This is a repost of something I posted ages ago, thought it might be worthwhile to dust it off again
In a number of posts the comments have stimulated a vigorous debate about the relative merits of naval and commercial shipbuilding techniques.
HMS Ocean is the poster child of those that say commercial shipbuilding rules are wholly unsuitable for naval vessels but I think the problems with Ocean were more to do with poor design and construction, rather than any inherent fault with commercial ship building standards.
We tend to think that commercial standards create weak ships, lacking in durability but this is simply not the case. Offshore platform supply vessels operate in some of the worst weather anywhere in the world, commercial ships are driven by commercial reality, generally spend a much greater proportion of their lives actually at sea and safety standards for large crude carriers or cruise ships are such that a knock or two is not going to sink them, flimsy they are not.
But there is much more to naval shipbuilding than sturdiness and the paper below should provide some background reading.
[scribd id=42621845 key=key-1c0v5s5l65ieu3snrt1q mode=list]
@Simon – What no casino? I believe off shore gambling is very lucrative these days. You’re never short of a toilet on a flat-top. Privacy, yes.
@ Simon
I was going to ramble on and on. But I don’t feel like it. If the thread is going tomorrow or the day after I will have a ramble. Um. Basically flight decks are important. Having a big fast flight deck is quite a capability. I will ramble on perhaps tomorrow. :)
NaB,
So does this mean that if I stump up the cash Lusty is worth buying and will float around for a while longer (without engines, systems or heads/toilets) ;-)
I’m going to put forward the idea of a 9 hole pitch and putt on the flight deck, a restaraunt and shopping arcade in the hangar and a hotel below that!
x,
We can afford 1/10th of the US levels… I make that 1 x Nimitz or two half-sized ones ;-)
The trouble is we dither around just like the Americans but have fewer hulls to write off the MoD’s ineptitudes over. So, we end up spending £6b (similar to a Nimitz) on two ships, half the size, but with only STOVL jets and not nuclear powered.
We should have two slightly larger Charles-de-Gaulle, or four Cavour (silly) or four Wasp for the same money.
Again, don’t confuse commercial standards with being “built on the cheap”. Lloyds Rules (for commercial or naval ships) basically apply what could be thought of as an “average” load (although it isn’t) throughout the ship, rather than design each detail to the actual load. What that tends to result in is a slightly heavier structure, largely because the plate is thicker and carries more load than the grillage structure that you get in “classical” naval standards, where everything is optimised to reduce weight. For a “large” ship, the structural weight fraction is less important. So, no, LPH was not designed (or built) to the same spec as CVS – the point is that the hull isn’t really near any edge of the envelope, so compared to the comedy systems, it’s the least of your problems…….
@ Simon
Um. I think it depends on how you see the RN’s place viz-a-vis our other security partners, or potential partners; roughly the US, France (Europe?), and Australia and New Zealand (bi-lateral and Five Power). And the UK’s ability to field carrier air groups, both ships and FJ; we can’t afford to do this at a USN level. And whether the future really is strike alone or whether sea control or naval tasks will come to be just as, or more, important.
When I said auxiliary I am using it in its dictionary sense and not naval or maritime security sense. The Invincibles were designed to support and help USN CBG by carrying a large number of ASW helicopters. By being larger and fast CVF will be able to support allied operations to an even greater extent.
“CVF needs to be much more than just an “auxiliary flight deck” simply because they’ve cost so much.” – Spilt milk, Simon. They’ve cost what they have because they were intended to be strike carriers, plus politically induced delays and redesigns.
@Challenger – 40 (36 F35s and 4 helos) is the surge figure. The day we actually see 36 fast jets on CVF, which aren’t covered in stars and stripes, is the day I eat fish.
Can I just clarify, when people talk about CVF covering Ocean’s LPH role, do you mean troop carrying, or just as a helo platform?
@Challenger – “Back on the subject of carriers once again, never takes long!” – That reminds me, all those armoured vehicles coming back from ‘stan which we don’t need anymore, that amounts to a lot of steel. Shame to let it go to waste! And then there’s all those Tornadoes to break up.
Early requirement was for 50 aircraft – including helos – quickly cut to 46, then settled at 40, with 36 F35s and 4 helos. That’s the “The sh*ts hit the fan” surge figure. I wouldn’t want to park my £130+ million aircraft on the deck in the Atlantic on a regular basis. I’ve just realised I don’t actually know how many aircraft CVF can hold in the hangar. Can anyone help with that?
x,
CVF needs to be much more than just an “auxiliary flight deck” simply because they’ve cost so much.
At £2b they’d still have been a rip-off when compared to Wasp if not used for more intensive jet ops.
At £3b they absolutely need to be more than two Cavour in one. That’s two squadrons of jets and a couple of dozen Merlin… plus. Otherwise the rationale for them was completely wrong!
Anyway back to the topic.
NaB said something about Ocean being able to go the distance as long as the systems don’t deteriorate too much. Does that mean that Ocean was built to the same spec as Vince/Lusty/Ark in terms of the hull?
I was under the impression even the hull was built on the cheap?
If we push Ocean another 10 years (to 2030+) we’ll have QE, POW and Ocean, two available, one as CVF and another as LPH – that way we’re still okay.
I’d suggest QE can operate 24 jets and 24 Merlin. You can swap any two Merlin for one Chinook and one Lynx. So play with the numbers.
Quality info – great stuff!
So if we had a time machine and a bit more money, and wanted to fix Ocean’s throughlife problems up front, how much extra should she have cost? Would the extra £60M of the competing contract have been enough, with hindsight?
As a rule of thumb, does taking the sticker price of absolutely pared down cost and x 1.33 sound about right (assuming that you also pay attention to detail/specific requirements etc)?
Back on the subject of carriers once again, never takes long!
I do have a question relevant to them though. The talk is always of 40 aircraft, but could more be carried in an emergency situation?
I seem to remember talk of more being stuffed on-to the deck and in-to the hangar for in a crises? I doubt we will ever have enough aircraft to reach the maximum load, but theoretically, any thoughts?
@ NAB said “deliver Fleet AD and strike”
True, true. But I try not to think as MoD(N). The only way I can see us deriving value from CVF is stop pretending it is a mini-Nimitz and look at more as a few acres of auxiliary flight deck for “coalition” efforts. Somewhere where say the USMC can offload their STOVL squadrons freeing their amphib decks for helicopters. Or purely as a “fleet” helicopter carrier servicing Chinook/MV22 down. I have said here lots of times there is a possibility CVF will carry its full compliment of F35b, just they won’t be all ours. If CVF for domestic deployments sails with 12 F35b, 12 Merlin, ASaC, and a clutch of Wildcat it still more than most nations can carry. Seeing CVF purely in terms of US fleet carrier type operations is to miss alot of the value of the platform. Unfortunately the latter is all the detractors see. So yes you are right. I was just having a gentle game of fantasy fleets. :)
@NAB
I agree that against a credible enemy one QEC won’t be able to do it all.
In a serious duffy I would expect us to have to send both QEC: one to sit over the horizon and provide Air Security with JSF and the other closer in with the Amphibs to host all the rotary needed to deliver, supply, transport and support the landing force.
Against third rate powers who simply need a bit ginger up them a single QEC packing 12 Fast Jets and a tailored mix of Apache, Lynx, Merlin, Chinook etc will probably work just fine.
That was the context of my remark about QEC being Ocean’s replacement.
X
Dock slots, LIMS and berths are all very well – agree we need those, but without the ability to do the aviation bit (ie load the chalks and deliver them in an integrated fashion) and just as importantly, service the birds, we will not have a credible amphibious capability. QEC will not be able to do that and deliver Fleet AD and strike, which is why CEPP is such a half-baked idea. EDPI (which would really open up the offload capability) appears to have died a death as well.
PE
As far as I’m aware, there is NO endorsed requirement for a Fast Landing Craft, be it PACSCAT or anything else.
Royal is finding out that there’s more to high-speed operations than just jamming the throttle open and going “Raaaah!”. It costs money, in design, in build, in training and qualification, in fuel – money that might not be there at the minute.
The Australians may have one going cheap. Just needs a little work on the drive train…
We need another Bay then we could base a reinforced company and helicopters in CVF. And a have follow on reinforcement group of 1 x Albion and 2 x Bays.
Its not just about the ship hulls either. Replacing LCU 10 with PASCAT will be a big step forward and one that we might even be able to afford before 2020.
The point is that by using faster landing craft it will allow the ARG to sit further off shore, making it safer to include a big ship like a QEC amongst them.
FWIW I think it is already a done deal that Ocean’s replacement is sitting in No 1 Dry Dock at Rosyth, and as suggested by others the RN’s next specialist amphibious warship will have to wait until after Albion and Bulwak wear out after 2030.
Its docks and cargo capacity we need not substantial aviation facilities. Um. I think too many concentrate on the aviation aspect of amphibious warfare and neglect the more mundane seaborne systems. An LPD25-esque ship would probably service us better as a companion to CVF.
EDIT: with a Harpers Ferry-esque variant of the LPD25-eque ship to help with lift. 3 of each should do. More ships! I said, MORE SHIPS! :)
I think the article is wrong, but then it is Wiki! Contracts tend to specify a minimum rather than absolute service life – if specified at all!
From memory, when first brought into service, she was programmed for 9 yrs operating followed by a single mid-life refit, then another 9 yrs before disposal.
Of course as soon as she was properly in-service (and yes she has been worked very hard) it became clear that this approach wasn’t going to work and her docking periods since have turned into proper refits.
Unlike aircraft (or boats) there is no hard and fast life-limiter for a ship. Fatigue should not be an issue for a ship with the amount of longitudinal structure she has and global strength should not be a problem either, provided that in-service surveys identify and replace any plate below the required minium thickness. I haven’t seen her stability assesment recently, which is the one certification piece that it isn’t easy to fix, but wouldn’t anticipate too many problems. In essence, certification issues (the equivalent to airworthiness) is unlikely to require withdrawal of the ship in the medium term.
What is likely to force withdrawal is escalating cost of maintaining her on-board systems. Switchboards, some hydraulically powered ME equipment, main generators and on-board piping systems have all caused trouble in the past and will still be doing so. There will come a point where appetite to spend vs availability collapses. Trouble is, unless you use the second QEC deck you’re then into looking at how to replace in the context of the wider amphibious fleet again and the LPDs have a much longer potential life, leaving LPH out on her little lonesome. Not easy this one…..
It’s service life in that article is 20 years but will go beyond that. Has it been extended because of a need or through it’s refits found to be good to extend it’s life? Or is the article wrong?
Swan Hunter.
Which were the other yard that tended for the contract?
It’s a shipbuilding thing. One yard tendered what was in effect a military ship with some commercial features, the other tendered a design with some military features (eg assault routes) but primarily commercial equipment. The difference in price was around £60M.
The commercial equipment was inappropriate to the intended use of the ship and as noted above, some of the detail design and logistic support was woeful. Still, pay peanuts, get Monkeys.
That said, the MoD should have paid much more attention to what it thought it was buying…..
@ NaB
What was wrong the builders of Ocean, where did they fall short?
Gary Google is your friend….
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmhansrd/cm081106/text/81106w0011.htm
If it’s changed since then it’ll be classified.
When’s Ocean due to go out of service now?
Agreed, had meant to add your bit on assault route dimensioning and vertical access routes did reflect a lot of the lessons learned from Albion, Rusty B and Hermes, plus the old LPDs. Shame it went to a bunch of monkeys rather than a proper shipyard…….
Thanks NAB.
EDIT: As I said it is a shame because she has been so busy and some parts of the design work well.
There seems to be an awful lot of confusion here on what constitutes “Naval” and “Commercial” standards. This is also being mixed up with poor requirementeering, for which as SI rightly points out, the most important thing is to ” Know what it is you are asking for!!”.
When Ocean was contracted for (1993 – remember it well), there was basically a choice between Naval Standards (SSCP23 for constructive design, NES 154/155 for build and inspection, various other NES for machinery, outfit, magazines etc etc) and “commercial” Rules (eg Lloyds Register Rules & Regulations for Commercial Ships). For a variety of reasons, VSEL/Kvaerner went with LR for the design of the hull structure and probably the main machinery. Other items of equipment were specified against what was believed to be the “appropriate” standard. The problem being that there was very little input from MoD/the user to confirm this was the case, the classic case in point being the LCVP davits. The davits were perfectly normal davits such as you would find with lifeboats dangling off them on commercial ships. Perfectly fit for that purpose, which basically involves a proof test for MCA once a year where you demonstrate that the davit can lower the boat. Not so good for the sort of intensive use you get with Royal, where the davits are operated several times a day – in other words the duty cycle assumed for the requirement was totally inappropriate. Hence off Sierra Leone, three of the four LCVP points were unusable within hours of the op commencing.
Other elements of the ship are just poorly designed – the well-known 7 Golf heads issue is largely caused by there being no “fall” in the pipes coming off the heads where dozens of marines relieve themselves of three square meals a day. A problem exacerbated by the inability to fully isolate the sh1t treatment plants which are consequently often broken. This means that the Buffer has a “sh1t list” which really does mean that you’re in the sh1t if you get on it! The rest of the ship systems are similarly afflicted by lack of attention to detail or poor logistic support – be it training, manuals or spares. Many of the pumps are chinese with all sorts of different starter motors etc, largely because she was built with minimum build cost in mind (to win the contract), rather than through-life support.
Some of these lessons were learned in the LPD contract, although again, the systems design element exposed the difference in philosophy between the Navy and the regulatory regime required by SOLAS – particularly in how the Navy fights fires and what is expected of systems after a machinery space fire on a warship, compared to a commercial vessel.
The LPH and LPD experience led to MoD commissioning LR to create a set of Rules & Regulations for Naval Ships, commonly known as the Naval Ship rules. DNV and ABS have also produced their own versions. What these tend to do is allow the derivation of design criteria for a particular naval function which means if you chose the right Class notation, then the Rules will make you apply the correct loads and system requirements. There are a whole raft of “military” loads (blast, shock, whipping etc) that have been derived from Naval Eng standards and included in the Rules, which (like the commercial rules) are updated annually.
All future RN vessels from T45 onwards are being contracted against LR Naval Ship Rules – even the MARS tankers have a “tailored” set of Rules applied to reflect what they will be required to do, without totally constraining the ability to have them built outside the UK and access the cost savings arising from use of standard ranges of ME equipment etc. They call up DefStans only where required (eg RAS systems for which tehre are no direct comercial equivalents).
Most of the horror stories you hear regarding “commercial” standards arise from not understanding how the ship will be used in service and thus either selecting an inappopriate (or no) notation, or by taking a piece of commercial equipment that is type-rated to operate in a particular way and then operating it in a completely different regime. Some of them have nothing to do with “commercial standards” at all. The T23 are often said to be falling apart structurally, which is true to some degree, but it has nothing to do with their “part-commercial” framing system and everything to do with A) poor detail design in way of openings and deckhouse positions and B) the use of plate without any rolling margin applied in the build of the later batches. None of these problems are insurmountable, they just cost more money than one would like to spend.
Hope that brings a bit of clarity to the debate. “Commercial” standards (eg DNV Offshore Steel Ships, LR Special Service Craft Rules), are perfectly acceptable if they are appropriate for the operating and support regime that the ship will be subject to, with the correct notation requested / selected. The same applies to Naval Ship rules – if you choose theh right notation for what you’re doing, you’ll be fine. If you operate outside that notation, expect trouble……not least from your Platform Dutyholder.
@x
Appreciate the pointer, thanks.
QM2 hull is 10mm thick & designed for a 40 year fatigue life. Do we know how thick HMS Oceans hull is?
@ TOC
You need to look up SOLAS.
Quick one before bed, haven’t looked up the details to confirm, but my understanding with the Concordia style Civilian vs Military construction was a lack of watertight compartments adjoining the outer hull as per the Seydlitz lessons?
Is there much difference between the two anymore outside damage control? I suspect the two standards have converged with most off difference taken up in speed.
You’re absolutely right TD.
It’s perfectly possible to get a commercial ship that is built to good quality standards and lasts much longer than 20 years.
I guess the only logical conclusion to make is that HMS Ocean was built on the cheap, I mean a 20,000 ton ship for the price of a contemporary Frigate, you get what you pay for!
I think, as many other folks have advocated previously, that the best thing to do in the future is to replace Ocean, Albion and Bulwark with 2 larger LHD’S. Perhaps go down the commercial route, but with a slightly bigger budget and some more care taken to make sure we get ships that will last longer and work well alongside military standard vessels.
QM2 is gorgeous. You may speak of her as often as you like. Especially in boring threads about tanks and FJs. But her hull isn’t 50% thicker than usual. She is a liner designed to keep a schedule despite the weather. Because she is used as a cruise ship doesn’t mean she is a “cruise ship”. If Ocean had been built to the same standards she would have been as expensive as a typical American amphib. Ocean’s low cost came about because she is filled with low cost equipment.
I know I go on about the Queen Mary 2 liner, but why stop now? This is a commercial boat, but built with a hull 50% thicker than usual to cope with large Atlantic waves. Shame Ocean was not built with a hull that thick or we would have got an extra decade out of it. QM2 runs on diesels most of the time, but does have an RR turbine when it needs more oomph. Again a shame Ocean did not have that.
Albion and Bulwark are built to Llyods’ Fast Cargo rules.
SI,
“Because of all this, where OCEAN is required to be able to manoeuvre at low speeds in a restricted area to offload her boats and troops, the engines are not up to the job and are degrading rapidly.”
So she was poorly specced, or the requirements did not make clear that she would be required to manoeuvre in that way, not a failure of either the commercial design or manufacture but a failure of whoever developed the requirements and specification.
The Bays can of course do this task fantastically well, using technology that has existed in naval use since at least the 80s.
Hmmmm – so if Ocean had been built with a commercial dynamic positioning system (like those on many off shore work boats) she wouldn’t have had nearly as many problems?
If so, how much extra would she have cost?
Somewhatinvolved.
I think your last point is the crux of the matter.
For example: -Modern rigg support vessels are at the forefront of working under all conditions, turn in their own length, manouvering etc.
As are some larger types (Cruise ships etc) now – Azipods etc. Remember tugs cost money, and the more ship can do without them the better.
As you say get your spec rigth then ask people to design it.
BTW someone tried to tell me that the costa concordia showed commercial ships were no good.
Tear a hole that 160ft plus in the bottom of any ship and it’s probably going over (and subsiquently under). leaving aside Italian damage control practices- (tripping and falling into lifeboats etc).
The point I was making is that people equate
commercial rules = flimsy tat that falls apart when someone on the bridge has a loud fart
military rules = built in Scotland from gurders and lasts a lifetime
This does not seem to be true and it is more about GOOD DESIGN rather than military or civilian design codes
So, as the article suggests, you can get effective military vessels by using the civilian codes but it is not automatic and neither trump sensible design against sensible requirements
That is what I don’t get about Ocean.
A lot of commercial ships, including some very complicated and supposedly safety critical; spend far more time at sea actualy working; and in conditions the Navy tries to avoid. The owners of the container ships that literally spend their lives at sea circling the globe, would laugh their socks off at the deployment to maintanance ratio of some of the navy’s vessels. As Td points our the Oil industry works its support vessels arround the world harder than almost anything in grey paint.
And yet Ocean apparantly was not up to much. I suppose just because it was commercialy built does not mean it was properly commercialy specked for the job.
As someone noted about the wartime light carriers, they were some of the most cost effective, longest lived warships in modern history. Some of them were 50 odd years in service and were disposed of for a variety of reasons by their end users- not necessarily because they were knackered….
Classic case in point for OCEAN is her powertrain. Commercial diesels on a commercial shaftline, should be good news. However, there is no reversing gearbox and to operate astern, she needs to shut down the engine and restart it in reverse. The engines are only mounted to commercial standards and are designed to damp over long hours of continuous ahead power, not repeated ahead/astern power. And her thruster is a commercial berthing thruster, not a proper positioning thruster.
Because of all this, where OCEAN is required to be able to manoeuvre at low speeds in a restricted area to offload her boats and troops, the engines are not up to the job and are degrading rapidly. With only a bow thruster, stationkeeping is only achieved by operating the main engines asymmetrically. ALBION and BULWARK can do this because their engines are electric and are designed for rapid changes in ahead/astern power. OCEAN does the best she can, but at the cost of ragging the engines. I’m sure some bright spark will suggest anchoring but no, not an option to be attached to the sea bed at half an hour’s notice to weigh if the balloon goes up.
Commercial standards can build strong ships but most merchant vessels are designed to go from A to B in a straight line, and be manoeuvred alongside by tugs on arrival. They also have a short life expectancy, something in the region of 20-25 years, by which point the hull is structurally at it’s limit and beyond a mere refit to strengthen. Having a commercial yard design and build our ships is fine by me, but make sure the requisite standards of manoeuvrability, damage resistance and overall lifespan are included in the contract. Know what it is you are asking for!!
Martin
The measurement isn’t in initial cost. It’s how many refits have been required and at what cost. How much fuel has she burned during deployments and how that would compare to an equivalent naval designed ships. Also is there anything that couldn’t be done on deployments due to here build. Then you must decide what the balance is and move fwd. In most designs it’s in the initial stages that’s costs thru life are set. Generally speaking if you spend more up front it reduces cost thru life. While commercial ships are reliable and robust they do delay sailing and seek shelter in rough weather naval ships do not have that luxury.
Martin
The measurement isn’t in initial cost. It’s how many refits have been required and at what cost. How much fuel has she burned during deployments and how that would compare to an equivalent naval designed ships. Also is there anything that couldn’t be done on deployments due to here build. Then you must decide what the balance is and move fwd. In most designs it’s in the initial stages that’s costs thru life are set. Generally speaking if you spend more up front it reduces cost thru life. While commercial ships are reliable and robust they do delay sailing and seek shelter in rough weather naval ships do not have that luxury.
The military bits of Ocean work. That is extra wide assault passage ways, the hanger etc.
It is the hull, the civilian bit, that is a bag of spanners. Built down to a price.
Poor thing has been worked to death. All she has proved is that the UK could have done with 2 LPH built to proper standards.
Is HMS Ocean really that bad? Seems there were a lot of design issue’s but more than anything that seemed to be down to the fact that we had not built anything similar before. All the old Commando carriers were converted aircraft carrier’s. However Ocean always seems to have been able to do the job. For £ 200 million she seems to have been a bargain.
It is a bit like horses for courses, a ship built to naval standards will contain a good deal more redundacy than a ship built to merchant standards.
The down side is that military standards of construction are significantly more expensive.
The simplest example of this is hull framing. A merchant ship derives much of it lontudinal strength from the decks and the hull skin, hence gererally thicker steel. A military standard vessel is by comparison longitudinally framed. That is there is a whole lot more T section running lengthwise. Which adds a lot to fabrication costs as every penetration of a WT bulkhead has to be sealed with welded spacers.
Of course just how resistant to damage modern military vessels really are is open to question. The dependance on power supply in a modern warship is unprecidented and noone knows how the tonnes of missle propellent present within the hulls of most modern warships (the VLS system) would stand up to serious warfare.