For well over a decade, I have returned periodically to the theme of ‘Light Strike’, a mobile, agile, and firepower-focused approach to force design that sits between traditional light infantry and heavier armoured or medium-weight formations.
The idea has evolved through successive Army reform programmes, observing operational experiences, and technological shifts, but its core purpose remains: how can the British Army generate disproportionate effect with constrained resources across a wide range of scenarios?
This introductory post launches a multipart series.
It will chronicle earlier Light Strike writing on the blog, examine its relevance today, and propose an updated framework. One article will have a more in-depth look at the historical 24 Airmobile Brigade concepts as a doctrinal reference point.
Another will analyse the current role and experiments of 11 Brigade in the ‘near-surface domain’.
The series aims to contribute constructively to ongoing discussions about the Army’s future structure and capabilities.
Origins of the Light Strike Concept on This Blog
My thinking developed from observations of Army reform in the 2010s.
Programmes such as FRES and the later Strike Brigades sought to create more agile medium-weight forces, but in practice they often appeared as compromises; too heavy for rapid strategic deployment, yet not sufficiently robust or supported for sustained high-intensity combat.
Light role forces, meanwhile, frequently seemed limited to stabilisation or training tasks, lacking the organic firepower and mobility to influence higher-tempo operations decisively.
Early posts explored related topics including helicopter mobility, precision fires, and airmobile operations.
The dedicated article The Light Strike Brigade set out a detailed proposal for a helicopter-mobile formation drawing on cavalry principles. It emphasised exploitation of UK Support Helicopters for tactical and operational mobility, combined with lighter vehicles, integral precision munitions (such as Brimstone derivatives and EXACTOR systems), light artillery, and UAVs for ISTAR.
The concept prioritised find-fix-strike at reach, deception, and rapid manoeuvre rather than prolonged close combat. Equipment and ORBAT suggestions were offered with close attention to realism, cost, and industrial factors (as I like to do with pretty much every proposal I write).
The proposal was never intended to replace heavy armour, which remains essential for credible deterrence and peer-level combat. Instead, it was positioned as a complementary capability globally deployable for intervention operations and able to support heavier forces as a reserve/blocking capability through speed, sensors, and precision firepower.
Refinement and Broader Application
In Revisiting the Light Strike Concept, (published in March 2022), the theme was updated in light of Army 2020 Refine and emerging Future Soldier ideas.
The post suggested using existing Light Role Infantry and Cavalry units as building blocks. It highlighted the value of lighter forces in distributed operations against modern threats, in fact, a rehash of 24 Air Mobile Brigade but with better mobility and updated systems.
Subsequent articles developed the thinking further.
Discussions of helicopter-carried vehicles examined air mobility options.
Posts on unattended ground sensors linked them explicitly to modernising the legacy of 24 Airmobile Brigade, using sensors and precision fires for mobile blocking or anti-armour roles. Coverage of precision strike systems and light/medium force design continued to explore how lighter formations could avoid disadvantageous mass-on-mass engagements in an era of proliferating sensors and long-range weapons.
Common threads across this body of work include:
- Mobility (strategic and tactical) as a genuine combat multiplier.
- The combination of sensors, precision fires, and asymmetry to offset limitations in protection.
- The importance of simplicity and organisational stability to reduce overhead and improve predictability.
- Consistent attention to practical constraints — budgets, personnel, logistics, and industrial base.
The Contemporary Context
The British Army’s Future Soldier programme and subsequent adjustments have introduced notable changes. Particularly relevant is the development of 11 Brigade, which has transitioned from a Security Force Assistance role to become the Land Special Operations Force’s primary fighting formation.
Focused on covering force tasks, advance operations, and near-surface manoeuvre, the brigade has conducted extensive trials with uncrewed systems, including Ghost UAS and Bolt loitering munitions. Exercises such as Northern Star in Finland and TARASSIS in Latvia have tested integration of drones into infantry tactics, remote command, and recce-strike effects.
These developments share clear conceptual overlap with earlier Light Strike thinking, agility, organic effects, deception, and the ability to operate effectively without heavy armour, while incorporating rapid advances in uncrewed technology.
At the same time, proposals such as my earlier Future Soldier Pallet and Bridge Chap post highlighted broader Future Soldier challenges, including organisational complexity, enabler shortfalls, and questions of mass and sustainment.
A refreshed Light Strike approach could help strengthen the light and expeditionary elements of the overall force design.
Structure of the Series
The series will proceed as follows:
One part will chronicle previous Light Strike material on the blog, assessing what remains relevant and what requires updating in light of recent operational experience and technological change.
Another will examine the historical 24 Airmobile Brigade concept in greater depth, its original rationale, capabilities, limitations, and enduring lessons for modern mobile light forces.
Another dedicated article will analyse 11 Brigade today: its role, equipment trials, tactical concepts in the near-surface domain, strengths, integration with NATO partners, and remaining challenges around sustainment and resilience.
The concluding part will propose an updated Light Strike framework for the late 2020s.
This will include pragmatic ORBAT options (regular and reserve elements), equipment recommendations, operating concepts for different scenarios, and integration pathways with heavier formations and ARRC.
As always, the focus will remain on realism, budgetary, personnel, logistical, and industrial considerations will shape my proposals.
Why Return to This Theme Now?
The fundamental questions have not disappeared.
The British Army must balance credible heavy forces for high-intensity deterrence with agile, deployable capabilities for a wide range of contingencies. A well-designed Light Strike element building on 11 Brigade’s experiments while incorporating historical lessons and practical enablers offers a flexible middle tier suited to intervention, flank security, and mobile reserve roles, against a credible Russian threat.
In an environment shaped by drones, precision munitions, electronic warfare, and contested logistics, the ability to find, fix, and strike effectively while remaining light enough to manoeuvre retains strong value.
This series aims to contribute to that ongoing development in a constructive manner.
Comments, corrections, and differing perspectives are welcome, as always. The next instalment will follow shortly.
Dear TD,
I think any ideas you come up with need to get around the obstacle of money and the British Armed forces need for everything to be shinny new kit. For example we have a huge number of British Army Infantry Regiments in non-deployable organisations. They don't have the logistics, engineering, medical resources to deploy yet all the talk is about new drones & tanks etc.
So before we talk about equipment etc we need to reorganise these Regiments into self contained deployable organisations. These may be Regimental Size or Brigade Size. But each unit should have within it, its own organic Reme Unit, Own Vehicles and Equipment, Medics, Artillery, etc so that it can self deploy. Like the USMC everybody should be a soldier capable of fighting if they have to and be able to wield a riffle. But, a large element will have to learn skills to provide the organic services for the unit.
Once that is set up you can then look at vehicles. Everything must be on wheels. Preferably large amounts towed by any vehicle available. So Artillery, Missiles, Anti Drone Guns should be trailer mounted or containerised. So that they can be towed by LGV's, put on standard trucks etc. For example drones. We do not need some exquisite bespoke massive 8×8 vehicle to deploy drones that will fly 100/200 miles to its operational area. They can be packed, stacked and launched from a container on the back of a 40 foot trailer. I am sure you will have looked at this, but we need to use existing lightly armoured wheeled fleet to transport the vulnerable people, whilst everything else goes by Truck. We don't also need easily identifiable 8×8 monster trucks either.
I look forward to see what you come up with, but this needs to be cheap, maximise the use of the people we already have and then leave what budget the army does have to actually build a 3 battalion proper armoured Division with enough tanks (Yes they can survive the modern battlefield if properly equipped) APC's/IFV etc so you don't descend into trench warfare which is where the Ukraine/Russia conflict has gone because neither side has the armoured mass especially in route clearance etc to actually overwhelm the trenches of the opposition. All drones are is the new machine gun of the western front. Which until tactics and tanks were developed just brought the warfare to a stop as horses and unprotected infantry couldn't be used.