In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the British Army, alongside NATO partners, explored airmobile forces as an operational reserve.
24 Airmobile Brigade formed the British core of the Multi-National Airmobile Division (MNAD) and the concept was compelling. Helicopter borne anti-tank heavy teams that could bypass ground obstacles, establish blocking positions, and buy time for heavier forces.
- Fly forward over 120 km to prevent observation and attack
- 48-hour sustainment
- Massed Milan ATGW firepower from ambush positions
- Hunter Killer pairing of Gazelle and Lynx helicopters
Yet, as I analysed in my 2018 proposal for the Light Strike Brigade and revisited more recently, that earlier approach carried significant limitations that undermined its effectiveness in anything approaching contemporary operating environments.
Helicopter availability was a constant constraint; once on the ground, mobility often devolved into foot marches that exhausted troops already burdened by heavy missiles. Light platforms had terrain and technical shortcomings.
The whole formation risked becoming a ‘glass cannon’, devastating in the initial ambush but vulnerable to timing errors, artillery, or loss of lift assets. MPs even described it at one point as ‘no more mobile than a bicycle battalion’ due to insufficient dedicated helicopters.
The 2018 TD Light Strike Brigade
In 2018, I set out to revisit and evolve this lineage, not only looking at 24 Airmobile and the MNAD but also the 6 Airmobile Brigade trials of the 1980s and operations like AGRICOLA in Kosovo.
The core idea:
Helicopter-enabled concentration of strike effect as a flexible reserve or disruptor remained sound for certain scenarios
What needed fixing were the practical weaknesses
- Post landing immobility
- Excessive helicopter dependency and their vulnerability in modern A2AD environments
- Individual soldier burdens
- Direct fire only weapons
The Light Strike Brigade (LSB) concept I proposed was my attempt to deliver a helicopter-mobile cavalry brigade optimised for intra-theatre agility, drawing on existing or easily adaptable British equipment with minimal initial outlay.
It also postulated that the 120km fly forward of 24 Airmobile Brigade would have to be extended because of modern Russian integrated air defence systems.
The Light Strike Brigade was based on the following themes.
Helicopter transportable vehicles were central to the solution
Although I also had a nod towards conventional military transport aircraft as well, Support Helicopters (at the time, Chinook, Merlin and Puma) were to provide intra-theatre manoeuvre.
I rejected both protected vehicles (too slow and lift-intensive for true air mobility) and pure light role foot borne forces (too slow once inserted and unable to carry much).
Vehicles did not necessarily need high speed, but they had to enable sustained travel distances, and a categorised family of lightweight, helicopter-portable platforms that enabled a ‘fly, drive, maybe march a short distance and fight’ approach.
Vehicles grouped options by size, weight, and compatibility for internal loads, underslung carriage, or air despatch. Without going into too much detail here, the vehicles went from an e-bike to a Jackal.
This directly tackled the historical loss of tempo after landing while respecting the hard limits of the UK support helicopter fleet (Chinook, Merlin, Puma).
Low-signature features and maintainability were prioritised.
Instead of being mostly infantry like 24, Light Strike would be mostly Cavalry.
Support Helicopter availability meant everyone needed to do ten jobs
It was no good pretending that the UK’s relative shortage of helicopter lift could be magically resolved.
Combined with the need for everyone to have a vehicle seat, and that vehicle needed to be moved by helicopter, the force would in no way be a full brigade in size, but it would exert a brigade’s worth of firepower.
In all honesty, it should probably have been called a Light Strike Battalion.
Keeping to 48-72 hours sustainment, it meant that the concept of a fly forward and rear area component like 24 Airmobile Brigade would have to be retained.
I also suggested pre-emplaced stores caches and air despatch could also be used for sustainment stores.
No more Milan
Whilst enemy forces have evolved since 1991, so too has British Army weapons.
Javelin replaced Milan, in 2018, EXACTOR was still in service, and Ground Launched Brimstone was equally attainable.
Dispersed, semi-autonomous subunits combined with long-range precision weapons enabled ‘hit-and-run tactics to replace the 24 Airmobile ambush.
Vehicle mobility allowed disengagement before enemy reaction forces or artillery could concentrate. Integration with ISTAR, night operations, and terrain masking further improved survivability.
Because it would not be able to hold the ground, it would instead exploit its mobility to engage at a time and place of its choosing. Disrupting lines of communication and supply locations, delaying enemy forces with hit-and-run tactics, careful observation and reconnaissance, emplacing unattended sensors or ECM jammers, anti-tank or even anti-aircraft ambushes and route security should all be within its operational palette.
The 2018 article suggested that vehicle mounted 120mm mortars, especially equipped with precision guided natures, would provide a dramatic increase in firepower with a reduced logistics footprint.
The 30km range EXACTOR (SPIKE NLOS) was also suggested as an excellent weapon for the Light Strike Brigade.
The importance of comms and sensors
Central to the Light Strike brigade was comms and sensors
ISTAR and connectivity is probably the most important capability for the Light Strike Brigade. It might be a clichéd thing to say, but building a ‘combat cloud’ of interconnected sensors and effectors (sorry about that) provides not only huge power but also great survivability.
But this was 2018, the world still had Watchkeeper and Desert Hawk in it.
The 2022 Light Strike Revisit
I revisited the concept in 2022, incorporating early observations from the Russia-Ukraine war while cautioning against over-extrapolation.
It refined the Light Strike Brigade (LSB) idea rather than any fundamental changes, moving away from some of the organisation changes in the original article.
Some early lessons of the Russian invasion of Ukraine we incorporated, air defence density, long-range strike, and the value of non-line-of-sight (NLOS) weapons and sensors.
I also cautioned about extrapolating too much from Russian performance.
Russian performance in Ukraine should not be used as a cast-iron indicator of Russian performance in a future conflict. Does NATO want to bet on Russia learning nothing and doing nothing?
For this version, I stole the line ‘float like a butterfly and sting like a bee’ to characterise the force, the core features being:
- Forward reconnaissance to establish kill zones, followed by NLOS engagement (EXACTOR, loitering munitions, guided mortar bombs, and ground launched Brimstone) to keep firing points separated from operators.
- Vehicle-borne mobility for the last 100–150 km on the ground to stay outside dense air-defence envelopes (S-400, etc.).
- Deployment via support helicopters for tactical flexibility or fixed-wing for speed and payload (roads or tactical airstrips).
- Sustainment starting at the familiar 48-hour baseline but potentially extendable through efficient munitions and small UAS.
- Roles focused on delay/block of armoured columns, striking high-value targets (air defence, logistics), or operating in contested corridors.
- Pre-positioning in periods of heightened tension is sensibly floated as an alternative to pure rapid deployment. This is a pragmatic evolution from the pure “fly in from afar” model.
I kept the same approach to vehicles, although recognised the changes in the Army’s fleet since the original article,
Added into the equipment mix were small UAS for ISTAR, counter UAS capabilities, off-route mines, and combat engineering tools for field defences.
As with many of my articles, I emphasised combining practical experimentation and equipment already in service.
Criticism
[Drafting Note: I asked three different AI models to be critical of the 2018 and 2022 articles, and place them in the context of the modern operating environment. What follows is an amalgamation of their feedback]
The 2018 and 2022 Think Defence articles on the Light Strike Brigade (LSB) / Light Strike concept form a coherent series that correctly diagnoses enduring problems with earlier airmobile ideas and proposes practical evolutions.
However, when measured against the 2026 contemporary operating environment, significant gaps remain. A NATO force facing Russia in eastern or Northern Europe would encounter threats and constraints that both articles only partially anticipate.
Weaknesses already visible in 2018 include optimism about “very little initial investment” and achievability with building blocks, a still-broad vehicle spectrum that risks fleet-management complexity, and limited depth on sustainment under observation or fire.
The tactical model assumes the ability to insert, strike, and displace before enemy reaction, plausible in exercises but fragile against a competent peer.
The 2022 revisit builds directly on the 2018 foundation, improvements are clear, especially using NLOS weapons and the potential for pre-positioning rather than being purely reactive.
It still treats sustainment largely through the 48-hour lens, without deeply stress-testing logistics under persistent enemy ISR or fires.
The Ukraine caution is prudent, but the article was written early enough that full implications of mass cheap drones, one-way attack UAVs, and artillery dominance were not yet fully integrated. Implementation optimism persists.
By 2026, the NATO-Russia confrontation in eastern or Northern Europe has sharpened several challenges that the 2018 and 2022 articles only partially address.
Key Gaps
Drone and cheap precision strike dominance.
Both articles predate or only lightly touch the full scale of FPV drones, Lancet-style loitering munitions, small UAV swarms, and persistent ISR/strike that have transformed light-force vulnerability.
In Eastern Europe, dispersed LSB elements and light vehicles would face constant detection and cheap attritional attack. In Northern Europe (High North/Arctic), long distances and limited infrastructure amplify the problem, small teams or vehicles become easy targets for enemy drones or long-range fires.
The articles’ counter-UAS mentions and NLOS focus help, but they do not grapple with the need for robust, layered counter-drone/EW capabilities or the reality that “ambush and run” becomes far harder when the enemy can mass cheap sensors and one-way munitions faster than you can displace.
Helicopter and air-mobility fragility against mature IADS
The articles correctly flag A2AD risks and advocate stand-off insertions plus ground mobility. In 2026 reality, even stand-off operations remain high-risk. Russian integrated air defences, long-range surface-to-air missiles, and tactical aviation (plus potential multi-domain effects) make any significant helicopter package vulnerable.
Loss rates or temporary grounding of the limited UK Chinook fleet would collapse the insertion tempo. SEAD/DEAD support requirements are mentioned, but not deeply analysed as a prerequisite. In Northern Europe, weather, vast distances, and sparse infrastructure further constrain rotary-wing utility; in the east, dense defences around Kaliningrad or Belarus make low-level penetration extremely dangerous.
Sustainment and logistics under contested conditions
The 48-hour (or modestly extended) cycle, pre-positioned caches, air despatch, and palletised systems are recurring themes.
In a peer fight, these are brittle. Enemy ISR can locate caches; fires or drones can interdict air despatch or ground convoys. Eastern Europe offers more road networks but also denser threats and potential refugee/congestion friction. Northern Europe presents the opposite problem, enormous distances, limited roads/LZs, harsh weather, and sparse civilian infrastructure make dispersed sustainment even harder.
Both articles understate how quickly even a low logistics force can become logistically paralysed when operating away from secure main supply routes.
Protection–mobility trade-off sharpened by modern fires
Light vehicles (quads to Jackal-class) offer the lift compatibility and ground speed needed, but they are increasingly vulnerable against massed artillery, mines, ATGMs, and drones.
The articles acknowledge the trade-off and the ‘glass cannon’ character of the 24 Airmobile precedent. In 2026, the balance has tilted further against light platforms. Adding active protection, better armour, or EW suites erodes the very mobility and lift advantages the concept relies on.
In northern terrain (soft ground, snow, limited roads) or eastern hybrid/urban environments, the vulnerabilities compound.
Scale, mass, and integration shortfalls
Brigade-level (or Battlegroup) effect can disrupt, delay, or raid effectively in specific corridors. It is unlikely to generate decisive mass against Russian-style operational manoeuvre or concentrated fires.
The articles position LSB as complementary to heavier strike forces, which is correct, but integration details (fires handover, C2 in contested electromagnetic environments, recovery of casualties/vehicles, airspace management) remain underdeveloped.
Fleet diversity, training, and UK-specific constraints
The broad vehicle categories (A–E) maximise theoretical flexibility but create real-world friction in training pipelines, spares commonality, maintenance, and driver licensing, recurring British Army challenges.
The optimism around rapid experimentation with existing kit underestimates institutional and budgetary realities.
Theatre-specific nuances
Eastern Europe features dense IADS, potential hybrid elements, and shorter but more contested distances.
Northern Europe involves extreme weather, vast spaces, limited infrastructure, and different adversary force mixes.
The articles’ general A2AD and mobility focus does not differentiate sufficiently between these environments or address unique challenges such as Arctic sustainment or Baltic maritime-air integration.
Overall Assessment
The 2018 and 2022 articles correctly preserve the useful core of the 24 Airmobile/MNAD logic; mobile, firepower-heavy forces that can exploit temporary windows of opportunity created by helicopter insertion and then operate with ground agility.
They usefully evolve the concept with NLOS weapons, sensors, and combined-arms awareness.
They are stronger on diagnosis and tactical ideas than on the harsher realities of implementation and survival in a 2026 peer conflict.
The most significant gaps are the under-appreciation of cheap drone/precision strike proliferation, the persistent and severe fragility of helicopter-dependent concepts against mature IADS, and the brittleness of sustainment for dispersed light forces under observation and fire.
In eastern or Northern Europe against Russia, a Light Strike-type force could still deliver valuable tactical effects, rapid reinforcement or disruption in specific corridors, high-value target strikes, or screening, provided it is tightly integrated into a wider combined-arms and joint campaign, equipped with robust counter-drone/EW layers, and sized/logistically supported realistically.
Turning the concept into fielded capability would require narrower vehicle standardisation, more rigorous war gaming of loss rates and sustainment, and honest acceptance that “light” now carries even higher risk than it did in the Certain Shield era.
The series remains a valuable contribution to the debate; it simply needs further hardening against the threats and constraints that have become brutally clear by 2026.
Next Article
I think the AI criticisms are all valid, except for the comments of vehicles, I was presenting a range of vehicle options, not saying we should have all of them.
That said, the concept needs stress testing against the world in 2026.
Next article will be a look at the British Army’s 11 Brigade, a new grouping that has some roots in 24 Airmobile Brigade (and maybe even my thoughts on Light Strike).
