It will be a real shame if FRES gets cancelled but in an age of real austerity, a worsening economy and likely future cuts can the MoD afford it?
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OlgZvD6AMvw
Could more of these, plus a handful of upgraded Warriors, a mix of lighter vehicles, UAV’s and a a multi cap badge Regiment of dismounted specialists be the future of Formation Recce?
Hardly ideal, but in the context of the whole of defence spending is this a compromise we will be forced to make, and if so, will it be such a bad one?
I’m away from office just now with some pretty dodgy wifi so cant see the video…is there a suggestion its getting cancelled?
I’m in the office, but they dont like us watching video (at one point a few years ago, 40% of webtraffic was BBC iPlayer).
FRES really needs to die.
The whole project has just gone completely off the rails. I swear, all thats left to add is a TARDIS function that allows it to transport 400 Royal Marines and fit in the back of a land rover.
Presumably we need to replace the 30 mm RARDEN with a cannon which is currently in production using NATO standard ammo, ( or 40mm CTA if it can be integrated), if we take CRV(T) Mk II into core equipment budget and increase the numbers?
If we cancel FRES now we will have repeated the mistake with nimrod mra4, I.e spent an absolute fortune, had it nearly ready to go and then scrapped it.
My view now is don’t upgrade warrior, but replace it with Ascod. Thus realising the £500 million just spent for development.
With crrt2, I think it’s too small to take a stabilised cta40, but if they did the same thing on new build stormer chasis it would probably work. The issue is power provision I believe.
While not wanting to bring the Wrath Of Bob down upon me, I am conflicted on the subject of FRES. I don’t think it’s a great vehicle or even a good concept BUT it is starting to look like it will deliver vehicles needed by the Army. Scrap it now and, like Phil Says, it’s another Nimrod debacle.
As for upgunning CVR(t), would it be possible to fit a Warrior turret? I have no idea how big the turret ring is on a Scimitar but if it’s at least as big as that on Warrior then why not use the upgraded Warrior turret on CVR(t)2? When upgraded, the Warrior turret carries a 40mm CTA cannon with modern sights and full stabilisation and, after the last round of cuts, there will be quite a few warriors around from which turrets could be nicked. Then use the newly turretless for other roles.
Peter Arundel
It will be scrapped.
BTW Am I the only one who was deeply suspicious of Nimrods supposidly “just about ready to fly but HMG scrapped it” status. there were reports of continuing aerodynamic problems.
As for the development cost of Fres ..
Dennis Healy’s First law of Holes
When your in one stop digging.
Phil/Pete
We have spent £500mn on FRES
The projected project cost is £60bn
We have spent 1/120th of the planned spend
Nimrod this is not.
Yes I know, some of that £60bn will have to be spent on whatever eventualy replaces our armoured fleet, but not all of it, and not now.
FRES does not do what it says on the tin.
It is not Furturistic, it is not Rapid, it will have little more Effect than the current fleet, and it has fewer Systems than the current fleet.
The £500mn has been wasted, its designed a vehicle we do not need and can not afford.
Spending another £59.5bn to avoid having to admit £500mn was wasted is insanity.
FRES’s primary role was to rapidly deployable.
Before final production, FRES will weigh over 45 tons.
Thats not rapidly deployable.
Its just not.
Ixion
I’m very sceptical about the claims Nimrod was “ready to fly”, but who knows.
Sounds like the army is keen to get out the good reviews for this thing. I wouldn’t be at all surprised if this fills a scout role for many years; someone will certainly point out that they’ve used this in a real war and had no complaints, so why do you need an ASCOD scout?
———
If it were not possible to fit a stabilised cannon to the new CVRT, is it worthwhile having a cannon at all? Will unstabilised cannons quickly become out of date?
If you meet another vehicle that requires a 40mm cannon to harm it, and it has it’s own stabilised weapon, then you either sit there stationary like a prize plum trying to hit it or you are running away and unable to shoot.
Would HMG, GMGs be more suitable for an unstabilised mount? Spray them at infantry while running.
BB
I must admit.
Couple of .50’s, or maybe a 40mm GMG paired with a Javelin, sounds a lot better than a difficult to fit, expensive, cannon.
Hi BB,
RE “wouldn’t be at all surprised if this fills a scout role for many years”
– to me, the fact that about the same number of other versions was ordered points to it *not* being just an A-stan UOR for fire support/ convoy escort. Recce against a Taliban type of opponent can be carried out much better by other means.
TD
What we already spent?
Was it £500mill / 700mill for some R+D on an existing vehicle / platform and half a dozen drivable chassis?
I have to admit the T26 project looks a paragon of virtue in this company.
How many new Warrior turrets could that 500 million have paid for?
A few points:
Even before the election of 2010 PPrune was hightlighting the inevitability of the project being scrapped (due to structural faults).
If the current Scimitar ring in too small then should we follow the French idea and go unmanned turret? [May need to find space for the commander, hands-free radio-links and Optronics.]
If the Scimitar could mount a low-cal 76, why would it be so difficult to mount the new 40mm?
Just asking….
MRA4 wasn’t ready to fly: it was flying. First flight was 2004, first delivery to the RAF OEU was 2010. Whether it was ready to go into squadron service is another question.
Count me a vote for the chop. As far as I can see we’ve now got:
A vehicle that’s too big and heavy to be rapidly deployable, that’s too big and clumsy and slow to be sneaky, that’s not going to have a better gun to fight with, and that despite being too big won’t fit a complete section in the back. Is there even one project requirement it actually fulfils apart from the oh-so-vital one of not being French?
At least MRA4 actually was roughly what the RAF asked for, just late and expensive. This thing is late, expensive, and doesn’t fulfil any of the key requirements.
Is this so dead in the water though? We have a shed load of bulldogs, uparmoured and generally updated i know, but basically it’s an old vehicle. So seeing as we have shelved out the national debt of a 3rd world country, then have an order in for the potected mobility version to work in hand with warrior, (ie in a platoon 2xwarrior with CTA 40mm, 2x ASCOD with gpmg/gmg unmanned turret) The sparimitar then cracks on with recce. If the production lines are up and running, then in the future as warrior gets knackered it can be replaced by ASCOD (maybe even in that time frame advances in designs could envoke more space for the toms.
Difference with this compared to nimrod this has options in other fields ie ambulance, recce, recovery etc I’d like to see a swingfire version.
Nimrod did have years of mismanagement i had the unfortunate task of been invited to woodford to recruit guys who were getting laid off, the stories they told me about the cluster surrounding nimrod beggars belief, I’d explore all avenues before shit canning this.
The problem I have with FRES is I dont think the army really now what they want. I dont know how it fits with warrior but looking at them I cant really tell the difference. I think the US use the braddley as the bases for all there heavy infantry vehicles is that what we intend and if so let say so get a base vehicle that can do that and get a move on. I however fear this will turn into yet another niche fleet. I think we have the lighter forces covered with ocelot and indeed Viking time for something similar in the heavy stuff even if that means reduced or removing capability now to build it up and pay for it, foreign occupation is off the agenda for sometime so we have a wind to do this right.
Paulg as for nimrod I heard similar stories from some of the engineers that worked on it and you really couldnt make it up.I would say nimrod could also operate across many field also but the shame was theyd done the hard work to get it to field only for the government to deal it fateful hands.
DominicJ where dud you get the £60billion figure from? The total fir FRES (SV and UV) was only £16 billion and that was when we were looking at 3000+ vehicles!!!
With reference to Nimrod, if it was air worthiness issue then BAE should be taken to court if not then the government has flushed £4 billion+ of tax payers money down the toilet! Whoever made that decision needs to be prosecuted!!!
Surely if the hulls of Warriors aren’t rusting away we can refurb them? Look at the M113. FRES is a cock-up.
Entertaining comparison for you all:
Jaguar Land Rover spends £400m per year on R&D.
80% of the cost of the SV development contract every year. In the four years that SV – an extremely complicated and robust vehicle – is spending £500m, JLR will have spent more than £1200m doing the same sort of thing but with cars that have a much shorter service life and much less stringent requirements.
Would you say less stringent or just different?
Commercial vehicles have all sorts of expensive compliance issues, have complex electronics and human machine interfaces, have to work in probably a similar set of environmental conditions to military vehicles, have to be reliable and perhaps above all else, have to be produced at a cost that the market will stand. Value engineering in incredibly complex so I would say, different
Mr Fred it is interestinstand shows the value of r&d but jaguar sells 250k cars a year we will buy maybe 1500 vehicles total that’s why jaguar can afford the r&d it’s spread over lots of vehicles.
@Phil Darley
“If we cancel FRES now we will have repeated the mistake with nimrod mra4, I.e spent an absolute fortune, had it nearly ready to go and then scrapped it.
My view now is don’t upgrade warrior, but replace it with Ascod. Thus realising the £500 million just spent for development.”
I’m inclined to agree with the view in your first paragraph, Phil. However, I don’t know whether the the suggestion in your second paragraph is now possible. A public pronouncement has been made by the MOD on the subject of the Warrior upgrade and, for all I know, contracts might already have been signed. Anyway, in terms on numbers I think we shall need both FRES SV and the upgraded Warriors.
Actually, I think ideally we should have Scimitar 2 as well, the latter for armoured support, recce, etc. for 16 AA Brigade and 3 Commando Brigade. In that respect, Fluffy Thoughts’ view is very apposite:
“If the Scimitar could mount a low-cal 76, why would it be so difficult to mount the new 40mm?”
Where’s Bob when you need him?
TD,
Less stringent, I would say. You would accept limitations of a commercial vehicle that are not feasible on a military vehicle. The military vehicle includes requirements for: signature, survivability, gun control circuits, accurate optics, radio fits and EMC that either a commercial vehicle does not or only faces a smaller requirement. On top of that, it is the same set of requirements for the commercial vehicles year in and year out.
Value engineering is complex, but coming up with new AFVs is at least as complicated
In short, £120m a year for four years out of ten seems astonishingly cheap by comparison.
Mark,
Just because JLR sells many vehicles doesn’t change the amount of R&D needed for a new model. R&D is expensive and if you want it to go into your vehicle you need to fork out for it somehow. Military vehicle producers can’t afford it because they produce so few vehicles in the usual run of things. Thus the MoD has to pay and the amount they pay is small relative to the motor industry, often held up in these comments as the paragon of efficiency.
To address Fluffy Thoughts question regarding 76mm vs. 40mm guns:
The 76mm is a low velocity, manually loaded weapon. It’s pretty small. The 40mm gun is not much bigger, but being automatic it is fitted with a substantial ammunition feeding system that is badly suited to installation in a low profile, manned turret.
A one-man or unmanned turret would suit the installation better, but this would deny what is ostensibly a scout vehicle a valuable source of situational awareness.
An interesting option would be a modern 90mm gun with an autoloader mounted in the bustle.
Fred
Lets start with the fact that JLR products must be:-
1) OK to varying degrees off road for many products.
2) Capable of upto 140 mph on the road
3) Handle at all sorts of speeds and weights like 1 – 5 passangers. stick to awet road like glue.
4) Have a 10- 20,000 mile service schedule
5) JLR build about 4 different types of car 180 mph sports car – Landrover defender.
6) Includes engine development.
Fres is:-
One chassis
With offroad maximised on road basic.
Engine by someone else
Etc etc
Not at all the same thing at all.
Mr.Fred, I wonder if the its that different, an order of magnitude or less. Dont want to split hairs and on balance you are right but the automitive industry has a whole load of difficult engineering, time and cost challenges. Perhaps the latter become more important with cars and the former becomes more important with military vehicles.
On some of the electronics in modern vehicles, head up displays, adaptive braking/ride, fibre optic data bus and other systems surely these are equally as complex in their own way.
Your points are valid but I dont think there is a gulf between them
Did you watch the video by the way, the point was made about height being a positive advantage!
One chassis, multiple vastly different equipment fits.
We can pick and choose a few categories that suit SV
– Weapon systems capable of hitting targets out beyond 1500m
– Able to be repaired in austere condition
– Able to withstand multiple multi-kJ impact events and remain 100% functional
– Able to withstand multi-MJ impact events (a 1 tonne vehicle impacting at 70mph would be the minimum possible qualifying event) without significant injury to the crew.
– have a service life of 20+ years. Not sure how many miles that is, but probably quite a few.
Mr Fred
Yes I know that but we’ve spent nearly a billion on fres over the last 5-10 years and are precisely no where then spend 2b buying and upgrading existing vehicle. The car industry will develop a new car every 2 years for that money or even several. They also use a base chasis across various fleets. That money hasn’t done it with fres and if the current vehicle can’t it gets binned and find one with. I don’t see the leap in tech or capability fres offers that we can’t currently buy off the shelf in current apcs.
I still say the British Army would be better off dropping the heavy FRES/Ascod, in favor of Panhard Sphinx doing the armed part with Uni Eng Ranger carrying the troops. These 17/19 ton vehicles are easier to deploy than 34/40 ton (white)elephants.
I liked Nimrod MRA4. The prototypes were flying. Armed with Storm Shadow, they would have given the RAF global strike capabilty.
Now waiting for the “wrath of Bob”.
Fred @ 9.09
Your are having a laugh aren’t you, aren’t you?
JLR’s money covers the following –
3000 + engineers.
Body engineering
Chassis engineering
Systems engineering – electrical et al.
Powertrain engineering
Odds and ends engineering.
It covers the vehicle and the production infrastructure.
It covers emissions, type approval and changing global standards.
It covers 6 vehicle platforms and an industrial antique.
It covers 4 engine families and a Volvo IL6.
It covers the move to a low carbon economy.
It is working on a new 2 seat sportscar.
It is working on a new Defender.
It is working on a lightweight Discovery.
It is thinking about a 7str Freelander.
It is looking into using more aluminium bodyshells.
It is designing a new family of 4 cylinder engines – petrol and diesel.
It is wrestling with Stage 6 emissions.
It is helping out the parent company in India.
It is trying to teach Brummies to build cars …
… as good as the Scousers can.
It will deliver stuff this year.
It will deliver stuff next year.
It will make mistakes.
It will fix those mistakes.
It will make an economic surplus …
… And some good cars the world wants to buy.
Now what is Fres doing apart from spending our money badly?
FBOT.
No, I’m not.
An amount equivalent to one third of JLR’s money per year goes to:
Body Engineering
Chassis Engineering
Systems Engineering
Electrical and electronic engineering
Power train engineering
Odds and ends engineering
It covers the vehicle and the production infrastructure.
It covers emissions, type approval and changing global and military standards.
It covers 1 vehicle platform split into four or five significantly different variants
It covers the integration of an entirely new weapon system
It covers the move to a low carbon economy.
It is working on a new 2 man turret.
It is working on a new Command vehicle.
It is working on a new APC.
It is thinking about adaptability into future variants.
It is looking into using more efficient armour systems.
It is wrestling with Stage 6 emissions.
It is trying to teach Welshmen to build AFVs …
… as good as the Geordies can.
It is building an AFV design and build capacity that is squandered between each increasing gulf between new AFV family.
Some things are not covered, undoubtedly there is some waste, but it isn’t so far adrift of commercial R&D as you might believe.
The problem with military procurement is that it comes in lumps, and small lumps at that. The MoD demands the finest vehicles known to humanity so it won’t have to buy new ones until all the engineers who worked on the last one have retired. The car industry has consistent income and production runs that dwarf even the most prolific AFVs. They compete between each other on a car-by-car basis; if they fail at one then there is another in 10 seconds or so. Not 10 years if you are lucky.
It is mucked up, but it’s scarcely the class-war nightmare than FBOT proposes.
My army friend tells me the army are prepared to loose challenger 2 CSP in order to fund fres scout. So no heavy armour in ten or so years time. So all eggs in one basket with fres
Mr Fred @ 11.58
Fres SV is badge engineering.
It is £500mill for 7 prototypes.
It is a licence to print money.
AFV production has more to do with ship building than cars.
It is marrying chunks together rather than proper R+D.
You have to ask what are the issues the programme is trying to solve?
The bottom line is how many engineers are currently employed and where are they based?
Remember JLR’s spend puts real production vehicles down a production line.
The FRES SV £500mill is a “demonstration”l contract producing glossy brochures and angle iron engineering.
It has nothing to do with production.
It has nothing to do with diesel engines.
It has nothing to do with new weapons systems.
It has nothing to do with a new chassis.
It has nothing to do with commercial reality.
Phil
Purchase cost of £16bn
Lifetime costs of £60bn
http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/2010/10/savagely-vindicated-again.html
As for Nimrod
BAE is smarter than the civil service, I’m amazed BAE cant take the government to court over the issue!
We can cancel now, or we can build them, realise they are completely wrong and cancel when £20bn has been wasted, or we can just use the wrong equipment, and watch soldier after soldier after soldier come home in a body bag, again.
Hi jonesy,
10 years counting from now would be good going, as C2 has been increasingly “let go” since 2008:
“Despite the proven combat success of the Challenger 2 main battle tank, severe budget shortfalls have effectively taken the Challenger out of action. By June 2008, the C2 CSP program was facing cancellation due to increasingly severe MoD funding shortfalls. In September 2008, the MoD also canceled its base inspection and repair contract with its Defence Support Group (DSG) organization.
On October 19, 2010, the Conservative-led coalition government unveiled its much-anticipated Strategic Defence and Security Review. Among its other cuts, the SDSR mandates reducing the active Challenger 2 main battle tank fleet by 40 percent. The Royal Armoured Corps must mothball 155 tanks, leaving only 231 active Challenger 2 tanks in the entire British Army.”
About all eggs in one basket; yes
– out of the £9.1 bn (before cuts to the numbers of units to be ordered) the rest (WR and Terrier) are done deals, or (Viking, Titan and Trojan) already delivered
period since the 1998 Strategic Defence Review
Date project commenced
Status, and
expected in-Service Date
number to be procured
Sunk Cost(£m)
Forecast cost remaining(£m)
–
Future Rapid Effect System –
Specialist Vehicle (FRES SV)
June 2008 Delayed: In-service
from 2017
~1300 142 7,586
Warrior Capability
Sustainment Programme (CSP)
June 2009 Delayed: In-service
from 2017
550+ 38 1,418
Terrier armoured engineer vehicle July 2002 Delayed: In-service
from 2013
60 217 101
Subtotal for costs 718 9,105 (this line includes sunk costs for cancelled projects)
Projects delivered in the period
Viking All Terrain Vehicle (Protected)4 June 1997 In-service April 2006
100+ 60 –
Titan and Trojan armoured engineer vehicles May 1996 In-service Oct 2006
66 347 –
Subtotal 407 –
Total expenditure on armoured vehicles 1,125 down 9,105 to go
Urgent Operational Requirements spending on vehicles 2,813 N/A
Talk about scrapping UORs systematically when they have been paid for (though not from Army budget)!
I’ve combined two defence management/ acquisition/ procurement reviews below, and both have ending punch lines that could be 100% about FRES:
the US 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR),
the fundamental reason for the continued underperformance in acquisition activities is fragmentation of authority and accountability for performance, or lack of clarity regarding such authority and accountability. Fragmented authority and accountability exists at all levels of the process, including identifying needs, defining alternative solutions to meeting the need, choosing and resourcing the solution, and delivering the defined capability with discipline on the agreed schedule and within the agreed cost. In the current system, the complex set of processes and authorities so diffuses the accountability for defining executable * programs intended to provide the needed increment of capability that neither objective is achievable
– either rapid response to the demands of today’s war
– or meeting tomorrow’s challenges*
An older review of US Defence Management concluded:
serious result of this [the reference could easily be the above description] management environment is an unreasonably long acquisition cycle — ten to fifteen years for our major weapon systems. This is a central problem from which most other acquisition problems stem:
> It leads to unnecessarily high costs of development. Time is money, and experience argues that a ten-year acquisition cycle is clearly more expensive than a five-year cycle.
> It leads to obsolete technology in our fielded equipment. We forfeit out five-year technological lead by the time it takes us to get our technology from the laboratory into the field.
> And it * aggravates the very goldplating that is one of its causes. Users, knowing that the equipment to meet their requirements is fifteen years away, make extremely conservative threat estimates. Because long-term forecast are uncertain at best, users tend to err on the side of overstating the threat*
No CSP does not mean CR2 dies, the rumour mill has it that a solution to the ammunition problem could be found.
Current planning round appears to be about distributing the armoured fleet around the multi-role brigades in a fashion that does not break the bank- who knows what the outcome will be.
As for FRES-SV being badge engineering, that is just plane nonsense. I have pointed out here multiple times that £500 million for 7 prototypes (+2 recycled test platforms) covering 4 variants with a new drive chain, new turret and modified suspension is entirely reasonable when put against other AFV programmes. Just because you do not have £500 million in your bank account it does not make it a large sum of money.
Bob @ 1.24
What new stuff are we getting in the powertrain?
Why are we getting new stuff in the drive train?
What changes are being made to the suspension?
What is new about the turret?
What is being developed from scratch?
What is being leveraged in from outside?
What level of design re-use is involved?
My question still stands –
How many engineers are currently working on the programme?
Where are they based?
The Americans did the sensible thing and got their base design from somewhere else. Thereby they got the Stryker in cost terms almost spot on
-Stryker project start in 2004 with a $3.949m price target
– outcome $3.671m, relative to target 0.93
New technologies like F-22 (3.00) and V-22 (2.7) have done much worse (not a surprise)
But we are facing FRES unit prices where the forecast was made based on quantities like 1300 and 3000 (the former inclusive in the latter, even though the products have nothing to do with each other; so who was pulling wool over whose eys at that point in time?).
– we might be in for a surprise? Even after having done the sensible thing and combined many best-of-breed components (to leave room for the risk that comes with innovation; that one still to be defined )
Fatty,
Your question was answered in a previous thread multiple times, it does not stand.
The questions remains though;
Does anyone think FRES may be cancelled to be replaced with a handful of upgraded Warriors and a few more CVR(T) Mk 2’s?
Would this be a bad thing if it allows the earmarked money to protect other capabilities?
Bob, it might be pure fantasy but is it a bad idea?
Not so sure it isnt actually, if we could combine that with some form of wheeled protected mobility vehicle like I dunno, Mastiff!
Interesting debate, the relative value of wheels v tracks, unfortunately, no conclusive answers and the result being simply a collection of compromises
TD
I guess it’s up to what you see the army doing in the future. If it sf operations with limited specialist troop operation a la initial afghan operation then fres is out and a readonable capability can be retained with warrior/crt2. If it’s more Iraq or afghan post 2006 ops then fres is needed as a total replacement vehicle. I personally would go with the former.
Bobby @ 3.14
Cut the crap and answer the questions?
There are 9 to choose from so you must have the answer to at least one of them.
TD, I think in the end, economics will dictate an answer to your question.
If this thing is more inportant than Chally 2’s then perhaps the Army is taking a leaf from the Navy’s book, sacrificing most of its future capabilities for one project.
hi Mike,
interesting way to put it. Let’s turn it a bit and say:
– the Navy, other can continuous deterrent, Trident, and sea-denial, Astute, does not think it can carry out major operations if they are not Carrier-Assisted… that could be a fair statement
Is there any such statement that could be made in the Army/ FRES context?
FBOT
“It has nothing to do with new weapons systems”
Cased telescoped rounds are arguably as large an innovation as riffling was……. not new !………the CT fired guided projectile being developed in the background (based on starstreak laser beam riding), not new!
We don’t yet know what CT munitions are really capable of, but the signs are that this is the way to go and that curtsey of Excalibur etc.. modern electronics will withstand the 60,000 G of initial gun firing. This opens the way to a host of projectiles that don’t want a bullet shaped profile but something much more advanced (and hence need to be fired from a telescoped round).
If most of the money is diverted to the weapon, and the rest is procurement of a rough MOTS standard I reckon it’s money well spent.
CT technology, for my mind, is almost worryingly advanced, if today you can laser guide a 40mm round or fit it with a radar fuse, how soon will we have smart .50 cal rounds, and where will it end?
Don’t forget while Nexter are incorporating optical sensors (Starstreak)in their CT rounds BAE are putting small milimetric radars(Brimstone technology) in their new 40mm Bofors naval gun ammunition.
The CT developments could be part of a golden age for British munitions if it combines with the proven Starstreak and Brimstone (including the targeting algorithms) and such innovative procurement as Team Complex weapons… which has just delivered LWMM
Also at a larger scale I think there is a chance to merge rail gun and CT technology (with additiv e manufacture of hybrid barrels and projectiles) for ranges as yet unheard of, but with high reliability and lower technical challenges than all out rail (so lower costs).
So pursuing FRES SV ( for me) has less to do with vehicles and much more to do with weapons.
RW @ 6.00
Thanks for those comments although I struggle to understand the whole process.
Is GD handing out sub-contracts to develop all that lovely 40mm CT stuff you describe?
If yes the MOD has got it wrong –
40mm CT is bigger than FRES – it will have a wider use so why should one Army project take the development cost?
GD will get a contractors mark-up on the sub contract.
FRES goes it takes CT with it unless we have a messy round of negotiations.
Consequently I think the CT / weapons systems stuff is separate from the FRES £500mill, however if the info is out their to prove me wrong then I would love to read it.
Also I thought the big advantage of CT was ammunition handling?
Does CT allow a larger / heavier projectile than normal?
Finally on the topic of shell / fuze electronics, where are we now?
WW2 had proximity fuzes in 3″ AA in 1943 / 44 if my memory holds out.
Consequently not a huge step to get it in 40mm now?
Or are you suggesting the the munitions will be “guided” in some way?
Finally, finally if all the good stuff is in the 40mm CT system, why not save money and put new guns in old systems?
Hi FBOT,
RE:”40mm CT is bigger than FRES – it will have a wider use so why should one Army project take the development cost?
GD will get a contractors mark-up on the sub contract.”
– if you look at the Warrior upgrade contract, it stipulates that the Gvmnt supply the 40mm CTA (pieces) and the rest of the suppliers (GD in the lead) comply; ie. the cost has already been borne by another project [in the contract], but when you ask for the money (Parliament; Defence Board…) you have to include it in the total cost [request]
– I hope all that speaks exactly to your argument?
…
“Finally, finally if all the good stuff is in the 40mm CT system, why not save money and put new guns in old systems?”
– cfr. the point above
ACC
Fair and true yes but you cant compare the two –
The Army has other assets that can take on FRES’s role, this is what TD is asking – unlike ships that can handle fixed wing aviation, what we have here is equipment that *could* take on the role rather than FRES, maybe not perfectly, but well enough until budgets allow – post 2015, post afghanistan when we can expand beyond the afghan effect.
If projets are pushed forcefully through periods of austerity then cuts will be made in design and equipment for it (T45), or neccessary numbers (Nimrod, F35 and I fear; FRES) – like the T45’s, will FRES have “fitted for but not with”? or Come in too few a numbers to actually be of use in large scale operations? or operations with a peer nation?
I’m not against FRES – but when for afghanistan at least, other cheaper options like the vehicle in the video could be taken whilst development can continue and not be rushed/cut/contstanly redesigned.
Hi Mike,
we are thinking alike; I was partly carrying on from jonesy’s “all the eggs in the same basket”. But you brought in the interesting comparison with the navy.
ACC @ 7.12
All that tells me is that the £500mill cost of the FRES Demonstration project would not seem to include the weapons system.
The engine and drivetrain look to be catalogue engineering, the suspension is upgraded – if a 50% increase in the maximum weight can be considered an “upgrade”?
Interesting that we are now looking at an infantry fighting vehicle that could be heavier than a 1945 era A41 – we really now seem to have an universal fighting vehicle rather than a universal tank.
Consequently still looking for value for our £500mill.
The Spanish seemingly paid less than £3mill per unit in 2004.
That is 170 real vehicles for less than our demonstration contract.
Interesting!
FBOT
As I understand it CT has been jointly developed by the French and British MODs (using various companies) but FRES SV is the first industrialisation of the technology at which point many problems are solved / resolved
GD had no choice about the weapon it was mandated by the MOD and Lockheed Martin are the subcontractor for the GD FRES turret with the various CT companies being involved as required. The issue for CT and the turret designers being the ammunition feed, the advantages of the short breach etc…….
They may have had proximity fuses in WW2, mainly for anti aircraft but it has never really taken off since you are just sensing when you are very near the target- why not just hit it !!,
With current technologies munitions can sense distance to target (which can be quite large) and detonate for effect . For the simplest effects it’s like the AHEAD munitions but BAE 40mm rounds can be detonated above a target such as a pirate skiff.
Yes laser beam riding CT munitions
You may have missed this link
http://www.aaafasso.fr/DOSSIERSAAAF/ACTES_COLLOQ.LIBRES/ActColloq.06/MissDef.06.NonCompress/papers/35_23_27.swf
The CTA gun has issues of its own:
* Unique and very expensive ammunition that is non-NATO standard
* Lack of a firm market (it remans unclear if it actually will be fitted to the French EBRC, despite their claims) meaning that without exports the production run will be quite small = an expensive weapon given the need to recoup the RD costs
* Dependence on a French supply chain
* Alleged technical problems (presumably to do with the reliability of the moving breech, but I am guessing)
* Lack of suitability as an air defence weapon because of the fixed nature of the magazine which must move with the weapon, which means limited development potential
Has anyone heard of any country apart from the UK and France expressing a desire to adopt CTA for their own vehicle designs?
CTA is another Rarden cannon: a clever concept, but not attractive to many potential customers and one that has additionally sucked up money that could have been better employed. It could not have been justified without the requirement to retrofit the small Warrior turret.
Like the Irishman, I wouldn’t start from here. CTA won’t survive any FRES Scout cancellation.
FAT MAN
so Brimstone is no good because no one else uses it, Starstreak, also no good, same reason Stormshadow the same, LWMM also the same
Fire shadow no good various AA missiles the same
why do we bother since we obviously know nothing
NB the irish have been part of Starstreak and THOR so they may want to argue with you
Good list, RW, but they are not as one-off as would seem
– so Brimstone modified from Hellfire (mainly high-speed launch, and of course the all important seeker head)
– Starstreak, so good that the French bought the whole company
– Stormshadow another European JV
– LWMM also the same Frenchies, those who bought Starstreak company (are we buying the “H” from their French factory?)
RW
I am not sure it is worth commenting directly on your observations; ArmChairCivvy has done that nicely. Let us just say that while the UK has considerable export successes in areas such as military support equipment, software and security equipment, in recent years too many of the UK front line projects have not been so saleable.
Compare:
Challenger 2 v M1 v Leopard 2
Starstreak v Stinger
Warrior v Bradley
and so on.
The UK tends to over-specify equipment for its own doctrinal needs and too often those needs are different from those accepted by other countries. CTA is a good example. The concept is technically brilliant, but it is the equivalent of a Morgan sports car. It superficially appeals to many, but sells to few; it is very expensive for what it is; it meets a need for a dedicated group of specialists. It is never going to achieve mass market sales that would bring down the unit price and you have to possess deep pockets to own and operate one. The UK used to have deep pockets, but as you may have noticed is now close to being insolvent. Our attention should be devoted to projects that will sell in significant numbers and export well, not to systems that make lots of money for Nexter and BAE in RD costs, but whose unit costs are too high.
We had the same problem with Brimstone, which has only found a real use over the last 3 years after being modified with a new and expensive seeker. The original project was ideal for the Cold War Central Front scenario and no doubt would have sold well in the 1980-1989 era, but came just too late. The unit cost of Brimstone is eye watering and the only export customer has been Saudi Arabia (and you can guess why).
I am not doubting UK technical excellence, although sometimes UK engineering skills are rather less capable than should be the case (look at the mess of the relatively simple Terrier project, not to mention SA80). What I am saying is that we now have very limited resources and we cannot afford to dissipate them on future projects of the CTA kind. That is not unpatriotic or overly self critical, it is just hard headed realism. If you want to see what can be done by concentrating resources on critical projects and simply purchasing other items off the shelf have a look at the Israeli defence industry. The Rafael and IMI websites are worth a good look.
Hmm. I think I agree with Fat Man on the CT40, but perhaps not on development costs.
IMHO, RW is badly off the mark:
Proximity fuses have taken off in a huge way. Nearly every artillery shell and mortar bomb has one to allow them to airburst. Bofors 40mm shells have had prox fuses since the 1970’s and larger anti-aircraft shells have had them in since 1944. In AA work, a miss is as good as a mile unless you can get the round to airburst close enough to hit the target with fragments. prox fuses make that happen better than the time fuses they superseded.
Modern airburst rounds are actually a revival of much older technology. The AHEAD round is a laser ranged, electronically timed version of Major Henry Shrapnel’s Spherical Case. Other air-bursting projectiles are analogous to later developments that used clockwork or pyrotechnic delay to detonate a HE shell at a desired point. The modern slant is that:
1) The timing systems are small enough to fit in 30mm shells
2) The range is determined accurately using laser rangefinders
3) The timing is set automatically using inductive electrical signals.
Otherwise it isn’t that new.
Missiles are a little different to guns. If a missile becomes obsolescent, it can be replaced relatively easily. A gun is inherent to the structure and design of an AFV, especially if you choose something odd, like a Rarden or CT40.
Plus Starstreak has had some export success, Storm Shadow and SCALP are pretty much the same thing. LMM is a private venture with reasonable chances of success.
Fireshadow is a concept I don’t like, but we will have to see how it does.
@ ACC my point wasn’t about provider but about user
Yes there are many French / European contributors but we have selected wisely, and you are also conflating ownership and competence
@ FAT MAN
I’m not sure why you place such value on exports
Have you never considered that there is an element of US” tat” in the lists you a make
The US defense industry has traded for decades not on quality but political influence and price, note that their premier fighter (F22) is a limping disaster, they can’t currently build a ship that doesn’t have to be sent back for years of rebuild and that their basic infantry rifle is pretty unimpressive.
If you want to talk exports, talk about Israel, Sweden, Singapore, South Africa and others who make it on merit, the US don’t come close, with the Turks and India in the mix and the Emirates to follow the US will struggle to export anything in the medium future.
As to challenger and leopard that’s real easy……………….. You sit in the leopard I’ll sit in the chally and then we’ll choose incoming for each other!!!
What type of last rites do you observe?
But your basic point is that we should arm ourselves as others do, and that’s wrong, because we take on more challenges than most others and we need to overcome in the future with even more capability advantage than before. Money is wasted on platforms but much less so on munitions; AAA welded to Toyotas always comes to mind
Libya and the salvo fire of 24 brimstones make the point, it’s not the lack of use that is the point it’s the effect when used that clinches the deal, try buying a comparable munition anywhere else, and what do you think the export potential is now
@ Mr Fred
No storm shadow and scalp are not the same, and I expect you know the differences
I used AHEAD as an example of old technology but modern effect
And yes modern technology proximity is a big thing, but not the type FAT MAN referred to, rather the type I referred to.
@all
I still struggle to understand what you don’t get about a cased telescoped round, does it just seem “kinda the same” ???… its not !!, not nearly, the shape of a bullet or artillery shell is a very poor compromise between the available technology (decades ago) and the optimal shape / configuration from the moment you leave the barrel.
Just think about the round in flight and then ask yourself how dumb is the current design of shell? How many aircraft have such a rear profile ? or anything that’s aerodynamic??
Best I can do to explain
td
cutting fres and the raf f35’s saves enough to cover the procurement black hole.
So yeah, they’re gone.
I just do not get what fres offers over cvrt /warrior /challenger.
Before we head off down what gun is best ect can I ask what operational role will we use these FRES vehicles in?. Surely that should decide if we buy them or not.
I think someone mentioned on this thread or the other FRES threas that we may keep 80 cvrt2 or however many we upgraded. Any independent uk operation of the future will most likely look like serria leone or something similar a rapid deployment overseas of a battlegoup. If such an operation required some armour support it will be flown out. As I get 3 cvrt2 or a single fres per a400m I guess cvrt2 will be top of this list or the marines viking vehicle as we have few a400m and as far as I know fres cant “swim”.
That leaves us with a stabilisation missions a la afghan even though we have hundreds of upgraded boxers and hundreds of warriors available we went and bought hundreds of wheeled apc for afghan and deployed few tracked apcs is this because wheeled apc’s are the vehicle of choice for a this type of work?
That leaves us with a high end armoured charge Iraq 91, 03 starting mission. Im guess the explosion of armed UAVs means sending anything on an armoured charge bar a MBT could be considered sucide and maybe very infrequent. My concern is we spend billion on this and then when then next operation come around due to our limit logistics capabilty all we continually deploy is the handful of updated cvrt2’s and UOR wheeled apcs I guess im asking has FRES been over taken by events.
DomJ
Cutting the F35 from the RAF ends UK ability to operate overseas independently and severely limits any operation without US involvement we would be below critical mass in air assets. but thats a whole other thread
@RW
If you get round to reading SDSR 2010 or the recent studies on defence procurement (Gray Report, etc – see http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/78821960-14A0-429E-A90A-FA2A8C292C84/0/ReviewAcquisitionGrayreport.pdf) you will understand that defence exports are now absolutely central to British government defence policy. The Type 26 Global Combat Ship is a case in point.
The domestic defence market is just too small to support the development of national UK programmes except in a few very specialised areas (nuclear weapons, cyber security, stealth, etc). Moreover, since August we have been signed into the EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive (see the MOD website). This has the stated aim of creating a European defence industry by running down national industries. The EU wants remaining national companies to combine into multinational groupings like MBDA and Thales. EU countries will be expected to specialise in certain areas and rely on other EU partners for key capabilities. One example is that 7 EU countries have shipyards that build submarines. The EU wants this reduced, perhaps to 2 or 3. So for example, does it make sense for both the UK and France to build nuclear boats? – surely one nuclear submarine yard is sufficient.
The UK is therefore most unlikely in future to start any major programmes that are not:
a. Exportable and/or
b. Collaborative
Ideally they will be both.
Programmes that meet neither criteria will be rare or minor. So, the UK will not develop another tank to replace Challenger 2. The cost of doing so for a production run of 250-300 is just too excessive and the last British MBT to sell well abroad was Centurion. A new UK tank will probably not export and would violate the EU directive. Consequently the successor will be Leopard ‘3’ or something of that ilk, to which the UK might contribute armour design as part of a joint project. We are all Europeans now you know.
I fear that you are deluding yourself that the UK can go on being different, getting a competitive advantage by deploying unique equipment. In a few areas (EW?) we can, but we are going to have to get used to making do with joint projects or modifying other nation’s equipment. After all this is what most smaller military powers do and that is exactly what the UK is now becoming. Just accept the fact, unpalatable though it may seem.
RW,
There is more commonality between Scalp and Stormshadow than any other two missiles out there, but if you feel sure that they are vastly different, I’ll accede to your certainty.
As for Prox, I don’t know what “modern type” you refer to unless it is the gated prox that allows high velocity, more-or-less line-of-sight engagements over ground clutter. That’s just the clever combination of two systems (electronic timer and prox fuse) and something that CT40 doesn’t have.
Modern shells have varying degrees of boat tail and base cavity to deal with external ballistics and the fact that they have to be pushed down the barrel by hot gasses. The CT design doesn’t change that fact. In fact it introduces significant issues with internal ballistics that conventional rounds have safely dealt with for the last seven decades plus, namely interface with rifling at shot-start and obturation.
The CT projectile is no better than the most basic conventional projectile out there. The basic shape of the projectiles seen to date are such that the nose drag is going to be much greater than the tail drag, meaning that the projectile is much more dependent on gyroscopic effect for stability. The shape looks like it channels combustion gasses preferentially into contact with the barrel walls, causing greater erosion and shorter barrel life.
RW @ 9.33
Better / more aerodynamic sub munitions reached the modern world in WW2 with APDS, so the issue has been out there for quite a while.
Consequently why are we doing CTA and what does it offer over the other solutions?
My understanding is that CTA offers improvements in ammunition handling, more rounds stored in a specific space.
A BWoS press release of June 2006 again suggests volumetric efficiency is high on the agenda this time in the context of the swept volume of the system and how this helps with the upgrading of the Warrior turret to contain a longer range, more lethal gun / weapon system.
Unfortunately such sentiments look as if we are trying to paint the hall through the letterbox, taking the difficult way rather than doing some root cause analysis and sorting out the issue from the ground up.
That is if the current Warrior turret is too small and too cramped by today’s standards would it not be better to take a holistic approach rather than try to stuff some exotic new technology driven by the Warrior’s turret ring and then force it’s use onto all other similar AFVs and hope that the British disease of poor development does not blight the new technology as it has blighted so many other projects.
Surely it would be better to –
1) Buy in some new IFVs with a better weapon system and a fully automatic self levelling gun.
2) Turn the Warriors into APCs with a new smaller / remote gun system.
What size is the 40mm CTA sub munitions?
How does it compare with other conventional 30mm / 35mm / 40mm / 57mm sub munitions?
FRES as it stands looks like a make work scheme for the CTA 40mm gun.
That and a bit of R+D work for the folk producing armour.
Finally do we ever cascade vehicles as they get older?
Surely better to bring in new stuff at the top end and re-task the older stuff to pack the batting behind them?
Any thoughts on all the CR2’s going spare now?
Power packs not up to it?
Just a little comment on the use of crystal balls and the whole “what are we going to use FRES for, we don’t really need it….”
1970’s upto 1982 -the threat evaluation / strategy was based on: the threat is the Soviet Union, that is it. We don’t need naval air, the RAF can protect the fleet out into the North Sea, North Atlantic, and we don’t need to operate East of Suez anymore
Reality – Flaklands
1990’s – threat eval / strategy: No more Soviet Union – peace dividend, the MBT is dead.
Reality – Kuwait, Iraq, the Battle of 73 Easting and other mass armour battles in the desert against an enemy with soviet technology using Soviet tactics
Late 90’s Balkans – threat eval / strategy – Precision Guided Munitions, no need for boots on the ground, its all about tac-air
Reality: Dead Serb civilians, bridges that would not drop, naughty bad guys who would camouflage their kit, F117 shot down, and a presence by NATO ground troops for coming up on 20 years……
2000’s – Afghanistan, special forces and air power is all we need. When it goes COIN it’s all about the infantry…… “we don’t expect to fire a shot in Helmand province…” etc
Reality: Taliban escape across the mountains into Pakistani for the lack of rapidly deployable infantry. MBT, SPG and IFV’s all used at one point or another
Iraq GW2: We don’t need big ground forces, just look at GW1 (yeah, thanks Mr Rumsfeld), MBT’s will be vulnerable in urban warfare, precision guided weapons (again)
Reality: M1A1 and Bradly’s in the heart of cities, snipers make a big come back, the Grunt rules, not the Jet Jockey……….
So based on Afghanistan recce might be a Jackal, but what if we had been asked by the “Free Libya” forces to provide ground troops ?
Hi Mark,
Your expeditionary example was bang on. The news were a bit vague, but the cvrt2 order totals anything between 58 and 65 of all types. As it is reasonable to assume that post-Afghan they would all operate in one formation [rather than be spread around, despite the spares commonality with remaining versions of CVR(T)], one could deduce from the total what kind of formation would have them. Your Viking is a nice pairing with it (rather than the heavier Warthog). France has already bought the better protected Viking2 and it may be on the cards for UK, too, at some stage. Unknown to me by how much that will up the weight.
Hi FBOT,
RE:”Consequently why are we doing CTA and what does it offer over the other solutions?
My understanding is that CTA offers improvements in ammunition handling, more rounds stored in a specific space.
A BWoS press release of June 2006 again suggests volumetric efficiency is high on the agenda this time in the context of the swept volume of the system and how this helps with the upgrading of the Warrior turret to contain a longer range, more lethal gun / weapon system.”
All agreed, and makes sense (but then you proceed to suggest that we should start again?) A quick tour of AFV upper end gun market (prices on request only):
Bushmaster: No one has bought the 40mm yet; at least two armies in Europe are looking to add punch to their 30 and 35 mm, respectively, to add punch without having to change (expensive) turrets
– this would be by using “supershot”, obviously two different rounds but exactly the same drivers and the same conclusion (bounded by cost efficiency)
Bofors 40mm: Has even that clever airburst round that was decleared missing from CTA. Has such huge turret intrusion that it practically cuts the turret space in half – not considered good for recce type of work even though might be OK for busting OpFor IFVs (and infantry hiding behind a ground elevation)
CTA: What is wrong with it?
If we get the 300-350 turreted WR upgrades out of the higher “official total” as per below and we get a turret for recce use that is actually fit for purpose (just a couple of hundred to start with) and by early 2020’s are practically standardised on one medium gun (isn’t 40 the lowest boundary for medium?), I’ll be happy with that. I understand that the LM turret design for Warrior use won as the most economical?
Future Rapid Effect System –
Specialist Vehicle (FRES SV)
June 2008 Delayed: In-service
from 2017 [decision in three years from now, so not many in service during this decade]
~1300units [you bet!] 142m spent 7,586m to go [original rqrmnt]
Warrior Capability
Sustainment Programme (CSP)
June 2009 Delayed: In-service
from 2017
550+units 38m spent 1,418m to go
Fatty,
You odd ill-informed ramblings are nonsensical, suffice to say you are almost universally wrong- I just can not be bothered to go through this absurdity again.
Think Defence,
Mastiff is a nightmare, they have atrocious mobility, appalling reliability and current exist in 4 different generations (1/1.5/2/3) meaning that their service retention would require a very expensive programme to standardise them all and would still leave a pretty limited vehicle.
FBOT I’m with you ASCOD SV is nothing more than a revamped/face lifted/warned over ASCOD.
Most of the new whistles and bells are nit really kart of the main vehicle (CTA40, optics etc).
Bob, if we are wrong answer the bloody question abd shut us all up once and for all!
Phil Darley
Have to say completly agre I can only go what is published of course. But it looks like a standard upgrade in line with improvements in automotive technolgy, some thicker torsion bars ets, and some bolt on stuff.
Whether the bolt on stuff is exisiting or in development.
It remains a steel box with tracks and an engine.
FBOT’s question like how many people working on it, where for how long etc are perfectly reasonable questons.
Talk of quantem leaps, intigrated systems, etc etc are just smoke and mirrors sales talk.
The whole thing is going to get canned any way – were broke.
Hi Bob,
I’ve seen the figure and it was a multiple of “buy them new”?!
RE “Mastiff is a nightmare, they have atrocious mobility, appalling reliability and current exist in 4 different generations (1/1.5/2/3) meaning that their service retention would require a very expensive programme to standardise them all and would still leave a pretty limited vehicle.”
– howabout keeping just the newest tranche and doing nothing to them?
Jed
I’m not saying we dont need *something*, I’m saying we dont need FRES.
I’m not saying a massed armour charge is impossible, I’m just saying that thwe way for us to smash it would be Apache/Typhoon/Tornado Hellfire/Brimstone
I’m frequently wrong, and happy to be corrected, remember, I thought you were mad for thinking PDWs should be main line infantry weapons once upon a time, but, I just dont see what FRES offers for its monumental cost.
I just dont see what it does that new build CVRTs cant do, or that Challengers cant do, or Warriors.
F35 I get, Typhoon I get, these things can smack the **** out of 5 of their predecessors.
Astute I get, Daring I get, Daring is apparently more capable than the entire T42 fleet.
FRES….?
In a stand up fight it would get its arse handed to it by Chally2, and in a logisticaly limited battle, three CVRTs would surround it and blow it apart.
I get that CVRT isnt well protected for the modern battlefield, but neithers FRES, The IDF was losing Merkavas SIX(!) Years ago to frontal hits
Ahh, the ramp up for MRAPs was done as a one-off, the US Gvmnt itself acting as a systems integrator (I bet they have withdrawn from the business by now):
“Ultimately, five vendors received the bulk of the orders, including one company
that was new to mass vehicle production for the military. The program office
ordered three different variants of the MRAP, known as Category I, II and III
vehicles, from each of the vendors. Mission-essential equipment for the vehicles,
such as radios and sensors, were provided separately as government-furnished
equipment. Together, these factors led to a high degree of complexity in vehicle
integration: the designs of each variant produced by each vendor differed, and
the mission equipment installed on them differed by the Service or command receiving
the vehicle. Ultimately, this meant that twenty-seven different major configurations
of MRAPs were being fielded simultaneously.
… Hence the industrial capacity
that would normally have been used for commercial products could be quickly redirected to military production. This ability to rapidly ramp up production is not found in many other areas of the defense industrial base such as nuclear
submarines or fifth-generation fighters.
…DoD’s role as systems
integrator. Because each vendor was allowed to use their own designs and their own off-the-shelf components, more companies were able to enter the competition. It also sped up deliveries to the fielded forces because companies did not
have to retool or redesign as much as they would have if DoD had selected a single
design for all vendors to build. The decision to use multiple designs from multiple
vendors greatly increased integration complexity and risk, but in the end this added complexity did not prove insurmountable.
Perhaps the most impressivesuccess of the MRAP story is that DoD managed this integration challenge on itsown using government personnel and facilities at the Space and Naval Warfare
Center (SPAWAR) in Charleston, South Carolina[:} Twenty-five integration lines were established with a projected capability of integrating one thousand vehicles per month—a figure that was exceeded in April 2008 when 1,157 vehicles were
successfully integrated.”
… does not compare with a Ford factory turning out one Liberator every hour!
– pretty good, though, in modern day terms
Hi DJ,
Absolutely: “just saying that thwe way for us to smash it would be Apache/Typhoon/Tornado Hellfire/Brimstone”
But what then… next?
“France has already bought the better protected Viking2 and it may be on the cards for UK, too, at some stage.”
24 Viking 2 have already been bought as battlefield-losses replacements, in place of Viking 1s.
Not that long ago, perhaps last year.
This despite the Army selecting Warthog against Viking 2 when they had to pick a new all-terrain vehicle.
At the same time, Warthog was bought by killing a budget option for the Royal Marines who needed to replace non-armored, old BV206 vehicles.
Hopefully, enough Vikings will come back from Stan in good conditions, to remedy to that issue.
Unless, of course, the Army, post-afghanistan, does not pass Warthog to the RM.
“What size is the 40mm CTA sub munitions?
How does it compare with other conventional 30mm / 35mm / 40mm / 57mm sub munitions?”
I should be able to provide some data.
In stowage, a 40 CTA round has a diameter of 65 mm and is 255 mm long.
The APFSDS dart weights 450 g and flies at 1600 m/sec.
The HE – airburst weights 1 kg and contains 120 g of HE, flying at 1000 m/sec.
There are two General Purpose Rounds (HE), the GPR-PD (point detonating) and the GPR-AB, fitted with programmable electronic fuze for airburst firing. The projectile is designed to achieve a fragmentation pattern biased to the sides and rear, to engage troops hiding behind cover.
The CTA round contains a 500 g propellent charge, which compares with:
50 x 330 mm Supeshot – 500 g
35 x 228 mm 360 g
40 mm Supershot round – 260 g
30 x 173 mm 160 g
30 x 170 Rarden – ?
Tests show that:
the 50 x 338 round has 96% of the lethality of the CTA round.
35mm = 77%;
40mm Supershot = 70%,
30mm = 60%.
The 40mm CTA is claimed to be able to penetrate all AFVs up to the T55 over the frontal arc at 1,500m. (150 mm penetration at 1.5 km)
The cylindrical rounds of the CTA are wider in diameter, but shorter. The gun in particular is very small, particularly important for fitting in the warrior turret envelope, which isn’t that big.
Currently, the 40 mm CTA gun offers higher performances than the guns even in 50 mm caliber, while having the sizes of a 25 mm gun.
“I’m not saying a massed armour charge is impossible, I’m just saying that thwe way for us to smash it would be Apache/Typhoon/Tornado Hellfire/Brimstone”
It has been said this approach would spell the end of tanks, even since 1960.
Just as the White Paper of 1954 (!) that foresaw a world in which no fighter would be needed, as missiles would do all the work, in both senses, it proved, excuse me, bullshit.
Tanks also tend to have this wonderful quality of being always around so long as logistically supported, and do not stay grounded because of bad weather or other issues. Armoured Vehicles have also the big advantage of providing the infantry with a solid, moving shield, something that Typhoon obviously cannot do.
And the rounds of a tank, as expensive as they are, tend to be endlessly cheaper than air attacks.
The day in which planes will be flying all over the battlefield, 24 hours out of 24, 7 days on 7, and their weapons will be as cost effective as gun rounds and tank guns, we will talk again about it.
Until then, let’s avoid believing in fairy tales.
This reminds me a lot of the “wonderful” idea of fighting wars with a container ship loaded with Tomahawks, to be used against all and any targets, regardless of the cost of the said ammunition…
Realism, i must suggest.
Gabriele
I’m not Anti Tank.
I quite like tanks.
What I dont like, are tank armies.
Drive 400 Tanks from Moscow to Berlin, opposed by 12 Typhoons.
How many do you think will make it?
“Until then, let’s avoid believing in fairy tales.”
Knocking down your own strawman doesnt beat my arguement.
”
This reminds me a lot of the “wonderful” idea of fighting wars with a container ship loaded with Tomahawks, to be used against all and any targets, regardless of the cost of the said ammunition… ”
Well, I didnt suggest that, so, please do me the courtesy of not simply making shit up.
However, if you do intend to put words into my mouth, at least knock them down.
Storm Shadow costs £1mn.
FRES costs £15mn.
Why shouldnt I hit Fres with tomahawk?
Fighting a first world opponant, you could slot individual soldiers with cruise missiles and win on dollars.
Thanks Gabby,
the stats corroborate the plans of some armies, which I have believed to be sensible and cost-efficient anyway, but good to see numbers for them.
Where are these sourced from?
“Tests show that:
the 50 x 33[8]0 round has 96% of the lethality of the CTA round.
35mm = 77%;
40mm Supershot = 70%,
30mm = 60%”
Just to point out the obvious: doing a barrel change on a 30mm Bushmaster and going to Supershot and getting a 17% improvement for that money; why not?
Out of curiosity, is that 30mm Bushy or Rarden (the latter renowned for accuracy but not so much for armour piercing)? I take that your “lethality” has been measured in that dimension?
Phil Hartley,
As you well know I have answered the question before, multiple times, you just ignore the answer because you do not like being wrong. Why not go back to the previous thread that explains some of the complexities of armoured vehicle development and integration and provides comparative costs. The real problem people here have is they fail to realise that £500 million is really not a lot of money, especially spread over 4 years to create 7 prototypes.
ArmChairCivvy,
Re; Mastiff, the problem with the latest Tranche is that there are just not that many of them- and they are still not very mobile, especially cross country and are unreliable. The sad thing is they have also been expensive, I have seen estimates that suggest they were coming out at nearly £1 million each by the time they had been fully fitted out.
Hi Bob,
Yep, putting an exchange rate on “22,882 vehicles, or an average cost of $1.59 million per
vehicle (in FY 2011 dollars)”
– and that’s what they cost Uncle Sam, there may have been a middle man?
– the figure is averaged across 27 different models, all of them ready to use though (so any UK specific fitting out would have been met with some itemised cost reduction, to counter it… of course we are masters in pushing up unit costs of any kit)
It seems to me that if we only talk about FRES scout, we can say that the French SPHINX would be enough, it looks like Ferret, it’s interesting, but here we are talking about a dozen variants of the same vehicle. I don’t know how much costs separately a radar vehicle, command vehicle, an ambulance, a missile launcher, etc … Also, I don’t know if a ASCOD direct fire could not replace the Challenger 2. I remember having read somewhere that the Challenger 2 had been destroyed by mines or just RPG, then ASCOD direct fire, with protection TROPHY or LED, more resistance to mines, may be as effective.
Frenchie, I think it is widely acknowledged that CR2 is the best protected MBT in service anywhere but would add that anything that can defeated and those that really know can’t and won’t say!
British MBT’s have generally favoured protection in the firepower/mobility/protection triad, maybe something to do with experiences in Normandy
Sorry TD about this, it’s just a suggestion and some memories ;)
DJ, that’s ok if you are on the defensive, what if you are on attack. Nato really struggled with finding serbian tanks in the air campaign there. Not until the threat of land forces did they pop up, my point you’ve got to find them first.
The Serbs had some common sense tricks up their sleeve:
– if the normal AA kept tacair at about 3 km height, that numbed the sensors quite a bit (sure, today they are better)
– send an expendable drone to be the eyes for targeting etc… they are not much faster than good helos, so nice target practice (especially if you have a heave machine gun at the open side door)
Yeah they did well with what they had, lots of hills and forests to hide in helped as well. Not sure how well those two particular tricks would work today?
Topman
Supporters of Airpower will have it that
‘Next time it will be different’
because…..
There is always a because, and it is never different.
During these discussions concerning the future of FRES, I have more than once heard the argument that it might the case that Warrior hulls will be used for some of the variants. The theory runs that if the whole range of variants does not have to be produced on the ASCOD hulls, then we might have some money for at least some of the FRES SV Scout and Protected Mobility vehicles.
In this connection, mention has been made several time of a Warrior Bridgelayer. Contributors have complained that they have not been able to find a decent picture of the vehicle. Well, I came across some very good images of the Warrior MRP (Multi-Role Platform (MRP) on The “Plain Military” website (under the heading “Military Vehicles non SPTA”). These were possibly taken at DSEi, I don’t know. If you are a member of that site or have registered with it, you might be interested in looking at them. There are pictures of the Bridge Launch Mechanism (BLM), the Warrior Multi-Role Patform, etc. etc.
Someone on this site (the “Think Defence” site, I mean) suggested that the Warrior Multi-Role Platform (MRP) still retains the turret. I can see no evidence of this whatsoever and can only conclude that it is turretless.
I think the airforce did a pretty gd job of destroying the Iraqi army in GW1. As for kosovo I believe it was deficiencies in European inventories of the ability to bomb thru cloud that was the major draw back there and the ROE. But gd tactics by the serbs also hiding the real vehicles. However that was one of the things that Astor was bought to help with and its down very well in Libya at doing just that. I would point out the biggest tank battle fought by the british army since ww2 was a 14 tank action in basra not exactly a frequent or large scale type of action.
Gabby I think tactical UAVs a la predator B are doing 24-7 armed CAS for want of a better description in afghan now any peer enemy will have something similar though this is manpower intensity 21 crews per 24hr orbat.
Bob mastiff maybe pants or not but the question I think is this we had hundreds of tracked apc but we bought wheeled apcs for afghan which suggests to me they prefer wheeled apcs for stabilisation ops.
Chally 2 is pretty damn gd and a core will remain in the army haven’t heard lots of criticism of warrior either so thats the high sorted out. Medium we seem to like wheeled vehicles and for rapid deployment cvrt beats FRES because its really too heavy for the UK to deploy in any numbers rapidly. Unless its a warrior replacement I cant see were FRES fits in is it needed right now. Medium wheeled apc, ocelot and cvrt2 update would seem a better area to spend money on.
In GW1 the Iraqi army dug its tanks into open desert. As the Allies had total air superiority it couldn’t have been too hard a task to find them. Especially at night with the disparity in temperature between desert and 50 odd tons of steel (especially if the engines had been running to keep their crews warm.)
GW1 produced an unrealistic model of the capabilities of modern air power. There was literally nowhere for a large proportion of the Iraqi Army to hide, especially since it had to be deployed in defensive positions since at the start of the air campaign coalition ground forces were just over the border. So, once air supremacy was gained it was a simple matter of plinking Iraqi AFVs sat right out in the open from clear, largely cloudless skies.
In Kosovo the Serb Army did not have to deploy in defensive positions for most of the air campaign and so their forces could remain in the most robust posture against air attack – dispersed and hidden and cold. Bombing through the clouds was only a problem if you had actually managed to acquire the targets, and if you had acquired a target it was not a dummy.
Had large NATO ground forces been deployed from the start Serb forces would have been forced to take on much more vulnerable dispositions but even then there was far more opportunities for discreet movement and camouflage than there was in 1991.
When air power has air supremacy, and the enemy have to move en masse and target acquisition is aided by ground forces it is very effective – it is not so effective with no ground designation, dispersed and hidden forces and maskirovka being employed.
Bob… No you haven’t!!!!
Answer the bloody questions and prove to us that fees SV is nothing more than a modest upgrade of an existing vehicle using off the shelf products!!
I believe you are a fraud, you probably no someone, who knows, someone… At GDUK and have told you a few inside gossip stories which you claim as your own inside knowledge. You dont fool me at all I think you are talking bollox?
Sorry but you have not substantiated anything in my view.
Bob clearly knows something we don’t or has links or contacts in the industry or in Main Building because he has a very high and mighty, I know, you don’t tone about him.
He is obviously enjoying educating the plebs.
Which is fine, we all like to be educated but he is most selective in backing up his facts with sources, since, presumably, his sources are not on the internet or in literature but come from somewhere else. And his tone has gone from patronising and robust to just, frankly, ugly.
You try Bob, to gain the high ground by employing a tone suited to an academic debate but you riddle it with ugly turns of phrase like “fatty”.
If you said “my sources at GDUK say this…” or “I have read in a memo that…” everyone would be far more inclined to tolerate a haughty attitude since the folk here are interested in armoured vehicles and you’d be teaching them something they couldn’t find out on the internet. Instead you’re keeping your cards close to your chest and now I am not the only one to suspect you’re passing on second hand, hyperbolic, rumour mill stuff.
A huge amount of stunning common sense is very evident from all of TD’s regular commentators in this thread. Well done, everyone and thank you. I hope Liam Fox reads this.
As a former CVR(T) recce troop commander, I shall not be disappointed if the ASCOD behemoth gets the chop. I also agree that it’s too large, too old and too similar to Warrior to justify its purchase. I think the 40 mm CTA is an interesting and probably a very effective weapon weapon, but it is an expensive one. The cost of engineering the turret and marrying this with the ASCOD chassis is considerably more than it would be for buying an off-the-shelf 25 mm or 30 mm cannon in a proven turret.
This is exactly what Stormer 30 is. A 13 tonne vehicle with substantially greater protection and firepower than the Scimitar and with comparable mobility. it is also air transportable in a C-130 Hercules and can be underslung beneath a Chinook. Heaven knows why we didn’t buy these when they were first appeared in 1995. I guess we wanted the new, new thing, which was meant to be Tracer. Alas, this was an abortive project that only contributed to the £500 million spent to date without a single being fielded.
Now we’re stuck with ASCOD, its only advantage is that it is constructed from steel rather than aluminium and therefore offers increased protection. The penalty for this, of course, is a substantial amount of extra weight.
When ASCOD was originally selected, the SDSR hadn’t occurred. Now that it has, we have 300 surplus Warriors (and possibly more, because of war stocks held in reserve). These could easily be used in the recce role. (Let’s not forget that the US Army very successfully used M2 and M3 Bradleys for Infantry and Recce roles during Gulf Wars 1 and 2.)
Whatever happens to ASCOD, we will need to upgrade our Warrior fleet at some point. It needs a much better weapon than the antiquated RARDEN cannon. A less expensive option than the 40 mm CTA would be the US 30 mm chain gun or Mauser 30 mm cannon used in Germany’s Puma IFV.
Speaking of the Puma, If we really wanted a state-of-the-art FRES, I would have bought this. Like the Leopard 2, it is excellent as only the Germans know how. KMW has offered it to the US Army. It may well be used as the foundation for the new US Army GCV. Given that we’re on an economy drive, upgraded Warriors seem like the cheapest option. Since we had planned to upgrade the entire fleet before SDSR, maintaining this plan but diverting surplus Warriors to the recce role in effect kills two birds with one stone.
In the interests of cutting the defence budget and giving our troops what they need, my advice to the Coalition is to scrap FRES SV and the 40 mm CTA and then reconsider how best to upgrade the Warrior fleet with a new and inexpensive cannon. I certainly don’t think we should be in such a rush to buy a vehicle that isn’t urgently needed now. Or are we expecting to mount an armoured thrust any time soon?
Monty agree completely with your last post. The thing is, SDSR basically relegates the UK to only fielding a brigade so FRES is simply not needed!
Phil
While I agree to an extent with what you say however your comment
“When air power has air supremacy, and the enemy have to move en masse and target acquisition is aided by ground forces it is very effective – it is not so effective with no ground designation, dispersed and hidden forces and maskirovka being employed.”
Doesnt quite hold true with what happened in Libya were it proved very effective without ground designation and dispersed forces thanks to the extensive use by UK and US forces of significant ISTAR assets its just a shame we plan to scrap them all.
But back to all things FRES Monty very interesting post and one that I would totally agree with.
@ mike w, you’re spot on there someone on the ARRSE site did a little bit on it, he saw it outside at DSEi and stated that the chassis was the REME variant ie turretless.
ps @frenchie you’ll find on the net somewhere how the chally in GW2 took repeated hits from RPG7 and just shrugged it off abrahms however, had a weak spotat the back somewhere (shades of a tiger tank history lesson there). The only CR2 smashed was hit by another CR2. Recently a driver lost his legs, but i believe without checking i admit, that was a chuffing big IED.
In response to other questions i thought CTA was banging along now? if it’s working or even close to won’t there be a chance of selling it, genuine question, we need tony w to come and clarify state of play with it.
For what it’s worth i think it will go ahead, but very reduced numbers and/or a low volume per annum rate to “feed in” ie recce with turret attached to heavy mech and some PMV. Based purely on how far down the road the south wales factory is going and the govt wanting to invest in Uk jobs to avoid double dip bollocks!!
I’m not sure I agree. This is conjecture but I imagine that enemy forces were more vulnerable because they were engaged in ground fighting and were not at liberty to go to ground. So although they were dispersed they still had to be drawn out into fights. There must be some ground based target indication since NATO planes would be very hard pressed to autonomously identify a target as enemy and engage it. Someone somewhere is telling the RAF where to find the bad guys, which isn’t hard if they are shooting at you. I don’t know if it’s SF or rebels with NATO compatible radios but somebody must be doing it.
Once ground forces are forced into an engagement they obviously become far more vulnerable in all dimensions.
The story at the time was that Qatar gave $25m for the US-Libyan entrepreneur (who had originally been setting up the Libyan mobile networks) and in the contested areas it was the rebels who had use of those networks (good map coordinates somewhere further back were perhaps relayed using some “donated” radio sets.
As for lasing from the ground, there were persistent rumours that the French SFs were on the ground in Misrata, where the fighting was so close up that map coordinates were not of much use.
I agree that Warrior’s firepower needs upgrading but I disagree with cancelling the 40mm CTA. Like the RARDEN before it, it manages the neat trick of making a compact weapon capable of firing a large and powerful round – though at the expense of a low ROF. The German and US 30mm options are looking a little anaemic to me. As the long FRES-SV threads here on TD have shown, MICV’s, APC’s and other light armoured vehicles are , well, no longer light. Their armour is not just getting thicker, it’s also increasingly advanced composites rather than simple steel or aluminium plate. Will a 30mm cannon be up to the job? If it is now it will certainly be obsolescent before the 40mm CTA. A further advantage of the 40mm gun is that it throws a round that is 2.5 times heavier than the 30mm guns. That’s not insignificant for common HE rounds and becomes even more significant if sophisticated (and relatively bulky) air burst fuses are thrown into the mix.
EDIT – As usual when discussing cannon it’s worth having a look at this; http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk/WLIP.htm
If you’re so close your 8 figure grid is the same as the enemy’s than it’s hand grenade and bayonet time, not JDAM or Paveway time!
The biggest con of the CT40 is that while the gun is small, the ammo feed system that it needs is massive.
To pick up the issue of air power I think that, as always with historical examples, you have to look at the context and all the facts together, then ask yourself what lessons you can learn.
I think we get tied down to the idea of “well the conditions in that war won’t be repeated etc”. It all depends. The conditions of GW 1 were largely repeated… in GW 2. Would the same conditions apply to a war in Finland? Did the Russians use the GW2 as a model for ther campaign in Georgia?
This is important because it can put the “things will be different this time” theories into proper perspective.
Let’s say we were going to re-run the WW2 bombing of Germany, but with modern planes and equipment against a minimal enemy air force. Would it still take 1000 bombers to do the needed damage on a raid. Heck, we could probably hit one factory repeatedly with just two planes thanks to modern precision weapons.
I know the battle of Crete has come up on here before, specifically the evacuation phase. Now back then, ships caught in open water without air cover were hit hard by enemy air forces. However, modern ships, with modern systems, have shown great potential against air attacks in open waters.
I don’t think the end of the tank is nigh. But the tank(ers) do have to be more concious about the potential of air power, and adequate protection against air attack (SAM) needs to be carefully considered.
But anyway, that’s getting off track. Back on track – literally – I look at CVRT 2.0 and think “that thing looks good enough to meet our FRES SV needs”. Let’s can FRES and save the money while we can, instead of pouring good money after bad on another FRES wonder mission.
Monty – with the greatest of respect to your considerable experience, I can’t agree with your position. I am sure you loved your Scorpion or Scimitar, but things have moved on! My dad loved his Centurion, and his experience in Korea is that nothing smaller than a 17 Pdr should be used for ‘armoured recce” …… as TD has noted before the Yanks use M1A1 in the Cavalry role !!! As for Stormer 30, well sure when it was first rolled out (20 years ago ?) It would have been a great incremental improvement, but now, well I am just not convinced.
Mr Fred – where do you get the idea that the “problem ” with the CT40 is that its ammo feed system is “massive” ? Why would a weapon system designed from the outset for armoured vehicles, and acknowledged to have a small turret volume have a “massive” feed system? As noted previously in this thread, the rounds are about the same length as a 25m round but are wider. So which components are “massive” ???
@ JED
“Why would a weapon system designed from the outset for armoured vehicles, and acknowledged to have a small turret volume have a “massive” feed system?”
— The current proposed feed systems are quite bulky (not sure is ‘Massive’ is the word I’d use though). Unlike traditional rounds they can’t be fed into the weapon by a belt (the case has no extraction groove).
One method would require a horizontally rotating breech assembly, similar to a turntable design, into which each fresh round is fed. It might be hard to picture this mentally, but suffice to say that it would require the rounds to be fed into the mechanism ‘end first’.
The second solution is some variant of a revolver/gattling gun style feed, with a series of rotating chambers that are loaded, bring the round into barrel alignment, and are then unloaded.
Thirdly, you can have a system where a fresh round is rammed into a chamber, which is then raised up to alignment with the barrel, fired, lowered, and then the process of ramming a new round ejects the old (as proposed for the US LSAT Machinegun).
Regardless of which variant you choose, you end up eating space in the turret for the feed mechanism, with plenty of ‘dead space’ between the ammunition feed and the interior wall of the turret.
However, I’m sure there is a group of clever dicks out there who will come up with a suitably clever solution.
“I look at CVRT 2.0 and think “that thing looks good enough to meet our FRES SV needs”. Let’s can FRES and save the money while we can, instead of pouring good money after bad on another FRES wonder mission.”
Even assuming that CVR(T) can be dragged forwards through more years of service – and i remain skeptical about it – you can can the Scout, but NOT FRES SV whole.
Unless you also want to keep FV43X going until they are one hundred years old.
The confusion, anyway, comes from the 2005 decision of making FRES the “one and only” solution to the armour needs of the Army.
That was by far too ambitious.
Earlier, the Battlefield Armoured Support Vehicle (which at the time was an independent programme, which was to consider vehicle bases such as Singapore’s Bionix and ASCOD) was to deliver a very specific set of vehicles (Protected Mobility, command post et) to serve with Warrior and replace the FV43X.
Then there was the Boxer, which had to replace Saxon in the mechanized infantry.
Last came FRES, a C130-capable family of vehicles to replace CVR(T).
Putting everything together, along with the end of the confidence in light, small vehicles being survivable enough to do the job, has caused a huge mess…
“I don’t know if it’s SF or rebels with NATO compatible radios but somebody must be doing it.”
I think NATO air forces receive targeting “hints” by both sources: the presence of special forces is by now kind of official, and radios were definitely supplied as part of “humanitarian” help, which included also armour and tactical vests for top rebels leaders and other stuff.
And ultimately, FRES broke down again, and kind of returned to the original configuration, minus the C130 portability requirement, which just doesn’t get along with survivability and protection requirements.
From C130 to A400 portability. From 20 to 30+ tons.
“The conditions of GW 1 were largely repeated… in GW 2.”
Not really. Iraq fought the GW2 in a VERY different way than it fought the GW1.
Also, despite the success of the air campaign against Iraq forces in GW1, i remember lots of tank battles, especially in the american sector.
Air power dealed massive damage, but did not win on its own.
And there was a moment of the campaign in which weather and sand storms had temporarily grounded air support.
Yes, even today, it can happen.
“When ASCOD was originally selected, the SDSR hadn’t occurred. Now that it has, we have 300 surplus Warriors (and possibly more, because of war stocks held in reserve). These could easily be used in the recce role.”
The first time it was realized that up to 300 Warriors would not be needed was in 2005, labour still in power.
The defence industrial strategy then released fused the Warrior CSP and Battlefield Armoured Support Vehicle: “up to 300” non-updated Warriors were to be released to be turned into BASV, to replace FV43X.
Current status of the BASV effort: unclear.
There is plenty of roles to fill past “Recce”.
The Scout makes for 250 vehicles or so, in a first order planned to be as high as 600, in a programme aiming for over 1000.
We should not forget such “details”, as FRES goes past Recce by a good margin.
“A less expensive option than the 40 mm CTA would be the US 30 mm chain gun or Mauser 30 mm cannon used in Germany’s Puma IFV.”
Any evidence at all of the promised “savings” of canning CTA 40 after investing all that money in it, to buy a less capable gun?
Sorry, it does not feel like a smart decision.
“One method would require a horizontally rotating breech assembly, similar to a turntable design, into which each fresh round is fed. It might be hard to picture this mentally, but suffice to say that it would require the rounds to be fed into the mechanism ‘end first’.”
. . . and that’s the method chosen. As I have said before, read this; http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk/WLIP.htm
You will notice that the CTA 40mm is fatter and shorter than the 30mm rounds used by the Rarden.
Regarding airpower
Yes, Tanks can hide from it.
But only immobile tanks, and only small groups of tanks.
You cant hide 150 tanks storming across the country.
An enemy on the defence has already lost the war.
Either he defends his capital and surrenders the rest of the country, or he defends everything, and you smash his penny packets one by one.
Regarding Tanks
“Also, despite the success of the air campaign against Iraq forces in GW1, i remember lots of tank battles, especially in the american sector.”
I’m fairly certain IFV’s did more tank killing than tanks.
Isolated Iraqi tank units that had escaped destruction from the air were surrounded and annihilated.
They couldnt co-ordinate movements to counter attack in force, so they just hid and hoped to ambush advancing allied forces, which outnumbered and outgunned them.
Yes yes, airpower was ineffective in Kosovo, but we know why, the enemy was allowed to disperse.
Had we landed a Pocket Division, they wopuld have either remained dispersed and been picked apart by our land forces, or massed, and annihilated by our airpower.
I’m not argueing we dont need armour, I’m argueing we dont need FRES, and we dont need 400 Tanks.
“I think we get tied down to the idea of “well the conditions in that war won’t be repeated etc”. It all depends. The conditions of GW 1 were largely repeated… in GW 2. Would the same conditions apply to a war in Finland? Did the Russians use the GW2 as a model for ther campaign in Georgia?”
The context in GW1 was wide open flat desert in Kuwait and South East Iraq and pretty good weather. There is the vague possibility of fighting another war in such terrain but it is now likelier to be more like Kosovo or Gw2 or Libya where a lot of the action is in urban environments.
Urban environments are the next challenge. Forces can deploy and move around an urban environment with a far greater level of protection from observation and direct attack and still be just as potent a fighting force. There is also now the requirement to limit as far as is possible collateral damage – which is why I believe we are seeing a slew of weapon systems such as the SDB, Paveway IV, SPEAR etc
GW1 was utterly ideal for air power. The good weather, the largely clear skies, the snooker table terrain, the fact that most of the Iraqi Army had to be deployed, the almost complete lack of concealment opportunities.
If we can effectively utilise air power in scenario’s like Kosovo and the more urban settings then we can easily fight another GW1 out in the wide open desert.
As to your other point, there is too much nay saying from some people who think just because a weapon system is vulnerable it means it no longer has a place on the battlefield, that its day has come and gone. Fighting involves risk, exceptionally high levels of risk and kit will get destroyed.
Which is why I advocate a mass of reasonable vehicles rather than a niche of expensive, specialist vehicles.
RE: Gabby’s point:
“Even assuming that CVR(T) can be dragged forwards through more years of service – and i remain skeptical about it – you can can the Scout, but NOT FRES SV whole”
While I think FRES SV base vehicle is exactly what we need, and I understand the future is fighting for information, given that in reality we are looking at a build programme of at least ten if not fifteen years,and we are strapped for cash isn’t there an argument to update all the Scimitar’s to the Scimitar 2 standard with OSD of say around 2027, later if we introduce a new turret programme, and leave the scout variant to the end of the build programme and concentrate on the other variants now – presumably protected mobility for example would have a significantly cheaper unit cost than the scout?
“An enemy on the defence has already lost the war.”
A simplistic outlook.
“Either he defends his capital and surrenders the rest of the country, or he defends everything, and you smash his penny packets one by one.”
As quoted by Hitler June 21, 1941?
“Had we landed a Pocket Division, they wopuld have either remained dispersed and been picked apart by our land forces, or massed, and annihilated by our airpower.”
Again, without wishing to sound rude, this is simplistic. Kosovo/Serbia is and was not a billiard table. There was complex terrain and choke points.
Small isolated pockets of determined forces with stockpiled supplies could have effectively blocked an advance by forces who had no choice but to take a particular and easily anticipated axis.
I don’t know what a pocket division is.
Hi Gabby, a good point
“The defence industrial strategy then released fused the Warrior CSP and Battlefield Armoured Support Vehicle: “up to 300″ non-updated Warriors were to be released to be turned into BASV, to replace FV43X.
Current status of the BASV effort: unclear”
Is that talking to the current (officially) 550+ WR upgrade programme number and the part that is not hugely under a half of it that won’t get the turrets.
Or *was* it talking to the number over and above any currently planned updates (789 minus 550 approx.)
– and what will the numbers turn out to be in the pending decisions (AI having gone down markedly in the number of bns)
– on the one hand the upgrades, averaging 1.5m eachaccording to Bob, present v good value
– on the other, the total funding that needs earmarking will push fielding anything new at all further into the future (not calling cvrt2 “new” in this context)
Right, I’m bloody tired, I’ll try to shifty through these as best I can.
@ Gabby
“Even assuming that CVR(T) can be dragged forwards through more years of service – and i remain skeptical about it – you can can the Scout, but NOT FRES SV whole.
Unless you also want to keep FV43X going until they are one hundred years old,”
— We can can the concept of FRES easily, that is, the idea of some super dooper new(sort of) whizz bang medium vehicle for the modern age. And just buy something that is out there.
“Not really” (regarding GW2 vs GW1)
— They were both fought in Iraq, where allied air power pretty much trashed most of their support and vehicles, is the point I was making.
“Also, despite the success of the air campaign against Iraq forces in GW1, i remember lots of tank battles, especially in the american sector.”
— They weren’t exactly the Battle of Kursk though were they. ‘Lots’ of ‘tank battles’ is a gross over statement of what happened, which was more skirmishes and involved a lot of Bradleys.
“Any evidence at all of the promised “savings” of canning CTA 40 after investing all that money in it, to buy a less capable gun? Sorry, it does not feel like a smart decision,”
— Sunk costs should not factor into the future.
@ Pete A
Yes mate, that link was precisely the thing I was talking about.
@ Phil
“The context in GW1 was wide open flat desert in Kuwait and South East Iraq and pretty good weather. There is the vague possibility of fighting another war in such terrain but it is now likelier to be more like Kosovo or Gw2 or Libya where a lot of the action is in urban environments”
The general thrust I was after is that often people tend to talk in terms of “it worked in GW1, thus it will work everywhere”, whereas I think what we’re sort of agreeing on here is that while one method worked in one place, it may not work elsewhere, hence the allusion to the war in Georgia which was very different to the GW1 due to terrain, weather, infrastructure etc.
So even though both Gulf wars have shown the continued utility of armourand air power, they don’t necessarily prove that those two weapons will always be clear winners in any fight.
Just that under those conditions (wide open spaces, little natural cover, practically zero overhead cover) that armour and airpower can be incredibly effective.
Phil
Simple, but true, you cant win a war without going out and shooting the enemy.
Perhaps I should have said static defence.
The Soviet Union had no concept of defence.
There were no defence strategies, tactics, or plannings. In May 1941, the USSR was spending more resources on planning the “liberation” of Portugal than the defence of Poland.
Nor is Barbarrosa what I am suggesting.
The Germans advanced on a dozen seperate lines, with who knows how many objectives, and ground themselves away on multiple concurrant sieges.
Thats not what I suggested.
Use superior mobility (by both being mobile oneself, and deny freedom of movement to enemy) to concentrate large numbers of your own forces against the enemy and destroy them, piece by piece.
Germany did the exact opposite.
Your missing my point.
Ok, Serbia defends a choke point.
What with? 400 Concealed T72’s?
Ok, go to another choke point, they cant all be manned like that.
And they cannot move to another choke point, because if they try, they suddenly appear to our airpower, and explode shortly after.
4 concealed T72’s?
Ram through 40 Challenger 2’s
40 concealed T72s?
Pulse airpower to allow a 12 hour window of mass cover, nibble through with our 40 Challenger 2’s.
A pocket division is just another name for the Multi Role Brigade, I think its more fitting.
@Jed,
I totally agree that things have moved on and that we definitely need a better protected vehicle with greater firepower than CVR(T). As I also mentioned in my post, I think the 40 mm CTA is likely to be highly effective. The problem is simply that we’re trying to filed a new vehicle that is hardly state of the art at a time when we don’t urgently need it and cannot afford it. The 40 mm CTA is a non-NATO standard weapon and is apparently 40% more expensive than a 30 mm Mauser or Chain gun alternative.
What I mean is that I just don’t think the combination of ASCOD and 40 mm CTA is a good one. ASCOD is excessively large and uses the same basic trailing arm torsion beam suspension as Warrior. Indeed, the only real difference between ASCOD and Warrior is that the former is still in production while the latter is not.
@Gabriele
There may be a need for 1,000 vehicles to replace the entire CVR(T) family and various antiquated FV432 vehicles still in service, but the mandate is only for 250 Scouts at this time. I think it is a pipe dream to think that FRES scout will lead to the procurement of another 750 vehicles any time soon.
Looking ahead, we will need to upgrade Challenger 2 at some point. As is, it is an excellent MBT and I can’t see this happening until the economy is well back on track (10 years time!) The need to replace Warrior, however, is likely to be more pressing. Its drivetrain can barely cope with additional protection requirements while its RARDEN gun belongs in a museum. One clear future requirement that’s emerging is for IFVs and Recce vehicles that are as well protected as MBTS, at least frontally. I think that mandates new design.
We will soon need a new IFV. In that respect the German Puma concept makes a lot of sense. It is highly agile, has an excellent 30 mm cannon and automated fire control system and protects its occupants better than any other existing IFV according to KMW.
I would rather soldier on with CVR(T) until we have the money to acquire a UK equivalent of the Puma family. This would include an IFV, Recce, REME, Command, Ambulance, Mortar and Anti-tank vehicles.
ASCOD is not in any way equivalent of the Puma. It is a previous generation design. Fed-up with waiting, I think the Army would prefer to have a second-rate option today than wait for something new and better tomorrow.
One thing i will say is that the Germans who have a much smaller defence budget than we do, yet seem to get AFV procurement right every time. The Boxer, Leopard 2 and Puma are all excellent vehicles. The whole process whereby their requirements were defined, agreed, designed and procured needs to be looked at and copied by the MoD.
“Use superior mobility (by both being mobile oneself, and deny freedom of movement to enemy) to concentrate large numbers of your own forces against the enemy and destroy them, piece by piece.”
We’ve been through this before and I don’t agree with you. Freedom of movement is earned through attrition unless the battlefield is sparse enough to allow unopposed or lightly opposed operational and maybe even strategic infiltration.
“Ok, Serbia defends a choke point.
What with? 400 Concealed T72′s?”
I imagine they’d have used the Serbian Army! Which was reasonably well motivated, competent, battle hardened, supplied and would have been dug in tight as a tic.
“And they cannot move to another choke point, because if they try, they suddenly appear to our airpower, and explode shortly after.”
This is very Clancy-esque. Certainly their freedom of movement would be curtailed significantly but there are a number of precedences of a competent army still being able to manoeuvre and and engage under conditions of enemy air superiority in such complex close in terrain.
“Ram through 40 Challenger 2′s”
Ah yes! Of course! Brute force! If only others before had thought of such an approach. Ramming through 40 tanks into complex terrain defended by motivated troops armed with anti tank weapons through a narrow and easily compartmentalized axis of advance. You make it sound very simple when it is not a simple task.
Nibble – another word for attrition and the need to earn your manoeuvre.
“I think the Army would prefer to have a second-rate option today than wait for something new and better tomorrow.”
Or, more likely, never. Far, far better to have a reasonable vehicle in existence in numbers than a CAD drawing.
Hi Monty,
“I would rather soldier on with CVR(T) until we have the money to acquire a UK equivalent of the Puma family. This would include an IFV, Recce, REME, Command, Ambulance, Mortar and Anti-tank vehicles.”
With all due respect, wait until when?
If it’s only buying 250 scout, he must have a modern vehicle, somewhere in the world, that would suit your needs. How long do you postpone the replacement of vehicles very very old?
A world war may well break out by 2025, and in Europe, it’s only the UK that has an army worthy of the name. But you are at a crossroads in terms of equipment, you can not stay with someone of the vehicles older than forty years, even upgraded.
Phil
“We’ve been through this before and I don’t agree with you. Freedom of movement is earned through attrition”
NO IT ISNT!!!
What would the British army need to attrite to travel from Colchester to Salisbury?
You have freedom of movement when there is nothing to prevent you moving.
If the enemy cannot redploy to block you, and is not already in a position to block you, it cannot block you, and you can move, freely.
“I imagine they’d have used the Serbian Army! Which was reasonably well motivated, competent, battle hardened, supplied and would have been dug in tight as a tic.”
What, all of it? To defend one valley?
Cross the next one then.
“This is very Clancy-esque. Certainly their freedom of movement would be curtailed significantly but there are a number of precedences of a competent army still being able to manoeuvre and and engage under conditions of enemy air superiority in such complex close in terrain.”
But how quickly, over what distance, and with what level of force.
Its 150km from the north to the south of Kosovo.
Lets say we’re based in the south, and Serbia sits in our path.
So we head north
4 Hours in a challenger 2 at off road speed?
Say it takes 8 to move everything and get into position to attack.
What can the Serbs move 150km in 8 hours whilst under constant air harrasment?
Either they defend the entire 150km front, in which case, we can attack a 5km front with a 3:1 advantage, even if they outnumber us 10:1, and walk right through.
Or they defend key sectors, but again, we break through one with overwhelming force, and ignore the rest.
“You have freedom of movement when there is nothing to prevent you moving.”
But there is, route, terrain, objectives are all immediately limiting your freedom of movement and then so is the enemy.
“What, all of it? To defend one valley?
Cross the next one then.”
Eh? Why would they defend a choke point or mountain pass with their entire army? There are only so many ways into Kosovo, only so much of a road network, only so many possible axis of advance. My point is those could be anticipated and defended, you don’t have freedom of manoeuvre because the enemy is straddling your routes, you have to “nibble” as you put it, to gain your freedom of movement, if you ever entirely can in that sort of terrain.
“But how quickly, over what distance, and with what level of force.”
Who knows, but they are in defence, as long as they can deploy a force only about a third the size of the attacking force and dig in they can conceivably defeat an attack.
“Either they defend the entire 150km front,”
They never would have had to do that. The terrain and road network and objectives dramatically reduce the likely avenues of attack. Your freedom of movement is severely restricted before you even start to fight.
The Serbian Army was quite large in 1999 and moving along internal lines in close terrain, often in bad weather and low cloud cover. Nobody says it would have been easy but it has been done in the past and it could have been done again.
Phil
Lets say had 120,000 men.
Defending 10 valleys, thats 12,000 men.
Defending 100 valleys, thats 1,200 men.
I question the 3:1 Ratio, ok as a guide, but ignores technological superiority.
I may not want lots of tanks, but I’m happy to spend a lot on making them very very capable.
“The Serbian Army was quite large in 1999 and moving along internal lines in close terrain, often in bad weather and low cloud cover. Nobody says it would have been easy but it has been done in the past and it could have been done again.”
Maybe it could have, but could it have been done again, and again, and again, and again?
Each time we force them to move to match our movements, we bleed them a little bit more each time with air power, until they’ve lost the war.
If I may ask this question if we had 200 of these vehicles right now would they be sent to afghan? If we had a serria leone operation would they be sent there? I would guess its no on both accounts.
We can argue about how useful large ground forces being deployed are or not but the UK has only once deployed more the a single heavy brigade to fight since the ww2.
The US have stated on a number of occasions now that anyone thinking of sending a large western army to asia or middle east needs there head examining which suggests there out of invasion game and both political parties in the UK have stated any military action needs support from countries in the region and the UN can anyone honestly see those conditions allowing a large land army to deploy cause I cant. Most ground forces will be sf/ranger type forces short of all out war.
If thats the politcal reality and with these hard economic time would why are we spending years and hundreds of millions of pounds of the armies budget on something that probably wont be needed for some time or that adds very little above upgraded warrior will do. Its taking so long to field it could be obsolete by the time its in service.
Have you looked at a map of Kosovo?
I have 8 fingers and two thumbs and I don’t need all of them to count how many ways there are to get into Kosovo from Albania and Macedonia. And nearly all of those ways are through steep sided valleys, with water obstacles (obviously) and densely urbanised. Once past those there are only so many routes to go and only so many places you need to get to.
Take a look at a map of Iraq in 2003 and overlay the advance axis of US forces and you’ll see an extremely strong correlation between north-south road networks, cross road and bridge urban areas and all arrows converge on one place, south of which was the strongest concentration of Iraqi forces.
It would have been precisely the same in Kosovo. There are only so many ways to skin a cat. Let us not forget that Serbian planning benefited from decades of planning to repel an invasion from all axis, this also meant that their garrisons were not in random places like the UK, but they straddled or sat aside historical and likely invasion routes. The entire FYR and thereafter Serbian army was organised and based to defend the country from invasion.
I’m not saying they’d have won, but it would have been a very, very tough fight.
“I question the 3:1 Ratio, ok as a guide, but ignores technological superiority.”
There’s barely such a thing as technological superiority in such close in, combined arms urban and forest warfare. It’s infantry platoons versus trench systems with fire support from tanks and other AFVs, if they can be gotten to the point of contact.
3:1 exists for a reason and against a moderately competent enemy in close in terrain on internal lines is a time tested rule of thumb.
Hi Mark,
If Israel is invaded, you don’t think it will attack Middle Eastern countries.
“We can argue about how useful large ground forces being deployed are or not but the UK has only once deployed more the a single heavy brigade to fight since the ww2.”
And it has deployed heavy forces in Palestine, Korea, Gulf, Iraq, Bosnia and Kosovo over a 60 year period. These replacement vehicles are looking at a similar length of life, so what you are suggesting is hobbling the Army for 6 or so large scale interventions supposing that the interventions occur at a similar rate in the future.
Wouldn’t a better question be if Israel is invaded and is unable to repel the attack with the assistance of a US carrier group would the UK ground forces be part of the forces used to liberate Israel? I think the answer is no. Just like I suspect it would be no if North Korea invaded South Korea or if India/Pakistan kicked off, hell I doubt we would commit ground forces if Russia invaded one of the Baltic states, or if Turkey launched an invasion of Greece – for the foreseeable future a the deployment of ground forces will an option of last resort, and we will concentrate on using our naval and air power to enforce our will. Just a shame that we cannot afford to fund any branch of the armed forces to the level required to back up our politician’s perception’s of our place in the world.
“Just a shame that we cannot afford to fund any branch of the armed forces to the level required to back up our politician’s perception’s of our place in the world.”
We never have done.
We never win a war with an aircraft carrier, we need ground forces, or to have nuclear missiles such as France. France is protected but we are not able to project land forces in sufficient numbers to fulfill our role alongside the U.S.
Frenchie
Im sure Israel would do what it needed to defend itself but it wouldnt involve UK ground forces so its not relevant.
Phil
So with out FRES the army cant do any major future operation utter nonsense. Challenger and warrior upgraded are gd for some time yet.
As for the examples you quote the armed forces had a global presence for the first 2 long gone and the others we were part of a coalition and only had to proved a contribution. Why should that contribution be heavy armour formations with hundreds of FRES in the future?.
looking at what the rebel forces have managed to bolt on to the back of pick ups for obviously peanuts, perhaps we should ask them to knock up something! This thought came to me when i saw a bloke firing 70mm rockets from an underwing pod from the back of the toyota battle bus
“So with out FRES the army cant do any major future operation utter nonsense.”
Nonsense is wanting a first world army to fight with vehicles that are 40-60 years old.
I’m sure Warrior and CR2 are good to go for some years yet but there are an awful lot of vehicles that have already reached the end of their useful lives and are turning into wheezing Heath Robinson contraptions.
There needs to be a whole hearted, concerted and realistic replacement for a whole swathe of vehicle types – the FRES (CVRT 21 shall we call it) offers that.
These vehicles have to be replaced sometime and I’d rather the money be spent on numbers of reasonable and new vehicles than getting spent on clapped out monstrosities.
People bang on about the cost of developing these things but I would bet that the life time costs of keeping the diabolical contraptions we have going for another 30 odd years (when their protection, armament and suspension is already maxed out) is going to cost as much, if not more.
A lot of the technology and R&D that will go into FRES will likely need to be developed to keep these things current AFVs viable for the future anyway and then there’s the headache of shoe horning it into these worn out vehicles.
“Why should that contribution be heavy armour formations with hundreds of FRES in the future?.”
I never said it should. But FRES is part of the concept of medium forces, and it can be part of a heavy force too. Flexibility is a key capability.
I dont want the army to fight in 60 year old vehicles. We have 700 warriors more than enough to form two heavy brigade that use only warrior.
As for the medium forces bit the vehicles are so heavy they maybe heavy but by any other and unlike the initial requirement offer no real advantage for rapid deployment than what we currently have warthog would seem a better fit if you wanted a tracked medium vehicle. A number of countries including the US and arguably ourselves if you consider what weve bought for afghan seem to prefer wheeled vehicles for the medium bit. I think this is the wrong vehicle at the wrong time.
But I guess well have to agree to disagree
Let’s face it, after the Army is reduced post-2016 to 80,000 by SDSR it will not be able to conduct any major operations anyway. One brigade is merely a small contribution to future Allied operations. We can stick to simple tasks like protecting rear areas. 100,000 strength represents the minimum serious army; so I guess the post-Afghanistan future is peacekeeping and strategic raids. given the lack of likely operations in the European theatre. Will we really need FRES Scout for those tasks? If yes, we should go ahead and buy it; if not let’s cancel FRES, save the money and buy something more suitable and down market off the shelf.
Numbers are not the whole story. Capabilities are. And the 100,000 man army thing, if I had a pound every time I heard that.
Some of the cynicism on this site is so depressing.
Medium to me is not a weight. It is the difference between light and heavy. The Bde in Afghan is medium. The vehicles are on the heavy side but that’s the cost of doing business. It has been decided that light vehicles are an unacceptable risk to the occupants. It is a risk perception and assessment phenomena.
I forgot Warrior. It’s already 30 years old in terms of tech and design. The vehicles would need a massive re build, there isn’t enough of them (they’ll suffer attrition) and I’d bet they’d cost as much keeping them in service as it would be to build FRES and spend to save and do a proper job.
And for the sake of argument we convert the 700 odd we have that is not enough to replace all the vehicles FRES wants to replace. A smaller vehicle fleet means much more wear and tear and lack of training platforms plus increased pressure on the fleet because there aren’t enough to rotate through deep maintenance that it needs even more because of the wear and tear. Plus, the hull is the cheap part, the engine, suspension, weapon systems and sensors are expensive and they all need replacing.
Warrior conversions would be a very false economy.
Even if we actually get FRES, future vehicle sizes are lilely to be substantially smaller, with fewer vwhicls held for attrition and allowing vehicles to rotate through deep maintainance. In all likelyhood, units will not have there full quota, maybe half with the rest in storage for use only in time of war.
However and I have said this time and time again the biggest elephant in the room is funding post 2015. At present all three armed services must plan for post 2015 as if there is NO increase in funding. As a result many programmes, especially those of the Army are simply treading water, with UORs providing band aid fixes where possibly and the CVR(T) mk2 is simply another of those. Without clear and predictable funding and its growth, the MoD cannot plan effectively for FF2020 or place the contracts required. THis is just as it was under the previous Government where funding was never secure and so repeatedly a progammmes went on hold, requirements changed etc, the MoD didn’t know whether it was comming or going. Until Politiciams realise that defence planning needs at least 10 year funding plans guaranteed by all parties then things are never going to really change no matter how you reorganise the back office.
A fair bet is that if there is no new funding after 2015 at the levels needed to achieve FF2020, FRES will be in danger, but then again the whole of FF2020 in all three services will be dead.
What’s the point asking for Ten Year funding programmes when that is never going to happen. Nobody else gets them. And they’re unlikely to be worth the paper they are written on if they did happen.
@ DomJ
“What would the British army need to attrite to travel from Colchester to Salisbury?”
— You’ve obviously never tried to tackle the A12…
Anyway, on point.
Dom, don’t forget that like Phil said, if you’re attacking any enemy country then there are certain centre’s of gravity to which you’re going to be drawn, such as capital cities, resources etc. Invariably, while it is possible to invade an enemy nation through any conceivable point along its borders, usually there are restrictions imposed by terrain and logsitics.
Think about the Falklands for a second. The bulk of the enemy force was based around one town, because it was the most useful position for them to occupy and it was easily (easier?) to defend due to the high ground to the west. They didn’t really care how many square feet of pete bog we seized, because they knew we would have to eventually come to them and their strongpoint.
Now look at Iraq. How many square miles of desert does that god forsaken country have? But the majority of the population is concentrated towards the East and North, with a major port to the South East. Roads and infrastructure, plus the location of the enemy and all the valuable obectives, dictated a lot of the fighting.
It would have been possible, maybe, to drive an armoured division right up to the west, close to the Jordanian border, and then hook east and come at Baghdad from the North West. But it would have been a ridiculous logistical challenge and potentially would have left the division cut off. You couldn’t have sent the entire coalition army that way either, because it would have left Kuwait/Saudi Arabia/our supply lines (depending on the war) horribly exposed to a massive counter offensive.
Look at Normandy. The one of the reasons for its selection was the proximity of Cherbourg. Any sustained invasion plan had to factor in the need to capture a deep water port. This was part of the reason behind Hitlers winter offensive in 1944. He was after Antwerp, to seriously hamper the provision of allied supplies and perhaps force a truce.
You can’t think of war as isolated armies fighting over bits of land. You have to consider their support and their place in the wider scheme of any war, plus the natural features and choke points of an enemies territory.
Now for FRES.
I accept that we can’t keep plodding along with clapped out vehicles for the next 20 years. But I also think that given the current state of finances in this country, we essentially can only afford a fudge of sorts. That means CVRT 2.0 to fill the scout role and then buying an already developed family of vehicles to fill the other needed roles.
Literally find a vehicle that can take Bowmans and then away we go. Yes, it might mean someone else has to build it and we just pay BAE or whoever to fit the Bowmans kit over here. But tough. That’s the financial shit hole we’ve been dropped in to.
Maybe in the future we can look at something more “Gold Plated” and British, but for now we can’t be arsing about putting new transmissions into old vehicles and then calling that world leading.
And if you don’t like it… well remember never to put a cross next to the word “Labour” ever again, because you know that lot are just about as corrupt and extravagent spenders as you’re ever likely to find.
And if you don’t like it… well remember never to put a cross next to the word “Labour” ever again, because you know that lot are just about as corrupt and extravagent spenders as you’re ever likely to find this side of a Conservative administration.
Do not kid yourself that any government of any political hue would be any less prone to stupid, short sighted or down right bent spending decisions – except a Liberal Democrat one, of course. They can generally afford to be scrupulously honest because they will never actually wield power. . .
Haha, the Lib Dems. Everyone likes a trier I guess.
All I know is this. The Conservatives I expect to be a bit dodgy, but at least we all know they will be already. We know they’ll look after their rich mates. We also know that they like to cut back wasteful spending, usually looking to cut peoples taxes a bit in return. It doesn’t always go to plan but there you go.
The Labour lot though… how many millions was it that Ed Miliband spanked on a “relaxation and contemplation suit” for his department? They always shove up taxes, which I wouldn’t mind if they actually spent it on something worthwhile like defence or like genuine improvement for the NHS.
But no, it always gets spanked up the bloody wall on useless tat.
I consider the Conservatives the lesser of two evils. I get the impression that at least some of them know what they’re talking about, and that some of them care, whereas the red lot seem to be all in it for themselves and their ‘legacy’, with the exception of I think one fella who looks frustrated that to be surrounded by idiots.
Well given the current and reasonably certain future economic climate, we are going to see defence procurement having the same old problems unless there is a total rethink as to what the UKs role is in the world. As defence spending will never be high enough to meet political aspirations, and no Government will ever be willing to admit this we are going to be stuck in a down ward spiral. Long term planning will become a purely acedemic process with an even greater reliance on UORs when things turn hot. It is even possible that future planning could boil down to a “Dear Santa” list of UORs prepared in advance against possible senarios.
Back on topic, the current FRES (SV) programme should deliver a number of variant of the ASCOD 2, hopefully to an in service “Vanilla” standard and taking the programme to the end of the Developement phase of CADMID prior to Main Gate approval. The numbers bought will almost certainly be less the the current aspirational numbers and there is no way enough are going to be purchased to provide a Recce Regiment for each MRB and Recce platoons for Infantry and Armoured Regiments. I can see enough being purchased for the latter providing Recce, ATGW overwatch, ARV, and command and possibly Mortar and Ambulance, but the current Recce Regiments may have to go. A cheaper platform will have to fill the remaining roles plus others within the new Mechanised Regiments with the Warrior continuing in its current role but in reduced numbers, but even warrior could be replaced but the cheaper platform when one realises that the days of large scale armoured combat are over for the British Army and plarforms that are more versatile and economical to operate are needed.
But then again as the Service Chiefs have stated, without a 2-3% year on year rise in the Defence Budget after 2015, FF2020 simply cannot happen and all bets are off.
Chris B
Actualy, Argentinas forces were spread over 4 points.
800 on two sttlements on west Falkland, and another 1400 at Goose Green.
3000 men, 30% of the force.
Thats before you consider the distance the defence of Stanley was spread over, a box, well, more a triangle, 25miles long and 10 miles high, 125 square miles.
Hi LJ,
What actually is the difference between close and formation recce? You would need to be clear on this to state “the current Recce Regiments may have to go”.
Or is it rather that FRR/ BRR with a heavy C2 squadron in it is the future “armour” and tank regiments will have to go
– the Dutch, who let their all their Leopards go, are suddenly very interested in packing more punch into their IFVs with 35mm on them (through supershot). They still have their “flying tanks” but endurance and weather limitations are obvious
I will call the below a “bean counter -driven” approach. Capability in various, most likely scenarios is of course where we should start from(for real).
Have a look at the NAO document
“Ministry of Defence
The cost-effective delivery of an armoured vehicle capability” p.7 summary graph. Quantities are not included, but for the 2025 snapshot imagine that we will have gone from a 100k army to an 80k army and slice – proportionately – 20% off the top of each category (arrows in the graph, moving through time).
– assuming my devil’s advocate approach of amalgamating armour and recce, adding some punch to AI bn’s through, say, AMOS direct/indirect fire support Warriors, and proceeding with the most essential FRES SV versions (ie. ditching the bridge layer for instance), we’d be quite OK
– the only ones left in the cold in this scenario are MI bn’s; cobble together one with Warthogs, another with the newest AMRAPs and buy off the shelf for the rest (obviously a foreign design, yak, but likely to be good value for money).
Dom your simplifying things again. Overlay argentine force dispositions with settlements and high ground. A perfect correlation. The Port Stanley box did not need to be a continuous front, they just needed to hold key terrain. Which they did. There was only one way into Port Stanley and the Argies knew it.
Hi ACC
What I was refering to (badly) was that only Recce troops/platoons integral with other formations/Regiments would be retained and independant Recce formations would be disbanded with personnel moving to fill any additional posts created. Other FRES(SV) variants would form ATGW troops/platoons within the former formations as would other variants such as command, mortar etc, but these could also be provided by the cheaper platform I have referred to which would also form the main platform for the Medium/Mechanised formations.
It would also be possible to have 2-3 independant Recce troops/platoons alloted to Brigade HQ but these could be manned by TA Yoemanry units. This goes against the FAS but that programme is aspirational to say the least and again totally dependant on new money appearing after 2015.
Given that procurement of any new platforms is going to be stretched out to keep spending within yearly budgets, platforms such as the Bulldog, Warthog and the limited number of CVR(T)Mk2 will soldier on in the intrim. The latter could however be retained to provide Recce troops/platoons for 16AB and 3 Cmdo.
Hi LJ,
Not bad as BRR would effectively be partly downscaled/ partly delegated down to the next level units by beefing up their relative capability, as in “It would also be possible to have 2-3 independant Recce troops/platoons alloted to Brigade HQ but these could be manned by TA Yoemanry units.”
– where would UAVs sit in all of this (Watckeeper and the smaller ones; Brigade assets vs a centralised resource)? Watchkeeper can be catapult-launched – on the move – but you still need a runway to recover it
“If I may ask this question if we had 200 of these vehicles right now would they be sent to afghan?”
FRES SV?
Of course they would. And i’m sure the 40 mm gun would make people happy: i heard the Rarden has trouble making effect against muddy compounds. Amusingly, relatively “soft” walls like those are more complex to deal with than hard armor.
“There may be a need for 1,000 vehicles to replace the entire CVR(T) family and various antiquated FV432 vehicles still in service, but the mandate is only for 250 Scouts at this time.”
No it is not.
There are 245 – 270 Scouts, as many Protected Mobility APCs, Recovery and Repair vehicles.
To replace Spartan, a number of FV43X, and associated recovery vehicles.
FRES RECCE Block 2 would procure a further 100 or so, to cover specialized roles such as Engineer Recce, Joint Fires Control and Command Posts.
Again, replacing another portion of Spartan, FV43X, and the ancient Sultan.
And so along.
In my opinion, a lot of people here has not got real clear ideas.
“We do not need that many, we’ll only deploy a brigade at most anyway” is not a justification for dramatic cuts in numbers of vehicles.
The plan already is to have only one deployable MRB. But this does not mean that you can give kit to a single brigade, have 5 crews for each vehicle, and deploy that way.
A minimum of around 300 / 340 Warrior with new turrets and some 240 Scouts are needed.
As 200-some Challengers is the minimum to realistically hope to deploy around 40 or so.
Hi Gabby,
I tend to agree “As 200-some Challengers is the minimum to realistically hope to deploy around 40 or so.”
But how did you arrive at the 40? 5 x 8 as in a heavy squadron in each of the BBRs of MRBs? And get another 8 out of the workshops to put the TA formation on the same footing, if and when required?
Hear hear Gab.
Using Afghan as a template you’d need one set of vehicles essentially pre positioned as kit is just left behind for the new guys. Another set for the brigade on PDT and training scales for everyone else plus pre positioned kit in Kenya and Canada. Plus a deep maintenance pool, an attrition reserve plus vehicles being upgraded and in the pipeline to replace kit on ops. There just is not enough Warriors to do all that. Especially when you break the 789 number down into variants. And using them that hard is just going to wear them right out double quick.
It is not the economy people here think it is. It simply cannot be done.
If it can’t be done then as budgets are so tight we get out of the business of invading and running countries indefinitely. Were not particulary gd at it and it causes more and more problem with the locals the longer it goes. equip the army accordingly. We will have only 5 brigades in the end of the day to meet the 5:1 ratio and not all units will be medium or heavy equipped
Gabriele
“A minimum of around 300 / 340 Warrior with new turrets and some 240 Scouts are needed.
As 200-some Challengers is the minimum to realistically hope to deploy around 40 or so.”
But thats what we’re calling for!!!!
200 challengers gives 6 MRBs 30 Tanks with a few spares, or 5 MRBs 40 Tanks with no spares.
250 Warriors gives 5 MRBs with 50 Warriors (an entire battalion worth of transport)
250 Scouts is the same.
I disagree we need new turrets for the warriors even, nice, but not essential.
But even if we need new builds for all three vehicle types, you’ve just justified 750-900 vehicles.
FRES is a program for FOUR THOUSAND vehicles, and is NOT a C2 replacement!
http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/search/label/FRES
There is literaly a book on why FRES is wrong.
FRES isnt just a new scout vehicle, it isnt even a new family of vehicles.
FRES was supposed the key piece of a new damned army!
FRES was not a vehicle, it was a mirror of the US Future Combat System. The US dumped FCS as being too costly, and yet we plod on.
Isolationism is not an option. Simple as that. There is no credible argument for an isolationist stance in a globalised world.
The beach stopped being our border sometime around the time of Ceaser. Not being able to afford FRES, which I don’t agree with, isn’t going to change thousands of years of geopolitical fact.
FRES is just a jazzed up CVRT requirement. And obviously numbers are flexible. I am sure final programme requirements are nowhere near stipulated. What is blindingly obvious is the need to replace clapped out, maxed out, worn out and obsolescent kit which is becoming more and more like triggers broom and Heath Robinson in practice with all the implications for cost, maintenance and efficiency.
An article in the Sunday Times yesterday said that the MoD had yet to decide on the “core” (peacetime) vehicles, except for Foxhound (only 200). The Mastiff, Warthog and Jackal vehicles will be probably be handed over to the Afghans as the cost of bringing them back is prohibitive (an Antonov can only carry 3 or 4 vehicles at a time and costs £400,000 a flight).
There were also complaints that too many vehicles had been brough and not enough spare parts, and little thought how the vehicles would be integrated in the long term.
Well they were bought under a UOR. Essentially war orders. They are disposable. Expensive? Of course, but c’est la guerre! Why delay vehicles needed now for the fight to think about what we’ll do with them afterwards. One can do that to an extent but the emphasis must be on getting them into service.
Phil
It is not isolationist to decide the time has come for UK to stop sticking it’s beak in.
Why for example do we have an Isriali-Palistine policy. What F*cking good does it do UK to have such a policy. We have Zero ability to intervene millitarily or economiically.
I know this gets soldiers upset, but our intervention in G1 and 2 and afghan could have been entirely dispensed with by USA. (The offer was indeed made by Bush to Blair to do G2 without us).
G1 nearly saw UK units pretty much left idle.
It is exactly this urge to ‘intererveen’ that F*cks things up.
If we had let Gadaffi Butcher Bengazi what would we have suffered? He was quite happy to sell us oil and behave nicely (to the west) His son could have bene quite useful in power.
I accept that this is hardly the humanitarian option. But if that is the reason, when do we start bombing Syria?
It is not isolationist not to want Brigades that can be sent round the world; it is reality.
Are the Danes, the Belgians, the Dutch, the Norwegians isolationist?
The Sweds and the Swiss are, poor bastards look how they have suffered for it…….
There is every argument for not trying to tell every bugger how to run his country and when he refuses to try and force him to do it millitarily.
All those countries you mentioned are spending a lot of money creating expeditionary frameworks and units precisely because they are not isolationist and can’t afford to be now. British forces in gw1 were to be the centrepiece of the invasion it was a British political decision that changed that.
And why wouldn’t we have a policy on Israel-Palestine!? It’s in the Middle East!
Putting your fingers in your ears and expecting others to do what we won’t is no solution and there are no credible people arguing for that approach. Splendid Isolation was and is a massive myth.
Phil
“FRES is just a jazzed up CVRT requirement”
No, it isnt.
And until you accept that, this arguement is going nowhere.
FRES was never a “replacement”, it was part of a whole new army.
One that replaced armour with sensors and was rapidly deployable by air across the globe.
One that had its roots in the European Rapid Reaction Force.
There is an arguement that Warrior and CVR(T) are beyond economic repair.
But thats an arguement in favour of CVRT 2.0 and Warrior 2.0
FRES is neither of those things.
That might have been its conception but it’s clear things have moved on from such heady days, and such notions were very fashionable at the time. A decade of war has lowered the hyperbole. It is now simply a replacement, it will, if ordered, replace a swathe of old, tired kit. It will not ultimately serve alongside it. It’ll actually make the army heavier and better protected than it is now. Experience has shifted the perceptions of the risk and the measures to manage those risks.
Why spend money on triggers broom? It won’t work! CVRT 2.0 as you call it is wishful thinking. And whatever happened to old fashioned Mk. II? Too much flowery technocratic language infecting institutions these days.
Phil
But it hasnt!
Nor have any of the dozens of other contradictions been resolved.
And of course, Warrior existed for a specific purpose, one now long gone.
So moving infantry under armour and fighting are long gone roles?! Why do people think that the essence of battle and ops are changing so much right now? Nothing has changed despite the fads and flowery language. Iraq put paid to Transformation. Medium forces is just a title for a force that isn’t heavy or light. Back in the day they’d just be called Brigades!
Phil
“So moving infantry under armour and fighting are long gone roles”
When was the last time the UK did that?
Iraq twice, erm, cant think of any other post war.
We planned it against the Soviets, but they’re long gone.
Niether Iraq war required our participation, and the soviets bottled it.
We’ve lost 300 in Afghanistan and we lost about 110 during the ground war on the Falklands.
FRES would be relevent to neither of those.
Afghanistans casualties are primarily in extremely built up areas FRES literaly cannot go, or to mines FRES cannot survive.
The Falklands casualties died due to lack of deployable armour, FRES is not deployable armour.
As I said.
We need a thourough discussion on what roles the army is expected to carry out BEFORE we go about equiping them for it.
And yes, that does mean, asking simple questions, like should we be capable of Combined Arms Tier One Battlefield Operations, and on what scale.
Anything else puts the horse before the cart, and FRES if far too expensive to do badly.
Hi andyw,
RE “article in the Sunday Times yesterday said that the MoD had yet to decide on the “core” (peacetime) vehicles, except for Foxhound (only 200)”
Sounds very much like my “bean counter -driven” approach where a magical number of 200+ is emerging
– Heavy squadrons in each MRB BRR= C2
– medium squadrons = FRES SV
– light squadrons = Foxhound
Hang on! Two more bde’s?
– CVRT(2), Viking 1 & 2
– all air portable & better than the rest in amphibiosity (perhaps even put them in *one* Armour Support Group* for the intervention bdes?)
What’s left to do? The much smaller numbers of combat engineers,arty FOVs, command posts, perhaps even ambulances (as next batch of FRES SV, sometime in the future)
Phil
I don’t really care about ‘Credible’ (credible with Whom?)
Are you seriously suggesting the Dutch/Belgians etc are tooling up to go independantly deploying and supporting armoured brigades? A litttle expiditionary SF capability is one thing. Setting up forces to deploy and sustain armoured warfare 3000 miles from home something else.
I am not isolationist. I believe in international cooperation in all its forms the UN and all that, I believe in expanding the role of the FO etc via things like forwrds presence squadrons. Our place in the world requires us to pursue a policy of multi and Bi lateral engagement with every possible country to our benefit.
What I am not is egotisitacal with that: –
‘we are still a world power’
‘The world still looks to HMG for leadership’,
Punching above our weight
Bullshit.
Why Just because palistine is in the middle east , do we have to have a policy on it.
Are we about to piss off several Oil ritch countries by joining the US in Vetoing the Palastinian applicationfor statehood?
Why?
Do we need more Oranges than oil?
“When was the last time the UK did that?”
Probably a couple of hours ago mate, there’s an Armoured Infantry Coy in Afghanistan. Not to mention Kosovo, Iraq twice, Bosnia.
Five major operations in its lifetime.
“Niether Iraq war required our participation,”
Neither did the Second World War except as a base, so should we have demobilised the Army and cheered on the Yanks and the Soviets? In simplified terms no neither war required our presence in simple force generation terms but our presence was a massive requirement in real terms for diplomatic, coalition and strategic purposes beyond the mere military aspect of the campaign. Armies and conflicts do not exist in vacuum where other rules do not apply.
“FRES would be relevent to neither of those”
Erm, there’s AFVs in Afghan, there were AFVs in the Falklands, there has been AFVs in almost every single British intervention since 1916 and yet you think that they are not relevant? Right.
“Afghanistans casualties are primarily in extremely built up areas FRES literaly cannot go, or to mines FRES cannot survive”
What a skewed thought. So because we take casualties we should not bother with an AFV? Have you stopped to think how much harder the war effort would be, how many more would have died or been seriously injured if the AFVs out there weren’t slogging away everyday? Do you have any idea of what they bring to the show? Just because they are vulnerable and cannot go everywhere does not mean that they have no utility, they have EVERY utility.
“The Falklands casualties died due to lack of deployable armour”
Mate, please, first you say that AFVs are useless in desert terrain like Afghan and now you say that the deaths in the Falklands were caused by a lack of AFVs! Which is it? Are they helpful or not? The deaths in the Falklands were caused by enemy action as a result of a war. A few more tin tanks would not have stopped the poor bloody infantry from having to go over the top and dig out the enemy at bayonet point. There’s an awful lot of things that could have helped the war down there a lot more than some aluminium tankettes and none of them are anywhere near as “cool”.
“We need a thourough discussion on what roles the army is expected to carry out BEFORE we go about equiping them for it.”
You don’t seem to be privy to the discussion. The Army knows exactly what sort of operations it will be doing in the next ten years, in the last decade the Army has done the ENTIRE scope of its operations from rapid interventions to heavy armour to medium enduring ops to light SF strikes and support.
It used AFVs in ALL of those scenario’s, every single one of them. At the end of the day they are only a metal box that fuses mobility with firepower. The need for mobility and firepower has not diminished in any of the operations the Army will be conducting in the future because the fundamental essence of warfare and operations remains mobility and firepower.
“Combined Arms Tier One Battlefield Operations”
Where does that turn of phrase come from?
There is a crystal clear ambition to continue to generate force packages for the whole spectrum if operations from SF support right through to heavy forces. It is in black and white. It is a matter of policy. It is in Hansard, it is in White Papers, it is in Ministerial Statements.
“and FRES if far too expensive to do badly”
We agree on something.
IXION, sarcasm and swearing does not make a debate.
The Dutch, Swedish, Finnish, Danish, Norwegians and Belgians are all generating expeditionary capabilities within their means because they realise that they are no longer in a position to disengage or stand back from a globalised world.
Now you may disagree with how armed force is used by this country, but hobbling our geopolitical and strategic options by dismantling our Army into nothing more than a Ugandan UN battalion would be utterly criminal. The UK is on the world stage, it is part of many great alliances and treaties, it is one of the largest economies in the world and it has allies and commitments across the globe. We, do not have choice whether we want to remain engaged or not. We can try and hide, we can try and shirk our duties, but the chickens will come home to roost, they will always come home to roost.
Nobody is banging on about punching above our weight or leadership, you’re creating a straw man argument. It is about ensuring we can defend our interests, global interests.
We’re all in it together mate!
Andyw @ 1.54
Didn’t get a chance to read that article but if your summary is correct then the lunatics really have taken over the asylum.
All that money spent on UOR’s and then ditched in A’stan.
Another stick handed over to the Treasury to beat the MOD with.
Who thought all of this up?
Are the DfID compensating the MOD for all the stuff left behind?
Some people in the Army really do cut off their noses to spite their face.
All the stuff you mention is not FRES therefore it can’t be real armour.
Consequently not something the top Brass want cluttering up the vehicle parks.
I mean when will we next need mine resistant stuff after 2014?
Going by the odds at the bookies, that will be 2016 when the last one has been handed over.
As for the transport stuff, you couldn’t make it up.
£400K for an Anatanov?
Looks like big bucks to me.
From where to where?
To somewhere friendly in the Gulf?
Straight back to Blighty?
“All that money spent on UOR’s and then ditched in A’stan.”
All that kit was bought under wartime orders effectively. It is in a number of different fleets, it has been ragged to death in Afghan, a lot of them are patched up from IED strikes and battle damage and they were bought for a specific mission and war.
I imagine they’ll bring back a lot of the newer stuff, but things like Jackals have no business anywhere but in Afghan and they ideally wouldn’t be there either.
Like after WWII, wartime expediency in orders and kit requirements does not make for a clean and tidy peacetime organisation or use.
There’s no getting away from the fact that all that kit was bought outside the defence budget and so were the support and spares contracts.
Phil
Re sarcasm and swearing. Poss not political debate, but it makes me feel better when faced with blank refusal to address reality.
‘The Dutch, Swedish, Finnish, Danish, Norwegians and Belgians are all generating expeditionary capabilities within their means’.
I suggest you look at the last 3 words of your own sentence….
I do not understand genuinly what global interrests we have, that will be protected by the proposed force structure and Fres SV et al.
OK I was using straw men but why are they different from the ‘we have global interrrests’ idea you are using.
In essence what is one of the new brigades for? Where are going to send them (it)?
I am not hobbling the Army just asking what new actual capability it will have?
Genuinely explain it to me..
Still do not understand why we need to have a position and a policy on evry question of the day
Hi Ixion,
RE “The Dutch, Swedish, Finnish, Danish, Norwegians and Belgians are all generating expeditionary capabilities within their means’.
I suggest you look at the last 3 words of your own sentence….”
– have you ever totted up the GNPs of the Nordic area and the Benelux? (“lux” in it goes to roundation errors; but even they, within their means, ordered an A400M)
We are part of NATO, part of the EU, the UN, the IMF, the G20 and the Commonwealth.
We are a net importer of our energy since 2004.
We are a net importer of food and our food imports are double our food exports.
We are a net importer of many raw materials and natural resources.
We have global financial links
We have military forces in the Falklands, Belize, Brunei, Cyprus, Canada, Kenya.
“capabilities within their means”
I use that term in a wider cultural, organisational and political sense, in monetary terms they could in theory spend more, but domestic considerations come into play. But even so, they are still generating expeditionary forces.
Phil
There were 4 CVR(T)s in the Falklands
Could we have shipped down a single Boxer?
Even if we could, would its 40mm GMG have made a difference?
Could it move on through bogs that swallowed up soldiers?
No, it couldnt.
The Falklands needed DEPLOYABLE armour.
FRES is *not* deployable.
Its too big, too heavy, and frankly, all three concepts are undergunned compared with CVR(T)
I think the UK needs a rapidly deployable, mobile, heavily armed vehicle.
FRES misses all three of those.
The same goes for Afghanistan
I’m not saying we dont armoured vehicles, but they need to be Mine Resistant, economical, maintainable, and replaceable, firepower matters less.
An FP Cougar with a GMG on top costs £300,000
FRES costs £16,000,000
In both situations, FRES is MORE expensive and LESS capable than the alternative.
You can buy BOTH alternatives for less!
FRES is not “a metal box that fuses mobility with firepower”, its one that also adds sensors and such, to massive cost.
As I keep saying, FRES is not, never has been and never will be what you are insisting it is.
We simply do not have to be isolationist just because we don’t deploy an medium/heavy brigade half way round the world perminatly in a country that doesn’t really want us there. In 1991 yep saddam invaded Kuwait and under the UN we rightly kicked him out. Should the armed forces be able to do that yep. This was over start to finish in a year for land forces not 4 or 10 we didn’t try and take over a country. The marines created a safe haven but that only lasted a short while. Would a deployed force look the same today no it wouldn’t one has the apache after all.
Then we go to Kosovo much more difficult and may have required a continuous policing presence but the operation was outside of a UN mandate and would not be possible today. Were tanks or FRES needed or would mastiff/ranger/stryker have been a better option?
Afghanistan we went in early and rightly in my view. The initial force on the gound could be described as SF and ranger forces back up by surveillance and helo assets. We had done are bit bin laden and co were long gone probably by the time the buildings came down as there clever enough to have known what was coming. Did we after we had extricated ourselves need to charge head first in helmand no.
2nd gulf war much more questionable but had we said to the US well commit the air and sea forces along with the RM to take the al faw and open the port and 16AA to secure the oil field would we have had any less of influence than we had doubtful. We could have agreed in the aftermath to just run the port facilty train the navy secure the oil terminals and provide the SF element to the fight round Baghdad.
As for presence round the world were doing it in the gulf with our mine sweepers and on anti piracy patrol. We contained saddam for 10+ years using naval and air assets. We have maintain anti drug patrol and humanitarian needs in the carribean and as you say done training in Kenya Canada and Belize using the army. Ill even mention Libya and the countless recon and mp missions around the world. None of these missions have required FRES in its current form.
AFV yes are needed to replace clapped out vehicles but ocelot and Viking will equip the rapid deployable force or at least they should they are easily airlifted with our reduced AT fleet and can be moved by our ever expanding Chinook fleet. FRES cannot. Is it better than the wheeled option for stabilisation and “medium” missions I have serious doubts purely because the type of vehicles we buy to use in those type of operations right now look nothing like FRES. I fear fres is just the army generals loving there heavy cavalry and while talking about rapid this and that just wanting to play tank. If a warrior replacement is need for the heavy stuff its not top of the agenda IMO and if it is then maybe joining the US braddley replacement will delivers lower unit cost. I don’t see what the current vehicle offers. I would in conjunction with cancelling fres restructure the army along the lines of the US armys modular brigades not the current planned way http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transformation_of_the_United_States_Army#Modular_Brigades and equip them accordingly.
“There were 4 CVR(T)s in the Falklands”
I believe there were 9.
“The Falklands needed DEPLOYABLE armour.”
The Falklands. Always with the Falklands. Should we still have the V Bomber force since they were used to drop bombs on the runway? Perhaps a County Class for NGFS? Bring back Sea Harrier FRS1! There are other ways to bring fire-power to bear against the enemy these days in a scenario like that. Which, was outside the norms and would be so today.
Time have moved on. There is no merit in fielding a vehicle designed to fight on peat bogs when most of the time it will not see a peat bog but it will see enemy fire and mines. Times have moved on from these little tankettes where it was good enough to stop a 7.62. The whole risk perception has shifted and the management of that risk has moved towart heavier armour since they are after all designed to operate in high threat areas.
“I think the UK needs a rapidly deployable, mobile, heavily armed vehicle.”
Well it has one, CVRT. But its too light, too old, too unprotected and there isn’t the ability to support via air more than a troop or so, (two troops by sea in fact) air capacity that would be better used for other things than supporting some aluminium tankettes which are completely vulnerable to a huge array of weapons.
“I’m not saying we dont armoured vehicles, but they need to be Mine Resistant, economical, maintainable, and replaceable, firepower matters less.”
But at the same time light and airportable right? Reality check please!
“FRES is not “a metal box that fuses mobility with firepower”, its one that also adds sensors and such, to massive cost.”
Some of them will have sensors, most of the fleet is what I said it will be or it will be enablers for other components to bring mobility and fire-power to bear.
I’m not going to get into a debate with you about unit costs and fire power and all the other sexy details because frankly none of that matters as much as you think it does. The vehicle will be operated in the context of an organisational culture and it is that culture that will bring most of its effectiveness, of course the same is true of CVRT and look how much mileage they’ve got out of the things, but worn out is worn out and no amount of training and support can make up for the fact you’re driving an overweight, tired old collection of ad hoc improvements.
The Army needs a reasonable fleet of replacement vehicles and FRES is the most likely answer to that need. It is not cheap but then AFVs are not cheap. But neither are they ridiculously expensive in the grand scheme of things.
“As I keep saying, FRES is not, never has been and never will be what you are insisting it is.”
It’s fact. FRES is a fleet of vehicles that might replace several other fleets of vehicles. It is a fleet that takes into account a change in the perception of risks and a decade of fighting experience.
The bells and whistles aren’t half as important as it being there, in numbers, not broken down, reasonably future proof and being operated in an institution that will make the vehicle and its crew greater than the sum of its parts.
40mm grenade launcher, CTA, who cares as long as it can do the job it needs to reliably and well.
“AFV yes are needed to replace clapped out vehicles but ocelot and Viking will equip the rapid deployable force or at least they should they are easily airlifted with our reduced AT fleet and can be moved by our ever expanding Chinook fleet.”
Completely and utterly irrelevant unless you want to air lift a gate guard. There is not the lift to usefully air transport more than the most token force, and that space arguably would be far better spent ferrying defence stores, water, ammunition and munitions than transporting a couple of shiny tankette’s which will spend most of their time hiding because they are completely vulnerable to RPGs let alone modern ATGWs.
Risk perceptions have moved on, missions have moved on. CVRT was designed to stalk and hide and operate behind the immediate FLOT, FRES as per experience will be operating in vulnerable postures, often behind a FLET or in urban situations. They need the extra protection, the design philosophy behind CVRT etc was probably flawed then and it’s certainly flawed now.
You can’t get away with it now when CVRT are being used in direct fire support roles and patrol roles rather than stalking and reconnaissance.
Emperor forgive me Phil but I understand why people swear at you sometimes.
We need
Heavy ****ing metal
Big arse MBTs, SPGs and IFVs based on tank chasis that chooses protection and firepower as their key charecteristics.
Light Armour
Which are dominated by Mobility, both strategic and tactical, and firepower.
COIN
Designed for Mine Resistance and Low Cost.
FRES meets not a single damned one of those requirements.
Toe to Toe against a tank, its dead, it cannot move like a Light Tank, and even if its crew survived Mines, which they wont, at £16mn a pop, they are too expensive to be lost in such a way.
“The vehicle will be operated in the context of an organisational culture”
But the culture that supported FRES has been SCRAPPED!!!!!!!!!
How many times must I repeat this?
FRES was part of a an Army that doeshnt exist and never will.
“40mm grenade launcher, CTA, who cares as long as it can do the job it needs to reliably and well.”
WHAT ****ING JOB!!!
I’ve asked half a dozen times, what is FRES for, what other assets are needed to make it work, and it what war does any of it make sense!!!!
You havent answered, you just demanded I accept your great knowledge that all those questions have been asnwered. They havent.
I repeat.
If you want to fight fast interventions, you need a vehicle you can move quickly, not necessarily by air, although thats handy.
FRES is too big, too heavy, and too resource intensive to meet that roll.
A Bay Class and 40 Stykers could be had for £200m
Or you could have a Bay class (£120mn) and 5 FRES’s for the same price.
Do you not see a huge problem there?
Even if somehow money becomes no object, it weighs twice as much, so a transport ship can only carry half as many. So we can have 20 FRES’s per ship (£420mn), or 40 CVR(T) 2.0s (£200mn)
If you want to fight a long drawn out COIN war, you are going to take losses from mines.
Evehn if we accept the fantasy that the FRES crew and passengers can walk away from a 1000lb+ ANFO mine, tyhe vehicle will still be reduced to scrap.
£16mn down the toilet every time.
How many hundreds of vehicles have we had written off in Afghanistan and Iraq?
Half of your arguement is that the CVR(T) has basicaly been destroyed over there.
What does FRES bring to Afghanistan that an FP Cougar doesnt? That makes it worth 50x the cost?
“a couple of shiny tankette’s which will spend most of their time hiding because they are completely vulnerable to RPGs let alone modern ATGWs.”
Yeah, because FRES will shrug off weapons that knock out Merkavas…
FRES is going to cost 4x what the Apache program did.
Thats the level of folly involved.
Madness
Where does the £16m each figure come from?
“Emperor forgive me Phil but I understand why people swear at you sometimes.”
Why because I think about my position and don’t immediately concede it? Nothing I’ve read so far makes me feel I should at the moment.
“Heavy ****ing metal
Big arse MBTs, SPGs and IFVs based on tank chasis that chooses protection and firepower as their key charecteristics.
Light Armour
Which are dominated by Mobility, both strategic and tactical, and firepower.
COIN
Designed for Mine Resistance and Low Cost.”
FRES is the new light armour. Medium is the new light. Sorry you don’t like it but there is almost no place on modern operations for a complete fleet of light armoured vehicles in the old sense. Scimitar is incredibly vulnerable to almost everything an infantry platoon can carry and totally vulnerable to an IED of a size that is often found in Afghanistan and certainly in more technologically forward places like Iraq.
There are niche roles for things like Jackal, Panther etc but medium is the new light. The threats are too high. You can get away with a light vehicle that is meant to scout and hide and be behind the FLOT but that reality no longer exists, FRES variants will be on and behind the front line offering fire support, protected mobility and a host of other support services, it therefore needs to be survivable. And survivable means weight. That’s physics.
“Toe to Toe against a tank, its dead, it cannot move like a Light Tank, and even if its crew survived Mines, which they wont, at £16mn a pop, they are too expensive to be lost in such a way”
You’re seeking what then? Your light tankette fails two out of three of those tests. You’re not going to get a super vehicle that is light, heavily protected and possessing great firepower.
FRES will operate in an environment and design culture completely different from that of the late 50s 60s when CVRT was thought of. The fleet will be required to be beyond the FLET and vulnerable and it therefore needs to be survivable.
There are other vehicles which can do the light scouting role which can be light on armour because they are designed to hide and scout.
“I’ve asked half a dozen times, what is FRES for, what other assets are needed to make it work, and it what war does any of it make sense!!!!”
Every single war we’ve fought (apart from the Falklands) since Korea. I don’t see what is so hard to grasp about the concept of an AFV designed to operate in high threat areas which means it has to be heavy. Unless there’s a defence contractor that can bend the laws of physics then there is no choice.
The decision has been made that FRES will operate in high threat environment in vulnerable postures and it consequently must be more survivable.
A survivable AFV isn’t useful you think?
“If you want to fight fast interventions, you need a vehicle you can move quickly, not necessarily by air, although thats handy.”
I am not following. Why can’t a FRES ASCOD be moved quicker than another AFV discounting the pointless air move debate? If we really want to get pedantic a C17 can carry it easily. So I just don’t see why this vehicle is not as operationally and strategically mobile as the next?
“FRES is too big, too heavy, and too resource intensive to meet that roll”
Whats more resource intensive about a new modern AFV than an old, clapped out, tired, vulnerable, hodge podge of a vehicle?!
“Do you not see a huge problem there?”
Yeah your massive over-simplification of what it costs to buy and run a ship compared to an AFV viz an old clapped out CVRT.
“so a transport ship can only carry half as many”
That’s not true. A vessel is far more likely to max out on space / volume before hitting any weight limit. This is not an issue. And your example of 40 vs 20 is disingenuous since 40 vehicles take up a MUCH larger logistical effort than 20 units will – especially when they are old crap vehicles.
“Half of your arguement is that the CVR(T) has basicaly been destroyed over there”
CVRT is totally vulnerable to IEDs of a certain size.
“That makes it worth 50x the cost?”
Well it depends on what price a life really doesn’t it? But there’s also the fact that the more survivable a vehicle is the more likely it is to be repaired and returned to the fight.
“Yeah, because FRES will shrug off weapons that knock out Merkavas”
No, it won’t – which is why it’s ridiculous to think about air lifting in a poxy troop. But it is more survivable.
“FRES is going to cost 4x what the Apache program did.
Thats the level of folly involved.”
Apache was one weapon system purchased for a specific role for a specific part of the Army.
FRES envisages replacing entire fleets of vehicles which do different jobs and have different requirements, different spares, different problems, different designs with common designs which will massively ease maintenance and other issues.
It’s not madness. The Army needs a huge number of AFV replacements to replace the clapped out piece of shit it has now. FRES is the most likely candidate to fit those requirements. And it is not just one vehicle is it, its an array of vehicles.
I’d rather a reasonable and likely fleet of AFVs over a non-existent one and a fleet of cobbled together clapped out museum pieces operating in environments that they were never designed to work in with doctrines they were never designed to be used for.
“But the culture that supported FRES has been SCRAPPED!!!!!!!!!”
Nope. I just checked. The British Army is still there.
I really have no particular flag to fly for FRES other than it is low risk, good enough by far and realistic. I couldn’t give a toss which vehicles make up the programme as long as they meet those requirements plus the actually being in existence one. That’s an important one.
“Where does the £16m each figure come from?”
His ass.
Seems to me that nobody in the Army, the MoD Ir anyone else has any idea what vehicles the Army should purchase!
There is a real danger that we will get Ascod by default, as we are rapidly running out of time to make our minds up.
With our army being desimated I dont think it matters at all. One brigade and 500 vehicles can effect FUCK ALL!
If we really are abdicating our role in the world let’s scrap the whole lot and spend the money on the scum that won’t wirk
oh grow up phil
Phil
I did not ask you to list our overseas commitments.
I asked you to list the our overseas commitments that would be in practice protected/advanced by the proposed force structure and Fres.
Some Idea of how you see it working would help.
“There is a real danger that we will get Ascod by default, as we are rapidly running out of time to make our minds up.
With our army being desimated I dont think it matters at all. One brigade and 500 vehicles can effect FUCK ALL!
If we really are abdicating our role in the world let’s scrap the whole lot and spend the money on the scum that won’t wirk”
Bet you read the Daily Mail.
“oh grow up phil”
Yes it was a low blow but its hard work being serious all the time! No offence intended.
Phil Darley
Don’t disagree with your first 3 points!
We don’t need to spend the money of scrapped dinosours on the workshy.
We could spend it on re equiping a more usable realisticly configured army.
“We don’t need to spend the money of scrapped dinosours on the workshy.”
Or, maybe, reducing a massive deficit! There’s a lot of the Daily Mail attitude to benefits here.
@Phil
“The UK is on the world stage, it is part of many great alliances and treaties, it is one of the largest economies in the world and it has allies and commitments across the globe. We do not have choice whether we want to remain engaged or not. We can try and hide, we can try and shirk our duties, but the chickens will come home to roost, they will always come home to roost.”
Well said, Phil. Agree with every word. You seem to have a very pronounced historical perspective and strategic understanding.
I also concur with your comment about kit:
“What is blindingly obvious is the need to replace clapped out, maxed out, worn out and obsolescent kit which is becoming more and more like triggers broom and Heath Robinson in practice with all the implications for cost, maintenance and efficiency.”
@Andyw
“An article in the Sunday Times yesterday said that the MoD had yet to decide on the “core” (peacetime) vehicles, except for Foxhound (only 200). The Mastiff, Warthog and Jackal vehicles will be probably be handed over to the Afghans as the cost of bringing them back is prohibitive (an Antonov can only carry 3 or 4 vehicles at a time and costs £400,000 a flight).”
Haven’t had a chance to read the newspaper article yet but have been looking at an item on the BFBS British Forces news programme about this subject. Their reporter, Will Inglis, is of the opinion that the problems with these vehicles stems from the way in which they were bought: i.e. without sufficient spares and with a lack of training programmes, etc.
He did say that he thought the figures quoted in the newspaper article for transporting them back to the UK were exaggerated but that nevertheless some of them might be gifted to the local Afghan forces. He added that work was continuing to identify which vehicles would be brought into the ‘core’. He thought that Foxhound would be confirmed as the new Light Protected Patrol Vehicle and said that he expected Mastiff to be around for the next decade or so (In an earlier interview he said that it was being looked at very seriously by the Army as an interim vehicle in the absence of FRES Utility.)
He further stated that one of the basic problems was that the vehicles were owned by the Treasury (being UORs). If the Army were to keep them, then the money would have to be found by Defence and in these straitened times, that might prove very difficult.
It does occur to me, though, that if the Jackals, Warthogs etc. were to go, that would leave the plans of several pundits on this site for future Army vehicle provision rather floundering. Some of you have suggested, for instance, Jackal to ‘flesh out’ reconnaissance units, Warthog to provide a solution for the Mechanized Infantry etc.
Where does that leave such plans if those vehicles were to be jettisoned? Would new vehicles of a different kind have to be purchased?
“FRES is a program for FOUR THOUSAND vehicles, and is NOT a C2 replacement!”
In the dreams of who????????
It once perhaps was, but now FRES SV and Fres UV wouldn’t arrive to 2000 not even if we wanted.
“a more usable realisticly configured army.”
Surely this “realistically configured army” involves protected mobility, does it not?
Can i hear what you people think is a “realistic army” for the Uk of the 21 century?
Without self-destructive crap like “we could just do like Sweden” or operationally unfeasible dreams of light tanks coming in slung from under a Chinook only to explode on the IED 10 meters away from LZ, killing the crew and allowing the press to bang on with deadly, unprotected wheeled coffins.
If people has not noticed, Land Rovers have become Jackals and Foxhounds at 7.5 tons each or more.
CVR(T) mk2 itself went up to over 12.250 kg, and it would have grown even heavier if the margin for growth existed.
The hundreds of deaths “acceptable” years ago in any conflict now aren’t politically acceptable even if spread on 10 years, with welcome (but expensive) force protection culture ever expanding.
Also, a brigade won’t affect much.
Really? Are you sure? A well kitted MRB will be able to do plenty. More than most countries in the world would ever be able to do.
What it won’t be able to do is winning III world war on its own, or achieving the necessary and obscene density of boots on the ground for trying to build stability in a nation as big and fucked up as Afghanistan.
Both things the UK couldn’t do anyway, even if Army went up to 150.000 instead of down to 80.000. Not yesterday, not tomorrow. Not ever.
But an Afghan war is the only one kind of war we have to avoid like death itself. And since such a COIN op is almost certainly going to be discretionary and not inevitable, the better planning for it is: AVOIDING IT.
Libya is a model of today’s acceptable wars. Punish. Influence. Help [a side against another].
Considering that Libya is about to becoming Yesterday’s war, Afghanistan, even if still ongoing, is already an old war.
With its scars and lessons. But planning an army for another Afghanistan would actually mean having NOT learned such lessons.
I had thought that the original FRES concept, that was the partner to FCS, was to make lightweight, “network enabled” wotsit that used electronics for armour and could be airlifted in the vast numbers of transport aircraft that we have.
Sadly, this took rather longer to collide with reality than it should have, costing some money in the process. The key thing that eventually transpired is that war is not as clear cut as a powerpoint slide and that only armour can substitute for armour.
Hence FRES has evolved beyond the FCS-lite that presumed that copper and aluminium heatsinks would be efficient at stopping bullets, into a vehicle that can withstand the hard knocks, operate in the field and dish it out to the enemy.
ASCOD is at least something that can form the basis of a family of vehicles, if not the optimum for a particular task (and I would note that there is some really specific selection of favourable scenarios in support of chosen systems), then at least capable in some fashion.
The CT40 is a funny old shape – it has this big lump of something that sticks out the side to feed the ammunition in and then a big, complicated, linkless feed system sticking out of that in some fashion. The optimum route for the feed system bit runs through the location for one out of the two turret crew. The number of rounds in the feed system depends on path length, which depends on round diameter. The only time round length is important is being able to fit the feed path somewhere in the turret. So the CT40 has fatter round = less rounds. The CT40 also falls into the trap that FRES did before it. The idea that the battlefield is like a computer game and you can see where the bad guys are is both pervasive and wrong, but the promotional literature harps on about improved effect and an effective increase in stowed kills. The CT40 gives less rounds onto suspected targets, so less suppressive effects.
Regarding the latest about UORs scrapped in 2015 and so along, i put together a few observations here:
http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.com/2011/09/santa-comes-with-mtp-uniform.html
Hi Mike W,
I try to tackle one at a time:
“If the Army were to keep them, then the money would have to be found by Defence and in these straitened times, that might prove very difficult.”
– I was reading the Defence Committee uncorrected transcripts from a couple of months back (Dr. Fox got a serious rebuke for being too busy to turn up and sending one of his two other ministers). There was Bernard Gray and a military type. They spoke in “code” but what I could decipher was that the contributions to Iraq that should have come from Treasury Reserve, but came from Army core budget, are being sorted now retroactively. No sums mentioned, but a long topic so must be big. Bernard Gary had a definitive answer to “how much has been paid or made available?” – None so far.
= there the budget, but it will all be netted out in one big settlement, and only the net published… otherwise this constant “no money” and at the same time being owed billions would not look good
Right, one down!
“It does occur to me, though, that if the Jackals,”
– somebody expressed today that they should be left in A-stan, and I fully concur. Have you noticed that more informed texts have always been using Jackal/ Ocelot with the forward slash in it?
” Warthogs etc. were to go, that would leave the plans of several pundits on this site for future Army vehicle provision rather floundering. Some of you have suggested, for instance, Jackal to ‘flesh out’ reconnaissance units, Warthog to provide a solution for the Mechanized Infantry etc.”
– there only about 100 Warthogs and RM is pushing on with Viking models, so only a very partial solution to the kitting out mechanized infantry
“Where does that leave such plans if those vehicles were to be jettisoned?”
– over and above the specific comments, if it is done wholesale, rather than selectively, it means that between now and the inking of the 1998 Strategic Defence Review the army has received AFVs £ 407m worth within the core budget and £ 2813m worth as UORs. That says it all
As Gab has pointed out, a UOR is essentially a war order with the emphasis on urgent. Short cuts are taken in areas concerning long term service such as testing, future proofing, integration of kit, training and spares pipelines. The whole funding line is in addition outside of the MoD as mentioned. It’s not surprising that there’s going to be difficulty integrating these vehicles back into a core fleet. They’ll have been worked half to death because husbanding procedures would be unecessary in kit intended only for one campaign. A lot of them will be very battle scarred in addition. Theyre the equivalent of hire cars. You buy your own nice car, you tax it, service it, husband it, clean it and pat it. You hire a car and you rag it until you’re done with it since you need the car now and don’t have to worry about the future of it.
RE: the £400,000 per flight – I think this figure might be bang on. If you do a simple search of google you will find a cheap return flight to Pakistan is around £500 per passenger. If you take a 747-400 it can sit around 500 in two classes (so one class would be paying well over twice the economy class tickets) so the airline is making at least £125,000 one way, and it can fill it’s plane up with paying passenger’s on the return leg unlike the operators of the AN-124 who would fly back empty, so you could consider the cheapest it would ever be would be as £250,000 per flight using commercial airline as a comparator. However, a passenger airline like BA has both economies of scale and far more frequent flights than the operators of the AN-124 as I cannot see the operators of the AN-124 operating them on an almost continuous basis like a passenger airline would do between scheduled maintenance of its jumbo’s, therefore the operators of the AN-124 would have to charge more to make up for less frequent flights. Plus big jets like the 747 and the AN-124 take over 200,000 litres of fuel, so even if aviation fuel is considerable cheaper than unleaded you can easily see how the cost racks up.
Google search gives you a rough ball park figure of £10,000 an hour, AT LEAST, to charter an Antonov 124, it’s probably a lot more to fly it into riskier areas like Camp Bastion.
Plus there’s all the additional fee’s charter airlines charge I imagine like handling fee’s. I’m not sure if they charge the per hour rate for the flight from its base to where you want it, then from where you want it to where you want to go, and then from there back to its base. If they do, which I imagine they must, then you’d be looking at 20-25 hours of flight time.
Unless those figures are dead wrong, £400,000 per flight is looking a bit steep. Maybe 250,000 to £320,000 all in.
BUT!
Bit more research, in 2000 it was $23,000 per hour for an An124 into Kosovo. Add inflation and we get what £18,679 per hour. Times by 20 hours say and you get £373,000.
We’re getting close. I bet there are a few more charges that maybe bring it to £400,000.
It may not be that far out. Commercial airlines make all there money for cargo carried under your feet not much on the passengers. Less than 10 years ago it would have cost about 250K per flight to carry bits from the UK to US on an-124 charter.
Stuff on the way in got stuck in the Gulf staging areas because of lack of (air) capacity.
Surely the operation would run the same in reverse – there is less urgency and more time to plan (for dovetailing the initial hop and then by sea)
Judging from my very back of a fag packet figures the £400k figure seems right. Just shows how expensive operations are. Mind blowing.
They either get flown out or convoy. Which if they got ambushed might end up costing just as much if we lost a handful per convoy. I’m not sure who would even drive them? Contractors I guess. They charge hoooge sums of money because of insurance and security costs. We had six truckloads of aggregate delivered and the cost was in the hundreds of thousands.
Phill
I repeat my questions
How does the proposed force structure an Fres actauly defend anything?
Where would you see one committed give me some scenarios.
BTW
Stop wrapping yourself in the flag, I am a firm believer in pursuing UK natioanl interrests, just dont’s see the Medium armoured brigade as much more than ‘look were a propper army we got tanks and everything’ sort of window dressing. I struggle to see where we could send one and why.
Ixion
But SDSR FF2020 does not talk about a “Medium Armoured Brigade” – It talks about a Multi-Role Brigade (MRB) that has heavy (say a squadron of MBT, and MLRS), medium (FRES, Warrior, possibly Warthog and Mastif) and light units.
FRES sits in that force structure. If you want to know what the threats are that this force structure is meant to defend us from, the National Security Committee threat evaluation report was linked to by TD on this site, in fact he wrote a bunch of posts disecting it, so you could search for them.
Other than that, if anyone wants to stroke my crystal balls, I will do my best to see into the future for you…………………. :-)
What Jed said.
I tell you we have global interests, you ask what they were, I tell you some of them and now you think I am wrapping myself in the flag? Nice try.
If you can’t think where we might send the Army then just sit back and enjoy the ride, the world will decide where it will have to go next. Who’d a thunk ten years and one month ago we’d have invaded Iraq, be putting down an insurgency in Afghan and bombing Libya.
Let’s not re write history now gen Jackson and the rest banged on repeatedly how Fres was a medium weight vehicle designed to provide the deployability of light forces with the firepower and protection of the heavys. It currently does neither. Yes Phil who would have thought it but I fail to see which of this campaigns fres helps in. Germans yanks us in afghan who require the medium weight stabilsatiin vehicles are using wheeled apcs in the 18-25 tns range not a 37tn tank. You say we don’t need air deployed armoured vehicles but in serria leone op paras were on the ground in under 36hrs and needed a vehicle to drive around in. FRes isn’t supporting that either. If it’s a warrior replacement then I fail to see why that’s the priority now considering its getting csp.
How is it a Warrior replacement, none of the vehicles is intended as a Warrior replacement in the SV tranche?
If you can’t see how a modern, well protected, mobile AFV would be a help in any of the conflicts that have been mentioned then I doubt I can convince you the sky is blue either.
Yes FRES started out in a time when it was fashionable and sexy to talk about Transformation and networks and agility but all that is long gone or remoulded into something far more realistic. Which is why the weight has gone up.
Yes some forces need mobile firepower platforms and they are available in vehicles like Jackal, and WMIK.
We have clapped out tankettes. There’s no place for tankettes in our TTPs and doctrine anymore, let alone forty year old aluminium Heath Robinson ones.
Further, in this respect “If you can’t see how a modern, well protected, mobile AFV would be a help …” just look at what the Russians (Chechnya) and the Israelis concluded from their lessons learnt: BMT-T and Namer (T-72 and Merkava MBT chassis, respectively)
“Fres was a medium weight vehicle designed to provide the deployability of light forces with the firepower and protection of the heavys. It currently does neither.”
FRES was a vehicle meant to weigh 20 tons and fit in a C130 to be deployable.
It became a “Medium Weight” element, following a trend that is becoming the rule in the US and in NATO (Stryker brigades, new US Marines Expeditionary Brigades to sit between MEUs (small and Force (huge!), other reforms to force structure and kit, but also Italy, France and so along).
The C130 is to be soon gone, and 20 tons is now considered too little to give the vehicle adequate protection.
The new C130 is the A400 Atlas, and the new desired weight is 30+ tons.
Instead of carrying one in a C130, we’ll carry one in a A400.
Difference: none, other than, unsurprisingly, the number of A400s will be lower than the number of C130s that used to be around. On the other hand, it wasn’t planned we’d have 7 C17s, if we want to be totally honest.
Deploying armor contingents by air anyway remains a dream, so this is nearly irrelevant. Air mobility is nice to have and eases supporting forces in theater. But forget about deploying more than a very handful of armored vehicles by air.
As i said already, it’ll work like Germany plans to do with Puma:
4 A400 to carry 3 vehicles, with the fourth plane carrying modular armor kits to add once landed, and basic initial support kit.
“Germans yanks us in afghan who require the medium weight stabilsatiin vehicles are using wheeled apcs in the 18-25 tns range not a 37tn tank.”
There are also Warriors, Bradley, Dardo and other vehicles with tracks, “big” guns and stabilized turrets, you know. And Leopards and Abrams and Direct Fire Stryker Mobile Gun Systems. The wheeled 8×8 vehicles interestingly are also close to 30 tons, or heavier than that (Boxer, but also RG35 being 33 tons easily) and they tend to get a stabilized turret with the weapons you’d find on tracked vehicles. There’s far less difference than you imply.
And there are Scimitars too, which FRES is due to replace. And Spartans and Samsons too. Same reasoning.
The role of FRES is actually very clear, and the growth in its weight has absolutely nothing strange or not yet seen. Every vehicle has been getting heavier as protection needs go higher and higher.
“Google search gives you a rough ball park figure of £10,000 an hour, AT LEAST, to charter an Antonov 124, it’s probably a lot more to fly it into riskier areas like Camp Bastion.”
I laud the attempts of calculating costs of bringing stuff back by air, by i’d like to remind everyone that most vehicles will be brought down to a Pakistani port and make the return on ships, such as the Point RoRos, as with Iraq.
The RoRo are going to be busy in the next few years, as a lot of stuff is coming home from Germany (expect lots of Points sailing back and forth from Hamburg!) and then there will be Stan.
“the contributions to Iraq that should have come from Treasury Reserve, but came from Army core budget, are being sorted now retroactively.”
Indeed the Treasury/government promised to pay back the wear and tear of 8 years of Iraqi campaign funded by defence’s core budget (arguably the origin of the 80% of the financial black hole when you think about it), but so far not a penny has been paid back to the MOD, and there is… no hurry to pay, to say the least.
“somebody expressed today that they should be left in A-stan, and I fully concur. Have you noticed that more informed texts have always been using Jackal/ Ocelot with the forward slash in it?”
Why don’t we scrap the Land Rover WMIKs first, and keep some Jackals until further orders for Foxhounds come…?
Because, you know, this is a monumental case of “jam tomorrow”. “Throw away that thing, Tommy! You don’t want it, tomorrow we get shinier kit!”
What if the kit does not come tomorrow nor the day after? Because we all know it could very well happen.
Mr Fred
“Where does the £16m each figure come from?”
£16bn procurement for 1000 vehicles, with an option to raise that to 3000 vehicles.
£16bn/1000 = 16mn
Phil
“Scimitar is incredibly vulnerable to almost everything an infantry platoon can carry and totally vulnerable to an IED of a size that is often found in Afghanistan and certainly in more technologically forward places like Iraq.”
But so it FRES
The British Armies anti tank capability will consist of Javelin and MBT Law (NLAW in UK service)
Both are designed to crack MBTs.
FRES offers no more protection than CVR(T).
Its like putting a woolen coat on, yes, it will offer some increased protection against small handguns, but thats irrelevent if you’re under sniper fire.
“FRES variants will be on and behind the front line offering fire support, protected mobility and a host of other support services, it therefore needs to be survivable. And survivable means weight. That’s physics.”
If you want survivability, you need to be a lot bigger than 30t
FRES offers no more protection against mines or anti tank weapons than CVR(T), CVR(T) with a couple of tons of bar armour added is probably safer, and still weighs 10 tons less.
“You’re seeking what then? Your light tankette fails two out of three of those tests. You’re not going to get a super vehicle that is light, heavily protected and possessing great firepower.”
No, you arent!
Thats exactly my point, but thats what FRES is supposed to deliver.
Its impossible!
How many times must I repeat this.
You cannot have a single vehicle for armour on armour, long range scouting and COIN.
FRES says otherwise, but is wrong!
If you want to fight an Afghanistan war, you need a vehicle that can protect its crew from a huge mine, and is cheap enough to be lost in huge numbers.
The dirty truth is, the MoD would rather lose 4 squaddies and a land rover, than lose a FRES.
If we buy Boxer, it might (it wont) be able to protect its crew from a minestrike, but the cost of replacing boxers will be so great, they simply wont be deployed to theatre, and men will die because of it.
“Nope. I just checked. The British Army is still there.”
Again, you still refuse to accept what FRES *IS*
It isnt just a fancy new replacement for CVR(T)
http://eureferendum.blogspot.com/2004/07/another-blunder-of-eurofighter.html
It was theorised as the armoured contingent of a “rapid reaction corps” that has been abandend, to be deployed by air and sea lift that has been cancelled.
I can only repeat, FRES is not what you think it is.
It never has been
It never will be
No one on this board argues that the UK couldnt use new armoured vehicles, although its miles from the top of my list, but FRES is not, never has been and never will be “just” a program to procure new armoured vehicles.
If you want a CVR(T) replacement, even if you want to double the weight, fine, but thats not FRES, it never has been, it never will be.
Your argueing the FSTA should have bought Steyr AUGs.
There might be good reasons for the MoD to buy SAUGs, but its not and cannot be FSTA.
ACC
“Stuff on the way in got stuck in the Gulf staging areas because of lack of (air) capacity.”
Not quite, the army simply didnt want to introduce them in stages, they wanted them all in the ME, then flown out to Afghanistan in time for the next troop rotation.
Madness.
Phil
“They either get flown out or convoy.”
I would have thought it would make quite a lot of sense to drive out of Afghanistan, to Karachi and sail our kit home.
Maybe the stuff we would have to leave behind isnt worth it, but there would be propaganda value in driving through the Talibans heartlands in force.
Phil and any one else who wants a pop.
I repeat the question, because it is not being answered.
Airy assertions about our global interrests I get.
I even agree your list of those interrests.*(and could add some others)
What I don’t get is how the MRB helps? (Sorry for calling medium armoured, my slip as we are discussing a medium armoured vehicle)
To assert we have interrests in the middle east is one thing. To suggest there is a credible scenario in which we will deploy a brigade of line troops is another.
As for letting the rest of the world dictate what happens, I have news for you it already does.
Like I said we have a middle east policy, very nice and all that but we don’t have any actual influence over events.
We’ve got policy on everything. After all forign office has got to justify it’s existence.
As I mentioned the last three major wars we’ve gone to were completely elective and would have happened without us being there.
So once again what good will Fres do within the proposed force structure.
ACC
Except of course, NAMER is a ****ing main battle tank converted into a troop carrier.
It weighs 60 tons and carriers a GPMG.
FRES is 30-40 tons and includes a cannon in that.
I think the UK could find a use for something like Namer, but FRES *is not* Namer.
Gabrilie
“The role of FRES is actually very clear,”
Which is obvsiously why it was described as “like trying to grab smoke”
****
It amazes me that people who bitch and moan on here that the army is being cut and its mean and unfair and unsustainable can possibly support FRES.
Do you not get it it?
FRES is the wonder vehcile thats supposed to allow an 80,000 stro9ng army to do a better job than the 250,000 strong army it replaces.
I’ve linked to the quote three sodding times already!
FRES is the wionder vehicle that replaces boots on ground!!!
You cannot possibly be Pro FRES and Anti Infantry Cuts, they’re two sides of the same coin.
Dom
You’re about ten years out on what FRES is supposed to be. As I have conceeded it did start out as a super network-centric transformational vehicle. But the concept, the programme and the likely mission requirements have evolved from there. This is why weight has grown. It has been de-risked, re-thought and made far more pragmatic in scope and design.
No it does not offer invulnerability. No AFV does but it offers more protection that CVRT. It is also far more likely to be repairable after a strike and the highly trained crew survive. CVRT was good for it’s day and the prevailing doctrine but those days are gone.
FRES SV has evolved into a pragmatic replacement for CVRT and a few other types and variants. This is why UV was delayed because the Army recognises that CVRT is finished.
IXION.
It’s not just a brigade though, it’s the whole joint force package. It represents part of an intervention force. A means to influence and coerce. And yes it must be done as part of an alliance but that has been true since Tudor times.
We are vulnerable beyond our Borders. It makes emminent sense to have the ability to intervene. Especially if we will be expecting others to lend a hand.
Phil
“You’re about ten years out on what FRES is supposed to be. As I have conceeded it did start out as a super network-centric transformational vehicle. But the concept, the programme and the likely mission requirements have evolved from there. This is why weight has grown. It has been de-risked, re-thought and made far more pragmatic in scope and design.”
When?
When did a minister/civil servant stand up and say “wait, hold one, we were wrong, FRES as envisioned doesnt work, we in fact cant do what we said and so cant cut the army to 80,000”
Because, you see, the army is still being to 80,000, and the justification remains, FRES is a wonder weapon that saves the day.
“No AFV does but it offers more protection that CVRT”
Against what?
What weapons specificialy does the Boxer offer more protection against than The CVR2020 A?
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2011/06/the-need-to-rethink-fres-sv/
What size mine strikes can the FRES be repaired from that would write off the Concept E?
Fres was delayed because the government didnt want to spend any money on the army.
Youre adding one plus one and getting three. FRES is not connected to the cut in the Army! The mission set of the Army has been redefined and made less ambitious (arguably more realistic) so the force structure is changing. Nobody claims that the entire Army is being rebuilt around some prototype ASCODs but you. FRES is not what the army’s re-org is revolving around. As I have said ten years ago there were all sorts of fashionable notions but a decade of war has put paid to those. Show me where in SDSR it mentions FRES as being a driver behind the changes.
I dont know the armour specs on an ASCOD. But what is public domain is that it is heavy to meet protection requirements and it is designed to survive mine strikes. I’m not claiming it’s invulnerable or even the best protected, its all a balance. But it’s common sense mate, the better protected it is the more likely it can be repaired and returned to battle. I’m not saying it can drive over large IEDs and plod on. Anymore than a CR2 can plod on with a broken track. But it’s quicker and easier to fix and your crew is less likely to be dead or severely injured.
FRES for once is a common sense vehicle designed to meet the likely, far more demanding and dangerous mission set than CVRT was ever meant to face. UV was specifically delayed to allow funding for SV. It’s public domain Parliamentary fact.
“FRES is not connected to the cut in the Army! ”
Yes, it is.
“Show me where in SDSR it mentions FRES as being a driver behind the changes.”
http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/051AF365-0A97-4550-99C0-4D87D7C95DED/0/cm6041I_whitepaper2003.pdf
4.11 and 4.12
Does it explicitly say, this will allow us to shit can 30,000 soldiers, no, but that was certainly between the lines.
“But what is public domain is that it is heavy to meet protection requirements and it is designed to survive mine strikes.”
And? The Mod claimed bomb disposal teams riding Pinzergaur Vectors with riot protection were IED resistant.
Lets see the pictures of an ASCOD after hitting a 250, 500 and 1000lb mine.
I’ve seen pictures of similar vehicles, they’re spare parts, if that.
They’ll never drive again.
How many Vikings did we manage to repair?
We seem to have 35 replacements, and have decided to dump Viking in favour of Bronco……
Even if FRES is fixable, at what cost?
We can have a vehicle with better IED protection for 1/50th of the cost. That will no doubt close up a bit once a comms system is added, but even so.
Its madness.
How can you possibly argue FRES is a common sense replacement to a vehicle it weighs twice as much as, when we’ve halved the transport fleet thats supposed to deploy it?
On the extremely narrow measure you insist on using, FRES is poor, but viable, but once you step back and look at the big picture, it rapidly falls apart.
Its part of a rapid intervention force, but its much bigger and heavier than the vehicle it sort of replaces, and the transport fleet to deploy it has been gutted.
Again, this was always going to be the case, but the justification was, we need fewer “boots on the ground” becauase FRES is a step change in capability.
@ACC
“They spoke in “code” but what I could decipher was that the contributions to Iraq that should have come from Treasury Reserve, but came from Army core budget, are being sorted now retroactively. No sums mentioned, but a long topic so must be big. Bernard Gary had a definitive answer to “how much has been paid or made available?” – None so far.
= there the budget, but it will all be netted out in one big settlement, and only the net published…”
I know that Gabby replies to your point when he says,
“Indeed the Treasury/government promised to pay back the wear and tear of 8 years of Iraqi campaign funded by defence’s core budget (arguably the origin of the 80% of the financial black hole when you think about it), but so far not a penny has been paid back to the MOD, and there is… no hurry to pay, to say the least.”
However, what I would really like to know is whether anyone has any idea of how large that reimbursement/rebate might be? What I am really after is whether it would possibly be large enough to enable the Army to embark on the acquisition of at least some of the new vehicles they need or whether it will simply disappear into the maw of the great financial black hole that the MOD has (or be dissipated in other directions).
Incidentally, what do you mean by “only the net published …” I can’t really follow that bit but then I’m a little bit slow over financial matters.
So it doesn’t specify FRES as a driver for the re-org then?
Just because you don’t know how many vehicles hit IEDs and get repaired does not mean it doesn’t happen on a daily basis. There are Maistiffs out there who have been blown up more than once. ASCOD promises to be far more survivable than CVRT.
What transport fleet that’s supposed to deploy it? Everyone credible knows that air portability is a pipe dream in practise. It is not the main effort of FRES SV.
1/50th of the cost? After it’s been made to meet our requirements?
Hi Mike W,
I don’t follow the Parliamentary Committees (on the broader Parliament site) regularly, but went to those minutes through the link provided by Jedi.
“8 years of Iraqi campaign funded by defence’s core budget (arguably the origin of the 80% of the financial black hole when you think about it)”
– I think 80% 0f 30-40 bn is off by quite a bit
” but so far not a penny has been paid back to the MOD”
– this was confirmed in the minutes; I think after Iraq A-stan has been handled on-going, and in that the “debt” runs the other way, i.e. the value of the UORs that are going to be kept
” and there is… no hurry to pay, to say the least.”
– that could be it, but I assume that the sum is still being defined between the Treasury and MoD. Hence, as Treasury was not there as part of the session, the discussion was dancing around the sums without getting to them
Mike, the above (speculation) partially answers this. No one outside the Treasury and MoD knows, if even them. If the sum (at the time of the session) was known, the MPs on the Committee would have been entitled to know. RE “However, what I would really like to know is whether anyone has any idea of how large that reimbursement/rebate might be? ”
– I bet the net is big enough to bring back any UORs that are worthwhile.After all it is the fair value, after wear and tear, that is/ should be the basis. Whether any would be left over, towards new purchases… we await the information with abated breath
Please one simple question why is almost every major miltary we are in alliance and even ourselves currently using or procuring hundreds and hundreds of wheeled apcs as there future medium capability using modern mine protected hulls which is were FRES sits and all are in the 18-25tn range and most have a 30mm gun capability yet we almost alone think this should be meet by a 37tn tank with a 40mm gun.
They are also procuring tracked AFVs.
Let us not also forget that back in the early 60s we ignored the trend in MBT design as well with Chieftain. A trend which was later followed by every serious MBT design.
Also, FRES SV is just one part of the programme.
It is not the entire programme.
SV is “specialist” variants.
There are others that hopefully will come along, one is wheeled for a fact since it is the UV variant.
Phil
“What transport fleet that’s supposed to deploy it? Everyone credible knows that air portability is a pipe dream in practise. ”
Did you bother to read the white paper?
“1/50th of the cost? After it’s been made to meet our requirements?”
The Force Protection vehicles are already in UK service,
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmdfence/159/15906.htm
We UORd some 120 vehicles for £70mn, £580,000 per vehicle.
They suited our requirements, of drive from A to B and prevent injury to the crew in the event of hitting a big mine, whilst being cheap enough to be abandonable.
Thats all you need for Afghanistan.
Mark
We all started from the same point.
The earlier the vehicles were procured, the lighter and smaller the armament.
As time went on, they were uparmoured based on experience in Iraq and Afghanistan and consequently upgunned, the added weight and cost limited numbers, meaning each individual had to be increasingly ‘effective’
@ACC
Thanks for your detailed reply. So the answer is that very few people, if any, really know. The news, when it comes, willl be very interesting.
“They suited our requirements, of drive from A to B and prevent injury to the crew in the event of hitting a big mine, whilst being cheap enough to be abandonable.”
FRES SV isn’t just about driving from A-B though is it. You know this.
FRES SV is about specialist vehicles.
If Mastiff fits the FRES UV bill then crack on fine.
But it is not what FRES SV needs to be.
You’re comparing apples and oranges.
Mark
aren’t the the wheeled APC’s being used in conjunction with tracked vehicles?
The Scandinavians and Dutch have CV-90, Germans have Puma, Austrians and Spanish have Ascod, Italians have Dardo, and the Americans new manned ground vehicle is going to be tracked.
Phil
“You’re comparing apples and oranges.”
No I’m not, I’m pointing out that FRES is attempting to be a superfruit that looks and tasts like pears, pineapples and tomatoes.
Because neither you, nor the British Army, can come up with a coherant specification for the future needs of the British army.
You say FRES is an AIFV
Fair enough, yet FRES also tries to be mine resistant PPV, without much success, but with 15t of extra weight.
Phil @ 10.47pm
Can you give any more detail on the 100 tons of aggregate you got supplied to you in A’stan?
It is waste like this that gives the MOD a bad name and deservedly so.
Add in the hydro turbine debacle and we are starting to look stupid.
I fear we are having another Escort Carrier fiasco with the FRES SV.
What is wrong with just buying something off the shelf?
The original ASCOD looks OK.
FRES is a shambles because the costs are too high and the timelines are too long.
I always thought it would have been a better idea to buy some AN124s, personally.
What’s the betting 2 sqns of Ruslan would work out cheaper than FRES?
“You say FRES is an AIFV”
No I didn’t. I said it was an AFV. Quite different.
“Because neither you, nor the British Army, can come up with a coherant specification for the future needs of the British army.”
What the hell do you think it written into the specifications of the different variants of the FRES programme?!
What do you think is written in the manuals and in the doctrine let alone the strategic direction and policy of Whitehall? Just because you haven’t read them don’t think that nobody is at the helm.
“yet FRES also tries to be mine resistant PPV, without much success”
A completely unqualified statement. When was the last time you blew up an ASCOD?! It is self evident that ASCOD has more protection than CVRT.
Because it is not invulnerable you try and pooh pah it.
Like I said, if Mastiff fits FRES UV I don’t have a problem with that. If FRES UV is to be an MPV then go for it.
But FRES SV is not designed to be an MPV, it is not a Mastiff, it is not the same thing and it will have nowhere near the same mission set as Mastiff.
Your comparing applies (ASCOD) with oranges (Mastiff).
FBOT
How much would you charge to drive it from Karachi to Bastion?
“Can you give any more detail on the 100 tons of aggregate you got supplied to you in A’stan?
It is waste like this that gives the MOD a bad name and deservedly so.”
To be fair, the delivery of the aggregate was made on the third attempt after the first two convoys were completely destroyed and wiped out. The total cost included the destroyed vehicles and the dead drivers plus the increased security.
It is unfortunately, the cost of doing business in a war zone. Everything costs the earth.
It’s staggering. But it’s been true since time immemorial, wars break the bank, even little ones.
DJ @ 1.37
Drive what to where?
Aggregate = Coals to Newcastle.
Just what were we going to use it for, sandbags?
Hydro Turbine = MOD / DfID playing silly buggers over a proper trailer.
The average speed on the journey would have made Hannibal blush.
It’s used to winter-ize FOBs, PBs and CPs so they don’t turn into re-creations of the Somme every winter.
Phil @ 1.52
Something wrong somewhere.
What about a few shovels and a riddle?
Why does the rest of A’stan not turn into a quagmire?
Given the losses you describe my thoughts are that it was not worth the effort. We should have tried something else.
Helmand turns into a god awful quagmire in winter. I’m sure lots other parts do too.
And I don’t know where you expect us to get it from ourselves, we’re not miners.
Not worth the effort? Try living, operating and patrolling from a base knee deep in mud. I’m not exaggerating. Not every aggregate convoy met the same fate.
Stuff costs a lot of money in war. There’s no way around it. Unless you think lives are cheap, but then, even in the medieval period, wars were ruinously expensive.
“Please one simple question why is almost every major miltary we are in alliance and even ourselves currently using or procuring hundreds and hundreds of wheeled apcs as there future medium capability using modern mine protected hulls which is were FRES sits and all are in the 18-25tn range and most have a 30mm gun capability yet we almost alone think this should be meet by a 37tn tank with a 40mm gun.”
This is so not true.
The British army has its own requirement for an 8×8 troop carrier in the FRES UV. As you’ll remember, Piranha V was chosen, and VBCI and Boxer trialed, before contract issues and lack of funding killed the programme and the Army decided that replacing CVR(T) and FV43X had in the meanwhile become ABSOLUTELY PRIORITY, due to both vehicles being by now ‘dead’.
The fact that it is not possible to fund FRES UV at the moment is another story.
Currently, FRES UV will not come any earlier of 2022 (if it survives at all), but the Army is thinking about retaining Mastiff as interim solution, probably what reassures them a bit in the short term, allowing them to focus on CVR(T) and Warrior upgrade.
So the MOD is arguably following the very same path of the others. Or at least, it would be if there was the money for doing it.
FRES SV is, as Phil is trying to say from ages, a whole different thing, meant to fill other roles.
Mastiff is not a recce vehicle. Is not a Command Vehicle. Is not a IFV. Is not an ambulance. Not a Direct Fire vehicle. It is not a good off-road platform due to limited mobility.
It is a wheeled APC, excellent on roads and acceptable cross country if the ground is in good enough conditions. There it ends. It is the Saxon of today. The interim solution for equipping the Mechanized Infantry that the MOD wishes to see mounted in FRES UV one day, which means 8×8 wheeled vehicles like Boxer and so along, just like everyone else is doing.
The same formations which used, in fact, to use Saxon.
FRES SV is about delivering a RECCE/Fire Support combat platform with good protection, tracks for mobility on all terrains, adequate sensors and growth margin for a 30 years planned service life.
In addition, it is to replace TRACKED APCs like Spartan and FV430 in TRACKED formations with the ‘Protected Mobility’ variant.
Just what the US Ground Combat Vehicle will have to do (they will replace IFVs as well in time according to plan, but priority is replacing ancient M113 to start with).
In addition to the Protected Mobility and Scout variants there will be dedicate Recovery and Repair variants.
Protected Mobility replaces: Spartan, FV430
Scout replaces: Scimitar
Recovery and Repair replace: Samson, FV434
Then, FRES SV Block II is supposed to deliver, on the same hull, other specialized variants:
Joint Fires Control (direction of artillery/mortar/air attacks) replaces: Fire Control Spartan variant
Command and Control C2 variant replaces: Sultan
Engineer Recce: replaces FV430s and Spartans used for Engineer teams and their kit
And so along.
It is really simple and makes total sense if you don’t mess FRES UV and SV up and put one in the role of the other.
DomJ – I usually really dont want to get personal, but if you ever do get elected and your political career progresses, god help us if you become Minister of Defence, or even a member of the Select Committee.
Nothing is invulnerable to a big enough IED, nothing at all – so why keep labouring on that point.
Is ASCOD 2 FRES invulnerable to a 14.5mm AP round – which CVR(T) absolutely is not, I would hope so. If bar armour does not prevent an RPG hit, CVR(T) is so old it does not even have kevlar spall liners, which are now considered ‘standard’ etc…. and so on and so forth.
As I keep mentioning my crystal balls, while pretty, do not allow me to see the future, and I doubt very much yours do either, so MRAP’s are used in the Stan – so what ? Great we bought useful kit via a UOR, seems sensible to me. Is it the answer to everything – no ! Which is why our norther european allies use tracked IFV’s and even MBT’s in the same theatre.
Your a “FRES Hater” – I get it, but really, take a breath and think about your arguments a bit more !
FRES is not a vehicle, it’s even not a family of vehicles, it’s a System. A system that the Army / MoD still have yet to define. It’s been in the pipeline for 20 years or so, cost hundreds of millions and they can’t even decide on what the base vehicle for the system should be.
In my opinion, FRES has grown into an obsession for the top brass, they have sacrificed and delayed other equipment projects in order to keep their bastard child project alive. The introduction of MRAP’s was resisted, and were only finally purchased when the government announced the costs would come direct from the treasury. In my view this was all part of the Army’s bid to keep the FRES project on track. At the expense of soldiers who were taking on the IED threat in Snatch Landrover’s and the sick joke that was the Pinzgauer.
FRES should be buried, and the sooner the better. Then hopefully we can have an open minded discussion on the future of the Army’s equipment requirements without the shadow of this monstrosity darkening the debate.
Medieval people were a bit more civilised and stopped playing war at harvest time and then sat it out until spring. Harvest caused more than one siege to be lifted. Food, unlike war, was a matter of life or death.
A bit like the Afghans today.
@Monty “We will soon need a new IFV. In that respect the German Puma concept makes a lot of sense. It is highly agile, has an excellent 30 mm cannon and automated fire control system and protects its occupants better than any other existing IFV according to KMW.
I would rather soldier on with CVR(T) until we have the money to acquire a UK equivalent of the Puma family. This would include an IFV, Recce, REME, Command, Ambulance, Mortar and Anti-tank vehicles.
ASCOD is not in any way equivalent of the Puma. It is a previous generation design. Fed-up with waiting, I think the Army would prefer to have a second-rate option today than wait for something new and better tomorrow.
One thing i will say is that the Germans who have a much smaller defence budget than we do, yet seem to get AFV procurement right every time. The Boxer, Leopard 2 and Puma are all excellent vehicles. The whole process whereby their requirements were defined, agreed, designed and procured needs to be looked at and copied by the MoD.”
Could not agree more, in fact said so in my post:
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2011/07/future-army-vehicles/
I am sure Bo woiuld argue that ASCOD SV is even more mordern but I do really believe it. IF you fit ASCOD SV with the same V10, update the suspension, improve optics (especially mast mounted/telecopic), some ATGW (aka Spike)really not convinced that the British Army is right about not fitting Missiles to general AFVs, especially a Scout that has to fight for information. A couple of Eurospikes or even Javalin, would help if they ran in to a sqaudron of Tanks, where a CTA40 is little oe no use.
With regards to Phil’s comment about the Daily Mail… No I dont actually, and must confess to feeling a bit depressed, so probably detracted from the main thrust of my argument, that Defence has slipped even further down the political interest and the SDSR will relegate us to the same level as Belgium!
In which case, it really makes not a jot what FRES is. FRES in its SACOD SV is not what FRES was intended to be, that has long since died. We are now back to whre we were 10+ years ago when we simply wanted to replace an ageing set of vehicles… SAXON, CRVT and FV432s. Now the are even older, the goalposts have changed and nobody knows what to do!!
Be warned that the MoD and others, are starting to spin the ASCOD SV, implying that it is the result of all the previous (FAILED) programmes. It isn’t. It is nothing more than an updated version of an existing design. Not the culmination of all this polled knowledge. The was not carry forward of anything useful from the previous projects. It was just money dowen the drain.
BOXER was OK and we should have bought it. The nearest thing to what FRES was intnded to be would have been SEP. Its a shame it was canned, although, lives in (just) in the form of the Aligator? This is a much simplified version i.e. converntional engine not hybrid electric drive and so on, but still worth developing, IF we need something smaller and lighter? The eternal Conundrum!!!
“FRES should be buried, and the sooner the better. Then hopefully we can have an open minded discussion on the future of the Army’s equipment requirements without the shadow of this monstrosity darkening the debate.”
And that, done tomorrow, will give you the requirement for a 8×8 vehicle, just what FRES UV is about; a requirement for a tracked platform to work offroad and along Warrior/Challenger, which is FRES SV, and a Light Segment which is Foxhound and the Operational Utility Support Vehicle due to restart next year.
Just as before FRES became the one and only we had:
M1P1 or Armoured Battlefield Support Vehicle: tracked, planned to work with Warrior and Challenger.
In 2005 ABSV was fused with Warrior Upgrade, with the non-upgraded Warriors to be modified into support vehicles (various variants) with the rest of variants coming via FRES SV.
M2P2, or MRAV, or Boxer – it became FRES UV after in 2005 FRES expanded becoming the single tag name of the whole armour plan of the army.
Tragical decision in more ways than now, especially since i see its effects have caused a confusion in the public that lasts now in this debate.
Tracer – new Scout, canned to get into the original FRES, intended as CVR(T) replacement, C130 portable.
In other words, in the last decade, the Army has been changing project names, but is sticking to requirements that are evolving (ie: augmented weight, protection and growth marging, inspired by Afghan experience) but NOT changing.
CVR(T) replacement and ABSV have ended up being met by FRES SV (and Warrior upgrade, if the conversion of non upgraded Warriors is still envisaged, which is not clear). They are tracked, A400 capable, well armed, well protected, and with massive growth margin.
FRES UV still seeks a wheeled 8×8 for the Mechanized (or ‘medium’ if you like the definition more) infantry.
Through 3 or more different programmes, all cancelled at some point, the Army has been seeking again and again the same thing.
Go ahead, cancel the programme once more, waste other 7 years and 500 more million pounds, and then see the Army asking for the same things again, with another name, as CVR(T) and FV430 get even older.
Meanwhile, continue to tell the Army that they don’t want FRES SV, but a new CVR(T).
“daddy knows best” approach, i guess.
“The nearest thing to what FRES was intnded to be would have been SEP. Its a shame it was canned, although, lives in (just) in the form of the Aligator?”
I quite agree, but i cynically must note that if the Army had tied itself to developing a revolutionary platform, people would have moaned about “gold plating”, costs, untrialed solutions, high risks, and asked to cancel it.
The UK requirement for A400 is 30 tonnes, at 32 tonnes SV Scout will not be A400 transportable as per official requirements. Of course A400 will likely be able to carry more but the point is that we have made the decision in contract terms to forego air transport by anything other than C17. Good or bad is a discussion of course
I think we have come to the point with FRES where its the least worse option and that is its greatest strength, by arsing about for decades we have painted ourselves into a corner where even the last chicken in the shop is looking good.
Shame really
“I would rather soldier on with CVR(T) until we have the money to acquire a UK equivalent of the Puma family. This would include an IFV, Recce, REME, Command, Ambulance, Mortar and Anti-tank vehicles.”
Without wishing to seem rude. You’re not going to be the one soldiering on with a 40 year tin can that is being used in ways the designers would have specifically been told it was not going to be used.
It’s done. It is a dead parrot. Expired. No amount of wishful thinking can make it otherwise. It is old, outdated, being misused and is tired and overweight. There is no Puma. There are no official aspirations to buy it. ASCOD is within sight and FRES is no longer the silly fashionable programme it was at the start. It is a pragmatic, de risked and better protected bit of kit.
Gabby you make most of my points for me. Take the yanks and the germans they have heavy formation medium formation and light formation. They have a main battle tank and a heavy apc (braddley,puma) which they use for everything the heavy unit need on the same chasis. They then have a medium formation, which use styker and boxer and everything in that unit uses the same chasis. And so on so forth.
We in the UK post 2015 will be down to what maybe 4 battle groups of heavy formations. And nothing much in the middle as most of the UORs could be binned. This is where FRES was supposed to sit. Now both US and German vehicles in this category at 18-25tn vehicles as standard baseline (post afghan experience) and all are wheeled, this is where there main investment is right now. We instead of either getting into the german or US design have gone off and made the priority a 37tn tracked tank which is only really useful to the heavy forces and carriers a non standard gun why? We have heard for years how the conditions, missions ect requires a medium vehicle this is what needs to happen and yet we get out of afghan and its back to tank battles across the fulda gap.
I hear cvrt needs replaced agreed. The light forces it generally supports the most and oscelot and Viking/warthog are more than capable of performing all the roles required of the light forces and they allow for rapid deployment. The warrior can support the much reduce heavy forces 700 spread across 4/5 battle groups is 100+ per group with plenty left over for training. We need to first and foremost buy now off the shelf a medium wheeled vehicle that can perform all roles at that level of capability from recon to apc to command. FRES SV as is remains the wrong vehicle at the wrong time and in the wrong configuration.
I’m not a big fan of this ASCOD thing, but to give it some credit it has passed all the MOD required tests for mine resistance. That’s not an issue.
Me personally, I just look at ASCOD and I see a tracked vehicle that is needed in a wide array of variants, that they want to stick a 40mm gun on.
Then I look at CV90 and see a tracked vehicle, available in a wide array of variants (including forward observation, command, recovery) and with a variety of guns (you can have 30mm, 35mm or 40mm, depending on what tickles your fancy).
Boom, right there. Fit it with Bowmans and you’re ready to go. 70kph speeds, 600 mile range in the latest variants, protection against 14.5mm all around, supposedly 30mm protection up front, 30 odd tons weight and has even been the test vehicle for that fancy new IR system that lets you pretend you’re a car.
Cost is about 3 million Euros a pop. No development costs. Just job done and get on with it.
Then we can find something to fit the wheeled requirement. I’m backing VBCI at the minute.
Jed
No offence taken.
I agree CVRT needs replacing, althiough I disagree its the most urgent need, but then, I dont know to what extent they are simply worn out.
Replacing CVRT does automaticaly mean FRES, it certainly doesnt mean a 30t vehicle.
“so MRAP’s are used in the Stan – so what ? Great we bought useful kit via a UOR, seems sensible to me. Is it the answer to everything – no ! Which is why our norther european allies use tracked IFV’s and even MBT’s in the same theatre.”
I dont know how to make this any clearer.
I am catagoricaly not argueing we need a MRAP because we will do Afghanistan again.
But if you are supporting FRES, you ARE catagoricaly saying we will never again have our supply lines peristantly mined, because FRES, as is, is so expensive, it rules out a parralel fleet, and even if it can protect the crew from mines, its too expensive to be lost to them, and “Our Brave Boys” TM will be sent out to die in land rovers.
For what must be the 10th time, what are the British Armys requirements for armoured vehicles in the future?
I still havent seen a coherant case made, and without that coherant case, I am forced to question anything purchased.
When the Army tries to blow the entire vehicle procurement budget for the next two decades without specifying its needs in total.
The army “specification” trotted out in the HoC is at best contradictory and frequently flat out wrong.
Phil D
The Germans have a tiny navy, which pretty much sorts out the smaller defence budget…
Hi Mark,
Quantity-wise you are right with “We in the UK post 2015 will be down to what maybe 4 battle groups of heavy formations. And nothing much in the middle as most of the UORs could be binned. This is where FRES was supposed to sit.”
But if we go by the “received wisdom” and we’ll have 5 similar MRBs (the other two bdes are allowed to be different), how do you cobble together 4 from 5?
I’ve got some thoughts on the Armoured or call it Mechanized Battle Group/ MRB relationship, but would be great to hear yours? We might at some point be back to discussing force structure and standing formations; we had a warm up under “Future 04” thread.
@chris b. CV90 yeah would’ve been good, but BAe thinking they had the MOD up against a corner were refusing to build it in the UK, and when they finally realised that all the posturing had failed in the week the decision was to be announced they said they would assemble in the Uk and if they didn’t get the contract then they were going to close the factory in the north east.
I guess the top brass got sick of jumping through hoops for the twats.
I note today the BAe job losses fingers were being ponted at the govt for the SDSR and also not buying the new radar for typhoon. Of course it’s not BAe’s fault, oh no!!!!!
Acc
I would scrap the mrb proposal and head towards a us modular brigade set up. But assuming a mrb is it I think it looks like a 4 battlegroup organisation with a heavy 2 medium and a light battle group in each. I think the 5 into 4 will be achieved by making the battle groups smaller than is currently the case possibly down to 500 people per heavy inf batt
I suppose one could counter DominicJ’s comment with something like:
If you oppose FRES then, should the British army face anything heavier than a BTR80 without complete air supremacy, then you are condemning soldiers to being wiped out by mech forces. Hell, even a Libyan technical platoon will do a number on MRAPs.
I often wonder if BAE should have submitted a FRES SV based on the Warrior 2000 chassis, if they were serious about British manufacture. Probably too costly. Still, there would have been a heap of advantages to it, depending on how much was common with the original.
Paul G is absolutely correct. BAE blew their chances by attempting to blackmail the government (‘give us the business and pay a premium price or the jobs go’… and that was after persistently refusing pointblank to build CV90 in the UK). GD offered a much better industrial deal including UK assembly and export potential. In my view CV90 or a developed ‘CV100’ might well have been a better system, but BAE is too used to milking MOD and was complacent.
Gabriele makes an excellent point. The FRES Utility Vehicle programme was the priority and was supposed to be in service by 2009-10 (I heard General Dannatt say that in a speech back in 2007). The FRES UV programme was about building 3000 8×8 UVs to replace the 432s, Saxon, etc supplemented by a much smaller programme of a few hundred vehicles for a tracked replacement to the CVR(T) family (the FRES SV family). FRES SV was never meant to be a Warrior replacement, although I am sure GD has aspirations in that direction.
The Army almost ended up with the Nexter VBCI, very much against its wishes. I spent time with the French working on VBCI and with one exception it met all the UK requirements and was both cheaper and arguably better protected than the GD Piranha V. The exception was that the engine was fixed in place like a truck engine (in fact it was a truck engine) and could not easily be changed in the field. The French Army prefer to use one VBCI to tow another to a repair area rather than doing the plug in engine change bit the British Army favours. But there is no question this is an excellent and under-rated vehicle and would have been in service for 18 months if we had ordered it. The French offered a really good deal including IPR transfer, but the top brass knew better.
This led to the debacle over Piranha V where after selecting them as the ‘preferred bidder’ GD then refused to give MOD access to IPR and after getting its fingers burnt over Bowman there was no way MOD would proceed without it. Hence the abandonment of the competition and the present chaotic position where we are the only major Western country not to have an 8×8 in service.
For some reason the Army was determined to have Piranha V come what may, and I suspect the choice was based on considerations other than ones of just technical and industrial merit. In terms of early service entry and benefits to the British economy VBCI should have won this hands down.
fred
no!
I’m not saying the uk should be an all mrap force, i’m saying unless the uk is never going to operate persistantly mined supply lines it cant afford to be a none mrap force
A lot of people seems don’t want to ASCOD SV, it’s not here to make a medium armor brigade, it serve to provide modern vehicles for recce regiments, you want to keep your CVRT long time again ?
Don’t take equipment of the French army, buy British vehicles, the RG41 from BAE is a very good vehicle, it will avoid the loss of jobs in your industry.
DomJ
Don’t confuse mine with IED and dont confuse “main supply route” with tactical manouvre, horses for courses my man.
I am not making any categorical statements, and your over simplifying with this:
“But if you are supporting FRES, you ARE catagoricaly saying we will never again have our supply lines peristantly mined, because FRES, as is, is so expensive, it rules out a parralel fleet, and even if it can protect the crew from mines, its too expensive to be lost to them, and “Our Brave Boys” TM will be sent out to die in land rovers.”
I have done pre-deployment IED / mine awareness training, but thank goodness never had to foot patrol in danger zones, although I suppose I have been vehicle borne in high threat areas – have you ?
No, I thought not, so please don’t put words in my mouth until you have the campaign medals to back up your “opinion”. I never said no MRAP’s, but I also don’t say no FRES, so we can agree to disagree :-)
Dominicj,
Sorry old bean, but I thought that we were engaged in the pursuit of extrapolating to the bizarre absolute and stating that as the only opposing position.
I would oppose the all-MRAP force for the reasons stated. I would suggest that there is room for FRES SV and MRAPs in a modern army. Arguably any vehicle destined to leave the UK should have some degree of mine protection. The Mechanised battalions would seem to be the ideal recipients of mine-protected vehicles, be it an 8×8 purpose-built APC or a modified truck like the Mastiff. Something scalable to a variety of purposes (RG35, Boxer or something like) to fill the roles of recce, PPV, RRV, APC etc.
Frenchie,
Buy British so purchase a South African vehicle? Wrrrr?
I read that Lord Drayson wanted VBCI and after a number of reported ‘blazing rows’ decided to jack it and leave DE&S, a shame. because he seemed to get it but was obviously overwhelmed by the old school and regiment tie brigade.
You know what though, with our new found love in with the French I can see VBCI coming back on the agenda
It’s simple. FRES SV is all there realistically is to replace CVRT. Bang on about Puma etc but there are no plans whatsoever to buy anything other than ASCOD.
It’s a shame the Army has called all these vehicles FRES like Gabs said. FRES long ago stopped being a “system”. It is now a collection of different vehicles and variants for different jobs. All very familiar and vanilla. If FRES SV was just called CVRT 2 half the people here wouldn’t be getting their knickers in a twist about it.
It is an AFV. The vehicle is not determining the doctrine. The doctrine is deciding the vehicle and as Gabs has pointed out no matter what it’s bloody called the requirements have evolved to be the same.
Hi Mr. fred,
I fully agree with “The Mechanised battalions would seem to be the ideal recipients of mine-protected vehicles, be it an 8×8 purpose-built APC or a modified truck like the Mastiff.”
Further, the idea that all infantry should be trained on all “platforms” was, I believe, abandoned when – while going to GW1 – it became apparent that 19 bns were in the middle of re-roling/ training and could not be used. However, whatever number of light/ independent bns will remain, they should all be able to deploy on this platform,too, if so required.
Hi TD,
yes, if we don’t share production runs (to give them some chance to spread fixed costs, whether R&D or tooling up) we (nor them) won’t have an arms industry before long, RE
” with our new found love in with the French I can see VBCI coming back on the agenda”
They pushed it into service with another turret; has the CTA gun been integrated yet? Most vehicles of course would not need that – but a good way to have organic fire support at low level in MI units and spread commonality/ shrink logistics tail.
A further thought:
Both ” 8×8 purpose-built APC or a modified truck like the Mastiff” have their place.
The costs can be incredibly close, though the latter should hold an advantage being an adaptation from mass-produced components as opposed to the former where production runs tend to be in ’00’s or ‘000s rather than in 0’000s.
– Stryker is the only exception that I can think of where the “mass-productization” benefit has been fully reaped in unit price
Mastiff is from the larger end of AMRAPs. Averaged across all (US) models they cost $1.59m, so Mastiff in particular was quite likely a tad above that. An AMV, over a run of a couple of thousand, costs $2m a piece.
Jed
“Don’t confuse mine with IED”
I’m not confusing anything, they’re the same damned thing, concealed explosives.
As for the the rest “I’m the expert, how dare you question me”.
I’m sorry, bollocks.
The experts in the army lost the war in Iraq and are losing the war in Afghanistan.
In any other field, the senior ranks would be in prison.
Mr Fred
“I would suggest that there is room for FRES SV and MRAPs in a modern army.”
There isnt room in the budget of the British Army for FRES as it stands and anything else.
Unless someone has some newer numbers than I do, FRES is a project with liftime costs greater than anything else in the armed forces, barring the hoplessly overinflated cost of the Trident Replacement.
Paying for it is the direct driver of the manpower cuts and will still wipe out the armys procurement budget for decades.
Phil
Perhaps you have seen something newer than I have, but the latest numbers I have seen is FRES is a £16bn procurement plan with an additional £45bn life cycle cost.
£60bn.
The armies budget for vehciles for *at least* two decades.
If I’m wrong, provide evidence to that effect.
Simply repeating “FRES has changed” isnt evidence.
Losing the war in Afghan. Right. A laypersons perspective and shite to boot. Just because it’s not easy doesn’t mean it’s not going well.
Dom
Where have I argued price? I’m sure it is expensive. But it’s a programme to conceivably replace most of the AFVs in the Army.
“A laypersons perspective ”
Am I going to have to point out you arent a Field Marshall again?
“Just because it’s not easy doesn’t mean it’s not going well.”
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/
I suggest you read
“Commanders ignored warnings that British troops were at risk from attack by Afghan allies”
and
“Afghanistan is lurching towards a civil war”
But no, we’re winning.
Winning what, no one seems sure, because believe me, the second we’re out, Iran, Pakistan, India and China will sponsoring “their” side in a civil war.
“But it’s a programme to conceivably replace most of the AFVs in the Army.”
And does it meet every need the British army will have?
I dont see how anyone can disagree with the idea that if you spending half the budget, you should meet half the requirements, and if you’re spending all the budget, you should meet all of the requirements.
I may not be a field marshal but I bet I outrank you. What that means is I have first hand experience on the ground in Helmand working with the ANA and have received briefings you won’t have seen in the public domain. I went out there as cynical as you mate and I had my eyes opened. We’re kicking ass and taking names and doing very well. If you want a campaign with no mistakes that goes perfectly then you’re on a fools errand. I’ll take my ISAF briefs over a Daily Telegraph article thanks.
I bet if I asked you how we are doing what we’re doing on an operational level you won’t know. Yet you feel qualified to condemn a strategy you do not know in detail.
Phil
So could you enlighten the fat knackers amoungst us; –
1) When do you see victory
2) What does victory look like. (in other words what do you define as victory)
Coz I can reprint dozens of official millitary statements along the lines of: –
‘It may not look like it but we are winning ‘
From 68 onwards by US forces in Veitnam, pouring scorn on Civilian commentators who could not see the ‘secret stuff ‘ they could.
Phil
“I may not be a field marshal but I bet I outrank you”
No Doubt
“We’re kicking ass and taking names and doing very well.”
Again, no doubt, but I was calling for the “targetted killing” of the Taliban leadership 2 full years before we started that.
But I shouldnt have to tell you, the strategy isnt to kill Taliban.
The Strategy is to bring the ANA and ANP up to the point where they can protect the road network and suppress banditry throughout the country.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7801459/Afghanistan-police-corruption-is-fuelling-insurgency.html
There are LtCols blaming the ANP for the insurgency, the bandits do less thieving than the bloody police!
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/02/world/asia/02marja.html?pagewanted=1
Elite Police, mostly drug addicted, mostly rob the locals, cant be bothered to patrol, or even stand watch.
I wasnt going to go as far back as Ixion, but I have plenty of “Victory in sight” and “Taliban Power Broken” press releases, which rather missed the fact that the Taliban had just gone to do some farm work as they do every harvest time.
But maybe your “official” papers disprove all that.
Afghan is a product of it’s culture. There is corruption, there is nepotism and there is a background of tribal conflict. Far more dangerous would be a strategy that overlays western values and ignores the reality. Afghan will not be a mirror image of western Europe. Ever.
So yes there are corrupt violent ANP. And so on. But that is the context.
We are winning because we now have the density to hold ground and operate in depth. We have incredibly potent ISTAR assets saturating local areas. The experienced leaders are now all dead replaced by young, reckless ineffective leaders. A coherant insurgency has been decapitated and fragmented. A lot of what is left is die hards leading thugs. And the die hards will die. The locals despise and fear the Taliban for they punitively tax them and intimidate them. And since we’ve taken more risk and reduced the bombing their main reason for hating us too has gone. The Taliban are finding it harder and harder to recruit. Violence has gone down massively this summer. There has barely been a fighting season. Over the winter we had the mass to move in on the Taliban when they were desperate for their rest. They have been shattered and we continue to grind them down. Violence is coming down to levels manageable for the Afghan
Security forces.
Phil
Ok so what does victory look like and when (roughly) will it happen?
phil
Further
I suppose the locals love and respect Karzi and his crowd. As well as hating and fearing the Taliban?
phil
only the terminaly brave fight us.
The calculating will sharpen their knives till we leave, and then fight.
Dom at 08.56
OK matey, ref: “I’m the expert, how dare you question me” – I never said that all, I pointed out I have relevant experience and you have non, and now your on the defensive and getting snarky.
I never said I was an EOD tech, or OIC of an armoured recce squadron. However you, apparently, can take all your layman’s book reading and web search and know considerably more about what is good at fighting for information in the armoured recce role, or indeed about armoured vehicle procurement full stop, than the entire army and MOD. Yes there are idiots in both, and recent experiences graphically illustrate that, but again so what ? That does not apply to your inane arguements about FRES (as in Ascod 2) being more or less vulnerable to certain weapons systems than a CVR(T). Phil might not be a Field Marshall either, but not only does he outrank both of us, he has considerably more experience and has the chance to discuss matters outside of experience with peers who may well be experts; who are your contacts at the British Legion ?
As for mines versus IED’s: “I’m not confusing anything, they’re the same damned thing, concealed explosives.”
Yes absolutely on the most simple of levels – but on anything more than that your wrong actually, there are many and higly nuanced differences. In the end they are only words, labels, but the way they are used is pertinent. As far as NATO is concerned a certain class of mine contains a certain amount of explosive, and that is what Ascod or anything else is tested against. It is considered to be a sophisticated military weapon, easy to deploy and conceal quickly. An IED, could be a tonne of fertilizer based home made explosive (not easy to hide or deploy quikcly) or four big mortar shells strapped to a grenade attached to a trip wire.
The difference applied to Ascod / FRES or any tracked IFV is ability of an enemy to rapidly scatter mines over any type of terrain over which tracked vehicles have good tactical mobility, as opposed to the ability to plant mines / emplace IED’s on roads that have to be used by wheeled vehicles or at other natural choke points.
I suspect you actually know all this, but from your point of view as FRES being the ultimate spawn of the devil and epitomy of all that is wrong with defence and the army, your just being bloody minded :-)
Victory. Now there’s a loaded word. I suppose it’s when we hand over Helmand to the Governor with a tolerable level of violence. I can hear your howls from here but the ANSF are getting to critical mass and are key in providing the density that is winning. Yes some of them are shit. Yes a lot of ANP are corrupt but the same traits are found in the Taliban.
There is simply no support for the old Taliban regime. It’s gone. Timed have moved on. The insurgency is now very localised. It’s local thugs fighting over drugs, women, power and money. As for Karzai. Most don’t give a shit. Anymore than someone on the Oregon Trail in the 1840s gave a shit about who was President. Practically, beyond the presence of ANSF it makes no difference.
As for the calculating ones. Yeah whatever. There’s a whole bunch of evil geniuses waiting in the wings.
Fact is. The overwhelming majority of Afghans are perfectly happy to plod on in life. A lot join the insurgency for adventure and a quick buck but these ten dollar Taliban invariably melt away and go home when their families tell them too and when they realise it isn’t fun. The tier ones and the leaders suffer enormous attrition.
Like I said. There hasn’t really been a fighting season this year. The insurgency is loosing, in fact it’s lost. It’s only a few hardcore ones left countrywide. Everyone else are just opportunistic and bored thugs.
It’s wrong to even call them Taliban anymore. The word just means criminals now. There’s less than 1,000 tier one Taliban in the whole of Afghan. In fact that was in Oct 2010. I’d bet there’s less now. Afghanistan will always have a background noise of violence, like Ulster. But that’s reality.
Jed
Your STILL not listening.
I’mn not saying MRAPS are good at fighting for information.
They CATAGORICALY ARE NOT.
All they are good for is protecting their crews from ruinous mine strikes and being cheap enough (relativly) to be throw away units.
Nor am I argueing that FRES is more vulnerable than CVRT, it isnt, however theres very little its less vulnerable than.
“The difference applied to Ascod / FRES or any tracked IFV is ability of an enemy to rapidly scatter mines over any type of terrain over which tracked vehicles have good tactical mobility,”
But that only applies during a certain, quite narrow, phase of warfare.
FRES no doubt will excel at that.
But, and its a very big but, FRES is the only armoured vehicle the army are going to get for two decades.
If we fight a war outside the narrow field FRES is supposed to excel at, we are back to landrovers.
FRES is too big to be landed via beach assault and too expensive to be sacrificial.
If we are never going to need to conduct forced entry operations, rapid deployments or counter insurgency, those gaps dont matter.
But if those do pop up, the army is ill equiped, we take casaulties.
The Paras fought three battles in the Falklands, Goose Green (81 Casualties), Wireless Ridge (14 casualties) and Mt Tumbledown (63 Casualties).
At one of those Battles, CVRT wasnt present, at another, it was, but couldnt advance due to mines, and at a third, it was given free reign.
Guess which was which?
CVRT and MRAPs arent perfect, far from it, but in their little niche, they excel, if we operate in that niche without those tools, we The PBI pay in blood.
we was supposed to be struck out
Dominicj,
For me, the FRES numbers you present fail the ISMAD test. £16m for FRES is more than four times what a comparable high-end, turreted, AFV costs.
Even then, it is a programme cost, not the replacement cost for a damaged/destroyed vehicle.
Dom – I am listening, but you dont make sense. I could counter that neither MRAP nor CVR(T)really “excel” in their niches, and the narrowness of applicability just re-opens the tracks versus wheels debate.
As for landing over a beach, well jeez, I am pretty sure I have seen Chally 2’s in LCM on exercise……
The only point I will even consider conceeding is the potential for “too expensive to sacrifice” – as for the constant “we will fall back on Landrovers” oy vay !
Scots Guards at Tumbledown where they took on an Argentine Marine unit. 2 PARA at Goose Green was outnumbered and arguably the objective was far too ambitious for the unit employed. The Argentine force was far from defeated when it surrendered.
Like I said, there were plenty of other things that would have made these battles easier for the British. And CVRT was not one of them. Like you point out it was channelled by mines and was limited to direct fire, with poor target acquisition.
“But that only applies during a certain, quite narrow, phase of warfare.”
For the sake of argument, I’ll agree with your narrow phase of warfare comment, but it is also the most dangerous, difficult and expensive phase of warfare.
On a general point, the Falklands showed clearly a role for light armour and no doubt more would have made a material difference. It is equally fair to say that more of lots of things would have also made a material difference.
The fact that this light armour was notionally a recce vehicle just highlights one of the biggest problems when we discuss these things, what are they used for. Funnily enough, you could argue that CVR(T) has seen more action and delivered greater utility when not doing its traditional formation recce job.
Maybe if we split out the need for light armour and the need for a recce vehicle there wouldn’t be as much confusion!
It showed a role for mobile fire-power. Which was no secret in warfare. Falklands arguments are used time and time again to skew analysis. CVRT was there, so it was used. It was hardly ideal. Just like the V bombers weren’t ideal, just like the supply chain was not ideal, just like the SH fleet was not ideal, the air support not ideal.
There would be better ways of bringing fire power to bear on the Argie positions now such as Apache’s, EXACTOR, Brimstone, Javelin, 40mm GMGs and a proper supply chain that meant that there was plenty of ammunition to support the artillery and the mortars.
If you draw back and analyse why some battles were easier than others you will note not just a presence of come CVRT but a complete fire support plan using direct and indirect fires from 105 LGs, to Milan, to SF GPMG, to 81mm mortar, to Scout strikes to NGFS.
CVRT was a component of those fire support plans – they were not THE fire support plan. There is a bigger picture here.
To focus in on the CVRT presence is disingenuous. It ignores a whole host of other facts such as an integrated fire support plan using direct and indirect fires.
A Jackal has more firepower these days than a Scimitar with its 40mm GMG and GPMG and it also won’t poison the crew with its fumes when it fires ala Scorpion.
A trick I think BAe missed was its South African component. The South Africans have more experience with mine resistant AFVs than anybody else and come only second the the Old USSR with regards to wheeled AFVs. The Rooikat 8×8 Recce/Light Tanks is an exceptional platform, well protected, fast, agile and hard hitting. The same can be said regarding the Ratel series. With more modern systems and armour both these platforms would have met the Army’s needs (Not wishes/aspirations). The replacement for the Ratel would, in my opinion be a very good candidate for the FRES (UV) and a Rooikat armed with modified version of the WCSP turret carrying 2-3 heavy ATGW would have been a fine CVR(T) replacement. So why hasn’t BAe tapped into the resourse, only they and God know.
mr fred
if anyone has newer numbers, i’m happy to use them
jed
not about tracks and wheels
my criteria were solely weight/firepower and iedprotection/cost
yes we measure landing ships in chally2s, but i was told on here that the logistical effort required for tanks meant it simply didnt occur.
If we really could land and support half a dozen c2s when we next go to war down south then fair cop, i’d only ask why no one said so before i spent 3 days making a tit of myself.
Phil
i had meant to add cvrt cant take all the credit.
I dont think I was focussing on CVR(T) in the Falklands per se Phil, if you go back a few posts on this subject you will see some interesting quotes from a CVR(T) crew member and the analysis of the Falklands showed that there was a need not just for mobile firepower but protected mobile firepower. The general point for me therefore is that there remains the need for a lightish weight armoured vehicle, not necessarily for recce exclusively but direct fire support that has relative freedom of manouver and the ability to either cordinate indirect fire and/or bring its own firepower to bear.
An interesting debate might be around the need or not for direct fire support beyond the automatic cannon size, 90mm and up
On a side note, I think the 76mm poisonous fumes things was always a bit overlown and Scorpion withdrawn because of treaty reasons but could be wrong
@ Lord Jim
South Africa is an interesting force to look at. They know what they want, they know what they need and then they just go out and build it. The make us look positively Catatonic and foolish with their purchasing. I’m still a big fan of the Rooivalk.
Chris B
Hear hear Rooivalk sexyist thing on 8 wheels and comes in 105mm as well.
There are / were the whole family of AFV’s based on this at one time.
Err, Rooivalk is the helicopter….
Rooikat is the 8 wheeled gun bearing beast.
Hi LJ,
RE ” The replacement for the Ratel would, in my opinion be a very good candidate for the FRES (UV)”
In 2007 it was announced that Ratel will be replaced in the South African military by 264 Patria AMV vehicles as part of the “Hoefyster Program”.[Wiki; primary source has been taken down by Denel]
Rolling out of the factory in Europe they come at $2m; don’t know if S. Africa can make them cheaper when the production run is just 10% of the cumulative total.
All kinds of interesting add-ons (cost extra)
-BMP3 turret
-NEMO
-GD LAV 25mm
-Elbit 30mm RWS
-Quad-TOW
-Crotale
… why not the CTA+the smaller twin-TOW
Poland has had them in Afghan
TD
Thank God someones finaly got what I’ve been saying.
Its not so much that I think CVRT is great for formation recon, its that CVRT is the only armour thats going to be available. for a logisticaly challenging operation.
Yes, its vulnerable to armour piercing .50cal rounds, so, people generaly dont bother dragging that sort of stuff up a mountain.
In one of the earlier Indo/Pak wars, India deployed half a dozen stuarts and literaly pushed an entire Corps back a hundred miles. They just didnt have an anti tank weapon with them so could not do a thing to hurt the tanks.
For the North German Plains, Operating from an established base, CVRT is a bit pants.
However, those bases are closing, and the Soviets dont have a shock army to force Fulda.
If Iraq is nice enough to give us basing rights, and we feel the need to smack Iran, something FRES related would no doubt be an excellent choice.
But if you strip away those basing rights, it becomes a disaster pretty quickly.
Or in my none expert view.
Now I know, we are all for ruthless commonality on here, and I’m asking for three vehicle types, but, they can be “commonish” if they all use the same engine, and the same Remote Weapons stations, or at least some do.
I’ve stolen this from Anthony Williams forum (and I hope he doesn’t mind . . .) Depending how much weight you give to what wasn’t said, it could mean that this debate has become moot.
The UK Defence Secretary has been interviewed: http://www.defense-aerospace.com/article-view/release/129069/uk%E2%80%99s-fox-claims-defense-budget-on-firm-footing.html
An interesting extract:
We are therefore proceeding with the procurement of 14 additional Chinook helicopters, the upgrade of the Army’s Warrior vehicles, spending on the Joint Strike Fighter, the procurement of the Airseeker intelligence and surveillance aircraft, the cats and traps for the Queen Elizabeth Class carriers, and the development of the Global Combat Ship.
This is the second time he has listed major projects which will go ahead but has failed to mention FRES SV, for which a production contract seems to be still some way off.
Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website:
http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Pete
I’ve thought for a while FRES and F35 for the RAF were for the chop
The RN will still get a fast jet, although Rafal is far more likely in my view, but if we’re lucky, we’ll get 50 jets, definatly wont be 150.
Why is Rafale more likely?! There are no public plans to buy it. And he just said F35 is still being funded!
There is a school of thought that says
1. Industrial development share for F35 is not predicated on numbers purchased
2. The switch to cats and traps has nothing to do with cost or risk or performance but politics
3. A Rafale buy allows the UK and France to pool airframes, maintenance, training etc, big big cost savings
4. We now love the French
5. Identical aircraft for the UK and France allows aircraft carrier sharing/pooling and the formation of the backbone of an EU fleet
6. We now love the French
So reading the tea leaves it makes an interesting rumour, non!
cHRIS B
I’ve got to start taking more water with it
My slip of the keyboard!
Phil
I dunno, I just get this feeling that the UK and France will be operating a joint pool of three Carriers and Rafales.
http://eureferendum.blogspot.com/search?q=rafale
The Good Doctor is rather more convicned than I…
“yes we measure landing ships in chally2s, but i was told on here that the logistical effort required for tanks meant it simply didnt occur.
If we really could land and support half a dozen c2s when we next go to war down south then fair cop, i’d only ask why no one said so before i spent 3 days making a tit of myself.”
Technically, the requirement to land from the sea the Chally II definitely exists. It is trialed often during Commandos amphibious exercises.
The LCU MK10 was sized to carry the Chally. The new PACSCAT has been sized, and subsequently trialed, carrying a Chally or 5 Vikings. (Latest Commandos experiment being launching the Vikings directly from the well deck of Albion and driving them to the shore; doable but the Viking in the water is SOOOO slow)
http://www.army.mod.uk/news/18917.aspx
http://www.navynews.co.uk/archive/news/item/1321
HMS Albion and Bulwark both were designed to carry a Hippo BARV, 6 Chally 2, 6 Light Guns and some 67 other vehicles as standard.
While i don’t doubt the logistic issues of bringing tanks along, i do not agree with who says on here that, were tanks recognized necessary for the operation, they wouldn’t be brought in.
I think they definitely would come, and be among the first ones on the beach.
A US Marines MEU has 4 M1 Abrams tanks in force.
A current 1800-strong Marines battlegroup, depending on the mission at hand, could well have 6 Challengers embarked on the LPD going ashore in the first waves to secure the landing area.
Exercises have been done to prove the concept.
“We are therefore proceeding with the procurement of 14 additional Chinook helicopters, the upgrade of the Army’s Warrior vehicles, spending on the Joint Strike Fighter, the procurement of the Airseeker intelligence and surveillance aircraft, the cats and traps for the Queen Elizabeth Class carriers, and the development of the Global Combat Ship.
This is the second time he has listed major projects which will go ahead but has failed to mention FRES SV, for which a production contract seems to be still some way off.”
It doesn’t necessarily mean much.
Airseeker contracts have actually already been signed, so he is merely confirming that they will be respected.
Even after signing them, they were at risk of cancellation for some time. (2 contracts, one for the planes, one for support and upgrades up to 2025)
Warrior upgrade contract should be signed very shortly, so it is a welcome confirmation, but, again, it carries little news.
Type 26 development, again is already ongoing, so he’s practically saying he won’t stop the process…
Nearly the same reasoning is valid for F35, and the first order for the planes is planned for next year, or 2013 at the latest, i don’t remember right now.
The Army is still trying to fit in its schedule the FRES SV effort, and the production order is unlikely anyway to come before 2014 at the earliest, so i’m not that worried by it not being included in Fox’s statement.
“There would be better ways of bringing fire power to bear on the Argie positions now such as Apache’s, EXACTOR, Brimstone, Javelin, 40mm GMGs and a proper supply chain that meant that there was plenty of ammunition to support the artillery and the mortars.”
Indeed, between a Scimitar with the Rarden gun and a GMG, to assault Mount Longdon i’d want a GMG.
Especially if off-the-shelf Singaporean 40×53 mm Airburst grenades were made available.
Ten times as effective than Rarden to clear up entrenched soldiers on the mountain.
“Industrial development share for F35 is not predicated on numbers purchased”
The rage of the US is.
“A Rafale buy allows the UK and France to pool airframes, maintenance, training etc, big big cost savings”
It would also be an hammerblow over export attempts for the Typhoon.
The biggest user of Typhoon, buying Rafale…!
And yes, Rafale is for carriers, Typhoon not (yet). I know. Still, it would be kind of a suicidal choice in terms of marketing.
We maybe operating a pool of 3 carriers but the uk will not be operating rafale. There is more chance of having us marine Corp or us navy squadrons operating beside a rn squadron on a uk carrier than anything else in a actual operation. Your point 1 TD is not the case. Rafale is currently delivering 11 ac a year and simply does not meet the requirement of this system it will cost more to buy and support than f35 it is the worst possible option
This list is propaganda, some of it *firmly* signed ages ago (just look at the year on the Airseeker Foreign Military Sale notice to Congress; then relate that to Nimrod decision).
“14 additional Chinook helicopters, the upgrade of the Army’s Warrior vehicles, spending on the Joint Strike Fighter, the procurement of the Airseeker intelligence and surveillance aircraft, the cats and traps for the Queen Elizabeth Class carriers, and the development of the Global Combat Ship.”
– Chinooks and WR, yes
– cats and traps a decision in principle, he has said on other occasions that the final selection is well into next year
Now we know that FRES SV Main Gate is 30 (!) months away.
Gabriele
But we do a lot of things “on exercise”.
Would we do it in real life?
I suppose its not public information, but did any C2s go for the ride with the recent commando deployment (Cougar 11?) around Libya?
“It would also be an hammerblow over export attempts for the Typhoon.”
Not really, the other way to look at it would be Rafale is better than a none existant Carrier Typhoon, but the Existant Typhoon is better than the none carrier Rafale, thats why the Brits bought both.
But its not like Tiffies winning any orders anyway.
Tiffy has more export orders than either the super hornet or rafale combined. It’s production run is over 600 ac which in ac terms can be judged somewhat of a success
ACC
Its always important to listen to what governments announce.
If they reannounce a project over and over and over, it doesnt mean much, its just politics, but when they stop mentioning it, its dead as a door nail.
Why would they suddenly stop mentioning FRES?
Thingfs are rarely cancelled, they just stop talking about them.
Mark
Typhoon has two export customers, Austria, 15 units, and Saudi Arabia, 72 units.
The other four customers arent “exports”, they are the builders.
I instinctively avoid talking costs when the subject of F35 comes up but a shared UK/French fleet with all that implies in respect of training, systems development, spares and maintenance would on face value be cheaper than the UK and France operating their own unique fleets, kind of common sense no?
A pooled fleet means a smaller fleet which means lower costs as well.
Don’t underestimate the power of politics trumping the power of military wish lists
We are not yet at main gate for JCA and with the switch to CTOL all bets are off.
Am sure I read in some parliamentary evidence somewhere that the industrial share is guaranteed in the development contract (which we have stumped up a couple of billion for) and wholly unconnected to orders. Now as Gabby says, whether this would survive contact with an angry congress who knows but the contract is the contract and it would make a change, the UK stiffing the US on a military development!
Yes Dom exactly super hornet 1 export customer 24 sales. Rafale none. So tight has more.
TD
As our f35 training and oeu will most likely be permanently in the states with there massive support facilities does that not make more sense. Also at present will have a global support system to plug into. Do you think France has the equivalent for rafale.
HI DJ,
The last part in “Why would they suddenly stop mentioning FRES?
Thingfs are rarely cancelled, they just stop talking about them” is right.
To me this 15 months on trials (sure) *and then* another 15 months before you decide (=placing the order, not start of production)is stringing it out to balance “time profiles” of equipment programmes, as it is nowadays put
TD
It only assures lrip not production the contract is not with the uk it’s with bae systems. The man in charge of lockheed has said as much.
This is true “Also at present will have a global support system to plug into. Do you think France has the equivalent for rafale”
– but howabout the sharing between RAF and FAA (regardless of the number of airframes)? Contemplating that the RAF flew 107 Typhoons as their only front line??
True again ” the contract is not with the uk it’s with bae systems”
– the parallel inter-governmental agreement basically just sets out the rights of first refusal to production slots (each to be confirmed two years ahead, just that where you calculate the two years from has been slipping away – USAF plans in-service for when our first carrier will be in sea trials, 2017; anyone know about USN/USMC?)
Mark
But we would be equal partners with France, and customers of the US.
I think its a bad idea, but politicians are good with bad ideas.
Hi DJ,
The other production line will be in India RE “we would be equal partners with France” and assuming that not happening there will be only one – so what would make us an equal partner?
Dom
Acc is correct we’d just be swapping a production and buy contract with the US for a buy contract with France. The uk is getting out of final assembly of any ac. At least with production bits of jsf allows us to retain a core staff to all mid life updates or mod requirement to existing ac.
with ref to typhoon, how close is japan to signing up? It seemed to crop up often on tv reports about the BAe redundancies, i’m no politician but in the same week the govt talks about kick starting britains engineering skillset to aid recovery, BAe deliver this bombshell.
I can forsee a small order for the new radar which will lower the numbers but won’t cancel out all of them, as well as some Dti people flying out to japan.
2 snippets from the font of all knowledge, wikipedia!
During the 1995 Paris Air Show, Saab Military Aircraft and British Aerospace (BAe, now BAE Systems) formed the joint-venture company – Saab-BAe Gripen AB – with the goal of adapting, manufacturing, marketing and supporting Gripen worldwide.
Following a meeting with Ministry of Defence (MoD) officials in May 2011, Saab agreed to establish a development centre in the UK to expand on the Sea Gripen concept. Saab chief executive Håkan Buskhe stated: “The MoD is looking for competition”.
“rubs chin in Dr evil style” hmmmmmmmm!!
oh and ref 8×8 UV, seeing as we have a good working relationship and contracts/infrastructure in place with ST kinetics I’ll have some terrexs, and maybe sort out some CTA going back the other way.
i know foolish thoughts, i’ll blame it on sunstroke!
Hi Paul G,
Monday was the deadline for submitting a design that conforms with Japan’s RFP. I guess only those who tick the boxes get to talk trivial things like price, technology transfer, final assembly…
I think the London centre has more to do with Brazil than the RN. In a triangle between BAE shipbuilding (at least designing) here, Gripen engineers in Sweden and Brazil (befitting the naval emphasis of the proposed co-operation) across the ocean, a coordination team sitting geographically in the middle is what we are actually seeing.
– the new gvmnt in Brazil has trimmed the overall funding for the fighter programme but the carrier-capable requirement has not been dropped
Why do naval superpowers like Switzerland and Finland maintain ruggerised carrier aviation
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XNtFc0Z44m8
… talking about SeaGripen that (perhaps) makes the transition the other way
…a bit of thread drift, back to business next
Acc
Im guess when the decision was taken they were looking for a multi role a/c so only one type was needed. The options in the west were pretty much hornet f16 or mirage. Hornet was the choice because two engined was deemed necessary for operation over sea mountains or artic areas. Engines are now much more reliable but horses for courses.
Hi Mark,
All of that spot on, but importantly: A small airforce does not stand a chance without effective dispersal to (concealed) bare bases
– Gripen especially was designed to use a standard two-lane highway, but Hornets can do it, too
– did you see the undulating white lines on the highway; it is not a flat straight they are using
“But we do a lot of things on exercise.
Would we do it in real life?”
There is something seriously wrong in expending money to prove a concept and then do not use that experience when actually needed.
So, yes. The UK would definitely land tanks on a beach if it was perceived as a requirement due to possible early enemy reaction.
“with ref to typhoon, how close is japan to signing up?”
Dunno. It would be historic if Typhoon was selected. Rivals are Super Hornet and F35, and japan always buys US…
None of the three contenders has ALL what Japan asks, besides… which is two engines, stealth, and industrial advantages.
Typhoon can offer the two engines, excellent industrial advantages, but only limited low observability.
F35 has political advantage, not only one engine.
We’ll have to see. By the end of the year decision should come… and India should announce the winner as well.
“Now as Gabby says, whether this would survive contact with an angry congress who knows but the contract is the contract and it would make a change, the UK stiffing the US on a military development!”
The UK abandoning F35 would be a tremendous blow to the US effort, and result in costs for the US increasing a lot.
In 2005 the UK used this to ensure survival of the F136 engine… only to ignore its cancellation in 2011, but this is another story. So the UK already stiffed the US at least once.
But pulling out of F35? Even if (don’t hope in it) contracts survive congress’s wrath and british industry still gets jobs, the UK can pay for such a damage done in many ways, political, economical and in military cooperation.
First of all in the joint development of the new SSBN subs, the Common Missile Compartment and the PWR3 reactor to name just a few. And you don’t want your biggest-cost item going out of control because the US put you in a sea of s**t.
“Not really, the other way to look at it would be Rafale is better than a none existant Carrier Typhoon, but the Existant Typhoon is better than the none carrier Rafale, thats why the Brits bought both.
But its not like Tiffies winning any orders anyway.”
You are seriously underestimating the impression that a Uk Rafale buy would make.
And i’d be a bit careful about Typhoon exports. No new fighter has had as many orders as Typhoon, it is a fact. And it is competing for:
50-60 orders in Japan
126 in India (finalist)
24 in Oman
Possibly a further 48 for Saudi Arabia
Malaysia
And others. New orders might be merely months away. It is early to say “it is not winning orders”.
Problem is that orders are not coming for anything as people has little money to expend and they are very careful with what they do.
We’ll have to wait some more before we can say that the export effort is failed. As of now, it is definitely not.
Gabby
“HMS Albion and Bulwark both were designed to carry a Hippo BARV, 6 Chally 2, 6 Light Guns and some 67 other vehicles as standard.”
Are you sure thats correct I had read that albion class’s vehicle deck could support 6 challenger 2 or 30 Viking vehicles I didnt think it was both at the same time.
“The UK abandoning F35 would be a tremendous blow to the US effort, and result in costs for the US increasing a lot.”
Yes losing the UK would be a political blow for the US but 100 a/c out of a 2000+ production run doesn’t effect the price.
Just seen this over on Defence Management web-site, yes I know they tend to be shiny PR puff pieces but it was interesting neither the less:
http://www.defencemanagement.com/feature_story.asp?id=17352
So two squadrons of FRES and a lighter vehicle. Hurrah.
Thanks Tubby, anyone done the number crunching on that then
5 MRB, 5 FR Regiments, 10 Squadrons of FRES plus 5 Squadrons of a wheeled vehicle (any takers on that by the way, reads like Jackal to me)
So 10 squadrons of FRES SV is how many vehicles, even assuming they dont slim things down by WFM and adhering to defence planning assumptions on a maximum all out effort of a division
3 or 4 troops of 4 vehicles each plus HQ (Scout only) even at the top end of the estimate plus a few for training and development, still sub 200
This also assumes a 1 for 1 replacement ratio which is not certain by any means
Its not looking like that many vehicles is it?
I was wondering about the whole “one squadron of wheeled vehicles based on a UOR-to-core platform yet to be decided.” I was not clear if this was FRES UV and code that the Mastiff 3 was going to be brought into the core budget.
Sound like 3 cdm an 16 aab will get a totally different vehicle maybe an ocelot variant. Sad thing is this sound like a plan to replace all the heavy forces with fres sv and it’s derivatives possibly even challenger. Don’t see warrior csp continuing reading between the lines here. Depressing that this is were the generals see the greatest current need.
It isn’t mastiff by that article. It’s almost certainly Jackal that they’re thinking of. A vehicle that let’s the crew interact essentially. Jackal is good for that.
Hi Tubby,
We are talking BRRs here “one squadron of wheeled vehicles based on a UOR-to-core platform yet to be decided.” I was not clear if this was FRES UV and code that the Mastiff ”
– Mastiff would be a bit unwieldy to do recce in
– FRES UV will be nowhere to be seen yet when the regiments convert at 6 month intervals
So it is Ocelot or Jackal, both have sufficient numbers. As Ocelot has already been confirmed to the core, and Jackal is still unknown, I bet on Ocelot.
SF use a very Jackal like vehicle that you can make “kneel” and drive straight into a Chinook. As 3 CDO and 16 AAB are the ones most likely to operate with SF and SFSG, I would not be surprised if they will have “similar, if not identical” kit.
Hi Mark,
I don’t think these news have any effect on AI bns and their Warriors.
It is the specialist variants of WR where the overlap will be. Budget constraining, we will probably see (same) specialist versions of WR and FRES SV, so whoever they work with, then the spares for any unit will only need to be of one kind, rather than everything in double.
What’s this ‘kneel’ vehicle? Jackal 2 has suspension that goes up and down but it’s not a SF unique model.
Phil, the Extenda is a derivative of Jackal that has gucci variable height suspension that allows it to drive into a Chinook
http://www.supacat.co.uk/products/defence/hmt/hmt-extenda/
Jackals and the Coyote we had could do that though.
Hi Phil,
There are better pictures where people in them give the dimensions (but for those who are familiar with Chinook, this one also shows how low the vehicle can be made):
http://24.media.tumblr.com/tumblr_lnprxtd3831qlcxqlo1_500.jpg
I did like this quote off the defence management link that Tubby posted;
“Wherever you see a CVR(T) currently employed in the British Army, that’s where the common base platforms will be,” said Cripps.”
Except on the back of DROPS, or in a Hercules, or on a railway wagon, or a narrow road or an average canal bridge . . .
That, and I may be wrong, looks like a first generation Jackal right? Our Jackals could go that low I’m sure of it. They definitely had a variable suspension. I’m sure I have some pictures somewhere. Along with a video of how many folk a Jackal can carry!
Except on the back of DROPS, or in a Hercules, or on a railway wagon, or a narrow road or an average canal bridge . . .
Or in the vehicle graveyard with their turrets blown off and a strict no photo policy incase the civilians at home get upset over breakfast…
[Hanging my head in shame] I will admit to missing the point that the third squadron of wheeled vehicles was Scimitar replacement – so I will concede that Jackal sounds likely though I am surprised that they just did not come out and say so rather than hint at it?
“So it is Ocelot or Jackal, both have sufficient numbers. As Ocelot has already been confirmed to the core, and Jackal is still unknown, I bet on Ocelot.”
Ocelot though in the current variant is a Patrol vehicle carrying four dismounts under armour.
It is another variant of “metal box” thing that the article say won’t be used for the third squadron. The only Ocelot variant which would be suited for the role would be the Jackal-like fire support variant. But this is not on order as of now, and while the Army will undoubtedly trying to get the go ahead for at least a further 200 Foxhound at some point, this might not be possible for lack of funding.
And it says a UOR-to-core “yet to be decided”.
Foxhound/Ocelot IS decided already, but for another kind of role.
That makes it Jackal, consequently. UNLESS of course, by 2015, the second batch of Foxhounds is ordered, and is made up mostly of Fire Support variants.
If this happens, Jackal goes and Foxhound makes it into the RECCE squadrons of the 5 BBR and into 16AA and 3 Commando’s Brigade Recce Force.
My only complain is that, with the Armoured Infantry Battalion and Tank Regiment having 3 Companies/Squadrons each, having only 2 Squadrons of armoured recce will be a bit of a problem when a battlegroup has to be formed.
In 2003 in iraq a Tank Squadron and a Warrior-mounted infantry company was the standard kind of maneuver battlegroup.
Ideally, you’d want an Armoured Recce Squadron to attach to it, and possibly an assigned battery of AS90 from the brigade’s artillery regiment.
“Phil, the Extenda is a derivative of Jackal that has gucci variable height suspension that allows it to drive into a Chinook”
The Extenda is been around in forever, and only four wheels deliver traction out of six.
The Coyote is better, full 6×6… and i think the gucci suspensions are to be found on all Coyote and Jackals.
“Along with a video of how many folk a Jackal can carry!”
I won’t ask to see the video, but can you at least tell me how many did climb up? :)
Hi Gabby,
Interesting to see if open to people or open to mines argument carries the day.
RE “My only complain is that, with the Armoured Infantry Battalion and Tank Regiment having 3 Companies/Squadrons each, having only 2 Squadrons of armoured recce will be a bit of a problem when a battlegroup has to be formed.”
– how about the organic recce troops in these formations?
You can get nine on a Jackal. Officially. Maybe two more unofficially!
Gabriele,
The Extenda is a more recent variant of the HMT chassis. All wheels are powered.
http://www.supacat.co.uk/products/defence/hmt/hmt-extenda/
@TD,
With reference to your earlier post about number crunching, I think you might have underestimated the number of FRES SV vehicles needed for the reconnaissance regiments.
Major James Cripps was quoted as saying:
‘Each multirole brigade will have a brigade reconnaissance regiment, equipped, in current planning, with two squadrons of Scout SV and all the other SV variants where CVR(T) currently sits and one squadron of wheeled vehicles based on a UOR-to-core platform yet to be decided”
According to the reference books I have looked at, if you stripped out the third squadron (to be equipped by wheeled vehicles), each reconnaissance regiment would still have 54 CVR(T)-type vehicles. There are quite a few of the variants in those formations, you know. My 54 comes from 24 Scimitars, 15 Spartans, 10 Sultans, 3 Samaritans and 2 Samsons in each regiment. 5 regiments times 54 vehicles each equals 270 already. Then there are the CVR(T)s in the Armoured Infantry, which could also be replaced: 5 x 8 = say another 40. So we are above 300 already.
Mind you, I do take your point about how your calculation was assuming a 1 for 1 replacement ratio, which is not certain by any means. But then Cripps does say, “”Wherever you see a CVR(T) currently employed in the British Army, that’s where the common base platforms will be.”
Mike, I was referring to just the Scout variant mate, not all the others
mike
but thats still 300 rather than 900 or even 3000
In the last couple of days I saw a text where the 7 for trials are followed by an option for 400 – x; I quickly forgot the higher bound as irrelevant.
Now why would there be such a specific range. I can only think that the unit price has been prenegotiated for any quantity within that range.
As my earlier bet on 240 of Scout + 50% more of Protected Mobility variant does not quite make 400, perhaps we get a few recovery and repair variants, too. [Gabby had deduced from somewhere that there would be 37 Warrior bridge layers; 40 of these specialist SVs in the first order could therefore be plausible].
Putting these specialist Specialist Vehicles aside, how do we get from Mike’s 300 to my 360?
– the training formation, perhaps
@TD
Oops, sorry! Must read posts more carefully.
@DominicJ
Those figures (900 and 3,000) being the total numbers for what kind of vehicles precisely?
@ACC
Your point about training formations. I had forgotten about the need for those. Of course there would need to be extra vehicles for such units.
“@DominicJ
Those figures (900 and 3,000) being the total numbers for what kind of vehicles precisely?”
Can we please end up this number madness? What we are talking about now is FRES SV RECCE BLOCK 1 order. Maximum it’ll count some 580 vehicles, probably less. Some 240-270 Scout, a good lot of Protected Mobility APCs, and then recovery and repair variants.
END OF IT.
RECCE Block 2, when it eventually comes, will build on the Common Base Platform (of which a prototype is on order) and deliver a maximum of 140 vehicles in:
Joint Fires Direction
Engineer Reconnaissance
Command and Control (C2)
The eventual RECCE BLOCK 3 would include:
Overwatch (replacement for long gone Striker – will it eventually be armed with AA missiles to replace Stormer-Starstreak too?)
Ground Based Surveillance (mast mounted sensors and stuff)
A larger C2 command vehicle for higher echelons
An ambulance (evacuation) vehicle
A Mobile Medical Post (treatment) vehicle
An Area Denial System on flatbed (replacement for Shielder, some 30 units would be necessary)
Total of Block 3, at most optimistic conditions: 280 vehicles.
Then there is Maneuver Support (some 35 vehicles, possibly the Warrior Bridgelayer conversion seen at DSEI)
Last is Medium Armour, for a maximum of 193 vehicles between Direct Fire platforms and associated additional repair and recovery vehicles.
At the moment, the focus is on RECCE Block 1.
At most, there will be 1200 FRES SV vehicles at the end of the whole programme, probably a lot less than that, to say the least.
And eventually, one day, there will be FRES UV, delivering 8×8 wheeled vehicles for the Mechanized Infantry.
No way in all of Hell that we get close at all to 3000 vehicles, not even when FRES SV and UV get summed. Assuming that both go ahead.
Let’s not use absurd 2003 figures that have lost ANY and EVERY meaning.
“up to 3300 vehicles”, “16 billions programme” and other such statements, i remember them too, but they have long become meaningless. They are relative to a FRES that is no more.
Indeed, they relate to an Army that does not exist anymore, as it’ll be deeply changed and much smaller, in time, especially considering that the first FRES vehicle in service is years away.
If we are to talk about FRES, let’s please talk about the current and actual FRES, not an imaginary mixture of numbers, costs and requirements that do not exist and/or have ceased to exist. Today’s FRES is a whole different world from the Future Combat Systems clone that people imagined in 2003, and other than the FRES tag there’s little contact between the two.
Argh. I wish the Army in 2005 had chosen a different name. It has condemned any and every armour programme to be tied with the FRES mess by keeping such unfortunate name…
Anyway, I tried to make some order in things in this article i put on my blog a while ago. Should make it easier to see what is the FRES SV programme.
http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.com/2011/09/future-force-2020-armour.html
It’s all politics
“Argh. I wish the Army in 2005 had chosen a different name. It has condemned any and every armour programme to be tied with the FRES mess by keeping such unfortunate name…”
– by doing that it became a major equipment programme. The priorities between those are first sorted between Services (and then, because there always still is a funding gap, the “minor” ones fall by the wayside)
On the subject of numbers, we might speculate and wonder about them but the simple fact is, FRES is pre main gate and numbers are only decided at that point.
Then of course numbers are often reduced post main gate to compensate for rising costs and decreasing budgets
Weren’t we getting 21 MRA4?
As for all the other FRES variants in subsequent blocks, wouldn’t be holding my breath
Quite right “As for all the other FRES variants in subsequent blocks, wouldn’t be holding my breath”
I do realise that betting is a licensed activity, but (without a money pay-off) we should have a thtread for those , anyway
– the odds, and the changes in them over time, might be quite informative?
Nice aspirations, but there just is not any money for an extended FRES programme, perhaps not even for the Scout itself. Just watch for an announcement that more Scimitar 2s will ordered as an ‘interim’ solution that will take us well into the 2020s, to be followed by a new programme for an advanced family of armoured vehicles (AFAV) with an ISD of 2025-2030. In historical terms what we are seeing is the point where the UK ceases being a major player in defence matters, thanks partially to a very poorly thought out SDSR.
@Gabriele
“Can we please end up this number madness?” That was my very point in asking Dominic what the figure of 3,000 represented. The last time I heard that figure quoted it was for the overall number of FRES vehicles to be procured (SV, Utility, the lot) and that, as you say, was quite a few years ago and bears little relation to the current situation.
However, I see nothing wrong whatsoever in discussing numbers, something which TD, Dominic and I, etc. have been doing, In fact, you do quite a lot of it on your own blog! Or perhaps that is not what you meant.
Are we even sure they’ll bother with FRES? Come 2014 and the great Afghan withdrawl, what are the chances that the words “peace dividend” start getting chucked about again? When that happens, we might lose a lot of programs, FRES among them, along with promises of no more nation building exercises (if bloody only).
“However, I see nothing wrong whatsoever in discussing numbers, something which TD, Dominic and I, etc. have been doing, In fact, you do quite a lot of it on your own blog! Or perhaps that is not what you meant.”
As long as we discuss realistic numbers.
There is no “3000 vehicles” FRES programme anymore, and certainly there would have never been and never will be a FRES SV of 3000 vehicles.
If we are to discuss numbers, we should try and use the current ones, not those of a 2003 programme that is no more other than in name tag.
i’ll say again, if you dont like my numbers, present newer ones…
Dominicj,
There doesn’t have to be anything in place to supersede a fact, or thing, for that fact or thing to be obsolete to the point of being meaningless.
If it’s a 2003 number then it is absolutely irrelevant to the current project.
In fact, a quick google search with date-limited parameters shows a later figure of £2bn for 600 vehicles
just over £3m a pop
Hi Mr. Fred
Where’s the “just over £3m a pop” stated? The silence around costs beyond the already signed prototypes & trialing has been defeaning
£2,000m divided by 600 equals 3 and 1/3 million pounds each.
Of course, that’s a programme cost, so 600 vehicles for £1,500m – i.e. programme cost less the development phase – would come in at an average of £2.5m each.
Must be all-in, otherwise you cannot prioritise this programme over (or under others).
– I was more interested to know the quality of the source (you may have noticed that I like to speculate, so use me as a source at your peril; I am just blogging to either test my views, or make them known – the latter does not carry any significance whatsoever, I’m sure)
A 2009 article from the Times, also reported in the Independent and a press release from BAESystems:
http://www.baesystems.com/Newsroom/NewsReleases/autoGen_10910215160.html
May not be the most accurate figure, two years old itself, but better than project costs for a different programme.
I also think that identifying programme costs and recurring unit costs is valuable, as it stops people using the programme unit cost as the replacement cost.
Very true “I also think that identifying programme costs and recurring unit costs is valuable, as it stops people using the programme unit cost as the replacement cost”
But I am sick and tired of people using it in reverse, saying that some programme was rotten, just because the numbers were cut back so drastically that the unit cost went through the roof
Thanks, Mr. fred,
The piece talks about two programmes/ bids that BAE lost. But it sets out the ball park figure; the problem is whether to divide £ 2bn with 400, or a number in mid 7 hundreds
600 is the number associated with the figure, so I would say that is the best quantity to use with it.
Forgot to include the Times link:
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/engineering/article6826641.ece
50% error of margin is as good, or better, than what we have been told so far
– most people seem to use £ 5m as a guess (FBOT 15, though)
If I mix up FBOT and DJ on this topic, apologies in advance!