We all know the Government has been under huge pressure from an array of sources on 2% of GDP spending.
Despite it being an arbitrary target (like 0.7% on overseas development) with little relation to any kind of rational security or risk analysis the need to achieve deficit reduction savings and the need to carry on ‘talkin a good un’ means that there was only ever going to be one way to square the circle.
Clever sums…
As predicted
I don’t think you need one of these to decode that
https://www.flickr.com/photos/timg_vancouver/200625463/
A thousand slices of this
That will result in decreasing defence capability and personnel that want to leave whilst slipping under the radar of the Telegraph.
The actual figures have been detailed here, but a quick summary.
The more things change, the more they stay the same, except of course the widely trailed £1b is only £500m
Oh goody goody, defence has come out of it well.
That of course, is what they want you to think.
What would be nice if the government said something like;
You know what, we are going to spend alittle less on defence and do a little less. We think it is a reasonable risk in order to get the deficit under control because that is the real risk to the nation.
There is nothing wrong with doing less with less, nothing whatsoever.
Maybe some moral and political courage to match the courage showed on a regular basis by those that will actually be affected by this would not go amiss.
@TD
The more worrying question is what will be announced in the forthcoming budget. This table doesn’t include the 12 billion welfare savings that underpin the deficit plan (before you tack-on the election spending commitments). Watch this space ?
Politically the average British Joe has very little day to day interest in defence and even less interest in paying for it.
However genetically as Brits we still think of ourselves as a first rate power ( and so we should ).
This leads to a somewhat interesting paradox. You can cut the funds for defence and you will get votes. But for god’s sake don’t in any way indicate that the UK can’t kick ass with the very top rate countries in the world else your political dead meat.
The total big headed certainty that we can do what we bloody well like, and let Jonny foreigner beware if he or she dares to contradict, is our very birth right.
The concept that an enemy might lay a toe inside sovereign realms UNTHINKABLE !
But the idea that we have to actually pay for this service, and it is not just a function of this magically imbued green and pleasant land…. This is somewhat difficult?
Either way the 2% will be honoured, what they are scared about is that with projected growth figures, they won’t commit to 50bn + a year in ten years’ time (@ 3% growth compound), till the money has already come in.
Beno
A source rather than newspaper coverage. Cherry picking – Defence would see a c33 % reduction is spending between 2010 and 2020 if the governments deficit reduction plan is followed through on. This is potentially a minimum number given the election spending/tax commitments.
http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/7765
Headlines on R4 just now intimated Defence was amongst a handful of the departments achieving bulk of their savings via underspends.
ToC
good or bad though ? Not doing something you planned to do or something costing less than you thought..
That was the newsreader’s headline. No details. Sorry.
Nice word “underspend” what it doesn’t say is, ah we are saving £100m this year by not recruiting the engineers the RN needs, so certain ships will not sail because they don’t have enough staff, no they don’t say oh we are cutting 3 ships from the fleet, in effect you have. Same with the RAF, so we will not equip and buy enough equipement to have anymore than say 12 Typhoons capable at Theatre Entry level, not recruiting any new pilots this year or enginners or we will pay freeze all grades so that good quality engineers walk out to go and work for double the money at Heathrow or Stanstead.
The list goes on, because that £500m underspend is for every subsequant year, the budget has lost £500m, this year you might (although I would argue you have no wiggle room on this) underspend by that amount and not hit capability that much, but remember in 10yrs time you are still going to be £500m light plus the lack of growth on that £500m compunded. So if the defence budget finaly goes up by say on average 2% over the next 20yrs, that £500m “saving” costs you £750m a year by 2035. In total in that 20yr period you have lost £12,891,658,597 or £12bn thats an awful lot of kit or wages you are not paying in that 20yr period. Let alone factor in defence inflation that kit bought now is going to be exponentally cheaper than bought in 10yrs time.
when America talks about “hollowing out” this is exactly what they mean.
To be honest with the current state of things, if the MOD have been smart enough to save up enough money to cover this parliament’s savings requirement then ‘standing still’ is a better result than it could have been.
Clearly the above is caveated by how the underspend was achieved, either not spending or purchasing more cheaply than budgeted, but I can’t help feeling it could have been a lot worse, which is probably just indicative as to what a poor state commitment to defence spending has fallen.
By the way, whatever happened to that £8 billion ‘headroom’?
Don’t forget though, this is before the Comprehensive Spending Review and SDSR, more pain to come I think
CC – what happened to £8Bn headroom? A fair bet it slid back into HM treasury’s grabbing mits, very quietly and without any fuss. Then at some later date the Treasury can give a small proportion back with a huge fanfare of vote-hungry proclamations. “See how responsible we are! See how we have increased the defence budget by £500m!” is so much more likely than “See how we have returned 6% of the budget we took!”
That might be seen as a tiny bit cynical.
£500m , what relief when it was leaked £1bn . Anyone ever played cards , bridge , poker ? Anyone think we have been bluffed or finessed?
On this budgetary savings there is more than one way to skin a cat , how about moving all the C17’s and A400M’s onto the DfID . We snatch them back or lease as required for the same rates as they give the RAF , same for warehousing HADR supplies etc.
Differentiate between pots of cash for equipment (where the contingency and headroom pots sit) and the annual budgets (where the £500m p.a. savings need to happen).
Here’s the last NAO major projects report:
http://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Major-projects-report-2014-and-the-equipment-plan-2014-to-20151.pdf
Page 16 is the Equipment budget breakdown (Note: Equipment, not Operational i.e. salaries, pensions, scram, diesel, etc) and you can clearly see both the Contingency (c.£4b) and Headroom (the “£8b” being mentioned) pots.
Also note these figures are built up over the years described.
The “Headroom” figure (the c.£8b across the plan being quizzed) makes up the majority of what’s been referred to as the Unallocated budget which is c.£9b. Add to the Contingency of c.£4b.
Salami ahoy!
Many people on here and other defence forums assume that the public have little interest in defence. I’m not sure that is entirely the case. The situation is that the public have very little idea of what our forces are capable of, and neither does the “meeja”. Plus, it’s not a good idea for people in the forces at any level to bemoan our capabilities. Apart from giving comfort to our enemies, it would be a career threatening move. Contrast that with any other department and vested interests are falling over themselves to paint the worst picture possible. So the general public (thick though they may be) gets limited information on defence. Whereas they all know about the “cuts” and “austerity” in other areas, they don’t get such a picture of defence. If it ever came to a situation where our forces had to be used and the shortfalls were exposed, THEN you wouldn’t hear the last of it. I sincerely hope that doesn’t happen in reality.
Of this was the on,y cut required it would be of little issue. Indeed between the underspend head room etc we could probably get away with a cut of over 1£ billion with out having mich impact. My fear is osbornes looking for atleast £4 billion though again. A Tory government with a thin majority has to be the best outcome for defence spending but then me thinks those same back benchers that profess to caring about defence of the realm are far more worried about breaking out of the EU, bashing immigrants or cancelling HS2 to hold the government to account on defence spending.
IMO stupidity in still playing the 1991 peace dividend games in a currently ever increasingly dangerous world. If Ukraine does not with Western help contain Putin and his invasion of Ukraine, then Moldova will follow and then where Putin needs conflicts to stay in power it is inevitable that other European countries along with NATO solidarity will be challenged.
In such an environment we will have to fight with what we have got as there will not be the time for anything else. All this against a backdrop of Russia currently increasing their military spending at a level not seen since Soviet times. Feels like a rerun of the 1930’s, will Dave play the role of the arch appeaser Chamberlain to buy us time to rearm?
It’s worth looking at this from a politicians perspective.
The services went charging into Iraq and Afghanistan only to humiliate themselves (they needed bailing out by the US on both occasions) then enthusiastically bombed Libya- the result being a failed state resplendent with an ISIS presence and spewing immigrants out into the Mediterranean. The net result being little public support for any sort of military operation (as we saw with the Syria vote) so from Cameron’s perspective, whats the point in funding defence when he can’t do anything with it and its of questionable utility even if he could?
‘The services went charging into Iraq and Afghanistan’
I’m pretty sure sure it was more than the services that wanted to charge into Iraq and Afghanistan, there’s the little matter of parliament voting in support of Iraq and the Afghan mission was supported by the leaders of the 3 main parties until a vote in 2009 by parliament to stay in Afghan.
‘A Tory government with a thin majority has to be the best outcome for defence’
The Tories have never been a party that is strong on defence. They have cut defence consistently throughout history whenever they could, as they see defence as government spending just like any other.
Just to be contrary: they cannot subscribe to arbitrary measures like 2.0% because its arbitrary. They have said they’ll await the requirement of the sdsr15, so an efficiency saving only adds credibility to that narrative.
What matters is that they prioritise defence and that is best demonstrated by meeting 2.0%, even if it requires a bit of creative fudge. You can only add pension costs in once…
SDSR2015 The rewrite , is due for Cabinet digestion on or about end August / beginning of September , the end of the 100 days . With whatever amendments the Cabinet make it is due for publication the end of October IIRC. Expect the usual leaks etc but I expect , due to pressure from over the pond the obvious one carrier ready at all times and associated marine forces etc AND one armoured medium/heavy division ready at all times for overseas deployment within NATO. The Carrier Battle Group can stand in for cover for the Sixth fleet in the med if called eastwards and the Armour to counter Putin if required.
DN,
The services were all for it and merrily telling the politicians how easy it would be.
Are you about to tell us that Labour are the party of defence? If so don’t bother, only idiots believe it. And as taxation is immoral anyway I will take the Tories.
Hohum
The services might have been merrily telling the politicians how easy it would be but it’s the politicians (either via the elected prime minister or parliament as a whole) who have the last say and not the senior leadership of the armed forces.
No I’m not going to say that Labour are pro defence either.
DN,
Politicians make their decisions based on what they are told by the services.
Hohum
I would hope they are basing their decisions on more than one source of opinion, and they can always so no.
“to get the deficit under control because that is the real risk to the nation.”
It’s not. Interest rates barely exist even for 10 yr bonds, liquidity is guaranteed by BoE, the debt is in GBP, most of the debt is debt to the own citizens (or is it still “subjects”?).
Deficits merely mean delayed taxation. The delay may be out of politician’s cowardice and ineptitude or because the secondary effects of taxation would be critically worse than a deficit’s secondary effects.
In other words: Instead of dictating the high-income/rich folks “give us more money” the government asks them for a loan and promises (tiny) interest payments.
Where’s the “threat” in all this?
The interesting thing about “fiscal troubles”-induced military spending cuts is that they show how much of the military spending was actually unnecessary, luxury. In the case of Greece the entire spending for their puny imagined cold war with Turkey was unnecessary – 2-3% GDP p.a.!
The luxury part that wasn’t about “defence” of the UK at all, but about providing toys for politicians to play great power games, was apparently about 2% GDP p.a. as well.
Agree that the 2% is pretty arbitary, it just looks very difficult to connect that to either the current international context or the role the political leadership want to play.
Beady hits the nail on the head about the comfort signals it sends to those bent on mischief are counterproductive and increase the risk of stuff happening. Its not very quiet in Donetsk at the moment
But everything must have a logical explanation, a guess might be that this really be about the political leadership concluding that being world financial centre and no votes in defence and the US will sort it out means we have to be a bit more minimum/low profile in our defence posture – a sort of Nuclear armed version of Austria.
More worrying with Russia suffering via low oil price, the incentive is to stir things up more to get the price up……more rubles for more hardware.
To the hills!
The threat?
Simple, just because a debt crisis and/or hyper-inflation hasn’t hit yet doesn’t mean it won’t. I know there is a delightfully charming myth on the left, and pushed by paid Russian trolls, that debt is not a problem because its not real. Well it is a problem because it is real as multiple countries have found out in the past.
And yes, we all understand that your agenda is to explain to Europeans how Europe doesn’t need any defence spending and Vladimir Putin is lovely.
You got found out: http://www.theguardian.com/news/2015/apr/09/kremlin-hall-of-mirrors-military-information-psychology
The 2% isn’t quite a number picked out of a hat, it was a historical agreement that NATO countries should spend at least 2% of their GDP on the military, which means that the 2% limit is supposed to be sacrosanct. What all the maneuvering is about is how to “keep the law” without keeping the spirit of the law, so you get budgets sliced very close to the edge and maybe some double counting and “future spending predictions” involved.
It does make a bit of sense as the UK is in a very safe location. Unfortunately, history has shown that “safe” can turn “unsafe” at the worst possible times in short notice. The problem now is how to balance a decent budget that does not overspend for the safety of the UK, yet retain enough steel that when push comes to shove, your response can be a shovel to the other guy’s head. This is also unfortunately not an isolated consideration, if your hostile neighbour has, for example, 100 planes, you would want 120-150+ as insurance. Without someone to compare against, it becomes hard to figure out if you have “enough”, “too much” or “too little”. From 1996 onwards, the USSR has not been used as a comparison for too long, with us thinking they are down for the count. Recent events have shown otherwise. On the bright side, we now have someone to compare against again.
@SO
” Interest rates barely exist even for 10 yr bonds”
UK government is paying an average of 3% on £1.5bn of debt, which works out at about £46bn every year before you think about repaying the principal. Compare that with a defence DEL of £35.4bn/year. So if we didn’t have the debt run up by previous governments, we could double defence spending and still have an extra £10.6bn/year to throw at whatever pet projects one wanted.
SO, all defence spending is unnecessary.
Until you need it.
Sorry Hohum, did you mean Russian debt or British debt?
Whether it is 1% or 5%, I just want a clear strategy. The fundamental issue is the nation has no clear vision on what it wants to be.
How do you expect a country of nearly 70 million to have one clear conception of its national interest and / or what it wants to be? My employer has 7 members of brass and they can’t agree on a solid vision either.
The elephant in the room is that whilst the Cold War provided a strong narrative for foreign policy the period still didn’t see a unified concept of a national interest much beyond a natural survival instinct of “don’t get destroyed”. Remove any strong narrative and you amplify an inherent problem when it comes to organising humans – we all have different views, interests and perceptions of problems. Strong threats provide strong narratives and help narrow the range of views on what the national interest is, but they don’t massively narrow the range of views on how to attain that national interest. And even that variance of views on the overall national interest still doesn’t entirely go away (1940 being a good if overused example).
Welcome back Phil.
The problem I have always had with defence spending is that Politicians can never tie aspirations to resources in their own heads. They love to strut around the world stage and write cheques with our Armed Forces the latter can barely afford. Simply look how the forces we can deploy are so out of balance with what we want them to do, and how they have shrunk. Yes we can send eight fast jets and a few Reapers to bomb IS, but compared to even the French, it is a pathetically small force and could be classed as a simple PR tool.
The coming SDSR needs to first and foremost establish what our realistic role in the world is to be and this must match the resources the Government is willing to put in to our Armed Forces. I hove no problem with a shrinking Defence Budget if out worldly aspirations also shrink. SDSR 2015 is going to be resource driven, be decree of the Treasury. We are going to get a few headline gains, most probably a limited number of Maritime Patrol Aircraft to be delivered around 2018-19 and the initial order placed for the first couple of Type 26 vessels for the navy. There will then a lot of recycled announcements regarding the F-35 and FRES(SV) buys and covered by this smoke and mirrors dance will be substantial salami slicing of everything else and a quiet reduction in the reserve requirement which they realise they cannot meet anyhow. Yes the numbers of regulars will remain constant but we already have severe shortages in key areas across all three services.
Finally any mention of FF2020 will vanish from the records as it is going to be unaffordable with out the “Promised” 1% increase to the overall Defence Budget, so we will hear repeated statements praising our modern and flexible Armed Forces without any elaboration on what they can actually do or more importantly what they can no longer do.
@Lord Jim: I agree, but at the moment I’d say Cameron is doing less strutting on the world stage than we have done for hundreds of years – this is making our allies nervous. I don’t think this is a problem, the problem is a lack of clarity in our intended role in the world and not focusing just on the capabilities that we wish to provide.
Perhaps we simply need to ask: who’s the enemy?
If you go by most sources, it is still terrorists. Can’t quite understand why we need “carrier strike” and a reduced army strength for them!
After that it’s supposed to be (cyber) espionage so surely investment in intel gathering assets is a priority? UAVs, SIGINT, SSNs, plenty of frigates…
Correction: “Who will be the enemy in 30 years?”
Okay, let’s scale our forces to meet a future threat and fail miserably to deal with the ones we currently have.
There’s certainly a balance to be struck, but predicting the future didn’t work for Michael Fish.. and he’s a weather man like John Kettley.. ooh, I feel a song coming on ;-)
@Simon: Yes, the most immediate threat is terrorism, and (taking today’s headlines from the US at face value) so is Cyber defence, therefore the capabilities you suggest are very much needed.
However, I’d say Carrier Strike is also very much needed. CdeG has been used by the French in their fight with ISIL and I’d argue that the more flexible CVF design would even be more appropriate for the job IMO. What is not needed however is an mechanised / armoured division. If the UK wanted to get involved in the fighting, mobile SF units backed up by support RM / Para units based offshore would be the way to go. The other thing to note is that by investing in that model it is a capability that can operate globally at short notice, covering 80% or more of the world’s population.
However, alongside the immediate needs the UK needs to plan for less likely / but high impact (peer on peer) scenarios as well as considering how to protect global interests including supporting key alliances.
The nearest we have to a peer-on-peer situation is a slide back into a cold war with Russia and “skirmishes” on the borders of the EU. Therefore, in priority order for the UK I would go for:
– strong naval force / MPA presence in the North Atlantic
– strong QRA Typhoon force
– naval support for NATO/EU forces in the Mediterranean and Baltics
– mechanized / armoured division held at low readiness but with frequent training exercises.
– CASD (or alternative)
To protect global interests including supporting key alliances, I would go for the following in priority order:
– Low level training support / technology sharing
– Increased intelligence gathering capabilities and sharing
– CBGs / ARGS & SSNs to “cover” the US if needed, and to also support alliances like the Five Power Alliance through high-end training exercises – e.g. showing that the UK has the capability to operate globally without having to support expensive global bases. To me sailing a CBG around the world every five years would have a much bigger impact than putting a battalion or two in the Middle or Far East.
its worth noting that for all the talk of France in the fight against ISIL that the UK is still in second place for number of strikes carried out in Iraq. Recent reports also state that all 10 of our reapers are on active duty in several locations plus Tornados over places like Nigeria.
Wee are obviously not engaged in Syria but then the government did loose a democratic vote in parliament over military action there.
Perhaps David Cameron’s rhetoric is now (post Libya) more inline with what he is willing to spend. I do still believe though the the UK must committ to the 2% target even if it has to be a fudge. we can talk about capability matching threat level but we can never judge the threat level and capabilities costs money. It’s not a perfect target but for an institution the size of NATO it’s probably the only one that can be used. NATO is just as important now as it was in the Cold War maybe even more so. It’s the only Organization on the planet that will keep the likes of Russia and China in check. we must continue to support it.
It’s not about failing to deal with current threats, it’s about the length of time it takes to develop counters.
We’re combating current events with a combination of mature systems/processes that were conceived 30 years ago by designers trying to think ahead and a comparative scattergun approach of UOR-style reactions.
@Simon
And I’m wondering why you need the army to deal with terrorists. Those are threats for the police, not armed forces. In that light, does it mean that you can scrap the army, air force and navy? Because if that is the logic, when you really start to need an army, it is already too late.
TOC – yes, but… No-one (least of all it seems the military analyst) has a crystal ball that accurately defines the future capability either in terms of functionality or scale. Its all best guess. I don’t have a problem with rapid procurement to deal with urgent needs, just because there isn’t really much alternative if the stuff on MOD’s shelves isn’t right for dealing with the immediate threat.
In my world (weird as it might look to outsiders) the MOD would be capable of understanding their largely understandable difficulty in predicting the future (resulting in the truism that the military always procure the best equipment to help them better fight the previous war) and would adjust their equipment plan to suit. This would then lead to a focus on both faster URD-to-Equipment formal procurement processes, and a move to buy basic robust equipment and platforms which by design would be reconfigurable in short order – in essence moving the UOR bit down the food-chain from complete platforms or major systems, to new standard interface modules (machinery, hardware, software or combination) to fit into extant equipment.
At the moment, it seems when MOD determine they need a new sofa or new washing machine, they run a competition between Wimpey Barrett and Persimmon and buy a new house incorporating sofa & washing machine. The rest of us don’t find it that hard to fit what we need within the existing house. While buying the whole house shiny & new looks really flash and might impress the neighbourhood, its a very expensive way to resolve shortfalls in capability.
Isn’t it at least good news that the government is sticking to the 2% figure?
This cut has probably come about because growth has been a shade lower than expected for the first quarter of this year. So defence spending creeps to 2.02%, or whatever, and Osborne snatches the extra back. The MoD can apparently still do what it wants to do by covering the small difference with efficiency savings.
If growth is slow, and the chancellor has such a tight grip on any excess spending, where it could affect the MoD is with some of the upcoming procurement.
If in any given year, spending absolutely must not creep above the magic number of 2%, then we could begin seeing little contract packages of two T26 at a time, rather than half a dozen or more. And while that might help keep spending down in any given year, it could cost a whole lot more in the long-run. With other big deals coming up -submarines, Lightning, vehicles- quite substantial lumps of money could be shoved down the line, but would still have to be paid for eventually.
just because a debt crisis and/or hyper-inflation hasn’t hit yet doesn’t mean it won’t.
look, people have been promising one real-soon-now since 2009. Also, SO has never come across as pro-Russian to me; more like “obsessed with the hordes from the east”.
‘Isn’t it at least good news that the government is sticking to the 2% figure?’
They’ve only promised to stick to the 2% this financial year after that, who knows? but after listening to various interviews I have a feeling that defence will be lucky if future force 2020 is funded properly. Personally I do not mind if defence is cut as long as it is part of a foreign policy that runs in parallel with our military capabilities.
@DavidNiven
“The Tories have never been a party that is strong on defence. They have cut defence consistently throughout history whenever they could”
This is a good point. Despite his gold-blindness, and profligate welfare jam jar, Gordon Brown did order 2 carriers with a potential half-century legacy. Do we think that a Tory government would have ordered 2 carriers to be built in a Labour heartland ? Whatever you might say about the unions, they have been effective at getting ships built over the decades. I know he didn’t order many others, and his motives were selfish, but the carriers could have been lost forever….
@Hohum
Labour the Party of Defence ? instinctively I’d say no, and take your point, but…. I’d be very interested to see what the actual spend/increase/cut record has been of all administrations since the war. And SDSR 2007 v SDSR 2010 – what’s the best defence outcome – not fully funded but strategic review or almost fully funded yet non-strategic review ?
None of the parties fare well under scrutiny. CVA? TSR2? Delaying CVF until contract penalties were higher than just building the things?
“Observer
SO, all defence spending is unnecessary.
Until you need it.”
That’s mere smartassery.
There’s not just all or nothing – there actually is an “enough”, with additional spending being wasteful.
It’s difficult to know in advance where that threshold is, but ex post we can observe that drastic cuts were enacted for no harm to the nation. This means what was cut was almost certainly unnecessary.
It’s not a perfect evidence, but better than whatever evidence the proponents of more military spending can bring to the table.
It’s thus not surprising that an irrational counter would be provoked by pointing at such evidence against more military spending.
@El Sid:
2.5 % p.a. approx
http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/GUKG10:IND
Inflation rate was about 0.5-1.5% p.a., I don’t know if those bonds are inflation-correcting or not.
The interest rates in the UK are extremely and historically low.
@SO: “we can observe that drastic cuts were enacted for no harm to the nation. This means what was cut was almost certainly unnecessary. It’s not a perfect evidence, but better than whatever evidence the proponents of more military spending can bring to the table.” – The fact that the UK armed forces were not funded to enable it to meet the UK Government’s demand to fight two major conflicts (Afghanistan and Iraq) is surely beyond dispute?
The proponents of more defence spending I feel are just reflecting the known that government aspirations (especially over the past decade) have been woefully out of kilter with funds.
As I and others have said – no-one will argue if the UK government decides a strategy and funds it properly. Also, no-one will argue if the government stops delaying necessary kit acquisition to meet the strategy which results in higher costs. In fact, if there is no mismatch between strategy and budget, we’d probably get rid of much of the inter-service bickering nonsense.
@SO
The problem with your premise that if there is no immediate effect to something, it is ok can be pushed to an all or nothing conclusion. All defence budgets can be cut to 0 right now in reality if you do not have a hostile neighbour. There really is no need for defence if you are not actively at war. Until someone does turn hostile. But since reducing the defence budget to 0 does not currently harm the country, it’s all right isn’t it? Let us just do away with defence and put it into welfare or education. Maybe the US will come to help us when we are in trouble later, so we shouldn’t waste any money on an armed force at all?
There are limits SO, and just because the results are not immediate does not mean that there isn’t a negative effect. Even more ridiculous is to say that a defence budget enacted in 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the time of the “Peace Dividend” is still sufficient for a resurgent chaotic Europe. Times change, what may have been “enough” then might be “insufficient” now. What is worse, it is harder to manufacture equipment from scratch than to maintain it, IIRC it takes 5 years to make a plane, 2 for a ship. If anything happens, 2 years is a long, long time to wait, even assuming there are no disruptions. Your country can be overrun in months, much less years.
@Chris
“a move to buy basic robust equipment and platforms which by design would be reconfigurable in short order”
The CVR(T) programme produced a base model if understanding is correct which was adapted as time went on to caring needs as they appeared. The Scout series all ready has several models defined but I am sure could be adapted to specialist roles, anti-tank missile carrier , 120mm mortar carrier etc if the need proved sufficient. A similar core assembly of parts in effect in the form of a wheeled equivalent would seem the next logical step.
You see imaginary trouble in imaginary situations.
Europe, “resurgent and chaotic” or not, is easily safe because there’s hardly any threat. All those people impressed by Russian brazenness and aggressiveness and army and whatnot are impressed by what’s the equivalent of a mobilized Romanian military (since that’s what the Russians can muster in the West!).
The Russians have hardly any military power in Europe, and cannot call on their Asian troops without giving up deterrence against the Chinese, Muslim uprisings and nationalist uprisings there.
Budgets were cut, nothing bad happened.
The burden of proof that more spending is advisable is on the pro-more spending side.
And I’m not easily impressed by fearmongering. Sadly, fearmongering is seemingly the only thing that appears to drive military budget discussions in public nowadays. Hardly anybody looks at allies, at neutrals, at unfriendly powers, at geography and then comes to a conclusion about advisable budget sizes.
Such a look at realities would reveal that Europe’s military spending and military power are vastly greater than required for a 1:1 parity with the sum of all threats to itself (invasion, air attack or blockade).
A look at the insanely spending Americans is pointless, since we don’t prepare defence against them. The relevant perspective is Russians + Belarus + Med Arabs. And they have hardly any military power. The only alliance defence Achilles’ heel is the scenario of a coup de main against the Baltics – but more spending doesn’t change that. A reallocation of spending would do.
“no-one will argue if the UK government decides a strategy and funds it properly” surely that depends on the strategy. Strategy has not been a strong point of any government for quite some time.
I’d love to have a broad-spectrum capability. But if that capability means that each components is so small that it becomes ineffectual then I’d rather plan properly to prevent piss-poor performance.
Ultimately a submarine industry with a dozen SSBN+SSN along with home-built (yes, that’s what I’d prefer) MPA and interceptor jets with maritime strike capability is all we really need. Add to that the presence afforded by lots (yes, lots) of frigates and intel gathering assets we should be able to keep tabs on much of the things happening in the world. We can then also police our SLoCs.
We’d then need to deploy an army.
The notion of small-scale raiding (which it seems is all we’ll be able to do with carrier strike and our single amphibious battlegroup) is very, very expensive and not much use against terrorist networks or cyber warriors and spies. I also fail to see how they’d help stop WMD proliferation in comparison with a strong intelligence service.
Yes, I’d love to keep them, but they are very much at the bottom of the list of requirements.
Yours regretfully,
Mr D. Advocate
monkey – I don’t share your warm feelings toward Scout/FRES. Considering the rumoured internal configuration that leaves such a large vehicle, relatively lightly armed, with room for just three personnel. Or PMRS without a turret and room for (I think) a total of five. The driveline is not particularly flexible and is pretty large; I’m not even sure the engine/transmission would readily swing round to the back for rear-engined options as the transmission seems to have been shaped to fit the pointy nose. As far as I can tell Scout and its family will all look APC shaped and have little more internal space than CVR(T). This to my mind is not a flexible or modular approach.
Those few who have seen my designs might note my engineering concept has proper flexibility designed in from the outset. Much more modular than Boxer; more flexible than SEP. This is because I figured out the need for rapid development of new role variants already exists, and its not met by decade-long competitions nor is it well served by panic-buys of whatever Uncle Sam can spare.
So I don’t find the ASCOD/Scout a particularly good modern modular flexible vehicle, nor a good example of how to approach any wheeled vehicle buy. Sadly though I don’t think the purchasers have enough imagination to see past a virtual showroom of Piranhas Boxers SuperAVs and AMVs, all designs of the last century and pretty rigid in their configurations.
@Mike – true, but I stand by the thrust of my point. I think we would all like the government to grow some balls and show some direction / transparency.
@SO: I’m really not sure where you are going with your arguments. If the UK’s strategy was solely for the defence of mainland UK and the EU, and that we plan to have 10-20 years to re-arm, yes we could spend much less. But it’s not.
@Simon: “We’d then need to deploy an army.” – how and why? Without a CBG and ARG then you really need some very friendly neighbourly nations and time / money to build up capabilities ready to engage, whilst events could have moved significantly on.
Carrier air strike is not a all singing and dancing capability and has it’s limits – but it’s flexible and allows the UK to go and project force globally in the most efficient way IMO. Also, without significantly more funds the UK should not try to operate anything larger than a brigade sized force unless it’s a direct threat to the UK (not a made up one) – Iraq and Afghanistan has shown this.
On a more pressing need than some replacement escorts in 5 years or a new wheeled armour (other than UOR’s) Ukraine I anticipating the need to bring in external peacekeepers on an urgent basis ( rather than wait 3 months for a UN resolution) . Previously special Presidential decree could legalize the use of external military forces on Ukrainian soil but now Parliament has endorsed it included the deployment of foreign controlled WMD , that’s to say Nukes , on its territory , you know , just in case :-{
http://www.google.co.uk/url?q=http://rt.com/news/265093-ukraine-law-foreign-forces/&sa=U&ei=4eBxVd2DGMSVsgGGkICwDQ&ved=0CBcQqQIwAQ&usg=AFQjCNG_v3QR5BI4K3HaPnk1jjxjk5_F1Q
Again I will say in IMHO our European based heavy armour and accompanying kit needs to be ALL based in the easternmost NATO countries , not 1000 miles literally where it will actually be used in anger. If migrants start landing on Europe’s southern shores in MBT’s from LCAC not sinking wooden fishing boats then I’ll rethink it but untill then a little bit of logic wouldn’t go amiss.
Repulse,
Why? Because there’s little point in knowing what is going on if you can’t do something about it when needed.
How? By amassing force on the border and/or arranging to land equipment with the government of the nation harbouring the terrorists.
We have had rather friendly neighbours in most cases where there is a land border.
I’m not sure having a CBG and ARG will help anyway, it simply isn’t big enough to force an army over another nations shore. Is it big enough to capture a port? Maybe. maybe not.
I would counter that with the same questions you originally asked me. How and why? In particular, what relevance does it have to terrorism, cyber espionage and WMD proliferation?
As ever, your faithful,
Mr D. Advocate
The French will spend less and still have more capability.
Simon, pay homage to CS Lewis, sign off as Wormwood. :)
SO, whatever makes you happy. If you want massive defence spending cuts for Germany, it is hardly my concern. I’m more comfortable with my country’s level of defence spending, but that does not affect Germany does it?
@SO
We’ve had a brief blip down – rates for that 10y gilt reached 1.5% a few months ago – but if you look at the national debt as a whole, we’re effectively paying 3%. And even so – it’s such a huge number that even 2.5% of £1.5 trillion still amounts to more than the entire defence budget. So I’d disagree that “Interest rates barely exist” – the size of the debt is so huge that even historically very low interest rates still mean large interest payments. What’s really scary is that 30% of City traders have only ever known base rates
I wouldn’t get too romantic about the French position – they spend so much more on their deterrent that they’re looking pretty thin in other areas, notably they haven’t got any kind of replacement/supplement for CdG lined up, and only buying two Horizons didn’t do much for unit costs there.
The interest payment son UK public debt are overwhelmingly to British creditors, and thus overwhelmingly a distribution issue, not a threat to the nation.
Furthermore, the size of the current debt and current interest payments are almost entirely irrelevant to the question whether to reduce the deficit now or not. This is counter-intuitive, but any educated economist should understand that those expenses are sunk costs. They happen anyway, whether or not the deficits are reduced or not.
The relevant costs are the costs added by the deficit and the (long term) interest rates for financing it.
At 2.5% p.a. interest it’s easy to find public expenses worth this cost – particularly infrastructure, preventative health care, research and education expenses.
The current obsession with deficit control is not founded in textbook or any other established economics. It’s political ideology.
I’m generally in favour of getting a national budget right and balanced, but I’m even more set against narratives driven by political ideology instead of analysis. The asserted “threat” by debt and obsession about deficit-cutting is as well-founded as was the invasion of Iraq. People believe it, though there’s no evidence to back up their priority.
An extract on government debt.
The Bank of England bought £375 billion of gilts in their quest to support the UK economy between 2009 and 2012, which represents about 25% of the total gilts outstanding and about 23% of UK GDP. Since the Bank of England is an arm of the UK government, though acts independently when setting monetary policy, then these gilts represent debt that the UK owes to itself – each year the government pays interest on these gilts to the Bank of England, which books the interest as income and can be used to pay a dividend back to the government. On the national balance sheet, the gilts are an asset of the Bank of England but a liability of the government, and so cancel each other out. Although when QE was originally announced in 2009, it was expected to be temporary and would be unwound; ie the gilts sold back into the secondary market, when policy was to be tightened again, it is now clear that this remains a long way away and policy tightening will initially be implemented through interest rate increases. These gilts will be held for a long time. The advantage to you in cancelling these gilts is that the ratio of debt to GDP falls from around 90% of GDP to around 70% of GDP and the UK balance sheet suddenly looks much healthier in absolute terms and compared with the major European countries as well as the US and Japan. The pressure from being an economy with too much debt disappears and gives you as politicians much more flexibility in how rapidly you need to deal with the debt. Further, ahead of the 2020 election you will have lots of very attractive charts showing that the UK has much less debt than all those around – what a sound economy the UK will seem to be. – See more at: http://www.morningstar.co.uk/uk/news/133345/would-cancelling-qe-gilts-boost-the-uk-economy.aspx#sthash.6SjdWBbT.dpuf
@Simon: Having a Division on the ground doesn’t mean you can do anything about it. You said yourself that terrorism was the primary threat; if that is the case please tell how you plan to use it to defeat ISIL, without faliing into another Iraq / Afghanistan II? Even if you could use it you would near a base to build up your force (please name one?) and 6 months to get your kit there and logistics by which time Baghdad could have fallen. An alternative approach is to train / arm the local forces and back them up with advisors supported by strike aircraft / UAVs / TLAMs / Special Forces used to disrupt / attack terrorist supply lines / bases – all of which can be supplied from a CBG / ARG within a month without having to build and secure land bases where the locals don’t want them.
@Repulse
If you are training local forces then why would you need an ARG? If you have host nation support then you can just fly in your special forces/trainers etc just like we do in Kurdistan.
@Simon: further to my last comment, I agree the UK needs the ability to fight cyber espionage and WMD proliferation; but neither could be done via an Army division either. Investment in diplomacy, BMD and infrastructure hardening is needed with a level of MAD capability either through CASD (for WMD) or cyber attack capabilities (probably through GCHQ).
The UK defence budget is big enough to do this, and support a CBG / ARG / SSN global maritime based strategy as well as doing keeping the UK safe / supporting NATO through QRA / MPA / EEZ Patrol asserts with an Army Division held at lower readiness.
Also with a maritime strategy I am not saying the RN wins it all; I’m quite happy for all carrier F35Bs (bar a few air defence a/c) / MPAs / long ranged UAVs / Tankers to be owned by the RAF, and all “commandos” (outside of fleet protection) to come from the army or by led by the army.
I actually think that SDSR 2015 may actually deliver something close to this…
As I’ve long argued you need some clarity on threats and then you need to swallow some hard lessons regarding them.
Something which I think is hard to argue against is that at the moment there is no realistic peer enemy and won’t be one for at least 12-18 months, more realistically 3-5 years. That really should drive us to reduce high end capabilities to the minimum required to regenerate a multi-divisional / CVBG / air expeditionary force capability in 3-5 years. This as a matter of deliberate policy.
To me in a very broad brush that means an Army able to deploy a division and a Corps HQ. A Navy able to deploy a CVF but with minimum carrier strike capability and instead focused on the LPH role. And an air force with smaller numbers of more capable platforms with a big emphasis on UCAVs, ISTAR, air mobility and precision stand-off munitions – with a large pool of training aircraft, mostly in storage.
What we’ll use on a daily basis, as it were, will be light and medium infantry directed by ISTAR and employing stand-off precision weapons with penny packets of heavier capabilities. We’ll mostly use the air force primarily to service that ground capability or replace it to some extent where the politicians go wobbly. The Navy will spend 98% of its time doing what it has always done and been effective at – presence operations and littoral operations. That doesn’t need full spectrum carrier strike or large numbers of first rate escorts.
Phil: “That doesn’t need full spectrum carrier strike or large numbers of first rate escorts.” I actually agree with this and would say that the @20 escorts and 2 CVFs actually deliver this. With the CVF design it will cover the LPH role also plus a reasonable carrier strike (@16-24 F35bs deployed). It also allows the UK to grand stand a high-end CBG on global training exercises showing that the UK remains a powerful ally to have. This needs to be protected ahead of an army division ready to deploy. I just wish there were more SSNs…
Not having CVF hasn’t stopped us being effective for the last 40 years. Remove the ability to deploy a division and all of a sudden we couldn’t have carried out almost all of our operations over the last 40 years. Northern Ireland required a division, the Falklands required a division, Bosnia and Kosovo did, Afghanistan effectively did, Iraq did (twice). CVF is a wonderful thing to bash Chinese internet fan-bois over the head with but in the real world it has currently limited utility. I only support it because its a capability that has taken 18 years so far to try and regenerate and we’re still several years away!
Repulse,
How would I use an army division to defeat ISIL? Deploy it and eradicate the military hardware ISIL is acquiring. And yes, I’d need a base in Turkey, I guess.
However, I’m not sure I see how a CBG and ARG will help. You suggest fielding strike aircraft we don’t have(or Tornado from RAF Akrotiri), UAVs (certainly not from a carrier), TLAM (in pitiful quantities from SSN or alternatively SS from Tornado/Typhoon) and Special Forces – which certainly don’t need to come from a carrier.
I wouldn’t suggest that cyber espionage and WMD proliferation is fought with an army division. I’d suggest it is fought with intel and covert ops. Again, backing up the lack of need for a carrier.
Lastly, I agree with both yourself and Phil in that the capacity that needs to be delivered by CVF is probably more of an LPH role. So if we’re going to field a glorified LPH with a handful of jets then perhaps we should find an alternative to the “jet” part as I still think F35B is extremely high risk and high cost for the effect that a) a few will deliver, and b) they will cost.
Screwtape ;-)
Phil, if I could give that a million likes I would
I would add, our rapid response capability needs to improve, beyond that, you are spot on
@Phil: I’m not saying remove the ability to deploy a division but hold the capability at lower readiness – say 3-6 months to generate.
The C(VF)BG would have worked to a much greater effect in Libya and in my view even in fighting ISIL. As for not having the capability for the last 40 years, we did but it was on two platforms the Invincible and Ocean classes.
Phil, shouldn’t it be the other way round? Remove the easy to regenerate lower end capabilities and keep the long lead higher end?
@Simon: I personally think that using a Division to attack ISIL will have the same end result as Afghanistan – early success and then years of road side bombs, terrorist attacks, alienation of the local population and then ultimately a embarrassing withdrawal.
login form test
S O said: “The current obsession with deficit control is not founded in textbook or any other established economics. It’s political ideology.”
While the level of acceptable deficit is largely a political choice it *is* Keynesian economic orthodoxy that when the economy is growing you aim for a surplus. With Conservatives in charge it is entirely unexceptional that they would attempt it, as it is simply the same as they have done in dealing with previous recessions.
Current borrowing and spending decisions should keep one eye on future threats and shocks in the same way defence decisions do.
Snazzy quotes.
And no I don’t think so. Because we use the lower end stuff all the time. If we were isolationist we could do it that way around.
@Repulse
That’s pretty much what we are doing. The division will take 6 months probably to deploy.
Repulse,
I agree so much with your opinion that it would be another Afghanistan that I would suggest we change the objective.
Go in.
Decimate their warfighting capability.
Get out.
Then use ISR assets and covert ops to determine when we do exactly the same again, and again, and again. It’s also reasonable to use ISTAR assets with a more “distanced” strike capability as we are now.
Basically some clinically executed battles with a simple strategy of attrition for winning the war.
Phil, good point. So basically you can’t cut anything. The high end because it takes too long to regenerate and the low end because you are using it constantly. Oh well, that’s life.
You can cut high end stuff, you just need to be realistic about the differing thresholds and how much of it you need and at what level of readiness you need it at for a particular threshold.
How would you improve rapid reaction TD?
Phil – want to buy lots of my neat air transportable armour then? Five to a C-17, two to an A400M and if you like one in a C-130. Would that be rapid enough?
It’s a bit more complicated.
It’s not only about growth, but also about whether the economy is still recovering. The UK GDP and UK GDP/capita is still several per cent below the figures of 2007! A lost decade, the UK would have a approx. 15% bigger economy if it had maintained the long-term growth trajectory!
This is still economic crisis times, not boom times. This is the time where the Keynesian recipe is to spend much, or at the very least not to crunch the budget.
The conservatives got it backwards and the public pays too much attention to growth rates instead of the relative level compared with 2007.
This might seem like heresy but the more I read about the underpinning thinking behind FRES the more it made some sense, so I know we made a horlicks of implementing it but the concept was better thought through than the final outcome would make you believe.
So without buying into the whole transformative revolutionary stuff, the ability to shift a medium weight force at some speed still has some appeal. I think our rapid reaction forces are too light and not mobile enough
@ TD
‘I think our rapid reaction forces are too light and not mobile enough’
You think they should be heavier and more deployable?
Yep, which means more deploying assets!
The question is begged, if we wish the ability to deploy (and sustain!) a Division: A Division comprising what?
TD – ref FRES thinking – as it changed so much between inception and contract, which bit of FRES thinking, as in which of the many concepts, do you align yourself to?
I think we have a big gap between light forces that can rapidly deploy and whatever comes next. I would like to see something that can deploy relatively quickly but at a strength, weight and staying power that improves over 16AAb and 3CDO, like a medium weight force, or in other words, the original FRES concept
What’s a useful size rapid reaction force to deploy?
What sort of operation do we expect it to cope with and for how long; and thus what sort of sea / air mobility assets would we then need?
Where do we expect it to operate (a European rapid reaction force is a totally different beast from one required to deploy globally) and finally, seeing as its to be rapid, will that mean we have to practically plan that it won’t deploy as part of a coalition force and give it a wider spectrum of capabilities?
Some sticky questions I think.
I agree with TD. The basic thinking behind FRES was good and still relevant today. Infact for instances like dealing with ISIS is would be very handy indeed. What we need to do is accept than any vehicle useful enough to be transportable in numbers won’t be light enough to sustain a blast from a large IED. We need to evolve our tactics rather than the vehicle. So rapid deployment to theatre and rapid exit. Make way for heavier follow up forces. All so forget about using the vehicle to equip half the army. It’s should be bought in small numbers and used by a force that could almost be considered a special forces armoured unit. as Chris says it should be sized so we can fit 2 in an A400m. The contract should be based on the best armoured protection available that can fit into the transportation allowance which is around 15tonnes. Also something that can perhaps have additional armour bolted on later in theatre as the threat environment evolves.
Unfortunately, rapid reaction forces tend towards light infantry, not vehicles. The quantity of material (pardon me for calling men material in this case) that can be shipped in by air is very drastically changed the heavier and bulkier each unit gets.
For example, a single airplane can transport 200-300+ men in a single flight, which is a very potent though slow moving force. In comparison, the same flight can only ship in a dozen or two LSVs, which still is a potent force, though much less than a few hundred men. Then we come to MBTs. One per flight. Maybe two. While each unit is impressive in their own right, only two of them do not constitute a potent force as a whole. So we can see that as individual effectiveness increases, paradoxically, total force effectiveness actually drops.
So if you are looking for “rapid reaction” forces, focus on infantry and very light vehicles, not armour. In this case, the lighter the better.
Rather than “rapid reaction” forces I would prefer to see us develop a viable and effective “reaction force”. This would be similar to what the French deployed to Mali with equivalent equipment. The bulk of the French infantry are at least motorised in VABs, not the best protected AFV but a damn sight better than a 4ton truck or Landrover. Add to these VBL Recce/AT vehicles and pretty potent AFVs such as the AMX-10RC and you have an effective mobile force. They also have their version of the Parra and RM Commandos and the heavy stuff, but it is their light and medium forces that are most commonly used and usually together.
FRES(SV) will be a good light tank etc. but it will be more at home working with the heavy boys. Being tracked it lacks in theatre mobility needing transporters to travel any real distance. I am being guilty of sounding like a repeating record but the Army needs a wheeled AFV/FRES(UV) as a matter of urgency, more so than the warrior upgrade, challenger refit or even additional FRES(SV)s. Why do we still have the idea that light role infantry are still viable except in certain elite units such as the Paras. IF we had followed the French ideal, we would not have had to UOR so many MRAVs if we had bought the right platform for FRES (SV) or better still stayed in the Boxer programme.
Which comes back to Phil’s point on what do you want your force to do. COIN? Hold off an invasion? As an independent force? As part of a coalition? In what timeframe? By what means of transport?
El Sid, @SO
it seems to me that you’re both right. The UK government debt of 1.4 trillion isn’t cheap to finance even at 2 to 3 % interest rates. However, a very high proportion of the debt is 10 year + duration, which means that the UK has locked in historically low interest rates on a very large debt number, in a situation where global interest rates may well rise. The trigger for this will be US Fed driven (US interest rates returning to more normal levels will probably cause a deal of problems for some emerging economies).
So long as the UK can afford the interest cost, the debt itself will be rolled over and replaced by new debt (or not) over the next 8 to 20 years. In today’s money terms, the UK can easily fund the interest cost out of its taxation income. In addition, nothing stops the UK from printing new money to fund the interest payment or borrowing money to pay interest. The main reason why this isn’t done as it is thought to cause inflation. However, the ongoing financial crisis (from 2007) means that the risk doesn’t apply at all. In term, higher interest rates (when they return as they surely will), will also deflate the value of the loan principal in real terms.
For anyone who wants to think of Government debt as though it was a mortgage, 1.4 trillion is about 2.3 times annual government income (c600 billion pa). Again for context, the “value” of UK housing stock, which supports about 1 trillion of mortgage debt, is somewhere over 5 trillion (then add corporately held property, farm land, government owned property etc etc).
This isn’t an excuse to not sort out government borrowing (at c5 % of GDP it is on the high side), but it is relevant to the timing of doing, especially if you choose to only do the reduction by decreasing government spending.
There is no economic justification for getting into surplus in a 3 to 4 year period (in fact acting quickly creates unemployment across the economy). This is ideological. The other ideological driven assumption is that UK government spending should only be 35 % of GDP (USA levels). Since this is approximately the current overall level of national taxation, it follows that the UK government spending reduction will not create a net tax reduction for UK citizens as a whole.
Just to state the bleeding obvious, every benefit cut (family tax credits, rent aid, unemployment etc) will mean a proportion of the UK will have less money to spend (reducing the private sector economy) and every government service cut/reduced which is still needed will have to be paid by the user (private health care, unemployment insurance are obvious examples, but parents may find that they need to buy the children’s school books in the future etc). There is no free lunch here.
TD, Martin, Lord jim – thank you for those kind words. In essence I used the *original* FRES spec as a guide to my designs; hence C-130 transportable, 15t or so and producible as many versions (wheeled and tracked) with common support. I knew you’d all come round to my way of thinking eventually. Add to that better than Jackal mobility (wheeled versions), deep V-hulls (wheeled armour) greater punch than Scout/Warrior upgrade. Send money and I’ll make prototypes.
In terms of deployment of light infantry ( my definition being solider with pack and light support weapons – man portable ) should easily be air transported ( in an emergency) by UK based civilian airliners . EasyJet has 200+A320’s configured for 180 , that’s over 35,000 troops over a radius of 2500km+ . How many foot soldiers do we have ? That’s all of them near to theater ( local trucks , taxis , buses etc to dispersal point) in one lift , 24 to 48 hrs with a boot up their arse , and if not why not ? Ammunition, field hospitals in a bag etc to come by civilian air transports.
Dipping into heresy for the purposes of discussion…
Would you consider Challenger 2 (and its replacement) a requirement for a rapidly deployed and then sustained Division?
Is where we will be deploying with Allies where a MBT is required and where we’re likely to deploy on our own areas where a MBT is not?
S O said: “The UK GDP and UK GDP/capita is still several per cent below the figures of 2007! A lost decade, the UK would have a approx. 15% bigger economy if it had maintained the long-term growth trajectory!”
Some of that growth between 2000 and 2008 was funded by deficit spending despite Gordon Brown saying the economy was in rude health. Had that continued the debt and deficit would be even larger than it already is and the political distortions in the economy would be enormous.
A straight comparison between then and now doesn’t tell the whole story. The process of contraction and renewed growth reshapes and redirects the economy. When the UK economy recovers to 2007 size it will not be doing quite the same things it was in 2007. Who knows, maybe the deficit spending pre-2007 was simply delaying the economy shaking out the effects of the internet, digital cameras and other technological advances.
Consider the UK armed forces. They have shrunk since the fall of the USSR and rightly so because they were focused on protecting against the USSR. Once the government gets a clear idea of what they want the armed forces to be capable of it may even begin growing again but it will have a different focus to 25 years ago.
The US have move M1 Abrams by C-17 so a C2 ( or associated ARVE ) is possible so with six C-17 available to us at any time ( fingers crossed) in theory move 12 a day over the same 2500km+ . Spare space , which is a lot , to filled with support engineers kit , spares etc. Every 5 days that’s say 48 C2 and engineer support heavy vehicles with kit or our entire 240 C2 force and support moved in 25 days . Perhaps one day they could give it a go just to see if its possible , call it Operation MTL (Move That Lard )
http://www.google.co.uk/url?q=http://www.youtube.com/watch%3Fv%3Dq8_WsTjexSE&sa=U&ei=3zF0VfuAOYaW7Ab9r4HADQ&ved=0CBEQ9QEwAg&usg=AFQjCNGehbVGynZ_6E90B_2WLHwKCu3kNQ
With 8 C-17 we could move them in 18 days .
UK GDP has been above 2007 levels since last year
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/10889691/Britains-GDP-surpasses-pre-recession-peak.html
It’s worth noting that while current 10 year rates are around the 1.5% mark the UK tends to borrow more for 30 years. Historic debt issues were done at a higher interest rate which is why there is a discrepancy. I am all for borrowing at 1.5% and building infrastructure that will add to per capita GDP I.e power stations, roads, railway’s etc. But no doubt politicians would start to “invest” in health care. Personally investing in health care is my least favourite oxymoron. You can’t invest in something which does not pay dividends. More healthcare just means more old people to look after that costs more money.
I think the rapid reaction requirement was to deploy around 2500nm from the UK which was of the requirements requested for a400m with a 30t payload. I would of though operation desert shield would of been a gd place to start for rapid reaction requirements. Aircraft will be your most rapid heavy hitters as they can be almost anywhere in the world in 48 hrs from the UK.
monkey,
If you move heavy armour by air, how do you move their logistics support?
Martin
“You can’t invest in something which does not pay dividends”
If I had been born in the first half of the 20th Century rather than the second, I would certainly have died three times over by now (Kidney failure, Cancer x2, Brain haemorrhage) and I’m not quite 50 yet. I beg to differ on that, although I do agree that there is a point for everyone where the cost (and I don’t just mean economic) of prolonging life for a very short period of time is counter-productive.
Just to be clear, I’m not having a go at you at all; I think you are being too literal in your choice of words.
@mr.fred.
The TROJAN AVRE can be moved by C-17 ( I factored moving over the 5 days 48 C2 – 12 AVRE a ratio which could increase favouring resupply vehicles as you go past the 5 days on ) Other heavy items power packs , portable gensets , etc would still fit in the huge hold of the C-17 along with a C2/AVRE) . Other kit can arrive by civilian transports IIRC TD posted tables of most kit arriving in Camp Bastion came by civilian aircraft ( I suspect we used military birds because we had them not because they were essential to purpose !) . Tank transporters etc are not figured on the assumption the rough field the C-17’s land on is within a AAM shield , 100kms or so behind the operational area . What I propose is a very fast initial show of force to tip the balance with air assets bringing up additional military vehicles as required. My figures on the original post was 2 flights a day with 6 C-17 over 2500km and back , in ‘ theory’ with a fast turnaround that could be 3 flights per day .
Wherever I look, I get different statistics than those.
ONS is a cryptic mess that refuses to deliver anything of interest, but plenty others report such stats in an accessible way:
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/united-kingdom/gdp-per-capita-ppp
(PPP to get rid of exchange rate influence, since they usually report in USD)
http://www.measuringworth.com/datasets/ukgdp/result.php
They report a lower 2014 real GDP per capita than 2007 as well.
(And NOBODY should pay attention to nominal GDP figures or GDP figures that aren’t “per capita” when it comes to judge economic development!)
“You can’t invest in something which does not pay dividends.”
Nonsense. The government produces public goods, and the return of its investments are public goods, not dividends. Don’t apply business econ on governance: It’s usually nonsense (and still very popular among conservative non-economists).
@ Nick – “There is no economic justification for getting into surplus in a 3 to 4 year period (in fact acting quickly creates unemployment across the economy). This is ideological.”
There is a perfectly good justification if you believe there is a serious threat of round two of global financial chaos, only this time with all the usual monetary and fiscal levers being exhausted as they still haven’t been ‘reset’ from their last use. “Quick, drop interest rates………..oh!”
@ Nick – “The other ideological driven assumption is that UK government spending should only be 35 % of GDP (USA levels). Since this is approximately the current overall level of national taxation, it follows that the UK government spending reduction will not create a net tax reduction for UK citizens as a whole.”
If 35% is ideological then it is an ideology the public seems to share. Current plans are for about 36.5%, which is indeed close to the historic long term trend for the amount of wealth the exchequer has persuaded people to part with in taxation. How ideological!
Yes, the UK economy has now even LESS manufacturing:
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/elmr/gdp-and-the-labour-market/q1-2014–april-gdp-update/cd-prodq1.xls
As soon as you move vehicles and/or aircraft you’re in a scenario where you need to move a whole raft of other things too, depending on threat. Force protection assets to protect your APOD/SPOD and logistics areas, which can range from infantry and barbed wire, to crew-served weapons and SAM. LIfe support stuff like field kitchens / DIFACs, potable water storage etc. Toolkits, support kit, publications, spares and most importantly, fuel and ammunition. All require huge volumes of regular AT – particularly if you can’t rely on having enough F34 in place – for as long as you’re deployed and all require protection / security. Not guaranteed and not cheap. Look what Bastion turned into by the end of Herrick.
These sorts of issue are what tends to limit the viability of heavier air-deployed forces. Light forces are quick to theatre, but largely immobile once there unless you can secure basing for cabs and/or lift for vehicles. Once you add the latter, you get the logs tail that goes with it.
With all these scenarios it’s about whether you can get enough force in place within (say) ten days to make a crucial difference. That tends to limit the scale – particularly at distance. If you can’t do that, you’re into either “deliberate” deployment or forward-basing. Deliberate deployment means slower – typically as it involves sea transport – but means you get to bring as many bells and whistles as your lift allows. You can also stay afloat for a considerable period if required. Usually you end up having some forcible entry capability as part of it. Forward basing is a different kettle of fish – it reduces the response time and if based around rapid sea transport still lets you bring lots of kit. It does mean you need to commit lots of expensive assets though, both in terms of capacity and geographical spread.
Our GDP above 2007 with manufacturing still climbing?
Lots of ways to read figures…
@S O
The decline in output from manufacturing is depressing both me and the economy. I work for a small engineering company and we are busy but as a whole manufactureing needs a boost . In the past governments would use tax incentives , economic enterprises zones, capital projects etc to boost this. To an extent these exist but while a deficit exists there is a reluctance to extend these due to uncertainty that long term overall benefits will be the outcome. HS2 is one ( not fir ne though) , the new rail stock factory built by Hitachi in Co Durham ( much needed) CrossRail One ( much needed to ) are some proposed or on the go but small manufacturing needs incentives to not just relying on the spinoff from the big projects. A lot is proposed and even implemented to an extent but a major push not token 100m here and there for small incentives which is usually sucked up by government themselves in their admin costs , i.e. public servants .
Recently Manchester University has had a research centre completed to develop its discovery of graphene , that was five years in the building and nit a Jo of research conducted under its roof meanwhile hundreds of patents have been filed across the globe on this discovery . :-(
@Jedi
You and I have different perspectives on this :) There is no right answer whatever either of us think. Three comments:
1) The problem is, as I see it, too many politicians believe the 2008 crisis is over. In reality, until all QE type measures and effects lie in the past and the global economy has returned to normality, we remain within the crisis itself.
2) In any case, I believe we are in transition from an Industrial/Carbon based economy to something else. Whilst carbon energy sources (coal, oil and gas) will maintain a role for quite a while yet, ultimately they will be replaced in the forseeable future
3) It is somewhat irrelevant whether 36 % of GDP in tax is “right” or “wrong”. If you don’t want to buy education, healthcare, pensions on a collective basis via Government provision, then you must provide it for yourself, out of your post taxed income. This may or may not be more efficiently done by personal provision than collectively by the government. Either way it will still cost you something on top of the tax you will pay. There will still remain the question of what to do with the proportion of the population who “failed” to gain the benefits from an above average income (which will be the majority of the population). Do you wish to live in a neo-feudal society, with pensions, healthcare, education dolled out to the poorest 10 %, 15 % by charity ? I exaggerate to a degree, but I don’t think any of us would really find reverting to an 1830’s economy very likeable.
monkey, I won’t put too much hope in carbon nanotubes. I’ve been hearing about them at about the same time as “cure for cancer”, that was about 20-30 years ago. They have not gotten far with them since then and I doubt there will be any quantum leaps in development for the next few decades.
As for air shipping MBTs… don’t. Just don’t. Your calculations fail to consider that aircraft have to be sidelined for maintenance after every flight, my father did a stretch as a fire and safety for an airport and he mentioned that at the touchdown point, you get a lot of plane parts left behind. Nuts and bolts usually, but panels and blown tires happen too. Especially the wheels, those have to be changed after a few flights, the rubber literally burns off from the friction of landing. You’ll need a day or two to get the plane back into shape and to find out what dropped off. Literally.
When it comes to CS/CSS there is space inbetween the very light force and the very heavy force, or force that needs sustaining for a decade i.e. Bastion.
The inference that as soon as you have vehicles in theatre you need a tonne of force protection, a Timmy Hortens and contractor maintenance facilities is wrong, shades of grey and all that
@Observer
The bits dropping off planes is all to true , take the Air France Concorde disaster in Paris. Walking deck in line abreast is still a daily task in early morning/evening when low sun raises shadows of FOD on carriers still goes on.
At a push though air ops can be intensified with the accepted risk increase being known and accepted.
As NaB says though jet fuel supplies at the landing zone are a limiting factor. Military transports can land with a fuel surplus to allow them to takeoff to do a short hop to a suitably supplied field in a friendly nation but relying on over tasked air to air tankerage is just about ruled out as combat ops will have a much higher call on limited refueling support in theatre.
Nanotube use is widespread, worth having a dig around.
I know Chris, anything “graphite” is a variation of carbon nanotubes. However the “lightweight armour” breakthrough that people keep harping about is a long, long way away if at all possible. Hell, if you recall, I keep mentioning that the most common use of “graphene” is pencil lead. Basically single sheet graphene. But you don’t see people running around in bulletproof pencil lead suits do you?
Damn Chris, now I got the phrase “2B or not 2B stuck in my head. I blame you. :)
Airlifting and sustaining heavy armour is a no go at the start of an operation. The fuel requirements would be staggering especially if a road to the point of need is required from the airfield, and I don’t think you well enamor yourself to the local population if you empty the filling garages on the way while they try and carry on normal life coupled with trying to make a living. Plus you will have track maintenance, parts, recovery assets and ammo etc to worry about as well which all have come with very large weight penalties. I think Trojan was airlifted in to Bastion in an Antanov but I’m not sure if it was due to the added armour pushing the weight above what the C17 could manage.
@ Nick – “There is no right answer whatever either of us think. ”
Indeed not. :)
@ Nick – “Do you wish to live in a neo-feudal society, with pensions, healthcare, education dolled out to the poorest 10 %, 15 % by charity?”
No, but remember that for all the grand rhetoric we are essentially talking about the difference between spending 37.5% of GDP via taxation (approximately where the US sits these days) vs. spending 42.5% of GDP (approximately where the sensible euro nations like germany lie).
It’s not the end of the world.
@DN
“fuel requirements…”
NaB mentioned the issue with jet fuel also and tank fuel would also be an issue but both can run on the same . If local stocks of jet fuel are present then that can be used, or if not the transports ( in their own fuel tanks , can haul in jet fuel to be piped off to initially supply the armour. 5000 litres could provide more than sufficient for a C2/TROJAN AVRE to motor 100km to a forward jump off point. A 5000 litre trailer behind a C2 / AVRE shouldn’t be a struggle over even rough roads . Its this kind of exercise that should be practiced IMHO. Pipe Lin layers may need to be brought in to bring additional supplies closer to the point of need from suitable sources at some point but getting this show of force and capability in place quickly will give the local commander or politico at his negotiating table a nice big stick or headache for the OPFOR.
The USAF are using a C-17 to practice the forward deployment of a brace of F-22 ( prior to F-35 being available) The C-17 lands wherever, makes the strip good enough with kit embarked to operate and maintain two FJ with the added complication of LO maintenance. Once disembarked the C-17 returns and starts again with new kit and USAF personnel for the FJ support at the same or a new location. The whole lot is onboard , from tents to toilets to towing trucks. The FJ make their own way there once set up I am think something of the same but using civilian transports to move what they can 90% and the C-17 moving the 10% (the C2/AVRE) they can’t. When A400M’s are in numbers and up to speed Warriors/SV’s the same in a couple of years but then you are using not 6 C-17 but 18 A400M’s with similar support. That can military transports can land with the same total load as what they can take off with enables them them to also truck in fuel supplies to an extent.
monkey,
So you’ve got fuel covered to an extent, what about; ammunition, food, water, spares and other consumable supplies?
Monkey,
I will concede that airlifting a small force of heavy armour out to the borders of NATO is feasible and probably sustainable for a short period until the logistics are in place due to the nations having developed infrastructure. But what about areas of Africa and the ME where we are likely to send the reaction forces?
Just highlighting this illustration of the Joint Operational Fuel System here to indicate scale of the infrastructure often needed:
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Joint-Operational-Fuel-System.jpg
Sources/Related:
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2015/05/uk-amphibious-capability/
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2013/12/ship-shore-logistics-24-expeditionary-port-access-concept-2-fuel/
I can admit to having a simplistic, possibly naive view of rapid reaction – I was under the impression the purpose was to get a force of some substance in the way of an aggressor’s army ASAP to slow it down and prevent its unchecked advance, while the heavier force deploys by sea in slower time? Once the heavy (well supported) force is established, it takes on concerted action according to the strategy, with the vanguard rapid reaction force redeployed to supporting tasks, lower intensity combat zones and even (fingers in your ears RT) recce? Or isn’t that how rapid reaction ought to work?
I don’t know about armour contact rate ammo usage estimation, but I do know that a single contact rate of ammo for a single rifleman is 120-180 rounds.
monkey, have you ever heard of the armour term “throwing a track”? It’s very common.
@D N
Fuel, energy , power , whatever it goes by is the biggest by large headache of military commanders today and is THE determination factor in any mechanised or out of area conflict ( i.e. not where YOU live) . Be it grass for your horses or camels or petrol for your Tigers and Panthers it makes or breaks generals , think Rommel in Libya or Hitlers drive thro the Ardennes in the Battle of the Bulge ( his plan , his fail ) . Deployment of engines of war demands deployments of fuel of war and plenty of it.
Any thoughts here on rapid drilling to shale oil, local coarse refining and distribution. Shale oil is every f**king where it seems so what about a crew that extracts and prepares a fuel modern diesel’s and turbine’s can drink quickly. Modern commercial operations are looking to supply on a global scale but what about locally? A few hundred tonnes per day ( that’s 100 thousand litres per day ) is more than sufficient for a local area (25km radius) .
@Chris
Indeed we need to learn how to throw a spanner in the works , think the Battle of France, Operation Barbarossa, the Malayan Campaign by the Imperial Japanese Army , the North Koreans pushing the US and South Koreans back into an area the size of London on the extreme SE coast of Korea or Six day war or the Yom Kippur war ….
@Chris
I am trying to get over that with only 6 of 8 C-17 what we could do if we really really tried and practiced ( ala USAF with the F-22/C-17 I mentioned) let alone with a properly offensively tooled up force deployed by C130/A400M . A force big enough and equipped enough to stop in its tracks be it foot , wheeled or tracked . As I said enough to give the OPFOR commander a headache or the politicos a big stick to wield.
@aTD one of my posts went into some form of review and has relisted as @Chris when it was @Observer
P.S. still cannot edit on a Nokia Windows phone.
monkey, just use the 16AAB, they look well equipped for the job already. No point reinventing the wheel.
As I said earlier I can see it being feasible to NATO’s borders, where a combined effort is underway logistically with personnel, material and equipment moving by rail, road and ship while you place your heavy armour but anything out of area such as Africa with it’s limited infrastructure is going to be a non starter (unless we invest heavily into hybrid airships).
Also would it be worthwhile moving the heavy armour by air considering the % of platforms from our inventory that it will take to move in essence a very small force with a questionable deterrent value in the face of an opponent with a larger moderately equipped force.
I think our rapid reaction forces need to be fully mechanised especially given the small numbers we can deploy, but I don’t think heavy armour has a place in all but extreme cases.
Monkey, it was because you used the username mobkey !!
It went into the moderation queue because it was a first time use
Just for clarity, I wasn’t suggesting we start flying CR2 anywhere
Think conceptually in the 10-20 tonne area for a vehicle
Well the yanks have their Global Response Force which last I saw was made up of a BCT of the 82nd with additional 155mm howitzers, a Stryker Coy and a Mechanised Infantry Task Force of Coy size with BFVs and Abrams.
Yeah but the yanks also have aircraft dripping out of their ears and noses. They can afford the aircraft needed to ship squadrons straight to their area of interest. Not really the best of role models.
TD, think the best compromise is infantry backed by support weapons mounted on light vehicles. It keeps the weight down and the logistics burden isn’t so heavy as to be self defeating. Which, surprise, surprise, is close to the equipment list of the 16AAB.
monkey, I think the concept for shale oil is that you pump fluid into the area to force the oil out. What and where is the fluid you are pumping in coming from? And are you going to use sandy crude in your engines? You’ll need to ship in a refinery too.
That was kind of the point of me posting it. With all their airlift they’ve assigned quite a small medium weight element to their Army response force which is supposed to be capable of forced entry operations.
Let’s assume C17 and A400M can both deliver their payload (60t and 30t respectively) to 2500nm each day and then fly back.
That’s 6 x 60t + 16 x 30t = 840t each day (assuming approximately 75% in the forward fleet).
I make that the lead A2020 battlegroup delivered in three days and subsequently sustained with ease.
It will take a ship 7 days to go 2500nm at 15 knots in which time the aircraft will have delivered 5880 tonnes of equipment. This is about one half of a Point class (or two thirds if you were shipping CR2). The point of this is that three Point class and two Bay would easily triple the sustained assets in theatre… I make that the lead brigade.
I suppose if we reduced the weight of the deployed assets by a factor of around three we could deliver a lighter battlegroup in a single day. This is TD’s 10-20 tonne range which is Cougar (Ridgeback and Mastiff) if you want to stay alive.
And if a C17 is lost, damaged or grounded? And when you say with ease, what sort of mission is this battlegroup doing and where? I can’t see how you can say that without knowing those things.
You dont need to sustain your rapid reaction force indefinitely, they have either buggered off back to blighty or been augmented with follow on forces
That’s the point.
The objective is to get there quickly with a tad more mobility, firepower and protection than currently.
Light forces plus, rather than anything else. No massive, not massively heavy, not massively logistics heavy, just a bit heftier than what we have.
They would also carry out much of the same requirement as 3CDO and 16AAB, as I said, just with a bit more heft
TD,
I’ve always thought that our rapid reaction forces should be based around one of the Foxhound mounted light infantry btn’s and the ATG should be fully mechanised with Vikings.
@DN,
Yes, we can move large numbers of infantry in a short space of time, but it would seem to me pointless to do so if that your mobility is severely limited by lack of transport, particularly if the intervention is against the sort of irregular forces that seem to be springing up all over Africa and the Middle East (and who seem to understand how to use mobility, even if all they can get their hands on are Toyota pickups and mopeds).
Nice as it would be to introduce a complete new family of wheeled vehicles to replace the CVR(T) range (an idea that has merit), we seem to have a number of vehicles currently in service in the 10-20 ton class that could be used – Foxhound, Ridgeback, Mastiff, Coyote, Panther, Warthog, Viking etc (pick the vehicle type for the mission profile). The only issue that I have is that none carry particularly heavy weapons. Perhaps the simplest and cheapest way to plug the existing gap while the FRES UV program thrashes around in its death throes would be to buy an existing armoured car design and put a larger direct-fire gun on it. I also have this idea that a Foxhound-based “technical” might just work!
Simon, I believe that the rotation is something like one day’s flight out, one day’s required maintenance for planes, so you’re actually talking about 11 days.
DN, I like ATTCs, I really do, so it is with regret that I say that the Viking/Warthog is not value for money (or in this case, lane meters) in an airmobile role. A single ATTC would take up the space for a quad stack of light strike vehicles.
Light strike vehicles are the most efficient land unit I can think of to transport by air, they can serve as your make shift indirect fire support and transport. Failing that, an Exactor modified Land Rover would do as well.
@Observer
I take your point about the space they take up, but it depends on the terrain you will be operating in. Warthog/Viking may be the only suitable choice (paired with CVR(T), I would guess).
Caribbean, for example? If you’re talking about bogs and marsh, even tracked vehicles get bogged down, the tracks vs wheels debate often ignores the fact that tracks are not hovercraft, they get stuck too.
If you really need heavy firepower, ship in Apaches. Those give a lot of flexibility and firepower, if you can handle the logistics. A single AN-124 can carry a payload of 5 AH-64s or trade out with a Chinook for 2 Apaches.
The 3 most suitable units for air lifting are infantry, LSVs and AH-64s. Build your force around them. And for goodness sakes do not lose air parity at least.
@Observer – not arguing with you about the airpower side at all – | would agree completely and even assume that we would use Apaches in the first wave, in support of the spearhead forces. I was looking at it from the point of view of the follow-up ground forces that would support the spearhead.
With respect to the Warthogs and Vikings, I was thinking more of snow and ice and good old european mud or sandy desert than of bogs and marshes – tracks just have lower ground-pressure than wheels, which makes them better when the going is less firm. In the current context, I accept that we are more likely to be deploying light forces in hard desert/ scrub bush terrain than in European theatres, but it’s not the only possibility. I would also assume that we would, in the majority of scenarios, have established air superiority prior to sending in ground forces, so I was thinking more in terms of local superiority while waiting for the air support to arrive
Phil,
The “sustained with ease” comes from the 1000t per division per day figure that gets banded around so often. We’re shipping up to 840t each day which is equivalent to about 10t per day per vehicle that was inserted.
I then worked on each CR2 deployed operating 24 hours a day at 1.5t of fuel every 6 hours (6t fuel) leaving 4t for over 200 rounds fired each day.
Pretty active. And that’s the most logistically challenging asset… other than Apache ;-)
Rapid reaction is a wonderful thing, but you need a clear idea of what the problem is when they get there. Rapidly reacting the target du jour for whatever is at the other end is not one of the really good ideas.
@TD
I only mentioned using the C2 using UK only air assets to make the point that even our heaviest kit can be moved and supported ( in limited numbers initially) . Vehicles both tracked and wheeled in the weight class and resistance to OPFOR firepower that Chris proposes would be ideal as the C130 fleet could be used as well as commercial transports which some have reinforced flooring to withstand the point loads of heavy vehicles.
@Observer
I mentioned local refining and drilling if required ( any water supply will do be it ditch water, ponds,lakes,river ) as an alternative to transporting in diesel. In Syria locals and IS refine their own in very makeshift ‘ refinery’s ‘ . A purpose built unit would be much more efficient .
http://www.google.co.uk/url?q=http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2013/Apr-18/214139-syrians-take-up-backyard-refining-of-crude-oil.ashx&sa=U&ei=_1N1VdjyEYTV7Qb884LgCQ&ved=0CAsQFjAA&usg=AFQjCNHYNgbu0DhwDXNqsIe_xoCnJ3bxTw
I think talk of “rapid reaction” is really not practical unless you are talking about a) special forces operations with attendant backup like airpower and SFSG or b) are a superpower.
I think a more reasonable argument to be had is if we want to retain a theatre entry capability, however minimal, which is a lot more than 16 AAB or 3 Cdo, and would include specialized port and airborne units like RE airfield repair. I’m all in favour, obviously…
I won’t say “rapid reaction” is totally impossible, every year from Oct to Nov, we shove in a brigade+’s worth of men into Australia and pull them out again, though we cheat a bit. Logistics are pre-spotted and so is the armour. Lighter stuff are still shipped in though, memories of scrubbing rifles till they are spotless so that Australian customs can certify them clean and seal them.
A single B-777 has the capacity to ship in 3 rifle companies worth of men + HQ and support, AN-124s for the Chinooks and AH-64s, the Super Pumas self deploy from Tindal and the F-16s self deploy from Singapore to Shoalwater Bay in Australia (same training area as the US’s Talisman Sabre). One week in, two weeks running around, last week to pack up and leave.
In my eyes, a fantasy “basic building block” rapid intervention force would be about 5 companies, 3 rifle companies, 1 HQ/support and one logistics with the support company mounted on 16 LSVs (8 HMG or Mortar, 8 ATGM) loaned 2 types each to each rifle company with the last 4 as the HQ ready reserve. From what I can see, you can insert and support this force with a 3-4 plane flight (1 manpower, 1 equipment, 1-2 logistics). Just don’t do something stupid like get involved in COIN with this. This kind of force is suited for defence if an external party wishes to invade, not for places where you can get shot in the back from “civilians” or “allies”. Strictly for things like Ukraine or Kuwait. Not that I expect the ones right at the top to get it. I won’t be surprised if it does get tossed into COIN, people start crying about losses and UORs for heavy stuff start coming out.
Rather than looking at shipping CA2 etc. by air, I would look at shipping WAH-64Ds and sustaining them.
Russian Rapid Reaction plans:
http://www.janes.com/article/52089/airborne-troops-to-form-backbone-of-future-russian-rapid-reaction-forces
@ToC
The man in charge of the Airborne Divisions , Russian airborne forces (VDV) commander Colonel General Vladimir Shamanov has an interesting back history. Wiki has him down as being known as the ‘Butcher of Chetneya’ due to his ruthless dealings with rebels, their supporters, sympathetic villagers whathaveyou….
Russia focusing on troops that move quickly from one end of the country to another quickly is logical to deal with internal/external threats to Russia’s borders. Seems a sensible way of spending limited resources to maximum usefulness over huge areas.
Sorry, this contribution is so very late but I have been unable to post it until now. Perhaps it’s so late that some of you will have forgotten what you said! However, some very good thinking going on here.
TD starts it off really with a point about how the more he read about the underpinning thinking behind FRES the more it made some sense, and how the concept was better thought through than the final outcome would make one believe.
Martin appears to agree with TD’s point about the need for an the ability to shift a medium weight force at some speed but then makes the rather contentious suggestion that the force’s armour should be bought in small numbers and used by a force “that could almost be considered a special forces armoured unit”, a point with which I only agree to a certain extent. (More of that later).
Observer seizes on that Martin’s proposal and argues that unfortunately, rapid reaction forces tend towards light infantry, not vehicles, and points to the difficulties involved in air transport of vehicles, reaching the conclusion that if you are looking for “rapid reaction” forces, the focus should be on infantry and very light vehicles, not armour. “In this case, the lighter the better.”
When I said earlier that I partially agreed with Martin’s point about armour, I was wondering whether there was room for a compromise. That armour need not be of FRES SV weight but perhaps something akin to the “new-build” CVR(T) family, constructed only recently by BAE. Incidentally those vehicles are scheduled to serve until 2026 or so and should be allocated for use with 16 AA Bde and/or 3 Commando Bde. I don’t know the nature of the vehicles Chris is designing and often refers to but are they similar in any way?
Lord Jim believes that FRES(SV) will be a good light tank etc. but it will be more at home working with the heavy boys. He goes on to say that the Army needs a wheeled AFV/FRES(UV) as a matter of urgency, more so than the Warrior upgrade, Challenger refit or even additional FRES(SV)s. That inevitably leads to the question of whether he thinks that the decision to procure the FRES SV version before the UV version was the correct one.
Actually I think Phil raises the key questions, well paraphrased by Observer: “What do you want your force to do. COIN? Hold off an invasion? As an independent force? As part of a coalition? In what timeframe? By what means of transport?”
However, given the nature of the emerging world crisis spots and potential contingencies, am I being completely eccentric in suggesting that the former concept of multi-role brigades (each with its own armour, reconnaissance, artillery, infantry, engineers, logistics , helicopters, combat support, signals, medics, etc, etc.) would not exactly be a bad thing. It is an idea which now seems to be discredited within British Army circles (although not Australian, apparently). Such formations would train together (a la 16 AA Bde) and therefore be cohesive and well integrated, if an intervention were needed. No doubt, I shall be shot down in flames for suggesting the resurrection of such an outmoded idea but aren’t we now facing an increasing number of crisis points where it would be more than useful? Of course the brigade could be deployed as a whole but, as there is such a wide range of units, the “golfbag” approach could also be used, selecting units from within the brigade and tailoring the chosen force to specific operations. The advantage would be the previously mentioned cohesion and unity of organisation.
Mike W – I have a set of light/medium vehicles wheeled and tracked, some turreted some more APC/utility shaped. All with high power to weight ratio, better than jackal mobility for the wheeled versions, almost as light a ground pressure as original 9t CVR(T) for the tracked. Larger wheeled combat armour has deep V hull. For the tracked think CVR(T) scale at minimum, 20% bigger for the heavier versions. For the wheeled think longer/taller FV600. All fit C-130 9ft square transport gauge, although crawl space on some versions might be an issue. So quite similar to CVR(T) in scale, better in terms of protection, firepower and particularly mobility.
Mike, multi-role brigades are not obsolete, they are the bread and butter unit of any army. We were just focused on a very specific role which normal army units are not suited for, the quick response force. It’s a very specialized job, but that does not mean the brigades are useless, they will be critical for any long war you get involved in where the QRF is too specialized.
If you are interested, you can see what the Koreans did with their Spike missiles, they mounted them on Land Rovers and use them as counter-battery units. There should be some pictures on the net.
@Chris
Well, that sounds like a pretty comprehensive list to me.
Particularly attractive for me is the tracked vehicle which starts at “CVR(T) scale at minimum” and is “20% bigger for the heavier versions.” That sounds just like the kind of vehicle we need to accompany our rapid reaction forces. The FRES SV is going to be too heavy to be transported easily.
With the improvement over the CVR(T) in terms of protection, firepower and particularly mobility, it (or “they” with variants) sounds just the ticket. Hope you are successful.
@Observer
Many thanks for the information concerning multi-role brigades. The problem for me is that the term “multi-role brigades” is a very fluid one, meaning different things to different users. I even heard Philip Hammond, admittedly sotto voce at the end of an interview, describe our planned Reaction Forces as “multi-role”. Well, the Air Assault Brigade is, but the Armoured Infantry Brigades certainly do not appear to be so at the moment. They seem to consist of tanks, reconnaissance regiments, armoured infantry and heavy protected mobility battalions, with some logistic support designated and that’s about it: mostly heavy armour. Rather a different concept from the one planned four of five years ago when the British Army was to consist of five Multi-Role Brigades plus 16 Air Assault Brigade.
Those Spike missiles on LRs you mentioned. Would they be the longer-range version, the one we shall be calling Exactor in British service?
Mike W – thanks for the support. The designs are fairly innovative – they don’t follow the herd of light armour designs – but the technology is here & now stuff. Low(ish) risk, high gain; what’s not to like?
Yes, those are Exactors or to be precise Spike NLOS.
While comparing air transport efficiency, remember that I mentioned that you can ship in 300 (+ actually closer to 350) men in a single plane while you can only ship in 4-5 “tankettes” (sorry Chris :) ). That means in terms of efficiency, a single light tank needs to be able to do the job of 60 men, something I don’t see possible. The only reason I even include light strikes is for the mobility, reach and firepower to counter the inevitable hostile artillery.
Obs – sitting on the outside looking in (never having been in the forces), the perception I gained was that the most successful engagements have been those defined as “combined arms”? Amiens 1918 being a sound example, where the Australian & Canadian infantry advanced with hundreds of British tanks (both Rhomboids and the faster Whippets) supported by over 1000 artillery pieces (that first used precision strike against German guns and then provided a well regulated rolling barrage) and massed RAF close air support. Prior to the off, total secrecy had been maintained, so there were no readiness measures adopted by the German forces, and the attack slammed into them with such force that there was no chance of effective resistance or counter, hence Ludendorff’s statement that it was the blackest day for the German army. Had Rawlinson decided just to use infantry after a few hours artillery bombardment, the outcome would most likely have been similar to the start of the Somme offensive. Combined arms, it seems, eradicates the opposition’s options to find and exploit weak points in your forces?
So with that observation Obs (pun!) it seems right to consider a mixed force of infantry, AH and vehicles (possibly light guns too) if the intent is to deploy rapidly to quell or at least slow aggressor forces – no? So air transportable combat assets would seem sensible.
Chris, the time needed to ship in thousands of guns and hundreds of tanks does not in any form or function lend itself to the term “rapid”. You got a choice. Rapid or heavy. Any denial of the need to choose is simply wishful thinking and trying to have your cake and eat it at the same time.
If this was WWIII, the combined arms brigade would be the unit that would carry most of the burden, as I already mentioned to Mike. As part of a force to deter an aggressor from “Allied country X”, I fear it would be months too late to deter anything.
You can wish for CR2s. Will you get it in time? Not likely. You’re a rapid reaction force, you work with what you can get, not what you wish for. And for better or worse, the easiest and most effective thing you can fly in are men. This leaves you vulnerable to indirect fire though, hence the need for some form of light counterbattery unit.
Obs – you didn’t quite get my point I think – what I was suggesting is there is value in (to use your term) tankettes, similarly light AH and Light Guns to augment your rapid reaction infantry and give it a degree of multi-faceted combined arms form? So not Challengers one per C-17, but perhaps a few reasonably protected, reasonably punchy vehicles to do stuff the infantry alone might do with far less efficiency or effectiveness? As I suggested a few days back I see such forces as, if you like, a stop-gap measure to hold the fort just long enough for the big boys to deploy by rail or sea. Without the ability to insert some credible level of resistance early on, as you say by the time the heavyware gets to the fight its probably too late.
@Chris
Your proposal is to provide sufficient armour to a weapons system ( as well as transport , be it troops or supplies ) to suppress or even destroy other light infantry’s support weapons such as machine gun ‘nests’ etc. Nowadays light infantry has a multitude of light anti-armour weapons at its disposals which you propose to counter with the equal multitude of point defence systems. So rather a tommy running forward with a couple of handfuls of grenade’s the NCO asks for heavy cannon from the light armour a klick to the east ( west …) to f**k em up and on we trot. The light armour can tote one of the multitude of anti- aircraft missiles system to rather than bogging down a a whole squad per company to deal with a stray helo or fixed wing . Yes under sustained attack it will die but it brings a lot more to the party than an OPFOR may be set up to sea with . A rapid dash forward to lash up a retreating force or flank an over extended penetration on a broken front.
More headaches for OPFOR commanders the better at little initial and logistical cost to us.
monkey – I think that outlines well the value of lighter combat armour that can scamper about biting the ankles of opposition forces. As you say it wouldn’t be a match for concerted heavy opposition but would apply some fast moving muscle to what would otherwise be a force that could move at walking/running pace at best.
On our side things are almost clear, there will be different equipment for each situations.
Two deployable Division HQs will command the brigades, three each :
– Two armoured brigades equipped with Leclerc, VBCI, MRLS for real wars.
– Two medium brigades equipped with Jaguar (25 tonnes), Griffon (20 tonnes), Caesar (18 tonnes) for walks in Africa.
– Two specialized light brigades:
– A paratrooper brigade.
– A mountain brigade.
So in the case of two light brigades regarding the equipment we are in the fuzzy. We already know that the mountain brigade will be equipped with Vikings, Caesar, Griffon, snowmobiles and perhaps CRAB, to replace Sagaies.
For the paratrooper brigade, it is worse, we know nothing, except that it will be equipped with 4×4 vehicles, surely Sherpa or Bastion, Caesar, and perhaps CRAB, to replace Sagaies.
In fact we don’t know what will replace Sagaies (100 units), there will not enough Jaguar for everyone (248 units), so there will probably a lot of CRAB, to fill the holes.
One Airmobile Brigade is to be formed to bring all helicopter regiments under a unified command. This airmobile brigade will not have organic ground units, but will provide airmobility to the infantry of the line brigades.
@Chris
At the vast majority of our potential OPFOR , the vehicle’s in your stable of designs seem by the way you describe them what we should off had before all the multi Billion pound UOR’s for the sandbox wars and no doubt very much predate them, the lessons on IED/mines from Rhodesia/Namibia/Angola/Sri Lanka/Central America/Israel-Palestine/…..etc etc and the need to provide protection up to and including HMG fire not lost on someone from the armour design industry! We cannot afford to equip all our infantry with heavy Namer style armour. One due to cost , two because it would never get where its needed before the conflict cusp point was past and we would be forever Jonny come lately’s doing the heavy, expensive long term slogging .
monkey – indeed the concepts were forming in my mind as long ago as 1990. Its tough always being right, you know (insert smiley face here)
Chris, might I suggest that your deterant force seems a bit too gung-ho? :)
While a good defence might be a good offensive, sometimes you can’t take action as a deterant force. Basically, you cannot attack another country, your army does not have the authority to start a war, only to defend.
Part of my point against armour is that like monkey said, if you can call in fire from one km away or in the case of Exactors 20 km away, then is there a need to turn your support vehicle into a tank lookalike if the enemy isn’t even going to be able to see it, much less shoot at it? This is a lot safer than a CVR(T) remake as infantry these days come with a fair bit of anti-armour capability, with 2 men out of a squad carrying LAWs. A light tank is not going to be able to face them down without a fair bit of risk. Tank weight is climbing to meet these kind of threats, which unfortunately also drives armour out of the “easily transportable” range. Add the increased support tracked vehicles need to function properly and the things you need to bring gets more and more. Sometimes you just have to keep it simple. Indirect fire systems on land rovers. Can’t get cleaner than that.
@Chris and Observer
Observer, normally I would not have the temerity to disagree with you, as your posts are not only very lucid but carry a quiet authority, probably born out of your military service (recent and still continuing?)
However here goes. You see, I wonder why, when 16 AA Bde was formed some years ago, one element in its order of battle was a squadron of light armour (D Squadron, HCR from Windsor). Did it have no purpose at all? It seems to have disappeared from the Brigade’s orbat but I’m pretty sure a lack of purpose was not the reason for that – more like another salami slice of defence cuts.
Now it would strike me that the Air Assault Brigade had a multiplicity of uses for such a vehicle: reconnaissance, infantry close support , escort, troop carrying (if a vehicle like Spartan were included), command, etc. etc. That family of vehicles was fast, agile, mobile and had pretty good communications and viewing equipment (expect a noisy barrage from RT at this point). It would not take much to add a counter-battery or an anti-tank capability if a version like the old Striker were fitted with something like the Spike missiles you say were fitted to LRs by the Koreans.
You see, I do not agree with your premise that “You got a choice. Rapid or heavy. Any denial of the need to choose is simply wishful thinking and trying to have your cake and eat it at the same time.”
In this instance, Chris’s “a few reasonably protected, reasonably punchy vehicles to do stuff the infantry alone might do with far less efficiency or effectiveness?” to me makes far more sense. I really did not wish to mention Arnhem but isn’t there a risk of such debacle without some more protection? As he says, “Without the ability to insert some credible level of resistance early on, as you say by the time the heavyware gets to the fight it’s probably too late.” I’m probably talking garbage, but still.
I don’t think we should get hung up on the term multi-role brigade. All brigades in whatever shape can carry out a very large variety of roles with or without its usual organic units. And with a longer lead in time can be turned into a completely different brigade. Army formations are very flexible and changeable. Doesn’t take long to convert even a light brigade into a medium or heavy brigade if you have the kit and the institutional knowledge and experience.
@Observer
If I am reading your comments right you seem to be advocating a purely light unit of infantry with very little mobility once on the ground. Our current doctrine states that our rapid reaction units will be used for expeditionary ops encompassing the full spectrum of military tasks including non combative evacuations and HADR up to medium intensity ops. Our 16AAB derives it’s mobility from the support helicopters within the formation but without an adequate maneuver capability to extend the perimeter outside of indirect fire range to allow the SH to be flown in and operated it’s as good as a purely defensive formation which can be out maneuvered by a fairly competent and moderately equipped enemy.
Even if we just focus on the non combatant and HADR task the formation is woefully equipped to provide any form genuine assistance outside of a very small capacity to provide logistical movement. A formation built around lightweight vehicles such as Foxhound, Jackal and Panther etc provides a force with a greater capacity to operate in all the tasks stated above.
We could airlift a light mechanised battlegroup now with the equipment and transport we have which would be much more useful than a battlegroup which is more limited in both mobility and equipment which has to be carried.
@Phil
The US Global Response Force has a fairly largish contingent of armour for an airborne unit, but considering that this formation ids their forced entry formation and that once the airfield has been seized they would emmediately being flying in a Stryker brigade which can be airlifted into the AO in 4 days (so a battle group a day basically) just using C130’s (although I don’t know about now with the up armouring) I would argue the US has a very sizable deployable mechanised element at it’s disposal. It is basically the same doctrine as our original FRES project.
‘Doesn’t take long to convert even a light brigade into a medium or heavy brigade if you have the kit and the institutional knowledge and experience.’
It takes a long time to turn light units into effective medium or heavy formations the style of fighting is different and a lot more fluid once you become mobile. It’s easier go to a light role which is in essence what everyone is taught in basic training than to transition entire formations to a mechanised role.
@DN
I’m speaking relatively. You can turn a light brigade into a heavy brigade within a training cycle – especially if you leaven the units with experienced cadres taken from another heavy brigade (one of the reason to keep a few heavy brigades). I’m not saying its a job of a few weeks but more than achievable within a 12 month PDT cycle.
@Phil
I think turning a light brigade into a heavy brigade within a 12 month PDT cycle would be hard to do TBH, in reality you would probably need to add another 6 months to the time scale. If you consider that the heavy brigades take about a year to work up to being operationally effective within the training cycle ie working up to the culmination of BATUS, with this being done with say 80% of the formation having experience with say 10% being in differing roles due to promotions from the last cycle etc and say another 10% being posted in from light units and from training regs.
It can definitely be done but I think it would take a bit longer.
Mike, how do you ship your armour in? I’m not saying that armour is useless, I’m attached to an armour unit myself. The problem is that there are limitations to armour, in this case, time, weight and space (lane meters). If you can ship it in, go right on ahead, light infantry can use all the support you can give them. The question is not the usefulness of the armour, but “Is this the most effective (defensive) unit I can fly in with limited time and lift capability?”. 300 men can give a lot more effect than 5 light tanks and are better suited to dispersal for defending an area.
DN, I did recommend a squadron of light strikes or light vehicles.
http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-th9VgQfDi7g/Twbfv4u9EJI/AAAAAAAAA6U/rTIY-KwvqO4/s1600/Wallaby+Unload+Dec+2011+blog.JPG
These go by ship.
http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-VKoaMnGn1vk/Twbhh0MDK2I/AAAAAAAAA60/eKNJa4gZoEk/s1600/IMG_9255.jpg
Say “AH…”
Yanks could raise an armoured division in around a year in WWII. I think it could be done easily. Provided you had the kit to do it.
But you know yourself their is difference between a unit and an effective unit. The allies in WW2 learned a lot by fighting and dying, we cannot afford to do that now with the size of our forces.
Observer,
300 men may be able to defend well*, but their mobility is very low. Should they need to relocate then they will need something to give them mobility. One machine gun can fix a battalion in place for a short time. Several machine guns can stop an infantry advance dead in its tracks, making it vulnerable to artillery. It might be easier for infantry to deal with machine gun nests these days, given the proliferation of light, guided weapons. Still, something that is bullet proof that can carry heavy weapons and sensors has to be able to make a difference.
*very well indeed, should they have advantageous geography. But still they are fixed in place and vulnerable to being outflanked.
‘DN, I did recommend a squadron of light strikes or light vehicles.’
But for what purpose if your infantry are in essence static? what size area of ground can you dominate with foot patrols? How can you fly in and operate apache etc if you are within range of indirect weapons? How do you move from the airfield to the required position? what if you need to move and maneuver?
Jackal, Panther, Foxhound and Viking are all transportable by aircraft and can be underslung by Chinook, Husky is transportable by C130.
Depends on the fight doesn’t it. Sometimes fighting well enough is all you need. As heretical as that is in this time of relative peace and honey. But I think my original point still stands – army units are inherently flexible. Perhaps the most complex transition – from light to heavy – doesn’t need to take a huge time. And we’ve certainly shown we can create brigades from disparate units in 12-8 months.
But would’nt fighting well enough be classed as effective? I don’t think the experience of the subsequent Telic and Herrick deployments are an indication of transitioning units from light to heavy as for the most part a lot of the units were previously mech or heavy and it was a non maneuver fight in the conventional sense and a learning curve for all units involved. I doubt you could quickly transition a light brigade into a heavy brigade capable of conducting the sort of maneuver operation that took place during the initial invasion Iraq in 2003.
I’m agree with Mike W
If I may be allowed, a median brigade, and even a light brigade must have some firepower and protection. The Jaguar which is currently under development for our median brigades has two anti tank missiles in addition to its 40mm gun and a high level of protection against IED . You send men to death with Foxhound and Jackals. Our light brigades will possess the CRAB or other combat vehicle that will replace the Sagaie, in addition to Caesar pieces of artillery and supports Tigre helicopters,
You need a median family vehicles, which I hope will be delivered to the British Army, the famous FRES UV that would make me happy to see. I have a preference for the SuperAV which is amphibious and is available in 6×6 and 8×8, which would give you a wide range of use.
@Frenchie
‘You send men to death with Foxhound’
I wouldn’t go that far, don’t forget it’s for use by our light infantry and has a good level of protection against IED’s. What vehicle do your light units use for transport? We do need FRES UV though.
Yeah I agree. HERRCK especially saw units go both ways. Light brigades became more medium in nature, heavy brigades lighter. But as I say, that’s my point. A peacetime ORBAT is not a straight jacket.
I think the trouble is equating the last decades COIN ops with the ability to transition entire brigades between roles. During Op Banner heavy units from Germany constantly formed part of the rolement units involved in the operation and then came back to fulfill their original heavy role, and vice versa light units such as the Marines and Paras etc who went back to being light role formations. It is the very nature of COIN and stability operations that allow such transitions as it requires no real maneuver warfare to take place and is in essence a seize and hold followed by political transition exercise. This can be accomplished with the use of basic soldiering coupled with a degree of specialist theater specific training. Maneuver warfare however can only be accomplished by ‘training as you mean to fight’ and as such the skills (especially in the upper echelons of command) required are not easily transferred and require constant practice.
On Herrick the maneuver warfare on a day to day basis was hardly (unless a deliberate op was ongoing) present and the role was one of presence paroling to gather humint and deter for the most part.
Not sure I agree. BGs and Coys moved about the Helmand AO throughout 2009-2012. Through NDA, NES(S) and NES(N) along with Lash (I can’t remember the name of the AO).
Op PANTHER CLAW being an example of medium units engaging in manoeuvre despite being generated from a light brigade. Now I admit that’s not fighting 3rd Shock Army as such but I’ll refer back to my original argument that the US could raise a regiment in 6 months and a division in 12 in WWII,
mr fred, I do agree that there is a risk of being fixed in place, but think of it this way, a single aircraft load can bring in 3 rifle *companies* plus the HQ and support COY, not sections/squads. If a company gets flanked, there are 2 others to back it up for defence in depth. If the plane was used to ship in 5 light tanks, you can’t cover enough area with them without a serious dispersal problem *and* you didn’t bring in a HQ for coordination too. Light/medium tanks are also vulnerable to being pinned in place, despite their general bulletproof nature, a single rifle company comes with 9 sections/squads for a total of 18 LAWs.
DN
“Jackal, Panther, Foxhound and Viking are all transportable by aircraft and can be underslung by Chinook, Husky is transportable by C130.”
So how many aircraft do you have for tasking? Go check it up. That is the problem, limited lift. If you had 60 C-5s, you can even “rapid response” your CR2s. But you don’t. Don’t get seduced by the “high spec” units. If you can’t ship it in time, then it is no different from not having it at all. Despite the lack of mobility, infantry is still the most value for money unit in any army. And the role of infantry is not “run around looking for trouble” but “dig, dig, dig”. In a deterrence mission, your job is not to do foot patrols, you’re not doing COIN, your job is what is now called “POI” or Protection of Installations where you literally bunker down and set up fields of fire.
And I do have to wonder why are people talking about a general advance in a deterrence mission. Your job is not to attack in the face of overwhelming odds and equipment disparity, your job is to delay, harass and stall the enemy if he were to attack, not to counter-invade. Leave that job to the heavy units coming in.
I keep getting the feeling that people are massively overestimating their airlift capability.
Obs – I hope I’m not overestimating, and that we might be able to scrape together more than a couple of C-17s or a handful of A400M if we were essentially going to be on the verge of a war footing (assuming as I have the rapid reaction force is the stop-gap resistance against an aggressor used until the heavyware arrives by sea/rail/road). So I think there would be value in adding a couple of C-17s of high mobility wagons (mix of personnel carriers and punchy combat vehicles) to your first aircraft full of 300 infantry. Although I think it more likely that would be aircraft 2 3 & 4, with the first aircraft slipping in SF to do what they do best. But hey – I only think about this stuff, you do it, so I’m not really in a position to argue. Presumably each nation applies a different balance to tactics and strategies of war fighting anyway.
@Observer
Back of the fag packet calculation with our current fleet of C130 and C17 I would say we could manage to airlift in about 76 vehicles of Foxhound,Jackal and Panther types in the first lift. Based on an assumption of a 75% availability of the current fleet that would be available at short notice (although the rapid response force is at 24hrs notice to move and not to be in specific part of the world within 24hrs). This based on 2 veh per C130 of which 17 would be available and 6 veh per c17 of which 7 would be available. This would provide a mechanised battle group numbering 400 – 450 ish a day capable of immediately moving forward to defensive positions 100’s Km from the airfield rather than sitting in hangars waiting for someone from the foreign office to write a cheque out to local coach and transport companies.
‘In a deterrence mission, your job is not to do foot patrols’
Yes it is, even in a defensive position you send out standing patrols for various reasons. You don’t just sit there and wait for the opposition to come into the view of the nearest position, you will have constant patrols ahead of your defensive positions. And even more so in a deterrent role as you need to be seen to be there to have the desired deterrent effect.
‘And I do have to wonder why are people talking about a general advance in a deterrence mission.’
Who is talking about a general advance? You need to understand the roles that our Air Assault Task Force (AATF) and 16AAB as a whole are tasked with to understand the need for some mobility. Even as you state that your job would be to harass the enemy, how can this be accomplished effectively if your only means of manoeuvre is ‘shank’s pony’?
I’m not going to agree that operations in Helmand are examples of manoeuvre warfare we employ on occasions such as Op Granby and the initial stages of Telic. Kosovo would probably be more of a similar operation to Herrick in terms of UK experience.
I think an example from WW2 we should consider to base the time it takes from raising effective formations is the time it took the UK to develop effective heavy and medium formations to effectively counter the German’s from the remnants of Dunkirk.
Well DN, if you can, good for you. Think your availability numbers and capacity per plane may be on the high side though. And don’t forget to deduct ammo, fuel, spare parts and food.
“someone from the foreign office to write a cheque out to local coach and transport companies.”
I see you’re familiar with our deployment SOP. :)
As for foot patrols, I would advise against it. On foot, the ability to get back if there was an offensive is very low, you’re just dispersing your units to be isolated. And more importantly, what could you pick up from a foot patrol? Scout OPs are the way to go about this. Find an OP with a good field of vision, bunker down and feed info back. Hostiles appear, go to ground, play dead. Foot patrols are used to catch infiltrators, rebels and people planting IEDs, not against an army that might be rolling over you soon. Static OP is a better option for that scenario. Easier for you to catch their scouts too if you are dug in while he has to move.
Observer,
As ever, I would point out that the question is not “this unit vs that unit”, it’s a combined arms question.
You could ship in loads and loads of infantry, but infantry on its own suffers some serious drawbacks. So you start shipping in other things. Artillery for one. If you don’t want to lose that in short order to counter-battery fire you make it mobile, so you need tractor vehicles. You could tie up your infantry with logistics tasks, or you could ship in some material handling vehicles. When it’s one flight out of many, a troop of light tanks/weapons carriers gives you another capability with your airborne force. A battery of artillery gives you some reach.
You are right that an all-mechanised force is folly for a airborne unit, but I would contend that an all-infantry force would also be limited, just in different ways.
Forgot about poor Chris.
Chris, it actually all depends on the available lift. If DN has his sums correct (which I am not so sure), I would happily give my blessing to all the added armour and mobility vehicles you can ship over there. I’m just not sure if you simply have all the hauling capability that would need. If you had an aircraft fleet like the US, I won’t even bother with LSVs and light vehicles. Bradleys, MBTs, M-777s and HIMARs. Or Strykers as Phil reminded us that they use. People assume I have a problem with the vehicles. I don’t. I have a worry about the hauling capacity of available aircraft.
mr.fred – exactly my thinking.
Obs – poor Chris? Indeed I am poor as a church mouse – I might even have to think of selling some of the Rembrandts… As I see it, its a balance game. Clearly the UK does not have the air bridge capability of the USAF (used to be MAC and TAC if I remember right) so the space on transport flights – lane metres I think you said – is a serious consideration. For the rapid reaction – um – reaction that we have been exploring it seems to me the right thing to do is to get both protected mobility and mobile firepower to the fight quickly in support of infantry. And at such a crucial rapidly evolving stage of conflict, for surely things evolve quickest at the start of operations, I suggest absolute platform capability is less of a winning factor than numbers. Better (in terms of military effect) to send a larger number of highly mobile lighter platforms than fewer heavier vehicles. This of course is predicated upon the notion that early defence is vital and casualties must be expected if far worse is to be prevented from happening at a later stage. As you say if air transport capacity was vast then delivering useful numbers of FRES type vehicles would be possible, but consider to lift four Scout-SV by air requires five A400M flights plus a lot of spanner-work rehanging appliqué armour on arrival, where it would take two A400M to deliver the same number of my vehicles. Its all a case of best effect for the given resources.
@DavidNiven
Currently we have our VAB to transport troops, even for light brigades nobody walking, if you want to know everything, an infantry regiment of the 11th parachute brigade has 180 vehicles such as VBL (level 1 protection) PVP (level 2 of protection), and 80 VAB (level 4 protection), the last were modernized, making them much more protected with armour plates over the entire surface. Its angular shape is an advantage because, bullets and rockets can ricochet above.
Besides the shape of the amphibious hull, the relatively light weight and armour upgrade gives it strong resistance of VAB against mines. When exposed to an explosion from below, the VAB tends to be lifted into the air, allowing the force of the explosion to disperse away from the vehicle. So the shape of the hull and wheel position deflects the shock wave, helping to maintain the integrity of the hull. I’m not saying that it is indestructible, but we do not need huge vehicles to our missions, btw there are few cases of total destruction of a VAB with the dead of the troops.
Here is the equipment of a light infantry regiment with anything other than 8×8 over 30 tonnes that are not air transportable, or otherwise in dribs and drabs and does not constitute an rapid reaction force.
mr fred, what is the ratio that you want to mechanize your infantry? On what vehicle? And how many vehicles in total and planes are we talking about for a one shot lift? What are the numbers like?