. It doesn’t have Aster. It doesn’t have a tail. The minute you add this sort of capability (Singapore’s Formidable), the cost is going to go up, and you aren’t really in light frigate territory, it’s more ‘under sized big frigate’. If you don’t add it, you might as well stop pretending it has capability, get rid of the CIWS and other bells and whistles and just have a big OPV.
I do however, remain open minded. I really would like to know how Singapore have wedged so much capability onto such a small hull (the Saudis had their stretched), and what, if any, compromises have been made that we wouldn’t/can’t make.
Smaller frigate (than T26), I’m onboard with the idea (again, what compromises). Light frigate, I’m not with you.
Sweepstake time then gents.
Answer me two questions
1. What will the T26 cost
2. How many will the RN end up with
AW1 As a starting point, go look at the Lekiu that the UK built for Malaysia. Now imagine a next generation version tailored for the RN, perhaps with that rear wing bolted on, that someone was on about for extra stability & fuel economy.
If we had enough Destroyers we would be building Frigates a ( think T23 with growth margin). We don’t have enough Destroyers which is why we are building more, including VLS, Mission bay, big flight deck and long legs.
TD:
500m and 8
But there will be another design to follow.
8 @ £400m
with an option for 7 more with the hope exports can lower the unit cost sufficiently
TD
1. 650m pounds
2. 14 sole surface combatant, paams system transferred over from type 45 instead of mlu of that ship, Mk41 silo used for aster instead of french one.
The nature of the ‘other design to follow’ will depend on (a) whether T45 can be fixed (b) what the threat looks like circa 2025.
It could be an evolved AAW T27 to replace the Darings early. Or an overgrown Amazonas to supplement 6+8 Combat Ships. Or we might just stick on 14 and build more Amphibs for a bit. Depends on Events.
@TD
Provided there’s no political faffing about, circa £800m apiece if the Government orders 8 x T26, circa £500m apiece if it commits to 13 including non-towed array ‘General Purpose’ variants (roughly the same total cost). The history of the T45 procurement does not augur well, though.
Binning the Darings early is not such a stupid idea if we pull Sea Viper through. It solves all the propulsion issues and the hulls themselves will have been thrashed for 20 years by the time we tie them up.
@Peter Elliott
‘overgrown Amazonas’ such as the Khareef class which we should have purchased already?
Shark bait if we get to the point that we have 14 good Destroyers then we will be at liberty buy something a bit less fighty to go along with them. Until then: no.
TD
750 mill
6-8
And some very busy opv’s
@TD – Far too much, and not enough? :-)
GNB
BAES will get the integrator role downunder, to fix their F105 woes.
They will apply lessons learnt, and come up with a new design that they will claim their own. In fact, we will do the same as RAN, just in reverse order. That is, build an ASW and then AAW version on the same hull form. 7000 displacement, first 8 @£700m (expensive as so much is reused from T23s) but the next 6 will come in @800m in today’s money even though the price difference between versions should be considerably more. I have counted with 1 bn minus 20% as doubling the output should make that much difference on the unit cost curve… In the end, we are talking 8+6 here and 3+5 down under
– Navantia will say”hey, this is not cricket” but we will pretend not to understand what that means
And, when the non- nuclear Sorayo class will have been delivered, the yard behind then joins the SEPP alliance so that Japan will be able to counterbalance the growing fleet of PLAN SSNs fast enough with their own.
– China will retaliate by closing down the biggest RR turbine plant anywhere (having first copied all the designs. The workers have taken material samples all along by grinding any shavings and dust from the floor into their soft-soled plimsoles).
@DN
You have some funny ideas about maritime roles and tasks. Why the obsession with firing weapons when the ‘live’ tactical objective is often to find, fix and track ‘targets’ in various environmental conditions, gather intelligence about their caps & lims or even deter them? Moreover, the objective could be to build and maintain an accurate recognised maritime or recognised air picture (MAP or RAP) so as to ascertain, with some degree of confidence, areas clear of OPFOR or other impediments to possible operations, be they uncharted pinnacles or potentially hostile submarines, surface craft, mines, aircraft or whatever. Constantly practicing this and gathering valid data not only aids situational awareness but also helps hone and improve operational capability at the individual operator, unit and force level. This is not to say that one cannot exercise firing procedures at the same time but this is not necessarily the name of the game. For example:
ArmchairCivvy;
What is the actual schedule for the T26? Out here the ANZAC class will start reaching 30 years in 2026 so allowing for the normal first of class stuff you can expect the RAN to want the first of a replacement class in trials by that time, simply because any Australian version will be very different from the UK standard.
As an example one of the reasons that the first of the AWD’s is so far over time and budget is that the RAN ran amok with changes, see below:
***The Hobart Class – Differences from the F100 Class***
Navantia’s F104 ship design is the basis for the AWD. The F104 baseline is being updated for AWD to include;
Key F105 features,
Australian Combat system modifications, and
Selected platform upgrades that are unique to the Hobart Class.
These features are summarised as follows:
F105 Modifications
More efficient and powerful diesel engines coupled with improved fuel tank arrangements will provide increased range,
The inclusion of a bow thruster will improve manoeuvrability in harbours;
Improvements to underway replenishment arrangements for manpower efficiencies;
Changes to funnel tops to improve the ship’s air wake; and
Bunk size increases to improve habitability.
AWD Combat System Modifications
The Hobart Class will use the Aegis Weapon System Baseline 7.1 and the AN/SPY-1D(V) Phased Array Radar.
Under Sea Warfare capability will be upgraded by:
the introduction of Ultra Electronics Hull and towed array sonars and
the introduction of ASW decoys for torpedo defence;
Enhanced undersea communications;
Integration of the MU90 torpedo.
Other changes include:
Modification of the MK45 gun and Gun Fire Control System, including provision for Extended Range Munitions (ERM);
Addition of the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC);
Modification of the IFF UPX-29 to the current tactical standard;
Addition of an Horizon Search Radar (HSR) for improved anti-ship missile defence;
Upgrades to the Surface-to-Surface Missile System to improve target selectivity in congested water, littoral and coastal operations;
Upgrades to the Very Short Range Defence system to improve its integration and utility against asymmetric surface threats;
Upgrades to the Electronic Warfare system, including the addition of electronic attack capabilities;
Addition of X/Ka Satcom and INMARSAT Fleet Broadband and INMARSAT C capability;
Improved Infrared Search and Track capabilities;
Improved Electro-Optical Surveillance capability;
Addition of Nulka Launchers for active missile decoys;
AWD-Unique Platform Modifications
The ship’s displacement will be increased to 7,000 tonnes for an improved service life margin.
Cold weather operation will be improved to allow for deployment into Australia’s southern waters.
The hangar will be modified to accommodate a range of helicopters.
Other modifications include:
Increased total cold room capacity for improved endurance;
Incorporation of a fixed gas detection system to warn of the presence of harmful gases in compartments where personnel exposure risks exist;
Modification of the 220V/50Hz network to 240V/50 Hz, incorporation of Residual Current Devices (RCD) and the Australian pin configuration for general purpose outlets, and
Modification of existing stowage, and increases in the overall number of stowage facilities, for thermal protective suit and life raft containers.
(Source: Air Warfare Destroyer Alliance)
@TD
£400M / ship
10 vessels
is my wish, but will be
£500M /ship
8 vessels
In 10 vessels case, 3 River B.2 OPVs will perfectly fill the gap, provided they are to be equipped with a (telescopic) hanger for a Wildcat. Since OPV’s “at sea days” per year (~300) is typically 50% more than those of a frigate (~180), this will release the tension of the current RN deployment (in particular APT-N and Kipion) rotation.
In 8 vessels case, there comes another possibility for 4 “99m-class OPVs” to come, while the 3 River B.2 OPVs will eventually replace the current River B.1 fleet. (The “99m-class OPVs” I mention here is rather a Floreal-class equivalent than a La Fayette class. Must be less armed to make “at sea days” longer, operational cost smaller and crews lesser )
@ TD – I will go 450 million a ship and 8 delivered.
Then we will decide that 8 is not enough and we will start to up gun the MHPC and say we will order 14 but we will only get 6 delivered.
I don’t think unit numbers will affect T26 price that much as their is little R&D as with T45 and many of the systems are being cross decked.
Hypothetically speaking, had the U.S. Ever given serious consideration to Foreign designs for the Small Surface Combat, what point in development would have benefitted the T26 the most?
Earlier in the design process, roughly where we are now, start of build having started, sea trials?
@TD: 8 hulls, 4.2bn (inc design costs).
I’d also argue to buy some more OPVs in addition to the 3 extra planned so that the GP T23s can be retired early and also to give anoth 1-2 yrs to mature the T26 design to increase the AAW capabilities (either fitted with or not fitted with).
John H – be careful what you wish for. The last time someone tried to modify the Lekiu design, Brunei got its comedy corvettes. Or rather it didn’t.
I have no idea where this idea that T26 is somehow trying to compensate for T45 numbers has come from. It’s simply not true. The FSC (as was) back in 1999 had pretty much everything that is in the T26 now – Mk41 VLS, 2087, “local area AD”, accommodation for extra bodies, CH47 flightdeck. It wasn’t as big, but then E&E requirements and accommodation standards have changed a bit, plus the autonomy / unmanned piece has become more prominent and you want a couple of extra boats – not exactly staple fare for an AAW ship. Personally I think the design is having one or two issues with it’s weight estimate (which has knock on effects to cost due to the nature of the particular cost model), but what do I know?
Cost-wise, it really shouldn’t take more than 3M manhours on average to build them. Depending on how you value a manhour, that’s somewhere between £220M and £300M, plus material. Your steel is chump change (sub £10M), your propulsion and generating machinery should be between £50-60M, which (as the vast majority of combat systems are to be cross-decked) leaves the auxiliary systems and furnishing outfit, plus the Mk45 Mod4. So total cost ought to be somewhere between £400-500M. That ought to be good for at least 10, but the 2087 split points towards either 8 or 13.
All of course assuming that MoD and BAE can actually sort the design issues and get the cost model to give credible answers – which is just as important!
Johnno, for the reasons you outlined my maths not working as badly as it looks:
“minus 20% as doubling the output should make that much difference on the unit cost curve… In the end, we are talking 8+6 here and 3+5 down under”
– where is halfway?
– the Hobarts are irrelevant (-3)
– there will be 3 more first in class ships (-3)
– 22 minus 6, divide by 2=8 (so the UK AAWs would fall into these on the time line)
Of course the unit cost curve is just that: in reality a curve, not a step function
I would predict 8 at £425m each with an option for 5 more as currently planned. However timing of the 5 options would depend on the General Election result. A Conservative government will leave it until the next SDSR while Labour may try and get something else in time for the Scottish elections.
First of class being HMS Glasgow?
@NaB
“…but the 2087 split points towards either 8 or 13.”
Understand the 8 figure due to the 2087’s, but why would that kit also lead to the 13 number? Due to the other system equipment being available from the T23’s?
I ran out of editing time to add this question to my post to DN last night but it is may be pertinent to export-variants of T26:
How and where do people think the ‘real’ data originates to design, verify, validate and, perhaps most critically, maintain the currency of models used in our shoreside and on board tactical training simulators, not to mention enables the development of improved tactics, weapons, sensors and software, or do you believe that manufacturers have the necessary in-house resources to gather it?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Verification_and_validation_of_computer_simulation_models
https://www.unf.edu/~cwinton/html/cop4300/s09/class.notes/VerifyValidate.pdf
Yes I know that ‘data’ is/are more properly plural. Can you guess that I once worked at the Maritime Warfare Centre? ;-)
@Dunservin
If you don’t fire the weapon to try and destroy the opfor after all the maneuvering and procedures you have just followed then it is not war and therefore training regardless how many times you do it against a passing potential adversary. The entire paragraph you wrote summoned pretty much what training is, preparing for when it becomes real.
@DN
I suggest you try telling the CO of a DD/FF on MIOPS or a member of the SBS or CO of an SSN conducting covert intelligence gathering that what they’re doing is just ‘training’ and not ‘real’ because they don’t “…fire [their] weapon to try and destroy the opfor”.
As I said before, you have some funny ideas about maritime roles and tasks.
A question for the naval types
High fidelity synthetic environments are really making a dent in traditional training, even for the Army, where things such as the parachute trainer are making the capability much cheaper to retain.
How is this affecting naval capabilities?
And another question
What will be the impact on taskings of
6 T26
8 T26
10 T26
16 Type 26
I don’t care if their cost rises to £500m per unit [as it will inevitably] it sustains an industry of vital national importance. Build all 16 over a period of 10 years with first commissioned 2019. Get on with it for God’s sake.
8 ASW
2 always with the Carrier Task group
2 on work up with one of these sanitising the Faslane area
2 on maintenance
2 in the pool for FRE [see below]
8 GP version
two taskings:
1 Atlantic south
1 Mediterranean
2 on work up
2 on maintenance
2 in pool for FRE [from the pool of 4 one would be in deep maintenance, 1 on work up 1 shore/maintenance]
6 Absalon-class support/command frigate
built in Denmark but fitted in the UK, in non-BAE yards, much as they are doing with MARS tankers.
2 taskings
Anti piracy in the Indian Ocean
Anti-drug in Carribean
each tasking has rotation of 1 ship on task, 1 on work up, 1 maintenance
We have presence in four key areas of influence for the UK. When the carrier group visits any of these areas there is this additional ship already on task.
2 Canberra-class ships
to replace ocean and, to an extent, Argus [but see below]
draw on the expertise of the ACA experience of building the carriers and built across British yards.
Commissioned 2021 and 2024
RFA
6 MARS [SSS] – 1 will use the common hull and propulsion but be configured to replace RFA Diligence.
A capability sustainment for both Bulwark and Albion [funded by Dfid] to transfer them to the RFA and be used in the role of PCRS in times of conflict and proactive medical diplomacy – surely even the most ardent leftie-luvie-pacifist can see the benefit of RFA Argus in its current tasking.
We transfer current Rivers to Fisheries. HMS Clyde is based in UK waters to act as the training ship for crews rotating through the 3 new OPVs all forward based [ FI, Caribbean and Mediterranean – the latter 2 very much crewed in partnership with local Overseas Territories and other national partners in constabulary role.]
Has this thread turned into some sort dictionary corner?
@TD
Have you seen the Zumwalt’s CIC (Linux driven) press releases in the last week? There’s a shore based reproduction of the facility for training and hi-fidelity simulation. Looks very impressive, I’m certain it will provide a very high quality output of training.
@NaB mentioned tapes above. Provided you have the data it would be very realistic and the more sophisticated these facilities and exercises the higher the baseline level of ability you’ll eke out of your personnel.
What’s missing (ASW context) are items such as:
– Variable factors in the simulation: Was the sample data of the South Pacific taken during an El Niño or a La Niña? What was the weather like on the US East Coast when sample data was taken in the Hebridean approaches and does that alter the background noise?
– Human factors: Does the shore based facility take into account manual handling of the towed arrays. Are the crew following the procedure? Is the procedure correct? What’s the condition of the array coatings?
– Platform variation: One fibre optic connector to a GPS at the LHC was a fraction longer than a partner cable resulting in spurious readings suggesting the speed of light had been broken in a neutron test. This was a high precision engineered piece of kit. What are the tolerances like in a class of ships and how does the variation between vessels and the shore-based simulator affect results?
You need experienced personnel out in the wild to pick up on these kind of factors, help with picking up new details (e.g. will the new 955А boat sound similar to the existing 955’s in active service and in particular compared to the “tape” of the what’s highly suspected to – but may not – be the Aleksandr Nevskiy recorded in the Norwegian Sea?), and pass on their experience to less experienced, yet highly trained (c.f. simulation, exercises, training) personnel to preserve these perishable skills. Not to mention feed back to the trainers, engineers and designers.
Am not for one minute suggesting that simulation replace the real thing but it can have a very real impact on training cost, even in areas that might not immediately spring to mind, like parachuting
If you can observe it surely you can model it.
Are these variables for ASW training any less complex than flying an A380
I was wondering how much is done today in the naval domain and how much can be done tomorrow, accepting that training is not the only reason for setting forth in one of her maj’s grey war canoes, after all, we use shore based simulation for damage control, why could you not mount a ships control room in a three axis simulator and network it to a Merlin simulator(s) whilst running complex scenarios.
@Dunservin
‘member of the SBS or CO of an SSN conducting covert intelligence gathering that what they’re doing is just ‘training’
Are not the SBS tasked at a strategic level? so the example you gave of conducting covert intelligence gathering by it’s very nature would not be training.
Having dabbled in the world of civil flight simulators, I’d suggest a major strength of simulation is procedural training and malfunction resolution training (easier to simulate a malfunction than to cause one for real). Cockpit Procedural Trainers can have a high fidelity at modest cost because they only deal with the machinery and its operation (focused on crew instrumentation & input devices). Its a big step to make a Zero Flight-Time Full Flight Simulator – one that can turn out capable pilots without on-aircraft training – because there is a lot riding on accurate simulation of environment and the machine’s response to control inputs within that environment. I’m pretty sure the Aviation Authorities would not accept a pilot can be fully qualified to fly paying passengers without having taken aircraft to the sky – the zero flight-time bit I suspect applies only to type conversion. And its a given that in the civil aviation domain the simulator is used as a regular examination of competence.
So for training on how stuff is controlled and what to do when the machine gets stroppy, simulation is just fine. In this context, to train a sonar operator how to detect and track targets they are probably going to be too simplistic.
Do simulators really work then? Personal experience suggests they do – over a few years on simulators I got to know how to drive commercial jets, mostly a 737 on which we had some 9 months integration & test. At the end of that job I booked a trial flight at the local aerodrome just to see if the real thing was like the simulator (real life imitating art?). The lady instructor was – I found out later – known to be quite nervous of novice pupils; she gave some brief instructions on what did what and what not to touch, and took off. When she asked if I’d like to take the controls, I slipped 8 fingers behind the yoke and gently pulled pushed and tweaked it, commenting as the aircraft bucked around in response that “It’s a bit lively, isn’t it?” She gave me a seriously suspicious look and demanded “Are you a pilot?” Apparently the norm was ten white knuckles holding the yoke in rigid terror. So yes, simulators do work.
DN the implication of the SBS comment is that while publicly deployed on what you define as ‘training’ our ships are also supporting other activities too, not all of which can be acknowledged.
In general I am in favour of a forward deployed fleet. But it will be interesting to see how the pattern of those deployments changes once we can start generating meaningful Task Groups of the sort that will be in high demand by our allies in dangerous places. Ocean’s annual toddles round the Med with a few Merlin and Apache are not in the same league and do not make the same demands on escort resources. The RAF may find the advent of a deployable carrier makes similar demand on the Voyager and Sentry fleet. Some will decry this as the Carriers ‘pulling the forces out of shape’ but it is in fact exactly the refocus that SDR98 envisaged.
Will we still be able to train single ships on deployment in the way we do now when we also have to be actively protecting a Task Group half way round the world for 9 months at a time?
Talking simulators, don’t forget that the RN does have them. There are sims for the Bridge, Ops Room and for machinery control rooms. I know for a fact that the machinery control sims are in almost constant use, and certainly remember my Navs struggling to get bookings at the Bridge Sim in Collingwood.
Echoing Chris’ comments, we can’t use the machinery sims for everything. They are great for doing endless breakdown drills on, pausing, re-setting, re-doing small elements to get the drills right. But doing it on a live platform is different again, before we even discuss the differences between training scenarios and reality. Without completely replicating the internal layout of a T45 or T23, with all it’s machinery etc, there are just some things you can’t reproduce. For that reason, you must always endorse your qualifications at sea, on your own platform. A sim only ticket just doesn’t quite cut it.
The ability to train/consolidate, call it what you will whilst on deployment is invaluable. There is a reason we prefer to send trainees to deploying ships, rather than UK runners, as we know they will get the Bridge Time/Machy Breakdowns/GUNEXes etc in.
I remain open to the possibility that higher fidelity sims might allow for that to happen ashore more, but currently industry cannot deliver a simulator to that level for the propulsion plant.
AW, I don’t think the suggestion was sim only, more advancing the current systems to relieve pressure on on the already stretched personnel
How much could we, for example, network together a ship at sea, a damage control simulator (those wet ones!) and a Merlin simulator ashore.
Just trying to get a feel for the state of play today and the art of the possible purely as a way of maintaining proficiency with less of everything
When are we going to see a T45 (or 2!) accompanying the RFTG on it’s annual stroll through the Med and Indian Ocean?
The T45 fleet as a whole has been busy with plenty of deployments with operation Kipion, the South Atlantic and a round the world cruise by HMS Daring but i’d have thought by now with all 6 commissioned and worked up that the RN would be eager to have them practice in their primary task-group escort role.
@ challenger – I agree it’s a bit disappointing that the T45 is yet to sale with the RFTG. I understand keeping one on the gulf but surely the second available ship should be with the RFTG and not swanning round the south Atlantic
@PE
‘DN the implication of the SBS comment is that while publicly deployed on what you define as ‘training’ our ships are also supporting other activities too, not all of which can be acknowledged.’
I’m not going to go around in circles with this training issue, if while on deployment to the caribean you wish to listen to the sonar and gain experience then you choose to for training purposes and not because there is an active threat in the area and you need to, that is the difference. I’m pretty sure the Navy increases and decreases it’s posture for every area it enters after an assesment is made and for specific tasks. Or am I to believe that the Navy are on a war footing constantly?
@all
I am also at a miss that people suddely think that because the concept of not using high end surface combatants for standing tasks suddenly means you would not be doing any training during the deployments. As TOC allududed to it would not be too difficult to have modular systems to enable training on such vessels.
“…if while on deployment to the caribean you wish to listen to the sonar and gain experience then you choose to for training purposes and not because there is an active threat in the area and you need to…”
Ahh, think I know where you’re coming from.
It’s the reverse: If you have ASW kit onboard, you’re operating the equipment on patrol because everywhere is a threat environment.
In the specific case of the Caribbean, historically you’ve had Cuba sympathetic to the USSR with Soviet SSN’s in the area, more recently Venezuela receiving Scorpène SSK’s, to pick just two sources/centres of submarines there across the decades.
Are they friendly to us, the US? If Argentina turn nasty, what will they do in turn? If they also turn nasty, it would be great to have profiled their Scorpène’s in the various environs, which means engaging in ASW activities “for real”.
More globally, China have Type 093 SSN’s, are they sniffing around UK EEZ’s or our vessels on patrol? What of the new Type 095’s? There’s possibly fewer choke points to limit their Atlantic access.
“[T45]…not swanning round the south Atlantic…”
Similar to the ASW line, it allows the AAW personnel to build on their skillsets in that environment.
And it reminds certain airforces that even if you want to rent certain fleets of long range strike aircraft by bartering beef, you’ve still got to contend with world class Air Warfare assets entering theatre.
The last sweepstake I was in was for the World Cup – I drew Iran :-(
I agree with Dunservin but that price (500 mil) will be the average cost spread over 13, probably in two or three batches. If they go for an AAW version then, well, pin the tail on the donkey!
Maybe that could be a use for the T23’s as they start to go out of service, refit the ops room, bridge(replace the windows with screens) and control rooms to look like the T26 and T45, moor it in fareham Creek and stick a crew onboard for a month at a time running constant drills. That would be as close as you could get to a true ship sim. the problem with the current sims is that they can train you to use the kit in perfect conditions, they don’t let train whilst living aboard a ship and having to man the ship 24/7.
TD’s question about “taskings” is an interesting one because I’d rather like to know which “taskings” we actually need?
We could assume that we need to have something down south. And my guess would be that it should be an AAW destroyer. We could also assume that, as ToC says, that we must do some deployed ASW to maintain currency.
Still not sold on the value of deployed ASW over say a decent ongoing wargame between a T23/2087/Merlin and Astute. I personally can’t see any better training for both parties than this!
If we therefore had four of each of the above we would be able to service these requirements and have FRE and TAPS in UK waters ready to sail with the RFTG. However, that really isn’t enough to escort the likes of a CVF and LPD task force.
We really need another ASW and another AAW escort for the task force, which means either another two of each of the above, or three of a generic multi-role nature. However, these cannot be deployed.
I would therefore suggest that the absolute minimum is 4 x AAW + 4 x ASW + 3 x Hybrid. Obviously we could also go for 6 x AAW + 6 x ASW but deploy only two and possibly three at a stretch: one AAW, one ASW and one would be anyone’s guess what was available.
Place your bets – I know where mine are :-(
TD’s question about “taskings” is an interesting one because I’d rather like to know which “taskings” we actually need?
We could assume that we need to have something down south. And my guess would be that it should be an AAW destroyer. We could also assume that, as ToC says, that we must do some deployed ASW to maintain currency.
Still not sold on the value of deployed ASW over say a decent ongoing wargame between a T23/2087/Merlin and Astute. I personally can’t see any better training for both parties than this!
If we therefore had four of each of the above we would be able to service these requirements and have FRE and TAPS in UK waters ready to sail with the RFTG. However, that really isn’t enough to escort the likes of a CVF and LPD task force.
We really need another ASW and another AAW escort for the task force, which means either another two of each of the above, or three of a generic multi-role nature. However, these cannot be deployed.
I would therefore suggest that the absolute minimum is 4 x AAW + 4 x ASW + 3 x Hybrid. Obviously we could also go for 6 x AAW + 6 x ASW but deploy only two and possibly three at a stretch: one AAW, one ASW and one would be anyone’s guess what was available.
Place your bets – I know where mine are :-(
@AW1
“Not trying to cast the light frigate idea out without talking about it, but I really struggle to understand what one would actually look like.”
Please, bing/google “MEKO A-200SAN”. This is a light frigate of 3,700 tons. Our River 3B OPV is 2,000 tons. The Khareef corvette is 2,700 tons, a larger River 3B, exchanging a little range for a gun, VL-MICA, Exocets and a hangar.
@PJS
“6 Absalon-class support/command frigate
built in Denmark but fitted in the UK, in non-BAE yards, much as they are doing with MARS tankers.”
Odense shipyard is closed since 2012.
@NaB
“The FSC (as was) back in 1999 had pretty much everything that is in the T26 now – Mk41 VLS, 2087, “local area AD”, accommodation for extra bodies, CH47 flightdeck.”
1999! 16 years and going….
In between 1999 and now they also had a real go at slimming it down to something that would do less for less. Open to other suggestions as to why that plan didn’t stick but I would suggest that the lack of both hulls and multi – role capability in T45 has something to do with it.
Afraid not Peter. Other than the boats, they really have not added anything to the ship since 1999. Nor did they take anything off to slim it down. Some tunes played with propulsion options and some brief excursions into high speed la-la land when LCS was in vogue and the RN 2* caught the bug, but nothing other than that. If memory serves we were looking at something like 20 hulls for the 1999 FSC, but then that was when the DD/FF force requirement was 32.
@Mcz, John H.
My apologies, I didn’t mean what it actually looks like, ie an image. I’m quite familiar with the Leiku and Khareef. I meant what do people think an RN ‘Light Frigate’ would look like in terms of capability, equipment fit out, and most importantly, concept of operations.
As I alluded to up thread, I don’t understand how the RN would go about fitting a ‘useful’ frigate capability onto a small hull. The Lekiu’s have a complement of ~150 on a hull of 2,300t. The RN can’t do that, as we have different standards for habitability. The T26 has an expected complement of ~130 for comparison. They have a weapons and sensor fit roughly analagous to a GP T23/T26 (a main gun, VL Sea Wolf, an Air Search radar, a pair of FC radars, a sonar and a Lynx).
I think we could be looking at a symantics issue. Does ‘light frigate’ mean ‘lightly armed’ or ‘light weight’ (tonnage) to people. I don’t see how the RN can achieve the latter (See NaB’s repeated comments ref standards of accomodation, structure, habitability, escape and so forth). I don’t understand the point of the former. Big OPVs, yes. Under-armed ‘frigates’, no.
@TD
> What will be the impact on taskings of
> 6 T26
> 8 T26
> 10 T26
From reading the NZ study report for the “3rd (ANZAC) frigate” (which did not come out), I understand that; with 3 ships, you can deploy 1 for a long period but 4th is required to make it possible in case of long maintenance. Thus, I think 3.3 ships per 1 deployable ship is needed. On the other hand, on surge, 45-50 % will be deployed at most.
6 T26s
= 1.8 (2 in many cases but sometimes only 1) deployable
= 3 on surge (sometimes only 2)
8 T26s
= 2.4 (2 or 3 deployable, each nearly 50% probability by chance)
= 4 on surge (sometimes only 3)
10T26s
= 3 deployable always
= 5 on surge (sometimes 4)
In case of real war, you may need two task groups: 1 with CVs, and 1 with logistic support fleet,
CV group = CV x1, AAW escorts x2, ASW escorts x3
logistics group = AAE escort x1, ASW escorts x1 or 2
or 1 in front, and 1 in back
front: AAW escort x1, ASW escort x2 or 3 (with Amph. ships)
back: CV x1, AAW escort x2, ASW escort x2 (with AOs)
# I am referring to the Falkland Islands champaign as a template…
With 6 T45s, this means: you need at least 8 T26s at minimum. Since 50% deployment on surge is a bit unrealistic, I suppose 9 T26s at minimum is needed (of course better be with 10). I personally think RN shall relief some of the requirements to save the cost. For example, speed: since GT power evolves quickly, even though the first 2-3 ships may have a top speed of only 25-6 kts, the latter will be able to make it 27 kts easily.
@AW1
‘light frigate’ for me is a “cheap frigate”, i.e. its purchase/operation cost shall be less than a quarter of a T26. This means ~125 MGBP per ship at most (thus Floreal equivalent). If it is expensive than this number, then you are cutting significant amount of T26s to build the ‘light frigates’, which I do not think a good solution.
With this cost, it will have no ASW equipment nor AAW missiles. With a helicopter, a 5 inch gun, and a CIWS, it will perform perfectly for any anti-smuggler and/or sanction operations. It can also be used for “south georgia regain” operation in 1981 or even Sierra Leone operation in 2000. If this “large OPV-type light frigate” is unrealistic, then I think River B.2 will be better (although you need to add a helicopter hanger), which can perform nice in any anti-smuggler operations.
In my opinion, any Tier 2 fleet must be based on cheap and simple vessel design, which will lead to significantly smaller running cost and also larger sea going days (simply because of lack of complicated instruments onboard).
Hi Donald, set the carrier(s) and the amphibsup to 200 nm apart
– v little OTH capability (too little anyway,1-2 Coys worth?)
How does that impact your escort needs calc?
@AW1
“I think we could be looking at a symantics issue. Does ‘light frigate’ mean ‘lightly armed’ or ‘light weight’ (tonnage) to people. I don’t see how the RN can achieve the latter (See NaB’s repeated comments ref standards of accomodation, structure, habitability, escape and so forth). I don’t understand the point of the former. Big OPVs, yes. Under-armed ‘frigates’, no.”
If it’s a frigate by name in the age of 8,000 tons frigates is rather pointless. To me, T26 is a light cruiser.
The main advantage a Khareef-type has over River B3 is its hangar and basic self defense systems. We don’t need Exocet or VL Mica (we get Sea Ceptor), maybe we don’t even need the 3”-gun. But we absolutely need a hangar. And with a Wildcat, an UAV or UUV comes the bang and OTH effects. We could proceed with integrating MCM capabilities, when MHC comes to fruition. Could make things easier, as it will fixate one side of the equation. Heck, I would even give some of them a tail, or a MF-STAR radar like the Israeli Sa’ar 5s are getting, if I find some funds. We should give a tinkering, Raspberry Pi-like approach a shot.
I don’t get, how they plan to use the River B3 for anything else than fisheries protection duties. But then, I also don’t get why we are putting land-attack cruise-missiles into a scarce fleet-protection asset.
“I don’t get, how they plan to use the River B3 for anything else than fisheries protection duties. But then, I also don’t get why we are putting land-attack cruise-missiles into a scarce fleet-protection asset.”
They don’t plan to use it for anything other than FPV duties, despite the MoD blurb.
The T26 is more than a “fleet protection asset”, that’s why it’s called a surface combatant rather than an escort. It’s got strike length Mk41/TLAM, because it will be the most numerous ship in the fleet capable of fielding a useful number, particularly when tube launched TLAM ceases to be supported in the 20s.
The impact of the Mk41 on the design is about 100 te of structure, ten tonnes of outfit, 3 off launchers at 14 te each and 24 canisters (say 36 tonnes). Under 200 tonnes or less than 3% of lightship displacement if you prefer.
@McZ
You are right that the advantage of a Khareef over a River B3 is it’s hangar. Adding a hangar to a River would have advantages, and as I said, I’m all for super sized OPVs. I fully get why we are doing the minimum of mods to the design to get the B3s though. It is purely make work for the yards to keep the metal bashers.
However, then you start talking about it’s self-defence capabilities. If we added Sea Ceptor to a B3 and a hangar and a tail, the RN does not end up with a Khareef. Because we have different requirements to Oman for habitability etc we would end up with something much larger. Something frigate sized. Add in a gun, Mk 41 and a MT-30 for some speed and we end up with our big ‘frigate’, ‘light cruiser’, ‘Global Surface Combatant’, call it what you will.
Very simplistically, on a Khareef sized hull, you can have 3 of these:
ASW – A tail
ASuW – Harpoon/Excocet
Speed – A GT
Local AAW – Sea Ceptor/Mica + radar
A hangar and helo
RN Habitability and suvivability standards.
If we accept for the RN the last is non negotiable, which two do you pick for your light frigate? And what is said frigate then for?
I have been around the houses on this as we all have and from being an advocate of a French style fleet with corvettes / light frigates / patrol frigates / khareef lites etc in a big volte face I have changed my mind:
– maximise T26 numbers (13, maybe 14 in due course with 8 ASW, 4 GP and 13 and 14 being AAW leading into a T45 replacement down the line )
– fill gaps (production and patrol) with the extant B2 River OPV design. May be 3 more giving 10 OPVs in total. No hanger but possibly a camcopter capability and other low cost tweeks to surveillance and self defence capability. 4 UK EEZ (B1 Rivers + Clyde – also serving as test beds for future remote vehicles / UAVs), 1 B2 in FI, 1 B2 in Gib, 1 B2 with ME MCM squadron as shotgun / standing anti piracy) and 3 as cover for one standing task, eg APT N
Hi-lo mix, emphasis on existing designs. Future design work goes an AAW variant of T26 and MCM / Hydro replacement (and Albions down the line)
Look at Appledore perhaps for Archer replacements / inshore border cutter fleet enhancement in due course.
The only other vessel I’d add to the ocean going escort type mix would be a Protector supplement or replacement in due course with a double lynx hanger.
Not sure where all my comments have been going, seem to have been blocked
@NAB “particularly when tube launched TLAM ceases to be supported in the 20s.”
Are there any plans to cover that loss of capability in the Astutes? Aside from T26 having a strike capability I would have thought the stealth and range capabilities of Astute make them ideal for at least a limited land strike capability
Isn’t there supposed to be a tube launched MdeCN coming along? If tube launched TLAM did go then presumably we would have the option to buy that as an approximate like for like replacement.
But I guess that all comes down to the long term strategy for cruise missiles, Storm Shadow, Perseus etc etc. Ideally we would want a single family for Air, Ship and Sub launched weapons. Whether that includes the same family for Land Attack as for Anti-Ship is also a question to unpack. One needs a lot of boutique capabilities such as terminal manoeuvres that the other doesn’t. The cost impact of lobbing hundreds of specialist anti-ship missiles into a sandpit somewhere could be quite prohibitive.
I’m sure TD still owes us an article on the future of the largest of the ‘complex weapon’ families.
Oh, that is bad news
“It’s got strike length Mk41/TLAM, because it will be the most numerous ship in the fleet capable of fielding a useful number, particularly when tube launched TLAM ceases to be supported in the 20s”
Divide all of the 20’s by two (the ship every two years slogan) and you will be to under half a dozen…if you don’t refit T45s with new silos.
Can’t have it all? Drop “sub” from below’ and you have it in JSM
“would want a single family for Air, Ship and Sub launched weapons. Whether that includes the same family for Land Attack as for Anti-Ship is also a question to unpack. One needs a lot of boutique capabilities such as terminal manoeuvres that the other doesn’t”
@ArmChairCivvy
> Hi Donald, set the carrier(s) and the amphibsup to 200 nm apart
> – v little OTH capability (too little anyway,1-2 Coys worth?)
> How does that impact your escort needs calc?
Not sure I got your point, but it may not change.
Threat to the fleet “behind” is long range patrol airplane and maybe submarines. You do not need AEW.
Threat to the fleet “forward” is air raids by fast attackers and also submarines. You need AEW here.
Here I assume, with 5 CROWSNEST on CV, they can only keep single AEW position for 24/7/365, while second one can be there for a moment (say, a few hours). The latter is useful in case the fleet “behind” is approaching the theater.
I hope I get your point …
Donald,
I think ACC is talking about how many escorts you would need if you split the task force into two (one carrier battle group, one amphibious ready group).
I would also assume he means this happens just prior to the action with the carrier sitting out of harms way projecting air cover (and strike) over the landing… just like the USN and USMC model.
How many escorts are needed for the CBG.
How many escorts are needed close in with the ARG.
Donald,
I think ACC is talking about how many escorts you would need if you split the task force into two (one carrier battle group, one amphibious ready group).
I would also assume he means this happens just prior to the action with the carrier sitting out of harms way projecting air cover (and strike) over the landing… just like the USN and USMC model.
How many escorts are needed for the CBG.
How many escorts are needed close in with the ARG.
The reality is until there is an announcement we wont know how many Type 26s frigates will be ordered in the first batch and what the planned total might be. Ideally 14 as I have mentioned before (8ASW, 4GP, 2AAW). A lot depends on how much sustained pressure the USA is putting on us regarding defence spending (publically they have expressed concern, privately who knows although some US papers report Obama has leant on Cameron re this). Also a small P8 (or even P1) order and additional HM1 -HM2 Merlin’s might be announced prior to the election to stem the rise of UKIP. The equipment budget is guaranteed a 1% rise, the issue is the core budget and unless that is kept at 2% or very close to it, there will be manpower reductions. But since the PM in PMQs ruled out a reduction in army numbers, then that is very bad news for the RAF regiment and maybe the Royal Marines too.
A high lo mix would be great, but not more Rivers, either Khareefs or Holland class (helicopter facilities) would be the best for overseas deployment, keep all the Rivers for UK except Clyde (Gibraltar). Then 1 Holland/Khareef for WI 1 for Falkland’s, 1 for anti piracy and 1 for training/ maintenance (4 hulls maybe 5), but for any improvement 2% GDP is needed and that is improbable in the current political atmosphere.
No cut in Army numbers simple
As rec hints at, transfer in RAF Regiment and RM
Then cut
Result, a smaller wage bill across defence but Army numbers the same
@TD RAF regiment is almost a certainty for the chop, Royal Marines less so (after all seen as key by US and NATO). But back to Type 26 , we await the announcement of numbers and whether lobbying for 2% of GDP by USA and some MPs has been taken heed of. Probably Australia is the most likely export customer for Type 26.
@Simon
> how many escorts you would need if you split the task force into two …
> How many escorts are needed for the CBG.
> How many escorts are needed close in with the ARG.
Then, again
> front: AAW escort x1, ASW escort x2 or 3 (with Amph. ships)
> back: CV x1, AAW escort x2, ASW escort x2 (with AOs)
is my suggestion. On the CV group, 9+2 Merlins provides significant contribution to ASW, and up to 24 F-35B will contribute significantly to AAW for both groups.
Compared to the 1981 FI champaign, AAW escort is “5 times” effective (by RN website), and ASW escorts’ AAW weapon is far better (Sea Cat vs Sea Ceptor), actually much better than those used in T42 AAW destroyers when operated in Falkland strait.
I am not sure if it is enough, but it is clearly enough for current Argentine air force power.
With the chancellors comment about refreshing the fleet every 25 yrs, would it no result in a higher availability %? Especially with new simulator technology?
80% availability with 50% deployment, could be possible if you are sweating your assets (with backup crews like the MCMs).
This David Cameron that promised not to cut army numbers, would this be the same David Cameron that prior to the last election 1) Promised that there would be no top down reorganisation of the NHS, 2) promised that the government would balance the books by 2015, and 3) gave us a cast iron guarantee that there would be a referendum on membership of the EU?
I wouldn’t trust him to give me his correct name and address, let alone any promises about protecting any part of defence.
Although all in the realms of fantasy fleet the more i read people advocating it the more on-board i am with the idea of a 20 major escorts (including 14 T26, split 8 ASW/6 GP and 6 T45) and 8-10 Rivers.
The 3 batch 1’s and HMS Clyde in home waters for fisheries/general OPV work and also as test-bed’s for remotely operated and containerized mine-hunting and survey kit.
I’d have at least 4 batch 2’s with telescopic hangars but not much else to keep the costs down (maybe a Seahawk Sigma) and put one each at Gib and The Falklands as guard-ships, and 2 East of Suez, 1 out of Oman for anti-piracy ops and 1 out of Bahrain as a light escort to ride shot-gun with and support the mine-hunter force.
Then hopefully we will see something Black Swan shaped or fewer but larger mother-ship hulls replace the Hunt’s, Sandown’s, Echo’s and HMS Scott beginning around 2030.
Not a perfect solution, but something potentially cheaper and ‘good enough’ as apposed to the normal French style high-low mix that often springs to mind.
@Challenger: I think the idea of GP vessels with “bits missing” is probably no longer affordable. Future high end vessels either need to be specialist or even better have all the “bells and whistles”, that’s why 14 full fat vessels that are primarily there to be part of a CBG or be the FRE. Obviously backed up by GP OPVs / Lite Frigates…
@Repulse
I don’t disagree that all high-end escorts should be as full-fat as possible in the way that they have all been since the Type 21’s were sold off in the mid 1990’s.
In my mind i was following the current on paper differentiation (granted it’s a bit vague and probably won’t last) between the 2 variants which appears to only be with or without a Type 2087 Sonar. 8 ASW frigates to provide 2 for the RFTG and 6 GP for FRE and one other standing task.
That would be coupled with a minimum of 1 Type 45 for the RFTG and 1 East of Suez for a total of 6 ships out of 20 assigned with a bit of flex left in the system which sounds about right to me.
I forgot to say in my last post as well that to me the only suitable solution for Atlantic Patrol North is a converted merchant ship with a couple of helo’s, a couple of fast boats, a boarding team and chock full of humanitarian aid.
Just wading in with a few points
1. Why should we assume that the counter narcotics and HADR roles need to fulfilled by a) the UK and b) maritime forces owned by the UK
2. The current public number is 13 T26, never in the field of human endeavor has this number been exceeded :)
@TD
1. Because the Naval Service is best placed to engage in both roles whilst also flying the flag for the benefit of the Overseas Territories in the area and providing valuable experience for the personnel involved.
Of course the obligatory call for DFID to fork out some cash to help pay for it all is never far from my mind.
2. One can dream i suppose! 14 just looks and sounds like a nicer round number, 13 is an arbitrary number linked to what was left of the frigate fleet after successive reductions anyway.
“Why should we assume that the counter narcotics and HADR roles need to fulfilled by a) the UK and b) maritime forces owned by the UK”
Which is another way of saying “why should we assume that the British Army has a role beyond the defence of UK territory?”
Just a thought…..
No, that’s not the same at all
If we look at what seems the core role of our presence in the Caribbean it is to interdict the flow of narcotics to the US and Europe and to provide economic and HADR support to our dependencies in the area. I understand there are other roles but these seem to the core ones.
So, in order to inject some contingency in what we are told is a very tight availability situation that is placing undue strain on personnel in the RN could we examine alternatives such as
1. Withdrawing from the mission in its entirety
2. Delivering the mission in other ways
3. Delivering the mission with other partner nations taking a greater role
Just a thought
@TD
Perhaps a converted RFA merchant vessel with a lean crew and partly or wholly paid for by the relevant British Oversea Territories or the DFID or both?
What’s considered expensive within a very tight defence budget could be considered relatively little by other parties.
@challenger, I agree on14 v 13
I think I would just leave it a little open to allow continuation of design work
Batch 1 ordered soon hopefully – 8 full fat with TAS
Batch 2 – 4 GP, basically as above without TAS but possibly with other developments,eg enhanced boat deck,change in hanger size, different weapons fit, ie more like an Absalon type vessel. I’m not firm on that view, just an idea to keep things evolving
Batch 3 1. +? – hybrid Asw and AAW escort version with area AAW. Could just build 1 and then start replacing T45 or build 2 or even more before phasing out T45s depending on state of world (and T45s) then
Thus initial commitment to 13 with potential for follow on numbers. Escort numbers stay at 19 until after ship 12 is built and then it could increase. Of course escort numbers could be increased earlier by not retiring T23s on a one for one as T26s introduced.
We just want a restatement of the commitment to at least 19, and in my view at least that the new Rivers are kept alongside the old ones. Ideally 1-3 more Rivers B2, one slightly enhanced for FI duties but I am not fixed on the need for hangers if they can carry a UAV.
….so the Royal Navy conduct maritime operations in respect (mostly) of British Overseas Territories… perhaps the clue might be in the name? :-)
Not that a discussion about how costs and responsibilities might be differently shared with the local authorities would be any bad thing, mind you…
GNB
@challenger, on14 v 13:
I think I would just leave it a little open to allow continuation of design work
Batch 1 ordered soon hopefully – 8 full fat with TAS
Batch 2 – 4 GP, basically as above without TAS but possibly with other developments,eg enhanced boat deck,change in hanger size, different weapons fit, ie more like an Absalon type vessel. I’m not firm on that view, just an idea to keep things evolving
Batch 3 1. +? – hybrid Asw and AAW escort version with area AAW. Could just build 1 and then start replacing T45 or build 2 or even more before phasing out T45s depending on state of world (and T45s) then
Thus initial commitment to 13 with potential for follow on numbers. Escort numbers stay at 19 until after ship 12 is built and then it could increase. Of course escort numbers could be increased earlier by not retiring T23s on a one for one as T26s introduced.
We just want a restatement of the commitment to at least 19, and in my view at least that the new Rivers are kept alongside the old ones. Ideally 1-3 more Rivers B2, one slightly enhanced for FI duties but I am not fixed on the need for hangers if they can carry a UAV.
With the advent of a reshaped RN , focused more around support and protection of our larger capital ships and the reduced number of vessels to provide this support and protection alternative means to provide anti-piracy,narcotics and HADR will required . Tasking a £500m to £1000m vessel 4000 miles away from its principal role will become a difficult option in the future. No doubt the majority crew maintain their perishable skills on the vessels principle role be it ASW or AAW , but when a vessel of a 10th of the initial cost and with a 5th of the crew (i.e. on going cost) locally based could achieve the same result such missions will be hard to justify.
. However even during the runup to the build and launch of the CVF various spokesmen usually slip in at some point in discussions around the CVF ‘humanitarian aid’ ‘disaster relief’ etc . If they think 800 RN crew on a £3bn ship filled with another £3bn worth of kit is the best way to deliver tents and food to a hurricane stricken shore and is a justification for its existence I wonder if we will carry on as usual.
Donald of Tokyo,
Agree with the numbers you put forward for the split TF.
Availability of T23s has been mid-80s (%) and I think the CVF design availability was set at 79%.
Now we can calculate the numbers needed to maintain the capability to send the TF. Standing tasks involve a great geographical dispersion, so whatever the residual (numbers of vessels) available to maintain these tasks, there is this other factor to be put into the spread sheet.
We can calculate either way: how many escorts needed, given the planned HVUs and tasks, or how many tasks to drop, for a given number of escorts. Or we could count in capability terms (the Japanese 888 concept) rather than hulls (AAW being different from ASW…)? That would bring cost to the focus (Canada estimated they would have to fork out 1.5 bn for each AB, if they wanted a fleet of all-rounders) the already high unit costs going up further, but would reduce the number of hulls required (manpower being the most expensive element in thru-life cost).
PS Johnno might be able to advise us how much higher than the planned tge Hobarts will come out in unit cost. They are a modern day equivalent of the US ABs (in capability).
The core mission for APT(N), a bit like APT(S), is just being there. Counter-narcotics is something to do while we are there, a bit like counter-piracy off Somalia.
ISTR SOCA (now NCA) funding the counter-narcotics mission, possibly in a similar way to DEFRA and Fisheries Protection.
“1. Withdrawing from the mission in its entirety
2. Delivering the mission in other ways
3. Delivering the mission with other partner nations taking a greater role”
1. “Hey Caribbean territories & Commonwealth members, you’re on your own!”
2. Put boots on the ground and destroy the coca fields? Legalise?
3. “Hey USA, France and Netherlands, you do more than us already, so we’re just going to leave you to it. Maybe the banana republics can take up the slack?”
Square this circle
Excessive strain on the defence personnel and capabilities
Too many tasks not enough ships
But
Unwilling to countenance any significant change or thinking on delivery by different means
Am I missing something?
We also seem to justify a lot of things using the reason ‘we do it whilst we are there anyway’ and just being there is the core mission
Your 1 & 3 boil down to “doing less with less”, which is what is happening on APT(N) today, and has been happening since mid-noughties.
What are your outline proposals for 2?
Just being there – KIPION ready for the next Gulf war, APT(S) to deter Argentine aggression, APT(N) supplying warm fuzzies to Caribbean BOTs.
I don’t think we should withdraw from such standing tasks as the Caribean, after all we cannot actively recruit their kids to fill our understrength armed forces to fight our war’s and then tell them to jog on because money has become a bit tight. The standing tasks provide a source of training (to a degree) and experience for their crews, it also reaffirms the commitment to our friends.
However with an increasingly stretched budget (not to mention stretched navy) can we do these sort of tasks with a cheaper vessel? the answer without a doubt is yes, the question then remains will the navy allow themselves to become a navy with a high-low (I would prefer medium if money allowed) force mix? IMO opinion I would say no they would fight tooth and nail to prevent it, let’s not forget that the 3 new River’s were forced upon the navy and not something that was actively sought by the leadership and not due to a planned reshaping of the service.
@DN
“can we do these sort of tasks with a cheaper vessel? the answer without a doubt is yes,”
At the moment the Caribbean tasking is being undertaken by HMS Severn and it is often done by an RFA. The 2 FF/DD Kipion tasks require FF/DDs. At the momeet dauntless is integrated with the Carl Vinson CBG gaining invaluable corporate knowledge of carrier escort duties whilst already in theatre. Kent is the ASW Commander for the CDG BG, again fulfilling a vital role and gaining knowledge in theatre. You are not going to achieve this with 2 mid range corvettes. The FI FF/DD tasking of deterring Argentinian aggression requires an FF/DD whilst the support around the Islands is done by an FF/DD.
We have 4 MCMvs deployed to the gulf and now also a permanent MWBS who routinely and would in ops not only task and control the UK assets but also the US MCM in theatre assets.
Duty TAPS requires an FF with a tail and the FRE (unfortunately sometimes combined) is an FF/DD role.
So to answer your question, could we achieve these tasks with your medium assets? No, only one and for that we generally use a cheaper vessel than you propose anyway.
If I was starting from scratch on a vessel suited to APT (N) in terms of presence in BOT, hurricane assistance and counter drugs, I would be looking at something like HMNZ Canterbury. I don’t mean identical given its problems but a similarly sized multirole commercially based long endurance robust platform, fast boats and work boats, a double lynx hanger, some configurable space and a surveillance kit / combat system similar to a new River class. Essentially forward based as a permanent presence with Rivers / DDs / FFs still visiting but with the knowledge its still covered if our fighting vessels are needed elsewhere. I would like to see a similar type vessel with helo capability and ice strengthening ultimately replacing or supplement HMS Protector down south which in my view is deficient in not having helos
@APATS
‘No, only one and for that we generally use a cheaper vessel than you propose anyway.’
Only until recently due to being stretched.
Why do you need a full fat frigate for TAPS? a cheaper vessel with a just towed sonar and aviation facilities would suffice would it not, plenty of OTS designs to choose from? It’s in home waters so has air cover.
I think the big cheese comes over really well in this video
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wrg3orIqfl4&noredirect=1
5 of these for 1 Frigate
http://www.stripes.com/news/navy-explores-new-roles-with-1st-in-class-usns-spearhead-1.279984
Base Manning 26 (+ mission teams, by type of mission)
@ David Niven
“Why do you need a full fat frigate for TAPS? a cheaper vessel with a just towed sonar and aviation facilities would suffice would it not, plenty of OTS designs to choose from? It’s in home waters so has air cover”
So you would want to introduce a bespoke vessel for a single task? What else would or could we use it for? Also activated TAPS units often operate well outside UK waters and whilst being on call duty TAPS are generating for deployments or conducting training either for themselves or as a platform for something like nav or aviation training as part of an ops cycle.
@TD
RE: HMS Severn
Nice video, i’m almost convinced something like a River class is good enough for the role, if they only had a hangar i wouldn’t have a problem.
I still fail to see how you can effectively conduct counter narcotics ops without a helicopter, a 20 knot patrol vessel doesn’t quite cut the mustard chasing a ‘go-fast’ smuggler boat.
ACC, did you notice the two guys interviewed were a civilian captain and reserve officer
@APATS
Why would it be bespoke? Why could we not use stripped T23’s no gun or missiles, Artisan etc just sonar and helicopter, we have just spent over £150m (I say 150 as at least half of the cost would have been spent on the same designers etc building the T26 if it was on time) on 3 OPV’s, what would a few more sets of 2087 cost. By chance you have the makings of a patrol vessel without the cost of procuring new and just removing and substituting the high end weapons and systems with basic less capable cheaper ones, possibly whats fitted on HMS Clyde? could they not be used as the MCM mother ship as well? The crew would be reduced in accordance with the lost capabilities.
The US coast guard use vessels of similar size could we? If we had vessels such as these the TAPS units as at present would need to do both this and train for deployment at the same time.
@DN
“Why would it be bespoke? Why could we not use stripped T23’s no gun or missiles, Artisan etc just sonar and helicopter”
You are aware that you would still have to man them with a full ME dept, considerable WE support, warfare dept, Logs etc and train them in a role that would be bespoke and lead to a stove piping of the personnel involved? The crews would not be reduced in the manner that you think.
The USCG NSC are costing north of £400 million a platform. MCM mothership or support vessels require the ability to make enough water and carry enough fuel to transfer to MCMvs, they also require the ability to carry a staff and accept the MCMvs alongside to transfer the aforementioned water and fuel, as well as stores.
So you need to factor all that into account as well. Believe it or not people do think about these things but these are the sort of problems that make them less than feasible.
APATS,
“as well as stores”
With the introduction of Seafox it is increasingly about (relatively bulky) ammunition.
@Anixtu
In a conflict it would be but 20 C rounds carried by an MCMV last some time in normal peace time ops :)
Interestingly the US has it’s HSV’s without hangars, using them for among other things counter narcotics and disaster relief, I have seen references to HSV-2 operating two helicopters for 30 days straight without a hangar so it must be possible. Admittedly they have a bigger emphasis on transport than patrol compared to the rivers, but there seems to be a fair amount of cross over between the roles they are each being used in. I am not advocating us getting them or anything but there are lessons to be learnt about how you can conduct these operations.
@APATS
Don’t use it as an MCM mothership then.
‘train them in a role that would be bespoke and lead to a stove piping of the personnel involved?’
An FF gets tasked with TAPS now, suddenly it would be become a bespoke skill?
‘considerable WE support’
Some will still be required but considerable, considering the systems that would be lost? or are you talking in terms of the MCM mothership role?
@DN
“An FF gets tasked with TAPS now, suddenly it would be become a bespoke skill?”
An FF that is on call for TAPS now is still fully multi role and capable of training in all areas including multir role. your version would not be able to.
“considerable WE support’”
yes, given that you would still require an ops room system, link, military grade comms, then 2087 and 2050, bridge kit including radars and electronic charts, air weapons and other magazines. pretty considerable.
‘An FF that is on call for TAPS now is still fully multi role and capable of training in all areas including multir role. your version would not be able to.’
Does the navy not rotate individual members of crews every 2-5 years between ships (don’t know purely asking)? if so that should not be too much of a problem, I did say it could be used as a patrol vessel as well.
‘air weapons and other magazines’
Why these items? these are the sort of items that would be deleted. You are basically turning a T23 into a patrol vessel with a towed array.
Glad Anixtu and APATS explained why APT(N) is there, rather than what the ships sometimes get up to. This is just another case of the “£1Bn destroyer chasing pirates” syndrome that varous CGS/CDS have been prone to. The requirement for APT(N) is not to do DIOPS or HADR, they just happen to be capabilities that the deployed unit brings to the party, among others that may not be so obvious or public.
Severn is going to be an interesting experience/experiment. There will be a deployment report produced at the end of it, with lessons learned, additional support required “next time” and /or operational limitations. There may well be a series of these deployments until sufficient experience has been built up to understand whether it’s tenable long-term or not. Deploying OPV on APT(N) is by no means a done deal.
Not entirely sure what the relevance of a high-speed point to point transport catamaran is to the debate. What people may not have realised is that if the sea state gets a bit bouncy, these fellas head for port soonest.
The problem in suggesting that you end up having a ship optimised for this or that mission, (lie TAPS or HADR) is that it has an implicit assumption that that is all it will ever do. Great for spreadsheet planning exercises, but not so clever when the world changes and you have to change role, mission or otehr assumptions. You also end up with a fragmented fleet less than the sum of its parts (eg OPVs for these tasks, TA tugs for that task), particularly when hidden among all this are two other underlying assumptions. Specifically either :
1. You can have the OPV/TA tugs in IN ADDITION to the DD/FF numbers and bear the additional manning burden, or
2. You reduce the capital spend on full capability ships by substituting “cheaper” ships to the same total and give the money saved to someone else
What you’d end up with is a pool of ships to the same overall number, many of which could not be deployed for operations when you really need numbers.
As for air cover in home waters, the maths on a 2 ship CAP at (say 400nm) from Lossie or Coningby would be interesting to say the least.
Isn’t TAPS there to provide a very specialised and focussed capability in support of the deterrent?
Would have thought that would be the first call on a pool of ASW Frigates and the last place you would look for alternatives?
Same for FRE also, you want your A team in those two positions, surely
If our deployments to the Caribbean, Gulf and the Horn of Africa are multi-purpose in that crew skills are maintained whilst accomplishing vital tasks then it is money well spent . If the training could be accomplished in the ever more capable simulators such as what the RAF use extensively to cut down wear on extremely expensive airframes and it is an institutional aversion to anything but real time,hands on experience then it needs to be re-thought. Using our friend Google many Naval simulators exist but how good are they? If sufficient to train up to the proscribed level without the wear and tear on a hugely expensive asset that won’t be scheduled to be replaced for over a generation or more then a top down policy change needs to be applied. With ever dwindling numbers of high end hulls availability for their actual purpose ASW and AAW in protection of HVU’s , not only in maintainance but geographical location other ways of training need to be developed.
@DN
“Does the navy not rotate individual members of crews every 2-5 years between ships (don’t know purely asking)? if so that should not be too much of a problem, I did say it could be used as a patrol vessel as well.”
So you think that the bridge team and ops room non ASW member of which there would still have to be some would not suffer at all from this lack of ability to train multi role? Just draft them every 2 or so years and everything will be fine?
“air weapons and other magazines’
Why these items? these are the sort of items that would be deleted. You are basically turning a T23 into a patrol vessel with a towed array.”
It still has to defend itself so you need weapons and magazines and ASW is far more effective with a helicopter, which is also the weapon carrier of choice should it have to engage as submarine hence the air weapons mag.
Who (or what) said this….
The primary role of our military presence in the Caribbean is to deliver security and reassurance to the Overseas Territories, especially in disaster relief operations. In Atlantic Patrol Task (North) (APT(N)), a Royal Fleet Auxiliary ship maintains a maritime presence in the Caribbean region all year, enhanced with a naval party (including a boarding party and embarked naval helicopter) as necessary. This is normally supplemented by a Royal Navy frigate or destroyer during the hurricane season between May and November.
Is this incorrect or incomplete?
@ Monkey
“an institutional aversion to anything but real time,hands on experience then it needs to be re-thought.”
There types somebody who has never seen the less capable personnel that come off courses that have increased simulator time at the expense of sea time. there is room for both but sims are no substitute for doing things at sea in that hostile environment. They are great at building basic skills and procedures.
However as our deployments to the gulf and the Caribbean perform very real tasks as well as valuable training then it should not be an issue.
@TD
It is a slight misquote from a document that came out of the 2010 security review. did it not actually say “This is normally IMPLEMENTED by a Royal Navy frigate or destroyer during the hurricane season between May and November?
It is also 2015 now.
Just draft them every 2 or so years and everything will be fine?
No but everything is a compromise, what happens now when someone gets drafted from a River to a T23? Is not pre-deployment training for such purposes, to refresh the rusty?
‘air weapons’
Roger, thought you were meaning AAW, my crossed wires.
@APATS
If the present balance between simulator and real time is right then all well and good . In the future with at least one CVF to look after and a reduced number of ff/dd (14?) how will we keep availability. The T45 is all ready being programmed for new engines , who knows what issues will happen when the untried ,and almost equally new designs, enter fleet service and the T23 scrapped? Its not the time at sea doing whatever but availability to support a CBG and the almost certainly accompanying LHD task group as well , there if only to run the fleets helicopters from giving more room for fixed wing on the CVF.
The document was published on 1st march 2012 and the quote in my previous comment was a direct copy and paste but my question was, it is incomplete and/or incorrect
Just trying to get back to a definition of what APT(N) is as a baseline for the discussion because it seems to be a vague or unclear, is there actually a publicly available defined version?
What is frustrating is that we hear from you guys that overstretch is serious, we see it on the news, we read it in the reams of stuff from the MoD and HoC and given that getting more money from the magic money tree is a tad unlikely there surely has to be some debate about alternatives rather than just sending an OPV and that should be doing fisheries protection, counter terrorism and infrastructure protection in and around the UK, robbing Peter to pay Paul.
Of course alternatives which could include actually ceasing the commitment are not wholly within the RN’s or MoD’s gift but that there is little debate to do anything but crack on is saddening to be honest
@TD agreed
I am as guilty as most of batting the issue about around high / medium / low vessels but the basic fact is we are highly unlikely to get any more ships (unless T26 is further delayed). The 3 new OPVS are the bonus. If we can hold onto those as additions we are doing well and I think we should try to do that. They key is then sustaining the full order of 13 T26s (any aspirational hope for 14+ is a decision for some time off anyway), maximising the utility of our existing fleet and looking for evolutionary replacement of key capabilities as they expire. If we can keep the OPVs, forward base a new OPV in the FI, bring Clyde back and base in Gib. The other 2 can be based in WI and UK. Thus we then have a permanent visible presence in WI, UK, Gib, FI and Gulf (MCMs). While we are not planning amphib assaults any time soon, the Bays and Argus become / stay as the supporting workhorse assets to these remote locations as required- temp hangers on all the bays if not already. DDs/FFs continue to visit as part of training / deterrent deployments but if they can’t we still maintain the local presence. Long term planning for Bay, Albion and Argus replacements should include permanent hangers on all and ensure they are as ‘flexible’ assets as possible.
“air weapons and other magazines’
Why these items? these are the sort of items that would be deleted. You are basically turning a T23 into a patrol vessel with a towed array.”
Not much point in detecting, classifying and localising a submarine if you can’t then drop something unpleasant on him. Which means you need a mag.
@TD Just found your document, there are docs with both words :) To answer your question, any document that tries to specify assets rather than aims will be out of date pretty quickly.
“Of course alternatives which could include actually ceasing the commitment are not wholly within the RN’s or MoD’s gift but that there is little debate to do anything but crack on is saddening to be honest”
Sometimes there is no magic bullet though, the best solution being the least bad one. Never thought of that? Lots of ideas on here but when you actually point out practicalities you see the issues. Believe it or not people do think about these things.
@DN
“No but everything is a compromise, what happens now when someone gets drafted from a River to a T23? Is not pre-deployment training for such purposes, to refresh the rusty?”
There are not many if any AW or ASW rates on a River Class though.
‘There are not many if any AW or ASW rates on a River Class though’
I assume there isn’t but the concept still stands as we are discussing a sonar equipped patrol vessel with aviation facilities and not a River.
@DN
“I assume there isn’t but the concept still stands as we are discussing a sonar equipped patrol vessel with aviation facilities and not a River.”
The concept does not stand at all, nobody from a River is going to transfer to am Ff/DD ops room other than an Officer post 13 months PWO training. ASW and AW /EW ratings and indeed PWOs on your TAS ship who have had zero multi role experience and would not even bee at OPS are going to transfer however and that would lead to a big hit on operational efficiency.
@APATS
‘zero multi role experience and would not even bee at OPS are going to transfer however and that would lead to a big hit on operational efficiency’
So how do you absorb newly qualified personnel now?
APATS, not suggesting there is a magic bullet, we both know they are a myth, but very little discussion about any bullets other than ‘must do like we mostly always have’
RE. “2. You reduce the capital spend on full capability ships by substituting “cheaper” ships to the same total and give the money saved to someone else”
– we’ve already done that, as an inheritance from the days of”within NATO specialition” Cold War?
Now that manpower (the cost of…Oops! That’s where the money went, and could not be given to”somewhere else”) is the effective constraint and those ships are becoming ripe for scrapping, we could do some spreadsheet planning afresh?
“” we could count in capability terms (the Japanese 888 concept) rather than hulls (AAW being different from ASW…)? That would bring cost to the focus (Canada estimated they would have to fork out 1.5 bn for each AB, if they wanted a fleet of all-rounders), the already high unit costs going up further, but would reduce the number of hulls required (manpower being the most expensive element in thru-life cost).”
And that would be the end of many standing tasks (in their present form). Maintain readiness for the real thing , let the 100+ Coast Guards (or near-equivalent navies) that exist do their job? Chip in some military assistance (training, seconding officers and specialists…).
@DN
“So how do you absorb newly qualified personnel now?”
We train them from their basic level as very junior operators initially in single discipline but then as part of a team in multi threat environments. What we do not do is send them to a ship where they can only ever practice in a single environment or even worse pull them out from a more senior level send them to this stove piped “tas tail” and then expect them to come back into a multi role environment operationally efficient.
I have quite a bit of training experience.
@TD
How do you know what sort of conversations go on within the force generation and planning personnel? However they start from a position that negates some of the ideas we see on here.
@APATS
‘We train them from their basic level as very junior operators initially in single discipline but then as part of a team in multi threat environments.’
Fine, then a drafting to these vessels would not be for the newly qualified and to be drafted you would be required to have served a minimum term on a ship that experiences multi threat environments, once your drafting to TAPS is finished pre-deployment training will get the rust off. If the vessels on TAPS deployed for less time more frequently and by virtue of being based at home would this help retainment?
‘What we do not do is send them to a ship where they can only ever practice in a single environment’
Except a drafting to the Rivers of course. What’s the personnel system with the current River’s?
‘How do you know what sort of conversations go on within the force generation and planning personnel?’
But are you not planning your force generation requirements from the basis of the fleet you have now, vessels being commissioned shortly and future vessels such as the T26, but not from the basis of alternative vessels for taskings? Is that not how the 9 month deployment’s came into being?
@DN
“Except a drafting to the Rivers of course. What’s the personnel system with the current River’s?”
I really do not have time this afternoon to explain the different branches within the RN. People drafted to rivers do not serve in ops rooms on FF/DDS as warfare specialists, simples. The impact of one vesl because how can we have more than one as it can only do one thing would have no affect on retention, it could have a negative affect as it would place more stress on other vessels on the deployed taskings.
Perhaps fleet gen was not the right example but these conversations do happen at high levels and the answer is always the same and that is what is made public.
For instance you “TAS idea” would not be floated as everyone in the room would understand the minimal manning savings made, the adverse affect on training of warfare ratings and the lack of flexibility offered by the platform.
APATS, am confident these kinds of things are discussed, would be surprised if they weren’t to be honest, but why not here :)
@TD
See my last sentence of my last comment :) I think I am pretty patient.
@APATS
‘People drafted to rivers do not serve in ops rooms on FF/DDS as warfare specialists’
So you are discussing that specific trade fair enough. The TAPS vessel (if you want to call it that) would require some warfare specialists to use the sonar.
‘how can we have more than one as it can only do one thing’
It’s a stripped down T23 with the Sonar retained why would we just have one, could they not replace the FF/DD’s on some standing tasks? And would they not be just as capable as the new Rivers if not more capable regardless of the sonar.
“t’s a stripped down T23 with the Sonar retained why would we just have one, could they not replace the FF/DD’s on some standing tasks? And would they not be just as capable as the new Rivers if not more capable regardless of the sonar.”
They would be but they would be far more expensive to man and run, They would also still be no use other than the Caribbean or TAPs which is a role contained within the op cycle of the current tasks anyway.
Bored with training and simulators… Where have all the spreadsheets gone?
(To lighten up the mood…)
@APATS
‘They would be but they would be far more expensive to man and run’
They would yes, but cost less to run than a T26 or T45. With the added benefit that we already own them, and on a plus side they would also offer a surge capacity to the surface fleet by way of being already fitted with a silo and have been plumbed or have space for plumbing for other systems and crew accommodation etc
I think what APATS is driving at is that the ships are rotated around inside the fleet to do various taskings and then you have to fit in maintance of the ship and then when it will come back to the UK for a overhaul, amongst other things no doubt. I don’t know too much about ships but to I can equate it to the a/c world and a small fleet (single figures) with some of the having a large change in capability would be a real headache, trying to match it into various cycles be they maintance, training, ops or something else. I think it would limit you far more than any benefit.
‘I don’t know too much about ships but to I can equate it to the a/c world and a small fleet (single figures) with some of the having a large change in capability would be a real headache’
I have no doubts that it would not be easy to do, it will however cost less than a new vessel and all of our fleet bar the T23 are single figures in terms of numbers already. The change in capability is a step down in terms of surface warfare and self protection and involves mainly the removal of systems some of which should have been budgeted for (removal of Artisan for an example) in the T26 programme.
Could the process not be done as the first T23 gets its systems removed to fit onto the T26?
@DN – I have thought about your idea before but in the context of a worst case of axing 3 T23s at SDSR 2015 but managing to hold onto them in ‘reserve’ stripped down as you say – 2 in Albion style extended readiness and one active as ‘ASW reserve / training vessel’ – rotation for which one is active. Would give us some contingency. Essentially mothballing some of the fleet rather than out an out scrapping. However, I can’t see us getting both a full 13 T26s and some stripped down T23s due to manning constraints. For the present time 19 escorts and anything between 4 and 7 active OPVs would I think be seen as a ‘win’ at SDSR 15.
@DN
Their price in comparison to a 45 or 26 is irrelevant as they cannot complete their tasks.
@mickp
‘For the present time 19 escorts and anything between 4 and 7 active OPVs would I think be seen as a ‘win’ at SDSR 15’
I think that result would be the very best the navy could hope for, but I cannot see a bloodless SDSR for the dark blue or the army. The second carrier has been promised and the money needs to be found for that as a minimum with no increase in defence spending in real terms during the next parliament at least.
@APATS
I was thinking that they could cover TAPS and the standing patrol tasks in the Caribean and those Islands down south, and pretty much every where we would use a patrol vessel, which they would be more than capable of doing.
What tasks are you thinking of?
It would be nice to see a list of peacetime tasking requirements because with the exception of real-life sensor use, I can’t see how anything else is anything but a simulation – which can be conducted anywhere.
So having a ship with Artisan and/or 2087 is a great idea even if it has no CAMM, Stingray or Merlin to engage. It becomes a training ship that can also be used in war as the sensor platform. This becomes especially applicable if people believe that the future is CEC (in whichever form).
Also, creating familiarity for the operator wouldn’t go amiss – that way it shouldn’t matter which vessel they’re on. They just plug in and go… just like anyone that hot-desks to their Citrix desktop or expects the kettle to have tea, sugar and a fridge near by.
Okay, I admit it would be a bit mad not to embark a Wildcat and RHIB because that allows us to use it for constabulary duties… but just how far do we have to go to deliver our peacetime tasking requirements?
We haven’t even validated the need for a warship down south, nevermind about one in the Caribbean.
It would be nice to see a list of peacetime tasking requirements because with the exception of real-life sensor use, I can’t see how anything else is anything but a simulation – which can be conducted anywhere.
So having a ship with Artisan and/or 2087 is a great idea even if it has no CAMM, Stingray or Merlin to engage. It becomes a training ship that can also be used in war as the sensor platform. This becomes especially applicable if people believe that the future is CEC (in whichever form).
Also, creating familiarity for the operator wouldn’t go amiss – that way it shouldn’t matter which vessel they’re on. They just plug in and go… just like anyone that hot-desks to their Citrix desktop or expects the kettle to have tea, sugar and a fridge near by.
Okay, I admit it would be a bit mad not to embark a Wildcat and RHIB because that allows us to use it for constabulary duties… but just how far do we have to go to deliver our peacetime tasking requirements?
We haven’t even validated the need for a warship down south, nevermind about one in the Caribbean.
@DN Taps will be covered as it is now within the Flop cycle and the other roles by OPV or RFA which are cheaper and it cannot do the 26 45 roles so it will be more expensive
@ APATS,
I remember a ways back (2011/12?) when we were discussing Somalia and the like, and the second you pointed out that RN ships only really did this when passing through and it wasn’t a dedicated task, that’s when the penny dropped and everything started to fit into place. Might be useful (if you have the time, or TAS does) to do the same here?
So for example my understanding is that FRE and duty TAPS are almost side roles (perhaps not the best explanation) performed by ships in home waters i.e. the TAPS ship isn’t literally plodding around the north atlantic for six/seven months at a time. It’s more akin to being on call (was it HMS Sutherland that appeared at a defence expo and did a bunch of other exercises in 2013 while ostensibly being duty TAPS?). And perhaps (time and security permitting) an example of how it’s scheduled in might be useful for the thread? So for example “ship A” comes back from APT(s), crew goes on leave for a bit, then ship A serves as duty TAPS for six months, then goes into refit. Or whatever the set up is.
I’m 100% with you on this one though. Don’t see the point in a light/neutered frigate.
@Chris.B.
Was it this one?
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2012/05/cuts-to-piracy-patrol/#comment-52000
For everyone else, this was two and a half years ago, Somalia focused, but there were similar conversations going on around the same time with TAPS, APT(N/S), etc.
The wiki resource on RN taskings for those interested:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Standing_Royal_Navy_deployments
@ TOC,
It wasn’t, sorry (though interesting look back in time none the less). I think it was on one of the threads for TD’s “Simms” concept.
@ TOC,
I can’t find the original thread for the piracy discussion, but I just remembered one of APATS long comments (from yet another thread) which he and TD let me post on my own blog (mainly to preserve as a reference for moments like this!) and there was this line on it; “Ship B if not in refit has slotted into the UK tasking cycle of training, FRE or TAPS as required.” [Ship B in this case having come back from a long overseas deployment and just finished a leave period].
Hmm, think this one may have been the reprise:
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2014/08/us-coastguard-royal-navy-partnership/#comment-302066
@TD
# I am sorry if I missed your point.
I think you are suggesting to “discuss” possibilities to:
– get as many T26 as possible (say 9 or 10) and since the number will fall short of current 13 of T23, then just abandon APT(N), i.e. give it to anybody else (e.g. local government) and also reduce the size (e.g. 2 Archer-sized patrol boats)
– in addition to the current “increase OPV” and/or “reduce the operation cost of FF (by stripping weapons)” discussion.
As a Japanese, I am not familiar with the situation of west indies, but looks like the economy of the british territories there are not powerful enough to stand against their Hurricane (as well as volcano) disaster. And what is more, the drug-smuggling still looks like a “clear and present danger”. Then, you need to keep something there not to make these island “a shelter for smugglers”.
So no matter who pays, I think you need a standing operation there (OR just present the islands to US and also pay (not get) money and let they do it).
Then the issue is, what is the cheapest solution?
To me, a single OPV looks fine (better be two for 24/7/365 op.). If you have 2-3 Islanders/Defenders flight ashore, it will be perfect. We in Japan has relatively large cost guard equipped with tens of OPVs. Many of these vessels do NOT have helicopter hanger, simply because they will not deploy “very far away” from our land and air support is provided by fixed wing airplanes (which I suppose is much cheaper to operate a helicopter on a ship). We have helicopters, but I think there are there primary for SAR tasks (I need to check).
Disaster relief, if it is too significant for an OPV, you can ask help from US and/or task larger ship from UK.
cheers
I find it ironic that the US. Navy in need of Frigates, can’t by directly from foreign sources, because of the “Jones Act” of 1920. But, the US. Army can…
@ The Other Chris.
The “Jones Act” of 1920, Prohibits the Government of the United States of America and the US. Navy, from buy DIRECTLY from a Foreign Government or a Agent of that Government. There is a “Loophole” in the Clause, the US. Air Force and US. Army are exempt from that Clause. When the Drafter of the Act made it, they didn’t foresee the day’s of World War II. So they were never included in the Act. And the US. Air Force, didn’t exist as a separate Command Structure until 1947…
@Secundias
Appreciate that, hence the “Hypothetically speaking…” preface. A T26 joint build would have been feasible via expansion of BAE Systems US shipyards (e.g. facilities and teams in Mobile, AL per Austal precedent) if engagement had been early enough in the process, which is the source of the question on where that point would have lain.