Computer Generated visulisation of the future Type 26 Global Combat Ship

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New images from the MoD’s official Flickr feed…

Sorry, couldn’t resist

Computer Generated visulisation close up of the future Type 26 Global Combat Ship

Computer Generated visulisation of the future Type 26 Global Combat Ship.

And some new imagery from the MoD on the Offshore Patrol Vessels

Computer Generated Image of the new Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV).

Taxi…

 

PS

Hopefully, they will correct this easy mistake anyone could make. Would like to think they would have more grace than BAE who after me pointing out to them a spelling error in their DSEi Type 36 video decided to delete it and issue a new one later in the day without so much a nod, wink or cheers.

PPS

Yes, I know they are incorrectly labelled, that is the point of the post!

 

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Absalon
Absalon
I think the 1st two graphics are for the new RN OPVs not Type-26.
NavyLookout

I’m sure you’re just testing but first 2 CGIs are Batch 2 River Class OPVs not T26 GCS. Keep up the good work ensuring BAES spell correctly:)

WiseApe

That’s not even how to spell flicker :-)

Rocket Banana

As long as the OPV is “sold as seen” then great. I’ll take 50 of them.

Mark
Mark

Is this the navy’s cunning new plan to get the type 26 past the treasure or the treasures plan to hood wink the navy into these other “new frigates” after being told the bill will be 11.5 billion for the one they really want??

stephen duckworth

Does that “all rights reserved” on the T26 image explain their legal cover for doubling/ tripling the intial cost estimates ;-) WOW it must be so much better than a Arleigh Burke Flight III …….

stephen duckworth

The USN have ordered 9 new AR FIII for $6.1bn.
First steel cut next year so the race is on to which will enter front line service first!!!! http://news.usni.org/2013/06/07/navsea-on-flight-iii-arleigh-burkes#more-3501

Observer
Observer

@SD

I noticed a rule of thumb for automation on ships is that if you reduce crew manning by x%, expect the price to rise by the same percentage x 2. The USN and anywhere that has low manpower costs have heaps of bodies to throw at the problem, the others do not, hence a lot of the newer ships are also a lot more expensive than a Burke.

stephen duckworth

@Observer
I can’t comment on the level of automation on a AR FIII but I suspect it’s still a lot but with manual oversight . The US after their WW2 experience like to have lots of bodies on board for damage control , a skill they developed exceptional levels too as they approached the Japanese home islands greater and greater intensity of attacks. I suspect that a crew member can abandon their watch station to deal with fire/flooding in their/nearby compartment knowing it will look after itself whilst they help save the ship. Also having large crews would mean that in terms of ramping up hull output in a major war skilled crew could be pulled from existing experienced crews , to be replace by new recruits, to get new hulls worked up and in service asap.
On the pay side they still aren’t that cheap.
http://www.militaryfactory.com/military_pay_scale.asp

Not a Boffin
Not a Boffin

Not convinced they’ve ordered 9. This appears to be the most up to date and comprehensive bit of info.

https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL32109.pdf

Flight III AB is far from a done deal, the USN is still some way deep in the poo……

Hohum
Hohum

NaB,

USN is not “some way deep in the poo”, Flight III is happening its just a matter of which FY and in the meantime they are still building Flight IIs. Personally I am not sold on the approach but they needed something that looked cheap after the DDG1000 debacle, I suspect they will build a handful of Flight III hulls then suddenly decide they need the same systems but on a new platform.

Where there may be a problem is the orphan DDG1000s, three bespoke hulls and systems fits, awkward.

Not a Boffin
Not a Boffin

My day rates are surprisingly cheap. I await a call from Dr Lewis……

stephen duckworth

On the AR FIII I suspect the USN are trying to finesse the AMDR onto a hull to prove its worth ( the manufacturer is not going to perform at sea trials at their expense) . If the present hull is up to it all well and good but they want to prove the modular AMDR radar system is the great leap forward they hope it is. They are hoping the now named AN/SPY-6 will be able to create a step up in ability , including extremley powerful EW functions , that justifies the risk. They are basicly seizing the already agreed budget for a AR FIIA and tacking on the already spent development cost for integrating the AN/SPY-6 onto a hull . I suspect the muted stretched Areleigh Burke will be the long term outcome but in these days of sequestration the Navy is playing a close game.
On TD ‘ s point on the article NaB posted that kind of publicly made information , across all services, might have a significant effect on how we run our big ticket projects.

Not a Boffin
Not a Boffin

DD(X) and DDG1000 were happening and just a question of the FY – as was LCS, as was LPD17, although that was eventually unf8cked. T-AO(X) is far from sorted, etc etc.

They are actually having some serious problems in designing ships. The only area where they’re having fewer issues is in submarines where they kept some sort of continuity in new design going between EB and NN over the years.

Once you stop designing certain types of ship for an extended period – particularly when you’re down to one or two suppliers – then you’re in trouble. It’s why long extended production runs (see T23 for details) that sound great to consultants and pollies are sometimes the wrong choice.

Hohum
Hohum

NaB,

Oh no, DD(X) and DDG1000 were in very severe trouble long before they met the axe, AB Fl3 is in a much happier place, for a start the combatant commanders are screaming out for it, the systems development is happening (and apparently happening well as far as AMDR goes) and the programme is genuinely core to naval operations and technology transition. By contrast to earlier efforts the cost concerns are minimal.

The design issues are a result of trying to shoe-horn a whole new (and actually quite different) sensor fit into a legacy (and thus largely fixed) hull design. If the money spigot could be opened wider they would have no trouble producing a new hull design.

Repulse

Completely agree with you NaB, the ability to be able to do something (e.g. design complex warships) is as valuable as having them already.

For the T26, I’d like to see the first 8 (or 9 ;)) ASW versions come out to a similar “batch of 3” designs (incremental improvements) and the Non-TAS (ready) ships come out to a revised extended design. We should then move onto the T46 quickly after…

Hohum
Hohum

Also, not sure what you think the problem with T-AO(X) is, the RfPs have been issued and the programme is broadly on schedule.

The Other Chris

@NaB

Are the USN problems in part related to the success of the AB and Perry’s?

Hohum
Hohum

ToC,

No. The USN’s “problem” is that it spent the best part of 20 years designing a highly specialized series of ships rather than a general purpose destroyer to follow the Burkes on the slipway. Having belatedly realised their error they are trying to look frugal by shoehorning next gen systems and sensors into a Burke hull.

Not a Boffin
Not a Boffin

RfPs are one thing. Build contracts with a competent yard are another. In this particular case, there is only one competent yard (you can guess which one), but another yard with zero track record in that type of ship is being proposed – primarily to keep it alive while AB Flt III is “fixed”.

Time will tell whether T-AO(X) runs smoothly.

As for AB Flt III – the very fact that they’re trying to shoehorn that system (and some of the other systems changes) into the 30 yr old AB hull design tells you that they’re a little short of grown-ups. It’s like those fruit-loops who think a remanufactured T23 (or a T45 variant) would be a better bet than T26.

Regrettably, USN ship design and procurement (and I include the USCG in that) has a painful recent history. One might argue that only Lewis & Clark has come close to being a trouble-free programme in the last fifteen years.

Not a Boffin
Not a Boffin

Hohum, TOC, yes.

The AB design was generally complete in the mid-80s – about the same time as our T23s. That’s thirty years ago, since when they have designed precisely zero “conventional” DD/FF type ships. As Hohum says, they’ve done some bizarre specialists where particular parts of the requirement (eg speed or low RCS/distributed combat system) had an inordinate effect on the design.

What that means is that the most senior guys in Navsea now were making the coffee and getting the bagels in Crystal City and Carderock when the AB design was being conducted. That’s what long production runs combined with limited subsequent design exercises gets you. Just as we found with T23 and the gap between it and T45/T26, which was not as pronounced as in this case.

While you may know “what” a design looks like, if you don’t know “why” it looks like that then you will struggle to know “how” to produce a sensibly balanced design.

Hohum
Hohum

NaB,

Nope. T-AO(X) is running just fine, the RfP process is required prior to a build contract. It’s process.

The perceived (actually pretty minor) problems with AB Fl3 are the result of the USN confining themselves to using the DDG51 hull, nothing to do with skills fade.

Not a Boffin
Not a Boffin

Time will tell. Having both written and responded to a number of RfP for ships, I’m perfectly well aware of their function thank you. You should also be aware that process (or more precisely over-reliance on it) is not necessarily a guarantee that all is going swimmingly. Their oilers are not technically challenging – this isn’t a skill fade issue – and they appear to be happy to play the get out of jail free card wrt MARPOL for another fifteen years or so. What is disturbing is that the US is blobbing this up with the amphibious programme and making it a winner takes all programme between HII and NASSCO. Given the disparity in nature between the two types of ship, this can only be an attempt to put either Ingalls or NASSCO out of business, preserving BIW (owned by GD, like NASSCO). Much litigation will ensue and either the Navy will lose its only competent merchant/auxiliary shipbuilder or its only experienced amphibious shipbuilder.

As for AB III, I repeat – trying to shoehorn new generation systems into a 30-yr old design for a new-build is not something a competent organisation does willingly. It tends to be a symptom of either lack of experience / ignorance in the acquisition department and/or loss of confidence in the design capabilities of Navsea/industry.

Hohum
Hohum

NaB,

The USN has been trying to knock out a shipyard for years, it may one day gets its way, but there is nothing wrong with the Oiler project as demonstrated by your inability to provide evidence to the contrary.

AB Fl3 uses the legacy hull for cost reasons, nothing else, and there is no evidence that any of the challenges thus far encountered are insurmountable.

Peter Elliott

Is it not the case Hohum that by deciding to go for AB 3 they have guaranteed that skill fade will have occurred by the time they do sit down to design a new ocean going combat ship from the keel up?

Hohum
Hohum

Peter Elliot,

Nope. Skill fade occurs if you lose the personnel or stop allowing them to do their jobs. As long as internal design work continues and the staff retained skill fade will not occur.

Not a Boffin
Not a Boffin

Sorry Hohum, your last two don’t actually add up.

The US industry has lost numerous shipyards over the last 20 years or so, the most recent being what was Avondale, after the disaster that was the early LPD17s. No-one is suggesting there is something wrong with the tanker programme technically – not least because (unless you’re the MARS IPT) – naval auxiliary tankers are relatively straightforward to specify. You should note however, that no designs have yet been produced.

What is different here is that they’re asking two yards with wildly different product histories to compete head to head for a bundled contract where the most valuable contracts (LHA8 and LX(R)) are slap bang in HII’s product range, whereas T-AO(X) most certainly isn’t – it sits squarely within NASSCOs expertise. There are a number of issues with this in that the winner of the amphibs doesn’t get the tankers, which is fine if HII win LHA8 and LX(R). Not so much, if – heaven forfend – NASSCO win it and have to build amphibs, leaving tankers to HII. The obvious answer is to direct individual contracts to respective yards, but that would then freeze out Aker Philly – who probably need a shot at the T-AO(X) given the current commercial shipbuilding market. So there may yet be plenty of battles to get this approved in Congress.

As for skill fade being prevented by “internal design work” and “staff retained”, what sort of “internal design work” did you have in mind? I’d be fascinated to hear what BIW, HII and NAVSEA for that matter have been doing for the last twenty years on DD/FF, cos my contacts in the relevant PEO haven’t heard a thing!

You tend to find that in a shipyard, “internal design work” quickly gets limited to detailed design work – which tends to be specific calculations and drawings, rather than real blank sheet design and more importantly maintenance of rationale, design information and databases. The latter are what constitutes a design capability, which if not exercised relatively frequently atrophies through retirements, reorganisations and disuse.

Hohum
Hohum

NaB,

You claimed the USN was “still deep in the pooh”. You have failed to provide a single shred of evidence to support that claim.

Congressional battles are congressional, ultimately the USN will get the ships. The USN’s desire for the future of the US shipbuilding industry hasn’t matched that of Congress for several decades but the world keeps turning and the ships keep coming. Stop trying to paint a picture of impending doom when there isn’t one.

Your contacts know sweet f.a then.

Engineer Tom

No major defence company will be doing internal design work without someone paying for it. They may have someone making nice concept sketches etc, but they won’t be going into the detail of how to design the ship itself which is where all the previous experience is needed.

TAS
TAS

To be fair, US design agencies can be really proud of that they’ve come up with recently. LCS, Zumwalt – truly inspirational.

Hohum
Hohum

ET,

Much of the US naval ship design capability (though not all) is inside NAVSEA rather than the contractors. Its a fun tail actually, after the Cold War the USN did in fact suffer ship design skill fade, it was quite serious iin fact. Then from the early 2000s they started to seriously rebuild the naval ship design community.

The decision to use the DDG51 legacy hull was for cost reasons, not for any of those outlined by NaB.

TAS
TAS

Ooh – I’ve got a gold star! Thanks TD!!

stephen duckworth

@NaB
In terms of our learning curve and sustaining domestic FF/DD design capabilities we have T45 AAD done and dusted , all lessons learnt I.e. no great walrus GT. The T26 ASW must be approaching final detail but has yet to cut steel but no great f**kups expected once sea trials start. Obviously as the work up crews start to feed back lessons will be be brought forward to the next FASAD warship. ( that’s Future All Singing And Dancing :-) . By stopping T26 at boat 8 and starting a T26/45+ along side at say boat 6/7 with a view for a further 8 we can keep that design and manufacturing drumbeat pounding. Thoughts?

Not a Boffin
Not a Boffin

I see Hohum has reverted to his usual devastating wit and repartee.

Let’s see if he can identify the common element in the following :
CVN78 – Significantly overbudget and delayed – but not surprising for a new design CVN
DDG1000 – Orphan project, originally for 32 ships, phenomenally expensive, curtailed at three (possibly two) ships
LCS – Originally to be class of 55, now 32. Significantly overbudget and delayed and with modular based capabilities currently uncertified
SSC – Small surface combatant – as yet undefined other than evolution of LCS
CG(X) – To replace CG47 capability with 19 ships. Cancelled – capability to be delivered by putative AB Flt III
LHA6/7 – Originally to have been delivered 2012. Two years late and design changing again. Still not a major drama.
DDG51 – Thirty year old design still in production. Margins significantly eroded.
CG47 – Primary AD Battle mgmt. ship and some BMD capability. Ageing very rapidly. Nominal replacement AB Flt III. IOC for which is 2023. Navy proposal to upgrade 11 CG47 and then retire other 11 rejected by Congress. Youngest ship currently 20 years old, eldest ship 30 years old.
T-AKE14 – Unqualified success. Should have been bought for UK FSS!
T-AO(X) – time will tell – as will the proposed contracting strategy. As yet no firm design.
L(X)R – As yet undefined. Unlikely to be cheap
CVN73 – Still at outside risk of early withdrawal on sequestration grounds despite long-lead funding approval this FY.

So – right now the USN has 62 ABs, 22 CG47s and a slack handful of LCS. Less than 90 surface combatants. Those cruisers are going to start dropping off the plot, with all gone by 2028 on current plans. In any case their availability will reduce through hull fatigue remedial work between now and then. If everything goes to plan on AB Flt III (far from a done deal, despite Raytheon and Navy PR) they might get half a dozen in service by the time the last CG ties up. So, net loss of fifteen-ish hulls. The 22 Flight I ABs will also be well over 30 years old by that time but will have been augmented by a mix of the additional 11 Flt IIA and LCS. But you can bet that there will be a net drop of ten or so hulls with Mk41 cells at least.

In essence, they have a firm programme for CVN (if more expensive than they’d like)
They have no programme for cruisers
They have a potential programme for a modified DD, based on a 30yr old design
They have a 30yr old DD design in restarted production
They have an LCS design in production with capability issues
They think they can make a surface combatant by playing with the LCS design
They have block obsolescence in their cruiser and early destroyer fleets
Their last FF are just decommissioning
They have to replace relatively cheap LSDs with something that as yet has no design, but if based on LPD will be reassuringly expensive
They also have a replacement bomber/boomer to fund.

All of this assumes no further sequestration / budgetary nightmares.

I would suggest that this is far from rosy. Hohum clearly has evidence from elsewhere – although as ever, it’s rarely offered.

Not a Boffin
Not a Boffin

I will add that Hohum is quite correct in where the USN design expertise is held – they are a little better placed in that regard than MoD. However, the last time NAVSEA designed a surface combatant (other than DDG1000) from scratch that has subsequently been built was??

For the UK a production run of 13 T26 at an annual or longer drumbeat is likely to result in a re-run of the T23 to T45/T26 skill fade. Unless someone does something very sensible with NDP/MHC.

Hohum
Hohum

NaB,

Cruisers can and probably will be life extended if required, as ever with the joys of congress a solution will eventually be found.
AB Fl3 Hull may be 30 years old but at a systems level its still perfectly modern, which is why the same systems are still being put in new-build warships by multiple export customers
There is no “block obsolescence” in the CG/DDG fleet, in fact quite the opposite there is a continuous upgrade path
AB Fl3 is not a done deal, well no, neither is anything else until it gets a build contract
SSC: New project is new….erm, well yeah
They don’t need a cruiser programme, thats AB Fl3

So no, no impending crisis.

Also, please think about just how little of your original claim this question actually leaves: “However, the last time NAVSEA designed a surface combatant (other than DDG1000) that has subsequently been built was??”

TAS
TAS

I’ll hang it on my wall. So proud. I guess that doesn’t count my old comments as Somewhat?

Not a Boffin
Not a Boffin

Congress can’t actually magic a way of life-extending cruisers – not least because there are real physical limits to what is essentially a Spruance design that you can’t simply overcome. Perhaps you’d like to explain – precisely – how the structural and stability issues evident ten years ago will be overcome? Or how the cable and pipework life can be extended? Or how the myriad electrical/electronic boxes that control the marine systems can be supported?

The ME systems elements of the AB design are far from modern, but I will certainly agree that the continuous upgrade of the AB combat system has been and is generally successful. There isn’t an issue with Mk41, SM2/3/6 or SPY – it’s the platform elements that are problematic. For DDG51 and especially CG47.
Impending CG retirement – cos congress can’t change the laws of physics and Flt II is not yet real – is block obsolescence.

These same physical issues are the ones that will affect the viability of Flight III, which is why a competent organisation would not have sanctioned the Flt III approach, unless they were absolutely desperate to get something/anything to sea – even if that timeframe was 12 years away.

So the USN is still “some way deep in the poo” – to revisit the original post.

It has a 30yr old design restarted in build because its replacement programme proved fatally flawed and ruinously expensive.

It has two small fast combatants in production, both of which are heavily dependent for their capability on modules that are some way from being successfully demonstrated, yet alone operationally proven.

It has a large surface combatant force of which at least a quarter (if not a third) will be well over 30 years old before any real replacement starts to arrive – and they can’t be simply extended.

It is betting that a design that is thirty years old today can accommodate a new sensor system requiring more power, cooling and weight for an in-service date eight years from now and can remain viable for what is likely to be forty years beyond that date (assuming a dozen plus Flt III end up being built). To put that in context – it’s the equivalent of Turbinia being still a viable ship in the late 60s, or a WW1 V&W being useful in the 80s. Or some halfwit offering a Type 12 as the basis for T26.

The USN has also decided that it will persist with the LCS as a basis for the SSC, when LCS itself is proving to be somewhat problematic. I don’t believe LCS is a disaster, but having had exposure to it from concept through the various development contract, it ain’t what it was supposed to be and it ain’t going to be a CSG asset either. That they’ve stuck with it as the basis for SSC suggests that either – politically it was too difficult to suggest anything other than LCS or that they had real concerns about their design capability. Which reminds me – uniquely LCS was not NAVSEA designed – it was BIW/Austal and LM/Fincantieri if memory serves.

Which is why the question

“However, the last time NAVSEA designed a surface combatant (other than DDG1000) that has subsequently been built was???”

remains both valid and unanswered by you. Nothing you have suggested offers more than vague PR-related references as evidence that they’re not in quite a bit of trouble.

Hohum
Hohum

Which is why its convenient that aren’t any issue that can’t be overcome. The structural issues having been corrected and the stability issues managed which is why the ships are in service now. BTW, CG47s are already undergoing modernisations; they can and are being extended.

What platform problems with DDG51? It already has a planned 40 year service life.

So no, no deep poo.

Modernised ship design effort has engineering challenges, yup, thats the process. Thus far nothing insurmountable has been identified.

SSC, given no design has yet been released it seems somewhat premature to comment on it. LCS is producing ships that are already deployed. Its not ideal but the ships completed and in build will be improved.

Your question has never been valid because your original claim was invalid. It is even more invalid when your question is “when was the last time NAVSEA designed a destroyer except for that destroyer it designed?”.

NAVSEA suffered severe skills fade in the 90s, that has been rectified. DDG 51 Fl3 is being pursued for cost grounds not on skills grounds.

Not a Boffin
Not a Boffin

Sorry Hohum. Specifics not waffle.

Here’s a question for you. Is a structural fix for a ship implemented ten years ago, valid for that same ship in ten years time? If so why? If not why not? What has changed?

How does one “manage” stability and what consequence does that have? I’ll let you avoid absolute specifics and numbers, but the principles are unclass…..

What is the usual life rating for naval fire-retardant cabling? What are the issues involved in extending its life?

If you’d like me to redefine the question on NAVSEA designs – try this “how many surface combatant designs to contract-level definition has NAVSEA undertaken since 1980 and when did activity complete?”

And while I’m at it – the cruiser modernisation you refer to is primarily a combat systems upgrade and a hull refurb – what you might call a refit. It doesn’t solve the underlying problems.

Mike
Mike

How about 30x Type26 for the USN?

Hohum
Hohum

NaB,

Let me just point out a fact for you (again), CG47 class ships can be extended, we know that because that is happening right now. In fact just five days ago USS Cowpens was the first ship to be inducted for that modernisation- a process that will extend her life from 35 to 44 years and give her an extremely modern combat system. The cruisers can and actually are being extended, thats a fact. That the Tico class had design issues is well known but they are and will remain in service just as they have since 1983 as those can and are managed.

Now, your original question was invalid because it was being used to support a false claim, it was rendered more invalid because it involved ignoring an entire ship class this incarnation remains invalid by being the same question. NAVSEA had a skills problem in ship design, it recognised that in the late 90s and has subsequently rectified it.

ArmChairCivvy
ArmChairCivvy

Exactly the way to do it:
“By stopping T26 at boat 8 and starting a T26/45+ along side at say boat 6/7 with a view for a further 8 we can keep that design and manufacturing drumbeat pounding. Thoughts?”
Ref: comment 36 , as the comments to comments will get time ordered

Not a Boffin
Not a Boffin

USS Cowpens (one of the younger ships by the way) has entered a refit to upgrade her combat system and refurbish her hull. Agreed. No argument from me there.

However, the extension to 44 years is contingent on spending a large chunk of it tied up either in the refit itself or reserve. That’s what the reference to “preserving force structure” and “offering options” is about. The navy “plan” is to decommission half and gradually refit them to replace the older half later. Something Congress is vehemently opposed to. So one way or the other you’re losing 11 hulls imminently. You may wish to note it also puts fatigue damage on hold.

I notice you’re still avoiding specifics as to the validity of structural repairs and managing stability. This is redolent of the beliefs of a number of naval programmers I have worked with who basically extended the life of a given ship programmatically by adding in another refit, irrespective of whether the ship needed major and specific modifications to maintain structural and stability compliance – or even whether such was possible. None of those ships ever made their “programmed” extensions…..

So – specifics please on structural safety and stability management.

One other thing. If NAVSEA really did rebuild its design expertise in the late 90s – what exactly are they all doing now? Not CVN, not DDG1000, not CG(X), not LCS. I can believe some are looking at SSC but as that’s a mod of LCS, it won’t be many. You’re telling me that AB Flt III is easy, so what on earth is this highly trained design cadre up to?

ArmChairCivvy
ArmChairCivvy

@TD, RE:

“Think Defence
TAS, it goes on email address used so no, sadly!”

I demand to be at least a 3Star General/ Admiral… and whatever it may be in the matters relating to the RAF, based on the number of my posts here.

These upstarts have spectacularly failed to heed the direction clearly indicated by me , even more so: to take direct orders when those have become necessary. Has this Board got any backbone, whatsoever, as expected in matters military?

Hohum
Hohum

And the decommed ships will be replaced by continuing Burke procurement; the pre AMDR restart vessels of which seven ships are already in build. So again, no poo.

The life extentsion includes hull and mechanical work- thats how the years are being added. The ships are viable and will remain so. This is happening even by your own belated admission, which is impressive as earlier they apparently couldn’t be extended- according to you.

Nice try, NAVSEA as ever has multiple ship programmes underway. I never said ABIII was easy, it still needs a design staff. It is also not certain ssc will be based on an existing LCS hull.

Not a Boffin
Not a Boffin

Still no specifics other than vague repeats of words you saw in the press release, like hull and mechanical. You still can’t explain what is being done or why and what the consequences are. Saying the ships are viable and will remain so over and over again does not actually make it a true statement.

You did not say AB Flt III was “easy” – you did say “pretty minor”. Which – by the way – tends to need a detailed design staff rather than a ship design team per se. What exactly are these other multiple design programmes then? Get googling…..

stephen duckworth

@NaB/APATS
In terms of ship design is there a reason why the USN couldn’t enhance the front end of a San Antonio class LPD with a 20′ diameter AMDR , full length Mk 41/57 say 64 VSL , and a big ‘gun’ , serviced with MW power and cooling for future laser/maser/rail type weapons? A big aspect of DD51 operations is fleet defence against air threats and land bombardment by shells/ missiles so why not combine the two on one big hull? Such a vessel could free up a DD for other tasks away from close in to the fleet and being big on space able to absorb future upgrades.

Hohum
Hohum

And no specifics from you either, which is odd as you are trying to disprove official US Navy statements. CG47 class ships are starting modernisations/life-extensions now that will extend them from 35 to 44 years.

I said the problems were pretty minor, not the design exercise, do try and keep quotes in context. NAVSEA are engaged in multiple ship design activities as you well know, you have listed most of them in this thread.

So we are clear, AMDR is to go to sea in DDG51 hull rather than a new hull for cost reasons, not because NAVSEA lacks the skills to design a new hull as you tried to claim.

The USN is not “deep in the poo” as you tried to claim.

Hohum
Hohum
Not a Boffin
Not a Boffin

There are some relatively well-known things one has to consider wrt specifics. Ageing has three effects on ship structures and two on stability. Some are related, as are their fixes.

If you are as knowledgeable as you try to project yourself, you should be able to list those things and their interrelationship with each other. If – once you’ve done that – you can relate that to the original CG47/DDG963 hull design, it will be clear why the sort of life extensions you’ve been repeating from NAVSEA press releases are highly improbable in a practical sense.

Using the “same” hull design to fit entirely new systems is rarely (if ever) a cost saving to those who know what they’re doing. To the inexperienced, or a non-naval engineer, a systems engineer – or a politician, it can seem attractive, but will not stand the test of a sixty-year life.

Perhaps you’d like to tell me where the hull design expertise in NAVSEA resides – and how many hullforms it has designed recently? Or perhaps you’d just like to keep repeating the same vague statements in the hope you may convince others that the USN surface programme is in rude health……

Better things to do now I’m afraid,

stephen duckworth

@Hohum
Yes , very similar but I envisaged all the new kit forward and no Mk 57 around the flight deck . But in all yes , the ballistic missiles are going to target the capital ships so why can’t it defend itself and other , earlier generations around it offloading their strike force at a land based objective , be it by air or sea.

Not a Boffin
Not a Boffin

Remind me what the design speed of LPD 17 is again? Compared to that required to maintain station on a CTOL carrier conducting flight ops?

stephen duckworth

I was trying to say that a part of the Arleigh Burkes operational plan was providing AAD and shore bombardment to USMC dedicated vessels whilst attempting landings ,be they by air or sea bourne. If one of the vessels providing the USMC deployment can also provide AAD / land bombardment and free up a DD51 for their ASW work why not? The AAD is pretty much an essential remit of such landings so why not enable one of the ships tasked with it the ability? I didn’t say it would cut cost it would just add ability and flexibility.

Hohum
Hohum

NaB,

Provide some evidence that the USN is wrong when it says it can life extend the life of the CG47s to 44 years

Provide some evidence that ABIII has failed

These tired generalities about how the USN is obviously incapable of designing a new DDG or hull or of doing the things is actually doing just make you look silly.

Hohum
Hohum

Seriously,

NaB has accused NAVSEA of being incapable of designing a new DDG hull without a shred of evidence

He has then claimed that the CG47 class can’t be life extended despite the fact that is happening now

He has claimed the USN faces armageddon because of the nearing decommissioning of the some of the early CG47 ships despite their replacements being already in build

He has claimed that AB III won’t work based on nothing but his own uninformed opinion

And his lines of defence are thus:

“when was the last time NAVSEA designed a destroyer other than the destroyer it designed” and,

“tell me specifically how the USN is going to do the thing it is already doing”

NaB, let it go.

NOt a Boffin
NOt a Boffin

An alternative view might be – Hohum says it’s all good because the USN says so.

You still can’t or won’t answer the actual questions I asked though can you? Keep dodging – time will prove one of us right. In the meantime, back under your bridge, the goats are coming……

Hohum
Hohum

Time has already proven you wrong.

NAVSEA can design new DDG hulls which is why your question requires the exclusion of one, Ticos are being life extended right now and the first DDG-51 restart boat has already been launched keeping the USN on course for its two DDGs per year construct.

Not a Boffin
Not a Boffin

Now you’re even struggling to write coherently.

“NAVSEA can design new DDG hulls which is why your question requires the exclusion of one”.

Except that since the original AB in the late 80s, the only surface combatant hull they’ve designed (and in fact it was largely done by the industry Blue/Gold teams of the DD(X) programme) is DDG1000. In around 2001. Which we both agree is an aberration. So now, rather than design a new one for a destroyer, they’re not. Despite having since around 2007 to conduct the work, they’re falling back on a 30 yr old hullform, significantly reworking it and expecting it to accommodate new systems, but more importantly perform and meet structural and safety standards out to 2060+. Making it the equivalent of proposing a T12 hull for the T26. If you knew how little hullform design (as in the structural and hydrodynamic elements of it) actually costs as a proportion of the overall design, you’d realise how silly “cost-saving” sounds. It’s actually fear of failure, driven by skill fade.

Saying “NAVSEA can design new DDG hulls” is not supported by what they’re actually doing.

Trip, trap. Trip, trap.

Hohum
Hohum

Thats entirely coherent, your invalid question from the outset has been thus:

“When was the last time navsea designed a new ddg except for that ddg they designed”

You have then been falsely and without evidence claiming navsea can’t design new warships.

Hohum
Hohum

It has been pointed out to you multiple times that the reason for selecting the DDG51 hull was cost, not skills fade, you have presented no evidence to support your outlandish claim.

Not a Boffin
Not a Boffin

Au contraire.

I’ve put plenty of evidence forward that Navsea and the USN are having significant difficulty with their programmes and are in the poo. Whereas you have supplied zero evidence – other than “the USN says so” to support your premise that they’re not.

Nor have you managed to answer the relatively straightforward questions on structures, stability management and their interrelated consequences.

Trip, trap. It’s the sound of Big Billy Goat Gruff……

Hohum
Hohum

Now you are just lying, you have provided no evidence, all you have said is that choosing to use the DDG51 hull to carry the AMDR hull proves that the US can’t design new destroyers. That is complete nonsense.

You also made ridiculous comments about impending block obsolescence for the current DDG/CG fleet despite multiple new destroyers being in build and cruisers already starting life extension. And that is why your questions aren’t even valid, you have just made them up to cover up the fact you made an unfounded accusation.

Peter Elliott

Regardless of the debate about why they chose not to design a new hull for the Flight 3 build the very fact that they haven’t will engender a degree of skill fade. It can’t not. Actually doing something beats thinking about it every time.

JamesF

@HH. Do you really have to be provocative and offensive to everyone you disagree with, or is your surname Putin? I’m sure you have lots of friends: is this the way you speak to them?

Not a Boffin
Not a Boffin

No lies in my submission my friend, but plenty of bluster in yours.

There are seven new DDG in build (not new design) – four of which are “technology refresh” variants of AB Flt IIA and three of which are straight Flt IIA. They are in build not because the USN wanted to do that, but because their proposed replacement – DD(X), later DDG1000 – proved to be a spectacular catastrophe. They’re building them because they have to, because they have no other viable way forward at the minute, other than to build variants of a 30 yr old design. Their combat systems will be fine, because the US are actually very good at keeping them updated, not least helped by having Mk41/SM range as a building block. However, the safety aspects of using that hull design – which is already at its margins structurally and stability-wise – for another 30-odd years are not good. It’s all to do with that question you could not/would not answer about what happens to ships structure and stability as they age – and is just as important to “new” ships of an old design, as the original ships to that design. By the way, the USN are hardly likely to say we’re going to build new ships to an old design but either relax their safety standards or impose operational penalties on them such that they meet the original standard, are they? But if you are technically competent (which means knowing the answers to certain questions), then you know what they will end up doing and why.

NAVSEA have designed one new surface combatant since Arleigh Burke in the mid 1980s. That surface combatant (DDG1000), designed with considerable assistance from the BIW and HII teams is not yet in service and some might just consider it something of a failure.

The only other new design surface combatants are the two LCS variants (Freedom and Independence), designed respectively by LM/Marinette and Fincantieri and BIW/Austal (with a little help from BAES). Neither are unqualified successes and while build contracts are being let, the modules that deliver the capability are far from operationally proven. The ship programme itself has been significantly curtailed.

So, since the DDG1000 programme was capped at three back in 2008 (and it was apparent it was coming long before that!), NAVSEA has done nothing in terms of a new surface combatant design – it has instead put 7 ships of a 30 year old design into a build programme to replace what was to be a 32 ship DDG1000 class.

Similarly, the CG(X) programme has died a death. Has Navsea tried to design a new surface combatant to replace the CG47? No. Instead it is trying to shoehorn a new sensor system (and some novel platform systems) into the existing 30 year old DDG51 hull design, despite major concerns about power, cooling and stability margins. While the SPY6 system may be passing its critical design reviews, it’s a bit quieter on the ship front. One minute it’s getting a new electric propulsion plant, the next it’s not – the CNO “mis-spoke” apparently. Even this may only deliver a first ship IOC in 2023, by which time the eldest CG47 will be 37 years old, seven years past its original design life and much, much heavier. Which has consequences. The navy has put lots of money into hull and machinery refits since 2010, but these are maintaining material state, not addressing the structural and stability issues that are emergent. The navy is highly unlikely to publically announce that the ships will be constrained. Instead they’ve announced they’d like to take 11 out of them out of service to husband the hulls while the other 11 are run into the ground, before feeding the withdrawn 11 back into service. You don’t do this by choice. Again – hardly the actions of a navy that’s not in the poo.

Largely because it’s new surface combatant design and procurement activity since the mid 90s has been less than an unqualified success. At current date, five LCS in service and two or three DDG1000 to enter service over the next couple of years. Plus the future delivery of seven restart Flt IIA ships from a programme planned to end with the FY2005 budget.

All of those are facts. My professional contention based on those facts is that the USN is in the poo. Yours is that everything’s fine – it must be cos the USN says so.

Trip, trap.

mickp
mickp

Starting from a view of holding the USN in high regard and affection, the fact they are using the AB platform for AMDR speaks volumes for the paucity of will or ability (or both) to design something better. The AB is a classic design, albeit very different in manning and other ways to an RN philosophy but its at its limits and outside of the AB what do we see? LCS, Tico and Zumwalt none of which appear optimum for anything (notwithstanding the Tico’s service record, it remains in my eyes a top heavy, jam packed Spruance conversion). For the type of strategy the USN projects it was and is crying out for a bottom up cruiser design on a conventional hull form with masses of room for AMDR and a large missile load out for ABM / AAW (should have gone with Aegis CGN at the outset). The bigger the better. AB remains the all round high end escort and solo tasking vessel (with a long term plan for an equivalent replacement) and then the next step should have been a genuine OHP / frigate replacement as an ASW specialist vessel. Just my laymans’ view. Zumwalt should have been killed at one or two as a demonstrator for future cruiser capabilities (without tumblehome…)

mickp
mickp

@NAB – on skills fade, if T26 is, optimistically, a 13-16 run of a pretty similar design and early in its production life, work kicks off on MHC and later down the line work kicks off on a T45 replacement, not forgetting somewhere in there, will be a project to replace the Albions – is that enough to mitigate major warship skill fade in the UK or should the T26 buy be say split into two distinct variants say to allow for a degree of design refresh? Is more needed to keep the team busy and refreshed? How would you structure it? Thanks

TAS
TAS

Apart from myth and bluster about it being a 30-year old design, is there anything actually wrong with the Arleigh Burke design? I mean, why the need to design anew? Boeing is still building 737’s – it’s not like the design is inadequate, is it? Seems to me that the Burke is actually pretty capable – after all, the COLE survived the attack in Aden, when I’m not convinced a T23 or T45 would have.

If it works…

Not a Boffin
Not a Boffin

Mick

Personally I’d build 8 ASW T26 and then a new class using much the same major equipment items for a GP role, primarily to avoid design skills fade. But there is significant political risk associated with that, which is why it isn’t on the plot. MHC will not be as complex and therefore may not sustain the same lessons and knowledge, but at least offers to mitigate some of that risk.

TAS – there’s no myth or bluster about the AB – it is a thirty year old design. If you are where I think you are, step over to the Fleet Nav or the Surflot MEO and ask him/her what the T23 are having to do now to meet their stability certification. Then ask the Chief chippy whether he thinks that could be done in another way. He’ll probably suggest a particular solution (which is approximately 12 times as dense as the current one) which comes coated in PVC (no-not that!), but should then note that doing so will have other consequences. primarily to do with hull loading. While you’re doing all this, remember that the T23 – a ship with minimal growth margin – has already gained well over 10% in lightship and has another nigh-on 20 years to go.

Those factors apply equally to AB as they do to T23. If you’ve any T42 time think how many unplanned crack repairs happened in Fleet time and how knackered those ships were by the end. And none of them served 30 years.

The AB was and is a good design. So was Leander – but would you want to go to sea in that today – even with an updated combat system?

Rocket Banana

NaB,

Are you saying that ships such as T23 and AB are rendered obsolete simply due to weight growth and the need to re-ballast?

Does everything get heavier? Doesn’t anything get smaller and lighter during a ship’s life?

Peter Elliott

Basically it’s much easier to put stuff on a ship than to take it off. Little things like paint, pipes, cables etc all add up. And that’s before you deliberately add new stuff because it’s necessary to combat effectiveness.

TAS
TAS

NaB,

Mate I know the inherent issues with through-life weight growth but we’re not talking about extending old ships in service – that issue relates to the Ticos – but new builds to an existing design. The AB Flight 3’s could, of course, grow heavier and put on topweight – the AMDR is a good example as it moves all the weight up higher in the superstructure. But they are new build – without changing the design you can move a lot of stuff around internally and compensate. They are also much bigger than a T23 so can absorb a greater increase in tonnage (keeping it proportional to stability), but they are clearly big, broad stable hulls already. The basic hull design is sound and stronger than an equivalent UK vessel (double hulled), the propulsion system is still sound, the weapons fit is still sound – a new build hull will still last 30 years, longer if you design fixes into it at the outset.

Given the choice between T26 and a new-buildAB, I’d take the AB every time – proven tech, proven design. But a refreshed Leander? Isn’t everybody here clamouring for corvettes? Could do worse…

Hohum
Hohum

NaB,

Still more lies, just in greater volume this time.

There is nothing wrong with the AB design, its system fit has been continually updated since conception, so just give it a rest. Trying to suggest it is not fit for purpose as you now are just shows how ridiculous you are being.

The structural issues with the CG47 class are well known and have been managed for years, hence the modernisation programme that is happening right now. Keeping ships in service for very long time periods is something the USN is rather good at.

NAVSEA is perfectly capable of designing ships, it is ridiculous to say it isn’t and even more ridiculous to claim that the reason they are using the DDG51 hull because they are incapable of designing a new one. The height of ridiculousness being that your entire absurd argument requires one to ignore DDG1000.

TAS
TAS

Great example whilst thinking about it. The T23’s will lose topweight when Sea Wolf is replaced by Sea Ceptor, as the latter no longer requires a fire control radar. One assumes that at some stage, the Burkes will lose their AN/SPG-62’s if the AMDR can replicate that function, saving a considerable chunk of mass.

Not a Boffin
Not a Boffin

While specific equipments occasionally get lighter / smaller, the ships as a whole always get heavier and their centre of gravity often rises. Both of these effects are “bad things”. Trouble is much of that weight growth is known as “unattributable” – because you can’t actually identify all the things that comprise it.

Occasionally you get a win – Sea Ceptor means we can lose the Radar 911 trackers which saves about 9 tonnes. Unfortunately, the average annual weight growth on those ships exceeds that value. Using material other than steel for vent trunking in the messdecks saves weight. However, more often its a negative – Sonar 2087 is a heavier fit than Sonar 2031Z. Using electrical control rather than LP air means heavier cabling / trunking and motors compared to small bore copper pipe and air valves. You do it because it’s nominally cheaper to maintain or allows a more automated control system, but there is a penalty.

As Peter says, taking stuff – particularly unattributable stuff – off is generally much harder (and costlier) to do.

TAS
TAS

NaB,

You’re not following my point – I am asking you about new build ships. Take a 30-year old AB. Build another to exactly the same specification. The newer ship will be lighter than the old, because you haven’t got 30 years of weight growth. Add in the fact that you can modify the design, use lighter materials and move equipment around, you create capacity that should last the lifetime of the ship. Anyone else following my logic?

Hohum
Hohum

TAS,

Of course, and your logic is not just sound but what has happened in practice. NaB just made some stupid comments and is now desperately obfuscating in an already failed effort to avoid embarrassment.

The AB design has been continually evolved through its build run, the systems fits (not just combat but electrical and mechanical) have been continually evolved and those changes retrofitted back through the fleet.

Then of course you have margin, on the Flight IIA ships for instance that margin is said to be almost 1,000 tons, that is intended to absorb that weight growth.

Mike
Mike

Sorry Hohum and TAS, I’m with NAB on this one. I’m an admirer of the USN, and let’s face it, it’s absolutely vital for all our sakes they get things right. Unfortunately to this outsider it looks like they have lost (surface fleet) plot recently. They should most definitely be designing a new destroyer and (I may be in a minority of 1 here) consider the the T26 so they can concentrate on the big destroyer.

TAS
TAS

I for one would have been perfectly content with a refreshed Type 23 instead of accepting all the cost and design risk associated with T26. With systems updated and structural issues addressed, it would have been perfectly serviceable. I think it would have benefited from some redesign to accept ISO containers, and of course the propulsion systems would benefit from an overhaul, but fundamentally it’s a sound design. Nothing about T26 is going to revolutionise the way we do business.

Not a Boffin
Not a Boffin

TAS – Unfortunately not quite true.

There will have been systems changes since the original ship was built that you will want to embody in the new one – either for capability reasons or regulatory/standards ones. They generally add weight and rarely reduce it. Is Radar 997 heavier or lighter than Radar 996? Are the new CW plants heavier or lighter than the old? Is Sonar 2087 heavier or lighter than Sonar 2031Z?

Lightweight materials may help, but only if they can be certified for use. Lots of people talk composites, but what is their resistance to fire? Is the Defstan on Fire protection the ship was designed against still in existence – or have its requirements become more onerous? Talk to NAG-Fire for the answer. What about LSE? How much extra on the upper decks now required by regulation compared to Norfolk ISD? MARPOL compliance? SOLAS enhancements? Want Scan Eagle? Add launch and recovery system. Want the chicks aboard? Separate messdecks and heads / showers then. Messdecks have changed dramatically since Norfolk was built and are no-where near the standards on T45. Which would you prefer? Access policy? Escape & evacuation? Compare the passageway sizes on a T45 with T23. None of these things stand still.

You can build to print an old design, but it has inherent assumptions and limitations on use – particularly wrt safety. Which is why no-one credible has proposed new-build T23 with refreshed systems to meet the T26 requirement. Now the US are less prone to applying regulatory standards than the Europeans, but they still do it eventually.

Ship safety and capability requirements do not stand still over 30 years – they tend to get more onerous and they almost invariably add stuff and weight. As a practical example – Kent commissioned in 1999 significantly heavier than Norfolk did in 1990 and she did so without either a 2031Z or a 2087 at the time. With your branch you should be able to access both BR and compare that net weight.

Hohum – I see you’ve emerged from under your bridge once you think you’ve got an ally. That margin that is “said” to be almost 1000 tonnes – is that a bit like the Stig is “said to feed on Castrol GTX”? Or is it doing some Googling? Is that structural margin or stability margin? Or have you just subtracted the full-load displacement of Flight I from Flight IIA? That might just indicate that Flight IIA has used up any margin that was in the original design.

There’s a fairly simple calculation you can do that tells you how much deeper a ship gets in the water as you add weight. If only you could explain what the consequences of that are for stability and structure…..

Trip, trap.

Hohum
Hohum

Mike,

Quite the contrary. They lost the plot in the 90s but now they have it back. AB III is considered the most cost effective means of getting AMDR to sea so thats what they are pursuing. Would a new ship have been better, yes, even the DDG51 PM admits that, but he also admits that the current approach is the best balance between capability and cost.

Also, that is not what NaB has been saying. He instead falsely claimed that the USN surface fleet was facing “block obsolescence”, that the CG47 class couldn’t be extended and that the US lacks the ability to design a new DDG and to this he is now trying to claim that the DDG51 class is no longer viable. All of those things are completely untrue.

Hohum
Hohum

NaB,

Your accusations of trolling really just demonstrate how desperate you are to deflect from the absurdity of your claims.

To underscore your ridiculousness, the about “1,000 ton number” comes from the DDG51 Programme Manager, who also states that the the vertical centre of gravity margin on newly delivered Flight IIA DDG51s is two thirds of a foot.

You see it turns out, that despite your ridiculous claims, NAVSEA actually spends its time designing and managing warships. As an institution it knows them well because thats its job, thus all these issues are known to them and in constant management. But let me guess, despite your demonstrated lack of knowledge about NAVSEA, the DDG51 design and current USN ship building and modernisation programmes, you know better right?

Not a Boffin
Not a Boffin

Only just noticed a whole raft of posts that have appeared, so sorry TAS previous posts may be somewhat out of phase.

AB is not a double hulled ship for a kick off – and in case you had a misconception that’s not necessarily what MARPOL requires either. MARPOL is much wider in scope. Hopeflly you’ll have seen the GWS26 vs Sea Ceptor comparative weight numbers. Swallowed up in an average year of T23 growth.

Hohum – still bleating on and calling me a liar in ever more hysterical terms. Think about this…

“Would a new ship have been better, yes, even the DDG51 PM admits that, but he also admits that the current approach is the best balance between capability and cost”

He’s hardly likely to say that we don’t believe we have the in-house capability to do a new design, now, is he?

Never mind. Trip trap.

Hohum
Hohum

NaB,

Just as expected, your last line of defence for this nonsense, you accuse the Programme Manager of the DDG51 programme of being a liar.

Look, its clear you have no idea what you are talking about and just wanted to look clever so you made some sweeping untruths. Just admit it and we can all move on.

Not a Boffin
Not a Boffin

Been googling have we? I seem to remember reading that article a couple of years back.

2/3 of a foot, eh? Or eight inches in real money. Or 200mm in metric. Funnily enough the difference in VCG between Norfolk and Kent when delivered new was about half that value already. Two new ships, 9 years apart. One heavier and without a hoofing great sonar. guess which one?

Trip trap.

Hohum
Hohum

NaB,

And considered sufficient for the ships planned service life based on analysis of weight growth in earlier vessels. Again, despite your completely false claims NAVSEA knows what it is doing.

The google thing is particularly amusing given all you knew about the Flight III programme came from a CRS document hosted on the FAS site. You didn’t know anything about margins on the DDG51 class and yet you still felt able to pronounce on their viability, its clear you are just making it up as you go along.

Not a Boffin
Not a Boffin

Found your interview now. Thought I’d read it before. Programme manager is a Combat Systems Officer – nothing wrong with that – some of my best friends are CSO etc, who “doesn’t want to get into the naval architecture”.

Interesting that you didn’t cover the rest of the interview where he explains where that 1000 te is coming from, which is by finessing a V-line analysis. Something I’ve done a number of times and I promise you that you don’t voluntarily achieve 1000te of reserve buoyancy by moving downflood points. You do it if you’re struggling. Because it has significant knock-on effects throughout the hull, adding more weight to bulkheads among other things. I wonder how much of his 1000te margin that will swallow up? Nor does that address the global structural load effects of an additional 1000 te and how you overcome that, usually by increasing structure which adds more weight, which reduces the margin you’re trying to achieve. It’s known as a tail-chase.

Then we get the whole debate about the 2/3 of a foot KG margin and how stability is his number one concern. Funny you didn’t mention that either. Perhaps it’s part of that overall technical debate you are unable or unwilling to engage in.

Never mind. Keep calling me a liar and telling everybody the USN is designing a new surface combatant. When it patently is not.

Trip trap.

Peter Elliott

Surely no-one can be sure of in – service growth margin of the flight 3 until the engine room changes etc are all totally nailed down. Growth in weight during design changes eats into the in – service margin which is presumably exactly what they’re wrestling with right now. Maybe they do manage to find the sweet spot but until one goes in the water and the displacement is measured I don’t see how anyone, inside NAVSEA or not, can confidently assert what the in service weight growth margin will be.

TAS
TAS

Sorry NaB, I’m not convinced. But as it makes no difference whatsoever, I’ll leave it at that. And in any case, you and HoHum have made this a thoroughly unpleasant conversation to read. I’m done, thanks.

Hohum
Hohum

PE,

For certain, nope, but the design process has been going on for a while and the Programme Office has presented estimates to congress.

NaB,

Why would I mention it, the PM mentions it as a design challenge and says hes working to improve that margin. Its part of the design process, only in NaB land is it portent of impending doom

You are a liar. You have falsely and without evidence claimed the US is incapable of designing a new DDG, you have falsely and without evidence claimed the CG47 class can’t be life extended, you have falsely and without evidence claimed the USN surface fleet is facing “block obsolescence”, then without any understanding of the margins and life-cycle planning for DDG51 you attempted to claim they weren’t viable.

When called on your false claims you have called the DDG51 PM a liar and questioned his technical expertise (and by extension those of his team). And yet you call me a troll, which is amusing.

Hohum
Hohum

TAS,

My apologies, but when I see people making completely false statements on topics about which they don’t even have the basic facts, not to mention when they make accusations of dishonesty against serving military officers in order to defend their uninformed and false allegations, I feel it necessary to respond.

Not a Boffin
Not a Boffin

Sorry TAS – not my intention. If you go back to the top of the thread, the contention was that the USN is in the poo. Something I believe has been adequately demonstrated.

Our other major contributor to thread does not concur and is the one busily casting aspersions without any supporting evidence and seemingly unable to provide the explanations as to why the USN programmes are late and struggling.

Just as a point of order, I’m not calling the DDG51 PM (or anyone else for that matter) a liar. I actually sympathise with him as he’s been told to manage and deliver a high-profile programme, with a customer desperate for a result, after a couple of equally high-profile procurement disasters. The decision to go with that programme was made before he took charge by people with much higher pay-grades. What he can’t say politically is that “this is actually a high-risk programme that may not deliver, we’re doing it because we don’t believe we can design a new destroyer from scratch, so we’re having to do all sorts of things to an old design that we wouldn’t do otherwise”.

The subsequent discussion on using HV electrical distribution is also quite illuminating. Increased weight of electrical distribution systems, increased bend radii in transmission cabling, increased heat load from that HV switchgear all cost weight and space. He’s also likely to be burning an extra 50te in generating fuel alone per week, which is either coming out of his base bunker load or needs additional tankage and weight.

Still – what do I know – I’m clearly out of my depth!

Hohum
Hohum

NaB,

But it was neither demonstrated nor evidenced and was an opinion you expressed whilst not fully aware of the facts.

To give you an example of the evidence I provided, you claimed that the CG47 class can’t be extended, I pointed out they are being extended right now.

You did call the DDG51 PM a liar.

Given the lack of knowledge you have shown about the current USN shipbuilding/upgrade programme and about the margins associated with the DDG51 design it is very clear you are out of your depth.

Not a Boffin
Not a Boffin

This mornings post deals with your nonsense Hohum. Read it again, try not to misrepresent it and see if you can understand it.

At no point have I called the PM (or anyone else) a liar. That accusation has been used exclusively by you. While desperately avoiding answering a number of pertinent questions or providing anything supporting your arguments other than various versions of “the USN says its alright so it must be”. Back under your bridge, trip, trap.

Here’s another thought that the PM will be currently wrestling with. There’s a rather high profile lawsuit starting up in the US involving the deaths of a couple of navy aviators, swept off the flightdeck in an SH60 from one of the most recent Flight IIA ships. There is virtually zero chance of the suit succeeding in court, but it will outline in excruciating detail how low freeboard on DDG51 ships contributed to this (and 13 other) hazardous incidents. It is unfortunate that the route to design margin chosen for Flt III involves reducing that freeboard further. Might just result in a change in the design standards, increasing minimum allowable freeboard, which would be another challenge for the poor PM. I do not envy him his challenges.

Safety rules change – for very good reasons over time, which is why old designs stop being fir for purpose and new designs are necessary.

Hohum
Hohum

None of your posts do any such thing, all of your claims remain false and thus unproven and your slur against the DDG51 PM is there for all to see. It is as it was before:

You said CG47 can’t be extended: it is being extended right now
You said the US is incapable of designing new destroyers: it designed DDG1000
You claimed the USN was facing “Block Obsolescence”: It is facing no such thing
You claimed the DDG51 was design was already at its margins: The latest Flight IIa ships have almost 1,000 tons of margin

You had no idea what you were talking about and when that was demonstrated you resorted to accusing a serving military officer of being a liar.

Now you are claiming that a single lawsuit, that by your own admission has virtually no chance of success, in the most litigious country on earth is evidence for your entirely false claims.

Not a Boffin
Not a Boffin

It’s like dealing with Violett-Elizabeth Bott (apologies for those too young for the reference).

If you can find the exact post where I called the PM “a liar” bring it on. Nor have I suggested the lawsuit is any sort of evidence for ludicrous claims. What I did say, is that said lawsuit may have consequences for safety regulation which will have a direct impact on the viability of the design solution for Flt III margin. If you even began to understand how the “1000te margin” (on Ft IIA – not Flt III) is being assumed – it’s not actually inherent in the Flt II design, you’d know it’s a risky proposition, even without any regulatory change from the aviation hazards.

But you don’t know, or understand, so keep screaming “liar, liar, pants on fire” possibly until you’re sick. You’re not hurting my credibility, just your own.

I’ll leave you with a couple of blasts from the past- 2004 and 2005 to be precise. When DD(X) was also going to deliver for the navy. That Navy PM had a solution at the time. He wasn’t a liar, he just didn’t know his solution wasn’t going to work.

http://www.defense-aerospace.com/article-view/release/60202/dd(x)-passes-initial-critical-design-review-(jul-19).html

Or this one from the GAO (pgs 45-46). The Program Office comments on pg 46 ought to be particularly poignant. This report is from 2004 and the PM expected to place a build contract in 2005 – much like the first Flt III contract s expected to be placed in FY2016.

Turned out well didn’t it?

Trip trap.

Hohum
Hohum

NaB,

This wouldn’t be so tragic were it not for the fact you knew nothing whatsoever about the margins on the DDG51 design before you started opining on them, and you still know nothing about them beyond those details I found, and yet you persist in making claims against them you just can’t support. Your base accusation remains though, that NAVSEA has no idea what its doing and its belief that it has sufficient margin in ships it has been managing for decades is thus false because you, someone who didn’t even know what those margins were, says so. Do you not grasp how absurd that is?

The USN surface fleet is just fine, 62 Aegis destroyers in the fleet, a further 7 laid down, another 4 to be laid down over the next 18-24 months. 22 cruisers in the fleet of which the first of 11 has just begun the life extension you said was impossible. The Flight III design is in progress and the USN is expressing confidence, unlike with DD(X) there has been no serious suggestion that it should be cancelled.

Accusing a serving military officer of being a liar was particularly disgusting but not surprising when your opening gambit was to falsely claim the US was incapable of designing a new destroyer (despite them having designed DDG1000)- something you have still offered no evidence for, just your own uninformed opinion.

TD,

If you would be so kind I would rather you left this open. It is important that discussion be based on fact and I am rather enjoying pointing out the multiple instances here where NaB has let his opinion run far ahead of the facts.

Hohum
Hohum

And finally,

You still haven’t addressed any of these:

You said CG47 can’t be extended: it is being extended right now
You said the US is incapable of designing new destroyers: it designed DDG1000
You claimed the USN was facing “Block Obsolescence”: It is facing no such thing
You claimed the DDG51 was design was already at its margins: The latest Flight IIa ships have almost 1,000 tons of margin

JamesF

WTF?

WiseApe

Sorry to interrupt in mid tif and just on the Type 26, but do we know the actual tonnage yet? It was, IIRC, supposed to be circa 5400t, but I have seen figures from 6-8ooot banded about. Anyone heard anything recently?

JamesF

@WA – about 6,250 I believe. 8K is full load.

WiseApe

Thanks for that James but do you have a source for those figures? I had a gander at wiki which quotes 6500-8000, the latter full load as you say, but their only source is a defencenews article from 2014:

“Design work is continuing to mature on the frigate. Part of that effort has seen the weight of the warship creep up slightly by 250 tons to 6,500 tons. Full load displacement is now more than 8,000 tons, officials said.”

I tend to equate unnamed officials with the ubiquitous bus load of nuns – a useful literary device.

Not a Boffin
Not a Boffin

Sorry guys, I omitted the link to the GAO report from the earlier post. It’s here – pg 45-46 being the relevant bit.

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04248.pdf

I note that Violet has still not managed to identify where I called a serving military officer a liar, but grows ever more hysterical about it. An outrage bus of magnificent proportions.

It is also clear from the interview with Capt Vandroff the PM (link below) that my assertion that the DDG51 design had used up its original margin is correct.

http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/an-interview-with-capt-mark-vandroff-ddg-51-program-manager-peo-ships-naval-sea-systems-command/

What he is saying is that the Flt IIA had used up all the margin in the original design, so what they’re having to do now to get their extra 1000te is allow the ships draft to grow, which decreases the freeboard. It also brings downflooding point much closer to the waterline which is what a V-line analysis is all about and what he means when he talks about moving “holes” up in the ship.

Unfortunately, what he doesn’t then address is the structural effect of that increased displacement. Which is non-trivial. When you put the ship deeper in the water – aside from all the stability issues like reduction of reserve of buoyancy, what you also get are increased bending and shear loads in the ships girder (global loads) and increased hydrostatic loads in the decks and the bulkheads. The associated fatigue loadings also go up and have to be addressed.

All of that means you have to add steel to the ship to accommodate those loads. Which adds weight, increasing the displacement (and draft) and hence loads still further. Just as an example, if I wanted to add 1/16″ (1.5mm) to the weatherdeck plate, that would cost me about 30 tonnes additional weight – just for the weatherdeck. Because of the way the hull distributes stress, I’d also have to do something to the keel as well, with similar effects. I’d also have to beef up the grillage structure on each deck to match. More weight and increased loads – hence the earlier description of a tail-chase.

If you do the maths, you’ll realise that if I have to add an inch of steel plate to the decks distributed throughout the depth of the ship, I’ve used up 480 tonnes, just doing that and not counting extra girders, increased global loads, bulkhead and deck strengthening to account for increased hydrostatic loads.

If you understand what he’s saying, you can see what they’re trying to do and can see why the 1000 te isn’t actually the margin – it’s what they’ve calculated they can get by increasing the draft. The structural weight penalty for that is yet to be dealt with.

If you understand those issues you can comment on them. If you don’t then you end up getting a bit hysterical.

T26 displacement values are not official, because they’re still rather sensitive, so you won’t see actual values in the press. The 6000 te is a lightship value (ie without people, fuel, ammo, stores etc). The deep displacement is about 8000. The End of Life Deep displacement is larger still.

Rocket Banana

Wise,

I posted this last year:

http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2014/06/royal-navy-type-26-contract-awards/#comment-293515

Take NaBs last post into account too (as it’s likley to be way more accurate that my spreadsheetery), but it is worth looking at wiki for the displacement definitions. You can see how the media/RN can mangle the “size” just about any way they want. Especially if they compare apples and pears.

ArmChairCivvy
ArmChairCivvy

Call it a cruiser, and we are done?

Rocket Banana

ASW destroyer… which to me is accurate, acceptable and awesome.

The frigates should be the GP ships NaB wants to build next :-)

Hohum
Hohum

NaB,

That’s not what’s he is saying. First you call him a liar then you put words in his mouth. New build Flight IIa ships have 1000. Tons of weight margin. You also know nothing about the structure of those ships so stop pontificating about it. Using weight margin reduces draft, that doesn’t mean their is a problem, as you well know.

It was you commenting on things that you know nothing about that caused you to make such invalid statements in the first place, like when you claimed CG47s couldn’t be extended because you didn’t know the program had already started.

JamesF

BAe are saying 6,900t. I based the 6,250 figure on the original estimate of 6,000t (after the design was downsized in 2010) and a recent report I read somewhere that it had grown by 200-300t.
http://www.baesystems.com/en/product/global-combat-ship. Basically its what you think it might be.

ArmChairCivvy
ArmChairCivvy

@Simon,
You are pre-empting the follow-on AAW version then?

Peter Elliott

Use of margin is an increase of weight which increases draft. Before you use margin the ship sits higher in the water than after you use it. Obviously! Perhaps Hohum mistyped ;)

Hohum
Hohum

PE,

Hohum certainly did, he meant freeboard, thanks for pointing out the error!

Not a Boffin
Not a Boffin

You still haven’t identified where I called Capt Vandroff a liar Violet – despite numerous requests to do so. But that’s because you can’t. Nor am I putting words in his mouth – any competent naval arch reading that interview knows exactly what he’s saying and what it means. They might also raise the odd eyebrow at your contention that “reducing draft (or freeboard – do try and get your terminology right) doesn’t mean there is a problem”.

One of us knows a lot more about the structure of those ships than the other – and doesn’t need to pontificate. I’ll leave the readership to decide who that is.

You’re not guesting on Question Time tonight are you? Similar standard of reasoning and logic to some welsh bird with large breasticles.

No? Oh well. Hope the underbridge environment isn’t too dank.

Trip, trap.

Hohum
Hohum

Wrong again NaB,

He is referring to what the USN calls service life allowance, which is growth margin. Amusingly, there is actually a series of charts showing this in the CRS document you linked to earlier. So thank you for once agin demonstrating you know nothing about the Arleigh Burke class, we both know you know nothing about their structure too.

Hohum
Hohum

TD,

If I may be so bold, I know precisely what the original disagreement was about, it occurred when NaB, without evidence, tried to claim the USN surface fleet is “deep in the poo” and that the U.S. is incapable of designing a new DDG hull. He added a host of other false claims later but they were the original dispute.

Not a Boffin
Not a Boffin

It’s pitiful Violet.

Service Life Allowance is the growth margin (weight, centroid and other quantities) required in the design. Capt Vandroff was describing how the Flt IIA and Flt III designs were going to achieve that. That method of achieving the weight growth and centroid element of the SLA carries significant risk, for the technical reasons I outlined previously. But then if you understood that – instead of casting round for different terms in the vain hope that it would sustain your forlorn argument – you wouldn’t be demonstrating your lack of expertise now.

It appears everyone has had quite enough of this, so I’ll summarise where we are (just like yesterday).

The USN surface fleet is in the poo.

It was going to get 32 DD(X) starting from around 2010. It will now get three – or possibly only two.
It will also get seven restarted AB Flt IIA, the first of which will not commission for a year or two. The through-life allowance for these has been achieved by a rather risky approach.
So – destroyer numbers down by twenty-odd and much later than planned.

It had a cruiser programme – CG(X) – which was going to start delivering about now. That was cancelled.
The fallback position is to try and shoehorn a new sensor and combat system, plus several new platform systems into a thirty year old destroyer design. There is significant technical risk in doing so (similar to Flt IIA), which is as yet unmitigated. The first ship is unlikely to reach IOC until 2023 – and is not yet ordered – (see also unmitigated technical risk).
This means they will have to run the CG52 variant even longer than planned. To do this, they are refreshing the combat system and undertaking a refit to maintain the material state of the hull – BUT – to make it work, they want to put half the fleet into reserve, so they can make them last the required period. I submit that this is less a life extension than a husbanding exercise. Unless tying up half your fleet in reserve is something you do voluntarily?

Their other surface combatant programme has been curtailed from 55 to 32 ships, or which 5 have been delivered and for which the modules that deliver the capability are largely operationally unproven. A further surface combatant programme is planned to be based on these ships but is as yet undefined.

Much of this is because NAVSEA has suffered skills fade. The only new destroyer they have designed since the original AB Flt I in the mid-80s, is the exemplary DDG1000. A design so good, it was reduced from 32 ships, to 3 and is so important that they are actually considering scrapping the third one which is 70% complete. Rather than produce a new cruiser design they are trying to make a ship originally designed for 9000 te displacement achieve just shy of 11000 and remain viable through a 30+ year life. The AB Flt I was a good design, but not that good!

If that summary does not describe a surface fleet in the poo, then I dread to think what does.

Last on the subject, irrespective of whatever hysterical ramblings Violet comes out with. Hope some have found it informative and apologies to those offended by the tone.

Hohum
Hohum

More outright lies. From you,

SLA is growth margin, the Flight IIA ships as delivered have almost 1,000 tons of it. You didn’t know that when you started pontificating on DDG51 margins. Now you have started making up even more nonsense based on things you don’t know (such as DDG51 structure) in order to dig yourself out of that hole- you are failing.

Programmes cancelled years ago are irrelevant now they have been replaced by other programmes; specifically the new build DDG51s and the cruiser life extension that has already started despite you saying it was impossible.

NAVSEA suffered skills fade in the 90s, that has been rectified and has nothing to do with DDG51 which was a cost driven decision.

Again, on CG47, you don’t know what you are talking about. The eleven ships not being life extended will ultimately be replaced by the DDG51 ships currently in build. Also, courtesy of congress they are not being put in reserve currently either.

What we have all learned here is that you will start throwing. Around sweeping statements on topics about which you don’t even have the most basic facts and will happily accuse serving military officers of dishonesty to cover up your lack of knowledge.

Rocket Banana

Guesstimates:

T26: 6000t light, 7200t standard, 7350t normal, 8000t full, 8800t end-of-life
T45: 6500t light, 7800t standard, 8000t normal, 8600t full, 9500t end-of-life
AB2: 6800t light, 8200t standard, 8350t normal, 9000t full, 10000t end-of-life

I think my end-of-life (full+10%) and T45 full loads are a bit high.

Mike
Mike

NAB, have found it very informative, thanks.

Hohum
Hohum

Mike,

Given that most of what NaB has posted in this thread has been completely false and shown to be so I do trust you don’t take any of it as fact.

JamesF

@HH Who cares? – its an internet discussion on things we are mildly interested in and a distraction from everyday life. Turning it into personalised warzone is both impolite and frankly, idiotic.

WiseApe

Well said James. Belated thanks to Simon. Just this lunchtime I was in WHSmith’s reading an article on the Type 26 in the October Warship magazine (in the public sector so can’t afford to actually buy such fripperies) – would you believe the author was still quoting 5400t and 250-350 million.

And National Geographic now costs £5.50. Hard times.

The Other Chris

Smelling a rat with those likes/dislikes, quite the reversal overnight… Just down to US waking up and taking constructive criticism the wrong way…?

@NaB, very informative thank you. Although not my specific area the mechanics add up to other engineers in other specialisations, especially chasing tails. There’s a corollary with turbine blades and housings.

As for NAVSEA, they must be working on something very hush hush that’s made it to construction in order to regenerate and maintain sharp skills. Something the genset and prime mover crowd are also keeping secret squirrel…

In all seriousness, any sign of the UK returning the Electric Boat favour?

Hohum
Hohum

ToC,

Constructive criticism would require to have been fact based not just the product of NaB’s imagination, in case you missed it:

He said CG47 can’t be extended: it is being extended right now
He said the US is incapable of designing new destroyers: it designed DDG1000
He claimed the USN was facing “Block Obsolescence”: It is facing no such thing
He claimed the DDG51 was design was already at its margins: The latest Flight IIa ships have almost 1,000 tons of margin

He has also still presented absolutely no evidence for his skills fade argument either.

Chris
Chris

TOC – ref likes/dislikes – hilarious!

Rocket Banana

Isn’t the plan to run the Ticos into the ground and refurbish 11 of them to slog on as 36+ year olds?

It certainly worked for India with our old Hermes carrier. Not so well for the Argentinians with some of our T42s.

How many Zum are being built of the original 32? Have they really spent $22.5b on three like wiki states?

I think the USN are rather banking on AB. How much room for growth is left in these designs? Do we really think the USN will be wallowing around in 11,000t AB hulls? I suppose with some nice amphibious copters it doesn’t matter if the flight deck is under water ;-)

Are they changing the hull shape?

Does anyone know what displacement they put to see at at the moment?

ArmChairCivvy
ArmChairCivvy

A catastrophic thread, but there is always a lesson to take home:

Likes and dislikes by name, or not at all?

Hohum
Hohum

Simon,

With the growth in the DDG51 fleet the USN only needs eleven CG47s, one per carrier battle group to provide the cair defence commander role. Thus the plan, which is already under way, is to modernise eleven of those ships and extend their lives so they can continue to provide that role. There is a dispute between the navy and congress over the pace of the modernisation programme but it is happening.

In terms of DDG51, the Flight IIA ships have, as far as the USN is concerned and based on their experience with other ships, sufficient margin to get them to the end of their service lives. We don’t know the exact margin for the Flight III ships yet as they are still in design but the last figures given put the weight margin (though not other margins such as power) below that provided in the Flight IIA ships and that was something NAVSEA was working to improve.

The Other Nick
The Other Nick

The Type 26 ref. the RNIA Jul/Aug quote “the programme’s assessment phase is a 7,000 tonne displacement steel monohull with a length of 149m, a beam of 20.8m and a draught of 7.2m” presume after a BAE briefing, not clear whether light or full.
http://www.rina.org.uk/Type_26_programme_progresses_under_demonstration_phase_contract.html

Thoughts on the AB FIII,
The Korean and Japanese newest Aegis destroyers are larger, Sejongdaewang 8,500 tonnes and the 27DD is 8,200 tonnes light.

The FIII hull is being widened by 4 feet port and starboard at stern, increase max. displacement to 10,700 LT to provide weight and KG growth.
To ameliorate corrosion on previous AB Flights and increase the strength the bottom hull steel plates and scantlings thickened, adding 90 LT.

No mention of the HED under development for AB’s by NAVSEA since 2008 due one must assume to limited space. Thirty four Flight IIA’s are to be modified starting next year with HED by L-3, to be installed on only one prop shaft, original design was to use EM on both shafts, will add 2.5 days between refueling . ABs have a limited range of approx. 4,000 nm as all propulsion by the big GTs, LM-2500s, which are inefficient when operated at low power. Currently the USN AB’s operate two of the three GT generators all the time, one as a back up, now that electricity can be used to power the EM to give 13 knots with one prop and the other trailing at minimal cost in extra fuel, with no use of the LM-2500 GTs.

Ronald O’Rouke in one of his reports to Congress questioned why the AB FIII did not take advantage of lengthening the ship by 55 feet as is possible.

AB FIII is not designed to have the electric power for the future EM rail guns and lasers that the USN is developing with big $, why.

Hohum
Hohum

DDG Flight III is about getting AMDR to sea in the cheapest way possible, and not much else. The largest build run for the type thus far seriously proposed is 22. After that the USN is is already contemplating a new class of ships with possible build start around 2028.

Laser and Railgun tech is still very immature and nowhere near ready for wide-scale fleet deployment. Flight III will have significant power margin though. Possibly the best way of seeing Flight III is that its designed to get the USN to a point where the next-gen tech is better understood and the budget situation improved.

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