OK, so I know I have not been a great supporter of Project CVF and I still remain rather sceptical about the whole thing to be honest but you cannot fail to marvel at the engineering.
From this
through these stages
to this
https://www.flickr.com/photos/greg-urquhart/14558106074/
I think a hats off is in order
PS
My new best mates at the MoD have risen to the infogram piss taking challenge :)
And I could not resist this one
Magnificent indeed!
Hope it floats! He He…
Its a bit like the Olympics. everyone bitches about the cost but I dare say even RT will have a bit of a lump in his throat tomorrow.
By making sure the Carriers cost more to cancel than build the Navy has pulled of a bit of an RAF type coupe. It was amazing reminiscing the other day about How many times that have been delayed or attempted to cancel then changing the type of aircraft they will operate twice.
its amazing that we have reached this stage and MOD f**king about aside the build has gone relativly smoothly? I don’t think any of us could imagine reaching this point back in 1998. we have managed to achieve a feet that the UK has been unable to do since the mid 1940’s. start and complete one of the largest aircraft carriers in the world.
Let’s just hope we can get more than air fix models to fly from them.
Bringing that in and out of Portsmouth will be fun for the QHM. I hope they measured it.
That info graphic has given me an idea. 470 London buses on the deck with 100 guys a piece should mean that we can get the entire british Army packed on to two carriers.
Not sure if we should be happy about having such large carriers or sad about having such a small army.
Martin
We can have a small army, what we have is enough.
What we need is a decent RN & RAF. They should be the priority.
Its very impressive indeed! Yes we all have our misgivings about either all or parts of this project but this isn’t the day for that!
May God protect her and all those who sail in her!!
To be honest despite all the Fekking about, they are relatively cheap as the only near comparables are The Fords at a Gazillion dollars each and a small township onboard, or the clockwork powered Indian jobbie, which is not a bargain in any way shape or form…
As long as all the automatic machinery onboard does it’s job reliably they should both be useable, and in the long run end up costing nowt in comparison to the above in manpower savings alone over fifty years…
Accepted, truly an awe inspiring piece of technology, its a shame we can’t capitalise on the situation and build a couple more for export. Given the tensions in the Far East, would it be wrong to try and get the Japanese to buy one?
Congratulations to the Royal Navy. Long, hard road, but you guys got there in the end.
Ford:
Crew
2,500 to 2,700
Aircrew
Approximately 2,480
Flag Crew
70
INS Vikramaditya
110 officers and 1500 sailors
Aircrew???
QE:
Crew 6-700 (Was supposed to be six but it does seem to be growing?)
Aircrew 900
We’re cheap as chips!
Not too late to cut a chunk out of her arse and fill her with wagons and landing craft. Then she might actually be useful, instead of being a parasite on the budget.
Bloody boats.
Well she’s not a pretty ship, that’s for sure . . .
@ Daniele Mandelli
I would be more worried about getting her under the Forth Rail Bridge than in to Portsmouth. The clearance will be unbelievably tight and will only be made possible with a large jar of vasiline that was added into the original cost when Gordon Brown was at the Treasury and insisted it was built in his constituency.
If BAE change the F35 production line to Tatton we might get a few more of them built as well. Mind you Osborne already spunked 600 million quid moving HS2 around his constituency so maybe he has already used his allotment ;-)
Its a pitty we wont be getting the fly past for the 3 F35B’s
We should not have laughed at the Russians fire on their T50 :-)
That picture of her next to Illustrious really does make her look jolly impressive. I note that the good old BBC (Today program) kept on announcing this morning that QE “won’t be in service until 2020”. Idiots.
Red Trousers
“parasite on the budget.”
LOL.
A really fantastic day. It has been a long journey and she has many battles ahead – by that I mean political battles. Nice seeing her sit next to Lusty. she seemed such a big ship but she really is tiny. A day many thought they would never see. Welcome HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH, you may be big but you’ve got some big boots to fill.
Am I the only one thinking that that iconic image of HMS Illustrious next to her, looking rather small, will the the death knell of demands to bring the second into full service
3 Illustrious = 1 QE
You all know how it works
PR blunder I think, and don’t get me started on having an Airfix model of the F35 on the ramp.
Daniele,
I’ll wait for you to explain your slightly curious comment above as to why the RN and RAF should be given priority.
If you look back at our history, you will find that in the last 100 years the RN and RAF have been enablers, not the actual forces who conducted the campaigns through to conclusion. It would be interesting to understand why you think that will change as we enter the future, and hence your prioritisation.
Hi Red Trousers.
For me, we will always be part of a Coalition which can supply manpower on the rare occasions we ( stupidly in my opinion ) occupy other countries. While the RAF and the RN are the true “Power Projection” assets that can give the UK some clout without having to deploy a large army.
On occasions where we will not be in a large coalition, Falklands being the prime example, there is no need for a large army.
If things with Russia / Ukraine go tits up and we face off against them again then indeed build a larger army.
Until then. RN, RAF, UKSF and Intelligence would be my priorities. Ground forces keep at 1 Armoured Division and a proper 16AAB and 3Cdo, not the trimmed down versions we are now stuck with.
Rgds Dan.
Thats a bit of a simplistic thought TD. Hammond has got a grip on the capability planning process and will not let the Treasury bounce him into any stupid decisions. The time to be worried is if some unfocussed numpty gets into the hot seat after the election or a reshuffle.
We have Ocean and Lusty working round each other now. We will have QE and PoW doing something similar after 2020.
The only question in my mind is whether they operate a pure one-on one-off or whether they ever overlap allowing us occasionallly to practice surge operations with separated FJ and Commando Carrriers.
Bloody great stuff.
@RT: quite right that the Army finishes wars. But sadly our current political class seem to want to rule out finishing wars with victories, but prefer to leave them festering on, inviting further pain later on
Dan,
I don’t think you understand the nature of power, or the constraints on projection.
Power is endurance, not measured in the tiny timescales of a boat “loitering” over the horizon, but in many many months, years or even decades. The RAF are just a bus service. The constraints on projection for those two services are that they have not got strategic lift, but that is not an issue, as there are enough commercial alternatives.
Look at how we actually moved stuff into theatre for all of the big operations since the Zulu War. Commercial. Then look at which service actually conducted the decisive operation.
I don’t mind floaty little boats, they keep the Andrew happy. But they are not decisive in any sense, and certainly not worth buying in preference to kit that actually does conclude campaigns favourably.
@TD
But not 3X Invisible, and Ocean?
Peter
I agree.
I would be delighted with occasional overlap but if I’m honest I’d go down on my knees and thank God that we get both, even if one is in reserve. Does the RN even have the people now to run both?
RT
“Look at how we actually moved stuff into theatre for all of the big operations since the Zulu War. Commercial. ”
If you want to look at what happens to ‘commercial’ when inadequately screened from hostile intervention in landing operations you have to go back little further than the Atlantic Conveyor. How much of a loss were those choppers towards concluding that campaign?.
@RT
Do not forget the power of Naval Blockade which has been a decisive factor in all the World Wars. Germany, Japan and France have all lost wars becuase they lost control of the sea.
Yes we sent armies to fight them on land. But choking off their trade very significantly weakened the enemy land forces, to the point of collapse.
@ Daniele Mandelli
The RN does not have the man power to run the vessels it has let alone another carrier.
Giev the fact the POW is getting built and I don’t think anyone other than the Chinese could afford to buy her I think we will get both with one in reserve. Compared to a £34 billion budget keeping another carrier in reserve won’t cost much.
If we get a defence pledge from Cameron on 2% of GDP and we don’t see further cuts then I think we have a decent chance of getting both. even for our cash strapped military £70 million is not a lot.
Once the ships are operational and politicians have got use to swanning around the world stage with them I doubt they will want to give them up for the minor savings it would generate.
Now the Army has dropped below the magic 100,000 figure it will be easier for politicians to seek further cuts from the Army of more savings are needed.
Am having fun on Twitter at the moment
erm, the RN has not ‘gotten there in the end’
There is still a lot to do to even get her kitted out…
lol the beginning of the story ain’t over yet…not by a long chalk.
But the thinking ya get, feels like she’s ready to sail off into the sunset with “shine on you crazy diamond” playing!
That is a lot of space… the RN will have plenty of sports to play on them ;)
Still pretty damn good we did it on our own, this one… not with US help like Astute. No European collaboration like Typhoon, and no standing still for a few decades hemorrhaging money, like FRES. All good.
But I can’t help but think of the inevitable compromises the RN has made… withdrawing ships and also in its design, like no proper self defensive means other than CIWS.
RT
Thanks, I accept your points as well.
I still feel that the UK can get more influence as a P5 member with resources into the RN and RAF more than the army.
That said, I am not advocating reducing the size of the army, I was against going below 100000.
All 3 services have their part to play. My feeling is what we have can still do the job, given the kit as you say, where’s the cuts since 1998 have reduced the RAF and RN to an unacceptable level.
Example – RAF had 22 Combat Squadrons as recently as 1998 I think? Now has 7, soon 6. Disgraceful.
Air power is also one of the first things the army cries out for. Either the SHF or Fast Air.
Our largest army deployment was, what, GW1 or 2? And that was rare. We still have 3rd Division to achieve that. now.
Regards
Dan
@ Peter Eliott
after watching 37 days this week. I did note that the Germans did not seem to be overly bothered by the Royal Navy. although possibly the decisive factor in both world wars was the Naval superiority of the allies.
That being said an enemy will always attack you were your a weakest and due to overwhelming allied superiority at sea and the air the Army is still likely to fight the majority if the battles.
However does that mean we need an Army of 100k or 82K or 65 K? its open to debate.
Being a civvie I’ve never quite got the turf wars between RN RAF & Army. I have always hoped it was friendly sparring not genuine argument. Remove any one of the three from the armed forces and the other two (as now structured) are much less effective; there is reliance in all directions for successful defence of the nation. Clearly when budgets squeeze each service will feel its own pain more than that of the others and will argue the reduction of funding as unfair or dangerous to the nations defence – well meaning and probably justified claims – but the real answer is better funding, not nicking the other guy’s icecream.
An alternative approach, which most here dismiss as stupid naive and unworkable, is to stop buying the most expensive do-anything kit that money can’t quite buy, and instead look at useful robust probably adequate kit in larger numbers, some of the equipment saving going on increased manning levels. With a fixed budget that seems to be the only way to increase the armed forces footprint around the world.
@RT
“The RAF are just a bus service”
You mean like a Ryan Air Force :-)
Agreed on shipping by air , their is a huge commercial capacity to tap into.
(Lets hope its work up is a lot smoother than the CDG’s was)
Flicking through Warships IFR magazine in Smiths, I noticed the French shipbuilders had an artists mock up of an enlarged, modernised Charles de Gaulle type carrier, they were trying to talk the French gov into ordering. Wonder if it is an updated version of their 58,000 ton 2004 proposal?
On a side note had a look at the infogram @3:10…Is it me or are the ships propellers on the wrong way round :), One hopes this sort of thing hasnt made it through to the final build ;) could get embarasing when trying to run the engines up for the first time :)
Monkey,
The RAF is nothing like Ryanair. At least the airline has heard of customer service, even if it fails to deliver. Have you ever met a member (a deliberate choice of word) of the RAF Movements Staff?
I struggle to decide which is the worst of the Kevins. Fast jets who don’t turn up in time because the moon is in Sagittarius or some other excuse, the Support Helicopters who land in the wrong field after a 5 day patrol in South Armagh, the chippy Spec Air Crew who man the Royal Flight and decide they are too important to stay in a Corimec in Banja Luka when CDS was quite happy to, and then get trapped by fog in Split, thus cunting up the entire visit, the Movers who just generally balls up everything and are not bothered, or the Walter Mittys in the RAF Regiment.
I’ve not ever had any dealings with the AWACS/MPA/ISTAR lot, but would expect similar disappointments. Shoddy service all round.
Of course you need a large army to seize and hold hostile territory, but you know what the days of the empire are over so it’s at the bottom of the must have list in my view.
If defence is the key, let’s not forget the defence of our ocean assets as well. For that you need to be ready to go toe to toe with a peer advisory, which means SSNs and carrier groups. One thought if someone invaded the UK we have CASD, but would we use it if someone did the same to our EEZ like is happening in the South China sea?
@ Guthy
They are not propellers. They won’t be fitted until she is floated out. Can’t remember what they are called? Someone will be along shortly with the correct name! They are for testing the whole propulsion system without having to go to sea.
Although with several reservations about the design and vulnerability, I admire, as you do, the engineering.
However, I am saddened to find that despite the ski-jump making this carrier operationally capable, no one has found it appropriate to pay tribute to its inventor, Lt Cdr Douglas Taylor, RN, whose dedication in the face of MoD opposition has never been adequately acknowledged.
First flight or first of class launch is always a bit special for all the people that helped to design and build her. I hope they enjoys the day a raise a dram in her honour.
Give all the planes to the RN, and all the helicopters to the AAC (apart from SAR / AntiSub), then disband the RAF.
Sure there is a saving there somewhere!
After utilising the transport services of both Naval and RAF aircrew on Op TELIC, I know who I’d rather be relying on.
Kinda cheated on the breaking of the bottle though… just sayin’
After Astute, they were taking no chances.
What she lacks in conventional good looks she more than makes up for in sheer size and raw power (potential power i should say!).
Whatever people think of the overall project i don’t think that should detract from the engineering triumph we are seeing taking a huge leap forwards today.
As other people have already stated she has been built in good time with minimum of fuss, without any assistance like we got on Astute and the price inflation mostly coming from pathetic project delays designed to save a penny then to spend a pound later plus the F35 u-turn.
To the speech writers for the event; B is for brevity. Jesus.
@Thread – genuine question, and not an effort to lose more friends; my layman’s take on Iraq and Afghanistan is that if we had been able to take a Corps to the first and keep a Division in the second we would have had real traction in respect of the overall planning and conduct of the campaign…and might (MIGHT) have influenced outcomes for the better; but that at any scale less than that although we may have been valued allies for other reasons, our influence on policy was strictly limited. We were, in effect, trusted Auxiliaries to the Cousin’s Legions…and even saying that is likely to result in at least some disobliging comments from the other side of the Pond about Basra, Helmand and elsewhere.
That would presumably require an Army three times bigger than it was at the time, and although I personally would prefer HMAF to be significantly bigger overall, I am not sure that those numbers could even be achieved in anything less than full scale war…
That being the case, surely there is a genuine argument for emphasising expeditionary power…which includes Elephants and world wide air-power…provided we also build up air and sea-lift (even if it is by the planned and resourced use of Reservists and “taken up from trade powers” )…so that we can genuinely put as substantial a force as we can manage anywhere we damn well please in no short order…
And the next time a land campaign comes up we are absolutely clear that we can kick doors in with the best of them, but cannot do long engagements…simply because without a much bigger Army we will all but invariably be handing out hostages to fortune…by trying to hold a big place with insufficient men?
Retreats to bunker with ample supplies for a prolonged engagement… :-)
GNB
RAF Movement Staff are the worst humans alive. “Propeller wearing c***s” is how they tend to be described. Proper little Hitlers!
From some chippy Senior Aircraftman: “Sirs, Ma’ams. Ladies and Gents. Listen in for the nominal roll. Excuse ranks: Dannatt, Richards etc etc”.
@ Ed Zepplin
‘Excuse ranks: Dannatt, Richards etc etc”.’
Surely it was; Jackson, Mike (rumoured to be) first uttered? Or perhaps it was Caesar, Juilius? ;)
Tell you what though, you would have to have some big balls to say Jackson, Mike
Am surprised he didn’t get up and spark him out
Great day for the Royal Navy.
@Chris.B
I thought the First Sea Lord made quite a good speech.
GNB – ref kick in doors and leave – if the Army doesn’t stay for extended COIN then what are they going to do with all those shiny MRAPs brought into core?? To justify their usefulness I would have thought the strategists would be searching the globe for opportunities to insert a stabilisation policing force for the long haul…
@TD
Well there goes my weak effort…
Anyway, I’ve heard that tale with several high ranking officers names, I think it’s just an urban myth.
Urban myth perhaps, but eminently believable!
I’m never one to be bothered by such matters, as mainly I’m not a General ;) However their inability to move around an aircraft without driving something in to it (usually steps) does bother me and is definitely not an urban myth!
Just Look at Her.
I keep repeating myself AWSOME is the only word.
A true credit to the nation, in no way can anyone in the world no see that as know that Britain is Great once again.
A 70,600 Stealth Ship. Who whould do something that crazy !?!?! except the British LOL
She does look magnificent, and she is a triumph of engineering. What is incredible is just how difficult people here find it to understand the concept and relevance of power projection.
Putting boots on the ground to occupy countries has never been a feature of successful foreign policy. Anyone arguing for an increase in the Army has been blinded by the total irrelevance of the last eleven years of combat operations. The invasion of Iraq and operations in Afghanistan were complete and total failures. We should never had undertaken those operations. Gulf War One had more relevance, and should be held up as the shining example of what any major intervention should limit itself to. Defeat an invasion, and stop at the border. Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Libya – there are the interventions we will conduct in the future. And we will not go alone. We are too vulnerable – economically, diplomatically, militarily and above all vulnerable to the newly enabled generations of ‘freedom fighters’/terrorists who can apparently cross international borders at will. And our increasing dependence on technology and computing power makes us hugely vulnerable to the most capable cyber adversaries. We will go in force with allies and international support, or we will not go at all.
Britain is a world player. We sit at the top tables of all major influential organisations. We are a nuclear power and an economic key player. The world values Britain and her output in all forms and we influence the biggest players. Say what you like about the latest European debacle, but Cameron got the EU running scared and has effectively pumped grass roots support across Europe for the opposition to federalist integration. None of that comes from an Army of any size. Ground power is there as a last resort. When everything else has failed, and only if the situation warrants it, will we risk anything like that. We need one – but they will not have a handy war to go and practice in.
It comes from being there across the world. We embarrassed the hell out of the Australians by getting a carrier, destroyer and strategic air transport to the Philippines weeks before they did. We have major influence across the Middle East in the complex power-play of military activities and diplomatic gain – look at our stake in the Gulf region – enabled by maritime and air power. No boots anywhere, except for some tiny training missions in Africa. That’s not to belittle the fine work they do – but it’s less than a piss in the ocean by comparison. The ability to reach long distances is what gives us that capability.
Are carriers the solution? Of course not. The crowd that slag off the new carriers as ‘elephants’ have no idea of their utility but they are not an exclusive solution. That’s why we have a global network of bases we can depend on – Gibraltar, Ascension, Cyprus, Diego Garcia (and the nameless isles, for completeness). We have massive influence and huge basing capabilities in Bahrain and Al Udeid, and we retain significant influence and operational freedom in Singapore. But carriers give you overt presence and operational freedom. They are not invulnerable, but then neither is the threat so terrible and they have the best escorts in the world – nothing is as capable as the T45 at air defence. Even Syria doesn’t have the sheer weight of firepower necessary to overwhelm a carrier battle group – and that’s assuming they can even find the carrier in the first place. It’s a big ocean.
I’ve gone on enough, but please give the RN and RAF some credit. We know how to fight at the high-end, and that’s plenty enough for all of our potential enemies. Where we fall short, we do so by dint of Service and political meddling in budgets and procurement and in most cases can depend fully on allied support to cover the gaps. We have world interests that are shared by many. That is the reality of global power projection today. These carriers, for all their faults, give us a hugely significant capability that cannot, and will not be ignored. Far more so than any ground formation.
Anyway, seems to me this thing will be ready well before FRES…
@ Waylander,
He could have delivered the same effect but in a much shorter manner I fell. At one point I was worried that Prince Phillip might die waiting for him to finish. Then it occurred to me that they might take Phillip on a tour of the ship and given his proness for unfortunate comments maybe that would have been the least worst option for the Royals.
@ TAS,
“but Cameron got the EU running scared and has effectively pumped grass roots support across Europe for the opposition to federalist integration”
— Hahahahahahaha! No.
If that were a pub fight then it would be the equivalent of Cameron shouting “c’mon boys!”, the Hungarian fella getting up to stand with him, and then everyone else kicking the utter shit out of them and then laughing them out of the pub.
He catastrophically misjudged the situation and was left looking like a prize twat.
Edit; Forgot to add, Cameron is a federalist at heart. If he could get rid of those pesky backbenchers and half his supporters then he’d take an EU superstate like a shot.
If I could I would like to personaly congratulate everybody involved in the design and construction of this ship. I believe we will one day all be very glad of their hard work and dedication, as we will be of the servicemen and women and support staff and civilians who run and mainatin her throughout her life. I cannot wait to see her enter Porstmouth for the first time, enter service in 2018 and head off for her first deployment. A great day in the history of our Island Nation.
Having spent a fortune on these ships, I do hope we go on to do the aircraft carrier thing properly – at least in the context of the path we’re on at the moment.
We do need proper aircraft packages for the ships, and we need both ships. The French pretty much ran their only carrier into the ground during the Libya campaign.
Five months of intensive use to round off a couple of years of heavy use. The head of their navy said afterwards that had Libya dragged on for another couple of months, then Charles de Gaulle would have been non-operational for a year, just for training. Crew training had long stopped, and they were getting by only by retaining the people who would otherwise have left the service already under normal conditions.
I think it’s a reasonable ambition for us to be able eventually to relieve a carrier and modest airwing during an operation for that extra endurance.
Impressive, but ..
I’m ignorant of things nautical. I have been on one cruise, for our silver wedding anniversary, in the Med and that set me thinking.
In terms of size
The cruise ship had a bloody big space for the theatre. It is much heavier and the same length but not as wide as QE Class. It carries carried 1000 crew and 2,500 passengers. It is one of a fleet of 12 and one of the smaller ships in the fleet.
Even allowing for all the MOD spec and the warry bits it put things in perspective.
The cruise line is buying three new bigger ships for 2.1 billion Euro’s. or €700,000,000 each.
http://tinyurl.com/pkux3me
So is the Carrier Alliance having a laff at the taxpayers expense.
I can only agree with TAS. A magnificant post and I agree with everything said in it, and some.
We are somebody. If the left dislikes that then tough. I’m very proud of my country and the RN today. All of HM forces in fact, including the army!
I also feel that Chris comment earlier on maybe putting a little more emphasis on quantity rather than quality to enable us to get more assets is a very good point. Thus buying decent off the shelf kit along with the Gold plated stuff. Take the new Tides for example.
@Deja Vu
Comparing a cruise liner with a warship is apples and oranges. For instance crusie liners don’t tend to go in for shock protection, subdivision, CBRNDC, combat information systems etc etc. The hull itself is relatively cheap (steel and air). It’s the design and ensuring that the ship can float, fight and move in the event of damage which costs money.
Déjà vu, I suspect you may be confusing gross tonnage, which is a measure of volume, with displacement. The QECs have a displacement not dissimilar from Queen Mary2, which cost almost $1bn some years ago – would be far more with inflation.
That’s before one covers DB’s very pertinent points.
@TAS: small point. If GW1 was a shining success, why did we need to keep garrisons in place for what appeared to be an indefinite time? Doesn’t sound like success to me
@Chris B – Have to respectfully disagree on the EU…the usual suspects at the EU “Parliament” are wind-bagging on about the uselessness of the UK, but a number of serious German folk are making noises about how an EU without the UK is “unimaginable”…can’t recall ever having heard that before…I don’t really think they want to be presented with an even bigger bill by Southern Europe (now including France) to fund other peoples dirigiste economic policies/embezzlement (delete as appropriate). :-)
For me, the jury remains out on this one…
GNB
@wf
In answer to your question, we did not have to keep garrisons in the AOR post GW1. The US did keep about 5k forces in Kuwait and we kept aircraft deployed to keep Saddam honest but other than the horrific incident in Dhahran we did not have “occupation” forces being systematically attacked on the ground.
@wf
What garrisons do you mean?
But we did have Desert Fox, a considerable presence and considerable cost :)
So maybe not a garrison in the traditional sense but certainly a regional presence, a presence that has a price tag
@ TD
Arrh Ali Al Salem, got it. Yeah but we didn’t stay in hotels so minimal costs ;)
@ GNB – We could have sent an entire Army Group to Iraq and it would not have made a blind bit of difference.
No amount of western boots on the ground is going to drag them out of the 14th century.
True the Americans f**ked it up but I am convinced we would have ended up doing much the same no matter how many we had in the theatre.
Desert Fox. An example of the importance of Air Power. Along with GW1, GW2, Kosovo, etc.
Naval Air Power with Carriers will be just as vital.
@Topman, @APATS: I was referring to the RAF detachment in Kuwait, although you could also throw in potential costs if Saddam had decided to come south again. We could hardly have sat on our hands.
@Martin: the US did make a blind bit of difference. Sadly, they decided they wanted to throw it all away.
@daniele.mandelli: Desert Fox was one shootdown away from disaster at all times, just like the patrolling of the no-fly zone. Kosovo proved rapidly that air power alone is both largely irrelevant and effectively cedes the initiative elsewhere, hence all those refugees. Remember? It took an invasion to “sort” the problem.
my layman’s take on Iraq and Afghanistan is that if we had been able to take a Corps to the first and keep a Division in the second we would have had real traction in respect of the overall planning and conduct of the campaign…and might (MIGHT) have influenced outcomes for the better;
But GNB, I don’t think this takes into account two important points.
(a) There was no appetite to be in Iraq beyond May 2003. None at all. There was no real strategy in place to do that and the history of the campaign after and even before May 2003 is a history of politicians fiddling and fretting to get out. Once Helmand kicked off in 2006 then it really was itchy pants time with Chiefs being bombarded with “are we there yet, are we there yet, are we there yet”.
Having a Corps there wouldn’t have changed any of that. There was just no appetite to have anything there other than the bare minimum. The overwhelming weight of feeling was to go in, go in hard and fuck off. But we can see how that fantasy works out in the real world – it just catches you with your knickers down with no strategy when reality intervenes.
(b) Afghanistan is wider than Helmand and wider than any contribution we could have made unless we go into real fantasy land. A division in Helmand, properly employed might have tied things up slightly faster. But there was a considerable flash to bang time from going in there and then realising that we were not in Kansas any more. Add in the lag time to then generate a response, test and adjust and then drive it all home and we’re talking some period of years. We’d have not seen a division in Helmand until about 2009 I reckon and so I don’t see the outcomes as being much different.
Iraq was a cluster fuck. That cluster fuck impacted on the real war. At the moment we’re looking very much like the Germans – able to win at the tactical and operational level but we’re struggling at the strategic. Iraq was our France: the war and area that tied down troops from where the real decision was Afghanistan. Stupid mistake.
@ WF – Re America in Iraq
That’s what I meant. No matter how good a job was done in Iraq pre 2011 we would still have this Sunni insurgency. Its time for the people of Iraq and its Army to make a stand or face living in their Islamic hell/ heaven ( delete as appropriate).
I’m sorry to say but it is their beliefs that are the problem. They can either keep them and live in medieval times or cast them off and progress with the rest of the world.
Its much the same decision we had to make in the 15 th centaury.
even if we interven again and blow the f**k out of ISIS’s we would be right back where we started five years from now.
Putting boots on the ground to occupy countries has never been a feature of successful foreign policy.
You talk a lot of sense in your post, and I agree with good chunks of it, but this sentence falls outside that scope!
RT is right when he says air and sea are enabling capabilities. If the threat is ever big enough at sea or air to be existential then the only way to defeat that threat is to occupy it, or irradiate it. You also contradict yourself when you mention Kosovo and Bosnia and SL as success stories but then post the above.
@Phil
The key word is “occupy” and occupation has never worked for us. by all means use boots on the ground as required but only with.
Clear aims and targets.
A desired end state
An exit strategy
That is how you defeat threats, not setting up as an Army of occupation and becoming targets. Kosovo, Bosnia and SL had targets a desired end state and an exit strategy.
Just as a comment on the MoD publicity machine – they were obviously relying on the F-35 flyby to make a point about the other half of the carrier system. As a result AFAICT all their press packs managed to omit any pics of the F-35, leading to lots of easy commentary about a carrier with no planes. It just seems a careless own-goal in strategic communications – there’s plenty of nice photos about of eg multi-F-35 formations and that one recently of F-35 with Typhoon, it just makes the point that this is something that is now appearing in squadron strength across the pond, it’s more than just an Airfix model. I’ve also had a bit of a hunt for pics of BK-1 and the other British F-35’s which seem rather elusive – again a good pic of one of them would make the point that these things are already flying under British colours. (well, with those rubbish sludgy roundels, ugg)
2nd Army was camping in North Germany in 1945? 8th Army playing footie in Austria? The US divisions in Japan in 1945?
An exit strategy is a complete misnomer. Your “exit” is the fulfilment of the policy aims or acceptance of defeat.
@Phil
2nd Army and 8th Army were accepted by the Populace and facing a very clear and evident threat to the security of Europe which could only be countered by their presence. they were on the new front lines. The Japanese population also accepted their countries surrender. Post a world conflict where we had fought a total war.
No an exit strategy is a realistic acceptance that you may not achieve all your aims. which given Iraq and Afghanistan should be a prerequisite. Any future commitment of UK troops on the ground should be justified by at least these questions being answered prior to deployment.
Why are we going to put boots on the ground?
what is our legal basis for doing so?
What are the aims that we hope to achieve?
Which aims would we settle for achieving?
is there any other way of achieving these aims?
What is our exit strategy? (can be more than one triggered by events).
That is basic planning and questions we pretty obviously failed to ask too often recently. No misnomer at all.
@Martin: sadly you are entirely right today. Since 2011 the Iraqis made their choice: Iran, with whom we have lots of problems. Right now, our best choice is probably to let the Shias and Sunni’s fight it out between themselves. The only problem with this strategy is how we contain the issue if ISIS go for Jordan or Saudi.
@Phil: indeed. As always, selection and maintenance of the aim…
No an exit strategy is a realistic acceptance that you may not achieve all your aims
So it’s a defeat then?
What is our exit strategy? (can be more than one triggered by events).
No, that is an option. Not a strategy. Strategy aligns the means with the ends, always. The ends are decided in an iterative manner between government and military. What you’re talking about is a withdrawal. A strategy based on not winning and having to run away is a strange conception. Being defeated is not a strategy. Changing the ends required is again a very different animal.
2nd Army and 8th Army were accepted by the Populace
After the populace were smashed to bits and also, they weren’t wholly accepted as most history will show you. And they were still by definition armies of occupation.
Does anyone know what targets, desired end state and the exit strategy of both Bosnia and Kosovo where before we intervened?
@ Phil
“No an exit strategy is a realistic acceptance that you may not achieve all your aims
So it’s a defeat then?
In the real world Phil we do not always win, especially the aftermath of a conflict. We need to accpet and be able to plan for it.
No, that is an option. Not a strategy. Strategy aligns the means with the ends, always. The ends are decided in an iterative manner between government and military. What you’re talking about is a withdrawal. A strategy based on not winning and having to run away is a strange conception. Being defeated is not a strategy. Changing the ends is again very different.”
No Phil that is flexibility to alter strategy to take account of changing circumstances and the difference between purely military thinking and the joined up world that we live in today where we need to think and link with both political, non state actors and other International organisations, otherwise we ponce around getting blown up, declare victor, leave and in 3 years it has all gone to a pile of rat shit. y
They were on the front lines facing a huge conventional threat that we were trying to deter, so a clear aim other than occupation and some BS about bringing democracy.
@DN
“IFOR aimed to oversee implementation of the military aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement, the accord ending the Bosnian War. Its main task was to guarantee the end of hostilities and separate the armed forces of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the one hand, and Republika Srpska, on the other”
“IFOR’s goals were essentially completed by the September 1996 elections. As the situation was still potentially unstable and much remained to be accomplished on the civilian side, NATO agreed to deploy a new Stabilisation Force (SFOR) from December 1996″
SFOR’s primary task was to contribute to a safe and secure environment conducive to civil and political reconstruction.
Specifically, SFOR was tasked to deter or prevent a resumption of hostilities; to promote a climate in which the peace process could continue to move forward; and, to provide selective support within its means and capabilities to civilian organisations involved in this process”
Kosovo aims
“a verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate ending of violence and repression;
the withdrawal from Kosovo of the military, police and paramilitary forces;
the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence;
the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organisations;
the establishment of a political framework agreement for Kosovo on the basis of the Rambouillet Accords, in conformity with international law and the Charter of the United Nations.”
Now compare it to Afghanistan in terms of being realistic and measurable.
“NATO’s primary objective in Afghanistan is to enable the Afghan government to provide effective security across the country and develop new Afghan security forces to ensure Afghanistan can never again become a safe haven for terrorists.”
@APATS
Yes but we enetered Bosnia as part of UNPROFOR in 1992, IFOR was a result from the Dayton Peace agreement after we bombed the shit out of them, which is where the we got the peace inforcement ideas from.
When we entered the Balkans we had no idea what our end game was.
@DN
No UNPROFOR had a mission “ensure conditions for peace talks, and security in three demilitarized “safe-haven” enclaves designated as United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs)”. this evolved as required to meet the situation.
Do not confuse means (bombing the shit) with aims and we also evolved as the situation did maintaining clear and measurable aims and objectives. something we singularly failed to achieve in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Do you actually disagree with my points about what should be as clear as possible before we commit boots on the ground or indeed some of them before we commit any forces or would you be happy just to muddle through from one platoon sized engagement or air strike to the next?
however we are miles off thread, my bad :(
@APATS
‘and security in three demilitarized “safe-haven” enclaves designated as United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs)’
Which we failed at, and hence the bombing that went onto the peace accord and the idea of peace enforcement.
‘Do you actually disagree with my points about what should be as clear as possible before we commit boots on the ground’
No, but sometimes the call of ‘we must do something!’ is too hard for politicians to ignore.
In the real world Phil we do not always win, especially the aftermath of a conflict. We need to accpet and be able to plan for it.
Having a plan for how to respond to a defeat is not a strategy and you know it. An exit strategy is a contradiction in terms. You don’t put all your energy and vigour and resources into a strategy that does not marry the means to the required ends. It’s a logical point. Contingency planning is not a strategy. A strategy is the interface between the operational level and the policy level to bring about policy aims. You don’t have strategies that deliberately lead you to defeat.
No Phil that is flexibility to alter strategy to take account of changing circumstances and the difference between purely military thinking and the joined up world that we live in today
I’m not arguing that strategy should not be flexible, it must be that if it is to be anything, that’s why I said it is an iterative process between military and policy maker. What I am arguing though is that it is a logical absurdity to have an exit strategy. You’ve either been bested or you have achieved your aims and can thus piss off. If we can’t think clearly about these things and conceptualise them clearly we’re screwed.
You don’t go into a campaign with an exit strategy, you go into it with a strategy that marries means to ends. If things go south you test and adjust aims accordingly. Another way of saying exit strategy is “a strategy for defeat”.
@DN
“and security in three demilitarized “safe-haven” enclaves designated as United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs)’
Which we failed at, and hence the bombing that went onto the peace accord.
It went through plenty of stages but at every point we drafted aims and reacted to the situation, NATO still does on a nightly signal.
I am not against “doing something” but I think the public are far less likely to be in favour of doing anything that results in a commitment to something long term and I will summarise my position using your point and say.
I am not against “doing something” but
a. Know what you are going to do.
b. What you want to achieve by doing so.
c. The end state that allows you to stop doing it.
d. How you get out when you stop.
@APATS
We seem to be arguing for arguments sake here, I do not disagree with you in any way. I’m just saying that sometimes the politicians just want us to do something and that is where the trouble starts.
@ phil
1 question and I will agree to disagree.
Afghanistan, have we achieved our aims? Accepted defeat or come up with an exit strategy that allows us to leave with certain aims achieved?
DavidNiven,
Good god – politicians wanting us to do something? How very dare they! (smiley face to take the tension out…)
DN,
Who is this “we” you refer to above? I was the MA to the French 3 star commander of UNPF throughout most of 1995 (and UNPROFOR were subordinate to UNPF), and I can tell you of the utter uselessness of UNNY decision making, and of how the lives of thousands of Bosnians of all sides, not just the Bosniaks in Gorazde, Srebrenica and Zepa, were lost to international politicking and no desire to back political statements with action on the ground.
The troops the UN had available in Southern Bosnia and Sarajevo (3 French Battalions, 2 British Battalions, and 2 further reserve Battalions, all in high end IFVs or wheeled wagons with a full suite of infantry weapons were ready to go. We had CINCSOUTH and the air forces of 9 NATO nations less than 30 minutes away in Italy. We had total spectrum dominance. We had some weaknesses in ground based logistics, but only after 5 days which we war-gamed endlessly in Sarajevo and Zagreb. In Bernard Janvier and Rupert Smith we had two very gritty and tough commanders, both of whom understood Mladic and the rest of the Serb commanders, and both of whom I saw out-argue Mladic in the preceding May UN hostage crisis.
What we never had was the political will to intervene decisively. Probably because the politicians realised that the enclaves were only tenable if the UN intervened militarily, which was only going to be first vetoed by Russia, then result in a new international war in SE Europe.
HMS Queenie looks marvelous – however she is indeed a white ephalump with no air group. F35 program grounded due to the fire, AEW to be provided by “podded sensors” on helos needed for ASW or other tasing.
Queenie with Sea Harrier FRS2 and Sea King AW&C Mk7 would be better than Queenie with nowt……
:-(
@TAS
(smiley face to take the tension out…) duly noted and appreciated :-)
@RT
I’m not blaming anyone but the ploiticians. I was never impressed with the Balkan soldier and we could have hammered them with the kit we had then and there if we wanted to (but casualties would have been inevitable).
@ GNB,
Cameron thought he was on for a winner. He allowed optimistic assessments of the situation to cloud his judgement. To understand the scope of this look at the various Telegraph articles in the run up to the vote, where Cameron’s PR people were telling them that victory was a sure thing and they in turn were reporting that he was on for a sure thing at the vote, that he was set to strike a great coup….. and then got utterly, utterly humiliated. It was a thrashing through and through. He was made to look a complete fool.
And when the European parliament re-opened the usual suspects went right back to where they had left off, undermining democracy and planning “ever closer union”.
Afghanistan, have we achieved our aims? Accepted defeat or come up with an exit strategy that allows us to leave with certain aims achieved?
Without getting bogged down in the actual situation because that’s a thread on its own as we know, in the case above we’ve either changed our policy aims or been denied their realisation anyway, ie defeated. If the policy aim has become “leave in relative good order” then so be it, that’s a decision outside of the military. But that is not an exit strategy, that is a change in the desired outcome – the imperative to leave has become stronger than the imperative to stay. An exit strategy if such a thing can exist is effectively a statement to the effect that we never thought we’d need to do the things we initially said we’d need to do anyway, they weren’t that important to us so we always meant to leave before the original job was done. It doesn’t make sense!
This is a distinction with a difference. We must be able to think clearly about how the policy, strategy and operational levels interact. You might have an operational contingency plan for defeat and how to bring about extraction, but to actually exit with different outcomes is a policy decision, and strategy is the means of bringing that policy decision about.
An exit strategy means your aim is to exit and there is a means to try and bring this about. That happens when you win, or you don’t achieve the original goals. Giving it a distinctive label just encourages woolly thinking. Conflating an operational contingency plan with the means of achieving a change of policy is confused.
Your policy might be to leave if you don’t see x, y and z happening by a,b or c but again that’s really tantamount to a defeat and still isn’t a strategy. Strategy would be the means to bring about that policy end.
@RT
I don’t understand how you arrive at the conclusion that the army should have the majority of the budget.
Mainly, because I can’t think of a time when the army stopped an enemy invading the British Isles.
It wasn’t the army that stopped Hitler crossing the channel, is was the navy, and the air force.
It also wasn’t the army that stopped Napoleon crossing the channel, it was the Navy, at Trafalgar.
It seems to me, that history has proven (WW2), that it is more effective for us to take advantage of the fact that we are an Island, surrounded by water – and as such give the majority of the budget to the air-force and navy.
If someone seriously does want to invade old Britannia, we can stop them in the water, buy ourselves time, build up the army, and deal with them.
Roders
@ Phil
A political answer if I have ever read one :) ( not an insult btw) I would argue that an exit strategy is precisely ” that is a change in the desired outcome – the imperative to leave has become stronger than the imperative to stay”
You disagree, I respect that.
F35 is new, problems will be sorted out. There are always people to put a downer on events like today.
Complaints that QE has no air group are a bit ridiculous, the ship does not even begin sea trials until 2017, the F35’s have not yet been delivered.
I agree that having precious Merlins with Crowsnest deliver AEW is not ideal but that is the path we went down and the RN will make it work.
God. If we had dozens of F35’s already in service people would be moaning that what is the point if the ship is not ready yet. Sigh…..
I know I’m not an expert in the maritime field, and perhaps NAB will be able to put me straight.
However I cannot stop to think that the railings on the ski jump are going to cause some problems. ;-)
APATS
I’m trying to put across what I believe a strategy actually is in military terms. It’s the means to achieve the ends. Politicians set the ends, the military think about the means. An exit strategy is logically that the desired end is defeat and so the whole concept does not make sense. A military plan on how to respond to a change of policy is I believe what we are both talking about but labelling it an “exit strategy” is just confusing.
An exit strategy is a very political way of saying “we didn’t achieve what we originally wanted to and so changed the goal posts so we could save face”. If we achieved what we wanted, well then let’s call it a victory and hold a Triumph.
I don’t think we disagree at all, I think we are using different terms for the same thing. I am just saying the term being used by you and others is confusing and conceptually compromised. An extraction plan or goal post changing is what an exit strategy actually is.
Mainly, because I can’t think of a time when the army stopped an enemy invading the British Isles.
Nobody has ever called being under Siege a victory.
I’m all for the Navy I think its a wonderful institution and does a sterling job, far more than what is realised and what it is praised for.
But the reality is the existential decisions are made on land (nuclear weapons aside, although perhaps not as you are blowing up land).
excellent, now finish the second one and bring that into service too:
http://lindleyfrench.blogspot.co.uk/2014/07/hms-queen-elizabeth-power-unity.html
Roders,
I am not aware of saying the Army should have the majority of the budget: I have said that the RN and RAF should not be prioritised over it. Naval and air kit is expensive, so money and priorities are not necessarily the same. When there is only enough money for one or the other, then priorities kick in.
I’d also take total issue with your thoughts that either Hitler or Napoleon actually had total intent or capacity to invade. The German Army in 1940 was just not up to an amphibious invasion. Consider the scale of D Day in 1944 with 3 years of lead up and the resources of the entire of North America backing the detailed planning. It just about got over the beaches against 3 German divisions, and took 2 months to get beyond Normandy. The German Army in Northern France in 1940 had nothing remotely on the same scale, and indeed a much harder terrain along the south coast to try to take.
You also don’t acknowledge that Britain is a world power today because we had an Empire once. An Empire maintained by soldiers and supported by the Navy. No need to defend the islands, because the influence was all in having lots of bits of someone else’s country.
AS I have always said this elephant is the proof that TD’s dictum kit is not strategy is disproved by this floating fuckwitery.
Just look at the comments on this thread………
I still call Elephants! Elephants! Elephants!.
I had prepared a long post on this but can’t really be bothered.
Although still can’t see how our defeat in Iraq and Afghanistan has anything to do with Nellie and dumbo…
I had prepared a long post on this but can’t really be bothered
Gutted.
@ ixion
Post it, will be good for at least a hundred replies :)
@IXION
‘defeat in Iraq and Afghanistan’
Don’t you mean military stalement in Iraq and the hope that the locals can carry on we leave in Afghanistan (military stalemate).
@ IXION
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KuStsFW4EmQ
Jedibeeftrix
Great piece! Seconded.
@Phil
No one is debating that you win a war by rolling your tanks down the most important street in their capital – you just do, everyone knows it.
But history has proven, that for this country, the best way to successfully defend ourselves, is to make use of the advantage provided to us by our geography.
I don’t understand how you could ignore any advantage given to you when you’re defending you’re homeland, if we had ignored that prior to WW2, we’d all be typing German.
It is true that being under siege is not a victory, but it is certainly not a defeat.
In the coming world, where any major offensive action we take part in will be as part of a coalition, i have no doubt that the coalition will be a hell of a lot stronger, if each and every member plays to their strengths.
We are not big enough (in every sense of the word) to compete with the likes of China, India and the USA, who can (or will be able to) afford to do everything themselves. As such our offensive future lies in being extremely good at a narrow spectrum of capabilities. Not, a jack of all trades.
That narrow spectrum of capabilities should be as useful to us in defence, as it is to the coalition, in offence.
Therefore it is only logical to for the navy / air force to get the majority of the budget, and not the army.
@ IXION – please, consider it, and post it.
It will be an interesting read.
Regardless of minor matters (such as scale, cats/traps aircraft to use it with, budget etc)
Its a lovely thing, very nice articles
HMQE… Oh… you operate on the “Coooweeee” eh… that’s going to get old fast :o)
Loved hearing the Bullshit about this on BBC radio 2 today :D
RT,
ISTM that the key reasons that the Germans couldn’t invade in 1940 were the RN and RAF.
The army was, post Dunkirk, unlikely to have halted any credible German force landed on the south coast before it reached London.
However, their ability to land that credible force was precisely zero because of the RAF and RN. It would’ve been an absolute massacre if they’d tried.
Nobby.
The naming ceremony. Jump to 1 hour in.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g7MPk8vZpbs&feature=youtu.be
@ Siege
It doesn’t help that since WW2, someone has built a bloody tunnel between Us and France!
Just to get this slightly back on topic, was I the only one who noticed that the standards of Journalism have dropped dramatically! The best one I heard was on BBC Breakfast News, when one of presenters challenged the FSL, on why have a Carrier when we have no “Warships” to launch from it!
So much negativity when we should be showing off our capability in building an Engineering masterpiece!
And another thing, the so called experts used by Sky and the Beeb on both sides of the debate seemed to be talking nonsense! Obviously none of them read your blog TD!
@RT
In answer to Napoleon, look at the Origins section of The Battle of Trafalgar Wikipedia page, I’ll concede that it’s Wikipedia and not the perfect source, but hey ho.
On the Hitler front, he may not have wanted to invade, but he still invested a lot of resources in planning and preparing. The only concrete reason we have why it was called off, is because of the lack of air-superiority.
I may have been wrong to say that you want the army to have the majority of the budget, but you have said that it should be prioritised, it is this that I disagree with.
On the contrary, I’m all with you for the ‘world power today because of an empire once’ point, it makes absolute sense, provides us influence purely because it existed, it’s a great thing!
But more to the point, do you really think that we will be able to compete with countries like China and India, which have a labour force of at least 8 times our entire population, in a plain of battle where the advantage of numbers means a hell of a lot more.
No one can deny that technology has a disproportionate contribution to the capability of a nation’s air-force or navy, it is recognised by many that this is not so with the army. Does it not make sense that it is the services that possess this disproportionate impact upon their capabilities that should be prioritised?
Roders
(I’m a 17 year old still to form my main views on this debate, at the moment I’m just going with the one which makes most sense. Please, persuade me.)
@RT
Your only hope is that the Scots go for independence and when the PoW launches in March 2016 , The new King of Scotland (and about as mad as Idi Amin) claims the ship and renames it the William Wallace and it goes on to a proud career protection Scottish waters from the Sassenachs Border Reivers :-)
I think we need at least one more stretched to run CATOBAR so we have interoperability with the French and our cousins with as RT says a big well deck at the back to give the option of filling the hangar and deck with wagons.
How much acreage on that 2″ thick steel heavily reinforced plate deck is there? That’s a lots of wagons parked nose to tail.
Nobody start talking about top weight affecting stability and roll rates but you know what I mean :-)
But history has proven, that for this country, the best way to successfully defend ourselves, is to make use of the advantage provided to us by our geography.
Not it hasn’t. It’s proven the best way to defend ourselves is to depose or crush our enemy. Whether we like that or not it requires a ground force. The maritime argument can be a compelling piece of rhetoric but reality just does not support it. We went to war in 1914 because the Belgian coastline was of vital importance to us. We went to war in 1939 for precisely the same reason. It is also fact that there was enormous political pressure for 2nd Army to over-run V2 firing positions on the continent.
Now don’t get me wrong, I think the Navy has enormous utility. Almost as much in peacetime as in wartime. But I’m also a realist and just like I don’t believe in kicking in the door and going home, nor do I believe in the dogma of the maritime school.
No worries Roders, RT may have been laying it on a bit thick with the hyperbole. :)
RT relax a bit, once PoW finishes construction, the MoD budget might have a bit more flexibility in it then. It might be more of a matter of “when” than “what”. Right now, the naval construction budget is a bit tough on the finances, but that does not mean that the situation is going to last forever, especially once construction finishes, so more toys for the army might be more viable then.
Now, your biggest worry is the Americans and their F-35 troubles. Can you imagine what would happen if they cancelled the F-35 program? 2 carriers and no planes they can use. Not likely to happen though, but those screaming for “no F-35” might want to consider that. Bit of an old argument here, but this is why I thought that the carriers should have been catapult based. More aircraft that you can use, so you’re not stuck with a single failure point.
my idea of a ‘maritime school’ is that two carriers (even if one is rolled in and out of service), is a good balance with an 82,000 strong army, given the cash available.
a maritime school was/is necessary for all the wing-nuts that thought we could maintain an army capable of endless division-level deployments to the desert post 2008……………………. and maintain anything else on a useful scale in the Navy and RAF.
@Thread – just a thought – as nobody has any confidence that the political class understand war any more – hence their desire to use it to feed their egos, or opt out early to save face at home – what is the moral argument for retaining HMAF in a State where the representatives of the Demos are unlikely to use them either wisely or well? :-(
Another genuine question arising out of the one common idea that seems to have emerged out of all the points of view expressed…wildly off-thread, for which sorry…
GNB
@Observer
‘once PoW finishes construction, the MoD budget might have a bit more flexibility in it then’
Good point, the last decade or so has seen amongst other things 3 purely naval projects (CVF, T45, Astute) rack up £6+ billion a piece at the same time as the budget has come under enormous pressure with Telic and Herrick.
Excluding F35 which is a joint project and Trident/Successor which is a national asset the RN’s order book will be full of dribs and drabs such as MARS SSS, those 3 new OPV’s, some mine-hunting kit etc for the foreseeable future, with the biggest project being T26 at £250-£350 million a pop and roughly £4 billion overall.
@Phil
No it hasn’t. It’s proven the best way to defend ourselves is to depose or crush our enemy.
I understand that we need a ground force, you just do.
What I am picking on is the size of it, and how much of a role it should take in the wider strategy, to achieve the end result of deposing or crushing our enemies.
In order for the west (yes that’s right, the entire west) to remain dominant / capable of meeting and defeating enemies with far superior numbers, it will have to rely on stand off weapons.
This has been proven to be effective, look at the Korean War, or more specifically the Battle of the Imjin River, and the fighting at Gloster Hill, where the Gloucester Regiment held out for three days while the defences of Seoul were readied, and subsequently held.
The stand off weapons that should form the backbone of our strategy against far superior numbers should be provided by Air force / Carrier Air as well as Cruise Missiles / NGFS.
This will be the deciding factor in the future of our ground operations, not how many men we have, because as top brass know, we don’t have enough men.
Roders
http://britains-smallwars.com/korea/gloster.html
Oh bloody hell, i tried posting it 5 times, up until the 4th it showed that it hadnt posted, on the 5th it said ‘duplicate message detected’ and now ive posted it 5 times.
Great :)
Sorry TD
Roders
TD went to post the big requested post. but hit ‘save and return’ by mistake- it returned but i cannot recover it- can you help? or are my words of wisdom list forever?
I must agree that HMS Queen Elizabeth does look magnificent, but it has been built on the cheap not accounting for the cost increases caused by delays and dithering by the Politicians. Remember it will not be fitted with full task force command and control facilities as these were renmoved from the design to save money. It’s self defence capability of 2-3 Phalanx and a couple of manually oerated cannon is a joke especially when its planned escort group of 3 Escorts and a SSN is the bear minimum. At least the first squadron of F-35s should already be forming in the US by now and orders for the remaining two squadrons should have been placed. The first squadron could be working up with the US Marines now so that they can effectively participate in the QE work up rather than learning as they go in 3-4 years time. They should also be qualifying the weapon systems we are going to need like Meteor, which the US is doing its utmost to obstruct, and Brinstone Imp. as a pecursor to Brimstone 2. CROWSNEST should have completed assessment and developement and be ready for production with the order placed in the near future. All of the above should have happened, but the Governemnt is scared to spend the kind of money needed to realise the platforms full potential. We will see thing materialise in dribs and drabs over the next decade, but don’t expect to see a fully capable carrier in the true sence of the word even then. What we will have is the world’s biggest LHA. I think that’s the right one?
@Lord Jim
‘What we will have is the world’s biggest LHA’
Is that such a bad thing?
I agree with everything else you said though.
Roders, if a comments gets into the spam queue posting it again x4, wont get it out any quicker!
Have whitelisted your IP so should be OK now
IXION, sorry mate
Roders, most people don’t realise it but “far superior numbers” don’t usually mean what people think it means. If you anted up and went with conscription, you can mobilize very very massive amounts of manpower, your limiting factor is not really men but logistics (i.e how to feed, fuel, arm and move them).
For example, if you went up against big scary China, with IIRC a total manpower of about 2 million, you can easily match it by conscripting just 3% of your population. Of course, China itself can ante up, but arming, feeding and moving 2 million men+ is not a trivial task, so in most wars, the defender usually has a huge manpower advantage, IF they can utilize and mobilize it properly.
Don’t forget that each Successor submarine will cost more than a QEC – and we’re building four of the things. A full “airgroup” for a Successor will cost more than 36 F-35 as well….
Ouch El, that wasn’t just raining on the parade, that was a full fledged monsoon… :)
Oh well, they’ll muddle through somehow.
@ APATS and PHIL
Its worth noting that by historic standards our casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan were pretty light and our forces were exceptionally well behaved. If the occupation armies in Germany and Japan had had to conduct operations under modern media and standards they probably would have been seen as a failure.
There was an insurgency in Germany after the war. Hundreds if not thousands of allied service men still died through accidents, homocides and insurgency tactics. No doubt many innocent civilians died and women were raped.
what was probably different was the pay off. It was worth all the problems to put Japan and Germany back on their feet.
It probably was not worth doing in Afghanistan. Iraq is a different story as we caused the mess and were liable to fix it and at the end if the day we all need the oil to flow.
@ Challenger and Observer
are you forgetting successor submarine from the equipment plan?
Not that its really a naval project but every bit of spare cash in the equipment plan will be needed to fund the system.
The Army has £5.5 billion allocated and is likely to receive a further £ 4.5 billion from un allocated funding in the 10 year plan to buy a couple of thousand big green metal boxes on wheels and tracks.To my mind that should be more than enough as long as they stop pissing about and learn the true meaning of buying off the shelf. ( That’s enough to buy 5,000 Boxers)
It’s also worth noting that despite some high profile programs like CVF and T45 that by far and away the biggest acquisition program has been Typhoon for the past two decades with a £16 billion acquisition budget that is likely to leave us with just 107 planes which will need replacing just 15 years from now. CVF will be serving that nation possibly after many of us are gone.
@Martin
Honesty compels me to admit that I really did forget about Successor.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/10947797/Defence-Secretary-relieved-as-new-aircraft-carrier-christened-by-Queen.html
We want 2 and we won’t wait…
more to the point; he is on record as saying he wants two and he won’t wait!
happy days 8)
@Repulse – it’s very encouraging to see Hammond still talking up the prospect if operating the second vessel. Especially when he refers to it as a very small amount of extra money.
he is not exactly a man who seems to get easily carried away and shoot his mouth if like his predecessor.
Operating the extra ship would cost 0.0001% of government spending which is around 25% of the paper clip budget of DFID or 0.002% of the defence budget.
For such an incredibly small amount of money it hardly seems worth arguing.
@Red Trousers
“Parasite on budget”
“Not too late to cut a chunk out of her arse and fill her with wagons and landing craft. Then she might actually be useful, instead of being a parasite on the budget.”
What do you think Albion, Bulwark and the Bay class are for? Cruises around the Med? They carry all the green painted stuff and drop them off at wherever they are needed. No carrier and those ships can’t do their job when the chips are down and we are dealing with a peer rival.
You green tinted glasses types?! I will say it again…
“NO CARRIERS MEANS NO INDEPENDENT EXPEDITIONARY WARFARE CAPABILITY”!!!! ;-)
No carriers and we might as well disband the Marines and most of the Army and join Belgium in the league of military mediocrity.
We have the first one, it looks like they will see sense in next years defence review and keep PoW as well.
Cheers
@Phil
1982
Falklands
I rest my case
If you want to take the green stuff somewhere there is a peer or near peer rival and no friendly basing rights nearby you need the Navy with all its grey stuff, with flying grey stuff on some of it.
@Martin – Very good point about the post-war occupation of Germany…my Father had fluent French and German, so was posted to the Occupation Forces as a District Officer…he had seen some active service commanding a troop of Cromwells in Normandy before he was wounded, but he saw a hell of a lot more after the war ended…and that was close-up stuff with his service revolver and a sten-gun…the whole place was awash with SS/Wehrmacht hold-outs, deserters, brigands and black marketeers…all armed, all dangerous, and none of them much inclined to surrender.
He even mentioned rumours that some wanted war criminals were most unlikely to be found because if they were caught by any unit that had liberated a concentration camp, there was apt to be a Court-Martial at the Drum-head in age-old style, immediate justice and an unmarked grave. (He was in 11th Armoured in Normandy, and although not posted back to them still had friends there…this might well refer to events immediately after they found Bergen-Belsen)
I wonder if part of the issue in Iraq might be that although in 1945-48 how bad it actually was, and how ruthlessly it needed to be dealt with would be common knowledge…it would not be the kind of stuff that was written down even if it was honestly accounted for at a unit level; I don’t know for sure, but I doubt if those years are at all fully described in official documentation and what was known then is almost certainly lost to history now (unless buried in Military Intelligence or RMP archives). It wasn’t the story the Allies were telling themselves about the conduct of the war, and unlike now the press were pretty clear whose side they were on.
GNB
@GNB/Martin
The crucial difference to having troops on the Continent post WW2 and having troops in Iraq and Afghanistan was pretty easily explained to Joe public by the presence of Uncle Joe and a few million hostile Soviet troops.
It was clear we had just got through round one. Not so clear in our last two electives.
@ GNB
http://www.pen-and-sword.co.uk/Werewolf/p/74/
Being boring & going back on subject. I would not have built QE/PoW as they are, but we are where we are, so now the aim must be to make the most of them. So enough F-35B, with enough spares & weapons. Keep them away from the RAF at all costs. Are we getting the gun pod? V-22 tankers for the FAA, like the USMC to extend the reach of the F-35B. Enough escorts for the carriers to venture out safely.
@apats – True enough, although my point was more that very bad things happen in occupations, and however well that was understood in the 1940’s it might well not have been very fully recorded at the time…and that might have contributed to some of what happened in Iraq…
GNB
“Operating the extra ship would cost 0.0001% of government spending which is around 25% of the paper clip budget of DFID or 0.002% of the defence budget.”
And the percentage of the MOD equipment budget based on 10 years operation is what?
” V-22 tankers for the FAA, like the USMC to extend the reach of the F-35B.”
Is that to “extend the range” to allow an extra lap of the LHD or to top off tanks immediately after departure because it will be bugger all use at any distance.
“…so now the aim must be to make the most of them. So enough F-35B, with enough spares & weapons. Keep them away from the RAF at all costs. Are we getting the gun pod? V-22 tankers for the FAA,…”
This is aimed at USMC but obvious overlap with RN/FAA:
http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/7-things-the-marines-have-to-do-to-make-the-f-35b-worth-1560672069
Despite being an Army bod I am absolutely delighted by the new carriers. If you’re going to have a carrier strike capability, then you need to do it properly. And we do need it and we have done it well. In fact, I only wish we were building three not two. (I also think we need a new smaller combat ship, a littoral patrol vessel to support a reduced number of destroyers and frigates, but that’s another story.)
I thought the video that showed how F35’s would be launched and recovered was very interesting. So long as F35 works advertised, we will have a formidable force. I so want F35 to be a success.
This discussion should not be an inter-service rivalry. The question: Do we need a navy more than an army or Air Force is absurd. We need both.
If you want to take the green stuff somewhere there is a peer or near peer rival and no friendly basing rights nearby you need the Navy with all its grey stuff, with flying grey stuff on some of it.
I’m not anti-Navy, but no you don’t.
Has anyone ever done any research into running simultaneous STOL and VSTOL operations in from the same deck?
@ phil
“f you want to take the green stuff somewhere there is a peer or near peer rival and no friendly basing rights nearby you need the Navy with all its grey stuff, with flying grey stuff on some of it.
I’m not anti-Navy, but no you don’t.
The first statement was a bit simplistic but you either need it or you need an ally to provide it or you are going to get destroyed operating without air cover. The army is simply not equipped to operate against a peer or near peer opponent who has air superiority or in this case probably air supremacy.
@ Mark
” And the percentage of the MOD equipment budget based on the 10 year equipment budget is what”
Is irrelevant as we don’t run warships from the equipment budget.
Running cost are around £70 million a year or about the same as three frigates.
The RN’s annual budget excluding pension’s,equipment purchase and upgrade and defence estates is around £2 billion a year. even out of this meagre total its a pretty small amount of money.
We bought two so we may as well use them.
I think there was a study by US navy on medium strike. It was interesting to see that F-18 E/F or F-35 with EW support launching AMRAAM or JSOW and JASSM is far more potent than firing hundreds of tomahawk on well defended target. I cannot find the report now. If someone can find it it would great. Although it doesn’t support the carrier, i think both RAF & RN will be massively benefitted from this ship. But from defending a country or bombin somebody carriers are useful for certain period. After land based aircraft will be the best choice.
@ Swimming truncks
I stopped reading that article on the USMC F35 B when I cam across the numerous factual mistakes in it. He talks of the F35C being far more numerous than the B when orders for the B version are already double the C version and the B has export potential where as the C has virtually none.
he also states that the single engine choice was for STOVL flight when it was the USAF that insisted on a single engine design to keep cost down.
He then goes on to point out that their is no need for the F35B to be stealthy as the enemy will know their is an amphibious invasion happening anyway so the element of surprise will be lost.
Obviosly the F35 is LO to to surprise people but to avoid being shot down by enemy missiles.
In terms of the V22 AAR capability this would be a total waste of time. All the F35 B needs are the same drop away tanks that preserve stealth on the F22. The Israelis are already rumoured to be designing them. There is virtually no point on the planet that we could not rely on voyager to provide AAR except the FI were we would not need AAR if operating from a carrier.
A V22 tanker would offer almost zero capability at a massive cost.
@Martin: I’ve always thought that a buddy refuelling approach could work like the Buccaneers did.
@Phil
Well how then, please do explain how we place several thousand troops and their equipment ashore several thousand miles from home against a near peer or peer rival that has air cover when we don’t have access to local basing to operate our fighters? Come on how do we do that then…
No carriers. No organic expeditionary warfare capability. No point having an army.
The buddy refuelling is used because of the limitation of conventional carriers. It gives a small amount of fuel to allow a go around. I don’t think it has ever been used operationally to give an extended range for an operation certainly by the USN anyway.
One of the major advantages of STOVL operations is giving aircraft the ability to come straight back and with a big deck like the QE’s we could probably even see simultaneous landings at-least in combat operations.
another point on that article posted earlier.
The author seems to be completely ignorant of RAF/RN planning for STOVL F35 B carrier operations. he talks of the need for helicopter based AEW but fails to mention it already exists in the the UK. He also talks of the need to develop small missiles to be held internally in the F35 B, he has obviously not come across SPEAR 3. Indeed much of the operations he describes is basically the Royal Navy’s play book for operating carriers.
@Fedaykin
Have a word. We’ve not had proper carrier air since the 70s yet the Army has fought several campaigns. Uncomfortable fact is, carrier air is a niche capability.
Carrier with its abilty of launching F-35B will be a fearsome capability. That’s no doubt. And they can take on most of worlds’s airforces. However they cannot replace RAF on broader capcacity. They are a supplement to the RAF. So there you go….
@Martin: “I don’t think it has ever been used operationally to give an extended range for an operation certainly by the USN anyway.” Happened in 72 when 2 FAA Buccaneers from 809 sqdrn flew 6 hrs from HMS Ark Royal to deter an invasion of British Honduras by Guatamala.
@Phil: Are you saying that the UK has not used carrier air to support ground forces since the 70s?
No. I’m saying we’ve needed it once in 35 years.
All this ridiculous interservice rivalry.
QE and POW give the UK a capability few others will have, justifying our position in the P5 and keep the UK on the map of premier navies. End of.
We are Great Britain, for Gods sake, not Botswana. The RN should and will get these ships.
@Repulse
It has only been required by the UK alone once in 35 years but has been provided for the army by the USN/USAF/RAF on every other occasion.
The original point put to Phil was that in order to engage a peer or near peer enemy without friendly bases nerby or overflight then the Grey capability would be needed.
Phil said it would not therefore implying that the army could engage a peer or near peer enemy with them having air supremacy. Pretty sure that is not what he meant.
It has spiralled from there.
What these vessels will give us is increased flexibility in planning and the ability to do things better whilst providing the ability to do things we otherwise could not do.
@daniele.mandelli
The QE and The PoW sailing as a fleet with their escorts covering the AEW/ASW/SAR roles for the Merlin’s can take between them around 90+ F35 , that is more than the rest of Europe’s Navies combined can carry. The Russians ,Chinese ,Indians cannot put so much fixed wings at sea individually as we can only the US out matches us(by a country MILE and then some).
The Senior Service have pulled off an amazing feat to get this far but all it would take is some lily livered Politicians to scupper this tremendous capability :-(
I bet in Temeraire they are already coming up with all sorts of devilment to make use of that space…..
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/0c/US_Navy_060623-N-9389D-172_Conventionally-powered_aircraft_carrier_USS_Kitty_Hawk_(CV_63)_Chiefs‘Mess_Sailors_exercise_during_a_physical_training(PT)_session_in_the_hangar_bay_during_Exercise_Valiant_Shield_2006.jpg
Did we not use buddy refueling with Buccaneer?
Anyway, I think a single “buddy” refuel on the way out with F35B can extend the operating radius from 450nm to over 650nm.
If they also opt to refuel on the way back you can double the operating radius to 900nm!
Were carriers not used for Sierra Leone too?
Haven’t they spent a lot of their time enforcing “no fly” zones in areas where the cost in terms of air-hours, maintenance-hours and fuel would be significantly larger if done with land-based fighters and air tankers?
However, I suppose there was no real need any of this we should really have just left it to the Americans to shore up the instability in the borders of Europe. I often expect the chaps who live the other side of town to come over a cook my dinner for me ;-)
Saw an Abbot SP Gun today and wondered exactly where we have gone wrong. Hardly made an imprint in the local park… not that they have turned it round yet :-)
Just got back into the country – had to watch the ceremony on pokey hotel telly via Sky News – whose presenter kept referring to First Sea Lord as “Admirable Zambellas” – well perhaps he is :D
Well done to all concerned – except whoever designed the front end – it’s supposed to be pointy, not blunt – looks like it’s already had a shunt! Still, can sort that out at first major refit when we rip that silly ski jump off and put proper cats ‘n’ traps on.
Can’t wait for the other two.
@APATS: What about the Sea Harriers used for reconnaissance and support in Sierra Leone, no RAF fighters used there? Harriers were also used in partnership with land based aircraft in Bosnia. As you say, there probably hasn’t been a conflict involving the UK in the past 50 years, outside of Northern Island where the FAA and / or USN haven’t been involved.
However, I completely agree both carrier and land based aviation power is needed, end of.
@Simon: you beat me to it :)
No worries Repulse. I managed to totally fail to see your “buddy buccaneer” response to Martin. I guess we’re even ;-)
I tried to pull strings and have the ceremony put back but…well…I’m not X!
Still a shocking waste of whiskey – what’s up with using that fizzy wine – no one would miss that:
http://en.mercopress.com/2014/07/01/carrier-hms-queen-elizabeth-to-be-christened-with-whisky-in-scotland
Nice :)
Repulse said “Northern Island…….. FAA………..haven’t been involved”
I know you mean carriers but just to be pedantic the FAA were heavily involved in the Troubles.
The RN even made an amphibious landing too during the Troubles when LCU from Fearless landed AVRE, tanks, and troops into Londonderry.
@Martin
‘The Army has £5.5 billion allocated and is likely to receive a further £ 4.5 billion from un allocated funding in the 10 year plan to buy a couple of thousand big green metal boxes on wheels and tracks.To my mind that should be more than enough as long as they stop pissing about and learn the true meaning of buying off the shelf.
It’s also worth noting that despite some high profile programs like CVF and T45 that by far and away the biggest acquisition program has been Typhoon for the past two decades with a £16 billion acquisition budget that is likely to leave us with just 107 planes which will need replacing just 15 years from now. CVF will be serving that nation possibly after many of us are gone’
Absolutely, just over £6 billion for 2 carriers isn’t peanuts, but with a planned 40-50 year service life and running costs of only £70 million a year per ship i’d say the initial outlay is worthwhile.
I certainly think the Army has already good a decent equipment budget, with the exemptions being stuff like an Apache upgrade which will almost certainly get funding allocated soon.
For £16 billion and 160 air-frames 1 of 2 things needs to happen with Typhoon in order to salvage some measure of ‘value for money’. Either the Trance 1’s need to stay in service for a fair while longer or the Tranche 2/3’s are going to have to remain with incremental upgrades way past 2030. With the first T1’s retiring in 2016 i’d say the latter is more likely than the former.
@ WiseApe
:)
I never cease to be amused by,
1) the dogfight over whether a handful of harriers were used here or there,
2) the way people constantly remove large chunks of the cost of the carriers to try and massage the pain away (like the cost of the planes themselves),
3) the idea that if we didn’t have this capability (that we haven’t had for years and years anyway) that suddenly the roof would fall in on the rest of the armed forces,
@Repluse
‘support in Sierra Leone, no RAF fighters used there? ‘ I’m pretty sure, the recce Sqn on the Jag force (41F Sqn) went to Africa to provide recce capacity. They used French bases in West Africa after getting tanked by VC10s.
@ Challenger
‘ Either the Trance 1′s need to stay in service for a fair while longer or the Tranche 2/3′s are going to have to remain with incremental upgrades way past 2030. With the first T1′s retiring in 2016 i’d say the latter is more likely than the former.’
Yes certainly the latter, 5 Sqns isn’t enough to use all Typhoons delivered. No reason why any of the Tranche 2 and 3 would need retiring in 2030, life ex is 8000 FH. More like 2040 or longer. Of course that just from a longevity point of view, capability is another. Although I don’t think that would be outdated in 15 years.
@Topman
‘Yes certainly the latter, 5 Sqns isn’t enough to use all Typhoons delivered’
Are you suggesting standing up more squadrons then?
@ Challenger
Well you can never have too many FJ Sqns to hand ;)
On a more serious note, no I’m not just there are only so many can be operated by a small number of Sqns. For example you couldn’t realistically have all 3 Tranches operated by 5 (front line ) Sqns.
@Topman
No you can’t, but i guess you have to factor in maintenance and upgrade cycles, plus the attempt to share air-frame hours across the fleet (although their is a limit to the extent that argument will wash. The original plan to operate a 232 Typhoon fleet but only 7 front-line squadrons was ridiculous!).
In any kind of emergency we have to assume that the large OCU would be able to filter those spare T3’s into the active front-line squadrons or hastily form a new one to join them.
I’ve been to Botswana. Thousands of Elephants. All over the place. Had ’em for ages too. We’re rubbish.
@ Challenger
That’s a given even so alot of it is driven by other factors. Little point buying pieces of kit that you can’t support. You can work fewer numbers harder but generally you have to add in lots more manpower, maint. capacity, spares, repair capacity at industry even things such as tools and GSE etc. Yes 7 Sqns seems far too small to me, 11 would perhaps be more likely. But I think those numbers were put about in the years of, perhaps best described as, MoD fantasy planning years.
Growing another Sqn in an ’emergency’ is the last thing you would want to do. It’s a pretty long process. Much easier to bulk out the Sqns already on the books. But that is dependant on other factors (and plenty of others) listed above, you have to make sure they are able to have the capacity to properly use them.
Most of the above goes for all sorts of fleets beyond Typhoon.
Th equipment and sustainment budgets is what buys and sustains the carriers or any other equipment so it’s more relevant than however many zeros and a 1 of total government spend.
However I think you’ve answered your own question if no more money is forthcoming or found from else were then the choice could be “Running cost are around £70 million a year or about the same as three frigates.”
Refuelling an f35 from anything other than a proper air refuelling aircraft has about as much practicality as this http://s854.photobucket.com/user/cortonflyer/media/Tankerduo.jpg.html
What these vessels will give us is increased flexibility in planning and the ability to do things better whilst providing the ability to do things we otherwise could not do.
Indeed. I am not against CVF. Just. I don’t see it has having much utility as a strike carrier in the near term. But who knows what is out there in the mid to long term.
The Army is not reliant on Navy fast air. This might be uncomfortable for some here. But it simply isn’t. Carriers played next to no role in the support of 21st Army Group or 8th Army or 14th Army. The US might have thrown in some CVs and CVNs in 1991 and 2003 but the USAF could have replaced those numbers with planes it found down the back of the couch.
This is not the same as me saying carrier strike has no utility. What I am saying is that most of the time, you don’t need it. That is a historical fact.
@Mark
Nice pic not seen that before! :)
Agreed the only replacement for a proper tanker is another one. Interestingly one of the major users of the VC10 fleet was the USN, particularly in the Gulf.
Have you chaps ever read this
https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2012/05/the-post-they-tried-to-kill/
Might be useful :)
@ TD
‘Might be useful :)’
At (re)setting the cat amongst the pigeons ? ;)
Their pigeons have wings (the RAF’s that is )
Re: Operation Sealion
Actually, I recall that after the reunification of Germany, the guys at Sandhurst (?) found the former German officers in charge of Operation Sealion, and the former British officers in charge of the army defence of the UK, and dusted off their old plans, and had them run them through their latest simulation tools.
The Germans got their asses kicked.
Although there was a “statement” that the RN would – with great losses – eventually succeed in cutting off the resupply of the German expeditionary forces.
@MW
The Germans had approximately 1Battleship, 1 Cruiser and 10 Destroyers with less than 20 E boats to escort a make shift invasion fleet of barges. This was opposed by in excess of 50 RN Desttroyers with the Cruisers and Capital Ships of Home Fleet and numerous sloops MGBs, MTBs and converted trawlers. The Germans had none of the aerial Torpedo capability of the Japanese and Norwegian ops and especially Dunkirk had seen them fail miserably to sink RN Destroyers, only 4 out of 39 involved in Dunkirk being knocked out despite German air superiority and limited space to mvre.
Any attempted invasion would have been massacared mid Channel.
@ apats, the commander of the coastal batteries on the fjord to Oslo had the good sense to open up on the “neutral” fleet approaching, without asking questions.
– down went a cruiser and a brigade
– half of the destroyer force was consumed later in the Op… The crews won the Battle of Narvik, though.
Your count misses the fact that the “massing of” divisions to be on Dutch barges that had no power, but were to be pushed by something (that in the main did not exist) across the Channel just shows how the massive faint ( of massing 175 divisions in the opposite direction) is deliberately missed in your history books… I won’t go as far as to say in your quotes from them.
@ APATS,
” Dunkirk had seen them fail miserably to sink RN Destroyers, only 4 out of 39 involved in Dunkirk being knocked out despite German air superiority and limited space to mvre.”
— That’s not entirely true. Total British and French ship losses were almost 250, and most of these occurred in a short span 29th May – June 1st when the weather eased off and the Luftwaffe shifted from mainly bombing the army to bombing the ships. Almost twenty destroyers were damaged heavily in addition to those sunk. And the Luftwaffe had nothing like air superiority, they lost more aircraft than the RAF did. The evacutation of Crete in ’41 also provides a sobering lesson. In three days RN casualties; 3 cruisers lost and four heavily damaged, 6 destroyers lost and two heavily damaged, one aircraft carrier heavily damaged, two battleships heavily damaged. Which was basically the entire committed fleet.
When we consider the potential of mines, the bombing of harbours and the actions of U-boats, this idea that the Royal Navy would have walked all over any German attempt like a sunday cruise is highly debateable. That’s not to say that the Germans had the ships for it, or the will for it, but just that I struggle to see why people so casually dimiss any idea that it might have been a very tough ask for the Navy.
Re: the above,
Esp. When all of the capital ships would have had the whole length of the coast (down South) to travel, as they were kept ” out of the harm’s way” until the decisive day..:
@Chric B
Wherevdid I say it would be easy? Where do I claim it would not have been tough or that casualties would not have been taken. We are talking about defeating the invasion of the country of coursevit would not have been easy but the correlation of forces was overwhelmingly in our favour at sea. It would have been done.
Not simply my opinion but one supported by leading Staff College (KCL) Historians across land sea and air specialisations.
Even General Jodl said “as long as the British Navy existed an Invasion would be to send my troops into a mincing machine”
Low freeboard barges, escorts outnumbered by more than 10 to 1 at DD level and more at smaller ship level and who do you even try and bomb when the sloops, trawlers, MTBs and MGBs are amongst the troop carriers?
Air superiority is the ability to conduct ops without prohibitive interference, I do not think we prohibited German ops in the Dunkirk AOR. Interfered and caused losses but losses they accepted to conduct ops.
I haven’t had time to read through all the comments on this thread yet. However I have taken issue with RT’s comments about RAF Movements staff.
As you can guess, I am a mover. It’s very easy for you to critise what you don’t understand. You have no idea how hard many movers work to deliver to our customers (namely the Army). You also don’t understand our own frustration when aircraft break or things go wrong.
In my current role I go to great lengths to ensure we get the people and kit to where they need to be and when they need to be there.
So I do understand how annoyed you might be when your R&R flight gets delayed, or the kit you were after doesn’t reach you in time, but please don’t insinuate that we are all inept or incapable or that we don’t care.
Frankly your comments about the RAF and the various trades that make it up are unhelp and unbecoming of which ever rank you may be. So i would say wind your neck in, I doubt you’re perfect either!!!
Thank you!
@ Repulse
That’s is correct they did use the buccaneers buddy refuelling in Belize but it was for a glorified fly past. I don’t think they would attempt such a thing on a real operation with people shooting at them. Nowadays if we had had to do the same we could easily have done it with Voyager.
@ Topman
One thing to consider when moving land based aircraft to near by airfields is transport aircraft. it takes a hell of a lot of air transport to move a squadron to a foreign airbase. at the same time we may well be required to move a large amount if troops in the theatre.
we are no exactly blessed with a massive transport fleet.
Correct me if I am wrong but in SL I think the harriers from the carrier were in position first.
@ big Dave
Well said,I suppose its difficult for the army to appreciate given they are the end user and don’t really provide much support to the other two services.
@ Mark
Or two infantry battalions.
The MOD is currently underspending by around £1 billion a year. Point being there is spare cash that will get deployed some where.
So put another way running the second carrier will cost 7% of the under spend. Its entirely possible to do it without loosing other capabilities if defence is not subject to further cuts.
The bigger question is though would it be worth it? we are not exactly blest with large numbers of helicopters.
a single CVF could operate the Entire Commando Helicopter force of 25 Merlins plus Crowsnest and still squeeze a Squadron of F35B on board.
having two carriers with a similar set up to the to the Albions may make more sense.
@martin yes it can take some numbers but we prioitisewhen we need to and have moved sqns rapidly about where they need to be in very short order. not that it matters really, or to turn the thread into a pissing competition, no i don’t think they were. their role was to provide recce before the rest of the force turned up.
@Martin: Re “buddy” refuelling, agree that a tanker is better, however its amazing how these non optimal techniques are used to great effect. Lack of range is one limitation of the F35B, this would keep any foe guessing.
Double the Combat Radius of a GR9.
@ Repulse and Other Chris
It’s got the same radius as an F18.
Does anyone know how much extra fuel our F35B can lift off QE with?
I have seen USMC figures but the longer run on the QE plus the ski jump should offer a good bit more.
http://www.europeangeostrategy.org/2014/07/centrepiecebut-rest-board/
“Does anyone know how much extra fuel our F35B can lift off QE with?”
They can take off with with maximum fuel from both no difference.
@ Mark – that’s internal fuel though right? What about underwing tanks?
Martin
As far as I’m aware a mtow departure is available from from both ships. The balance will always be between fuel and other payloads and a potential VL return requirement. I would have thought in such a trade off they would go fuel light and connect with a tanker shortly after departure from the ship.
External tanks do not exist for f35 and will be unlikely anytime soon. I don’t particularly see a need for them other than for ferry deployments.
Mark that link that someone posted had a graphic of all the weapons AND DROP TANKS that are earmarked for the F-35.
John
Yes graphics are lovely they were deleted from sdd a long time ago. Don’t expect them operationally for at least another 10 years if at all.
@ APATS,
“Wherevdid I say it would be easy? Where do I claim it would not have been tough or that casualties would not have been taken”
Previously.
“Any attempted invasion would have been massacared mid Channel.”
— That sounds a lot like portraying it as a walk over. Given the Germans record for bombing ships, combined with the potential to bombs ports and bases if air superiority was achieved, the opportunity to use U-boats against the approach paths (you of all people being well aware that the Channel has three choke points), plus mines etc means that casualties would have been very, very heavy.
Now whether air superiority was ever likely to be achieved, whether the barges would have been any use, and whether the Germans would have been able to support logistically such an invasion is very much in question. But this idea that it would be a walk over for the navy doesn’t really tally with the proven record of the Luftwaffe at the time.
As for Air Superiority, the NATO definition appears to be “the degree of air superiority wherein the opposing air force is incapable of effective interference”. Considering the Germans lost 156 aircraft (British losses 145), most of them to the RAF, I’d suggest humbly that the Germans had nothing like air superiority over the battlefield.
@ Chris B
It would have been massacared but it would have been brutal. The RN and the RAF would have flung everything we had at the invasion and yes we would have massacred it but it would have been a brutal brutal day. Of course casualties would have been heavy, we would have been defending the country against invasion. That much should have been obvious.
You have a bad habit of putting words in peoples mouths or jumping on your own interpretation of their comment. I said that the Invasion fleet would be masacred mid channel a view shared by many leading historians. Not that it would be an easy day for the RN. Actually it would be a hard day for all. I am one of the least partisan people on here and do not appreciate you making your own interpretation of my comments.
The Germans did not have a great record bombing ships that were able to mvre at full speed in more open water but yes there would have been casualties.
The NATO definition does not mention casualties, did we effectively interfere with the Germans ability to bomb us over Dunkirk, interfere yes, effectively probably not.
@Chris B
“this idea that it would be a walk over for the navy doesn’t really tally with the proven record of the Luftwaffe at the time”
A walk over? No, it would not have been, ships would have been lost. However, given that the Luftwaffe could not stop the evacuation at Dunkirk, there must be serious doubt at their ability to stop a dozen destroyers steaming at full speed through the invasion convoys. The wash chucked up by a WW2 destroyer at full speed would have been more than enough to swamp the sort of barges Germany would have been using.
The Home Fleet didn’t have a dozen destroyers it had far more than that. Then of course there were the cruisers and battleships all giving of their best and, this is the crucial bit, not counting the cost.
So on your metric of the proven record of the Luftwaffe against warships at the time the RN would have won.
It’s a moot point, if the whole house didn’t come down when the wolf huffed and puffed Jerry had no intention of coming over.
The whole B of Britain was nothing more than a recce by force for what many Germans tenuously conceived of as an assault river crossing as part of the operational exploitation of the results of the Battle of France.
Ego’s, inertia and the desire to see if we’d fold under pressure dragged it out a bit from the German side but once it was clear there was going to be no bounce across the Channel Sealion, was effectively canned as a serious concern. From that point onward we were to screened.
Although I doubt very much that it all seemed like it to us in 1940.
As for a walk over. Almost certainly. Assault river crossings can go bad just by dint of when the enemy is in good defensive positions and keep up the pressure. The Germans only got over the Meuse in 1940 by the simple fact they could keep throwing blokes at it, even with plenty of air support.
Imagine the Battle of Sedan if the Home Fleet was able to have sailed down the river just once, and there were no more assault boats in reserve and no way to throw a bridge over.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/10947797/Defence-Secretary-relieved-as-new-aircraft-carrier-christened-by-Queen.html
Don’t know if this has been covered already. Hammond sounding very positive and hoping money will be found to operate the second carrier.
Sounds good I must say! :-)
We’ve been here before: https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2013/02/britains-greatest-battles/
So has ARRSE: http://www.arrse.co.uk/community/threads/crabs-making-shit-up-since-aprils-fool-day-1918.186976/page-15
And PPRuNe: http://www.pprune.org/aviation-history-nostalgia/465427-battle-britain-re-made.html
This was the considerable size and disposition of the Home Fleet in June 1940: http://www.naval-history.net/xDKWW2-4006-15RNHome1.htm
Given the circumstances, I can only support the view of APATS and others that “Any attempted invasion would have been massacred mid Channel”, albeit at considerable cost to our own forces. Apart from our cruisers, destroyers and minesweepers, even MTBs, MLs, armed yachts and the dozens of armed trawlers with 12 pdrs, 4 inch, 20mm, Vickers and Lewis guns would have posed a significant threat to any German invasion barges but they could easily have achieved the job by capsizing such vulnerable craft with their wakes or ramming them. Moreover, how effective would the Luftwaffe of the time (demonstrably ineffectual against non-stationary surface targets) have been once the RN cats were in among the German pigeons? I doubt the RAF and FAA would have been inactive, either.
In some ways, I wish the Germans had tried to invade Britain in the Autumn of 1940. Ensuing events might have been remarkably different had the remnants of their surface navy and the cream of their assault forces, including the bulk of their equipment, stores and vehicles, ended up at the bottom of the perfidious English Channel.
@Daniele Mandelli
Think that video is the first time an official source has referred to the cost of the carriers as £6.4bn rather than £6.2bn?
On Sea Lion – my memory of the wargame is that most of the Home Fleet are up at Scapa Flow so take a couple of days to get down to the invasion site, so the Germans get to make a beachhead but then see their supply lines eliminated. Obviously it depends a lot on how badly the crabs lose the BoB, but I guess you have to assume that the Luftwaffe have air superiority over Kent and Sussex.
http://www.whitebeamimages.ie/ss_kenmare/british_minefields_british_waters_ww2.png
@Dunservin “I wish the the Germans had tried to invade Britain in the Autumn of 1940″…would have taken nerves of steel and balls of solid brass, but if it had been possible to convince them that they had made good on Goering’s boast about sweeping the RAF from the sky (perhaps by dispersing the main strength north and east) and thus tempted them to make the attempt we might have been able to do them in by Christmas…let them get ashore, and then “take, burn, sink and destroy” everything they had afloat and starve them out. Had they got ashore, how long would the supplies of food, fuel and ammunition landed in the first forty-eight hours lasted once the Home Fleet had closed the door, and the RAF had re-emerged looking for trouble…
GNB
Great pic of the buc refuel Mark…
Reminded me of this.
@ GNB
We are assuming the British political establishment would have stood. No doubt our armed forces were capable of keeping the Germans at bay but even a smallish German force landed on the channel coast that was badly supplied could have been enough to dislodge Churchill and led to the UK seeking terms.
Operation sealion – years ago on TV was docu about sealion & they interviewed a veteran of a HE 111 squadron, who at the time was involved in the sealion operation.
If memory serves me right he was asked by Luffwaffe high command how to go about bombing the Home Fleet. Generally speaking he laughed & said it couldn’t be done without losing the bombing force. Getting to the target, low enough to accurately drop bombs & avoiding AAA against a battleship or even cruiser would have been a death sentence. Let alone the RAF causing mayhem on the flight in.
@Martin – We will never know, thankfully…but my money would still be on Churchill rather than Halifax once our backs were to the wall…certainly that was my Father’s view; but then he came back from Germany in 1936 and joined the TA, so he was looking for a fight pretty early on… :-)
GNB
@ APATS,
“You have a bad habit of putting words in peoples mouths or jumping on your own interpretation of their comment”
— The obvious implication of the term “massacred” suggests an unopposed crack of the whip. I’d also draw your attention to my actual comment; “I struggle to see why people so casually dimiss any idea that it might have been a very tough ask for the Navy”. People, meaning a large number of persons, a collective noun, not just specifically aimed at you. And if you want to be exceptionally pedantic then your comment “Wherevdid I say it would be easy?” is a strawman because I hadn’t claimed that you had said that. But then we wouldn’t want people thinking that you were putting words in peoples mouths or jumping to your own interpretation of their comments now, would we?
“The NATO definition does not mention casualties, did we effectively interfere with the Germans ability to bomb us over Dunkirk, interfere yes, effectively probably not”
— A few quotes,
“On one occasion, 12 unescorted Dorniers Do 17 of III/KG 3 were jumped by Spitfires and in quick succession lost half of their number”
“… but the Navy was reporting that ‘Fighter protection has been invaluable, and … bombing only sporadic’”
“German aircraft losses were high, and British fighter attacks often prevented German bombers from performing with full effectiveness”
“For much of the Luftwaffe, Dunkirk came as a nasty shock. Fliegerkorps II reported in its war diary that it lost more aircraft on the 27th attacking the evacuation than it had lost in the previous ten days of the campaign.”
I think Air Parity would be closer to the phrase you’re looking for.
@ HurstLama,
“However, given that the Luftwaffe could not stop the evacuation at Dunkirk”
— That’s not exactly a fair comparison I would say, given that you’re expecting the Germans to – at short notice and on the fly – completely prevent any evacuations. A few points worth making, starting with a quote ; “Admittedly, the Germans fought at a disadvantage. Although positioned forward at captured airfields, the Bf 109 was at the outer limits of its range and possessed less flying time over Dunkirk than did the “Hurricanes” and “Spitfires” operating from southern England. German bombers were still located in western Germany and had even farther to fly”.
This was an operation that was being tasked rapidly, without any kind of planning or preparation, while also supporting the fighting further inland. On the 27th most of the air activity was focused against the town. On the 28th much damage was done in the morning, then a combination of weather and smoke curtailed most of the air attacks for the afternoon. In the morning of the 29th activity was light, then picked up in the afternoon when again damage was significant. The 30th was low cloud and not much happened. On the 31st weather was better and sporadic action took place. On June 1st in the morning the Stukas arrived and sunk 30 ships in a matter of hours before the weather closed out the rest of the day.
So running this operation on the fly, with a portion of their strength, at long range and with intermitent weather, they did very, very well. Half of all destroyers deployed were either sunk or seriously damaged by air, mine and torpedo attack.
Now imagine the scenario of Sealion, but in this case the hypothetical scenario that control of the air over Southern England had been ceded to the Germans, and so they’ve started to seriously consider the idea. They now have the initiative. They have the option to bomb ports by day and night to start wearing down the RN. They have the ability (and the incentive now) to sow mines on the exits to various ports and waterways. They have an incentive to seriously plan for moving U-boats into position, especially considering that there are only two ways into the channel and both can be comfortably patrolled from the air to give warning. Both ends can also be mined. Once through all this they have to dodge getting torpedoed by German S-boats. And the whole time under sustained and concentrated air attack.
I know a lot of people say it wouldn’t make a difference, but I’m inclined to believe that there is something of a conspiracy of optimisim that exists with regards to the potential massacre, often tinged by a Naval tint that might ever so slightly be trying to undermine one of their sister services achievements with the “we were the real reason it didn’t happen” type argument.
@ Phil,
“It’s a moot point,”
— Luckily, yes it is.
@ Dunservin,
” even MTBs, MLs, armed yachts and the dozens of armed trawlers with 12 pdrs, 4 inch, 20mm, Vickers and Lewis guns would have posed a significant threat to any German invasion barges”
— I’m always intrigued as to why this is brought up but nobody ever considers the possibility of it going both ways, i.e. trawlers with AAA mounts that could shoot back. It reminds me of discussions you often see regarding the F-35 where the enemy always has AWACS and a variety of other goodies and the F-35 side doesn’t.
@ Chris B
“@ APATS,
“You have a bad habit of putting words in peoples mouths or jumping on your own interpretation of their comment”
– The obvious implication of the term “massacred” suggests an unopposed crack of the whip. I’d also draw your attention to my actual comment; “I struggle to see why people so casually dimiss any idea that it might have been a very tough ask for the Navy”.”
Bighorn, the Alamo and Thermopylae were technically massacres but hardly an unopposed crack of the whip.
“And if you want to be exceptionally pedantic then your comment “Wherevdid I say it would be easy?” is a strawman because I hadn’t claimed that you had said that. But then we wouldn’t want people thinking that you were putting words in peoples mouths or jumping to your own interpretation of their comments now, would we?”
Of course not you actually said “this idea that the Royal Navy would have walked all over any German attempt like a sunday cruise”. I of course forgot how difficult Sunday cruises are :)
I would not go as far as air parity but having done a lot of research would say that Fighter Command allowed them to gain only local air superiority and not continually.
“a conspiracy of optimisim that exists with regards to the potential massacre, often tinged by a Naval tint that might ever so slightly be trying to undermine one of their sister services achievements with the “we were the real reason it didn’t happen” type argument.”
You just accused not only posters on here but many respected academics including those that lecture ACSC on Sea, Land and Air ops as well as retired Officers from all 3 services of bias. It would have been a combined effort of whatever the RN and the RAF could get into the AOR at the time and it would have been brutal and uncompromising but the overwhelming historical opinion is they would not have got across.
By the way you do know the Kriegsmarine had only 4 mine layers actually available. we had 50 MCM vessels not including auxiliaries.
@chris.B
Venturing into the world of what-ifs with some trepediation.
Isn’t it matter of resources and where to apply.
If stukas were the best anti-ship asset then precision bombing would have left the radar station operational. With radar in place the stukas could have been easily countered since you knew where both RN capital ships were & the stukas are. Once the RAF have dealt with the finite Stuka force, leaves the home fleet to counter the invasion force with other available assets.
I also doubt that the RAF/FAA/RN were not also doing their own job of laying mines again disrupting the invasion force, did they have a substantial number of minesweepers?
Even if (big if) the German forces had land how on earth were the going to hold ground & resupply? At the time much of S & SE was tiny lanes, rivers, cliffs & various awkward geographical choke points with a shed load of annoyed British & Commonwealth soldiers all over the place.
Sealion could not have succeeded on any account except in the fevered imagination of those who watch the history channel.
It’s a simple matter of knowing your history, not just the myths and legends. In September 1940, we not only had an enormous conventional surface Navy but also the RNPS (Royal Naval Patrol Service otherwise known as ‘Churchill’s Pirates’ or ‘Harry Tait’s Navy’). The German surface Navy, comprising only ten or so undamaged destroyers after the two Battles of Narvik, never had anything near the equivalent and wouldn’t have been able to generate it. Incidentally, have you digested the pages (all four of them) listing the RN’s available assets at http://www.naval-history.net/xDKWW2-4006-15RNHome1.htm?
Formed in August 1939, the RNPS was plentiful, well worked-up and experienced. After all, it had been fighting the Battle of the Atlantic (the other Battle of Britain) since September 1939 and would continue to do so until the German surrender in May 1945. Based on First World War practice (see Admiral Lord Charles Beresford’s formation of the RNR Trawler Reserve in 1911), the RNPS included many of the same armed trawlers, drifters, yachts, MFVs and experienced men. At its height, it comprised 70,000 men and 6,000 ships. See http://www.rnps.lowestoft.org.uk/history.htm.
@ Leadslug,
With the air situation the way it was in 1940 then Sealion would undoubtedly have failed, with heavy losses on both sides. I don’t think that’s really in dispute. The question that intrigues is what would have happened had the Germans achieved air superiority. Under those conditions things begin to look very different. I think it’s also worth challenging the assumption that the attack would have gone ahead immediately. People often assume that had the Germans won the air war they would have immediately attempted an invasion. Nobody ever seems to consider the possibility that now, with conditions much better than those that actually existed 1940, they might have waited for the new year in order to build up their collection of vessels, while taking the intervening time to pound away at the Royal Navy.
Is it a thought exercise worth devoting huge amounts of time to? No, probably not. The thing I’ve always found the most interesting about it though is the utterly dismissive reactions [to a scenario involving German superiority in the air], this assumption that under no circumstances could it have been pulled off despite the very different set of conditions that it would now take place under. I think people are too quick to to dismiss the posibilities, often because it would potentially ruin a “the Navy would have saved the day anyway” narrative.
@ Dunservin,
Your response adeptly side steps the issue raised. Well done.
As far as the Germans were concerned I think they believe they did have air superiority. It’s just that they needed to whittle the RAF down a little more. Something that was denied by Hitler.
Was it not Hitler’s decision to move on Russia that consumed too much resource and essentially put the Nazi war machine spiraling towards defeat?
@Red Trousers
Nothing like the nasty wiff of inter-service rivalry is there.
So would you call the members of the Quick Reaction Force of 51 Squadron RAF Regiment at Bastion a bunch of Walter Mitty’s in 2012 when they took on the Taliban assaulting their base?
What about the RAF fire fighters who were putting out aircraft fires whilst under fire in the same attack or how about the RAF bomb disposal disarming IED’s in Afghanistan thus helping protect personnel from all services I take it you see them all as disappointments from a shoddy service?
There is jolly inter-service rivalry and then there is just being plain nasty.
Just saying
It seems that no one here believes that SeaLion was a faint… A well respected feature in history writing (faints, that is, we “won” is even more important).
Simon’s point above could easily be expanded on by looking at the key dates of German planning directives, and how they relate to the air battle dates (the only part that actually took place, other than the bombing of the requisitioned barges).
@Chris.B
I refer you back to @APATS comments
You appear to be just enjoying an element of trolling. If you are not then it looks like you are missing important element of the UK defence as of 1940.
Both sides lost planes, with the exception that Luftwaffe pilots that survived were captured since most of the fight was over UK. British & Commonwealth & Eagle pilots that survived fought again in new planes. & RADAR & a the beginnings of a comprehensive intelligence network.
Both sides sowed mines, only allies had sufficient anti-mine capabilities.
And have you ever travelled around S & SE England? Remove the A roads & notice layered defence.
@ ACC
I don’t know. Such was the nature of Nazi Germany that schemes often ran in parallel with others and for all sorts of reasons ranging from “divide and conquer” to “left hand doesn’t know what the right hand is doing”.
Sealion may have been a faint or the start of something in deadly earnest or both!
@ Operation Sealion
I do believe that this is the third time this has come up!
Anyway, I happen to find this link to the Defence Academy and they have four documents in PDF form, including a translated OKW document:
http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/jscsc/jscsc-library/archives/operation-sealion
Also Invasion 1940 by Dereck Robinson is well worth a read.
@ Leadslug,
You appear to not understand the concept of hypotheticals.
@ ACC,
They did planning and everything, high level discussions, the works. It was a legit plan.
I see quite a few nations use the AW101 too, maybe they could send a detachment to help fill up the flight deck and hangar when the QE heads out to sea. Seriously. that’s a whole lotta space. Or we could build a few more of those balsa wood F35’s and park them on top.
At least the 12 fj’s will have plenty of space to stretch their wings.
Nah, for all the fun and games, it’s a brilliant bit of engineering. It’ll raise a few eyebrows when it arrives in Norfolk for the first time. A kind of ‘huh, didn’t think they could still do stuff like that’ moment for our cousins.
@ Chris B, many things were or seemed legit at that time, you just need to see the wheat from the chaff:
The feint in Norway (threatening a secondary invasion of the UK’s North Sea coast) was shifted to an offensive posture against the USSR already on 13 Sept… A long country where transport takes a long time… in advance of the indefinite post-ponement of SeaLion on the 17th. Here follows an account of the meeting that nailed down Barbarossa from staff planning into reality (how seriously were the proposals made?):
”
During a meeting in Berlin in November 1940, Hitler actually suggested to Molotov that the Soviets join the Tripartite Pact. Despite the fact that German military planning for an attack on the Soviet Union was underway at this time, the invitation to the USSR was legitimate. The point was to deflect the focus of Soviet attention away from eastern Europe, which threatened and conflicted with German interests in the region, towards central Asia specifically Persia and India. For the Germans this offered all sorts of opportunities since, with the USSR effectively going to war with the UK, Germany’s eastern frontiers would be relatively secure. This, perhaps, reveals Hitler’s criteria for proceeding against England – the Soviet Union had to be an active partner in the enterprise. In this case, the British would have been forced into deciding whether pursuit of war with Germany was worth the very definite loss of its eastern empire to the Soviet Union.
Molotov refused the offer to join the Axis. From the Soviet perspective it implied relinquishing historical Russian interest in the Slavs of eastern Europe for the sake of territorial gain in the Middle East and central Asia. Just as important, the ideological divide between the communist USSR and the fascist Third Reich had been temporarily forded during this period, but not bridged.”
That was a fast- forward from Sept to November; we know the rest.
@ Chris B
“don’t think that’s really in dispute. The question that intrigues is what would have happened had the Germans achieved air superiority. Under those conditions things begin to look very different.”
I think the issue with this is the definition of air superiority. If the Germans had cleared the sky’s of ever single RAF plane then yes they would have caused the RN major problems.
However even when we achieved overwhelming air superiority against the Germans they were still able to mount the odd one off air attack and fly some fighters.
If the home fleet was heading for the Channel then even a very limited remnant of the RAF could still launch a sufficient attack to give the home fleet the ability to enter the channel and deal a mortal blow to the German invasion force.
I am not sure how much damage German aerial weapons would have cause the home fleet in 1940 as they had no armoured piercing bombs and little torpedo capability.
I often think that the level of air superiority the Germans required was a fantasy and completely unachievable.
One thing I would like to see in the 2015 SDSR is the evolution of the Army’s FF2020 into a tri-service Joint Force 2020 or JF2020. Whilst I strongly believe in retaining the three services there really needs to be a coherent joined up plan for the armed forces in the future. Below is a rough idea of how all three services should operate together in the UK’s two rapidly deployable formations
Air Mobile Force:
RAF/RN/Army-Rotary assets
RAF-Fixed wing assets
Army-Infantry
Army-Light Armour
RAF/Army-ISTAR assets
RAF/Army-Air Defence
Amphibious Force:
RN-CVF,LPD and Aux
RAF/RN/Army-Rotary assets
RAF/RN-Fixed wing assets
RN/Army-Infantry
RN/Army-Artillery
RN/Army-light armour
Army-Medium Armour
RAF/Army-Air Defence
RAF/Army-ISTAR assets
Both Formations also need to cross train to a large extent allow each to more effectively support each other. To this the hopefully realised medium formations need to train with the above two formations on a regular basis. I would do away with the palnned permenent Brigades and move towards three to four Divisions, which using current terminalogy would be;
1st Division (Reactive Force): 1 Battlegroup Headquarters (Divisional Level),3 Battlegroup Headquarters (Brigade Level), 1 Special Forces Battalion, 2, Ranger Battalions, 3 Airborne Infantry Battalions, 3 Marine Battalions, 2 Mechanised Infantry Battalions, 2 Mechanised Infantry Battalions, 1 Attack Helicopter Regiment, 2 Armed Utility Helicopter Regiments, 2 Medium Artillery Regiments, 1 Engineering Regiment, 1 Signals/ISTAR Regiment, Logistic and Administration support.
2nd Division (Reactive Force): 1 Battlegroup Headquarters (Divisional Level),4 Battlegroup Headquarters (Brigade Level),2 Armoured Regiments, 2 Armoured InfantryBattalions, 8 Mechanised Infantry Battalions, 1 Attack Helicopter Regiment, 2 Medium Artillery Regiments, 2 Engineering Regiments, 1 Signals/ISTAR Regiment, Logistic and Administration support
3rd Division (Adaptive Force): 1 Battlegroup Headquarters (Divisional Level),4 Battlegroup Headquarters (Brigade Level) 1 Armoured Regiment, 1 Armoured InfantryBattalion, 2 Mechanised Infantry Battalions, 8 Motorised Infantry Battalions, 2 Medium Artillery Regiments, 1 Engineering Regiment, 1 Signals/ISTAR Regiment, Logistic and Administration support
4th Division (Adaptive Force): 1 Battlegroup Headquarters (Divisional Level),4 Battlegroup Headquarters (Brigade Level) 1 Armoured Regiment, 1 Armoured InfantryBattalion, 2 Mechanised Infantry Battalions, 8 Motorised Infantry Battalions, 2 Medium Artillery Regiments, 1 Engineering Regiment, 1 Signals/ISTAR Regiment, Logistic and Administration support.
This is a very rough order of battle but I believe in flexibility and being able to form battlegroups to fit the job rather than trying to adapt a fixed formation to the job. Many will notice that I have not listed any Recce Ragiments though. I am m ore inclined to re-introduce integral Recce into individual Regiments/Battalions at HQ level, giving each 4 sections of 2 vehicles. Each infantry battalion would have in its support company 8 Mortars, though in the Armoured and Mechanised Infantry these would be 120mm as would those of the Marines as trials have shown the Bv210 can support and operate a 120mm sized weapon from the bed of the rear part of the vehicle. Both the Armoured and Mechanised Infantry also need a Fire Support variant of the main platform. A common turret woud be ideal armed with a large calibre auto-cannon and long range ATGW. The cannon should be of the sensor fused variety to increase its flexibility and the ATGW should have a lock on after launch capability to allow defalade fire when targets are designated by forward infantry.
Other units such as the much maligned RAF Regiment should have wider roles. In the case of the RAF Regiment, they future role should be as base security for all overseas deployments in both an infantry and air defence capacity. For this role they should receive additional Panther’s from the Army (who do not really want them) and Foxhounds. They should be supplimented by a tri-service Joint Military Police force, which should also be equipped with Panther’s.
Damn I have gone way off topic here! So summing up we need to do more with less far more effectively, with all three services using the same hymn book.
Lord Jim
Too big a change and will never happen! The army is still squirming to fit into the latest changes without changing the whole structure!
I count 41 Infantry Battalions, does that include the 14 Reserve? We only have, what, 31 or something.
What happens to the Battalion garrisoning Brunei? Or the 2 in Cyprus? Or the 3 with London District in Public Duties roles?
The JHC and JFC already exist, beneath which there is the JF HQ of the JRRF.
I also thought the Armoured Regiments and Armoured Infantry and Mechanized Battalions already posses their own CVRT Scimitar Recc formations? As well as the current 5 Recc Regiments.
You’d also need a hefty increase in the RLC, RAMC and REME supporting assets which are not listed.
Nice ideas though, but fantasy land for me I’m afraid.
Congratulations on getting your new floaty thing in the water! It looks big enough to add a modularized task force command and control center on the hangar deck if needed without materially affecting aircraft stowage. All you would need is somewhere to mount the antennae. I keep seeing an electromagnetic CATOBAR installed during refit in my mind’s eye with F-35Cs on deck, perhaps with updated LM S-3 Vikings providing AEW/ASW/tanker support, but that’s dreamtime stuff.
@Kent: sadly your dream is likely to remain just that. @Not A Boffin confirmed that the reason EMALS installation was impractical and very expensive was that the number of compartments impacted if fitted was very high. It appears that the MOD failed to get the specs for EMALS in the 2003-4 timeframe and stopped insisting on an “adaptable” design around the same timeframe. I’m sure it could be done, but it might have to wait for a time when EMALS can be re-engineered :-(
@wf – Steam catapults and old-fashioned landing cables take up less room than EMALS? Well, I suppose a “mature” system like that could be fitted if y’all could come up with a suitable steam source.
In the long ago and far away, the USN successfully landed a USMC Herc on the USS Forrestal and flew it off again. How would that be for providing a maritime patrol/AEW/tanker aircraft? :D
@Kent
The issue was the MOD demanding more money to be shaved off the carrier program from every corner, hence the design team very rapidly only played lip service to the whole “Adaptable design” concept.
As for a Hercules from a carrier, it is an interesting buy impractical foot-note from naval aviation history. At the time the USN was using the Grumman C-1 Trader for carrier on-board delivery (COD). It was piston engined a problem when the newer types on the carrier were all jet powered using different fuel. It had a limited payload capacity and a 300 mile range, a serious issue for the new big carriers with their high intensity flight operations with jet powered aircraft in the deep ocean. There was an increasing need to transport vital spares for flight operations and you could hardly get a spare J79 on-board. The Chief of Naval Operations ordered a feasibility study to see if they could use the C-130 as a Super-COD off a carrier.
It was actually far easier then one would expect and the KC-130F used was able to perform a landing and take off at 500 miles out in fairly rough seas with no arrestor gear or catapult. All very well but a look at the video below shows the real problem with the idea that made it an impractical proposition:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CfwJJD5jGXk
Not only does the deck arrestor cables have to be removed but the entire flight deck has to be cleared of all other aircraft and equipment. For a test fine but for a carrier conducting flight operations a nightmare of an idea, imagine every time the COD visits having to clear everything into the hanger before it lands and then move it back again once it is gone. That would have a huge impact on the operational capability of the carrier so the idea was quietly dropped and the Grumman C2 Greyhound procured instead.
A continuation of my thought about using Hercs from your new carrier: From a quick check of the deck measurements, it seems to me that it would work. If the ramp would support the Herc, you might even be able to lift bigger loads off the deck, too. For those folks who like the C-295/CN-235 aircraft, they’d probably fit better and there are already MPA/AEW/gunship versions of them. I was just figuring since the RAF already has some Hercs…
Of course, they’d have to park them on deck, probably starboard aft.
why would we want EMALS when we can fly our awesome hovering 5th generation jet of the current carrier as well as a couple of dozen helicopters.
I never really saw any benefit in F35C when you can get F35 B for a fraction of the through life costs with buckets more flexibility. The only thing F35C offers is ubber range which we don’t really need and luckily enough we now have 14 of the worlds best AAR tankers to supplement the F35B.
@ ACC,
They did extensive planning and preparation for Sealion. High level discussions etc, done in secret (for the time), in which they had no incentive to discuss issues that weren’t being genuinely considered or were merely feints (they had no reason for example not to talk about them as such). Clearly, like any government, the Germans would keep all options open to them. Hitler was supposedly something of an admirer of the British Empire and considered it a force for good in the world. Preferable to him (and what everyone in the German high command appeared to be banking on) was for a British capitulation. This undoubtedly would have been the favoured course and represented the best outcome possible for the Germans by far. Luckily Churchill disagreed!
@ Martin,
“However even when we achieved overwhelming air superiority against the Germans they were still able to mount the odd one off air attack and fly some fighters. If the home fleet was heading for the Channel then even a very limited remnant of the RAF could still launch a sufficient attack to give the home fleet the ability to enter the channel and deal a mortal blow to the German invasion force.”
— That’s highly dependent on the specifics and represents a very generous assessment of the capability of a reduced air force. The Germans for example in ’44 were barely able to muster much a whimper against the Allied invasion. If Sealion had been delayed till the spring of ’41 then it would have given Zee Germans several months to pound naval facilities etc from the air. There might not have been a lot left to sail by the time they were done. So you have to choose; preserve what’s left of your fighter force for the big day and limit yourself to harassing incoming raids, which effectively abandons the shipyards and ports to the fate of their AAA weapons, or try to mount a stiffer resistance over specific targets to preserve them but accept a greater rate of attrition ahead of the big day.
“I am not sure how much damage German aerial weapons would have cause the home fleet in 1940 as they had no armoured piercing bombs and little torpedo capability”
— Err, they developed armour piercing bombs as early as 1937, in various weights. See Crete for some of the damage they later pulled off against capital ships. By this point they also had a very good track record against Destroyers which were the main threat.
The problem with the Home Fleet would have been the dilemma of whether to send them or not. If you send them south they have to run the gauntlet of air attack, mines and U-boats. Keep in mind that the sea was already full of mines, British and German (as demonstrated by the map posted earlier by X) which limited the paths that ships could actually take. The Germans had a variety of ships still tucked away in Norway, so if too much of the Home Fleet was sent south then they risked leaving open the chance for a whole German flotilla of major warships to break out into the Atlantic and start running riot.
“I often think that the level of air superiority the Germans required was a fantasy and completely unachievable.”
— I’d agree that it was an absolute fantasy for the time scale they expected, and that it would have been a very, very tough ask in the long run even with a change in tactics. Achieveable? Hmm, debateable. Not certain as they really had the numbers to pull it off, especially with Kieth Parks approach of conserving his forces.
@Fedaykin – Well, the QEC doesn’t have arresting cables to remove…but, a C-295/CN-235 is quite a bit smaller than a Herc. Oughta be able to work that!
Chris.B. @3:02,
Yeah, for a real feint you need real action to the contrary on the ground; here is a good day-by-day account http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/1705143/GERMAN%20PLANS%20FOR%20INVASION%20OF%20ENGLAND,%201940_0001.pdf
If you bother to read that, it was the navy that saw the real risks, and elaborated them (obviously no one in Luftwaffe was going to contradict Goehring, who had committed himself).
In 1943 Hitler was actually regretting that he had been persuaded by the navy not to go ahead… by that time the alternatives actually chosen were turning sour.
“@Kent: sadly your dream is likely to remain just that. @Not A Boffin confirmed that the reason EMALS installation was impractical and very expensive was that the number of compartments impacted if fitted was very high. It appears that the MOD failed to get the specs for EMALS in the 2003-4 timeframe and stopped insisting on an “adaptable” design around the same timeframe.”
Errr. No. I don’t believe that’s what I said.
The current design delta remains perfectly adaptable, as the general arrangement drawings dated December 06 that I’m looking at illustrate perfectly. The spaces for the cats and arrester gear are sitting there as unallocated space on the STOVL drawings. What the MoD failed to do was contract for the detailed engineering design of the catapult and arrester gear installations, because until relatively recently, EMALS was still seen as a very risky proposition. The adaptable design included space and weight for either a steam or an EMALS installation. – the arrester gear being much less of an issue. IIRC the steam generator was to go in one of the diesel MMR.
The decrease in EMALS (system, not ship fit) risk co-incided with the perceived increase in F35B programme risk, which is one reason why the STOVL – CV switch was contemplated. However, by this time construction of the QE was well underway and the detail engineering had still not been contracted for – not least because EMALS details had previously been withheld and were only just becoming available. That meant that modifying QE was going to be expensive, hence the coice of PoW as the potential conversion. Trouble was, without the detailed engineering done (ie installation drawings, rather than arrangement drawings, component manufacture drawings, system diagrams, T&C plans etc) you’d have put a delay on the PoW schedule, which appears to have been interpreted as you’ll pay for all the staff on the project throughout the delay and pay for the actual conversion as well. That’s the only explanation I can come up with for the huge total of manhours implied by the conversion project “cost”. I have heard people describe having to rip out lots of compartments, but knowing where the systems go, I’d struggle to describe that work content as prohibitive.
The ships remain perfectly convertible. That is the beauty of building them big enough, with sufficient margin. Clearly such a conversion would be more expensive than building them like that, but that is a question of money rather than physical impossibility.
@ ACC,
Already have a copy :)
@Not a Boffin: apologies for my faulty memory. Good to hear eventual conversion is possible
@NaB
Always suspected Catapult and Arrestor Gear crew training/facilities/ongoing costs might have appeared in those figures. Any evidence for that in what you see?
Had wondered that myself, but on reflection probably not. Very much doubt we’d have bought our own training rig, much more likely to use US training rigs, potentially at Lakehurst. Cost wise it’s in the noise.
Just saying:
http://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1879
Su-33/MiG-29K uses STOBAR on the ships they are deployed on.
Does anyone know much could a F35C take off with from our ski ramp?
For that matter a Rafael?
If the arrestor wires were fitted first our carriers would we then have greater interoperability with the French and Americans.
There’s probably no reason why ## Insert Favourite 4G Carrier Aircraft ## can’t take off without a catapult from HMS Queen Elizabeth.
The 4G aircraft would have to take off with minimum fuel load, immediately AAR, would experience other limitations in operations dependent on weather, non-angled flight deck and would suffer in sortie generation as a result.
If you’re going to go CATOBAR, go the whole way. Otherwise, stick the course with STOVL/SRVL reaping the rough weather and sortie generation rates. Compared to Harrier the F-35B is experiencing a smooth development ride.
Something like STOBAR could be useful for an RPA however. Any news on whether EMKIT has been shortened from 100m for a 10kKG payload?
Thanks TOC , I wasn’t thinking of operations more just a extra place for a damaged aircraft/ship to set down in combined fleet operations, a kind of safety net if you will. In WW2 US planes often landed on other carriers due to their own being damage or they themselves being in dire need. Better to capture a £100m aircraft than have it ditch. The arrestor gear to have it fitted say £100m , one aircraft recovered from an allies ship that would of had to ditch would pay for it self :-)
Not forgetting the carriers for a minute. Sounds like we will have 1 active carrier (eventually) with 1 in reserve.(hopefully). There have been a couple of good posts about how important the carrier will be to project force and expeditionary warfare and for Falklands 2 etc.
If all this is true, then the carrier becomes a single solitary ship (ot target to the adversary) becomes the target to get to win, its just too tempting and its all eggs in a rather large basket.
Our leaders will be aware of this which means the carrier then becomes “too dangerous to risk” or use properly. Worse still, the defensive armament of the carrier and group (assuming we can afford full escort group and not “fitted for but without”) isnt overwhelming vs air, sub or stand off missle threats, survivability becomes a question which then undermines how credible the power projection actually is to an adversary.
Sorry, but in terms of projecting power and giving the country options in foreign policy, I just still dont get it.
Midlander
Watch this space……
She’s very wide, isn’t she? “Never mind the quality, feel the width.”
Worse still, the defensive armament of the carrier and group (assuming we can afford full escort group and not “fitted for but without”) isnt overwhelming
Come on now. We reputedly have the best AAW destroyer in the world, about to get a 5th generation aircraft, have ultra modern SSNs, and have sonar that other navies would sink their mothership for.
Some perspective. Please.
@ Midlander
“Worse still, the defensive armament of the carrier and group (assuming we can afford full escort group and not “fitted for but without”) isnt overwhelming vs air, sub or stand off missle threats”
Sorry but we currently operate the worlds best ASW Frigate with the worlds best ASW helicopter embarked and we are going to replace the Frigate with a new one and are upgrading the helicopters, T26 will instead of a PDMS system have a new AAW capability giving it the ability to engage crossing and non threatening targets and a range that has gone from the 4.5NM of Sea Wolf to close to over 15NM for Sea Ceptor. Then we have the incredible AAW capability of the T45, in an ideal world would like more missiles but it is still an amazing system and even the US look a little longingly at what SAMPSON does.
The supporting SSN is not too shabby either.
That is of course before we even mention the main punch of a CBG which is what flies off the deck, so not really certain where you think we are short.
Of course the carrier will be the main target., just like an airbase is (or was in 1982).
Hence the big problem with the fact that the carrier “sucks up” escorts to defend it, leaving precious little to do the actual landing/offensive and manoeuvre necessary to unbalance the enemy.
This is why those that tout the minimum 30 escorts have a point ;-)
APATS,
…over 15NM for Sea Ceptor
Is this actually true?
I can’t get my head round the fact that CAMM(L) is longer and will have a 25km range and get launched at near Mach 1 yet somehow at 1.23kg/m3 something that has to rotate and then accelerate past M=1 can go further.
???
@Simon
The actual range is noted as 25KM+ 15Nm is 27.78KM :) Where does it say that CAMM(L) will be longer they are common missiles, also CAMM(L) utilises the same soft vertical launch system as Sea Ceptor.
“Hence the big problem with the fact that the carrier “sucks up” escorts to defend it, leaving precious little to do the actual landing/offensive and manoeuvre necessary to unbalance the enemy”
We should not look at carrier Ops forever through a 1982 prism :) What really will unbalance the enemy is the effect of 48 storm shadow missiles arriving that were fired from aircraft launched from a carrier 700 miles away with a few TLAM STOT for good measure.
@ Simon
19 escorts went “South”. Even though some 82’s were pulled out of reserve and the RNZN covered one of our tasks there was still a good deal of RN left north of equator.
However good the new kit is or will be it can only be in one place at one time
x, Simon – I noted on the FRES page that quantity has a quality all of its own; the same applies to ships as to combat vehicles. In the case of ships my assessment of resilience is what proportion of the total capability is lost if a vessel is sunk – if there are 100 fighting ships losing one, however tragic for those involved, is a limited and coverable capability loss. If there are 20 fighting ships to start with then the lost capability is almost impossible to cover. Added to that is the accepted protracted build time for modern vessels which means replacements take years not weeks to build. No doubt the champions of maximum complexity technofest warships hold the view that they are so brilliant at everything that no enemy would ever be able to sink or disable any of them; I find such views naive and delusional I’m afraid. If we ever descend into full-on war again, there will be losses. Sad but inevitable. I see no evidence that the defence plans have taken combat loss (and how to restore to full strength) seriously. That applies to Air and Land as much as to Naval capability.
@ chris
“if there are 100 fighting ships losing one, however tragic for those involved, is a limited and coverable capability loss. If there are 20 fighting ships to start with then the lost capability is almost impossible to cover.”
Of course you have to define “fighting” within the context of required capabilities and tasking and then add in the extra training and manpower requirements with specific reference to complex course and key positions. Then justify the whole issue from a cost basis as you are certainly not going to do so on a capability basis.
“No doubt the champions of maximum complexity technofest warships hold the view that they are so brilliant at everything that no enemy would ever be able to sink or disable any of them; I find such views naive and delusional I’m afraid”
The people you rant against do not exist, they simply see the current split as the best way to use a limited budget.
Your rant would have had more impact if not for the fact that you know as much about warships as i do a about armoured vehicles i.e very little, though I have had ridden in them in 2 combat zones :)
APATS,
Drat! I didn’t mean CAMM(L) – I meant the air-launched ASRAAM replacement CAMM(A).
Sorry.
Perhaps I should spin the question the other way…
If CAMM(L) or CAMM(M) (soft eject Sea Ceptor) has a 25km range then surely a version launched at Mach=0.9 will have a significantly longer range? However, it too is being touted as 25km (WVR). I’d expect about 50km from it.
Chris,
Not 100% certain but the comparison between vehicle and ship redundancy design is a little different. I don’t think we’d expect a single £100,000 Brimstone to sink a frigate, whereas we’re pretty much expecting it to destroy a £3m MBT. Ships are designed to survive multiple hits and still contribute to operations.
I guess this is why we spend half the escort budget on 6 destroyers and the other half on 12-13 frigates… hopefully :-)
APATS – sorry if my previous comment struck you as a rant – it wasn’t (trust me I can on occasions generate World Class rants). It was just a statement that when bullets shells missiles & torpedoes are thrown about platforms will be lost, and if the number of platforms is small to begin with the losses rapidly become critical. IXION picked up the same theme on his new post. Its not criticism of the tactics or the capabilities of the personnel, just a fact of numbers. As such, whether I have served on HM Ships or not has little bearing on whether the opinion is less valid than any you may hold, has it? Or am I missing some special insight that only Officers of the Royal Navy understand?
@Chris
“In the case of ships my assessment of resilience is what proportion of the total capability is lost if a vessel is sunk ”
How the hell can you leave out the chance of a ship being sunk? thats like saying that victoria bechham is as resiliencent as mike tyson because if you knock them both out they have both lost 100% of their capabilty.
You have say 25 exocets. One fleet has 100 small escorts armed with 1980s tech. You fire of your 25 exocets and put out of action 20 boats loosing 20% of your covrage. You get another 25 exocets and the next fleet turns up with 5 type 45 destroyers. You fire off your exocets and one of the destroyers has a malfucntion in its radar and you hit it with a couple of exocets, the rest are all downed. However the thing is twice the size as the frigates and designed to take exocet hits with modern dammage control systems so although its put out of action its not sunk.
In both cases you loose 20% of your task force.
However thats kind of missing the point any way because the point of the task force is to provide cover for some high value target. How does your fleet of 100 boats do this? you can ether bunch them around the hvt and hope that they absorb most of the missile hits. so youve got a 20% chance of loosing your hvt. or you can put them on a permiter and try and stop the aircraft. However your ships are only caperbale of stopping missiles aimed directly at them, or aircraft going straight overhead. Aircraft could come in low and pass your permiter. In effect you dint really have any cover to loose in the first place you just lost some of your decoy targets,
With your 5 type 45s you have a ship that can acturaly cover an area and intercept missiles aimed at over targets. And you dont need to put 1000s of mens livs at risk to do so. You can make a case that more cheeper vessels would be better at keeping the cover up, but you cant do the calculations based on the idea that a type 45 is just as easy to sink as a type 23!
Random – you seem to read what I didn’t write? I don’t recall suggesting lots of old fashioned ships of no significant capability. Nor did I state they should all bob around one AOR or Carrier. Indeed I thought the purpose of the RN was to do its part in defending the Nation’s future, not just to defend the designated HVU in one task force.
Bearing in mind it was full-on war I was considering, having put your escorts around the carrier and oiler, what vessels do you deploy for convoy protection? Or choke point picket? Or coastal protection? Or overseas territory protection? Is the single task force going to be sent on each of these tasks in parallel? Last time I looked through ATP1 (it was ATP1c just changing to ATP1d) I recall looking at the huge convoy structures and wondering if the RN had enough ships to fully support the documented convoy protection.
No doubt the answer is “we don’t foresee fighting a war alone; our allies will support us”. A double edged sword of course because they in turn would expect us to support their needs too, which may not be to this nation’s best immediate advantage.
@chris
I was using it as an EXAMPLE ( i also used mike tyosn and vicoria beckham but you didnt say anthing about that ether)that you cant just judge resiliance as caperbilties lost when a ship is sunk, you have to balance that against against the chance that a ship will be lost. Exactly the same can be said of any senario, if you have 20 * the ships but loose them at 20 * the rate, then you have no more resliance. Im not disagreeing with you im just saying your argument has a logical falacy, bring up the task force was just an illstration of that falacy. if cheepr boats dont get lost at 20 * the rate then you need to state that in your argument thats all.
Random – I accept the hole in the earlier argument; I should have defined “of modern design but possibly of more focused capability” – in other words things like high quality radar fits but with self-defence capability only, capable of operating as radar pickets for whatever fleet they are part of. Or long range weapon carrier. Or towed array vessel. And so on.
@Chris
I was making a joke about unfortunately having the displeasure of riding in armoured vehicles, not what I signed up for :)
My original point remains though, you throw around comments like “if there are 100 fighting ships” we do not have a budget for 100 fighting ships. You do not define fighting nor look at capability vs threat, consider manning and training issues etc etc. All of which you do when you talk about armoured vehicles where you are obviously an expert.
There have been several very interesting threads on the topic that you could look at with quality contributions arguing both sides.
APATS – ref budgets – hole in one! The argument is much the same for all three services; through ‘good times’ the politicians have used feel-good-factor peace-in-our-time type arguments to turn down the armed forces; through bad times they have used austerity-is-the-only-way simply-can’t-afford-more arguments to turn down the armed forces. At every change of circumstances the politicians chose to squeeze the armed forces to fund other public-purse expenses. As a Naval sort, are you comfortable with a Navy that can muster one task force or send one frigate at a time to deal with distant troubles?
Anyway you are right I am no expert on how the RN works day to day. So I’ll stop now.
@Simon
You’re not comparing like with like – ASRAAM may have contributed bits to CAMM, but it’s still smaller and lighter than CAMM and from an earlier generation. You’ll note that the Block III AIM-9X is intended to increase range by 60% over Block II (http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/us-navy-hopes-to-increase-aim-9x-range-by-60-388468/ ) with IOC in 2022 – CAMM(A) won’t happen before then so one might think about the CAMM(A) wishlist in similar terms. Of course, range isn’t the be-all-and-end-all for these kinds of missiles, you’ve got Meteor for that.
Talking of which, MBDA have announced final flight tests of Meteor on Gripen, they’re just waiting for some software sign-off before it enters service.
And the Indians have bought a version of ASRAAM for their Jaguars in a £250m deal :
http://www.livemint.com/Politics/xHoQvHsQfyUtfYerKwVHxN/India-UK-sign-deals-worth-370-million.html
@Chris
“As a Naval sort, are you comfortable with a Navy that can muster one task force or send one frigate at a time to deal with distant troubles?”
We tend to try and maintain a presence in areas of interest and this keeps us pretty busy even in peace time. We generally keep 2 Ff/SS E of Suez on Kipion tasking, as well as 4 MCMVs operating permanently from Bahrain. We will have 1 FF/DD in the South Atlantic and often another in the North Atlantic. The deterrent is permanently at sea. at least 1 SSN is deployed and at least 1 preferably 2 FF/D are at high readiness in UK waters. So if you accept that you pretty much need 3 to keep 1 permanently on station and these need to be FF/DD vessels, then contradict myself by saying the N Atlantic vessel is not always and FF/DD. Anyway punch in these tasks and add in refit cycles, work up and training cycles you get something like 12 or 13 hulls just to maintain this. Add in the possibility of deploying the RFTG and you can quickly use our 19 escorts. Given that all these missions require an FF/DD then yes unfortunately the current use of our budget seems to be the best way of achieving our tasking whilst retaining the ability to respond to a crisis.
@Thread – If we need to fight a world war we expect to do so in concert with allies after building up capacity over a period of time…almost certainly by refitting any tanks, planes or ships in storage and borrowing extensively from the Cousins rather than turning out anything new, for which we have practically no capacity left unless the available lead time is a decade.
Thus our “strategy” such as it is must be to use our significant global reach and technological advantage to head off trouble at the pass by the use of punitive expeditions as and when required…and for that task, I should have thought the combination of the CVF, our remaining A/W assets and globally deployable air and land forces should be pretty effective. No need, for example for the RFTG to be organised as though anticipating a full scale attack by a hostile U-boat wolfpack…being in the same Ocean should be sufficient provided the capital assets are secure against surprise attack from whatever assets the local loonies can pull together for a suicide mission…so one North Korean Submarine, or a couple of flights of fast jets or a flotilla of speedboats manned by the Caliph’s Black Guard, Al Quds, or a bunch of Peronist Irredentists then…
The flaw, of course, is that if we do not deploy such assets as we have both wisely and well to deliver an unforgettable lesson from time to time…then somebody is going to figure out that we might have real difficulty in containing the trouble should they decide to take it out of their backyard and into ours…
GNB
Fedaykin, re RAF Regiment,
The exemplars you quote (well) above are merely doing the job for which they are paid. Yes, I do think that a QRF of infantry should get stuck in when their base is attacked, and no I don’t expect the completely industrial scale of self-congratulation the useless twunts of the RAF Regiment enter into when even a single round of hostile gets cracked over their heads, backed up by the grossly over-manned PR machine of RAF media management. Also, I would not expect RAF firemen to whinge if they are shot at while trying to put out a fire. Warfare is crap like that, shit happens.
I had under my direct personal control No 1 Sqn RAF Regiment in Bosnia for 6 months in 1995. Apparently the senior / best etc of the RAF Regiment, most Parachute qualified (hah! Most of them had wings but were fat and useless in the field). They were meant to guard the HQ, but sought a wider role. They were utterly fucking useless, so I refused them a wider role. We re-roled a company of Cheshires in Sipovo from 4 Bde to act as the Divisional Reserve.
Then you should have seen the total fucking numpties the RAF managed to nominate as students from the RAF REgiment on the Joint Staff Course. All 4 Wing Commanders, all a total bloody embarrassment to their service, and the proper flying Kevins completely disowned them. All 4 came in the last 4 positions in the order of merit for the course, despite being Wg Comds and so nominally senior to the bulk of the tri-service course. Which meant that they were grossly over-promoted, and should not have been there at all.
Elsewhere, TD is promoting a dialogue as to useless shite that Defence could happily cut. The RAF Regiment is my nomination.
@Red Trousers
Fine you don’t like the RAF regiment, personally I suspect you are slightly over egging your stories to satisfy your personal bias but as I wasn’t there who can say.
Your general statements about the RAF and its personal are broad, simplistic and insulting. All three services have good and bad types your attitude to the RAF is frankly imho a fine example of the nastier aspects of inter service rivalry.
I don’t think I have anything else to say on the matter.
I’ve met plenty of posh, 19 year old, cavalry lieutenants. No comment :-)