First Ramadi, then Konduz and now Sangin looks decidedly suspect. The West’s track record of building armies to fight its wars is looking suspect. So what then are we to make of SDSR 15 and of General Houghton’s Christmas RUSI speech where upstream capacity building featured significantly? How does “… building our partners’ capabilities so that they can better deal with terrorism, radicalisation and extremism” work in practice?
The phrase used by General Houghton throughout his RUSI speech was “defence capacity building” and this echoes the language of SDSR 2015. Current defence doctrine defines capacity building somewhat generically as “a range of activities in support of developing an indigenous security force, such as training, mentoring, partnering, monitoring and enabling.” Defence capacity building is often regarded as synonymous with Security Sector Reform (SSR). However the two are distinct and while SSR normally incorporates an element of defence capacity building, capacity building can (and often does) occur in the absence of a meaningful SSR effort. The distinction is important because the effect the UK policy seeks to achieve (stabilization) is probably best achieved by capacity building nested within SSR rather than capacity building in isolation.
“Security Sector Reform addresses security problems and tries to improve the situation through institutional reforms.”[1] “…the crux of the reform of the security sector is the development of both effective civil oversight and creation of institutions capable of providing security.”[2] The problem with defence capacity building in the absence of an SSR effort is that it is highly unlikely to be sustainable. The Iraqi Army did not suddenly collapse in Ramadi in May 2015, it corroded from the inside out over a period of some five years as predatory political and institutional interests undid almost a decade of US and Coalition defence capacity building efforts. Military capacity building in isolation of an SSR effort is unlikely to address root causes of military weakness, in much the same way that building military capacity in unlikely to deliver stability unless security weakness is the primary driver of instability.
There is no guarantee, even within an SSR programme that military capacity building efforts will deliver, much depends on how it is done. Iraq and Afghanistan both contain good examples of this. The most effective fighting forces in Iraq and Afghanistan today are the Counter-Terrorism Service (Iraq) and Afghan Special Operations Forces. Both of these forces were the subject of intense training and mentoring efforts (including Train, Advise, Assist and Accompany) for a prolonged period of time. Training included rigorous selection, and for the Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) sustainable success was designed in as the service was set up separate from extant security institutions with a clear constitutional mandate; in effect SSR birthed the CTS as an uncompromised security institution.
Looking at what has worked and what has not worked it seems clear to me that the most effective military capacity efforts share common characteristics:
- Focused, prolonged engagement,
that includes
- Train, Advise, Assist and Accompany,
and is
- Nested within an SSR context.
SDSR 2015 has boosted the means available for military capacity building through the provision of infantry battalions “…reconfigured to provide an increased contribution to countering terrorism and building stability overseas. They will conduct defence engagement and capacity building, providing training, assistance, advice and mentoring to our partners.” It remains to see whether policy will allow them to conduct focused engagement over prolonged periods. While there will always be a requirement to respond to short term requirements, enduring effect tends to come from enduring engagement. It also remains to be seen whether Train, Advise, Assist and Accompany will be part of the remit. Recently the UK has shied away from this latter aspect and while not necessary, it is highly effective. “Accompany” missions exponentially increase the risk (physical and political) but the pay off in terms of defence capacity building is through vastly increased situational awareness and the ability to mitigate indigenous military capability shortfalls while in the process of building up capability.
While the military means for capacity building have increased, one area where SDSR2015 was disappointing was in any effort to address the UK’s absence of a viable police capacity building capability. As SDSR 2015 is at great pains to point out defence and security are inextricably linked and an effective criminal justice system (of which the police are the most visible element) is fundamental to enduring stabilisation efforts. The UK’s Armed Forces are a great many things, but police capacity building is not one of them. As the police are the first line of defence and a key source of intelligence in any potential stabilisation scenario the lack of ability to deploy assets to bolster this capability in struggling states remains a concern, especially considering the lack of US capability in this area.
All in all though, the tools for defence capacity building are now coming on line than we have seen before, certainly in the Army (whither the RAF and RN?). Other options for capacity building are alluded to in SDSR through the new Defence Engagement stream and as part of this greater use of Loan Service personnel would certainly be both popular and desirable. The trick now will be to see if we can combine capability with policy to achieve the desired stability effect.
[1] Wulf,H, 2004, ‘Security-Sector Reform in Developing and Transitional Countries‘, Berghof Handbook Series, The Berghof Center for Constructive Conflict Management, Berlin, Germany.
[2] Ball et al, 2003, ‘Governance in the Security Sector, Beyond Structural Adjustment’, Palgrave, London
Its a tricky subject.
I’d argue that the failures in Iraq and Afghanistan are primarily failures of Iraq and Afghanistan, rather than western methods in general. Thats not to let western methods off the hook, it amuses me no end that we think we have “training” to offer to Ukrainian Units who have actual experience being mauled by artillery.
In my view the EICA/BIA would be the gold standard, but it would be a long term affair, requiring deployments lasting years not months and would likely create a shadow government hostile to whatever the actual government was.
DCB and SSR are also hampered by challenges in assessing how much (if any) progress has been made. Performance rating scales in AFG for ANSF and ANP units were changed so often they became meaningless. Institutional reform progress is also difficult to measure, but is arguably more important than the Security Force Assistance/TAAA aspects. Adequate security force institutions are a necessary pre-condition for TAAA success and the number of HMAF infantry battalions available to devote to the task is largely irrelevant by comparison.
” As the police are the first line of defence and a key source of intelligence in any potential stabilisation scenario…” In several of the British efforts in counterinsurgency the police’s role was essential from Malaya to Northern Ireland. NI suffered in the early days from the skewed affiliation of the RUC but excepted reform of themselves such as the disbandment of the B Specials who rightly or wrongly where perceived to be little more than a uniformed protestant Army. Perhaps in the same way the SF trained the most resilient parts of the Afghan and Iraqi armies our Special Branch could train similarly tasked police elements.
A key aspect should be understanding the locals traditional policing and legal processes which should be built on ,not crushed , to be most readily accepted by the local population rather than inflicting ‘Western’ standards and practice on a population whose historic traditions may be entirely different.
TD I disagree a little in the fact that the Iraqi Army eroded over time. More importantly is the very fundamental question in “What is the army fighting for?”. If the people who sign up are those that cannot make it in any other trade and are there for their monthly paycheck, then is it any surprise that they melt away when faced with a “kill them all, no quarter” enemy as there is literally nothing worth it for them to risk their lives for?
While I do get that this is a military focused site and tends to focus on the guns and bombs aspect of security, I have to caution that even the best “Western training” and “Western equipment” does not attack the most fundamental cause of radicalism and fundamentalism, the lack of a national identity, national pride and economic development. Trying to win the “hearts and minds” of the people using only the military is like trying to fight with an arm and both legs tied behind your back. And the right arm at that. To crush an insurgency, you have to discredit them in all ways, not just militarily, but also demonstrate that you can deliver something better than what the radicals promise, which also gives “the people” something to fight for and protect.
Darn, force of habit, sorry TD, that reply was actually for David.
If I recall, the problem with police is numbers. We don’t have a police contingency force on standby, and the UK police services can’t spare the manpower to make our capacity building efforts meaningful. In NI and Malaya there was already a UK-led police force in place.
EUPOL have picked up this baton to some extent (they can draw upon all member states for contingents, and thus create critical mass, and developed much useful mentoring expertise in Bosnia and Kosovo), but of course policing policy and legal frameworks differ widely acorss the EU. UN Police has also tried to cover this base, with less impact. Generally it suits the nations with the closest legal systems to lead mentoring. So UK would be a good lead on policing for former colonies which adopted much of the UK legal framework post-independence (as we have done to effect in Sierra Leone), but hopeless in places like Mali and Syria (or even Afghanistan) with completely different legal frameworks and policing traditions.
RAF are currently engaged in capacity building in Nigeria for counter-terrorism protection for airfields threatened by Boko Haram,, and helped build Afghan capacity for helicopter operations. RN has been heavily enegaged in developing capacity in Nigeria on maritime security for some time too I believe, and also helped Sierra Leone in this regards, and probably do this elsewhere too.
@TrT. However it may be no coincidence that Afghanistan’s longest period of stability was from 1914-1973, a time when the Soviet and Western powers were largely wrapped up in killing themselves in Europe and had no time for the Great Game. The 1973 Soviet-backed coup came after a period where US influence in Kabul had grown, and really from then-on to 1989 Afghanistan was a victim of the Cold War, and from 1989 we have reaped the consequenses as opposition to the Soviet occupation became the founding myth and model for a new Jihad against western (and Russian) infidels. Iraq, despite a murderous regime and catastrophic wars with Iran from 1979 and the West in 1991, and an enforced oil embargo, no fly zone and punative sanctions, remained highly politically stable until 2003. The fact that we entirely dismantled all of Iraq’s government and security infrastructure in order to build something in our own image, and then failed to do so and thus fuelled a civil war has surely contributed to present instability?
“the problem with police is numbers”
Exactly; this is why the UK doesn’t have a hope of doing proper Defence and Security Capacity Building except in the situations where the supporting institutions in the target country (Rule of Law Governance) are already well developed and UK-oriented.
If you want to do DSCB you need deployable agencies who can do more than just basic infantry skills training. Why can’t the UK have a deployable contingency Police Training Force ?
While I love the idea of an exportable police force to stamp out corruption and weed out extremists, is it appropriate for us to supplant a possibly pre-existing local government agency as an external country? If someone were to transplant, for example, the FBI over to the UK while abolishing the local police, how would you feel about that? It might cause a bigger explosion than if you had let the locals handle it in the first place. Not to mention most of our legal systems are built up over a long, long period of time, some things simply cannot be taught overnight, not to mention local mindset can be totally different.
For example, we had a case of a man stabbing his “friend” in an argument and attacked 2 policemen who happened to cross his path while he was escaping. He was shot dead and the public reaction was “Good riddance to idiots!”. If this happened in the UK, what would the public reaction be to the police shooting someone dead? I know the US would have riots, those guys have riots just sneezing. So different areas, different cultures and different reactions, so transplanting police might be a very bad idea.
Observer,
The reasons why an army may corrode are many. The reason that you allude to is but one. The divisions which melted away over the course of 2014 and 2015 were the predominantly Sunni divisions that were based in and recruited from the west of Iraq. When you consider the politics of Iraq at the time and the nature of Iraqi society it is almost a wonder that they lasted as long as they did. Why would a Sunni soldier fight for an unrepresentative and sectarian government? Why would a Shia soldier stay on and fight in a Sunni heartland for an absent and often exploitative officer corps and a strategy he knew would not work?
In my view the security sector is merely a necessary enabler of stabilisation (without security of some kind there will be no stability) but the security sector only addresses the most violent symptoms of instability, not the causes which are political in nature and revolve around governance and economics.
That is why SSR in itself is not going to stabilise a country unless the security sector is the cause of the instability. Stabilisation has to take place within a political strategy for the situation as a whole.
It links to your point about discrediting them. What is needed (and often absent) is a competing narrative, not a counter-narrative; a better offer. Instead of saying “this is wrong” when Da’esh says “this is good”, we need to be able to say “this is better”.
I am minded to do a follow up post on the perils, pitfalls and potentials of expeditionary police reform. Looking at the comments there is both interest and expertise out there.
I think may have written something way back in the beginning of TD on a deployable police capability, will have to dig it out.
It could be that I was before my time, a unique visionary, or, it is all a figment of my port soaked imagination!
I do not know if I understand all about it. I do not know if I’m going to say something stupid.
I do not think that the problem is a police problem, if we want to stabilize a country after clashes, we need a strategy..
I will speak only about France.
France spends its time in making police everywhere, but France has no strategy.
We see it in the disaster of Libya. Due to lack of budget, the French army is able to win battles but not the wars, still unable to transform tactical gains by strategic success.
It’s not the multiplication of interventions that makes a strategy. France intervenes everywhere, according conflicts without ever managing to treat the underlying problems. We project armed forces, we do our best, but we do not work in the long term.
When France intervenes for ending an armed conflict the military presence should last long enough for establish a transition to a sustainable peace.
The engagement in Libya was not necessary, it would have been much wiser to stop at the initially fixed goal which was to stop the tanks in front Benghazi. The consequences of this intervention is not only the destruction of Libya, but also migrants and chaos that is permanently installed in the Sahel, and for large part the consolidation of Boko Haram.
Currently, not knowing what we want to do in the Middle East, we are conducting a war of containment to gain time, the time needed to determine the possible compromise between the different stakeholders, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Turkey, Israel, etc.
But without agreement between Obama and Putin, without recognition of the legitimate interests of each other, we can not define a common goal.
Putin has an objective, reposition Russia in the heart of the international game, preserve its interests in the South of the Mediterranean and its military base in Tartus in Syria, and finally defend itself against jihadist movements on the southern border of Russia.
Regarding the departure of Bashar al-Assad, this requires realism. The first mission of a head of state as Hollande is to ensure the safety of its citizens, not to make morality. Now things are clearer, however, Assad is militarily argued by Russia and it will be part of the compromise to be found to get out of this crisis.
As Frenchie says “establish a transition to a sustainable peace.”
and David Hume says “not the causes which are political in nature and revolve around governance and economics.” The economics and governance need to be examined at a local level ( not necessarily on a country wide basis) by academic experts who are familiar with local customs , practices and acceptable processes. These will be most easily implemented to restore law and order with any future move towards Western practices ( including our levels of democracy ) being something to try to establish possibly a generation after the last shots are fired in frustrated anger and just the plain evil men that live amongst us all.
Are we talking here about the failure to establish a post imperial idea of what a successful intervention looks like?
I’m not saying that all Imperial interventions were successful, merely that they had a “whole government” coherence about them and a longevity of approach that no subsequent framework has succeed in replicating.
Is it time to rehabilitate Neo Imperialism..? :p
PE, I always did have a soft spot for the idea of a NATO viceroyalty or protectorate if it was a temporary thing. The recent “interventions” are neither here nor there situations, a military only effort without the social and economical development that would “build the peace” (ug… catchphrases…), the “infrastructure building” of a few wells and “clinics” and “schools” here and there by the military are but simply a drop in the bucket compared to sustained development on the national level. The people in Iraq and Afghanistan don’t need more tanks and guns, most of the time, armies have nothing to do with the common man. What they needed was development and a sense of belonging. And to put it nastily, have something worth holding on to (eg house, jobs, business) that they can be held hostage to the new regime.
Defence capacity now rest with six, used to be seven, 1st Div and FTC brigades.
How many UN mandated protectorates (ie UN appointed government) have there been since 1945? When was the last one? It would be interesting to know a rough % success/failure rate in terms of enduring stability, prosperity etc.
Frenchie is spot on about the lack of long-term strategy.
Observer is spot on about the culture conflict.
Peter is spot on that imperialism is the answer.
…I hasten to add that I jest about the last one, but the world was most stable under British Imperial rule. If there were a neat way to conquer a nation but still allow them to do what they want, grow and flourish under a new rule. I mean, what exactly have the Romans done for us?
Simon, you would not happen to be a member of the People’s Liberation Front of Judea would you? :)
@Observer,
****ing splitters :)
@DHF,
A pleasure to read your work as always. Both the professional experience and the clarity of writing always come through. I remain suspicious of tying up a substantial chunk of Potemkin infantry formations (I’m on record elsewhere in TD’s threads about Carter’s institutional coup d’état dressed up as reform that’s preserved disproportionate jobs for infantry OF-5s-and-above so that a branch with about twenty percent of the service’s personnel control roughly half the “natural” paths to two-star rank and above) dressed up as “upstream engagement.” Not totally sure Lance Corporal Simpkins from Clitheroe is the best contribution *in that role* (as opposed to doing what comes naturally for an infantry squaddie) for the UK in capacity development. The French through the Patrimonie have a more robust infrastructure for capacity building and support in areas where they have longstanding interests. They, like Italy, also have a large and well-respected gendarmerie (Gendarmie Nationale and Caribineri respectively of course) that solves the numbers issues. The US have the Special Forces, geared specifically to building combatant capacity and local-defence strategies, who are beginning to win the pushback against “Big Army” (being this side of the Pond now I try to keep up with the American defence blogs) on train & accompany, as the larger force is rediscovering the prospect that they may have to fight wars against substantial opponents again.
It seems to me a good approach for the UK would be twofold. First, given the current size of the service and the capacities suggested/demanded in the SDSR, on the Army side I’d do this:
– Rather than giving divisions responsibility for specific sets of capabilities, I’d give divisions (the Army component that can build up for a joint expeditionary force) specific *regional* responsibilities. You could have 1 UK Division responsible for NATO AOR and the Middle East east-of-Suez; 2 UK Division responsible for home operations from active public duties to MACP/MACA; 3 UK Division for all of Africa (incl. Egypt up to the west bank of the Canal) and the Americas (well, Belize and BOTs incl. Those Islands); and 4 UK Division for Central Asia to the Antipodes.
– Either 2 or 3 Div could be set up to “swing” to other areas in case of some unforeseen massive *and* persistent conflict (a combination I don’t foresee except perhaps some kind of China-India brew-up, elsewhere major-peer conflicts are likely to be intense and then reach a point of “blockage” where there will either be hybrid maneouvring or efforts to “break through” with Sunshine, Instant, for the nuking of.) But really divisions would concentrate on their AOR, and have as their only perpetual attachments the division HQ, a body of foreign-area officers, and a substantial British Army Training Team geared to the relevant regions and cultures, which while it would contain some basic components for combat-arms training, would concentrate instead on the development of institutional *culture* and local *infrastructure*, ie training leaders in batches rather than favoured individuals, medical and engineering support, signals-infrastructure development, and so on. They could do joined-up foreign policy work with FCO, development, NGOs, allies, and so on. You might have a light-protected bn on call in the general area as needed for armed backup or that kind of train-and-accompany work (say, one at Akrotiri — best to get out of Dhekelia, it’s an even more un-defendable “painted target” than Akrotiri — one at Gib or in Belize, one perhaps at a Commonwealth partner like Mauritius, etc.)
– For combat they could draw from a pool of resources that could, at peak, supply two divisions at full strength (a third with the Reserves spooled up?), so some version of four robust brigades (armoured/”strike” two-by-two or four properly-kitted modular that would build tailored BGs) and two reaction brigades (presumably 16 AAB and 3 Cdo but I’d like those identical: each with one para bn, one RM Cdo, and two para-sized all-terrain light role bns) whose employment would be tailored as-needed. Backed by an aviation bde and an EW/sigs/hybridity bde that could hive off bits at division level as needed, and the choice between two broad-spectrum support bdes, one geared to heavy warfare and the other to “strike brigade”-style ops.
-The two-star-level assets would maintain the permanent, regional maintenance-and-development assets managed at a responsible command level with Joint Forces’ and Main Building’s ear. At both the national-interest level and the coalition-ops level, the regional-hand divisions’ BATTs would provide capabilities where the UK has specific strengths, and ones that aren’t based simply on whether a local force has decent kit and looks good on OPEX with no regard for motivation, culture, support infrastructure, or strategic circumstances.
On a separate note I loved the SDSR’s mention of FCO “rapid-response teams.” Does this mean there are prepositioned supplies of Windsor-knotted ties and single-weight linen Aquascutum suits at various locations overseas?
tweckyspat
“DCB and SSR are also hampered by challenges in assessing how much (if any) progress has been made.”
Excellent point. Assessments are often frustratingly hard to do. How do you assess effectiveness if:
a) You come from a different culture with different expectations?
b) You have had no formal analytical or statistical training?
c) You are not allowed to accompany?
In several deployments I have seen Measure of Performance (what we are doing) be mistaken for “what we are achieving”. Measurement of performance is easy to achieve and briefs well (“We have trained 1500 infantrymen over the past month’) but it is harder by far to measure and quantify the effect that their training is achieving in the field and on the campaign.
Performance in the field is impacted on by numerous variables and without something very close to battlefield and systemic transparency, it is almost impossible to make sense of what one is seeing from afar. The military is also a system of systems and unless you are able to engage with the system as a whole (especially leadership and personnel selection, something that very few sovereign countries are prepared to accept outside interference with) the impact of what you are achieving can be minimised or even nullified. I might have trained the best infantryman in Africa, but if his platoon commander is incompetent and unsackable …
Jackstaff,
Thanks for the comments, I shall try not to allow my ego to brush the ceiling when I leave the room!
I have not seen enough on the proposed capacity building battalions to really comment. The Daily Telegraph briefs them as akin to US ODAs. ODAs do engage in capacity building but they are also designed as force enablers in order to act as a C2 and enabling node to fight the force that has been raised. That would be a departure from the British Army’s recent practice and while training and mentoring is perfectly within the realms of possible for most infantrymen that latter role of ODAs is not.
I would follow up with two further comments.
1) One can never have too many infantry! We’ve run short of infantry in WW1, WW2, N Ireland, Iraq and Afghanistan. I am less clear cut on the point about the preponderance of Infantry two stars and above. Stepping off topic slightly I would simply point out that there are very few Infantry and Armour tied posts (E1 posts) at Captain, Major and Lt Col level compared to other branches, and that most are regarded as not career enhancing (there are exceptions). This is very different from other branches who tend to keep their talent much closer. Infantry and Armour officers go to E1 by exception, others branches tend to go to E2 by exception. The upshot is that Infantry and Armour officers tend to be more generalist and more employable at the make or break Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel levels. I will close here by saying that I watch the significant changes the army is undergoing under Carter with interest as these are being felt in career management too.
2) There is an overwhelming focus on light infantry type units for defence capacity building tasks, but in my experience we need an all arms capability that covers the spectrum from heavy to light. Looking at the Middle East and Africa I think we are missing a trick in not having armour and enablers able to Train, Advise, Assist and Accompany.
I like your concept for regionally focused divisions, our Regionally Aligned Brigades are designed to do just that, but I think are hampered by a lack of scale/resources. From my scant experience of them they are also not designed for the systemic approach that you suggest, although I do sense that there is an increasingly joined up approach being achieved across Whitehall departments.
I’m reminded of old comment that there are no bad soldiers, only bad officers.
The very successful reformation of first tne Portuguese and then Spanish armies in 1810-14 involved posting British officers and sergeants at one step above their substantive (British) rank. Logistic support was also given in terms of using the British commissary to ensure all the Allied armies were fed in the field. Finally the trained formations were fully integrated into an Allied Army under Wellington as supreme commander for all three nations.
From being described by Wellington as “really children in the art of war” the forces developed under this regime became “the fighting cocks of the Army”.