This is a fantastic article, excellent reporting and superb photography covering the work of the Medical Emergency Response Teams in Afghanistan.
Full credit must go to the journalist, Marco Di Lauro.
This is exactly the type of defence reporting we need more of
The Military Afloat Reach and Sustainability (MARS) project has had more lives than a whole herd of cats, on, off and on again. Most of the indecision has been driven by cost issues and delays around the CVF. Originally intended to replace the existing replenishment ships and provide a joint sea based logistics capability, the sea basing concept seemed all the rage in the US so as usual, the UK followed.
The RFA logistics capability is a vital enabler; it does not attract much attention and certainly does not have the glamour of a sleek warship but make no mistake, the RN would simply not be able to operate without them.
It is a capability we neglect at our peril.
Towards the end of last year it showed signs of twitching back to life with the Afloat Support (AfSup) directorate in DE&S launching a pre-qualification phase for the Fleet Tanker element.
With a reduced fleet size in all areas the need for at sea replenishment self evidently becomes decreased.
The existing fleet is quite diverse.
Wave Class Fast Fleet Tankers, mainly fuel oil and aviation fuel but some dry and refrigerated stores are also carried and the aviation capacity is enough to operate a large Merlin sized helicopter. 2 in service
Rover Class, the smallest of the replenishment ships they are designed to support individual RN ships with mainly fuels. They have a helicopter landing pad but not hangar. 2 in service
Leaf Class, a large fuel only tanker with no aviation capability, 2 in service
Fort (I) Class, mainly used for dry stores with an aviation capacity, 2 in service
Fort (II) Class, arguably the jewel in the crown of the RFA, they are large multi-purpose vessels with extensive dry stores and liquids capacity. The aviation capacity is large and able to maintain and operate up to 5 Merlin sized helicopters. The large flight deck also supports a secondary aviation training role. 2 in service
Wave Rover Leaf Fort (I) Fort (II)
Displacement 31,500t 11,520t 40,870 23,890 32,820
Liquid Cargo 19,500m3 8,500m3 28,00m3 12,500m3
Dry Cargo 500m3 3,500m3 6,200m3
Hangar yes no no yes yes
Crew 85 RFA, 22 RN 54 RFA 56 RFA 115 RFA, 80 RN 140 RFA, 65 RN
MARPOL YES NO NO NO NO
The replacement for Rover and Fleet Class has evolved over the years and it is likely that these will be replaced by a single design. The IMO pollution regulations, commonly called MARPOL, are a significant driver for the new designs. Although government owned ships are exempt the UK Government has always ensured that compliance with international and cascaded national maritime regulations is achieved in its fleet. None of the RFA fleet is compliant (double hulls etc) except the Wave class. The older vessels do not benefit from modern engineering and machinery so are likely to be significantly more expensive to operate than a new design.
The original project called for 6 vessels to replace the 4 Leaf/Rover class, subsequently reduced to 5, If CVF is cancelled the need for aviation fuel will be reduced so 4 may be a more reasonable number.
Latest Design Illustration of the MARS Fleet Tanker
BMT, BAe, Daewoo, Ficantieri, Rolls Royce and Hyundai have shown interest and the BMT Aegir family would, as Jed has stated, would seem like an excellent fit and is available in 3 sizes and 2 configurations.
The largest is the Aegir 26 (26,000 tonnes) and is a large fuel only tanker, with 24,000 cubic metres of cargo fuel. The smallest is the Aegir 10 (10,000 tonnes) with 8,000 cubic metres of cargo fuel.
The intermediate design is the Aegir 18 (18,000 tonnes) and is available in a fuel only configuration with 16,000 cubic metres of cargo fuel or a split configuration (18R) that has a cargo fuel capacity of 12,000 cubic metres and cargo stores capacity of 1,350 cubic metres. The 18R also has a large aviation capacity.
Aegir 18
4 Aegir 18’s would provide approximately 15% less cargo fuel capacity than the Rover and Leaf class but given the reduction in aviation fuel capacity this would be acceptable.
Another option to consider would be to purchase 6 of the 18R design to provide greater flexibility; these would offer more or less the same fuel capacity and be able to provide both refrigerated and dry stores capacity as well as some aviation capacity.
It is likely that single or small task group deployments are more likely to be the norm so 4 might be a reduction too far and recent experience with RFA vessels has shown that they can actually supplement or replace RN vessels in some deployments. Carrying a Lynx or two, a selection of fast attack craft like RHIB’s/CB90 and a small contingency of Royal Marines they can be effective in the smuggling or piracy interdiction role.
After the Leaf/Rover class go out of service the Fort class will follow, these will be hard to replace because they are extremely capable. The MARS programme originally called for these to be replaced with two classes of vessel (much like the existing Fort class)
The Fleet Solid Support Ship and Joint Sea Based Logistic Ship are primarily designed to support the CVF and amphibious group. At this stage the potential to extend the service life of the existing designs should be seriously considered.
Looking beyond that, designs such as the Joint Logistic Support Ship, as suggested by Jed in his earlier post should be seriously considered to fulfill both requirements although 4 may not be required if CVF is cancelled at the brigade ashore support capability is not realised.
RFA Argus is due to go out of service at around the same time as Ocean and is an usual vessel because she has two primary roles, in wartime the extremely modern 100 bed hospital meets the Primary Casualty Receiving role and in peace time the extensive aviation facilities are used for training. Because it is an RFA not RN vessel is very cheap to operate and has shown its versatility on many occasions, standing in for RN vessels in extremis.
RFA Argus
Operational medical care has been transformed during the Afghanistan operation with more complex and extensive medical capabilities being closer to areas of operation with extra treatment being carried out in the UK but this does not mean there is no longer a need for an afloat hospital facility.
Aviation training for deck handling, large and small vessel landing with everything from Chinook to Lynx and in all weather conditions is carried out on Argus. The US military use a smaller vessel for deck landing training, the IX-514 but they have the benefit of a much larger surface fleet for follow on or advanced training. The Royal Navy does not have that luxury so that makes Argus particularly valuable.
IX-514
In an earlier post we suggested a C2 design based on an offshore supply vessel supported by a Bay type support ship equipped with RAS equipment. The Dutch JSS is a larger version of this and is a very interesting design. With an obvious reference to the Enforcer class upon which the Bay class is based the JSS is a large ship, displacing some 28,000 tonnes. The Dutch wanted a versatile ship out of which they could squeeze maximum value, it has to be able to resupply vessels with fuel, weapons and dry stores, provide a secondary aviation capacity, have command and hospital facilities and carry significant loads of equipment for an embarked force.
It will have 2 replenishment at sea masts, an elevator and crane for up to 40 tonnes, 2000 lane meters of vehicle or ISO container storage, roll on/roll off (Ro-Ro) ramps and a well deck. A large helicopter deck can handle up to 2 CH-47 Chinook heavy-lift helicopters, and the hangar will be able to hold up to 6 Merlin or even 2 Chinooks without the rotors folded.
Dutch Joint Support Ship
The RFA might not need the command facilities but being able to provide support for a range of vessels, replace RFA Argus is the aviation and casualty receiving role and also carry stores for an embarked force would be a valuable capability to have.
Dutch JSS
The contract value is for £320million and as Jed suggested, some collaborative funding arrangement with DfID may be worth pursuing given the types obvious advantages for the initial phases of a disaster relief operation.
It may even be worth reducing the fleet tanker numbers to obtain more of these versatile ships.
To set the scene for this post, our earlier suggestion of cancelling CVF and JCA was nothing short of a brutal cost saving measure. Some may argue that significant costs have already been sunk and contracts signed, to cancel now would not result in any savings. This is simply not the case, yes, there would be a great deal of waste but to continue means even more cost for both the RN and RAF because you can’t have an aircraft carrier with no aircraft. The pressure on the defence equipment budget as a whole will also inevitably mean reductions in capability elsewhere, across all three services, something has to give. It also fails to recognise the reality of the mono culture in UK military shipbuilding, cancelling would need some compensation and tough negotiating combined with a solid commitment to future business but would not be the disaster many paint it as being.
As an attempt at a more balanced fleet the suggestion on Think Defence was a slight increase in the Astute numbers to 8, keeping Type 45 at 6, a small quantity (6) fully specified C1 and a couple of novel C2/C3 concepts from a number of our contributors. Obviously with the loss of maritime fast jet aviation we would be out of the forced entry amphibious game although the combination of UAV’s, FLAADS/CAMM, Attack Helicopter and Type 45 might mitigate some of the loss of capability.
That is not to say that we could not still engage in amphibious operations because not all operations are in the teeth of advanced jet fighters so we should accept a capability reduction and recognise that future operations may have to be conducted in conjunction with allies that can provide the fast jet component.
To bring our FDR Maritime section to a close the next few posts are on amphibious/logistics capabilities and a look at a few innovative concepts.
The Royal Navy currently has 2 Landing Platform Dock (LPD), HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark and together with the Landing Platform Helicopter (HMS Ocean) form the forward element of an amphibious operation. Supporting assets are the 4 Bay class Landing Ship Dock (Auxiliary) and the RFA Point class RORO vessels (although these are not strictly amphibious in the truest sense of the word)
Bay Class LPD(A)
HMS Bulwark (Albion Class)
HMS Ocean
Hurst Point (Point Class RORO)
Taken together it is a reasonably sized and capable force although as can be expected, short in some areas.
The Albion class do not go out of service until 2033 and 2034 but HMS Ocean in 2022, acting in the auxiliary LPH role the 2 remaining CVS are also due out of service in 2012 and 2015. No plans have yet been made public for a replacement for HMS Ocean but it is widely thought that the second CVF will act in this role, although one might consider the QE class to be rather large.
If we are to cancel CVF there exists an obvious need to replace HMS Ocean.
There is an ongoing debate about the utility of specialist LPH and LPD versus the general purpose LHD. Many of the newer types of vessels coming into service with other navies seem to favour the general purpose LHD route with enhanced aviation and well decks; it is probably fair to say though that these are coming into service with navies that have smaller amphibious fleets than the RN so their vessels have to be jack of all trades. However, the RN is shrinking and these vessels will be operating alone more often than not so the flexibility offered by a LHD may well be worth accepting the inherent compromises.
With the inexorable rise in vehicle weight and volume as evidenced by the likes of FRES and PPV the specialist LPH becomes increasingly unable to support anything other than a light force. This light force would still be considered a Royal Marines area but even the Royal Marines have been subject to the weight trend. The Viking and Jackal being cases in point, both cannot be lifted by anything other than Chinook. This fact won’t change because there is a well deck, obviously, but the well deck means that a single vessel can support a more rounded and capable force alone, without the support of a Bay or Albion. The UK needs to get more out of its force so whilst the compromises imposed by having jack of all trades vessels are recognised, they are worth accepting.
The Spanish and Australian Navies have ordered similar designs in their Juan Carlos and Canberra class; at approximately 27,000 tonnes the Navantia BPE design is much larger than the Illustrious class and HMS Ocean. The design is inherently flexible and could operate F35B’s or helicopters; with hangar space for 12 aircraft, accommodation for over a 1000 troops, a well deck slightly larger than the Albion class, extensive hospital and command facilities. The design flexibility allows it to be used as an aircraft carrier although without the ability to generate sustained sortie rates or for an extended period.
Canberra Class
Juan Carlos Strategic Projection Ship LHD
If we were to replace to replace Ocean and the CVS class with a pair of these then the through life costs savings would be considerable, especially in crewing. As funds permit it might even be possible to obtain a third or fourth and operate them as a compact carrier with 6-8 F35B’s per ship, much less that the CVF of course but at least the RN could retain some fast jet aviation capability.
At a reported cost of less than 500 million Euros they would also seem excellent value for money.
The Bay class have proven to be exceedingly useful and versatile, they are relatively new so their replacement is somewhat out of scope for this post, perhaps more of the same would be useful.
Although strictly not an RFA asset the Point class, operating under a 25 year PFI, provide an excellent capability. Based on the Flensburger 2700 RORO design it has 2,700 vehicle lane metres, 10,000nm range and two access ramps. A total of 6 vessels are available for use, 4 manufactured at Flensburger and 2 at Harland and Wolff. Interestingly the project was completed 20 months ahead of schedule, the last of the class, Anvil Point, being launched in 2003.
Although the PFI concept seems to offer capability at a greater cost than outright purchase this one does show how they can be effectively operated, with little fuss or drama. The commercial charter market has seen significant shifts in the last couple of decades with the greater prevalence of the large and usually highly utilised pure car pure truck carrier, which cannot carry explosive cargoes because they do not have open decks (IMO regulations) so when the armed forces need vehicle and container shipping capacity the commercial market is less likely to be able to find suitable vessels.
As a part of this project only of 4 out of the 6 ships are used for the strategic joint rapid reaction force (JRRF) on a daily basis. The last two are chartered out on the commercial market but obviously available for MoD use when demand dictates. The Danish military have a similar concept (ARK), except they have a number of vessels on permanent charter.
The benefit of the UK approach is that the design can be dictated, for example the Point class have twin screws, rudders and bow thrusters which provide extreme manoeuvrability, have a shallow draught and reinforced and extended loading ramps for loading and unloading in a wide variety of locations. The double and strengthened hull increases build costs but given the monetary and operational value of likely cargoes mean this is a wise investment; something of note for those that seem to think that commercial off the shelf is always the answer.
As with the Bay class, their replacement is many years away.
Released on the same day the Green Paper the MoD also published the Defence Equipment and Support Business Strategy 2008-12 and the Blueprint: The Future Operating Model.
This Blueprint sets out the future operating model for DE&S in line with the direction set out by our Business Strategy. It describes how the organisation will ‘look’ and ‘feel’ by or during 2012. It represents an aspirational goal for the organisation to achieve over the next few years.
The Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) Business Strategy 2008-12 sets out the strategic direction for DE&S, its’ Main Board’s priorities over 2008-12 and explains the areas where the Board will drive particular development. The DE&S Business Strategy and DE&S Blueprint are designed to be read together.
Download both from here
The Mail are running with a story asking if an Iraqi WMD has been found.
They have been searching in Iraq for the past nine years, 10 months and 15 days.
Today, the hard work finally paid off as soldiers found one of those elusive ‘weapons of mass destruction’ that Saddam Hussein was supposed to have been hiding.
So is it all round to Tony Blair’s house for celebratory drinks?
Afraid not…
It appears to be a Silkworm or Seersucker anti ship missile, a Chinese made derivative of the Russian P15 Termit missile , although they have been used in the surface to surface role the missile itself is relatively simple and only has a high explosive warhead. It is difficult to make out the exact model from the picture but the damage would indicate being treated very roughly. The graffiti is in the under body slot where the booster rocket would be, raising questions about the circumstances surrounding its discovery.
Following yesterdays Green Paper release the media and blogs have been covering it in detail.
Here is a quick link round up…
Kings of War
http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2010/02/contested-and-constrained-cyber-ops-and-the-green-paper/
The Guardian
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/feb/04/uk-defence-green-paper-cuts
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/feb/04/defence-policy-budget-military-ainsworth
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/feb/03/uk-defence-review-key-findings
The Telegraph
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/7037771/Merger-of-Armed-Forces-should-be-debated.html
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/defence/7130355/Budget-cuts-will-leave-Britain-reliant-on-war-allies-MoD-green-paper-says.html
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/telegraph-view/7149856/Adapting-our-defence-to-a-dangerous-new-world.html
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/7149538/Britain-faces-attack-from-toxic-cocktail-of-enemies.html
The Times
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article7010497.ece
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article6956635.ece
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article7010494.ece
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article7013557.ece
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article7014270.ece
Defence Management
http://www.defencemanagement.com/feature_story.asp?id=13560
http://www.defencemanagement.com/news_story.asp?id=12054
http://www.defencemanagement.com/news_story.asp?id=12049
http://www.defencemanagement.com/news_story.asp?id=12062
The Independant
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/army-may-patrol-streets-to-confront-terror-threat-1889007.html
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/france-and-britain-a-history-of-relations-1889010.html
http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/leading-articles/leading-article-a-green-paper-that-starts-to-ask-the-right-questions-1888789.html
The Daily Mail
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-1248360/Accept-arent-world-power.html
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1248171/Green-paper-reveals-defence-budget-cuts-new-alliance-France.html
The Daily Express
http://www.express.co.uk/posts/view/156103/Defence-chiefs-could-create-closer-links-with-France-after-budget-cuts-
http://www.express.co.uk/posts/view/156009/-Tough-choices-for-Armed-Forces
http://www.express.co.uk/posts/view/155928/Armed-Forces-blueprint-unveiled
The Sun
http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/campaigns/our_boys/2838542/Goverment-plans-to-join-forces-with-France-in-cost-cutting-bid.html
http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/campaigns/our_boys/2838572/RAF-could-be-axed.html
The Daily Sport (for a spot of light relief!)
http://www.dailysport.com/view.asp?ID=2713
The UK National Defence Association (UKNDA) launches a new report on defence funding in response to the Goverment’s Green Paper and to provide recommendations for the Strategic Defence Review 2010
Click below to download
http://www.uknda.org/uk_defence_needs/n-536.html
UPDATE: Link corrected, thanks Ashley
Today, in the Houses of Parliament, the Secretary of State for Defence stood up and announced the launch of a Green paper that will inform the shape of the next strategic defence and security review.
Of our elected representatives, all 646 of them, the attendance to hear and discuss the announcement was this much
Thanks
Hot off the press, Bob Ainsworth MP is still speaking in the House of Commons but the MoD has now published the much anticipated Green Paper.
Remember the Green Paper (Adaptability and Partnership: Issues for a Strategic Defence Review) is designed to frame and inform the debate.
Click HERE to download
No doubt there will be lots of interesting debate over the coming weeks as journalists, analysts, bloggers and interested parties absorb the text.
We will of course have a look in depth over the coming weeks.
Key questions are
To gauge how important defence and security is to our glorious leaders look at the House of Commons discussing it (most of them are there to ask questions about the defence related jobs in their constituents)
Image: BBC Parliament
Standing room only!
Wait for it, wait for it
Paving the way for a full Strategic Defence Review the government will today publish a Green Paper, release is expected at 12.30
It is widely expected to state the obvious, we can’t afford to carry on as we are but then will confirm that we will be carrying on as we are, except for getting closer to France and other EU nations.
Expect the following to be on parade.
and of course our old favourite
KEYWORDS WILL BE
