Before starting this discussion we should all fully understand that project CVF is not a strategic priority for the current Government, if they could, they would have cancelled them in an instant. It is a combination of industrial and political factors that will result in the MoD paying for two, but planning on only bringing one into service, and whether the unwanted sibling will be sold or simply placed straight into extended readiness is not yet clear, as is the likelihood of this second vessel being fitted with catapults.
So for one carrier and a half completed one that might be sold off or not the UK taxpayer will likely be paying in excess of £6 billion and if I were a betting man I would definitely have a punt on the final cost going beyond lucky number seven.
And this is without a single aircraft.
Clearly, it is not a good example of acquisition best practice and is a stark reminder of how we should never again let equipment dictate strategy rather than strategy dictating equipment, or, commonly known as the SDSR approach.
Despite this, in many ways the project has been steaming along very nicely indeed, the blocks continue to be built, contracts are being placed and progress is self evident. When all said and done, CVF is actually a relatively simple, relatively low risk design.
We should draw a distinction between factors internal and external to the project, fiscal and political issues are largely beyond the control of the project and yet responsible for the overwhelming majority of cost inflation and delays.
The root causes of the problems on Project CVF have been politics and financial ‘short termism’, can we really blame the MoD and Royal Navy for all these, I don’t think so, but, they must shoulder some.
Squabbling between service chiefs and yes, cock waving, have also joined the supporting cast.
After the 1998 SDR in which CVF was announced, it took several years to place the order and this order was conditional on bringing former competitors together into an uneasy industrial alliance. As the MoD equipment budget experienced more and more pressure, as other projects ballooned in cost and budgets remained static, the need to balance the yearly budget overspend led to a whole raft of short term decisions, delaying projects and de scoping them allowed a short term budgetary crisis to be averted but inevitably pushed additional costs out the following years.
The impact of this was well known so it should have come as no surprise to anyone when another billion and a half was added to the bill for project CVF. The NAO has made several stinging criticisms of the MoD for this practice, paying more by paying later and the practice, commonly known as whistling and hoping the problem will go away, seems to be very common, arguably one of the more widespread causes of project cost inflation.
It might be seen as unfair to blame the service chiefs for these problems but they were willing accomplices in the jam tomorrow strategy, instead of changing projects they settled on a strategy of wishful thinking and all three were guilty in this respect.
It is the current government that has ‘called time’ and for this, despite the uncomfortable results, they should be roundly congratulated.
Because of this cost inflation and at a time when the Army was experiencing serious equipment shortages in Iraq and Afghanistan is it any wonder that carriers were starting to come under severe pressure, the debate/argument/slanging match between the services about the relative slice of the defence budget intensifying as costs rose.
This reflected both poorly and somewhat unfairly on the project team but amplified the distortion to the Royal Navy equipment plan caused by CVF. And distort the plan it has, self evidently, the Admiralty have traded off ship after ship and capability after capability in order to retain CVF in its original form. As costs have risen the need to make ever deeper cuts has been the painful result, making cut after cut in return for jam tomorrow put the RN in a very poor negotiating position with the Treasury and other services, others knew full well they could ask the First Sea Lord to wave his tackle at the cameras in Downing Street in return for CVF and he would more or less have to do it.
By continually failing to budge on CVF, the Royal Navy paid an ever more expensive price to do so and in what some might see as irony, the very fact that the RN has no carriers and carrier aircraft to offer Operation Ellamy is precisely because of the desire to have CVF shaped carriers and FAA insignia bearing carrier aircraft.
One might reasonably argue that the inability of the Royal Navy to see any future at all without CVF and a reluctance to consider alternatives has led them to mortgage off the rest of the fleet in order to get the carriers and rebuild from there.
The strategy it would seem; is the get CVF at any cost and rebuild around there in the long term, again, equipment tail wagging strategy dog.
Personally, I think it was a poor strategy and has resulted in a much reduced surface and sub surface fleet, a fleet that is arguably more relevant to UK security and more useful in the majority of operations the UK and Royal Navy will be involved.
There is also a less visible effect of rising cost, as night follows day, the subsequent reaction to a politically or fiscally induced cost over-run is to get out the red pen and start deleting line items from the design shopping list.
In practice, what this means is a gradual de-specification of the design and unfortunately it is a well trodden path. At the end of that path lies an expensive white elephant that flatters to deceive. It may well give the impression of being world beating but scratch the surface and the reality becomes only too apparent. These deficiencies may be rectified at a later stage but it will be several times the cost of doing the job right in the first place.
There have been numerous design compromises, deleting credible self defence systems, having a smaller than desirable hangar and a lower than optimal speed are just three examples that are paving the way to the end of that elephant width path.
But to repeat an oft repeated phrase, we are where we are and CVF in one form or another is a reality.
Conversations now should be all about how we maximise value on our not inconsiderable investment.
To do this we have to remove any trace of sentimentality or desire for prestige and look across the whole of the defence landscape, paying particular attention to the joint capabilities on offer.
CVF is not a Royal Navy vessel in isolation, it is part of a complex tri service defence capability set and it is in this context which it must be viewed.
Far too many people view it as an isolated maritime capability or as a way of preserving independence, being in the top league, punching above its weight and assorted other sentimental nonsense.
This attitude has no place in modern defence planning and to those that think this way, I would simply say, please, get with the reality of modern joint capability planning.
I am not going to suggest another defence review where the RAF is raped and pillaged and the Royal Navy gets all the toys, throwing a few consolation prizes like support helicopters to the Army Air Corps, I don’t suppose any of you will be expecting this from me but I thought I would set the scene.
I also still think we should have cancelled CVF a long time ago and instead had three or four smaller vessels to replace CVS, Ocean and the LPD’s but the opportunity for that has long since passed.
In the next paragraphs I am going to explore how I think we can derive maximum benefit for an acceptable cost, not rehearse the reasons for or against maritime aviation, a maritime strategy or why we should have binned Tornado and kept Harrier.
The Strategic Landscape
Most arguments for and against CVF tend to gloss over the strategic landscape and more importantly, completely ignore fiscal and political reality. Instead of some vague notions of sea lanes, punching above our weight, being in the top division and we are an island; CVF must be firmly rooted in reality.
The first reality is a fiscal one, after Nimrod, FRES, T45, Astute, A400, Typhoon and numerous others the government would seem to be in no mood for special pleading from the MoD. The fact is, the MoD needs to regain and retain some measure of fiscal credibility. The scope therefore, for significant extra money for new projects, is limited, however much we promise that this time it will be different.
The second major reality is a strategic planning one, it was quite clearly stated as far back as the Strategic Defence Review of 1998 and reiterated in the SDSR that the direct military threat to the UK is very low and that the future nature of operations would be expeditionary and largely collaborative.
Working in partnerships and coalitions will be the norm.
The UK should be still able to undertake a small scale focussed intervention without external assistance but anything above that scale or for a longer duration will be in conjunction with others.
This applies equally to air and land forces as well, just in case anyone was wondering, so we must carefully select capabilities and maintain them at a scale that delivers influence in such operations without impacting our obligations and requirements in other areas of defence.
Some might view maritime fast jet aviation as one of those capability areas that delivers this influence in a coalition but I am sceptical and would not prioritise it above other areas, at least not disproportionately.
Looking into the medium term, carriers do provide some hedge against uncertainty because of their inherent flexibility but a reasonable assumption would be that CVF is more likely than not to be engaged in operations against non peer or proxy nations and in a coalition with others. The location of these most likely future scenarios will be in the Middle East and Africa although as a system, it has to be able to operate anywhere because it might be argued that equally as likely is conflict in the polar regions.
So, setting the strategic landscape we must then consider how it could be used and for what purpose because it all informs equipment and design choices.
Usage
When considering the what’s and how’s of carrier missions the first thing we must ask ourselves is what do we want to achieve. Only then should we determine if a carrier is the optimal method of achieving that objective and if the answer is yes then equipment and others questions would need answering.
We should not be afraid of lateral thinking, if the requirement is first day strike then are aircraft necessarily the best means of delivery. Perhaps a containerised Storm Shadow that could be carried by any number of surface vessels might be a more cost effective means of fulfilling that requirement, I am not arguing for or against but saying that alternatives can sometimes be attractive and worthy of consideration.
CVF was originally a pure strike platform, optimised for attacks against land targets.
Our thinking around how we could use CVF should be centred on building up a capability that we already have and the obvious strength in this context is littoral manoeuvre from the sea or amphibious operations. We already have a strong capability in this area and CVF offers the possibility of improving this to an even greater degree if we put to one side notions of it being used a single minded strike platform with 36 fast jets. It also fits in with my thinking about the UK’s future approach to defence, this being the maintenance of as many capabilities as sensible at a small enough scale to satisfy the unassisted small scale focussed intervention as per SDSR, supplemented with a number of ‘capability plus’ areas that deliver influence in coalition operations and provide for a greater security by virtue of regional engagement and intelligence gathering.
In the recent ‘future of the Royal Navy’ series of posts I suggested that the Royal Navy retain a small but effective striking force or Single Task Group but supplemented it with a greater forward presence to build regional security and provide better intelligence.
The proposal to repurpose CVF is entirely in keeping with this approach.
Recent operations in Libya, particularly the joint USN/USMC TRAP operation to recover the downed F15 aircrew have demonstrated the value of being close and having responsive forces. It also demonstrated the complementary nature of land and naval aviation. In UK parlance, the Joint Personnel Recovery mission is one which we are relatively poorly resourced for. I would like to see this change; the value of downed aircrew, special-forces, conventional forces, journalists and NGO personnel etc to a terrorist group or opposing regime is significant. Capture, torture and manipulation of them to change the strategic direction of an operation is a very effective tactic and one to which the UK has very little in the cupboard to counter. This is not an area that I think we should or could rely on others to fulfil.
Unpredictability, choosing an entry point that suits you not the enemy and speed are can provide significant results in a range of operational scenarios. It should come as no surprise that in the forthcoming series on Land forces I will place a great emphasis on rapid reaction forces.
[Don’t let that lull you into a false sense of security though, I am not going soft on Strategic Raiding!]
This also allows the UK to exploit the size of CVF, space provides flexibility (a good argument for size if ever there was one) and the ability to embark a capable force from a large deck in a single hop i.e. speed.
Some missions will be aviation centric but these are likely to be less frequent and as would be the norm (operating in a coalition) other nations can carry out these roles, France and the US being the most likely partners.
A reduced emphasis on fast jet aviation, strike, interdiction, close air support and defensive/offensive counter air changes the requirement for JCA, reducing numbers and reducing cost. JCA would still be needed at the scale and capability for the small scale focussed intervention but that would be the baseline, anything above that becomes discretionary.
What does this mean for CVF?
First, it recognises that CVF has value, a lot of value.
Second, it means that to maximise that value the role of CVF should be changed.
Rather than prioritising fast jet aviation and using it as a strike optimised platform it will become more multi-purpose in nature. Operating with a mix of aviation and embarked forces. Many will say it can do this anyway and in some ways they would be right, CVF is designed to offer a secondary LPH capability, but this would mean CVF becomes more akin to the USMC America Class, aviation optimised amphibious vessels.
Strike and high intensity counter air become secondary roles, modifications and the fast jet air wing would reflect this.
Rotary
Whether it be Apache Attack Helicopters, Merlin/Chinook Support Helicopters or whatever comes after there are many options for a blend of rotary wing aircraft.
MASC/ASaC/AEW or whatever we are calling it this week is an area where people assume that just because we might use catapults it is an automatic shoe in for an E2 Hawkeye but again, we must smack those sweet shop bound fingers with a bit of fiscal and strategic reality. It is unclear if there even exists any funding for a Merlin based solution, post the withdrawal of Sea King in the 2016 time frame. To start with, the baseline must always be a small scale focussed intervention. For this, a helicopter based solution would seem to be perfectly adequate. There have been a number of proposals to palletise and transfer the equipment from the existing Sea Kings and lift and shift into a small number of Merlin airframes. This is a low risk and relatively low cost solution that still provides an adequate level of capability, in fact the existing Sea Kings are seriously underestimated.
Although flexibility is the watchword, a typical aircraft load would be 6 to 12 JCA and 24 to 30 helicopters (mix of Apache, Merlin SH/Chinook, Wildcat, Merlin ASW and Merlin ASaC)
We all know the UK is light on vertical lift capability but there is never enough money to pay for, the respective services have never given enough priority to helicopters. So how we do get the money for more, simply have less fast jets.
Fast Jets and the Joint Combat Aircraft
Some missions might require no fixed wing aviation at all and there is no shame in operating CVF without a compliment of JCA, put your teeth back in now!
Once you get beyond the aircraft carrier sometimes with no aircraft theme it is logical, but a normal (if there is such a thing) compliment of JCA would be in the region of 6 to 12. The America Class has 10 as its standard compliment for example, the Juan Carlos 1 and Cavour a similar number. Of course CVF is larger than these vessels but that is not the point and being larger than these alternatives provides excess space for stores (meaning greater un-replenished endurance), accommodation and the ability to surge up should needs dictate.
In defensive counter air and in conjunction with Type 45, Merlin ASaC and with support from land based aircraft in some instances should still be able to provide adequate protection against the scale and capability of likely opposition in the SSFI scenario. If there is a greater threat we would still have the option to surge or simply rely on others in the more likely coalition instance. Offensive counter air might also involve land attack, much better to destroy the ability of opposing forces on the ground than in the air and this opens up a number of options, particularly with cruise missiles.
Interdiction, recce and close air support would still be at a high enough level for SSFI, even with 8 to 12 embarked aircraft and again, the ability to blend air delivered munitions with those delivered by long range land based UAV’s, ship/submarine launched loitering munitions and cruise missiles allows a reduction in overall aircraft numbers for a given delivered effect.
Thinking in a joint context and with multiple means of mission delivery logically reduces the aircraft count.
The current preferred option to fulfil the Joint Combat Aircraft is the F35C but it has yet to reach Main Gate so that means almost anything is possible!
When looking at JCA it is important to understand the word joint is there for a reason, both the Fleet Air Arm and Royal Air Force will be operating a common aircraft type for joint missions, the services and MoD grasping the ruthless commonality nettle.
I think this is the reason for so much vitriol, the grown-ups at the MoD imposed an aircraft choice based on sound operational and financial factors, sweeping away service centric concerns and I wonder if either service really wanted the B model. The Fleet Air Arm wanted the C model and RAF the A model, why, because looking at the issue in a service centric stovepiped manner logically leads to a two type fleet.
The B model is a compromise, it is neither perfect for the RN or RAF but that is exactly the point, it was supposed to be the perfect solution for the UK.
The STOVL F35B was therefore the outcome of studies about how the JCA would most likely be deployed, initial operations on board followed by a transition to land bases for the sustainment phase. Not only that, it would allow CVF to dispense with catapults and barriers, thus significantly reducing capital and through life costs of the vessel. It would also neatly dispense with the training overhead of maintaining carrier operation currency for flight crew. To safely operate from conventional carriers requires a high level of skill and that skill is perishable. This means regular training and having to use a greater proportion of the aircraft fleet for this training, adding yet more cost.
By using STOVL, this continual and regular training requirement would be dramatically reduced, as regularly demonstrated with the Harrier achieving proficiency for carrier operations could be achieved in days by RAF aircrew. Of course it would be better to maintain and enhance these skills for all pilots but the ability to quickly surge or reinforce the carrier capable aircrew for the most likely operations was seen as a compromise worth taking because of the cost savings.
What this decision did was impose some order on the squabbling children at the heads of the RAF and RN, no more stovepipes, no more empire building and no more needless duplication. By sharing, the overall fleet size could be reduced and money saved.
This much sanity was doomed to failure.
This was the stated position for a long time until a couple of things happened.
The F35 and especially the STOVL B model started to have ‘problems’ and the keys to Number 10 changed.
Announced in the SDSR was a switch to the F35C or conventional carrier variant, an obvious design change to the carriers (even though they really wanted to cancel them) and a bit of wishy washy uncertainty about what would happen to the second carrier on order.
Explaining the switch, Liam Fox and David Cameron stated that it would provide better interoperability with allies, cost less to buy and offer better performance.
So F35C it is then.
In subsequent parliamentary questions the MoD has made it absolutely crystal clear that it does not yet know the full cost implication of the switch and given the widely acknowledged fact that SDSR was rushed I suspect when pennies start to drop and spreadsheets start to have more detail the MoD is going to be in for a rude awakening.
For the purposes of discussion, I am going to have a look at alternatives to the existing position.
Option 1 – Carry on Normal Jogging with the F35C
Why, I have to admit I was perplexed by the switch to F35C, it annoyed our principal expeditionary operations partner, the USMC and resulted in yet more delays and costs but I can see the logic in a service centric and more importantly politically expedient fashion.
Cost, the reality of F35 is that no one really knows how much they will cost despite the millions of words and countless spreadsheets but it is a reasonable assumption that the C model will have a lower price tag than the B model. The real costs, those inconvenient through life costs, have yet to be fully realised. The other truth about the F35C is that the MoD does not know how much extra the non aircraft costs will be. It may well be within their cost model boundaries but when did the MoD ever make a cost estimate that was worth the paper it was written on?
Additional costs include delay costs, which we know run into the billions and the modifications to the design of CVF, principally for catapults and barriers. The electromagnetic catapult design has not yet been selected, whether it will be the US or UK designs is not certain but one this is certain, they will not be cheap.
Putting the capital and delay costs into the shade will be increased through life costs.
Again, this is a complex set of equations, the B model is more complex than C and will logically cost more to maintain but in looking at the operating costs as published in Parliament of a Harrier and Tornado, there isn’t that much difference. Twin engine v single engine or conventional v STOVL makes an interesting cost comparison exercise for spares and maintenance but the F35 will be single engine in all variants. The B model lift fan will require extra maintenance but the C model also has additional systems and the airframe gets a maintenance intensive battering every time it takes off and lands, however gentle the electromagnetic system will be.
There is also the not insignificant maintenance requirement for the catapults and barriers themselves.
So whilst the differences between the C and B model in terms of maintenance may yet turn out to be fewer than expected the real cost differences lie in pink things.
To manage the catapult and barrier system will require additional staff in the DE&S Integrated Project Team, another set of contracts to manage and additional maintenance personnel to pay for. These are recurring costs whether we fly a single mission or not. The deck crew will need expanding also and training courses changed/added.
Each extra crew slot requires pay, housing, welfare, healthcare and pension payments that will need to be maintained for longer as people grow older.
Behind those extra crew are the logistical and management tail, even an extra course for catapult operations and maintenance will require staffing.
It is personnel costs that are growing in proportion to their number, in short, personnel are getting more and more expensive which is exactly why western nations do not carry out labour intensive manufacturing and are automating as many tasks as possible.
Military forces are no different and yet we have made a decision to increase personnel.
Risk, the C model has a lower risk than the B, some think that the B model may be cancelled and it is on probation in the eyes of the US Department of Defence. Risk might have been a significant factor in the decision
Capability, no doubt, the C model beats the B model in terms of performance so in this regard it is a sound decision
Industrial, no change really, yes we have the development programme B models but that is not entirely wasted and too much is made of this by the press. Whichever model is chosen the defence industrial benefits to the UK are significant.
Politics, this is I think the principal reason for the switch to the C model because it allows the Royal Navy to resource share with the French. There has been a strong move to greater military cooperation with the French and short of buying Rafale, a switch to conventional carrier operations means that a CVF could form part of an interchangeable and shared carrier force. The fact that there was a CTOL F35 variant is a happy convenience that means we don’t have to upset the US by switching to Rafale and yet can still also keep the Anglo/French alliance satisfied by sharing CVF. I think it is likely that the second, unloved and unwanted CVF, will be sold to France at cost and the UK and France will maintain a joint carrier strike group, one nation sitting in the hot seat on a rotational basis and covering each other’s refit periods. The Charles de Gaulle will be withdrawn as soon as this becomes a practicality.
So with this politically driven, resource sharing background, switching to CV makes perfect sense.
Option 2 – Cancel F35C and develop a carrier capable Typhoon
Why, isn’t it obvious, cost and commonality but it would be a significant development effort for a small number of airframes with little export potential.
Cost, the great conundrum when anyone suggests navalising Typhoon, perhaps the Tranche 3 aircraft and that is the cost. Whether the chosen option is to turn Typhoon into a conventional carrier version for use with cats and traps or a STOBAR design with a ski jump and barrier assisted landing system the cost of either option is uncertain. If it is feasible within an acceptable technical risk boundary then the cost benefits of having a single type with as much commonality as possible, should be obvious to all. It is an attractive proposition from a cost perspective, no doubt.
Risk, the detractors of Sea Typhoon tend to deride the very notion and dismiss it out of hand but I do wonder if those doing the laughing are the ones with most to lose, the RN and RAF, because they would no longer be getting the keys to the shiny new F35. As we have seen, both services are keen to get their hands on the F35 and the perception is that a Sea Typhoon would be a retrograde step. Hard facts are very difficult to obtain about the feasibility and therefore technical risk, some say combining advances in modern avionics, thrust vectoring, the QinetiQ work on F35 SRVL, older work on the Rockwell MBB X31 and the inherently strong Typhoon airframe would allow a STOBAR derivative to be developed within a sensible risk fraction. Others say the idea is barking mad and would result in a complete waste of money.
Capability, we know Typhoon is a sophisticated aircraft and when combined with the full range of UK weapons would be a formidable capability.
Industrial, swings and roundabouts, we may (possibly) lose some of the F35 work, although the F35 development MOU splits the numbers bought from industrial participation, it would be difficult to envisage a situation where the UK purchased no F35’s but carried on with the industrial participation, stranger things have happened though. On the other hand there would be considerable work accrued from developing a STOBAR Typhoon.
Politics, it would be difficult to manage the impact with the US of withdrawing from the F35 programme but would leave the Anglo-French CVF ‘sharing’ deal in place.
Option 3 – Cancel F35C and buy another carrier capable aircraft
Why, if we make the assumption than an F35C alternative is worth pursuing because of cost issues and a Sea Typhoon is not feasible then a number of alternative options open up.
F18, Rafale, Hal Tejas, Harrier III and Sea Gripen all sit on a three way capability/cost/risk matrix, each with different advantages and disadvantages.
Cost, whatever the cost of any of these alternatives, they would have to be significantly cheaper than the F35 to make it worthwhile, especially given the relatively small numbers in this proposal. Cost is the only reason for even looking at these non Typhoon alternatives and when the ‘small print’ costs like weapon integration are added I am sceptical that the cost savings would be significant.
Risk, some, like the F18 and Rafale M are very low risk, existing aircraft with only weapons integration to complete. Others like the Sea Gripen or Harrier III represent an unknown quantity and might not be available within the required timescale.
Capability, compared to the F35B one might argue that the F18 or Rafale do not fall far short in capability terms and bring different qualities to the mix. The others would offer a greater shortfall in capability but it would all come down to cost. Suffice it to say, most of these alternatives would be good enough for the majority of the mission requirements for the majority of time, whether they would meet the JCA requirements is another matter.
Industrial, a difficult one to answer but likely less than either the F35 or Sea Typhoon
Politics, interestingly, most of the alternatives would offer something positive in political terms
Option 4 – Switch back to F35B
Why, it was originally selected as the preferred option for the Joint Combat Aircraft requirement for very good reasons and I think we have allowed ourselves to get spooked at the technical issues and rising costs whilst succumbing to inter service machinations.
Cost, by switching back to the F35B we would still of course be liable for the additional capital costs. These costs are rising and they is no point trying to hide that fact but I also think that some of the hype surrounding the F35B costs are over played. A switch back would also instantly eliminate the additional capital and significant through life costs of going for the catapult options.
Risk, a slightly risky option because there is a chance that the F35B will be cancelled but I do think this is a slight risk. The USMC aviation strategy is built upon the F35B and even though they have bought into the C model I can’t see this changing.
Capability, in some aspects, the F35B has the lowest performance of the options but two things must be remembered. The F35B originally met the JCA specification and it will still be a step change in capability from the Harrier and Tornado. Reduced signature design and the sensor fusion on offer will mean it will remain relevant for a long time and despite a number of issues with what might constitute and austere location it has the greatest flexibility.
Industrial, the existing industrial participation arrangements will be retained and although the share may come under some pressure as the overall order is reduced the agreement more or less states that order volume has no relationship to the industrial share of the programme, it is the development cash we stumped up (£2b) that counts.
Other, it would be embarrassing flip flopping
Politics, instead of being interoperable with the French and US Navy we will be interoperable with the USMC and all the former Harrier operators that will eventually buy the F35B.
Option 5 – Unmanned
There are various unmanned options such as the X47 development and even the Anglo French programme that might eventually come out of Taranis but it is unlikely they will be practical options for several years and the cost seems to be rather open ended.
An unmanned system might also require significant satellite bandwidth, even with the advances in autonomous operation and onboard processing, satellite bandwidth that we don’t have.
It is also unlikely that an unmanned system would be able to fulfil the counter air role for several decades.
Unmanned systems are usually characterised by very long range which kind of negates many of the advantages of carrier launch.
In the introduction to this post I wondered if we could actually carry out some of the penetrating strike role with cruise missiles, maybe we can.
Finally, unmanned systems sound far too much like expensive jam tomorrow and the RAF is already trying to ditch yesterday’s news, the Typhoon, in favour of the shiny new model.
A Proposal
I actually think CVF does has a lot of potential, I know you lot might be surprised by this but my objections have always been on cost grounds. This proposal is one possible method of squeezing maximum value for the investment in the most likely missions it will be required to fulfil.
- Switch back to the F35B for JCA
- Obtain enough to maintain a minimum of 6 on board permanently so that we can maintain a littoral manoeuvre capability and more importantly, the skills to do so, on an enduring, always available basis
- In addition, obtain enough to maintain a minimum of 6 on an enduring land based operation (rotating with Typhoon as necessary) to support the deployed multi role brigade. the Typhoon would be more numerous and therefore find itself deployed for longer
- This allows for continuous cover for an enduring land operation of Multi Role Brigade strength whilst still maintaining enough capacity for the rapid reaction force to be available at short notice without impacting the enduring operation
- Total aircraft and crew numbers would be determined once maintenance and force generation factors become known
- For a one off, short duration operation the non deployed force could be used, STVOL supporting greater basing flexibility (land or sea)
- The RAF should stop dreaming about hordes of F35’s and get on with the job of deriving maximum benefit from the eye watering and defence budget distorting entity that is Typhoon. We need to start sweating our assets, not always looking over the fence
- Equally, the Fleet Air Arm and Royal Navy should stop dreaming about having a mini me CVN and concentrate on creating a credible entry from the sea capability with a much greater vertical lift capability, reductions in F35 purchase would provide the funding for this change in emphasis
- The FAA would cease operating fast jets and the aboard aircraft would be RAF operated. We can’t afford two air forces and the largest one, the one that can achieve some economy of scale and is focussed on managing fast jets, should have primacy
- Invest in greater platform diversity for Storm Shadow and TLAM
- Complete both CVF with one maintained as an in service spare to cover refit periods
- Investigate role of reserve forces to maintain second CVF at a level of readiness sufficient to provide some measure of resilience and refit cover
- Do not replace Ocean, the role to be covered by CVF
- If funds allow, the in service spare could be bought into full service
- Redesign CVF to have an enlarged hangar, at least big enough for Chinook, CH53K and V22 across the FULL width and length of an enlarged space. Also, improve command and control and embarked force accommodation facilities
- Invest in a Merlin based ASaC which is sufficient for the role
Some might say the JCA number is too small but I would ask too small for what?
If we accept the result of the SDSR then it becomes the baseline, a similar number of aircraft support (6-12) currently support operations in Afghanistan for a much larger force than envisaged in SDSR. 6-12, with a minimum of 6 would still deliver a credible capability and remember, the F35 will be incredibly effective and versatile.
Even if we stuck with the F35C then the numbers aboard would remain but the numbers behind would increase as training and currency issues would demand a larger fleet and the overall cost would rise because of it, it would not be the end of the world though and the additional performance of the C model would be very welcome. This option would need both CVF fitted with cats and traps so the B model saves again and retains the ability to maintain a continual CVF presence.
By keeping the numbers to a realistic level (6) then we afford an opportunity to maintain that fleet on continuous joint training with the RM and other services, something that is currently lacking. If we find a few quid down the back of the sofa then yes, lets have more, but it is a balancing act and we have to be realistic.
In effect, we have 2 small squadrons or large flights of 6 aircraft each. One more or less permanently on board CVF and one more or less permanently in a rotation pool with Typhoon for enduring deployments. If there is no enduring deployment then the training pool becomes larger, hours are preserved or more is available for one off operations. Of course the aircraft and crews rotate in and out of those slots on a normal deployment schedule, the details of which and total fleet numbers would be dictated by aircraft availability etc. I have pegged these numbers for convenience, reality means that the numbers will flex up and down anyway but it gives us some measure of scaling.
The inherent deployment and operational flexibility of the F35B means this scalability can be maintained much easier than with the C model, whatever its other virtues.
I am agnostic on the FAA operating fast jets, its not an idealogical issue, purely cost. Logically, the larger force, a force dedicated to the art of operating aircraft, should be more efficient and therefore lower cost. Whilst the US can afford four air forces the UK cannot, now, if the FAA can prove they can operate F35 cheaper for the same effect than the RAF then fair enough, but duplication and resource waste should be our enemy.
Summary
There are many options for maximising investment and getting the most out of what we are about to have. For what it is worth, I think the route to that end state is to turn CVF into as multi-purpose a capability as possible, building from a position of strength (amphibious) and not building from a weakness (fast jet maritime aviation)
This means littoral manoeuvre from the sea in the theatre entry phase of any operation i.e. an oversized LPH with the ability to operate a modest fast air wing with the ability to flex up should the occasional need arise.
Switching back to the F35B is my preferred option for the reasons outlined above; it allows both CVF to enter service, reduces through life costs, still keeps a fifth generation aircraft in the inventory, still keeps us in the largest combat aviation programme of modern times and provides interoperability with a number of important allies.
CVF becomes an air optimised amphibious assault ship pair, combined with the LPD pair in service and the LSD(A)’s.
Whoa boss!
You’re opening a can of worms on a hornet’s nest with this thread!
can of worms? this guy’s been sniffing turpentine! you have got to be smoking something illegal…drinking fortified alcohol…something!
why are you against having the Royal Navy operating high speed aircraft? cost savings will be lost with the expertise that will be sacrificed…besides the RAF will have to designate certain Squadrons as Naval so you’d have the same issue…it might look good on an accountants ledger but thats about it.
Ok my thoughts:
Commission both, but alternate one at extended readiness/refit.
Use them like small Tarawas rather than small Nimitzs, a combined Invincible and Ocean on single hull if you like.
Air wing
12 JSF B
6 UAV?
6 Merlin ASW
3 Merlin ASaC
12 Merlin/Chinook
6 Lynx/Apache
I disagree with you on the RAF operating JSF, I would much prefer it to be the FAA and ofcourse CHF
Enduring land based missions should be RAF Typhoon FGRs
Sorry this is a bit brief and I haven’t giving much reasoning but i better fill out this census form….
Incredible length of Bull written into this blog format which I have always preferred – quick to read; easy to respond to.
Looks like everything that has been said, is there, in one way or the other.
However, I think you got to the right destination, as in :
“For what it is worth, I think the route to that end state is to turn CVF into as multi-purpose a capability as possible, building from a position of strength (amphibious) and not building from a weakness (fast jet maritime aviation)
This means littoral manoeuvre from the sea in the theatre entry phase of any operation i.e. an oversized LPH with the ability to operate a modest fast air wing with the ability to flex up should the occasional need arise.”
– with all the other assets ( I think what will be at hand was seen, a bit, through “rosy spectacles” or was it just the wording, or… undisclosed future plans?
Hi WD,
RE “Use them like small Tarawas rather than small Nimitzs”
– that’s an America, then?
– with the uncertainty about the “B” USMC don’t like the concept that much, anymore, and they will be tending towards the “Tarawa” type of design, next… not exactly QE/ PoW?
The more I think about it, the more I think we should just sell the damn things and be done with it.
The only issue I would have with the analysis is that you seem to be building ~60,000 ton carrier with only about 12 aircraft per ship. That would be about 25% of the originally planned load.
Here are the problems I see:
1. 6 – 12 airplanes are wholly insufficient for any military operation beyond the most basic. The aircraft carrier would turn into a glorified helicopter carrier, with minimal offensive ability.
2. In that case, why buy the carriers? And, why have two? There isn’t any reason to have that large of a carrier for only 12 airplanes and there is no reason to have to for only 12 airplanes.
The Royal Navy will need to have a sufficiently large number of fighters to return on the investment for the two carriers. What they should do, in the short term, is to purchase the catapult version and hold off on which airplane they’ll buy to man it. The ships won’t enter the fleet for another 10 years so they can delay that decision until the prices for the F-35 B / C stabilize.
Having a 60,000 ton carrier with 6 airplanes will be a joke, it would in essence turn those ships into amphibious assault transports and yet they couldn’t launch an amphibious assault because they don’t have sufficient air support.
wrong answer gentlemen. the USMC is full involved and committed to the F-35B. as much as i don’t like having an aviator for a Commandant instead of an Infantryman, in this case its definitely helpful. he’s already formulated a plan to get the B off probation this year. so the B is a given.
as far as us trending back to a smaller Tarawa sized LHD, don’t believe it. in addition to the B’s we are also equipping with CH-53K’s, MV-22’s and even the AH-1Z’s and UH-1Ys are larger so America class it is.
quite honestly that would have been the ideal solution for the UK…a purchase of the America class LHD would have assumed the roles of two of your ship types and codified your expeditionary capabilities on fewer ships, yet allowed you to maintain a sea control ship type function as you (the UK) so admirably demonstrated during the Falklands War.
i do understand the fact that local industrial base at times trumps military issues.
Hi ACC
Sorry I meant a large Tarawa/America rather than small Nimitz…
By that I’m agreeing with TD in using them as commando carriers with extra sea control and limited strike capabilities.The Albions and Bays give us plenty of vehicle deck/dock capacity.
The USMC JSF C order is hard to read into, they seem to be saying they always wanted some Cs to replace their Hornets but it does look like they’re hedging their bets.It has to be said future of JSF B is the biggest stickler to TDs proposal…
RE “as far as us trending back to a smaller Tarawa sized LHD, don’t believe it. in addition to the B’s we are also equipping with CH-53K’s, MV-22′s and even the AH-1Z’s and UH-1Ys are larger so America class it is.”
– no mention about smaller size, just the method of landing the bulk of the force; air vs sea, or just skimming it?
– CH-53s and MV-22s – we don’t have American cousins/ godfathers for that kind of money!
– heyy, Zulus and Yankees, that is the ruthless commonality (the often cited, but unsubstantiated, 80%)
Look in an ideal world i’d love two CVNs with 3 Sqns of fast jets, the assault capacity to land a brigade and hey i’ll have some SSGNs aswell but needs must so i’m kinda in agreement with TD lets work out the best way to use what we’re stuck with…
I guess if you’re going to spend all that money and put them in service, you might as well have both and give them a full complement of fast jets. Owned and operated by Fleet Air Arm. I know if I joined the Air force and was told I was being deployed to a carrier at sea I’d be mighty miffed. If we’re going to have them then we do it properly or not at all.
And that is?? ( I mean, the rosy view that I referred to, in the leading in article, was Albions, in the plural)?
– let’s start with the “things” we’ve already paid for, then dream on…
– put one of these things together, as described, and two Albions and three Bays again… what have you got?
– three commandos, plus (sometimes) heavier supporting arms;
In my books, a brigade ( a very powerful one, and more self-contained than most)
That was @ WD,
sorry, Chris got in between
I used to be a bouncer, so I’m used to getting in the middle of fights.
but what are you going to do for aviation? the Albions are great but getting long in the tooth.
lets be honest here guys. you were never going to put 20 plus airplanes on these carriers and your Navy knows it. perhaps in a war time surge operation but never in a regular deployment type scenario.
the America class would be ideal. you could still retire the current LPD’s retain your amphibious capabilities…put your Merlins and Chinooks to good use giving your Marines a robust Helo Assault capability off a modern platform (along with being able to transport your vehicles such as the Ocelot and Bronco and BVS-10(?) and still have room to surge an airborne company aboard)
the real miscalculation was in aligning with not the US Navy…but with the carrier side of our Navy. your aim should have been to align with our Gator fleet.
The hangar of CVF is already sized for pretty much anything, including Chinook, Ch53 and even UNFOLDED MV-22 Osprey in the “hard-hat” area of the hangar where the ceiling height is over 9 meters.
HMS Ocean looks already condemned to have no direct replacement without us suggesting it, actually. My feeling is that either one of the CVF gets mothballed for a few years and pulled out when HMS Ocean bows out (either in 2018 or 2022 which is the latest planned date i’m aware of) or there is no mothballing but HMS Ocean is retired earlier in exchange. Either way, it is CVF and nothing else.
Just the F35 engine costs 15 millions. The B variant engine comes with a baseline cost of 32.
Start to see why the F35B, even assuming it works, is not what the UK needs? It does not reduce through-life costs AT ALL. Just each engine needed during the life of the plane could fund TWICE the number of engines for the C variant.
Also, remember that the F35 cost figures from LM do NOT include the engines, which are calculated separately.
The RAF achieves economy of scale??? Operations by the RAF compared to operations by AAC and FAA are reported to cost 38% more as average because of higher personnel retributions and shorter operating periods.
No way.
So 400 millions for a relatively weak Merlin-based platform is a good investment when the UK could lease 4 far more capable Hawkeyes for little more than that?
Small-scale operation or not, the Hawkeye offers greater endurance, range, coverage and performances in both AA and AG roles. To do what a CVF could do with 3 Hawkwkeye on boards it would take a good lot of Merlins.
Not cost effective i say.
6 attack planes…? That’s just ridiculous. Even 12 is little stuff, but 6, honestly… You couldn’t have more than 2 in the air all the time, and that, in presence of a shadow-threat from evenmy air forces would need to be in the air protecting the task force.
With the spare/operational airframe ratio used by the US Navy, the RAF/FAA with 40 F35C can form two 12-planes squadrons.
The practice of having two spare airframes for each flying plane must end. Buying a bit more spares will always be less expensive and mean more airplanes actually fit for service than buy 100 million dollars planes to keep them in hangars and cannibalize them.
If the USN plans to have a spare F35C every nearly 3 active F35 (calculations done on the recently released USN/USMC document detailing F35 plans), with how much they use them, there’s no frigging way the RAF can be justified in buying 40 planes to fly 12. No way. Is the RAF planning to crash-land an F35 every two weeks? I hope not.
12 must be 800° NAS.
12 + training airframes can form a RAF squadron.
The rest spares.
Anyway, officially, long term target remains “operate around 100 F35”. I do not believe that.
But i think 80 would already be an awesome fleet, and the UK can certainly afford it.
If defence is a priority.
If everything comes first, included aid to India, then it is useless to even talk about it, but this is another, purely politic matter.
My hope is that Libya taught Cameron that, once things get serious, if you miss the tools of the job, you can talk all you want, but you are out.
Surely the situation TD describes (with 12 as the minimum fast jet compliment rather than 6 F-35B’s) was the intent of the CVF when it was a STOL carrier, that basically during most mission’s it would emphasise it’s helicopter capabilities, but by going with a STOL carrier we could easily operate additional F-35B’s off the CVF turning it into a strike carrier if needed. The original CVF plan was bloody clever if you ask me, and made lots of sense.
The switch to cat and traps changed that. While I think the French were a factor, I have argued elsewhere once you pushed back the ISD to 2020 you needed to add an angled deck and cat and traps so that you could be operating UAV’s for ISTAR, as carriers are going to be the premier choice for operating HALE and MALE’s off, and by the mid 2020’s I reckon we will tentatively start purchase of our first UCAV.
So the problem appears to be that having accepted the reality of needing Cat and Trap’s for the UAV’s, some of which are eventually going to need full length catapults, we are stuck with F-35C, Rafale-M or F/A-18 International, which screws the way we intended to use the CVF, and forces us to have one squadron embarked at all times as it takes a lot more training to launch and land on a CATOBAR carrier. Of course we could decide to sacrifice precious under deck space for hydraulic rams, and add a ski jump which can be lowered to horizontal to allow catapult launches, then we can also go back to a STOL option like the F-35B or Harrier III (need a large buy to justify), or STOBAR options like the LCA (N).
Tubby, I think you’ve got it (in the good old days we would have been Kremlinologists, now we just have to read the tea leaves coming out of our own MOD), as in
“The switch to cat and traps changed that. While I think the French were a factor, I have argued elsewhere once you pushed back the ISD to 2020 you needed to add an angled deck and cat and traps so that you could be operating UAV’s for ISTAR, as carriers are going to be the premier choice for operating HALE and MALE’s off, and by the mid 2020′s I reckon we will tentatively start purchase of our first UCAV.”
TD – “Before starting this discussion we should all fully understand that project CVF is not a strategic priority for the current Government, if they could, they would have cancelled them in an instant.”
Simply don’t agree. As long as the government has ambitions to use the Armed Forces to achieve significant Foreign Policy effect then Carriers, in one form or another, are the best way to so. This is what “punching above our weight” actually means; to supply sufficient military effect that you in return receive policy/command input.
I accept that the phrase has been grossly abused and now bears closer relation to metaphor for politicans under-funding and over-committing the Armed Forces, but be in no doubt that they intend to continue supplying sufficient military effect that we in return receive policy/command input.
TD – “Switch back to the F35B. Complete both CVF with one maintained as an in service spare to cover refit periods. Do not replace Ocean, the role to be covered by CVF”
This is what we should have done in the first place, and I think I said more or less the same:
http://jedibeeftrix.wordpress.com/2010/10/10/1374/
————————————————-
“When we consider that we are buying the QE class anyway, and that Ocean is approaching the end of her life, the obvious answer to this ‘conundrum’ is to realise that CVF has the hotel facilities to support a battalion in addition to the crew itself, and that the limited buy of JCA will leave plenty of deck and hangar space from which to operate helicopters.”
“Buying both CVF and operating them in a swing role means that we technically keep the same capability to deploy, insert, command, and sustain a reinforced brigade in theatre, only now it will have access to CAP and CAS from an organic fighter-bomber squadron deployed with the task-force. We also retain a permanent ability to generate a carrier group, not unimportant given that deterrence relies on the perception of commitment, after all, we didn’t keep armoured divisions in Germany only six months of the year throughout the forty years of the cold war.”
“The current rumours suggest a JCA buy of 72 aircraft, which would indicate three active squadrons of twelve aircraft, twelve in an OCU/ECU, twelve in squadron maintenance, and twelve in deep maintenance or attrition reserves. The likely result is one squadron aboard the active carrier at all times, with a second squadron frequently joining for exercises, or deploying from the second carrier when there is operational overlap. This on a vessel designed to operate 36 JCA, of spare capacity there will be plenty!”
“CVF does not have a vehicle deck, embarked landing craft, or a rear ramp, but then neither does the Invincible Class when its pulling duty as the fleet LPH, and it’s not as if the Royal Navy is short of these attributes in the six other amphibious vessels; the Albion’s and the Bay’s.”
“If it proves suboptimal so be it, these are suboptimal times, and they can always revert back to operating as pure carriers in the 2020′s when there is money to buy one more squadron of JCA (24 in total) and a brace of dedicated LPH’s.”
————————————————-
TD – “Obtain enough to maintain 6 on board plus 6 on an enduring land based operation (rotating with Typhoon) to support the deployed multi role brigade.”
Don’t agree here, because the carriers are their to provide limited intervention alongside the rapid-reaction brigades 16AAB and 3Cdo, they cannot provide persistent support for an ongoing operation rotating the 5x multirole brigades in and out of theatre. Air support would best be generated by RAF capability based in theatre.
In conclusion:
While I’m not sure it will be possible to reverse the momentum behind the switch to F35c, the proposal is as close as Admin and I have come to squaring the circle over carriers, and I wish his proposal had been the status-quo-ante that emerged from the SDSR.
I might as well put in my two pence worth and be unpopular to go with it. I cannot see both carriers being fitted out with cats and traps. QE will be basically an large helicopter platform whilst PoW will have the ability to operate FJs. Instead of the F-35 I would like to see the UK and France form a joint airwing bringing on stream the 2nd and 3rd frontline Rafale squadrons, increasing the E-2 compliment to 5-6 for starters. The joint airwing will be manned by RN and Aeronavale personnel, and operate from either CdG or PoW, which ever is operational at any one time. This would mean chipping in for the 3rd Rafale Squadron and extra E-2s and running costs but it would give the UK and France and fully functioning CVA espaecially if the escort group is also joint with T-45s and FREMM.
This has to be the cheapest way for the RN to get back into the fixed wing game. Most ordonnance will already be cleared with only the Brimstone, ASRAMM and Paveway IV needing clearance. However ASRAMM can be left out as the combination of MICA and Meteor will certainly ge the job done. The French are looking for a nwer generation LD/EO pod for the Rafale so the RAFs Litening would fit the bill and the Frence already use a 500lb Paveway so integration of the IV should be too hard. It shuoldn’t be too hard to convince the French to adopt the Brimstone as the DM variant has proved itself both in Afghanistan and not Libya and the Frence do not really have an equivilent.
QE is a bit more of a problem but it will bring alot of rotary assets to a given operation and be able to carry out large lift ops due to the number of spots available.
I know this idea will be very unpopular with many but I am thinking outside the box and cannot see the UK being able to afford to run a Carrier(s) on its own effectively and that is the key word. At present everything is invested in the CVF whist little has been confirmed with contracts for its airwing. A lot of spin has been produced but in reality they are starting to look like “White Elephants” with little or no practical value until a firm decision on the platforms to operate it are taken backed up bt contracts.
Um…………………………..
I think Lord Jim has some jnteresting ideas and whilst I might not go as far, I do think Rafale Ms and greater co operation with the French are the way forward. As I said in another post, the french can run the OCU
TD
I think you have a basically sound proposition but fail to allow for the cancellation of F35B being actually most likely, it has two years not just to fix the technical problems but also the cost ones and they will be harder.
THe EFV was cancelled but the USMC capability need survives and will be met in other ways – ditto F35B. It is not the only way to arm their amphibs and Gates will be ruthless about its deletion if costs are not rock solid.
Tubby
I think it is possible to have both cats aligned on the port side and a ski jump remaining in the middle of the forward structure. I suspect that lifting a jump into place would mean it had to have a very strong structure which would lead to more weight and round in circles
Gabriele
Leasing sounds like an interesting option – what about leasing one of the CVFs to the US to help them meet their mandated 12 carrier fleet (which they are not meeting)
Hi RW,
RE “F35B. It is not the only way to arm their amphibs and Gates will be ruthless about its deletion if costs are not rock solid.”
– Gates is talking tough as he will be gone by then
– talk about White Elephants – without the B’s America”s” will be a huge waste of money
But back to our own… when I joined this site, I had a bet with a friend that it will Rafale’s flying off the carrier(s)
– still looking to collect
– rotating the 3 carriers (not ChdG, the next one) makes it two with aircraft and one populating (our) assault ships with helos (French amphibs carry theirs, regardless how far and in what kind of seas they have to travel)
– the Rafale production is running at peak as there are 51 Super Etendards to replace (not to mention that in the rush to get Rafale into service they, too, got their T1 that cannot be upgraded at a reasonable cost; only 10, though).But then, no orders! So all those billions and billions forked out (by the French tax payer); all we need to do is to place the order
– 3 carrier-borne AEWs; just buy one more – that will do (only $200m a piece; MACS will still be needed as the carriers can’t be everywhere
– and, after 2 or 3 bn gone, cancel the joint-UCAV and buy what USN has by then put in service; that will keep Rafales useful for a long, long time
To launch unmanned vehicles, you need no CVF. A dedicated mothership like BAEs UXV-proposal or better something COTS makes just the most sense. Also, I don’t expect HALE-UAVs to join an air wing anytime soon. Reaper or Avenger may be another question.
It is also no primary requirement to accomodate French or Spanish or Italian or US aircraft. If we go STOBAR, we will retain such a capability nonetheless. It certainly requires the French to qualify Rafale for STO, so it would makes THEM pay for THEIR additional capability.
I also see no valid requirement to cross-deck FAA or RAF squadrons with allied carriers. Seriously.
The CVF as I see it should provide “just another, but to-go-where-no-airfield-can-go airfield” to the RAF and the hub of a flexible and relatively cheap to operate RN + RM helicopter force.
If the RAF operates Sea Typhoon, F-35B or C is a detail which can be decided in 2012-14. Until then, the Indian MRCA deal has inked and we will see, if Sea Typhoon materializes. A STOBAR-carrier should be able to operate each of those types, it’s only not an ideal solution for hosting F-35B and C.
Irrespective of the carrier question, the F-35 will survive IMHO. In the early 2020ies, we need a Tornado-replacement. Until then, the development cost are written off and I expect the aircrafts price to drop.
So the general plan is:
– go STOBAR
– wait, if SeaTiffy materializes; if yes, convert half or better all the T3-orders to the navalized version; if not, proceed with the F-35C
– the RAF can concentrate to press capability out of the at least partially interoperable fast jet fleet and gets just one more basing option.
– the RN can concentrate on helicopters and fulfil the everday tasks with them
– the MoD can save money by filling the carrier-aircraft-requirement with T3-slots and delaying the F-35
– even BAE wouldn’t be to afraid of this scenario
Stick, hornets Nest, Poking for the use of…
@Sol, I am not against the Fleet air Arm and Royal Navy having control of naval aviation, far from it. What I am against is the duplication and cost burden that it delivers. As i said, we have to be unsentimental, hard in fact, when looking at this. I know there are operational benefits of keeping the FAA in the fast jets business, not disputing that all, but I am less certain that these benefits outweigh the cost of duplication. The US can afford 4 air forces, we can’t. I agree that the likelihood of B being cancelled is very small now. An America class would have been ideal, i agree, but that is not the point, we have CVF whether anyone likes it or not, this post is about making the best of that fact
@Willy, yes, mu suggestion is to commission both at an identical equipment fit but have one as the refit spare. It will cost more than normal extended readiness and I could see a role for retained reserves to maintain the second ship at enough readiness to cover planned refits.
@Chris B, who would buy both and at what price, what would we do with the receipts
@Arkady, what was planned and what was the reality were always very different. I think the actual, as in really actual, plan was, was for about 12-18 JSF. The fantasy land of 36 JSF plus was just that. You say 6-12 aircraft is wholly insufficient for all but the smallest operation, exactly, that is the whole point. CVF becomes a joint asset for small to medium scale interventions alone or as part of a larger coalition force, where the number of aircraft becomes less important than the overall contribution. Lets take off those single service blinkers
@ACC, you are right we don’t have the cash for CH53K and V22 but that is because we have plans for loads of F35’s, this is the crux of the argument and I think vertical lift is more important and more useful than more fast jets
@Chris B, not sure what you mean by you might as well have both and give them a full compliment of fast jets, how would we pay. The post is about pragmatism and achieving realistic capabilities
@Gabrielle, be careful of putting too much store in the figures on JSF, as I said the reality is no one actually knows yet and also I said, the personnel costs dwarf any equipment costs. The RAF does achieve economy of scale, yes they might have more people and more generous terms and conditions of service but with Chinook, for example, they achieve availability rates unmatched even by the US. i think the new engagement model will start evening out these discrepancies in service conditions as well.
@Tubby, not sure on your predictions for UAV’s. Their massive range and endurance will tend to trump the advantages of being nearer with a carrier. Am unconvinced by the UCAV/Carrier combination
@jedi, the government would have cancelled CVF in a heartbeat and you know it, that makes it not a strategic priority in my eyes. I think we tend to agree on the broad front but with two less well decks to call on the situation is far from ideal and with CVF not having a vehicle deck, optimised accommodation, a ramp and landing craft it will be no Ocean, but, this could be compensated by greater vertical lift and it is here that its size really comes into play because you can do a single lift in one go of good size. All we need is additional vertical lift and the F35 piggy bank is what i would raid to do so, less JCA, more helicopters makes CVF actually worth doing.
On your last point i think you have misread. I suggested an F35 force that could do 2 things, maintain 6 on board at all times (this would need rotating crews and airframes) AND maintain 6 in a land theatre, not OR. The 6 in a land theatre would provide CAS/ISTAR for an enduring mission, supporting the MRB.In fact, a bit like what Joint Force Harrier did in Afghanistan for 5 years. These 6 could be supplemented by Typhoon and UAV’s as well.
On a surge basis, thats at least 12 JCA, probably up to 20 odd being available for contingent operations either afloat or on land, the F35 delivers this flexibility
@RW, I don’t think the F35B will be cancelled but accept its a riskier proposition than the C or Rafale/F18 etc
TD – “On your last point i think you have misread. I suggested an F35 force that could do 2 things, maintain 6 on board at all times (this would need rotating crews and airframes) AND maintain 6 in a land theatre, not OR. The 6 in a land theatre would provide CAS/ISTAR for an enduring mission, supporting the MRB.In fact, a bit like what Joint Force Harrier did in Afghanistan for 5 years.”
I did indeed, my thanks.
Will update the post to make it clearer
TD
You really do like poking the hornets nest don’t you.
Do you hang arround seedy container opperater bars, nudging lorry drivers and saying ‘see him in the corner, he’s looking at your bird’?
Given we are stuck with the Things your proposals make a lot of sense. However the F35b will either fly or it won’t The technical difficulties will do all the argueing. They will either be dealt with or they won’t. Sorry to sound so trite but, Boy oh boy will we look silly if we build the carrier to take B version only, and it does not fly.
They would be left as rotary only carriers.
PS
Can the FAA run the Raf instead? After all if we havent got that many aircraft why can’t they be in Dark blue?
Hi TD,
Agreed “@ACC, you are right we don’t have the cash for CH53K and V22 but that is because we have plans for loads of F35′s, this is the crux of the argument and I think vertical lift is more important and more useful than more fast jets”, broadly.
But then paying attention to the fast jet split between carrier-capable, and not so?
OK, starting at the end and working backwards:
1. CVF as Uber LPH – don’t have a problem with this concept – EXCEPT I would make it a pure LPH and not bother with any F35 at all.
2. We should have cancelled it when we had the chance – yep, but we did not, hence we arrive at 1. above.
3. Time to start a fight: TD said” “By continually failing to budge on CVF, the Royal Navy paid an ever more expensive price to do so and in what some might see as irony, the very fact that the RN has no carriers and carrier aircraft to offer Operation Ellamy is precisely because of the desire to have CVF shaped carriers and FAA insignia bearing carrier aircraft.”
What total and utter cods wallop ! Let’s get one thing straight I applaud TD for his “pragmatic” attitude, and more especially for making the service chiefs take their slice of responsibility for current woes, but come on seriously ? At what point did you see a line of successive Admirals knocking on the PM’s door asking for the carriers to be delayed, again… or taking petitions demanding the surface fleet be cut ?
Grand strategy is the purview of HMG, particularly the Cabinet and other committee’s not the MoD, we are not a military dictatorship. If the 98 SDR said ‘expeditionary’ and laid out great plans for carriers, and Gordon Brown as Treasurer said “jog on matey, your not having the cash” – how exactly is the fault of the Admiral of the Fleet ? If said HMG, and its successors continue to pay for pointless adventures in the sandpit, while cutting real terms defence spending, but NOT drawing back on the strategic rhetoric, and continuing the “punch above our weight” crap, how is that the fault of the Admiralty ?
We could quite easily have a carrier and Harriers available, in fact if Libya had kicked off mere months ago, they would have been available. I am not re-opening the Harrier versus UK based Tornado argument, as it’s completely bogus; they are complimentary assets with complimentary capabilities, and lets face it, look at the way the Jaguar fleet was upgraded in record time when needed for the Iraqi no-fly zones; yes if we wanted Brimstone on GR9 we could have done it. That is just more treasury led divide and conquer bull shit, and too many people are just happily falling for it.
IF HMG wants to withdraw from it’s weirdly grand notions of being a world power, lets have 160 Typhoons and nothing else. Lets stay away from wars of choice and depend on providing niche capabilities to NATO formations.
IF HMG wants to be a world power, it has to fund it properly. If it want’s a major post Afghanistan, post 2020 expeditionary capability it needs to order a 3rd carrier and 100 aircraft of the readers choice (F35, F18E, Rafale M, whatever…..).
Of course it wont do either, and without a proper strategic context, our foreign policy, or response to world events and our armed forces will just bumble along, fixing stuff with gaffer tape, because that has become the norm.
Admirals, Generals and Air Marshals may have been unimpressive over the last 10 to 15 years, but not any where near as unimpressive as our elected officials.
Jed
2 big cheers for that post but:-
‘At what point did you see a line of successive Admirals knocking on the PM’s door asking for the carriers to be delayed, again… or taking petitions demanding the surface fleet be cut ?’
During the last SDR when it was clear from leaked reports that when the RAF and Army had nearly won the day on cancelling carriers; the Lords of the admiralty were widely reported, (and never denied it when it was reported) to have offered up everything in the surface fleet for the carriers. Where did the 19 unit surface fleet idea come from? The RN that where.
I am sure they did not want to be in that position and would Have done anything not to be, but when they were, instead of saying ‘Ok stuff it you can shove the carriers up the RAF’s tailpipes and on your own head be it’, or whatever, they got down on their knees and begged for them’.
So like I say Jed with you all the way but RN are far from blaimless.
@TD
The way I see it with regard to UAV’s and carriers, especially carriers mostly operated along side your amphibious forces, you want your UAV’s to spend as much time on station as possible scoping out enemy movements and least amount of time transiting to and from enemy territory, so it makes sense to have your UAV’s on your carrier. Plus I would imagine its now considered a minimum requirement that you provide the Royal Marines with real time video feed of their LZ and their alternate LZ, and I suspect that if you offered a RM Major about to put boot’s ashore a choice of QE with 12 F-35C’s, plus 6 MALES and 12 Apaches or a QE with 30 F-35C’s he will take the former over the latter, unless we have gone crazy and been talked into taking on Russia or China, then the 30 F-35C’s will be busy keeping the task group alive long enough to launch helicopters.
Here, here Jed!
Seconded! Nicely put Jed
fight fight fight :)
Jed, glad you see it as simple as that but I don’t
The leadership at the Admiralty have had numerous occasions on which they could have changed the design altered the specification, adjusted the requirement. All these would have dramatically reduced both the political and cost profile of project CVF, they chose not to
Now I am not absolving Cyclops of any blame, far far far far from it but the reality is, the RN is equally as culpable
If I made an error, it was not including the Government and one eye but lets all stop pretending the RN’s collective decision to have CVF at all costs has had no impact, choices were made, choices have consequences
anyway, my Dad’s bigger than yours!
So for one carrier and a half completed one that might be sold off the UK taxpayer will likely be paying in excess of £6 billion and if I were a betting man I would definitely have a punt on the final cost going beyond lucky number seven.
..contradicts this…
Despite this, in many ways the project has been steaming along very nicely indeed, the blocks continue to be built, contracts are being placed and progress is self evident. When all said and done, CVF is actually a relatively simple, relatively low risk design.
I’ve noticed a sort of negative euphoria around here recently…
Alex, how is that contradictory
The nuts and bolts have been moving along nicely but the project as a whole, as explained, is a complete cock up. The reason for the vast cost and time inflation has been short termism and spec changing which are driven by political and fiscal constraints outside the project
Alex
Going to go away and think about negative wotsit.
TD: “my dad is bigger than your” – erm, well mine is 6 foot 4, if only I had taken after him and not my mum….. :-)
OK, lets agree to disagree, there are degrees of culpability, and as the ultimate deciders of national strategy, HMG is ‘more’ to blame….
Now then, onto this 6 x F35 onboard, and 6 on ‘long term’ deployed ops with the RAF. How on earth does this work on a cost benefit analysis ? 6 a/c on the carrier, honestly you may as well not have them, as your not going to keep enough pilots current to pay for all the bother. I presume for some op like Libya you would embark and RAF squadron, or the OCU or something ? I just really don’t see the point on a pure cost versus capability standpoint.
As for 6 x F35 deployed on an ‘enduring’ operation alongside Typhoons, this is even more bizarre. You want to use a very, very expensive aircraft, one which has a design that has been highly compromised by the so called “first day of the war” low observability requirement for ‘enduring’ combat ISTAR ? WTF ?? what a waste of money. F35 is in U.S. parlance “a door kicker”. The USMC may describe how it will replace all their other ISTAR assets due to it’s Cylon based avionics, but we don’t have the USMC’s budgets (if only……).
So we are either skint or we aren’t – lets drop the pretensions and make them giant LPH. Maybe, just maybe we could introduce Avenger / Predator C and later a proper UCAV-N type, but if we truly are skint, the F35 in any form has to go.
You should see my mum!
There is an argument that says why bother if we can’t do it properly and I do see it but I hate to be the only one in the blogosphere that seems to get the financial issues at play, it might make me a bit of an outsider because I am not making up fantasy fleets where the result is the RAF gets raped and the FAA gets everything with a few crumbs left over for the AAC but I think it is a realistic position to take. Its not like the grown ups at the MoD have much credibility when it comes to generating future force structures from a finite pot of cash is it, in fact, the ore I think of it, the MoD is the ultimate hotbed of fantasy fleets.
keeping 6 on board permanently provides a realistic force capability on a permanent basis which will mean vastly more training opportunities for amphibious operations and littoral manoeuvre than the GR9’s ever had. Because they are STOVL, keeping then current is not a problem, like it would be with CATOBAR.
Keeping 6 on enduring operations is in conjunction with Typhoon, not as well. On an enduring operation you are rotating your 5 MRB’s every 6 months, there is an argument that the air component should have longer tours but it would still mean that F35 takes it place in the rotation system with Typhoon. typhoon being the more numerous would naturally take up more slots.
In a surge (assuming you are not already in an enduring operation, and this is the SDSR assumption) you can either take the ones on board and send them to a land base or take the ones at home and send them to CVF. The surge would use the F35 in the first day of war stuff only if that is what was required, equally, you might find typhoon more suited and as I mentioned, greater platform diversity for SS and TLAM would contribute to the short fall
If the shit really hit the fan then yes, strip out your OCU etc and this is where the B model shines, just like the GR3 before it. If the shit hits the fan in such a manner that carrier ops are the preferred option then every f35 pilot, whether normally sea based or not, can be qualified for ops on CVF within days
Creating a small fleet of F35’s allows us to build when times are better and the streets are paved with gold but that would be much cheaper than generating from scratch again
There is logic to this suggestion you know!
Indeed, I do see your logic ref buy a few now, and maybe we can buy some more later. However its just another salami sliced response to no cash; or as we say in the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yorkshire: “it’s neither nowt, nor summat lad!”
I even understand your logic ref Dave-B, even though part of me thinks if will never even see service with the USMC.
I have to counter your ‘tactical’ pragmatism with what I feel is a longer ranged, more strategic pragmatism; if you cant afford to deploy a certain number to achieve the desired operational effects, the ‘critical mass’ that makes the capability worth while if you like, then don’t waste money, time and doctrinal development bandwidth on it in the first place.
Oh and if were not wasting money on F35’s I will have two more T45 and a whole bunch of Absalon Global sloops or whatever please…. :-)
“The leadership at the Admiralty have had numerous occasions on which they could have changed the design altered the specification, adjusted the requirement. All these would have dramatically reduced both the political and cost profile of project CVF, they chose not to”
The problem was that CVF is probably the most comprehensively assessed military project HMG has ever embarked upon,.
Every size was looked at from Vinces, to CdD style 40,000 tonner, up to 55,000 tonnes for the BAE design, and they still settled on 2x 65,000 tonne carriers.
It was and is the right design.
I am not arguing with the size necessarily, but going large puts you in the political firing line and it might have been the most comprehensively assessed project in the world but things change.
The RN and MoD (and other services as well) stand accused of not moving with the times, putting their fingers in their ears and muttering, hoping things would change
GUILTY
Jed, I would also add, 6 F35B unable to deliver operational and strategic effect, come on, course they would.
In conjunction with the amphibious force or surged up for wider contributory operations 6 to 20 depending on the mix is still a pretty decent capability
“The FAA would cease operating fast jets and the aboard aircraft would be RAF operated.”
You know as soon as I heard that Dave-B had been dropped in favour of Dave-C, I thought “that will be the Navy ensuring that only their aircraft and pilots are carrier capable”.
Personally, I’d dump the entire RAF, but I’ve said that often enough for it to even bore me . . .
“Conversations now should be all about how we maximise value on our not inconsiderable investment.”
amen
“a reluctance to consider alternatives has led them to mortgage off the rest of the fleet”
AMEN
Seriously, to get these carriers when there were other options, the RN betrayed itself.
What a turd storm this is, both this thread and the real thing. I am going to sit back and watch, and laugh…and cry.
But to those frothing like their rabid at the RAF/FAA debate…lol its just a uniform, seriously… Joint Fore Harrier prooved it can work with Harriers, why the hell cant it work with JCA!? (or whatever we’ll get… I am thinking kites…) The training and logistics demands? Maybe, but we’ll get over it.
And oh, I am light blue who has served with dark blue, on land and in a tub, I wasn’t ‘niffed’ at all.
I have some question’s & a suggestion.
Question one is this:
How much is it going to cost in £Billions to upgrade the Typhoon with Thrust-Vectoring & an AESA Radar, conformal tanks & all the other stuff that they seem to want for it?
Suggestion is this:
Freeze the design of the Typhoon after it gets all the equipment that turns it into a bomb truck but before it gets all the other extra’s. Take the money that would have been spent on all the exotic extra’s that the RAF seem to want for it & TOGETHER with the saving from cutting the 5 NON 2087 Type23’s buy more F35-C’s & the little ships needed to impliment your LOG idea.
The RAF would then be in much better shape (i think), it would have 100 odd Typhoons at say FGR5 configuration for bombing & it would get perhaps as many as 90 F35-C’s for QRA, AD (either on land or at sea on the CVF), & for kicking the door down if it comes to an operation or war.
The Army & Navy would be better off as the RAF would then be able to better support any operation, anywhere, that might be required. With more aircraft available it would then make sense to keep & convert the second carrier for full carrier ops, thereby making the most of the investment’s in the carriers. What is the point of building them if you’re not going to make the most of them? Along with the Littoral Operations Group, which won’t cost that much will it, what’s not to like?
I have been wondering about this one a lot…….in the SDSR it says we should be prepared to be able to do a small scale independent operation.
Since when has an enemy cooperated in it’s own destruction by doing exactly what our plan’s have allowed for?
The thinking behind this assumption is mind blowingly stupid, the UK Gov. & MoD are only thinking of short term measures, they are not really thinking 10 years down the line at all.
If they were, they would not come up with a laughable prediction for the future, a prediction that, of course, is then used to justify their position & the reasons for that position.
One other question :)
Which will be faster off the ground for QRA, which will be better at Air to Air…..Typhoon or F35-C?
If i had any money i’d be willing to bet it on the Typhoon not having a hope in hell against the F35-C, especially if it’s in a slicked down anti-air configuration.
In fact i’d like to see 6 Typhoons v 2 F35-C’s, i bet that would be a real eye opener for all concerned!
Thinking about it, we could run a similar test right now.
Six Typhoons v Two F22 Raptors.
Who do you think would win?
If you think or admit it’ll be the Raptors, then why on earth are we going to bother with all the very expensive upgrades to the Typhoon? Is it really due to need, or merely due to inertia within the MoD & BAe?
@TD
You could do the same sort of thing with the F35-B, although i think the C model will be much better in performance & for me, performance is what it should all be about.
oooo i hate coming into boat/ship debates, mainly because in 22 years of green my time on a boat was 6 times round the IOW and then driving me truck up brown beach!!
However, someone said you don’t join the RAF to go to sea, not quite the same but when i was the maroon deliverers of death, many of the para trained reme had been in the brigade for donkeys years, in fact pulling out the stops to stay within the brigade. Why? because they really wanted to be tradesmen, but they really wanted to be a para, if someone really wants to fly fast jets, if it means going to sea i believe they will go to sea.
Really going out of my depth here but a couple of facts pointed on here one being we are commited to buying 3 dave b’s development aircraft so instead of paying for that huge, expensive refit for ocean in 2014. bin/sell it and get a carlos like the aussies, then there is amphib and accom facilities and if the poo hits up top there’s your 3rd “mini” carrier with some dave b on flown by RAF who because they are VTOL don’t need loads of carrier training. IT’s only a thought don’t hit me (or my mum or dad)
@ Paul G (at fist then another of my mad ramblings.)
I think I know what you are saying but a soldier is a soldier. Um. You wouldn’t apply that argument to REME attached to tank regiment would you? He wants to do his trade, but he wants to play with tanks. He is a soldier, then REME, and then para’.
But the pilot aspect of the FAA v RAF annoys me. The argument that FAA couldn’t field squadrons without RAF pilots to make up numbers. True, but only because FAA fast air community was eviscerated after the last conventional carrier went. How many graduates would know about FAA fast air in the 1980s? Not many. Naval aviation is a complex task for CATOBAR ops. It isn’t something pilots can opt into then opt out of. The costs of training mean that carrier pilots would have to (with the rarest, rarest of exceptions) stay in the carrier community. As I have said before there is a difference between being doing an exchange tour and spending your whole career do a job. Why can’t the FAA recruit more fast jet pilots? There was a time when there were no pilots at all, that has to a be a start to everything, why can’t the FAA start again? Are we that bereft of imagination? Are we that occupied with own time that we can see there was something before the RAF and there is no written rule that says we have to keep the RAF? As Paul G said if young (wo)men want to fly they won’t mind going to sea to fly? Why can’t it be Fly Navy why do we have to perpetuate the RAF?
Again as I have said before it seems here anybody who argues for the navy to look after its own equipment is being illogical or sentimental. That ‘planes are something special; yet aren’t many RN ships driven by gas turbines and filled with electronics just as modern ‘planes are? It seems hard data about sortie rate, force projection, deployment numbers for the RAF are ignored or swept under the carpet. If the RAF and RN were commercial operations would you as a shareholder of the latter want to see any part of operations merged with the former? How many RAF personnel are still “deployed” to the UK? The RAF is bigger than the RN yet it fields less than 10 airframes to A-stan. Its latest aircraft can’t even be deployed to the war we are fighting. How many planes approximately will it have ready in the air above Libya and A-stan at any time? About 4 or so. So it takes nearly 40,000 personnel to keep 4 elderly jets in the sky. The RN as a proportion of its establishment contributes the same number of personnel to A-stan as the army. Yet still has at least three submarines on ops, 4 OPVs, more than 6 frigates on ops, hyrdographic units, etc.
If you want to talk about pragmatism TD perhaps you should take a long hard look at the RAF’s record. The organisation apart from a few months in 1940 hasn’t got the best record.
Move the helicopters over to the AAC. Give the F35s to the FAA. Leave the RAF to fly its Typhoons and large fixed wing stuff.
TD and All
Please do not take my RN RAF crack too seriously.
Despite their expressed differnces not sure Jed are in reality THAT far apart?
However I would like TD to address what happens if F35b doesn’t (happen that is) Do we go to C?
TD
I will take issue with several points of your strategy. You have stated that you only wish the UK armed forces to operate independently at small scale. Thats fine you then go on to say 6 F35 will support one of the army multi roles brigades when deployed. Lets be absolutely clear the Britsh army considers brigade level deployment a MEDIUM scale contribution. Taking forward your analysis the maximum independent contribution from UK land force will therefore be Battle Group Level like it or not.
I think we can start to see the template of future operation from what is happening in Libya at present were by large scale western naval and air power in effect supporting an indigenous army with limited western ground forces as the preferred operandi. This changes the strategic picture considerably from what’s gone before.
You have wrote a interesting piece as always which will require a re-read and some more thought before I comment on the CVF part.
Great debate – glad we’ve moved on from the whole CVF vs no CVF argument and realised that there are real opportunities with the QE design. We should just think of them as two moveable airfields and are joint assets of all three services.
I can see more the parachute regiment doing a helicopter surge from them than the RM for example. The Albions are much more suited to the marines.
As for aircraft, in my opinion the FAA should be primarily providing air defence and anti ship / sub. The RAF should be strike / ground support. Why not the F35C for the FAA and the F35B for the RAF? This would mean keeping the ramp as well as adding the cats. It would allow the RAF to deploy quickly for an emergency. Say 5 x 9 plane squadrons each.
X
In 2009 with 3 commando brigade in helmand the RN had 47% of its personnel deployed on operations. The smallest service has been worked harder than any of the other services but remains the most maligned.
Random Maria thoughts.
First we should have built a state of the art shipyard capable of building Nimitz size ships or the largest cruiseliners or containerships. Bigger up front cost, but all large RN ships from then on, would be much cheaper.
We are where we are.
The panic to get Charles De Gaule back to sea for Libya, shows the need for 2 carriers to cover for refits.
One fully equipped in “go to war” mode. The other in refit or operating as a training carrier with skeleton crew & tiny airgroup. Training carrier could be loaded up with helicopters,cranes ,bulldozers & sent to civil disasters, without taking “war” carrier off task.
I still want QE class in Russian mode ie. angled deck with arrester wires + ski ramp. Waist cat could be added later if emals works well.
Minimum fast airgroup is ten fighters, ten bombers. Less than that cannot sustain even a small fighting operation. Knowing you are going in harms way, I would up that to 16 of each ie.32.
F-35C is a good strike aircraft, but I have doubts about it as an interceptor. F-35B or Seaphoon would be better for all weather air to air.
In the old days, we would have built a demonstrator, remember EAP? A Seaphoon demonstrator would be good. Most of its kit, thrust vectoring,conformal tanks, AESA is shared with advanced land versions anyway.
We probably need a few Goshawk C/Hawk 128 carrier trainers.
We should have kept one Sqn of FAA Harriers by using grounded RAF Harriers for spares. Cheaper than scrapping FAA fast jets now, only to recreate them in a few years.
We have money to overpay doctors & town hall fat cats, bail out Ireland & Portugal, give an extra 4 billion to third world dictators Mercedes fund. The money is there. It is how we as a nation choose to spend it.
Oh yes CVF………
For me CVF should be about sea control not all this strike and coin stuff. So I would be happy with 12 F35s, as long as the airgroup has 12 Merlins for ASW/ASuW, 4+2 Merlin ASaCs, plus a few Lynx hacks. Enough to control a good sized area of ocean.
I have been wondering about how CVF could be altered as an LPH. I would have a hanger constructed at current flight deck level. There would be landing spots back aft and on the “roof” of the hanger. I would convert the original hanger into accommodation for a commando and a hospital. I have been wondering whether the spaces now used for aircraft lifts could be used for davits for LCVP; I shall have to have a look. At the for’ard end of what is the current flight deck I would have some VLS silos. I think CVF would make a good home for Sea Viper; CVF would always sit at the centre of the task group and Sampson would sit even higher than on T45. CVF would make a good platform for TLAM and a supersonic missile like BrahMos. The bulk of the air group could be switched between Pinger Merlin and Junglie Merlin as needed. But would always carry a Merlin ASAC.
@x, sorry fella i wasn’t advocating that the navy shouldn’t fly their own aircraft, just pointing out that there will be people who will want to fly no matter what cap badge they are wearing. I’m in no way anti FAA (by the way the reme and tank anology wasn’t the best you could’ve used, if a vehicle mechanic goes “A” trade then he is fixing tracked vehicles for his career, not a dig just an insight)!
anyway as others had said we’ve got ’em now lets get the best out of them, I’d get them out on show as well try and beef up some customers, hells teeth the french have sold 3 mistral to the russians (ok not all built in france, but still have to pay for the design) who knows i’m going glass half full!
“I have been wondering about how CVF could be altered as an LPH. I would have a hanger constructed at current flight deck level. There would be landing spots back aft and on the “roof” of the hanger. I would convert the original hanger into accommodation for a commando and a hospital.”
But just WHY? What the hell, there’s already space for 500 soldiers as it is while keeping the ship the way it is. XD
As for lack of vehicles, especially when compared to Ocean…
men, Ocean carries 43 light vehicles, mostly Land Rovers, and 6 L118 light guns.
In the hangar of the CVF, you can fit lots of stuff. You need a crane to lift stuff onto the flight deck, but you’ve got two lifts rated each 70 and i say 70 tons.
Any vehicle that can be airlifted by a Chinook can just be craned onto the deck, driven over a lift and then into the hangar, then lifted back up on deck to be underslung to the Chinook when the landing moment comes.
Why should we make things complex when they are simple??? At the most, the smartest thing to do would be to find a way to incorporate side-mounted Ro-Ro ramps for easier access to the hangar when in ports.
Davits for LCVPs, if needed, could be made into sponsons under the left side of the deck where it stretches outwards, but this already requires lots of work during a refit.
But for the rest… seriously, people.
“Six Typhoons v Two F22 Raptors.
Who do you think would win?”
Another victim of hype about the Raptor.
Do you know that, currently, the Raptor can only receive on data link 16 and not transmit?
That it can only use two GPS JDAM and target only one at a time, and with difficulty…?
That it has no IRST, why the Typhoon has it?
Ok, the F22 is low observable.
Shame that the radar transmission of its AESA can be picked up from immensely afar (who’s got notions of electromagnetics knows that the radar can be detected before the radar can detect the targets, and that’s why SEAD is so effective), whyle the Typhoon can go around with its radar turned off, searching only with the PIRATE in the IR spectrum, sending off no signal.
It can also launch a missile at a target designated externally by a Sentry AWACS without turning on the radar thanks to full data link system.
Its AESA is awesome and everything, but it has a 120° degrees field of view against Captor’s 200°.
Hype aside, the F22 is actually got a good lot of defects. And even just the canopy costs 670.000 dollars apiece. News revealed after one canopy was stuck and to free the pilot locked inside the firefighters had to smash it open with axes.
And do we need to remember the computer system that shut itself down when it passed the Change of Data line in the Pacific?
A tanker had to be scrambled from the Hawaii and the F22’s pilots had to follow it visually to the airbase.
Personally, i take a Typhoon any day, thanks. A RAF T1 FRG4 is fine for me.
The F35, having its own IRST, is better than the F22 and has the upper hand in BVR engagement. With Meteor, it will be next to invincible.
But IF something gets close… in a dogfight the F35 is pretty much dead. It turns slower, it climbs slower, it is slower.
Everything has its limits.
RE “But IF something gets close… in a dogfight the F35 is pretty much dead. It turns slower, it climbs slower, it is slower.
Everything has its limits” but the missiles do the turning…
that is the philosophy, as I’ve understood it?
@X, as soon as anyone points out a few home truths about the FAA everyone gets defensive. I have no axe to grind but I know that tough decisions need to be made, I know we all like to talk about those tough decisions but no one ever seems to want to make them if it means their favoured capability gets cut. A tough decision seems to be OK if it is someone else taking the hit.
Now none of us know the costings and doing Google based analysis on sortie rates etc, as others like to do, is far too simplistic. There is much much more to air power than that.
Also, don’t get the impression for one moment that I think the RAF is faultless, far from it.
But, I look at it like this, the fast jet business, its what they do, full time
Operating fast jets is a part time activity for the RN
When I look at the services I see duplication and duplication means waste.
I want to eliminate waste wherever I see it because by doing so it means we can avoid as many capabilities as possible.
Does the RAF need its own police force and light infantry, maybe, but I don’t think there is a convincing enough case to justify the duplication.
If the RAF are deficient in an area, then they should improve it, taking away their toys is not the answer. I am not going to cover your other points about the RAF because it is rather shy of fact, yes they might only deploy a certain number of fast jets to Afghanistan but have you forgot the air bridge, FI, VIP transport, Support Helicopter, UAV’s, rapid reaction transport, force protection and of course Libya, need I go on.
Now who is being blinkered?
The UK armed forces are getting smaller, proper tough decisions are needed and as long as I see duplication I will not shy of saying so.
The US can afford four Air Forces, we can’t.
If I have to choose, sorry, the FAA and AAC aint it.
Its not ideology, its not bias, its nothing but hard nosed financial control sweeping aside little empires and cash sucking duplication.
@Michael(civ), performance is usually the last thing to be considered!
@Ixion, if F35B goes tits up in my master plan then we would have to go C, not ideal and I think more expensive but there are other benefits
@Mark, I didn’t say I wished the UK to operate independently at a small scale, the government did. The last lot said medium scale but remember, we will not have any strategic shrinkage
Libya does not in any way form a template because you know why, thats exactly the same thing I heard before the Balkans, before Afghanistan and before Iraq.
“Everything has its limits” but the missiles do the turning…
that is the philosophy, as I’ve understood it?”
You gotta turn the plane too to launch the missiles and, especially, to avoid them.
And don’t be fooled be the “shooting the ASRAAM backwards” magic: it is all awesome and good, but it consumes lots of propulsion and actuators energy that, in a missile, are finished.
Range is going to drop sharply, and the enemy chances to escape rise.
You gotta use such stunts the right way. Getting in the right firing position means a lot in ensuring the enemy is caught into a proper “No Escape Zone”.
If it was that simple, wiht missiles doing all the work, then with modern missiles on it you could call a Tucano an air dominance fighter.
But it does not work.
TD
So you are accepting then that its battle group deployment of land forces independently. I do accept your point about the Libya conflict but I do get the feeling that Iraq in particular has caused a major change in the way this country will accept future military adventures. They will have to be done thru the UN and it is almost a cert that they will refuse a ground troop deployment unless something similar to the Kuwaits invasion occurs.
I do have to ask what saving are to be made from removing the Fleet air arm fast jet squadrons. I just dont see it other than the RN uniform bill. They are co located and structured in the same way as the RAF squadrons they come thru the same training pipeline and jet servicing is joint. The only difference I can see is one does officer training in Dartmouth and the Other at Cranwell. One learns and signs up to deploy on as ship the other doesnt like wise the maintainers. Unless you co locate the 3 single service officer/enlisted men initial training establishments were is the saving. 2 FAA 2 RAF squad providing a single RN air group backed up only in times off crisis by the raf squadrons seems sensible to me.
Mark, you might be right on the duplication front, as I said its not ideology but cost driven
@ Mark
Thank you. I half remembered a figure like that. I also half remembered a figure that says 90% of the RAF are stationed in the UK. I am not very good at this off the cuff writing.
I know a lot of us like to talk about kit. But it is the culture of the various organisations and how they inter play that drives events. All organisations being composed of humans take on the human instinct for survival; this is deep within the corporate collective memory. Um. The RAF is very good at promoting itself, does “it” know this know? Yes and no. Good PR is PR. But deep down an organisation’s culture will foster certain behaviours and promulgate them. The RN goes to the South Atlantic and wins a war but its culture doesn’t play on this; it is the Silent Service. The RAF goes to the South Atlantic, plays a bit part, comes away with a medal tally that belies that latter fact by a large margin, and the upshot is RAF Mount Pleasant. So…….
there are a lot of solutions on how best to use the GE class carriers but almost none of them require any form of alteration, surely proving the case for building them. They are capable of being the platform for enforcinh a NFZ with 48 F35C or being a super LPH.
@ Think Defence
You do so have an axe to grind. If you were as open minded as you think you are you would acknowledge that the RAF is a redundant chimaera that is over manned, over represented, and under performing. Tell me in this Libya affair who was at risk more? The couple hundred matelots who spent hours alongside at Benghazi. Or the Captain Kirks in their 4.5 gen fighters patrolling empty skies looking for poorly equipped, poorly piloted 60s Soviet jets after the USN (with a little bit of help from the RN) TLAMed the 40 year old Libyan SAM sites to death………. ;-)
@ TD
Looking at how the RAF performs I would suggest that flying jets is part time business for them too……….
@ Paul G
I know about the tanks. It was the first thing came to mind. I didn’t think this was the place to give a break down on REME career structure.
(Do airborne have lighter hammers? Or do they just use inflatable ones? )
@TD aand everyone else :)
I am not suggesting any duplication at all.
I really do mean, give every single jet to the RAF!
Why continue to upgrade the Typhoon, it will not be as comparable to the F-35. Therefore, to get the most from the money we are going to spend why not cease throwing money at it & spend what we can on getting as many F35’s as possible?
If anyone can tell me why they think it’s neccessary to continue with Typhoon upgrades for the next decade, when there will be a better aircraft available for the RAF very soon, then i’m all ears.
About the Raptor, i used that cause it is a low observable aircraft & the USAF have already run a similar test!
I saw a documentry about the Raptor a while ago, (wish i could find you a link!), in part of it the pilot’s who formed the first Squadron (who were all ex-F15 jockeys), ran a test.
Five of them in F15’s V one guy in a Raptor.
The guy in the Raptor won, every single time, not kidding!
I have always wondered why we (the UK), don’t have competative fly offs. It would be easy to arrange one, we take part in exercises at Nellis.
I know that we like to keep aircraft flying for a very long time, mostly due to how expensive they are & i suspect, due to the long programs to upgrade them but why not skip the massively expensive upgrade program for the Typhoon & instead sink the money into the F35 program? Either the B or C version!
I know we have equipment cycles, what i’m saying is why not chop one short & then that would allow us to get in sync with the USN/USAF? With more aircraft, would we not get a better price etc etc?
I really think it would give the RAF a much better capability for the long term. Also you are still hedging your bets, cause you have 100 odd Typhoons if someone invents a sure fire counter to the F35.
I don’t think it actually matters to set up the exact composition of any air group for the CVF. Circumstances will dictate what’s on board at any one time, more F35’s of whatever flavour will simply give you more options in the event that everything goes really wrong & there is a full blown conventional war.
I know it’s trite but plan for the worst, hope for the best.
@x sorry mate we only had variable pressure applicators in the reme being a technical corp!! (thought i’d lighten the mood)
I agree that expeditionary operations are here to stay and that the Mid East, Africa are the most likely locations for this, though consideration has to be given to operations in the Far east in support of our 5 powers defence agreement and a remote possibly of operation in one of the polar regions.
We do have to accept that UK forces will now only ever do a small scale intervention on our own. So what does that mean well sdsr is not very clear what forces are required for this so I have gone back to the Hoon defence review post Iraq as that is the only one I can see which has actual numbers around the scale of effort it states the following:
Small scale intervention requires 18 fast jets, 2 AEW, 8 attack Helo, 12 support Helo 4 MPA and 26 Tanker Transport a/c as well as 1-2 Infanty battalions 3 RFAs and 1 recon a/c 1 sub 2 DDG/FFG.
What is the best way to operate that force and allow freedom of action. For me it comes from a carrier and amphib group. The issues with basing rights will be an increasingly difficult one as our influence reduces and with regimes more inclined to listen to their people our access will be more limited. Are now limited AAR capability will significantly reduce or ability to use land based aircraft over longer distances in any significant number. At the end of the day I can click goggle maps and find any airfield in the world I can’t do the same for a carrier. A carrier is self contained no need for ashore accommodation or pressures on our air transport fleet to the same level of degree as land based operations.
The QE has been designed for 45 days endurance with a range of 8,000-10,000 nautical miles at 15 knots. Ammunition, aviation fuel and stores for at least 5 days of aviation operations, including first day surge thats with 36 F35s not now the case so it should last longer. Replenishment will typically take place every 7 days. It’s planned that a dedicated fleet tanker for CVF support will carry sufficient fuel (and some supplies) for a further 28 days of on task operations.
A carrier operating in the same way as hermes did in the falklands makes the most sense indeed she operated 36 harrier and seaking a/c as well as have marines and SF aboard. If you look at our small scale force it requires exactly 40 Fast Jet, AEW and helicopters. Add a few SF or marines a full CVF.
A joint JSF force of 4 twelve aircraft squadrons has always been likely I for one don’t think the RAF ever wanted F35A. It is not compatible with any UK tanker aircraft and has less range than the F35C with range being one of the main requirements in a tornado replacement a/c. A 2 FAA and 2 RAF mix allows a navy squadron for the worked up carrier to be reinforced by the second squadron for major deployments only requiring RAF participation in national emergency or due to a lack of land bases this would require a 70-80 a/c buy.
Helicopter operation from a conventional carrier can be difficult but due to CVF size this should be less so indeed employing the US navies standard 1.5hrs between fast jet launch and recovery should allow reasonable flexibility with heli operations.
I do wonder how much the extra training burden is for CTOL the following is the standard US navy qualification process. If the undergraduate phase was done in the US and the increased use of simulators I wonder how much different this is to qualifying a harrier pilot on a carrier.
Undergraduate CQ for Student Naval Aviators, currently completed in the T-45 Goshawk and consisting of 14 day landings (10 arrested; up to 4 can be “touch and goes”).
Initial CQ flown in a newly designated aviator’s first fleet aircraft (FA-18, EA-6B, or E-2C), consisting of 12 day (minimum 10 arrested) and 8 night landings (minimum 6 arrested).
Transition CQ for experienced pilots transitioning from one type of aircraft to another, consisting of 12 day landings (minimum 10 arrested) and 6 night arrested landings.
Requalification CQ for experienced pilots that have not flown from the carrier within the previous six months, consisting of 6 day arrested landings and 4 night arrested landings.
Given the F35s advanced nature and allowing for the current ACLS system on US carriers being on QE the US navy calls an approach utilizing this system to be a “Mode II” approach. Additionally, some aircraft are capable of “coupling” their autopilots to the glideslope/azimuth signals received via data link from the ship, allowing for a “hands-off” approach. If the pilot keeps the autopilot coupled until touchdown, this is referred to as a “Mode I” approach. If the pilot maintains a couple until the visual approach point (at ¾ miles) this is referred to as a “Mode IIA” approach. Not I think beyond the RAFs finest especially if he/she has practise it in a simulator first.
X, we don’t measure the worth of a service by who is most at risk but we do so on effect
I didnt want this to descend into an anti RAF rant, nip over to Sharkeys World if you want to indulge in that. For the last time, I am not pro or anti any service, in fact I am pro all services and unlike the vast majority of service centric thinkers realise that the best way to ensure the best for all is to be realistic and pragmatic, seek out wasteful duplication and cull it without sentimentality.
As I said, if the FAA is the most cost effective then fair enough, but my gut feeling is the other way
We are where we are. But where we are is in a dire financial crisis, and I mean the UK not just the MoD. Given this state of affairs we must make the best use of the assets we already have. On the one hand we saw the French and Italians flying antiques like the Crusaders and Starfighters well past their sell-by date but on the other hand we are doing the opposite – disposing of perfectly serviceable aircraft little more than half-way through their lives (Tornado F3) or even barely 6-7 years old (Tranche 1 Typhoons). Anyone who thinks this is acceptable is not living in the real world. There is no case for buying any new fast jets, full stop. The F-35 should be cancelled.
Not so long ago politicians were being confidently assured a naval Typhoon was not a practical proposition (fore-planes in the wrong place etc) – now we see BAE exhibiting a naval Typhoon to the Indians. We have 55 Tranche 1 Typhoons sitting in storage awaiting disposal. There has even been insane talk of scrapping them. I am sure it would not be trivial to navalise them but I cannot believe it would be impossible either. It begs a question though – where does a politician go to get informed impartial advice on this? I cannot believe BAE, the Navy or the RAF would give unbiased advice, none of them would favour STOBAL carriers equipped with converted Typhoons, because if it could be done it would kill the F-35 stone dead.
Cancelling the F-35 would free up a huge amount of money, some of which could be ploughed into re-engineering the tranche 1 Typhoons. More money would be saved by not fitting the carriers with catapults and maybe enough money could be saved to guarantee the 2nd carrier does not get sold off.
STOBAL carriers equipped with converted Typhoons would not be anyone’s idea of a perfect solution but that does not mean it would not be the best solution. The best solution is the one that suits the country’s interests best. The MoD does not have enough money to pay for what it has ordered, but every attempt to postpone payment, from ‘re-profiling’ projects to PFI simply increases the final costs and digs them into an even bigger hole. Discarding the possibility of an injection of funds, something has to be chopped in order to get the MoD’s finances into order. Unless the MoD’s finances do get sorted out the services face a depressing future.
Two STOBAL carriers equipped with converted Typhoons would not be as desirable as a load of F-35s or several other options, but they would be a quantum leap forward from the handful of Harriers we had until recently and certainly better than nothing.
Mark
Last time I pointed out the problems that might come from trying to opperate CVF east of Pakistan; Various Carrier junkies rubbished the suggestion that we would ever try. I was accused of setting up a ‘Gold plated straw man’.
I challange some of your figures regarding re supply in the real world, it would be a nightmare. Given the need to support the screening group as well. In vietnam the US were resupplying carriers ever 3 days: – the nuclear ones. Not ones with big thirsty Gas turbines that will neeed to be wound up to 28 knots to launch (as will their escorts).
@TD
If you were truly dispassionate about the FAA then you need to say how giving all the fast jets to the RAF and requiring them to spend time on the carrier will work, as every time I see something by serving RAF personnel on the issue they make clear that they would not spend more than a few weeks a year on a carrier. Its one thing to say that the RAF would have to do it (deploy for 6 months on a carrier) and it is another for them to actually change their culture to do it – if they will not change their culture then actually all you have done is make the CVF’s even less useful than before.
@ paul g
Metric or imperial? :)
@ Tubby
That is the crux of the issue. I think the Harrier is too blame. It takes an above average aviator to fly one. And that means that they can achieve the transition from land to sea quite easily. You can’t compare Harrier flying to conventional flying. An F35c flyer won’t be able to trap wires without practice; it isn’t a question of jump in and go. The majority will be tied to the carriers.
And Mark hit the nail on the head for me with his comments about the RN uniform bill. As all these aviators come down a common pipeline why can’t they be FAA pilots? Surely if it doesn’t matter if they are RAF by the same token it doesn’t matter if they are RN either? Or is purple code for RAF?
I think over looking the culture of a service is a mistake.
Right. I feel like I’ve just embarked on the journey to the centre of the Earth getting down here. I’ll give this my best shot, but I appreciate my arguments might be mute/out of date by the time they’ve been posted.
Firstly, if in the future TD finds the cash to hire a hotel/motel conference room and have a Think Defence seminar, I hearby swear I will punch in the head anyone who uses the word “Littoral” in their speech. I think you mean “Coastal” chaps. And the experience of the Royal Navy in the war for the-islands-that-shall-not-be-named, should serve as a harsh warning for anyone with grand dreams of building a Coastal style Naval task group.
Secondly, I’m not averse to RAF pilots flying off aircraft carriers, or even being in charge of the whole Naval air thing, but I think it should be a clearly marked career choice when the pilots sign up, so you end up choosing a career in “Fast Jet Pilot (Naval)” or “Helicopter Pilot (Naval)” and so on.
Now, down to the meat and bones of what to do with CVF. I would propose either:
1) Flog ’em: Build them, fit them with Cats and Traps, then sell them to the Colonies or France. Maybe even Brazil or India. The money from the sales is then poured back into the purchase of additional Astutes, with a view for two things;
i) Sea Denial in a major shooting war,
ii) A “Submarine Task Group” for things like Libya, where they do intelligence work, deploy knife wielding ninjas, and deliver TLAM to cover for the first night strike loss of F-35. At least one sub would essentially be the “Hunter”, armed to the tits with torpedos. The rest would carry 4-6 torpedos for defence and then stack up on TLAM’s. Would save having to purchase F-35 at all to do the door kicking role.
2) Landing Platform, Helicopter: Essentially a serious sized assault ship. Maybe a few aircraft purchased for immediate air defense of the task group, but other than that they just carry Helicopters. Bung your Marines and Ninjas on board and away you go. A little lacking in “punch”, but it would make one hell of an anti-sub vessel, and would have the almost unmatched “Capability Plus” of being a serious tool for Disaster relief/support, counter piracy and counter narcotics (which I think we should have kept our old carriers for, even if they weren’t going to fly Harriers).
3) The Full Monty: Forget about F-35 and it’s one day of usefullness and go Rafale-M. It needs to be intergrated with our weapons systems. Lucky then that we don’t need them tomorrow. Gives us plenty of time to prod the French into action and get the work done now. What you’re then left with is a carrier that holds 20-30 jets. Sea Control. Persistent air operations. Take your pick. Not a lot of use in low intensity operations though.
To compensate we also need to make some other trimmings. These would mainly apply to 3 but could be useful in general:
Type 26 – Forget it is the simple answer. There once was a day when the Frigate and the Destroyer did didn’t things, horses for courses and all that, but now…. not so much. So now I think you either;
i) design a small, low cost vessel to fill the Anti-mine and anti-sub role (frigate). It’s designed purely to work as part of a fleet, so it carries maybe a Phalanx or two and some light defensive armaments, but certainly no missiles. It’s a frigate, not a battleship.
ii) Ring BAE and tell them we want a Type 45-Batch 2, with better sonar, the harpoon and CIWS fitted. Not “for, but not with”, just fitted. This way you leverage savings from the Type 45 production line.
If you’re investing in Rafale-M, then that means the RAF has to dump Tornado at some point and just live with its 160 Typhoons. Tough is the word I’m looking for.
And the army would probably be up for downsizing too. The whole point of CAS and battlefield strike is to provide an airborne artillery, which means a reduced need for (but not outright elimination of) things like Apache, Challenger and Royal Artillery assets.
That’s my take on it so far at least. On one final thing, TD, I sent you a message through the “contact us” feature, not sure if you got it or not. Could clarify that for me?
Chris, yes, got your message, will reply in the morning, been out and about so have a backlog of stuff to catch up with but of course, the answer is yes
Hi all,
This has turned out to be a rather interesting so far, and some interesting points made. So now time for my 2 pence worth.
First of all I have to agree with a few of the posters on here and I also believe that the decision to go Cats n Traps is final and won’t be reversed any time soon, no matter how nice it would be. Just before I post my suggestion of what to do with the carriers I have a question:
Q: Since we’ve switched to the F-35C I assume we can’t just transfer over our production slots as it’s a different aircraft and since the USN hornets are getting long in the tooth would they be willing to free up some slots for us (and now also the USMC)?
My guess to answer would be not really. We might if we are lucky, I think the ISD for the F-35c for the USN might have even slipped back a year with program restructuring, have 1 squadron of F-35c by 2020 and definitely no more than 2 by 2025. So that got me thinking and one thing lead to another and so I started to read through the current(ish) listings of the AMARC boneyard to see what bargains we can pick up.
http://www.amarc.info/
Since we still don’t quite know what the cost will be of the F-35, the fact that we don’t have much in the way of money floating around in the next 10 years and the fact that I believe that the RAF should stay a 9 squadron FJ fleet (160 frames Min. needed) by 2030 the Tranche 1 eurofighters (used for AD only) will need to be replaced we could then buy a bigger buy of the F-35c for both the FAA and RAF. That means in the mean time we buy cheap frames from AMARC and trash them for 10 years.
So my plan:
MASC
We need 1 squadron at least. According to something I read (will try to find the link) a few years ago Oman wanted 5 E-2C Hawkeye 2000 (i.e the French type) and did a deal with the US for the 5 + spares and maintenance etc for $400m. We need 12 (4 flights of 3 aircraft, 1 training OCU flight + 3 flights, 1 deployed at all times). AMARC has 26 Hawkeyes at the moment.
Total cost: $1bn or £625.3m over 10 years.
ASW & Ships flight
Ships flight made up of 2 Merlins that haven’t been upgraded to new standard and 3 ASW Merlins for the ASW flight.
Fleet Air Defence
We need a buy of 40 a/c, which allows us to form 3 front line squadrons of 8 planes, an 8 plane OCU/OEU and 8 spares. I’m going to suggest (remember this is just a suggestion so I’m open to ideas and this is only temporary) the F/A-18 hornet (not super hornet) as AMARC has 94 frames to pick from and the Aussie have ASRAAM cleared on it. Offer a contact for 40 at 2006 prices + maintenance for 10 years.
Total cost: $2.8bn or £1.75bn or 10 years
Strike
Again 40 aircraft following the same pattern as Fleet AD squadrons. For this I have selected the Grumman A-6A Intruder, AMARC has 163 frames too pick from. It has good range and can carry 18,000 pounds over 5 hard points (4 wing, 1 fuselage). It would prove very useful in Libya right now say with a RAPTOR pod on the fuselage and 4x triple brimstone launchers on the wings or each with a few AA missiles and a Storm Shadow when the first strikes went in. It would do some serious damage. We would pay for cost in 1998 + maintenance + some weapons integration (brimstone & Storm Shadow ony).
Total cost: $2.8bn or £1.75bn over 10 years
This allows for 3 CAG of 24 a/c, (8x Fleet AD FJ, 8x Strike FJ, 3x MASC, 3x ASW & 2x Ships flight) with 1 always deployed at a cost of around £4.2bn over 10 years for planes and maintenance or £420m a year, which I think isn’t too bad for what we get. Sure we can’t take on the likes of china or Russia but for things like Libya or taking on 3rd world dictators it will be fine. Plus since most of it is “old” equipment (however look what the Kiwi’s did with the skyhawk), the RAF won’t mind the FAA operating it.
Sorry for the very long post TD and all. :-)
For 10 years I mean 2020 to 2030 time period, say first cash handed over in 2017 so a/c can be ready for ISD of 2020.
Churchill would have chosen the oil powered F35-C over the coal powered B.
@ The Mintcake Maker
Your figures alone for the Intruder work out at a bit over £40 million a pop. Which, for purchasing the airframes, reconditioning them, fitting them out with engines, avionics etc, setting them up to use our weapons, training pilots, training maintenance staff, qualifying them for safe flight etc, seems highly optimistic at best. I would imagine it would cost at least another £20 million per airframe, and that is perhaps being optimistic.
@ the whole F-22 vs Typhoon debate
This is not advocacy work for either side, merely an observation. The argument of 6 typhoon vs 2 F-22 doesn’t stand up, under any scrutiny known to mankind. Firstly, to achieve this hypothetical ratio on a reliable basis you would need a 3-1 ratio of Typhoons versus F-22 in your inventory. If take the 187 number that was quoted to congress once as a total figure, and round it down a bit for various reasons to 150, that would require the UK to own 450 Typhoons. Good luck with that.
Then you have to consider the likely hood of 6 Typhoons meeting a pair of F-22’s in combat. Normally patrols might engage each other, so either a 2 on 2, 2 on 4, or 4 on 4 is more likely/realistic.
@ TD
Superb, but not sure if that means you’ll e-mail me first or if I should send you the thing now, so I’ll take a leaf out of the Politicians book and simply sit on the issue quietly and see how it develops.
@Chris.B.
Hi, we seem to be talking past each other.
The point i’m failing to make is that over the next decade we are going to spend a huge amount of money upgrading the Typhoon with all the bells & whistle’s that the RAF are currently lusting after for that aircraft.
Why are we going to continue with that program?
If we were to make the next upgrade the final version we could then spend the money that was allocated for the rest of the Typhoon’s upgrades on more of the F35’s.
In 10 or 15 years time, what aircraft would you want to be flying if the Gov. ordered you to start offensive operations against someone from Land or Sea?
Typhoon or F35?
The decision should really only be left to the Pilots themselves. Noone else should get a say.
If the Pilots were to say “Typhoon all the way!” Then fine, spend the money on the upgrades for the Typhoon. However, i have a sneaking suspicion that they would opt for the best aircraft that they could get their hands on at the time & in our case that will be about 40’ish F35’s.
There are many people here, who imagine that at some time in the future, the UK will get roughly 60 – 80 F35’s.
That is not going to happen as there will not be any money for them. The pot of money available will have already been spent on upgrades for the Typhoon. Some here really need to accept that there is not going to be any increase in the defence budget at all.
Remember, the target is 2% of GDP, the actual real needs of the military does not come into it, at all.
So, better make sure you are spending what money you have on the best possible equipment that you can get.
One serious point, the Raptor V F15 was a for real example.
Five v one all at the same time & they lost.
If one bloke can defeat 5 blokes who know his aircraft’s weaknesses, then it says a lot about the real effectiveness of the so called 5th Generation fighter.
There have been (in many wars), instances of small numbers of better aircraft & pilots defeating superior numbers & defeating them almost completely. Many times, the people with the superior numbers have had to get the hell out of there as fast as they could go. I mean it has to have an effect on you, seeing your friends getting shot to bits all around you.
To say a 2 v 2 or 4 v 4 is more realistic is not stricly true, i once read about a 2 v 30 & yes the 2 won! They shot down quite a few & the rest hightailed it for home.
Agreed, that was an extreme case in the Korean war but the example should not be forgotten.
For the record, i used to think that the Rafale-M would be good enough, for long enough, for us. Frankly i could not believe how many G’s it can pull if it has to. I thought we should forget all about the next new thing & get something that can do the job soon & that something was the Rafale-M.
I have changed my mind.
In a decade or so, how will it compare to other aircraft in service around the world then? In a decade or so, will we still be blasting Arab airforce’s before they can even get their bloody jets off the ground? Somehow, i don’t think so.
Afghanistan, Iraq & Libya are affecting our thinking & our focus. Our focus should be on giving our military the best possible equipment we can get for them so that they can do what we ask them to do while losing as few people as possible.
Why is anyone interested in giving someone a fair fight?
Finaly, at last, i really think that in our long term stategic interest, it would be better to get as fully in sync as possible, with the US.
What do you think?
Sorry, but one more thing :)
Think Defence’s idea for a LOG, is, in my very humble opinion, an absolutely brilliant idea from the top draw. I cannot praise it enough. It would not cost that much to impliment & even better it could be your total contribution to a particular operation.
Freeing up the rest of your actual fleet ships of the need to be tied to a fixed point…..using the sea for mobility is the whole point, isn’t it?
Whoa! I leave the room for ten minutes and I have to wade through how many comments?
@ChrisB 1122 Yep lets have a conference…THINK DEF-CON sounds good to me…Margate/Southend in July…we can all eat fish n chips, drink real ale/cider, buy samurai swords and get matching iso container tattoos :-)
Like I said boss i kinda agree with you on making the most of what we have.Post 2015 nudges and winks aside I can’t see the defence budget going up.Even if we reduce the deficit we still have to pay the interest/debt repayments let alone deal with the unfunded procurement programmes(kicking projects into the long grass/capability holidays are just dumb) and pay for Vanguard/D5 replacement(whoa another can of hornets!) out of the main defence budget.
But I just don’t agree with RAF vs FAA thing…I don’t think it is duplication one is carrier based one is land based(hotel based?)…USMC Hornets/USN Hornets thats duplication…selection/training/evaluation/maintenance/stationing/uniforms share all that but operationally different very requirements…
I’m definitely not anti RAF I was born in Princess Alexandra Hospital RAF Wroughton and grew up in Brize/Hendon…
Realistic fast jet numbers 2015+
RAF-160 Typhoons
Coningsby
1 Sqn Typhoon QRA
2 Sqns Typhoon Expeditionary
1 Sqn Typhoon OCU
Leuchars
1 Sqn Typhoon QRA
2 Sqns Typhoon Expeditionary
1 Sqn Typhoon OEU
FAA-JSFB
Yeovilton
1 Sqn JSFB QE
1 Sqn JSFB PoW
1 Sqn JSFB OCU/OEU
@Willy Dribble
My vote goes to Southend then. Just wait until I can afford it!
@Michael (Civ)
“If we were to make the next upgrade the final version we could then spend the money that was allocated for the rest of the Typhoon’s upgrades on more of the F35′s.”
— That is entirely dependent on each individuals view of which is the superior/necessary aircraft.
“The decision should really only be left to the Pilots themselves. Noone else should get a say.”
— Who’s going to pay for 160 Spitfires with diamond encrusted skins? ;)
“So, better make sure you are spending what money you have on the best possible equipment that you can get.”
— Agreed. All the more reason to be sure that F-35 is the right solution to your capability problem.
“One serious point, the Raptor V F15 was a for real example. Five v one all at the same time & they lost.”
— It might be true, it might not. Ask yourself this question though; if the F-15’s shot down the F-22 with anything other than a 1:1 or 1:2 kill/loss ratio, would they tell you about it? The point is mute now, but it was in the interest of the USAF, at a time when the F-22 was in serious doubt, to give every possible boost to their hopes of getting more than just 187 examples. If Congress had gotten wind of a bad result that would have killed the whole thing quicker.
“There have been (in many wars), instances of small numbers of better aircraft & pilots defeating superior numbers & defeating them almost completely. Many times, the people with the superior numbers have had to get the hell out of there as fast as they could go. I mean it has to have an effect on you, seeing your friends getting shot to bits all around you.”
— Most of said examples result from superior crews; tactics, training and morale (and in some cases, big, brass balls). Once the quality of crews and their experience against a given enemy evens out, loss exchange ratios tend to even out a little as well. Superior crew training was the key in ‘Nam.
“To say a 2v2 or 4v4 is more realistic is not stricly true, i once read about a 2v30 & yes the 2 won! They shot down quite a few & the rest hightailed it for home.”
— See above. Also, and I don’t mean to get personal here, but if you’d read the point I was making properly you’d realise it was in the F-22’s favour.
“In a decade or so, will we still be blasting Arab airforce’s before they can even get their bloody jets off the ground? Somehow, i don’t think so.”
— Agreed. With the growing shift towards Hybrid Electric vehicles, we’ll all be shooting up Africa for their Cobalt, Copper and oil. The Democratic Republic of Congo will be a prime ground, the poor buggers. China already has it’s foot in the door. Next on the list will be Bolivia, which has half of the worlds known Lithium deposits. The Brazilians, Japanese and French are already getting in there, but surprise, surprise, we’re not. The main hope to avoid that will be advances in induction motors, but then that would require the UK to subsidise university degrees in engineering, advanced computing, Physics, maths, Chemistry etc, and I can’t see any UK Government doing anything as clever as that.
“Afghanistan, Iraq & Libya are affecting our thinking & our focus. Our focus should be on giving our military the best possible equipment we can get for them so that they can do what we ask them to do while losing as few people as possible.”
— To a degree, but then the argument to the opposite would be that we’ve been waiting for “our type of war” for a long time now and the world keeps inconveniently refusing to play Cricket.
“Finaly, at last, i really think that in our long term stategic interest, it would be better to get as fully in sync as possible, with the US.”
— To be honest, despite the “Special relationship”, the Rebels have never been that keen on us. As long as we do as they ask, they don’t mind. When we try and do things without them, or without at least asking them first, they get a little ancy. People often point to them helping us out with Choppers in Afghan, but that’s because it’s their war and they want our help. If there was nothing in it for them, I don’t think they would be so generous.
“What do you think?”
— Well… wait a minute.
Some more comments since i can’t sleep…
I forgot Falklands MPA flight
Tranche 1/block5 fine for QRA but if we can off load them and get tranche 3b much better.
JSFB numbers at least 60 we’ll need more attrition replacements/maintenance reserves for carrier operations.
Aircrew and in use reserve aircraft numbers have to be increased if overall units are to be decreased.
Harmonising the harmony guidelines across all services also has to be addressed…surging to half/sustaining quarter is imho realistic/desirable…they’ll be winners and losers but the NSC tier 1 risks didn’t include warmongering politicians so if i was calling the shots…there wouldn’t be that many shots…
“An unmanned system might also require significant satellite bandwidth, even with the advances in autonomous operation and onboard processing, satellite bandwidth that we don’t have.
It is also unlikely that an unmanned system would be able to fulfil the counter air role for several decades.”
I think people really miss the point here.
A Pilot gets something like 200 hours flight time a year right?
And a Fast Jet has a service life of something like 25 years, right?
And costs about £50,000 an hour to fly.
That gives us a cost of £250,000,000 over its service life.
Not sure if the purchase price and various SLEPs needs to be added to that, but even if justs £250mn, thats a lot of money.
A Machine doesnt need practice.
Machine Skills dont degrade over time.
Even if, and believe me, it is an if, a computer pilot is inferior to a human pilot. Is he only one fifth of the pilot?
Because thats basicaly what your looking at. Your 1 human piloted Typhoon comes in at £250mn your 1 Drone Typhoon can be bought for £50mn and put in a controlled hangar for the next decade. Even if we say drone Typhoons do need some maintenace, we will if nothing else require teams of fitters enough for war fighting, they’re likely to be having at least a 3:1 numerical advantage.
Throw in the fact that a head on collision is a win for a drone and, well, all hail skynet…
@Chris B – I’ll take option 3 if it is on the table please!
I am more worried about simply keeping what we already have and/or pland to have than looking for an expansion in aviation assets alone. To gain any or the suggested increased something else laid out in the SDSR has to go so before there are any new ideas about the strength on the RAF/FAA think about what would be scrapped as a result. Remember no new money is cetain after 2015, and given the slow speed of recovery the country is undergoing, is looking more and more likely in any form other than keeping pace with inflation.
Btw just read this on the Telegraph website
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/8412467/Shortage-of-RAF-pilots-for-Libya-as-defence-cuts-bite.html
Dominic you must realise that ucavs also require a fully trained pilot to fly them also the only difference is there not necessarily deployed. Ucavs will also require maintainance and thru life ugrades. A proper ucav that could properly replace a strike jet will not be less expensive to maintain I believe.
As for the telegraph I’m not surprise it most likely a valid concern. From a fleet of currently on 60 a/c total over 20 are now on ops either over Libya or qra. Due to lack of pilots instructures were supporting the falklands task so it not surprising there is now training concerns with this extra commitment.
@Lord Jim
With harmony guidelines of sustained operations 6 months on 18 months off we’d only need four Multi-mmmn brigades there’s some savings…beef up(I don’t just mean Bovril) the infantry manning levels to take the strain…again its a needs must.
Also I think a Think Def-Con is a good idea. Any chance?
@ Chris – “in the war for the-islands-that-shall-not-be-named”
I’m glad to see my invented terminology is proving catchy among the TD crowd. :D
@ Chris.B.
Your right they are a bit on the low side, it was late and i wass just punting the idea of what we could do in the short term out too see what you guys made of it. Even if the entire project cost increased by 50% thats still only around £600m a year.
It would proably cost the same for about 50 F-35c over 10 years with maintainance. Based on Canadian covernment costs of $18bn for 65 a/c over 20 years, so (18/2)/1.5 = £6bn/65*50+30%(30% increase on the C version)= roughly £6bn over 10 years. And even the canadians aren’t sure about the price now.
So its horses for courses 50 F-35c in the short term, when we still dont know about software bugs and costs and 50 only allows for 12 to be deployed constantly (yes it could be argued that we need less because its more advanced) OR buy around 90ish used frames to allow us to have 16 FJ at sea at all times + (and this is the winner for me) Hawkeye for MASC.
Mark
“Dominic you must realise that ucavs also require a fully trained pilot to fly them”
Why?
Tomahawks and Stormshadows and Sidewinders are all perfectly capable of self piloting are they not?
So why can a platform to carry and deploy those weapons not be self piloted?
An unmanned fighter might cost as much per hour to maintain, but its simply not going to require 20 hours of flight time a month.
Its fitters will still need to be employed, although far more of them could be T/A, and they can spend their days taking apart and rebuilding grounded platforms to maintain their skills, which doesnt burn jet fuel or wear out airframes.
Yes I know there are “ethical” arguements against it, but they simply dont stack up.
Is the bloke who presses the button to fire a tomahawk from an Astute in any more control than the bloke who presses the launch button for a CAP that goes on to shoot something down?
Jedi..Czesc…love your blog…
Think Def-Con organising committee on me lets talk about it on the good news thread since its kinda empty….
How do you solve a problem like Maria and/or CVF?
In light of A Fact Lite Factbox on Typhoon, buy the Rafale-M and tell the media it’s a Sea Typhoon. They won’t be able to spot the difference.
Jesting aside, I find the suggestion of jump jets and a multi-role carrier quite persuasive. I would think the F-35B could also operate from other nation’s conventional carriers if required given a light enough load and long enough rolling takeoff.(ie in the same manner the USMC already operate their Harriers)
The 3 different F-35 models represent something of a false choice imo. How do you know which to buy? Each provides something the others don’t – A is nimble and can carry the biggest war load I think, B is adaptable but lacks range, C is sturdy and long legged. This serves to lose sight of the correct comparison – how much of an improvement over existing kit would any of those three bring?
The benefit is substantial whichever you pick and the most adaptable is the B. A shorter range and lower payload is something that can be worked around. Not being able to land or takeoff is not. The decision would rest on what it is envisaged our forces do with them – are they to operate from a carrier and then quickly move onto land (so would benefit from the STOVL capability) or are they to operate from a carrier indefinitely?(so the longer range would be of benefit)
A flight of fancy – could the B be fired from a catapult?
Czesc Willy, thank you.
Do I sense the presence of a Pole in the force?
:D
Polish ex girlfriend, loads of Polish friends and a very messy time in Warsaw 2004…Zubrowka and apple juice :D
Willy, bloody bison grass and apples
bad bad memories :)
ADG
The FrogPhoon remains a viable option, we provide the carriers, France provides the aircraft, cough…
Re ThinkDef-Con – what a splendid idea, if it takes off I will host the North American version !
The last thing we should do is change anything structural about the ships to make them halfbaked and Anglo-British. If we avoid that trap, it will always be possible to change the airgroup later. Otherwise the airgroup will be determined by the weird thing we did to the ship.
I’m increasingly keen on Seaphoon as a STOBAR option, especially as the Rafale has the problem that we’ve got to wait while the one line at Dassault fills up the French squadrons. Rafale wasn’t quite as late as Eurofighter but it was still pretty late, and the AdlA (and the Aeronavale even more so) is in a similar position to the RAF – a lot of tired jets and a lot of people desperate to get the new ones in operation as they trickle off the line.
If the job is actually less horrible than previously advertised, and doing STOBAR apparently helps with this (and also with equipping the carriers), this could let us wind up the whole machinery of the JCA buy and put a significant number of 4th going on 5th generation aircraft on the carrier.
Question: what’s the position with the German and Italian Typhoon production lines? (yes, I know BAE would scream blue murder, but it is just a matter of shuffling workshare between sites depending on who has spare capacity).
@ Willy
aha, the polish girl-friend is shared, as is the love of Bison-grass vodka. Glad Admin has fond memories of it too.
@Jedi
We shared a girlfriend!? Was TD there? I have no memory of this!
:}
Re UAV/UCAVs
I don’t think the bandwith/autonomy issues are gonna be solved anytime soon so manned/unmanned seem to be rather complimentary. The disadvantages of high cost,risk and lack of endurance of modern combat aircraft seem to be to be the advantages of UAVs…
What worries me is the MoD have come up with great names…Scavenger/Watchkeeper…but seem to lack a long term plan…
UAVs would be an excellent test bed for future procurement procedures…in terms of defining doctrine/requirements/specifications/selection/industrial strategy/project management etc etc…
lol, merely a reference to the the polish’ness of our respected spouses, ex or otherwise. ;)
with regard to all the suggestions above, does the decision by mr gates to cancel funding for the GE/RR F136 engine sway anyone? Basically gives pratt & witney carte blanche as sole supplier, be interesting to see what RR think as they’ve done most of the design for the lift fan on dave b. If it were me teddy would be shooting out of the pram and i’d be taking my ball (lift fan) home, so there!!
Hi paul g,
Two engines was always a risk management measure; now the engine probably comes out as risk n:o 54 or something on the list, so time to cancel the insurance?
The royal navy should get the F-18 Super Hornet from surplus The F-18’s should be much cheaper to buy , and so add up the greatly required number of aircraft. The Raf can than but the third tranch of the eurofigher which can also be navalised for us on the carriers. Buy F-35 in 20 years time if they are still viable , but i think they will.
IXION @1050 yesterday.
Well the figure I used our I believe the ones used for key project requirements. They may have changed post SDSR I dont know. Also dont forget T45 is also long legged part of the increase in unit price was to allow this and eliminate some RFA requirement. As for Vietnam as far as I know the only nuclear carrier the US would have had then would have been Enterprise as Nimitz was not commissioned until the mid 70s.
With the range issues east of Pakistan and real lack of friendly airbase anywhere close to any potential area of threat I would have thought carrier air would be in its element here as opposed to any land alternative we have. Many UK task forces have gone out that way for a long deployment with only 2-3 RFAs in toe but having the ability to do it would require MARS being funded as planned.
Dominic
“So why can a platform to carry and deploy those weapons not be self piloted?”
Well they could be I just dont know were you’re going to launch them from. Most countries (including the UK) will not currently allow UAVs to transit there airspace. Even the Global Hawk has a number of restrictions on it use in controlled airspace this is not yet a done deal. A drone carrying 3-4 storm shadow or a bomb or brimstone will at some point be required to select a target. This will require human input which means training and indeed flight training.
We could also employ RauxAF squadron right now for manned aircraft like the Yanks do but we choice not to (I believe reserves should be more involved particularly in the RAF and Army but neither service want that).
Planes of any type are built to fly. Its like if you buy a car and park it in your garage for months on end bits will seize and seals crack much more quickly than if its used.
Willy dribble
“The disadvantages of high cost,risk and lack of endurance of modern combat aircraft seem to be to be the advantages of UAVs…”
A fighter type UCAV will also be high cost and high risk. The endurance issue is all down to the speed you wish to fly at. The current generation of UAVs are recon drones (with some attack capability bolted on) which are designed for endurance hence the very high wing aspect ratio (similar to a glider or U2) a global hawk has a larger wing span than a 737. A ucav will not be designed for that mission the current generation are slow and require some significant transit time even from fwd operating locations.
IXION
The (forgotton) British Pacific Fleet managed to operate carriers East of Suez in 1945. Their carrier launched aircraft were the only Brits to bomb Japan. RAF Tiger Force never made it before VJ Day.
British carriers were in action during the Korean War.
Everybody !
what about MRAS, CVF runs for 8 days then needs resupply what are the implications for resupply (and hence costs) in your CVF configurations .
At the moment we’re all sending them to sea for a week and then finding them coming back for spuds, loo rolls and diesel !!
(and spares of ? sort)
lets get the support worked out before we set out.. not discover another optimistic scenario of our own making
UCAV’s still need supervision. And even the most optimistic suggestions of fully autonomous planes will likely prove to be just that; optimistic.
Computers run on programs, a fixed sequence of commands that they follow, interogating certain data along the way to help them make decisions.
As anyone who grew up in the late 80’s/90’s playing computer games will tell you, you can learn the patterns that computer programs use very rapidly. You can expose glitches in their ability to “see” and “react” to external stimulus.
I just have visions of a future enemy airforce flying around in circles laughing as they watch our hoarde of UCAV’s trying to dogfight pieces of chaff.
eight days in a hot war when operating as a fully committed strike carrier from day 1.
Jedi is right its 8 Alpha strike days of operation of the air wing then an air wing resupply(jet fuel more bombs ect). CVF the ship and food ect need replensihed every 45 days. MARS has to happen if we want to deploy any ship anywhere. It the RFA Fort Victoria (one stop replenishment ship) Replacement that most concerns the Carrier Group. Its the same with any deployed land based aircraft too. It just the land based will need more assets assigned for logistics than the sea based one.
so can we currently support CVF alpha days ? and if so how many ? and at what speed would CVF travel to allow the resupply? and at what range?
Well we currently have RFA Fort II class but one was culled in the latest defence cuts. Its that class of vessel that will support CVF. IF the current vessel can I dont know. CVF has a range of 8-10 thousand miles at 15 knts.
What will hobble MARS is reliance on British yards (read BAE.)
Fincantieri have just completed a fleet tanker (27,500 displacement, 20kts, 4 RAS stations) for Indian Navy; it was designed and built in about 3 years (yes three years!) CVF will need 2 similar ships (at least) for bunkers and AVCAT. But with MoD (N) at the helm well……..
Of course then there is the problem of dry stores. For this I would just dust of the Fort 2 design. Like the one we have just got rid off.
It is a question of political will. And there really isn’t one.
I think Grand Logistics did a post on how reliant land based air in the Gulf War was dependent on the sea for supplies.
Jedi, Mark, JH
CVF has an 8- 10000 mile range at 15 knots but in order to fire a F35c off a catapult it will need to accelerate to at least 25 knots, as will the 2 type 45 with it etc. That will really hurt fuel consumption doing that to launch 18+ sorties a day.
Yes we opperated east of suez in WW2 but come on! At the time we had 2 million men in continental europe in Uniform etc. If we had a navy the size we had in 45 we would not be worrying about 2 carriers and 19 escorts. That much would be parked in Plymouth on a slow day.
So opperating east of Suez is ok now?
Not gold plated or straw any more?
So we need MARS now to go with CVF. Just add it to the credit card shall we?
I Posted about difficulties opperating east of suez and various carrier junkies waded in…
EL sid replied
As for “East of say Pakistan” – no wonder you’re fretting, it’s pretty clear that the future of the RN is not about independent operations east of Suez, and probably only coalition ops as far as Pakistan, so you’re trying to shoot down a gold-plated straw man again.
Jackstaff
‘It’s strategic foolishness, instead of being a strong, smart power (rather than a “great” one) where it matters. Elminates a lot of straw men along the way’.
Tubby
‘our priority should be twofold: firstly to provide CAP over our amphibs and escort in our helo’s as the bridgehead a landing zone, while carrying sufficient MASC and ASW platforms. Realistically for next 15 years our interests …… is’s going to be in Africa’
This has rather slipped back into ‘we must have carriers We must have carriers… exterminate exterminate…’
Okay of too a slight tangent here, my ideal RFA
2x Wave class
2x Fleet tankers, either BMT Aegir or RR NVC
2x Fleet Solid Stores
(or possibly 4, multi-purpose AOR’s)
5/6x British JSS, take the Dutch design converts ome of the hanger space for more marines (around 200) and stores (just leave enough room on the flight deck for 2 medium or 1 large helicopter and storage for 4x medium or 2 Chinook. This allows 2 for the ARG, 1 for the Western Fleet, 1x Far East (Eastern) Fleet + 1/2 ready in the UK.
3x Bay
6x Point
1x Diligence
I have no idea how much it would cost, and its probaly in the flights of fatasy, its just my rough idea maybe around £4Bn for the lot, hopefully a lot less if we built the fleet tankers and stores abroad, hopefully nearer £2-3Bn in total.
http://www.rolls-royce.com/marine/products/ship_design/naval_support_vessels/unrep/index.jsp
http://www.bmtdsl.co.uk/?/309/865/
And now to get back on track,
I know i posted some figures earlier about referbished a/c for use on the CVF, so ive gone back to make them more realistic.
£3500m for 40 F/A – 18 a & c* over 10 years
£700m for 12 E2-c over 10 years
£2800m for 40 E6 over 10 years
£7000m total cost over 10 years
£700m per year for 92 a/c
OR
£6600m for 55 F-35c over 10 years
£700m for 12 E2-c Over 10 years
£7400 total cost over 10 years
£740m per year for 67 a/c
55 F-35c = 3x frontline squadron2 of 12, 1x 12 plane OCU + 7 spares.
* There are only 21 F/A-18C frames, so i’d take them all and make up the numbers with A’s and a few B’s for the OCU
Remember all the planes listed above are stored in AMARC, not doing much, so i propose to buy them at the last know(highest price of wiki) + refurb + maintainance for 10 years.
Some might say that the F-35c is better because its new and doesnt require as much maintainance however it would have to fly more as in my “cut price” FAA there are dedicated FD + Strike a/c. Also even if say 2 or 3 of the A-6’s needed to be fitted with jammer pods to beat local SAM’s and AD I think im right in saying that 5/6 A-6’s carrier more than the same number of F-35c?
Plus if the hornet is still too costly they have nearly 150 A-4 Skyhawks we could pick from and do up.
@ixion
Why pick a random figure of 25kts? The speed required will be completely dependent on how much wind there is and the required angle and speed of wind across deck. This will depend on the weight and type of aircraft being launched. I am sure some computer modelling has been done but before carrier construction complete and deck trials of aircraft complete you are just guessing. Is 25kts a no wind day in the gulf? That would be worst case, on a really bad day in North atlantic carrier could be going very slowly into wind.
further to my last post the only ship tethered to a carrier when it launches aircraft is the ship in the life guard station. The 45 can position as required to keep the HVU inside there isoleth.
@ IXION
Yes CVF to be done properly will need a fleet train. Is it expensive? Well yes and no. We could build all the necessary oilers and dry stores ships for about £1.5billion. About a 10th of the cost of the FSTA. And how much to operate? About 100million or so pa. So over 25 years about 2.5billion. That is still a lot, lot, less than FSTA. So………
Of course a good chunk of the fleet train to support CVF itself could be dispensed with if it was a nuclear ship. That would probably push CVF price up to a approximately £5billion a copy. (That is on the high side, think current hull plus the cost of 5 Vanguards, sans the expensive pressure hulls.) That sounds expensive but compared to Typhoon it is a mere bagatelle. Plenty of steam for the cats though or electric for the linear motor launcher thingy.
APATS
I admit my ignorance of take off speed of Seaphoon or F35C.
But modern fighters do seem to have take off speed in the 125 + knots area. (we are way beyond tying swordfishes to the deck as they tried to take of at more than 30 knots of wind).
Frankly if you get a wind of more than 50 or so knots the sea conditions would be too rough to launch.
USA work nimtizes etc up to 30 knots to launch very often (I am told).
Still think we are underestimating fuel load required to support the ships of a task force regardlessof the aircraft.
@ Minty
Those Italian built Indian tankers cost 300million Euros for the pair.
See,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deepak_class_fleet_tanker
And I made a typo it took only 2 years to design and then build the first.
All good clean fun.
Does anybody know if the UK refines all its own AVCAT? Or does it import some? If so how much?
@ IXION
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apparent_wind
To be fair, arguing about the cost of supporting a Carrier is a little redundant. The Supports ships would be needed regardless for the various other resupply missions that are assigned to the RN, and you have to keep in mind what it is you’re getting with a carrier. You can accept an increase in cost to buy a certain capability e.g. not having to fly Tornados 3000 miles, waiting for days before you can get your basing rights etc, etc ad nauseam.
On UAV autonomy, this is OT but fun, autonomous robots playing keepy-uppy/volleyball. If you let the vid run on to the second one, they talk about the science a bit :
http://www.idsc.ethz.ch/Research_DAndrea/FMA
ThinkDef-Con surely has to happen in Felixstowe?
Or would TD’s head explode in the presence of so many containers?
Too many things to comment on but TD – I’ve said in the past I think you’re being way too optimistic about the efficiency gains of having all FJ under one roof, and I’ll say it again. You don’t get efficiency gains from merging an efficient small organisation with a bigger bureaucratic one. My real problems with giving F-35 to the RAF are two-fold. First that it’s rewarding failure – the crabs should get no more new types until they can prove that they can manage what they’ve got. Aside from the litany of procurement balls-ups (Nimrod AEW, Nimrod MRA4, Chinook HC3, Wildcat, Typhoon Tr1 to name a few) they’ve got a shocking record on looking after the kit they do have. We went years without ever meeting the targets for Tonka availability, and the Harrier force only made it sporadically. Admittedly things have got better since they closed down DARA and let BAE take over maintenance – but how bad do you have to be if you make BAE look slick? The other thing is that for as long as the F-35 fleet is small enough to fit on one CVF, every F-35 will have to be prepared to go to sea, and it just makes sense to regard the entire fleet as a naval asset.
I really don’t see huge synergies from having them under the same cap badge – the RAF runs its various types largely independently of each other already, which is how you get crazy stuff like a £90m/year airfield being dedicated to just 9 aircraft, which are then grounded and scrapped but the airfield stays open for three years after the last plane flew from it. Never mind carriers without planes, how about airbases without planes?
It’s not as though the logistics chains have much in common, basic training is already centralised but type conversion costs twice as much, so you don’t get much switching between types except as now where the Tornado is being replaced by Typhoon. All the HR/IT/vetting stuff is being centralised across the MoD into Defence Business Services, so again you have to ask – where are the savings? Give the FAA Lightning, let the RAF prove it can manage the Typhoons effectively before giving them more shiny things.
@Chris.B. – you can’t say simply that F-35 is better than Typhoon, or vice versa. It depends. Not least on things like AWACS support, but a couple of Typhoons in A2A mode will probably wreak havoc on a bunch of incoming A2G F-35’s – and vice versa. Different strengths, different weaknesses.
I think Gabriele is a bit quick to dismiss HOBS missiles. They’re not necessarily about doing a full 180 degree flip, just getting to places where the plane couldn’t place them otherwise. He might want to read up on the AIMVAL/ACEVAL trials which had F-5’s doing nasty things to F-14’s and F-15’s. Now OK, an F-5 isn’t quite a Tucano – but let’s just say it was those trials that made the USAF a lot more interested in killing the opposition before they got into dogfighting range, hence AMRAAM etc.
HOBS doesn’t make manoeuvrability irrelevant, but it really makes the returns diminish ever more quickly. A 9g plane like an F-16 or F-35A will always have a considerable advantage over a 7.5g plane like a F-35B/C when it comes to conventional dogfighting, but the differences between 7g, 9g, or 11g all seem pretty irrelevant when faced with a 50g missile. And a 9g plane may have compromises in important things like payload or fuel load. So the way I see HOBS is that it reduces the importance of absolute manoeuvrability (at least for manned platforms) and puts more emphasis on eg having lots of BVR missiles and the target acquisition systems to use them. So I do wonder a bit about the tradeoffs between LO and payload.
@EL Sid
I don’t remember arguing for either.
Chris B.,
I think it was Mark’s comments (at least I think it was Mark — there you are then, lots of related comments tightly spaced, lots of chance for blue-on-blue) that drew El Sid’s eye. And your comment at 0003Z is straight on. The trouble with the supply argument is that it ignores just how hard it is to set up and supply landward air-basing outside an arc running through Europe to Saudi/Iraq. And if you’re looking at having to start from scratch round Africa and the Caribbean/Those Islands (portals to South America) or the frozen tundra of the old Greenland bases (ref: Arctic) that gets a hell of a lot dicier. And for those who would say “scrap carrier, let’s have thirty C2 instead,” those need resupply as well, particularly if you expect to actually sweat them around the margins of these various failed states. They may demand less individually than a carrier and its escorts, but there are more of them spread over more water, which means you need more RFA assets to prevent running your extant ones into the ground.
IXION somewhere above,
I bags a blue Dalek — exterminate the rainbow :) But seriously, since those of us who think carriers are a decent idea are neither from Skaro nor some kind of secret society, I disagree pretty seriously with the folks suggesting “oh, let’s send carriers swanning round Asia.” Even when it was either the first- or second-most powerful fleet in the world, there were only two periods when the RN had financial and strategic latitude to be a player in the Pacific and eastern Indian oceans, the mid-1800s and 1945-65. Now? Well, Chris B. is right on the money — the important “resource wars” of the coming century are in Africa, possibly the Andes, and the polar regions. All of them border the “quiet backwater” of the Atlantic, Britain’s strategic home turf. The Middle East is a graveyard of yesterday’s empires (the Yanks are there, beyond any arguing about Israeli lobbies, because a good chunk of their national-security establishment is quite literally paid for by petrochemical companies that don’t want to be yesterday’s news. Be ironic if representative governments, of whatever stripes from Sensible to Silly, in the region actually squeezed them out.) So concentrating on being a strong power closer to home (Atlantic and circumnavigating Africa) makes good sense. Sufficient unto the region is the evil thereof and all that stuff. I wouldn’t even bother pointing nukes at anything east of Pakistan, or trying to.
Boss and other sceptics,
I don’t think much of the current crop of admirals — lusting after oceans full of frigates and sucking up to the USN are not recommendations in my book. Somewhere Terence Lewin is not amused. But saying they shafted the fleet to protect the carriers only describes part of the effect and ignores the causes. They protected the carriers, and the Astutes (saving 7 of the 8 they really wanted, and might squeeze in the eighth if Vanguard replacement goes slow), and the deterrent boats (which MoD’s been made to pay for but that’s another can of worms). The RAF have fought like tigers for Typhoon and their Tornado placeholders for the next shiny thing (F35). The Army’s dug in on its manpower-guaranteeing war in Afghanistan and the next version of the motor pool (FRES). This is because they’re all beseiged by the effects of an unsustainable economic model for the British nation-state (no more of this capitalists v. socialists nonsense, it’s so last century, we’re all the way back to “What is the Third Estate” against the supranational moneybagses) and an all-powerful Treasury that considers its brief to be defending that system. Those are your points of attack. It took a modernizing religious radical (Thomas Cromwell) to dissolve the monasteries, and a dyed in the wool Tory (Pitt the Younger) to tax landed income and tolerate those newfangled industrial tradesmen. Want to solve the problem? It needs a change like that. That’s been put off fifty years or so. Can’t be put off forever. The Shah always falls in the end, as somebody once said. How messy what follows is, depends on the brains of the folks there in the moment.
Fixes in the meanwhile? Sod Type 26. You want to see me fulminate about the Admiralty? Has nothing to do with carriers (I save that for the last government — almost said that without laughing — and Big And Expensive) or subs or destroyers. A bunch of second-rate admirals longing for their Cold War youth is not the way forward. Sell one of the T23s and the Albions while they’re not yet knackered. Transfer five percent — **five** percent! — of one year’s DFID budget, preferably the bits subsidising Indian nukes, add it to the sale of above hulls, and get two Juan Carlos. Smaller ship’s crew than the Albions (yes I took into account the LPDs count their teams from 29 Assault Sqdn RM, them wot drive the landing craft), parts commonality with Spain, new hulls to last a while, great helo platforms, put roughly an entire EMF aboard. Two of them and two Bays at full war load will move just about all of 3 Commando Brigade themselves, especially when you add spare bits of space on a QE carrier. So then your carriers really are there to fly fast jets. Take the monies for T26 and get on with 2087 for all surviving T23s, and putting a full quota of weapons/vls/etc. on the T45s. Also getting at least two more T45s in the bargain. (Then you can assure one T45 for Armilla out on the strategic frontier, and availability of two more for a carrier group much of the time.) BAE wants to keep shipbuilding alive. Britain has great ship designers. Come up with a British-flavoured MEKO for the export market. Then the RN can buy in on an ASW hull arrangement when the T23s are truly knackered, at commercial prices, not “save our company and boost our stock valuation” prices.
With two real carriers, you can have bilateral agreements with the French and Dutch about rotation. Something like:
– QE battle group
– CdeG (later Richelieu once they flog CdeG to Brazil as a “bonus” with those subs) group
– PoW battle group
– Dutch ARG
Then you’re only requiring 50% full availability over a cycle from British carriers (with one worked up enough that you could push hard in the event of another Those Islands-like crisis.)
Next step, sod F35 early production runs. If it actually works, buy in when they get to E/F or so, once the Typhoons/Rafs/Hornets are all knackered. Show sense for once instead of currying status and favour. Either STOBAR the ships with Typhoon and live with rotary ASaC aboard Merlin (can be aboard the LHDs too, it’s an add-on kit so one could potentially generate numbers) or except the catapaults and buy in on Raf and Hawkeye. (I do like TMM’s buy from the boneyard suggestion on Hawkeyes.) Since in both cases there could be a different OCU arrangement, aim for 70 airframes. Three duty squadrons of 14 each (it seems an odd number, but the old Eagle/Ark Royal squadrons and the USN’s Tomcat squadrons were often in numbers of 14), another that would either “swing” for training or serve, and 2×14 of spares. With the lower stress on constant at-sea availability, you might even press to have two squadrons typically aboard at sea. Twenty-eight fast jets plus AEW and a bit of Wildcat perimeter ASW is plenty for most missions. In a heavy duty situation, one could either push 42 aboard your duty carrier, filling up the LHDs with helo assets (they can hold 20-24 plus full complement of green death and equipment), or Grand Fleet it with both carriers and 24-28 aboard each, rejiggering the squadrons as needed based on pilots and working frames.
What does that get you? Pretty well all the strategic effect you need. Plus it guarantees significant “buy-in” from the other two most significant Atlantic-oriented European nations, France and the Netherlands. Plus it means that, when the USN’s dire ship crunch hits in the 2020s, a new “five power” arrangement (Brits, Cloggies, Norse, Canucks, Danes) could face off and hold the Arctic line against Russian naval power with, perhaps, a small backing screen of American SSNs. (Unless the Russians get into a naval race their yards can’t hack.) Again, the irony is that for ships built in part to suck up to the Yanks, they can then give the UK leverage it hasn’t enjoyed in decades as the USN rearranges itself away from the north Atlantic to absorb ship shortfalls.
All of which is to say the QEs are worth it, and a fleet designed around
– them
– nuclear subs and
– MCM*
is likely to be much more strategic “use” to the UK than dozens of frigates on the wave.
* So, for another “impossible thing before breakfast” — ah, British optimism, makes me miss the old country so — I’d like to C3 learn from the Canadian Kingston-class and develop an MCMV sized to be capable of ocean-going patrol.
El Sid,
What you said at 0155Z, pretty well all of it. But especially the bits that the RAF are their own worst enemy arguing for total control of care-and-feeding on fast jets.
Also,
Dave-B is a dead bird walking. Even if they pull off the heroic feat of stopping the deck-melting thing, the sheer money pit it has been for the entire programme must end and soon or if they’re not careful the northern neighbour will start to lead the walk-out on the viable types (A and C) which have been grotesquely price-inflated on R&D and delays many of which relate to B. Plus like the F22, Dave-B is low hanging fruit for American congresscreatures of both parties, and for the USN (thought MoD was the only place with lethal inter-service politics? Tch.)
Good point, jackstaff,
” rotary ASaC aboard Merlin (can be aboard the LHDs too, it’s an add-on kit so one could potentially generate numbers)”
– as without those (or the rare carrier in tow)TD’s LOG would not be very survivable close to coasts … I did manage to say it without the word “littoral”!
Mark
But thats a legal obsticle, not a technological one, and as I said earlier, missiles like Storm Shadow already DO identify targets.
Ordering an unmanned drone to take off, fly to a pre set release point, and release a storm shadow is very simple.
Getting one to indentify an incoming fighter and shoot it down is harder of course, but no where near impossible.
Steve Coltman
“We are where we are. But where we are is in a dire financial crisis, and I mean the UK not just the MoD. Given this state of affairs we must make the best use of the assets we already have. On the one hand we saw the French and Italians flying antiques like the Crusaders and Starfighters well past their sell-by date but on the other hand we are doing the opposite – disposing of perfectly serviceable aircraft little more than half-way through their lives (Tornado F3) or even barely 6-7 years old (Tranche 1 Typhoons). Anyone who thinks this is acceptable is not living in the real world. There is no case for buying any new fast jets, full stop. The F-35 should be cancelled.”
I agree totally, at least to the sentiment of what you say. The carrier(s) will need some aircraft so I wouldn’t go as far as saying there is no case for buying any fast jets, just that they should be affordable fast jets. The RAF is more perplexing; they seem hell bent on getting the F35 on strength pretty much the same day the production line opens. The F35 will be in production for a long time. I cannot see why the RAF doesn’t fly their Tornados and Typhoons until their natural use by date sometime after 2025 and then re-equip. They are mortgaging their existence and proposing to spend a big chunk of tax-payer money several years earlier than it needs to be spent, simply to be first to get the next shiny toy.
IXION
I think you must be a lawyer or something. Is operating east of Suez ok well you may have missed it but we’ve east of Suez for the last 20 years. Indeed the point I was making was we have sent task group periodically to the far east since the withdrawal from Hong Kong. I have not once suggested operating a carrier permanently in the far east. I also suggested that should one day the UK be required to deploy fast jet to that region then due to the operating distances involved carriers would be a better option than land based jets with 30 air tankers we dont have.
Unless you wish the RN to turn into a coast guard force. It will need MARS wither we have carriers or not. Indeed only 1 MARS ship the task group support ship is specifically tied to the carrier group.
Dominic
No they dont storm shadow had a programmed target and route it selects nothing for its self. And while thats fine for fixed targets what about normal bombs for radars that suddenly pop up or a tank or rocket launcher or a target of opportunity. Do you propose giving these UCAVs the ability to discriminate and attack them also. It is im sure possible but I hate to think of the cost. If you want a real world issue heres one UAVs cannot yet operate in conidtions which lead to ice build up on the wings to which there is currently no easy solution. UAVs have their place in any order of battle they where supposed to be a cheap and expendable asset to flesh out numbers for manned platforms not there replacement. With capabilities talked about here they will be as if not more expensive than any manned equivalent bar perhaps the B2 or a british acquired Nimrod.
RichardW
Typhoon Tranche 1 and Tornado are due for decommission in 2020 and 2024. By which stage Typhoons will be nearly 20 and Tornado almost 40 years old. Not next week. Typhoon is complicated because all it really needs is a mid life update but due to the small numbers involves it will be expensive and the airframe will have used 2/3 to 3/4 of it life. F35 has already produced production standard aircraft they’re operating at Edwards Air Force Base
In the end its not if we need a carrier or not its about what it will cost to provide the same level of capability another way. A carrier with F35 offers the ability to operate anywhere in the world and hit any target or land troops up to 500-600 miles inland. Thats what 6b buys us for the next 40 years. How much will it cost for a land equivalent over the next 40 years to do the same? How much will access to foreign bases cost over the next 40 years if its less than 6b and you can guarantee their use now then lets get rid of the carriers.if there is any doubt then there is no doubt the carriers need building.
Hi RichardW,
RE ” I cannot see why the RAF doesn’t fly their Tornados and Typhoons until their natural use by date sometime after 2025 and then re-equip. They are mortgaging their existence and proposing to spend a big chunk of tax-payer money several years earlier than it needs to be spent”
– I quite agree (the Germans and Italians will)
– FAA and the Italian naval air arm are a different story, in my books (to have deployable aircraft, and as they will be few in numbers, true multi-role capability is a must)
Hi Mark,
RE ice build up that you point to in UAVs, yes a real-world problem, but the Northrop Grumman BAMS is cleared for conditions of moderate icing (how else could it stay on station over, say, the Atlantic).
Coming closer to us than one would guess (maybe this is the hint seen in the parliamentary answers; the named reporter writes for Shepheard Group, in this case 3 March 2011):
“the company was in talks with the UK in regards to BAMS possibly supporting the Royal Navy and said he was also expecting a ‘strategic update’ from the Australian Department of Defence next year, following their pull-out from the BAMS programme in 2008.
Andrew White, Melbourne”
Oops, apologies @Chris.B., it was late – I was mostly thinking of Michael (Civ.)’s comments on Monday night, and a bit of Mark’s.
Just in general you two, you should be a bit sceptical of the lessons you draw from combat trials – so much depends on the exact circumstances. For instance, supposedly on one of the exercises between the USAF and India, the Mig-21 Bisons were regularly knocking down F-15’s and F-16’s. That doesn’t mean we should all go get glorified Fishbeds – but it does tell you something about how a BVR missile and DRFM-based ECM go a long way to make up for a Vietnam-era airframe.
I know DRFM doesn’t work against frequency-hopping radars (unless it’s really, really clever and/or you’ve obtained the enemy’s radar algorithms) but it’s another example of the A2A playing field being levelled. So the lesson is not that we should buy Fishbeds, but that
1)a radar needs to be frequency-agile to have a hope against even modest opponents in air-to-air these days (so strike out the AN/APG-65 on boneyard F/A-18C’s for instance) – and that
2) something like the Elta EL/L-8222 ECM pod would make a really nice parts-bin addition to any low-end aircraft you want to buy or design for export, like my fantasy buy of Goshawks to bulk out the CVF airwing.
On CVF AEW, I still think TD underestimates the advantages of fixed-wing AEW – I’d happily sacrifice F-35’s in order to get Hawkeye, they’re perhaps the best argument for going cats-n-traps. There’s certainly logic in getting boneyard Hawkeyes as an interim measure to get us in sync with the USN’s procurement cycles. I’m not sure what kind of life they have left in them though. I can’t help feeling that in a joined-up world we could have bought E-2D’s instead of JSTARS – AIUI the -2D has a lot of JSTARS-y capability, albeit without the range. Yes they’d spend the first part of their life in Afghanistan, and they’re probably not as good at being JSTARS, but I wonder if that wouldn’t be the more intelligent long-term solution.
Yet again I find myself in agreement with Jackstaff…
@DominicJ
“Getting one to indentify an incoming fighter and shoot it down is harder of course, but no where near impossible.”
Errm, I was under the impression that especially the “shoot down” part is done by the UAV called “Aster 30”. So, you’re right, it’s not impossible.
@TD
The more I think of your concept, the better it get’s. In general, it is the way to go. It would allow to build up the capability over a longer timeframe, with a credible initial capability.
I disagree with the enlargement of the hangar is wasted money and time, when both is precious. Also, it’s only application would be the CH53K, the obsession for which I don’t share.
I think, a major question behind the CATOBAR solution is still missing. The electro-magnetic catapult will be a major emission source. It should be relatively easy to target during operations.
@Michael (Civ.)
The F-35 being a Typhoon-eating monster is crap.
The aircraft is optimized for frontal LO, and this is by far not undefeatable. It’s effectiveness depends on the capability and processing power of the enemy’s radar set and indeed the flight path.
As a fully networked aircraft, the Typhoon may be at a later stage capable of using one aircrafts radar as a sender and the other aircrafts radar as a receiver, thus getting a bistatic radar.
F-35 and Typhoon will have a hard time to hit each other in BVR-combat. In the WVR-environment, there is the issue of the high temperature of the F-35s engine and generally poor dogfighting capabilities.
I have determined to stay out of this depressing conversation, but could not resist this:
Ixion said: “CVF has an 8- 10000 mile range at 15 knots but in order to fire a F35c off a catapult it will need to accelerate to at least 25 knots, as will the 2 type 45 with it etc”
When was the last time you served on a carrier matey, 1944 ? Sorry, could not resist being cheeky……. :-)
IF the carrier has a “goalkeeper” close escort, it may need to speed up, and even take a similar heading. IF a T45 is part of a CVBG it can be doing whatever speed it likes, on whatever heading it likes, as long as the carrier is within its missile engagement zone etc, and it is general heading down the required Mean Line of Advance.
As for using ships for “plane guard” – that is what helicopters are for. I have experience of this, I was on a SeaWolf Leander that was “goalkeeper” for USS Nimitz during the late 80’s (Iran-Iraq war) when she lost an F14 during catapult launch, it ploughed straight into the oggin in front of the ship, I seem to remember that although both crew ejected, only one survived. He was picked up by an SH60 that is kept airborne for this very reason during flight ops. We were not asked to move off our station.
What a fantastic thread… I have been itching to put my 5 pennyworth, but there were so many excellent posts that mirrored my thoughts (notably Gabrille and Jed) that I have resisted the urge to jump in.
The points I want to make are:
The F35B is a complete waste of time. Ignoring the costs, range and payload issues etc. The bloody thing needs a specially reinforced / bespoke landing platorm to operate in the STOVL (well Vertical mode). When I realised that it would destroy existing runways and ships decks I knew it was a complete dud. The Harrier had many faults but you could operate it virtually anywhere, the F35B is limited in where it can be operated it is in all practical terms useless!!!
Ah! feel better now….
Secondly the CVF was designed as an out-n-out CARRIER not as a LPH, yes it was made so that it could be adapted from STOVL to CATs-N-Traps, but that’s it. It has been compromised in so many ways its make my blood boil. The thought of adding insult to inury by then not deploying as a carrier with at least 24 fixed wing aircraft (36+ surge)is nothing short of a national disgrace.
If we are not able to afford it to operate in the role for which it was designed I think we should simply sell them to the highest bidder and use the money to buy something that we can afford i.e. more T45s (fully equipped), more Astute’s (ideally batch 2 with VLS’s) and proper LPHD’s and updated Albion and Bays (i.e. with Helicopter hangers and self defence systems).
I must admit to being a Typhoon fan and am struggling to acept that it is not going to be fully developed (as was the plan) From my perspective the T1s were always supposed to be upgraded to the later T3 level and the entire fleet would be standardised. The RAF website still states that the T1 is to be upgraded. I cannot believe that they will be scrapped or even mothballed.
I know the development has taken forever and now the financial crisis may have killed it off, but I am not convinced that the F35 is really going to be as good as they make out. To that end I would still bet that a fully developed Typhoon would be nearly as good and certainly good enough for most if not all operations that the RAF would be involved in, certainly if that was not as part of a coalition.
In the light of that I think we should make the RAF be a Typhoon only force and give them enough for 9/10+ squadrons, so say 160-180 aircraft, but fullt developed (AESA, Conformal tanks, PIRATE, Meteor, RAPTOR, JSM etc. etc.)
If we bin the CVF then lets get the Harrier GR9 back or buy some AV8B+ (the two versions the USMC have i.e. a radar version and a ground attack version.
If we keep CVF then F35C or Rafale would be fine, even Super Hornet, but would guess a developed Rafale has probably got the edge. (if we could fit the EJ200, PIRATE and other Typhoon equipment then that would be perfect). In the meantime we should get in to bed with the USN and/or French Fleet Air Arm (Aéronavale) and start training crews on carrier operations ASAP.
PS one curved ball… Would it not make economic sense to convert the CVF to nuclear power, surely the savings in fuel costs over the life (50+years) will pay for the initial costs several times over!!!
@ El Sid – not to worry!
@ ArmChairCivvy – “as without those (or the rare carrier in tow)TD’s LOG would not be very survivable close to coasts … I did manage to say it without the word “littoral”!” – That’s the spirit ;)
@ Phil Darley – unless someone very rich and very generous is going to stump up the cash, or unless George Osborne decides to scrap the budget for DfID and the £20 billion annual Scottish subisdy, then we simply can’t afford to go Nuclear right now. We’re trying to control the costs of Lillybet and Big Ears, not add to them.
@ McZ – right on the money about the radar sets. Datalinked aircraft with powerful radars, combined with some rather spiffing RAF tactical work could spell the end of the “Low Observable” ilk (Think the “Thach Weave”, but on a much larger scale and performed by someone with a surname like Barnaby-Smythe ;) ). Then we’ll be back to just making things that fly fast over long distances, which is certainly more like Cricket.
The primary driver I would like to see here is, at the risk of sounding like a management speak twat straight out of the MoD, a “Capability Focus”. That is to say, everything would be judged on where it fits into the grand plan (which of course assumes we have one….).
Why do you need “Stealth” aircraft, when we have perfectly good Tomahawks to go shooting up peoples Radars with?
Why do we need to spend billions designing Type 26 when you can slap a sonar upgrade on Type 45 along with some Harpoon, give a cheeky pinch on the bum and call it Type 27?
Why can’t Tranche 1 Typhoons be upgraded for CAS or at least proper strike missions? You’re telling me we can put Sharpshooter pods on knackered old F-15’s and F-16’s, but not a generation 4.5 fighter?
And so on, and so forth.
Well no matter how many tomahawks we use there will always be radars and missiles we miss. F35 will allow operation of aircraft by reducing the detection and engagement envelope nothing more. The western air forces are gradually losing the technological edge over its potential enemies F35 hopes to prolong that a bit longer.
Typhoon Tranche1 is currently cleared for enhanced paveway 2/3 and the Litening III targeting pod. It could be cleared for paveway IV so its not useless they cannot be cleared for the heavy air to ground ordnance. The reason its not using them now is we only have a handful of typhoon pilots training to use them. The jets need there computers changed at the end of this decade to bring them into line with the other jets. MOD are not currently willing to spend the money to do it or any other upgrade that’s the issue.
@ El Sid
E2 is the plane that CVF should have been built around. Forget the F35, Seaphoons, Rafael etc.
@ All
What annoys me about T26 is that BAE have yet again been handed a shed full of cash to do some CAD work on a concept. How much was it? £126million. Enough to give every Daring a Sea RAM, the Thomson sonar fit, make them Merlin flight capable, and perhaps even a set of STWS too. Heck a bet it could even stretch to plumbing in Harpoon. (Yes I know Harpoon aren’t wonderful, but we have them, and they are better than nowt.)
@ Jackstaff re secret societies
Um. I thought the Wafus with their odd language and funny tribal ways were a secret society?
Hi ChrisB,
RE “@ McZ – right on the money about the radar sets. Datalinked aircraft with powerful radars, combined with some rather spiffing RAF tactical work could spell the end of the “Low Observable” ilk”
Intrigued by your comment as on the one hand, I am aware that data transmission between two AESAs has worked at 274megabits/ s from air to ground and almost 4 times faster than that in a lab.
– so formations (widely spaced) of such aircraft could do the current AWACS job between themselves (radar range from a single aircraft obviously not comparable)
… on the other hand, developments in frequency usage in radars are doing away with the advantages stemming from composite materials and absorbent pains (less so for the reduced signature from shape)
BUT, LO is still better than Hi-O, all other things given? Of course one of the not-givens is relative unit cost. So is the “business case” for the damn costly LO aircraft being eroded and the same money could be used to put top notch radars and BVR-missiles – wait for it – on F3 Tornados?
Hi Mark,
RE “reason [its] not using them now is we only have a handful of typhoon pilots training to use them.”
– This is sensible as we have plenty of Tornados, plenty of trained pilots (the Saudis taking precedence in A2G training was also sensible, to secure that deal)and Tornados can carry the heavy stuff
RE ” The {Typhoon] jets need there computers changed at the end of this decade to bring them into line with the other jets. MOD are not currently willing to spend the money to do it or any other upgrade that’s the issue”
– scrapping them, rather than storing, and then bleating about fleet numbers is not sensible (if the 2-seaters are saved, how many are under the sledge hammer?)
X & Jackstaff
Does having your own rules for Uckers count towards being a secret society ? If so then both WAFUS and Bubble Heads are indeed secret societies….. of the darkest and most diabolical type……
ACC
I wasn’t suggesting that it wasn’t sensible just the reason why were not using the capability. They needed to take over the QRAs that takes priority.
Im not arguing with you logic its more a case of early positioning of the RAFs case for the next round of cuts(sorry I am radical approach to the new world order) me thinks. Or the case to flog them them off and replace them with later models.
I believe there are around 30 single seat Tranche 1 a/c.
Hi Mark,
With “intrigued” I meant curious to know more, not to conflict your position.
RE”I believe there are around 30 single seat Tranche 1 a/c.”
– that’s not so bad then:
– 107 + the two-seaters, almost a hundred Tornados and then the new “joint force” in due course
Veering off the course now
– BAMS for MPA (sorry Jed, your call for “fully armed” not heeded); this still has something to do with carriers!
– F-35s for Sentinels (more survivable, if there is opposition, and can also strike back and at targets of opportunity/ manoeuvring forces); not in place by 2015, though?
– Scavengers to top up F-35s (not to deplete the small numbers) in taking out AD and known-position/ stationary enablers for opposing forces
… what do we need the new UAV for (the next Mantis) that we have signed up for, together with France?
– MASC stop-gap @ 8 Merlins (where would they otherwise disappear to from the Navy inventory) while pondering about fixed wing; cfr. my post about the do-it-yourself AWACS development
@ Jed
“Suck backs” and other chicanery aren’t to be tolerated…. :)
ACC
Not sure we can afford BAMS and Scavenger (it quite expensive). I would move heaven and earth to kept sentinel and fit the cameras. As for MASC I would purchase 4 Hawkeye and operate joint training, supt ect with France.
Hi Mark
– BAMS/ Scavenger: all statements are from the suppliers (so you have a fair chance of being proved right)
– Sentinel: a huge gap from 2015 to JSF ISD
– same for Hawkeyes, there are varying positions on the (extensible?) life of Sea Kings, but 2016 is the figure appearing most often… but the point that seems to get overlooked a lot is that with 8 Merlins we can have any/all task forces covered, whereas with Hawkeye 1(?)
JED
Happy to be wrong about T45 and speeding up to guard carriers. Only going about report of Spruance class oppperating with Nimitz in 70’s. However if CVF has to go into the wind to launch at 25 knots, 18 aircraft 2 at a time it will soon disappear over the horizon if it’s not followed!
However I Note CVF has only stores for 5-6 days heavy opperations. That seems comparable to the American experience.
BTW opperating east of suez we are not talking about 1 Mars we are talking about at least 2 if not 3.
1 with the carrier,
1 returning from being with the carrier,
1 Setting out to be with the carrier.
+ If its a real shooting war against a navy with a submarine capability the Mars will need guarding on the way there at back
This of course ignores any support for any amphibious squadrons with the carrier etc.
Just want to point out that floggin the oggin with big shiney bits of metal, with big gas guzzzling engines, is a big complicated and expensive business in terms of cash and manpower… None of which we have in big numbers. Particularly if you want to be fighting battles at the end of a 10,000 mile supply chain.
If you go that far “Particularly if you want to be fighting battles at the end of a 10,000 mile supply chain” then you take a lot with you
– the Italian-made supply ships/ tankers may be beautiful, but look at the USN specimen (40k t and ugly)
I am not quite sure what we have alliances for if we can (in the future) have one task force set sail – and it would go further East than Pakistan? (I hate to use Diego Garcia as the Stop sign)
X said: ““Suck backs” and other chicanery aren’t to be tolerated”
Shudders in his chair…..
Lets not even get into the damn “mixy blobs” !
Operating RN carriers East of Suez.
Ever heard of a friendly country called Australia?
In most scenarios, we could refuel/provision there.
What about watch keeper as MASC for CVF? … Lots of flying hours (as Hermes 450 in Afghanistan) looks small enough for easy launch from a CVF EMALS, even from a separate UAV EMALS lite… as was originally the EMALS brief.
Also in the what plane vein.. I wonder why we are so slow to adopt Sea Grippen, it has one really big advantage… that they will transfer the source code. Neither Typhoon nor F35 (or any other option) gives us the right to independently develop a system level capability based on integration of computer processes.
Adding to my concern about F35 is that not only do I believe the B will be cancelled but also that the C (that will be exported) will be closely controlled (as per C-17 access codes) so that nothing can be done outside Lockheed’s cost structures.
As a result the F35 configured CVF is in many respects a US licensed operation, alternatively with a mix of expensive air superiority Sea Typhoons and cheap ground attack Sea Grippens (NG) we could reconstruct the US previous pattern of both Air superiority and ground attack. At the same time we would have a route to deploy new munitions at our discretion and at reasonable cost.
If you think we retro, then wonder what happened to the Tomcat replacement it hasn’t gone away, the US Navy just haven’t decided if it’s to be manned or not, hence the carrier trials of X47B.
I think we should ponder on the “over the shoulder” missile fire that is claimed to reduce the relevance of F35’S lack of agility, if we stay on board for the Lockheed scenario we will be tied both to US munitions and US R&D cock ups.
If we go our own way then work on AESA for wide angle engagement can be leveraged. Please note the link 16 throughput for Grippen, and we have not even begun to understand the advantages of a strategic alliance with SAAB .
Not to give a kicking to BAE, but they do seem to learn how to extract the most money from the MOD to support a sovereign capability (to do only more of the same), they have a poor idea in some of their businesses of what competition is. If there was a European competitor for UK fast jet business we could at least find out, once and for all, if BAE can cut the mustard against an agile and intelligent competitor.
the EMALS brief
@ Jed
X ups table and makes a break for the hatch! :)
@ John Hartley
Australia is a surprisingly long way from anywhere. Look at how much effort the RAF is putting into just hopping past France. Even if there was an airstrip on Cape York using the Libyan Tornado raid as a radius of operation “we” could only bomb southern Indonesia, southern Philippines, and PNG.
Diego Garcia would work as a stop over point if political necessity meant other nation denied the UK their air space. But even that would entail a bit on “tankering.” And unless the enemy came with 300 miles or so you couldn’t use it as a base for operations.
X
You forget that the RAF reserve the right to move Australia in order to make their case.
X
The carrier strike group would sail from/to Australia to wherever it was needed.
Chris B. @ 4:57,
“someone named Barnaby-Smythe” is the single best thing said in this thread. Gorgeous. First time I was at uni I had an RAF cadet right across the hall from me — good bloke, upper-middle-class rural Kent right to his fingertips. Total Barnaby-Smythe. Some mothers, etc., etc.
X and Jed,
Wafus, as the kids say, for the awesome.
APATS two comments above,
Cheek. :-)
RW just above that,
Excellent comment. Like your thinking on a potential airgroup because, while it proliferates types just a little (but two are already in service and one is from a BAE “known associate” :) its doable and could probably chime with STOBAR.
“if we stay on board for the Lockheed scenario we will be tied both to US munitions and US R&D cock ups”
Where have run into that trouble before ….
@ John H
Sorry I thought you were on about the RAF.
A school friend of mine served in the Invincible. He spent a week bobbing around the world’s biggest island because the Ozies thought they had cans of instant sunshine onboard. And HMG would neither confirm or deny it. It was a shame because he was really looking forward to Australia.
Hi Guys,
This is just a generic question about planes, ISD’s and CVF and was wondering if you could help me out?
We are supposed to have carrier strike back by 2019/2020. Now assuming the later of those 2 dates is correct. It means that the first carrier with Cat “n” Traps will probably be in the water around 2017 for extensive sea trials with Cat “n” Trap testing around 2018?
This means that the first Squadron (12 planes Min.) needs to be in the UK by 2017 so that they can have time to get used to what there flying? This means that our order will need to be started to be constructed at the latest by 2016?
Now I can’t remember where I saw it, I think it might have been on flightgloabal, but because of the JSF program slipping the USN is only just going to get its initial deliveries by 2016.
If this is so, when do we get ours? I’m assuming we just can’t switch over our F-35B production slots to F-35c “a just like that”? Especially since the USN F/A-18 hornets are getting rather worn out, I can’t see them giving up production slots?
This leaves us with a potential gap for a few years, bringing us back to the, how daft it is to have carriers with no planes. So what do we do? Either way we look at it we are going to have to order a batch (at least 12 to 15 a/c) by the end of this parliament so that they can be constructed, personnel worked up etc. and then have them ship ready.
So what are our options, assuming that my figures are correct and the F-35 will be late?
-Rafale M – No good, production line full for our French friends
-Seaphoon – somehow I personally don’t see this working and/or costing too much
-Naval Grippen – maybe but again unproven and HMG are not going to pour money at it just to get the JSF later
The Super Hornet production line at the moment plans to close around 2013/2014. Does Boeing still do buy-backs? Could me possibly “rent” or buy and then sell them back to the USN, 12-15 Super Hornets up to 2025, by which time we should start getting our F-35’s, that is if we have the cash to buy them? FAA pilots are already training on them. Apparently Boeing are looking at meteor integration for the international SH and the USN has taken a slight interest (again from FlighGlobal)
So what do you guys think? And if my numbers are right, what plane should we go for if we can’t get the F-35 when we are supposed to?
@Apats
Would love to have a framed copy of the infamous ‘map’.
TMM
We have quite a few early production slots for F35(I’ll try to find a link) but it’s kinda hard to know wtf is going on with jsf…
Rafale is at a very low production rate at the moment(11 per year) because no overseas orders and the French government being in the same shit as ours…
I reckon Boeing would be more than willing to keep the F18e/f production line open if we put in an order…
Forget about SeaPhoon and SeaGriper we ain’t gonna fund it by ourselves…
The much bigger worry is the ‘capability holiday’, ten years is a long time in terms of loss of expertise…buying Goshawks and building a concrete carrier in the Solent is beginning to look sensisible…
Willy,
If we raided all the Whitehall drinks trays we could probably come up with proper Pykrete :) Goshawks and concrete in teh Solent does sound sensible.
And I agree with your point ref Rafale: I’d step in and demand the deal offered Brazil, which can help keep weapon integration costs down.
Agreed about the map: it’s been nearly fifty years now, someone needs to get down to Kew and into the PRO (sorry, sorry “National Archives” ’cause we needed to change the name from something welcoming and democratic to something that says “keep out”) to see if it’s knocking around in a nondescript file somewhere.
Also ref: Rafale, the RAF considers it an inferior dogfighter to Typhoon, so they may be less concerned about those strange Wafus getting their webbed hands on it ….
@ ArmChairCivvy – “Intrigued by your comment as on the one hand, I am aware that data transmission between two AESAs has worked at 274megabits/sec from air to ground and almost 4 times faster than that in a lab.
– so formations (widely spaced) of such aircraft could do the current AWACS job between themselves (radar range from a single aircraft obviously not comparable)
… on the other hand, developments in frequency usage in radars are doing away with the advantages stemming from composite materials and absorbent paints (less so for the reduced signature from shape)
BUT, LO is still better than Hi-O, all other things given? Of course one of the not-givens is relative unit cost. So is the “business case” for the damn costly LO aircraft being eroded and the same money could be used to put top notch radars and BVR-missiles – wait for it – on F3 Tornados?”
Mentioning upgraded Tornados with so many Harrier fans around? Ever heard of the phrase, ‘to have a death wish’.
Honestly I’m not convinced by the whole Low Observable deal. It’s a technology; materials technology versus electronic technology. And the pace of change in electronic technology far outstrips that of materials. Couple that with the simple observation that it’s much easier and cheaper to swap out a radar than it is to take apart an entire aircraft and rebuild it with new materials and you’re in for a shock.
In order to pull off the formational aspect, the down side is that you will need a certain number of aircraft in the air to pull it off. That means you have to convince two pilots to fly quite a distance apart, or else put two pairs up. That’s four aricraft to fly one sortire. Maybe this is could finally prove to be a firm use for UCAV’s? One at either end of the patrol area, crossing the zone with their radars?
If it did happen by the manned method, I hearby proclaim that the new tactic should be referred to as the “Barnaby-Smythe Weave” or “Barnaby-Smythe Sweep”.
Chris B.,
” It’s a technology; materials technology versus electronic technology. And the pace of change in electronic technology far outstrips that of materials.”
This. So let’s get off the next-shiny train before it crashes. Like your idea about UCAVs quite a bit. Like “Sinner” and “Confessor,” maybe the UCAV at one polarity would be Barnaby and the other Smythe? Then their targets can all be “Hopkirk” ?
@Jackstaff
I didn’t think of it that way (Barnaby as one radar, Smythe the other etc). Not a bad idea. Certainly worth stealing.
Jackstaff, is that a tenner on the floor over there?
*reaches into pocket for blackjack*
Couple of very interesting links for you chaps to ponder
http://blog.usni.org/2011/03/31/must-every-carrier-be-a-supercarrier/
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=6072569&c=FEA&s=CVS
Funnily enough, in those waters we always have to beg for a “Wasp”:
“As the Libyan operation was coming together in the days leading up to the attack, the Wasp-class vessel was the only U.S. Navy vessel with a substantial flight deck near the Mediterranean Sea. Smaller than a full-sized Nimitz or Ford-class aircraft carrier… ”
– Churchill developed it into an art!
Is it true FSTA will cost over £400million pa? For that each year the UK could buy 2 fleet tankers, fill them with fuel, and operate them! Gosh……
@ TD
I note Defense News is a GANNET(T) company…… :)
But is CVF even in CATOBAR a super carrier? Is CdeG a super carrier just because she is nuclear? Back in the 60s and early 70s many “naval thinkers” (gazers?) believed that most (big) ships would be nuclear by the time the 21st rolled around. I think interoperability with the USN is problem more important the interoperability with the USMC. Um. And what of our Gallic allies and interoperability with CdeG?
If we develop a new nuclear reactor for the Trident replacement submarines (PWR3?), then we should also look at it for future large surface warships (& RFA Tankers).
TMM
2016 is the US Navys Inital operational deployment date for f35 training should start on type next year hopefully.
For those who would like a little more on blocks and upgrade paths for typhoon I came across this summary which explains it rather well.
http://www.fast-air.co.uk/typhoon-block-tranche-summary/
@ John
Savings on the fleet train of nuclear carriers are substantial. As a general rule of thumb a ship doing 30kts is using twice as much fuel as one doing 20kts. As IXION has been pondering above there is if not a need an advantage to a high speed for carrier ops. The advantage that unlimited 30kt steaming brings is immense. And if it makes a saving on the fleet train how about savings compared to our current air tanker? Remember both air-tankers and carriers are about delivering air power at strategic distances. If that 400million plus figure above is the cost of FSTA pa and nuclear carriers would cost us say 6 years of FSTA (that is on top of the CVF design) it could be hard to argue that FSTA gives value. Especially as only so many of the 9 FSTA will be available and then the tanker itself has physical limitations; it can only fuel so many aircraft and nowhere near a squadron’s worth. That is to say if the CVF(N) is carrying AVCAT and the fleet tanker is only carrying AVCAT both vessels will be carrying much, much, much fuel than one air-tanker. Actually much more than all the 9 tankers together many times over. And the CVF(N) will be carrying one, two, three squadrons worth of aircraft; all of which will be closer to where they are needed……..
X
FTSA sound about right from what ive read. There is however absolutely no point in having a carrier which can do unlimited 30knt speeds unless all your escorts and RFAs can do the same. Short sprints to allow launch of aircraft is all that is required. Also when you go nuclear you severely limits the number of ports that will welcome you along side. For an Idea according to Richard Beedalls site 1billion pounds is now more than the annual cost off operating the entire RN surface fleet
@ Mark
I would have look further back up the comments thread and look for my post on Apparent Wind to help answer IXION’s “query” re ship speed for launching aircraft. 30kts has nothing at all to do with getting places…….
And all groups of ships proceed at the pace of the slowest vessel so as our amphib’s at best do 18kts or so perhaps the escorts only need to do similar speeds. But as I said the 30kts is nothing to with getting anywhere.
And have you then stopped to wonder why even the humble Invincible class can do 28kts if all our RFAs can’t match that speed?
Um. RASing is done about 12kts so perhaps the RFAs themselves are too fast? ;-)
FSTA is a joke. At the moment (though I will change my mind!) I am all for getting out of that contract ASAP. And buying some more of those A400m’s……….
x
CVF does not need to be nuclear. It is currently more than adequate in endurance and speed for what we require of it.
After all the longest a UK carrier has ever been at sea was the Falklands and CVF could handle that with a much more normal RFA commitment than 1982. The escorts are in all likely hood required to be faster than the units they protect. The requirement for the ship to steam at 30knt to launch aircraft are so limited it does not justify the expense of nuclear for the UK.
@ Mark
First an apology I only scanned your post before last. Sorry.
But I have never ever said CVF should be nuclear. I rambled on about the “benefits” of nuclear power. The vast majority of comments here are hypothetical and based in fantasy, even if actual figure used are real world accurate. If we talked about the reality of British defence there wouldn’t be much to say.
I am having a look at Richard’s site to track down this figure of 1billion……….
x
never worry about that. At the minute it would only be depressing cuts if we talked about reality! much more fun to discuss the what if.
He has wrote an editorial update its in it.
Richard’s site is too damn distracting. :)
My point is not that we need to be cruising arround at 30 knots.
It is that figures for range for the group unrefueled, and the consumption of fuel under ‘combat conditions will be significently reduced over the ideal ‘published’ figures.
The fuel bill for an operational deployment into the eastern indian ocean, would be much higher than ‘on paper’.
I repeat my point about the number of required support vessels and the neeed to replace them at regular intervals.
Of course we could support it but it would be a big strain on a small navy. Replacingf lost aircraft would not be easy either. Unless we had access to local support bases etc, which might well negate the need for a carrier in such circumstances.
Royal Navy + All Nuclear = win.
Chris B.,
Really, yes. Preferably all-nuke but really, anything from a Daring on up the size scale as a nuke ship would be a strategic revolution that leaves coal-to-oil standing there with dry cleats.
How much power do the new reactors in the Astute’s produce? I assume that it will be enough to propel a Darling, but how many for an auxiliary, or for a QE?
@ Mark on 31st
Thanks for the info regarding the F-35c and USN IOD date.
@ Gareth Jones.
The PWR2 on the Astute would probably be enough for Daring, but you might need to go the multiple reactor route for a Carrier or similar sized vessel. The key advantage to the current reactors we’re producing is that they need not be refuelled through their life time.
@all
The USN had a fairly detailed Alternative Propulsion Study about 5 years ago, which was mostly wondering whether they should go nuclear for the new LHAs and the CG(X), the Tico replacement. The first is a 30-40,000 phib, the latter was going to be in the 20-25,000t range. But cruisers tend to be a lot more active, the radar on the CG(X) was going to need 30+MW (!!) of power for BMD work and laser weapons would further add to the power requirements.. Conclusions were that the upfront cost of going nuclear are pretty fixed at £500m-ish, regardless of the size of vessel, so the numers become very sensitive to the price of oil. The nuclear cruiser broke even at somewhere between $70 oil and $200-ish depending on how active it was, the LHAN needed $200-300 oil to make sense. 100,000t supercarriers broke even at about $50 oil, “small” escorts (ie Burke/Daring size) needed $600 oil. Don’t quote me on those numbers, they’re roughly right; from memory the report is unclassified and out on the web somewhere.
The arguments about nuclear carriers being pointless unless they have nuclear escorts got an airing in the 60s, hence the Long Beach and sucessors as escorts for the Big E, even though it didn’t make economic sense. But money was the reason why the CGNs weren’t replaced. Persisting with nuclear carriers is a different argument.
From the above you can see it’s only since 2005 or so that they’ve made economic sense for the USN, but they’ve carried on with CVNs with or without CGNs since the 60s. The main reason is that not having to dedicate masses of space to fuel tanks for the ship means that you’ve a lot more room for fuel/ammo for the air group. Also not having to refuel the carrier makes the logistics a lot less onerous, even if it’s still limited by the need to resupply the escorts.
I’d guess that the nuclear/oil debate probably breaks even at around $70-100 oil for CVF, which seems a no-brainer over its lifetime – but it would involve spending upfront to save money later, which is not something HMG is minded to do right now, and I’d also note the problems that CdG has had with her reactors. I guess it would also need quite a major redesign of CVF, the current engines are not in the ideal location.
As for the basing thing, the USN didn’t seem to think it would be a particular problem, particularly once Japan had come round to the idea for Okinawa. They didn’t really have much choice, either they gave up on the no nuke ships thing or they lost their free CVBG once the Kennedy retired (last of the USN conventional carriers). However, it is an interesting thought how that aspect might develop in future, the Japanese electorate might have second thoughts about nuclear reactors floating around in a tsunami zone, no matter how super-hardened they are.
PS @TD – you seem to have some messy HTML on the bottom navbar
@ Garth Jones
You would need about 4 to 5 Vanguards worth of nuclear power for CVF.
Currently the 4 Vanguard boats cost about £250million a year to run. Some of that obviously will be pay, victualling, etc. And even the non-nuclear bits of a big submarine are “expensive” to fix. So shall we say that a CVF(N) would need extra £200million a year? That is a bit over simplification! So that is half the cost of FSTA pa. :) Of course FSTA can’t refuel 36 aircraft, power its own sensors and defensive weapons, move across the global common that are the oceans, or display a level of general utility that a ship can (a tanker plane is a tanker plane.)
@ El Sid
Yes in a nuclear ship there is a great volume for AVCAT.
But as rule of thumb for ships above 8000t in displacement the plant whether it is nuclear, steam turbine, or gas turbine takes up much the same internal volume. It is where that volume is needed that is of interest. Gas turbines though compact themselves actually need a lot of space due to the amounts of air they consume and hot gasses they expel. This means there are breaks in the structure needed to accommodate the intakes/uptakes which impact on upper deck space. This can be quite clearly seen on the Invincible class carriers in the hanger spaces. Steam systems weight is found more evenly distributed across the bottom of the ship; but again allowances have to be made for intakes and uptakes but these aren’t as great as with GTs as “forced” induction of charge air and the manner in which bunker fuel burns and the way that burning is controlled. Nuclear ships have everything pretty centralised, there is no need for large uptakes or intakes so no effect on the structure or layout of upper decks. The weight of the plant and its central location mean the supporting hull structure has got to be robust because of potential sagging.
@ Jackstaff
Many believe that all the world’s big cargo vessels would be nuclear ships by now.
This is the shape of things to come,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maersk_Triple_E_class
With twice the length and beam of an Invincible me thinks it would make a super Harrier carrier…
Some YouTube vids about Triple E
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fO6vMKf3jCg
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rOSrSXpWwSQ&NR=1
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aoZTPjAkTek&feature=related
All for $190million a copy……..
@ X – 18,000 TEU? For then love of God don’t tell TD!
x
It wouldn’t work.
A huge hull with capacity to fit pretty much the entire RAF Typhon buy on it; (I know about how they couldn’t fly off it etc). Cheeply avaialable hughely reliable. etc etc.
But you see it isn’t a ‘Propper warship’ It hasn’t been exquisitly designed to the latest technological standards to look sexy.
You see just as the RAF wet themselves at the sight of the latest ‘shiney shiney’ super fast sexything, The navy just has to have the ships that are suitable for the decendants of the heros of trafalger.
Forget
Mine warfare trawlers
Boom defence vessels
Local patrol craft
Flower & castle class corvettes
Merchant aircraft carriers
Liberty ship pased auxilary carriers.
Boston dakota aircraft.
The ‘only thing’ is a proper warship. So it won’t do at all.
The Compromises in requirement and usage which are part of any design, or any budget based purchase decision, (and which have been made in CVF long before SDR); would be held out to show the ‘unsitability’ of the design.
@ Ixion
Sometimes some people here bite far, far too quickly. I think I will start doing as observe on other forums and using tags like /joke , /sarcasm, etc. etc.
@ Gareth Jones
Yes there is container porn and then there is container porn. Interestingly it is too big a ship for North American ports and will only go between Europe and China. She is a thing of beauty though that is for sure.
@ Ixion
Hoisted by my own petard me thinks. Sorry. :(
x
I was rather extracting the Micheal, But not entirely……..
Refer back to the USN paper from the 60’s on ‘Carriers of large objects’.
@ x, ref: “there is container porn and then there is container porn”
Once you go Maersk it’s all you can bearsk?
:)
@ IXION
I am very familiar with experiments in using containers/container ships as cheap air craft carriers. Also David Taylor’s carrier of large objects and its short comings. And I will confess I have considered the idea a little more seriously than I would care to admit. So don’t tell anybody will you?
I think you could probably pack up everything a deployment the size of Afghanistan would need on one of those, just sail to somewhere and unpack then get on with it.
@ Jackstaff
You don’t think TD hangs around Felixstowe in an anorak do you?
x,
It would put a whole new meaning in “Aqualung” ….
Euan,
It looks like the primitive ancestor of a seabase to me. Get enough small-to-mid container ferries designed to get into shallows and enough mexeflotes and you could probably use it that way. Of course, talk about container porn, the imagery for that alone would make the nearest NHS casualty ward break out the defibrilator for TD….
My brother-in-law works the cranes at Felixstowe, so if anyone has TD’s description I’ll pass it on.
Chris,
Nice one. He’s like an Elvis sighting, you know. There are rumours he was hiding in the bushes with a digital camera at the first demo for the Ocelot, and that he works alternate Thursdays for the Sapper Store. Beyond that we haven’t much to go on :)
Re the French & CdG.
The French had plans/models of a slightly larger CdG of around 50,000 tons. All that the French learned on building/operating CdG went into the design of that slightly larger ship.
If we were starting from scratch, I would have wanted a pair of those for the RN. Plus a pair of cheaper smaller carriers. Perhaps a modernised version of all those mid 80s proposals for cheap carriers, post Falklands. Vickers designed a 24,000 ton light fleet carrier based on an economical liner hull. A good replacement for ocean & as the design had a ski ramp (unlike Ocean) it could keep TD happy by taking a few F-35B.
Using cargo vessels needs to be thought through or you end up with the madness of RFA Reliant. 23,000 tons, but could only operate 5 Sea Kings.
Maybe I’m missing something here, but wouldn’t a container ship such as this need billions of pounds of work to bring it up to scratch, by which point you could have just designed a proper purpose built carrier anyway?
JH & CB
On a slightly more serious note those of us that look enviously at the VLCC and Ocean liner hulls, are emphatically not talking about converting exisiting ships (reliant being a good example of why not).
Rather; Like the WW2 anti sub and auxilary carriers; using the macinery and hull (specifically the Hull) designs that exist already, and I am afraid make warship hulls rediculously expensive.
Just look at the new Mearsk class If we spent a £billion on redesigning them for basic carrier use, they would still be a 1/4 the price of Nellie and Dumbo.
AND re earlier threads, if you put 36 F35c on them, they would have enough carrying capacity to deploy to the far east! They would be so big that any design compromises would’nt matter, if some peice of kit does not fit there, who cares put it somwhere else (it would litterally have acres of space).
Go the TD route and make it flexible it could carry an entire brigade and it’s kit (Please I have only Guestimated that assertion, But it exceeds the available Point class tonnage on one hull).
I know they are noisy fair enough
I Know they are built to civilian standards.
But How much would it realy cost to put in,
A quiet Prime moover,
Some extra bulkheads
A couple of lifts
Tankage for aviation fuel
Big generator capacity
A Billion, I doubt it.
As for inevitable compromises so what for £1.5 billion with change, a true sea base we could send anywhere in the world.
Not ranting at all just saying It’s when I compare ships of this size, built for private companies, and ships of the complexity of Queen Mary 2;150,000 tons (Blackjack tables, waive pools 1500 air conditioned cabins, theatres etc etc GODAG plant, 26 knots ocean going, £500 Million); With the cost of Nellie and Dumbo that frankly I weep, and QM2 was a one off design!
BTW
Not off topic, but if we scrapped or built and sold Nellie and Dumbo; we could probably still get 2 of these cheaper overall which would solve a problem like…..
As with most things, there is a range of options for (Container ship) merchant based “Warships”; at the large/expensive end we have the Maersk AFSB concept, in the middle we have the MSO/Medical Cruiser concept by Brickmuppet, to the low end SCADS system.
Containerised conversions large ships seemed to be all the rage after the Falklands but I think they failed to take off because it was thought that by the time you had gone to all the effort it cost almost as much as building something that would provide benefit all year round.
Personally, I think the trick is spotting the right opportunity, cherry picking appropriate technologies and work practices. The commercial world is often the innovator and the military is equally often slow to recognise
@ Chris B
A container ship as a replacement for a large CATOBAR carrier wouldn’t work. As has already been mentioned there is a need for speed (sounds like a line from a movie.) But as Harrier or helicopter there may be have some mileage. I think you have to forget about the containers; that is to say forget about everything being module like the Danish system. Forget about filling the ship with stuff; the big hull is about space. Build what you need in between the frames using container dimensions (that is 40ft not TEU.) A lot of what makes ships expensive is fitting things in around the hull. Back in the old days it wasn’t unusual for a messdeck to have a piece of plant stuck in the middle of it because it where the ship needed it to be; the sailors’ comfort was at best a secondary concern. Using container dimensions nice square space can be constructed; no need to bend and fit things to shape the shape of the hull. You even see that on large modern ships like T45 let alone the Leanders which Jed spent his time. The large hull would allow you to space accommodation to spread out distance greater than the length of a destroyer like T45. Imagine 4 blocks, two to starboard and two to port at spaced a least one hull frame away. These blocks would be well above the waterline. Indeed I would fill the bottom of with several layers of TEUs all of which are to be filled with oil drums welded into them. Basically creating hundreds (thousands?) of water tight zones. Spreading stuff out will of course help with damage control. Smoke won’t be able to move through all areas. Perhaps each block or pair of blocks could have sea water pump and generator. Thought too many redundant systems will increase the cost, pumps and generators make up a large chunk of a build cost. As for crew size well the Triple – Es like all modern containers vessels will be able to go to sea with a crew of less than 15. This is obviously inadequate for naval needs, but it does reveal an intriguing minimum. Therefore a crew the size of modern destroyer should be more than enough; of course then there will be a need for an air group. The Italian Cavour has crew of 486 and air group of 211. Perhaps a good guide to structural costs beyond the basic hull and engines is the new Cunarder Victoria; £270million to carry 2900 souls and built to SOLAS5. A lot of the steel for a Triple-E carrier would be straight cut structural steel and it is complicated designs where the money gets consumed. The size of the ship will allow for straight runs of pipework etc. that should be easily accessible. I think the aim with this conversion is to separate shall we say the hydrodynamic elements from the warfare and hotel elements.
The Triple-Es will be as fast as the USS Wasp and 143m longer at 400m; Triple-Es have twice the beam of the Invincibles. For reference the minimum take off distance for a full loaded AV8b is 792m. And remember the Wasps don’t have a ski jump to aid take off ; I believe that is too increase space for helicopter handling. Therefore the will be lots of space for jump-jet operations. The size will hopefully mitigate the need for the ship to move too recover aircraft.
As for power and weapons systems. The Triple-Es are example of the new trend in container ship design call twin island. The engines are back aft. And the bridge forward to make ship handling easier. This change layout allows for more containers to be carried, but in someways is return to how ships used to look. Brown suggests that the costs for a warship break down thus 60% weapons and sensors, and 40% hull. The Cavour costs combat systems and weapons then using those ratios come in at approximately £500million. But the Cavour is proper warship, more a large cruiser, than something like HMS Ocean with a much simpler weapons and sensor fit. Perhaps something like the cost of FREMMs system’s as a halfway house at approximately £300million would be more better. The Triple-E’s engines are sited within one space so one engine would be needed to be moved forward a frame. And the Triple-E already generates enough power to handle 600 reefer containers so crew spaces etc. will already have ample provision. Though more power would be needed for sensors. An electric ship would allow for gen-sets to be scattered around the hull. With modern advances in using DC current over lines this would not be to problematic but it would move away further away from picking an off the shelf hull. Does the ship need modifications to make her quieter. Well as somebody has already pointed out here it is hard to hide the acoustic signature of a big ship. But the Triple-Es do have an advantage in that her engines are quite slow so no thrashing props like on a destroyer.
So if a Triple E cost $190million, which is about £120million pounds. Additional structural steel and accommodation about £250 million (lots of pumps and fire fighting system like sprinklers and compressors for BA oxygen.) A combat system similar to FREMM but with additional weapons to cover bulk and air craft handling about 400million. And through in another £80million for the pot for stuff I have forgot we come to about £850million. That figure isn’t far off what Indian expects to pay for her next carrier. Cheaper than a Daring. It should be remembered that HMS Ocean was built to commercial standards and has done sterling work. When she was built her costs came in at approximately those of a frigate.
Hi x,
Have a look at the next class the Italians are building, they are half way between Cavour and Ocean.
Something like $300m a piece? Two mainly for amphib duty and one mainly for aviation.
– Italy’s total take of F35s was, in the original plans, close to UK’s (131 vs 138) but they were always going to get the bulk of theirs earlier than deliveries to the UK
– if you get the platforms to move the actual strike delivery around that cheaply, then you can afford to pay for the planes…
We’re stuck/lucky (dep. on personal preference) with CVF now so alternative ships are a moot point. One good thing CVF gives that all sides should agree on, is flight deck space; and space=flexibility. As TD originally set out the key now is to get max value out of what we have.
I like the proposal of a truly hybrid air wing as, without raising our ambitions it’s hard to see what UK-only ops requires pretending to be a mini-Nimitz operating 40+ strike aircraft in a sortie rate far greater than our current experience/training.
There was blog post back in 2008 (lost the site link) on comparing future international aircraft carrier programmes; which speculated along similar lines with a QE air wing of 24x F-35Bs, 3x AEW SeaKing/Merlin, 4-6x Apaches and 4x Chinooks.
You can play around with the helicopters (4x Apache, 6x Merlin?, what about CH-53?) but they should have good legs unless you want to send your valuable carrier inshore.
Similarly you can play around with F-35B vs C vs Rafale vs F-18. There is a legacy view that it’s hard to mix conventional fixed-wing and rotary ops but apart from losing a couple of spots to the arrestor cables the rest depends on your sortie rate and if you’re constantly assembling alpha strikes on deck. (in the same fashion launch and recovery is often done in distinct separate phases even if there is sufficient angled deck clearance to do both simultaneously)
I would currently discount UAVs and Sea-Typhoon. The former offers many benefits but until increased autonomy comes in, the current limitation is bandwidth to control them especially in the congested EM spectrum around a naval battlegroup. As for the latter just think of all the ladders you would have to keep moving around! There is no easy route to that high cockpit and seeing that you can inspect the engine without knocking your head on the fuselage its a wee bit high for reasonably sized built-in/drop-down steps.
@ ACC
I didn’t realise the Italians were getting their F35b before us? I thought the UK was the primary partner on this.
Yes I am aware of the new Italian ships. It seems big aviation cable amphib’s are the way to go. Something else we seem to be giving up just as everybody starts to take an interest.
X, ACC
Its hoped that the Italians get the F35B. They have 2 problems one it maybe canned oops “big amphibs”(cavour only an airgroup off around 22 a/c 8 of which are F35) with no air cover. The second the Italian buy is a split buy with the air force only in there case the air force is getting the F35A only a small number will be the B variant it doesn’t take a genius to suggest that as the B variant price increases and their economy even worst than ours that only the A variant maybe purchased.
I keep forgetting that we are now getting C not B.
When I first read that Cavour was only to get 8 F35s it did cause me some head scratching because it seemed a low number. Some more digging did show it was a budgetary and not a size (that is hanger size) issue.
This is a very good picture showing how aircraft can fit into Cavour.
http://cencio4.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/cvh-550-cavour2a.png
This is the sort of ship we should have built. 12 jets + 4 Merlin ASaC + a couple of ‘plane guards seems adequate for our needs. The UK doesn’t deploy much more today out of area. Good level of self-defence too with Aster and the guns.
Nice YouTube of Cavour.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pGQSmc_H1CQ
Hi x,
That was probably 14 then, plus loads of helos. Cavour cost about 1.5bn euros (armaments incl.).
– these new ships (probably w/o weapons systems) cost $ 0.3bn and (the aviation variant)take(s) that mentioned 8 (only the aviation variant)
– but in practice the 1+1+2 (the current smaller carrier will be retired) means 8 to 14 plus another 8 strike/ CAP aircraft on board, with 3 bns and lots of helos
– can even divide for two ops, and still be non- reliant on any shore-based or outside support
– ships 1.5 bn euro plus a bn in USD on top,
– planes, call it $250m a piece and 16, only $ 4bn
– spares and so on on shore, add 50%?
– we would need to have QE, Ocean, Albion AND Bulwark, for the same effect; how much?
@ ACC
Ideally our Cavour would be accompanied by a “fast” LPD something in the vein of the US LPD25 but done properly. And accompanied by a fast store ships of the same design but with a much smaller well deck (similar concept to the USN Harpers Ferry.)
How the US can build the 16000ton Whidbey Islands to carry 4 LCACs and 633 marines, and then increase displacement by 10,000, troop lift 150, and then loose 2LCACs I don’t know…….
Cavour looks a good ship. We would have needed 3 or 4 to allow the same affect will get from 2 CVF. Now they would allow you to operate in more areas at once but would require more thru life costs as a result. Its only a good idea if the B version is built.
ACC
Cavour will operate as either a LPH or an Strike carrier but not both at the same time. So I take it that these new ships carry 8 helos and a battalion of troops?. If so thats a max of about 40-50 a/c or about the same as CVF on her own. If we replace the two LPD with LHDs when the time comes I think we will have done it right in the end.
@ Mark
The UK has only really had one carrier for decades. The Invincibles were never operated at the same pace as US operates her carriers. The hull in deep refit was in “very deep.” Only one of the two in service was ever ready to go. The other had more of what I would say was a skeleton crew. All smoke and mirrors. When CVF comes along the pretence of second carrier in service will be done away with.
And yes you are right about through life costs and them being dependent on the B. Though Cavour crew is smaller than CVF.
My view of what UK sea power is for is slightly different to Their Lordships. I see it more as for “defensive sea control” not as a mini-CVN for strike. 12 fast air frames backed up by a good air defence AAW destroyer or two should do. I am not for boots on the ground unless needed. But when needed it means kit and getting there in a timely fashion. Imagine a Cavour accompanied by the two amphibious ships in a “Libya” scenario.
Sometimes I think also we should have built 2 or 3 Makin Islands instead of CVF. Again F35b problem. Though I would use 4 conventional British LCUs not LCACs. (Or perhaps two of the French catamarans.)
x
I accept what your saying. CVF will also be oceans replacement. I think cavour has just over a hundred less crew than cvf.
So a future UK force may be CVF, Albion and a Bay Class (with a similar task group in 3-6 month reserve or refit). If we had some thing like Cavour we would need 2 Cavour Albion and a bay class to do the same thing.
I would love 2 or 3 Makin Island class ships in the navy but were would find the 1100 odd crew to man one from!!
I think if cvf has or could have incorporated space to allow embarking of marines similar to ocean(like american class LHD) then with the cats and traps we have a good ship. I dont think cvf should sale around with 36 JSf either but a typical air wing of 18 jets 2-3 aew and 18 helicopters would do nicely. I do however like the option that we can for large scale operations.
I never understood why nobody designed a carrier around the SAAB Gripen.
In the mid 80s, the Americans looked at ski ramps.
They came up with a very shallow 2 degree ramp with 2 catapults in it. It would have been fitted to a proposed 53,000 ton carrier.
I would have thought that an 800ft long, 35,000 to 40,000 ton carrier with an angled deck, traps plus shallow bow ski ramp with catapults, would be fine for the Gripen.
This ramble is my way of saying F-35B is not the only way for a midsize carrier.
8 fast jets is fine for token operations, but for even a moderate operation you need a minimum of 16, more like 20 on your economy carrier.
Hi Mark,
All agreed. But howabout the $$$ (don’t have the euro sign on my keyboard)? Those ships, to deliver the same thing (effect)from them, only cost just above 2 bn euros
– the JSF cost the same to everyone, and for B’s more than C’s
[@x; who do we defend against, with carrier aircraft?]
Hi JH,
The step is quite big (Indian data):
Name Pennant Tonnage Laid down Launched Sea trials Commissioning Details
INS Vikrant 40,000 28 Feb 2009 2013 2014 [16] Conventional-powered STOBAR carrier
INS Vishal 65,000 Mid 2011 2015 2017 [17] Conventional-powered CATOBAR carrier
53.000 just does not sit well with either design
The dimensions for the smaller
-Length: 262 metres (860ft)
-just about the same as for the “design study”
and here’s your equivalent to the US 53k t:
Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov (Russian: Адмирал Флота Советского Союза Кузнецов)
which is 55k t with full load
– has spent almost as much time in the “docks” as ChdG
– will only have modern aircraft (MIG29s) as the Russians duped the Indians into paying for the SU33 replacements
@ Mark
Yes it is the air group personnel where the savings are I suppose. I grant 115 bods isn’t much of saving.
I know that CVF is being touted as a possible Ocean replacement. This though in some ways will be a return to the bad old days. Ocean may have been a cheap build but she was designed around the Marines with extra wide passage ways etc. to ease movement to assault stations. I doubt that has even be thought about when CVF was being designed.
@ ACC
What I am talking about is defending choke points or escort duties to allow free navigation. If we are acting in concert with the US our naval power means we will be acting in a subsidiary role. If the US isn’t involved, let say the US returns to isolationist stance (look how they have stood down from Libya today) the world becomes one filled with small navies. Even our greatly reduced takes on a new dimension. A fleet that operates effective SSNs, with good AAW ships, and even a limited carrier capability like a Cavour becomes a force with which to be reckoned.
My guess is when push comes to shove we will end up buying a new LHD to replace Ocean around 2025, once we try out QE or PoW as LHD’s and find they are not entirely suitable(likely to keep French happy we will buy one of the Mistral’s they built for stimulus reasons only)
ACC
Yep they are cheaper. We will end up with 2 cvf and 2 albion to there 4. Now our Albions cost about 350m each. CVF would have cost us about 2b each had the government(only politics) not screwed things up. I think our ships are more high end assets and can stay at sea for longer and can deliver more a/c and troops. In the end comparing 1 Cavour to 1 cvf is fine it all depends if you think that youll need the high end stuff(C4ISR) and the larger aircraft carrying capability. I think CVF gives us more aircraft options and I would say the cost difference is acceptable, with cavour your F35B or bust(issues here have been know about long long time before they became public and I think CVF grew because of it).We know from operating the Invincible the problems space and operating 20 a/c in large scale operations brings CVF address this problem I dont think cavour would have. SDSR may have reduced the number we need to deploy but a small scale operation will still require close to 40 fast jet and helicopters to deploy which CVF could handle in one go.
I think theyre new ships will be closer to a thru deck albion with only 4 helos I believe. I think in future they’ll have 1 cavour and 2 of those ships as there high end assets.
I don’t think Ocean will last that long.
I prefer the Canberra/SPS ships to Mistral. Though the design could do with an extra kt or two so that it could achieve the magic 20kts sustained without being pushed hard. Slightly bigger engines and rounding the length up to a nice level 800ft would work wonders.
Tubby
I dont think that will happen I think LHDs will replace the albion class in 2030 we’ll muddle thru till then(as always).
X
I think the US will withdraw from the Atlantic/Med more there new air sea doctrine is all about returning to the Pacific theatre and not doing land deployments any more. I also think they will over time reduce there carrier fleet. They have pushed hard behind the scenes for UK to acquire these carriers as in strike configuration they almost allow operation of the same number of fast jets as on a US carrier. I wouldnt put past it that a UK squadron could be jointed by a US Navy or marine squadron for a major operation. Space ashore is always limited in major operation as on GW2 i think the US Navy and marines had more fast jet deployed than the air force because of it.
@ Mark
I have also been wondering if the plug got pulled on F35 altogether about reconfiguring CVF for the LPH role.
I would use the hanger space as accommodation for the commando and a hospital; good wide passageways and lifts could be constructed. Then I would construct a hanger on the flight deck at for’ard end to about midships. The hanger roof would be strengthen to allow flight ops too for assaults.
In my madder moments I think about fitting SeaViper to the planeless CVF and using them to carrier a couple of hundred TLAM…….
@ Mark
Considering the site owner’s dictum on RAF bashing
I am not going to discuss sortie rates from carriers.
x
If F35 got canned we would choice a different a/c but that wont happen now.
I actually think that the JFH worked and will do with F35. The planes on cvf could be RAF. RAF land and carrier air are complementary as an operation evolves AND we can afford both.Either 110 each typhoon and JSF or my personnel choice of 150 typhoon and 70 JSF
Ahh but X would you rather have 2 Mistrals or one Canberra class? To me there is also the danger that the stupid politicians will get confused with the Canberra class and think they are aircraft carrier or even if they are not that stupid they could get rid of the CVF down the line and buy some F-35B.
To replace Ocean and perhaps rather importantly RFA Argus both RFA Argus and HMS Ocean will need replacing around the same time I would imagine as Ocean is rumoured and I’ve heard some first hand to be a bit knackered especially since she has had a busy life. In reality though Ocean will go without replacement and that will be folded into CVF’s operational duties although we lose the vehicle capacity the mothballed Albion could be brought back. RFA Argus will also most likely not be replaced with her PCRS role being schmoozed over saying that CVF and every other new vessel in the fleet has far superior onboard medical facilities compared to their predecessors. The Helo training role will be bumped onto a mix of simulators and just getting on with it probably using anything available in UK waters with a helo pad. It would be nice to get 2 Mistral class one of them coming from DFIDs budget and painted white with some big red crosses on the side and it can run around helping folk. If the shit hits the fan it should be easy enough to give it a quick paint job or even then it would be valuable as a hospital ship in a conflict especially as we would probably have to treat both sides.
@ Euan
The US decided a long while back that an amphibious group needs to move 500miles a day. The quicker you get there the quicker things get sorted out. US amphib’s therefore are designed to do 20kts without the wheels dropping off. Our current crop of amphibs have tops speeds of 18kts, but their best sustainable is 15kts. Doesn’t sound a lot but over a week it is 1000miles or so difference.
So I would prefer the quicker ship. But can I have two please? :)
I agree with you with what you are saying about our amphib’s, CVF, and my beloved Argus.
@ Mark
Considering the site owner’s dictum on RAF bashing
I am not going to discuss ownership of the carrier’s fast air assets.
ACC
the shallow ski ramp with embedded catapults, was billed as a way around the jump in size. Well thats what the yanks claimed anyway. Never came to anything as the Nimitz lobby won.
@ Mark & x,
OK, where were we, quoting from my own post:
“- we would need to have QE, Ocean, Albion AND Bulwark, for the same effect; how much?”
– by now I have turned the euros and USD into a Grand Total of 1.65 bn £ ship cost
Mark, @ 10:25,
all points conceded, except your last paragraph (back to it later, at the end of this text):
– so let’s make it just one carrier (more capable with “air” and the other one in reserve at zero cost, for a fair comparison, and because both of the Albion/ Bulwark pair are capable to act as C&C centres (but only the Cavour in the Italian setting), we cost them at £350m each and throw in a Bay for free, just for troop/kit carrying capacity equalisation.
So we now have £3.7bn, making it 4.7bn euros. That is well over two times the ship cost… they fly the same (not anymore, now the more expensive) JSF and same Merlin, just a cheaper version of the attack helicopters.
Some issue about Ocean whether it will last to 2018 or 2025 (I fully accept Albion/ Bulwark to 2030; they are very new!). Solution, to be phased in:
-Royal Australian Navy is procuring two vessels similar in role and design to HMS Ocean (but with a significant increase in landing craft capability and the size of the EMF… an americanism here… over that developed for HMS Ocean) for a combined cost of £1.8 billion. If two vessels were built, it would ensure that a commando… we are English again… carrier – like “the” presently planned carrier double act – would always be available.
– so now we would have a carrier (again, only counted once) for £3bn, plus two fully capable amphibs without needing another vessel to ferry their helicopters (so only the escorts that we need to have anyway, needed as extras on the stage)
– now £ 4.8 bn
Who was it that was claiming that bigger is cheaper?
Final counter (to Mark): the plan is 1+1+2
– so Cavour stays
– the new amphibs are added (they have old ones, is it San Marco, to retire)
– they also have an older mini-carrier to retire, so the air-capable but hull-wise identical amphib is added as the last unit
– I am doing this count just to defend my cost comparison, setting out that it is for similar capability
Indeed a slightly faster ship would be better however you also have to keep in mind the logistics train and at the moment the Wave Knight class are limited to the same speed as the Bay’s and Albions. So although faster ships would be nice I see little point in it really if the rest of them can’t keep up because in a conflict they will need to stick together for protection from limited escort numbers. Just brainstorming here but we could lay down a ship to replace Ocean or Argus in 2020 for launch in 2022 with another following in 2024 and then another 2 both in 2026 to replace the Albion class. Although 4 new hulls is bloody optimistic the way things are going I could see us ending up with 2 new hulls replacing Ocean, Argus, Albion and Bulwark come 2030 alongside the 3 or probably 2 bay class.
At some point in the near future we need to sort out what is or was the Military Afloat Reach and Sustainability (MARS) program as the Leaf and Rovers are ancient as well as single hulled so are a priority. There is also the question of what is going to support a deployed CVF with the Fort classes either getting retired due to age or decommissioned due to budget cuts we need to think about that or look very silly. Just brainstorming again but it seems we need 2 large fast fleet support ships something that is a one stop shop for a CVF and her escorts with enough capacity to cope with a CVF doing air ops. It would also need to be able to keep up with them in all conditions so a top speed equal to or greater than the CVF, ideally a tad more so she can go to the escorts on their stations. The smaller replenishment ships is an issue I’m scratching my head about because of the unknown future operational picture or fleet composition, do we even need any because if a CVF is actually doing something the rest of the fleet will be with it.
An article on the BBC website; interesting comment near the bottom about building the Carriers in S.Korea for a fraction of the present cost…
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-12308437
When factoring in the closure of British shipyards, i’m not sure Lord Hesketh is convinced that it would have been cheaper in the long run for UK plc
just read that the aussies have bought largs bay for £65million, bargin!!!
@ ACC
Dude you have lost me. Sorry.
@ PaulG
It is a p*ss take. First British can’t follow a set of plans and so the cost of the Bay project gets inflated. Then HMG sells them for a knock down price. Then again there are family so…..
“The FAA would cease operating fast jets and the aboard aircraft would be RAF operated. We can’t afford two air forces and the largest one, the one that can achieve some economy of scale and is focussed on managing fast jets, should have primacy”
…and…
“I am agnostic on the FAA operating fast jets, it’s not an ideological issue, purely cost. Logically, the larger force, a force dedicated to the art of operating aircraft, should be more efficient and therefore lower cost. Whilst the US can afford four air forces the UK cannot, now, if the FAA can prove they can operate F35 cheaper for the same effect than the RAF then fair enough, but duplication and resource waste should be our enemy.”
This happened in 2006 with the retirement of the Sea Harrier. The RN stopped operating fast jets. The RAF operated them all and the RN provided personnel.
The RN pilots left Dartmouth then joined the RAF flying training system and trained alongside their RAF counterparts at RAF stations. The RN maintainers were all trained to maintain the Harrier by the RAF after finishing their RN specific training. No duplication. Even the RN air traffic controllers that worked at the Harrier stations were trained at RAF Shawbury.
JFH operated within RAF 1 Group, from 2 RAF bases. The logistic and supply train was for 1 aircraft and 1 aircraft only…absolutely no duplication.
When on operations they fell under the command of PJHQ, no duplication.
All the RAF personnel required training to deploy on board ship in the form on the Basic Sea Survival Course (BSSC) and this was provided by the RN. No Duplication.
There was NO duplication as it was ONE force.
If JFH was made up of 2 Gr9 Sqns that were part of 1 Group RAF, based at RAF Cottesmore and operated by the RAF AND a Gr9 Sqn under the command of Fleer, based at RNAS Yeovilton and operated by the RN then I could see your point.
You say your opinion is not an ideological issue well either you have very little knowledge of JFH and of the way F35 is planned to be operated…or…your opinion is ideological.
The JSF will be operated under an identical system to JFH. Joint only in the fact that the RN contributes personnel to allow it to be an effective force when aboard CVF. By contributing personnel it not only allows the RAF to benefit from the know how’s of living and working on board, but it allows the RN to benefit from the know how’s of operating fast jets. Bring them together; let them work as a team and good things happen! Your right, the UK can’t afford 2 forces that operate FJs; well we haven’t had for some time. But a Joint Force that is effectively controlled and ran by one service is the next best thing…and just as cheap.
@Jack
Let me clarify, my position on this is actually idealogical, my ideology is to want the best for UK defence, to have enough funds for decent kit, sufficient training and logistics.
My ideology is to realise that wishing for the goblins to deliver, fresh from the end of the rainbow, a big pot of gold, is rather unrealistic
So I therefore approach issues like this with zero sentimentality and logic. One of the underpinning aspects of this approach is that duplication is the enemy of cost effectiveness, it is true in any organisation. When I look at the FAA and AAC I see duplication, now that duplication may well have operationally sound reasons but is it worth the additional cost. You contend that the cost of this duplication is small and I agree to some extent but there is some and I am sure there are other hidden costs to maintaining the current arrangements.
If not then fair enough, lets crack on, however, I remain sceptical
The flip side to this is, if the RAF is so dominant in JFH, why bother with the FAA then, if it is RAF in all but name why maintain the charade of jointness and the FAA :)
If things carry on the way they are the RAF Pilots posted to the F-35 are going to have to accept that they will be at sea for long periods as will the maintainers etc. They will basically the FAA in light blue but will have no room for complaining as flying the F-35 will come with baggage.
@ TD
What I don’t understand is that you see aeroplanes as something special. But completely disregard the fact that for a ship to be effective its entire crew have to be sailors. Accepted the odd RAF maintainer here and there is going to make much of a difference; as Jack points out the RN makes them do the sea survival course. But on balance the crew needs to be effective in the full of damage control (a perishable skill) from fire fighting to making sure only the right hatches are opened etc. etc. Working in ops onboard ships isn’t the same as falling out of your bunk at RAF Much-Binding-in-the-Marsh and strolling along to the control tower for your watch. You just don’t seem to get that the three services have their own needs which has driven their respective internal cultures. The FAA and AAC exist for very good reasons. Perhaps you should be asking why the two senior services after letting air power go needed to go and re-acquire this capability? And as I and many here have said your obsession with duplication seems only to be about the RAF. Any suggestion about removing the duplication found in the RAF’s senior structure and giving aviation in toto back to the army and RN is seen by you to be outlandish. The army operating its own large helicopters that spend their days moving troops about, operating its own CAS assets to aid tasking, or operating its own large transports because the majority of cargo being moved into theatre will be for the army; what a silly idea. Perhaps we should go back to the days when the FAA operated fast jets and see on airframe to senior office how the FAA compared to the RAF? It isn’t who operates the airframes where the duplication is but in the upper echelons. But if the upper echelons go there is no real for a separate RAF…………..
I dispute that a ships entire crew need to be sailors;
Albion, Bulwark, Bays, CVS have all operated in circumstances where there have been significant non sailor contingents. The AAC have operated AH from Ocean and CVS with no major dramas, and if as jack says, JFH is more or less RAF anyway then again, operating with non sailors does not seem to be a problem. Did having RAF aircrew aboard the carriers in 1982 cause any major problems, when chinook flys off ships does the world stop turning.
I do get that the three services have evolved their own way, I just think we have to question the affordability because I truly understand that money doesnt grow on trees and the budget is under pressure from all sides.
in my world we fold three into 1
with your idea you fold three into 2
let me put it this way, suppose a fund bought tesco, costcutter and greggs the bakers
in my world, tescos manges costcutter and greggs, eventually consolidating and de duplicating
in your world, greggs and costcutter each divvy up the tesco stores and the back office, rename all the tescos and go their own way
In whose world is the lowest cost and highest profit
How much RAF moaning will there be, if they are stuck being seasick on a RN Carrier for many months at a time? How many expensively trained RAF types will quit?
Putting RAF on RN ships short term good, long term bad.
I still think the RN needs a couple of “small” replenishment tanker “Rover” replacements. This new X-bow seems stable in rough weather. So a couple of 15,000 to 20,000 ton X-bow replenishment tankers looks good to me.
John
I know some RAF personnel might not like living aboard but they are service personnel so I think if they were moaning its time to say ‘man up wet pants’!!!
Actually, I think the whole issue is overplayed a bit, the RAF personnel I have spoken to on this seem to enjoy their time aboard
I think any career minded personnel in for the long haul like a bit of variety. But there is a big difference between signing on for three years thinking you are going to spend it in the home counties. Perhaps with a trip to see the Penguins, or even somewhere a bit warmer like A-stan for six months. And spending those three years bobing up and down in a grey war canoe. At least 3 of my cadets went into the RAF because they used to get sea sick. One grew out of it and transferred to the RN. There is a big difference to living onboard a warship and serving in a warship.
I will respond to your early comment later.
TD even though I disagree with you, you still speak a whole lot more sense than those who are actually doing “the job” for real.
@TD
Fair point mate. I know you did your ‘Time gentlemen please’ piece and since then, despite initially thinking you were the RAFs answer to Sharky Ward, I now believe you to be extremely switched on! So, as you asked…
“The flip side to this is, if the RAF is so dominant in JFH, why bother with the FAA then, if it is RAF in all but name why maintain the charade of jointness and the FAA :”
The main reason, the OVERRIDING reason, is so that the RN is able to grow senior officers out of the Joint Force to manage the CVF side of operations. It doesn’t cost any more for RN personnel to operate the aircraft as the money you save by not putting RAF personnel through training pays for the RN. Simples.
AND…as I said earlier, both services learnt a great deal from each other, it truly was a great thing.
I’m going to break convention and say how I know this. Before SDSR I was training to be part of JFH. I have been on-board CVS several times and seen first-hand both RAF and RN personnel from JFH working together on exercise, learning from each other and even bantering each other for being ‘crabs’ or ‘fisheds’.
But the upshot of it all was, it worked and it worked well. There was no duplication as it was one force. Not two, one RAF and one RN but one, a joint one. And without the RN bit (1 third is the plan for F35) then JFH would have been unable to work on board ship as the RN would have little to nil idea of what was needed to operate FJs and the RAF would have little to nil idea of what is was to support a naval task force. The executive, doctrinal and command side of a capability is a hugely complex matter but put simply; Can you imagine the RAF sitting around a table and writing up the SOPs to operate FJs from a CVS in support of a naval task force at sea without anybody from the RN at the table? And can you imagine the RN writing the SOPs as to operating FJs in the strike role and how they are controlled by the CAOC and fit in to the ATO without anybody from the RAF sat at the table?
The armed forces are changing and you are right. You don’t need the entire ship to be crewed by sailors, as long as they are the majority it should be fine. In 1982, the RAF operated the Gr3s not from the CVS but from a Forward Operating Base ashore, they simply used the CVS as a hanger, took them off the ship low on fuel and unarmed then fuelled and armed at the FoB. It wasn’t until JFH that the RAF started getting the expertise required to operate from CVS (and just as importantly, the RN got the expertise to operate the Gr from CVS). When the RAF/AAC operate rotary assets from CVS it’s far less of a big deal, because the RN knows how to do this and has built up the type specific knowledge by working closely with the AH and SH elements of the RAF/AAC.
Even if it was found to be considerably cheaper to have no FAA personnel within the future JF F35 (which it isn’t), it just wouldn’t work. It would be cheaper to have Sgt and Flt Sgt pilots flying the aircraft as well, but then with such a small force how do you grow the senior officers to command it…? It’s not about the actual ‘doing of the job’, JFH proved that RAF personnel can deploy on board and ‘do the job’ just fine. It’s about the command and control of that job from higher up that matters.
Embrace it, clap for it, sing about it! It’s great! We ARE getting rid of duplication AND we have found a way of mitigating against the risks associated with the other services losing their expertise.
In my opinion, CHFs days are numbered, I can’t see the FAA getting the green merlin, not now the Chinook buy has been all but binned. But, I can see the SH force becoming more marbled (and staying under JHC) as the FAA loses its independent SH. But we may see a FAA squadron of Merlin as part of Joint Force Merlin within Joint Helicopter Command for all the same reasons as the JFH/JFF35.
I think Jointerary is a great thing. It allows us to have capabilities that we can’t afford if we did it the conventional single service way. It’s only a matter of time until we all wear purple hats! ;)
I hope this makes sense TD and good work with the site and your work. Great reading!!
TD
RE COST CUTTERS GREGGS ETC
What if the nature of the market and the available budget has changed?
What if the growth area is selling pies on the high street? (Say Close air support)and Knock down turkish tooth past to the urban poor who can’t afford to drive to the out of town stores? (say transport planes)
What if the overall market has shrunk?
Greggs BTW now largest takeaway chain in UK and growing fast VERY succesfull business.
The RN and the army are ‘End Users’ of air power the RAF are suppliers. Surely the customer is always right. If you let the supplier run the chain then: (and this may be the first and last time a defence blogg quotes Paul weller)
‘The public wants what the public gets’
And a plane like typhoon to which air to ground was design criteria but as an add on to air supperiority gets to drop 2 bombs in libya when an A10 would be far more usefull.
What if the customer ran the supply chain IE Army wants ato g army gets what it wants RN wants air supperiority and strike it gets what it wants.
BTW the attempts by the USAF to kill the A10 during development and before Gulf 1 are well documented. It took a flat US army: –
“If you do not build it we will, and if we have to set up the infrastucture to run we will, and having done that we will look at out transport needs as well like for example running C130 etc”
To get it built.
And pre Gulf 1 the USAF was still at it trying to develop a strap on GAU 8 gun pod to fit F16!
LONG history in every armed force of what happens (where it has happened) if airforce gets its hands on naval aviation is that it whithers and dies. Fact of human nature in effect Tesco’s running the show has been tried and failed. See its not pointy shiney and supperfast. Salt ruins their nice shiney shoes. (thats not as silly a crack as it sounds, People whose faces do not fit get ‘posted’ to unwanted postions, away from the seat of power in Whitehall so incimentally it looses influence in the counsels of the mighty).
Look at the state of the jungly fleet even within the rn to see that happening. (Not on those nice fast pointy sexy destroyers that the admiral likes, and remembers from his days as a commander).
@Jack, thanks, I know I get the label of being pro RAF but this isn’t the case at all. If you look back through the posts you will see plenty of critical stuff and a definite drift to a more AT/SH/ISTAR focussed RAF because thats the need. I am not blind to the many failings of the RAF but I also realise that we need to be ruthless when it comes to eliminating duplication and logic says the minnows should be eaten by the sharks (or Tescos and costcutters to use my other analogy). I take your word about JFH and it was a real shame it went, small savings do add up though.
Anyway, cheers for the kind words
Off to Greggs now for a sausage roll
Jack – great comment, many thanks, it’s good to get an opinion from those with your level of experience !
You asked: “Can you imagine the RAF sitting around a table and writing up the SOPs to operate FJs from a CVS in support of a naval task force at sea without anybody from the RN at the table? ”
I suppose I would answer, that yes, I can imagine it, and that is my problem with the highest echelon’s of the RAF, they appear to have consumed a large amount of their own marketing / psyops content !!
Also this is not exactly true is it: “In 1982, the RAF operated the Gr3s not from the CVS but from a Forward Operating Base ashore, they simply used the CVS as a hanger, took them off the ship low on fuel and unarmed then fuelled and armed at the FoB.”
They operated from Hermes, until a small FOB was set up on East Falkland near to the initial beachhead, I can’t be bothered to go Google it, but I think you will find that the majority of their sorties were flown from Hermes and the FOB played quite small role.
@Jed
Apologies, that was just a generalisation as I was under the impression that the majority of the Gr3 sorties were mounted from the FOB. A short Google later and it turns out I was mistaken. In fact the Gr3s operated quite intensively from the CVS including battle damage repair, maintenance, arming and fuelling etc.
Further proof, as if JFH didn’t already prove it, that the RAF are quite capable of operating from a Carrier. Also it showed that you needed the RN to have experience for it to work as the RN already knew how to operate FJs from carriers; they had the infrastructure already in place from the bottom all the way to the top, infrastructure, knowledge and doctrine that wouldn’t have been there had they not been operating FJs already. A little more research will reveal the amount of work that was required to be done very quickly to get the Gr3s sea worthy (including drilling small sea water drainage holes in the airframe) and for the force to be able to operate from a CVS; a task that required the corporate knowledge of operating jets at sea that was provided by the Navy.
I’m telling you, if you want both land based aviation and carrier based aviation but you’re on a tight budget, then doing it Joint is the way to go!
Thought this might be an interesting read from one of the GR3 chaps
If any criticism were to be pointed at the Harrier ground attack operations during the conflict this would have to come from the direction of poor operational planning and the almost total lack of understanding of the use of tactical reconnaissance and intelligence to select targets by the controlling authority, the Royal Navy. They again and again sent RAF Harriers to attack targets that were either ill defined, unsuitable, and in several cases just not there! There is an old Army adage that states “Time spent on reconnaissance is seldom wasted”, this is particularly true of ground attack operations.
It is clear that had more pure reconnaissance missions, as opposed to the RN love of the “Armed Reconnaissance” mission which were useless to the point of being a waste of valuable fuel, been flown then targets of higher tactical and strategic value could have been identified which could have then been attacked in ‘set piece’ Close Air Support missions as demonstrated by the successful 1(F) Sqn dusk three aircraft attack on the 35mm Anti Aircraft gun positions at Goose Green.
The Harrier GR.3s also received several modifications to operate on board ship, including the Ferranti FINRAE equipment, ‘Blue Eric’ electronic countermeasures pod, ALE 40 chaff and flare dispensers, and a fit for Shrike Anti Radar Missiles. Some were more successful than others. The FINRAE equipment that was supposed to align the Harriers Inertial Navigation system often malfunctioned and occasionally led to the aircraft having no head up display at vital moments. The ‘Blue Eric’ countermeasures pod was a limited success but demonstrated just what could be achieved by the Forces and industry when ‘needs must’. The ALE 40 Chaff and Flare dispenser was a popular addition and on several occasions was used to outwit radar systems trying to lock on to the aircraft. A major problem during the conflict was the operation and use of the Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) system fitted to the Harrier. This piece of equipment was so unreliable as to be useless and force the fixed wing pilots to return to the Carriers through the Task Forces Missile Engagement Zone (MEZ) with no identifiers of who they were except for approaching at a speed below 250 knots, hardly a speed to be flying in a hostile environment! It is interesting to note that having had this experience and identified a requirement, that just eight short years later aircraft of the Royal Air Force would take part in Operation Desert Shield/Storm with IFF equipment that was just as unreliably dangerous.
One of the crowning achievements of 1(F) Sqn must be the delivering of Precision Guided Munitions for the first time by a RAF aircraft during a combat situation. This is all the more noteworthy when one considers the fact that the Sqn learnt to use the weapons in a conflict environment, that in peace time would have taken moths of planning and preparation. This was not with out its hiccups though, as the Sqn had been told initially that the Harriers Laser Rangefinder and Marked Target Seeker (LRMOUNTS) could be used for the purpose of designating the bombs target. It was only after several unsuccessful sorties that the information filtered through from the UK that this was not actually possible, and that the target had to be designated from the ground. Due to the poor target planning by the controlling authority, the Royal Navy, several attempts by 1(F) to use the weapons were frustrated by time on targets being missed, changed or notified way to late to be able to get to the position, this was compounded by the Laser Target Marker being ‘battery hungry’ and on a couple of occasions the targets could not be designated due to flat batteries.
That is a good read, smacks of the same problems that Sharky Ward repeatedly mentioned in his book ‘Sea Harrier over the Falklands’. He was constantly at logger heads with the Admirals who controlled the air war from the carriers…using both RN Sea Harriers AND the RAF Gr3s. It seems both the RAF and RN Harriers boys both seem to think that the air campaign could have been fought differently and that it suffered due to non-air-minded flag officers.
The problems highlighted above seem to very much a problem with the RN not understanding how best to do ground attack. Which is hardly surprising considering at this point in history the RN were designed to use their carriers to find Russian submarines in the North Sea and simply use the Sea Harrier as a fleet air defence asset. They had done little work on carrier strike and therefor had no doctrine or experience to fall back on. Trying to then learn the art of carrier strike during war would then prove to be somewhat difficult.
I could now argue that if the RN still operated HMS Ark Royal with the Buccaneers and Phantoms then they would have understood carrier strike and would have been able to carry out the task without the RAF. Buuut….with the RAF having Phantoms and Buccaneers back at home waiting for a land based operation to kick off this would have meant duplication in capabilities and cost Not so clever when the country is well in to its overdraft. You could equally argue that if all the aircraft operated off the carriers in 1982 were controlled and operated by the RAF then the problems with target planning may not have happened. But then, who would be in charge of positioning the carrier for air ops with all the maritime considerations to take in to account, how would the RAF cope with this totally new and unknown factor? Or do you give this over to the RAF as well….then what about the carrier’s escorts? In fact why not put Carrier Strike under the command of an Air Commodore as it’s effectively an air orientated operation anyway…see where I’m going with this? OR, you could give all the carrier based aviation to the Navy, but then we are back to duplicating capabilities unless the RAF lost them to the Navy as they are maritime air assets, but then why do we need an RAF, we should just give it all to the FAA…hmmm this argument seems awfully familiar! I’m being flippant but you see my point. Hence the genius that is jointery to avoid duplication, unnecessary cost and best of all increase operation effectiveness as the expertise of both the services are brought together.
Jointery ensures that the people running these operations have all the knowledge they need to do the job properly (be they an Air Marshal allocating air assets to an ATO for tasks in support of naval operations or Admirals controlling a Carrier Strike group for an enduring land based/no-fly zone campaign such as Afghanistan or Libya or for an amphibious beach assault requiring fast air CAS). Also, with more exposure to joint operations in peacetime (through joint exercises and with joint forces), problems such as those highlighted above and by Sharky Ward in his book could been identified and resolved prior to operations.
Jack – I agree with you shipmate, the whinning by the anonymous GR3 type quoted by TD shows two things:
1. There are always complete nob ends somewhere in the hierarchy, I presume we have both served with such – and as you note, some of this is pointed out quite graphically in Sharky’s book.
2. Loss of “corporate knowledge” – the role of the SHAR1 as you note, was one of hacking at “shadowers” – a purely air defence role. Due to the loss of ‘real’ carriers the RN staff soon lost the plot with regards to close air support and over land recce. Don’t forget just because the GR3’s had landed on carriers before, there had prior to Operation Corporate been no major joint exercises between RN and RAF.
So your absolutely right but despite your very positive experience with JFH I don’t think having separate naval aviation is a simple as “duplicating capabilities” so……
“Hence the genius that is jointery to avoid duplication, unnecessary cost and best of all increase operation effectiveness as the expertise of both the services are brought together.”
The genius of jointery is that it keeps the Treasury happy. Sometimes some element of duplication is military necessary, and sometimes it’s not all about base cost, but overall cost effectiveness. I am not one of those who calls for the RAF to be got rid off. I am entirely with you ref some of the advantages of jointery (having been part of a small fully joint service unit myself) – but there is jointness for military advantage, and there is jointness because the Treasury won’t pay for anything else, and that is not a good reason.
TD – sorry, catching up with the thread – someway back you said, refering to Jack’s experience with JFH:
“The flip side to this is, if the RAF is so dominant in JFH, why bother with the FAA then, if it is RAF in all but name why maintain the charade of jointness and the FAA :)”
This is a completely circular argument. The FAA was the very junior partner in JFH because it was hardly that “joint” at all really! In fact it was just a drip feed to naval aviation to keep it barely alive after the untimely demise of the Sea Harrier FA2 until the F35 came along (RN conspiracy theorists are welcome to blame that on Air Marshal’s if they wish…..). Lets face it, in its history, how much time did JFH spend training / operating from a carrier ? Yeah, not a flippin’ lot ! How much time did the RN members spend in a land locked country doing jobs that could (should ?) have been done by the RAF ??
Mmmm’ as my Mum always says, two wrongs dont make a right…….
Now of course we are allegedly so skint the argument is that we can barely afford any, so the RAF better have them, and it can occasionally deploy them to sea, because, god forbid we should have any “duplication” anywhere (whatever that means in any particular context).
Yes indeed why continue the charade. However if your not going to continue the charade, then you may as well give up the actual capability, because “occasional” deployments of RAF squadrons, including all pilots, ops types, plumbers (Armourers) and airframe and engine mechanics WILL be a disaster if you ever want a long term, continuous operation of “medium” to “long” duration.
However if you want a capability that is “Naval Aviation” then why not have the RN as the majority stakeholder. Is there room for jointness, including RAF personnel – absolutely there is ! Intelligence specialists, recce specialists, mission planners even aircrew and maintainers could all have a place within the organisation. But this only makes sense if the carriers are to be used as a fully worked up weapons system; one capable of deploying its aircraft for maritime missions such as air defence and maritime surveillance / recce, and even anti-ship strike. If we are not serious about them, as we have not been since the formation of JFH, then as you say, why bother continuing the charade, sell the carriers now, or admit that we are going to occasionally use them as floating airfields for the RAF to undertake strike / attack missions (but you know the politicians will soon make a mocker of any capability caveats…..)
Jed, I lifted that quote but didn’t attribute the author, should have, I think it was from one of the GR3 pilots but can’t find it now
Thought it was an interesting counterpoint
On my circular argument, was being a bit naughty!
The RN, by the way, were only too keen to get rid of Sea Harrier and we all forget that in JFH, the ex Sea Harrier crews displaced a number of RAF ones, this is something that RN conspiracy theorists conveniently forget. Your point about enduring v short term is an interesting one and cuts to the heart of the matter.
The thing is Jed, naval aviation is seen as just that, a short term, theatre entry, niche capability that will be rapidly replaced by land basing. The RAF would therefore use CVF as just another operating location until land bases could be established. Of course there are some circumstances where a carrier is your only option for all phases of an operation but these are the exception, not the norm.
It is this that is the root of the concept
Just jumping in here TD but surely it’s both: you need short term, theatre entry for your strike/SEAD/DEAD elements, but you also need enduring element based on the carriers for air defence and ISTAR, particularly the latter which should be the carriers bread and butter role (finding and tracking threats). Therefore you need both the surge capabilities of the RAF and a core of element of fixed wing aviation on carriers likely manned by the FAA. More we discuss it more that the plan of 12 F-35C long-term on the carrier seems like a well thought out one and less of a bad idea and a white elephant that instinctively it looks like at first glance. My only complaint is that F-35C is neither the perfect platform for air defence or ISTAR, but given the costs of introducing a different type in the role I think we are stuck with it.
@TD
“naval aviation is seen as just that, a short term, theatre entry, niche capability that will be rapidly replaced by land basing.”
Oh TD, it was all going so well! That’s just not true. As the Battle for the Atlantic, the entire Pacific theatre, Korea, Suez crisis and the Falklands have shown. The carrier was weapon choice numero uno for the entire period of these operations and was there from day one until the very end. Not a niche capability at all.
Even in places like Korea and Vietnam where land basing was an option it didn’t offer the inherent flexibility that a carrier based aviation offered. The ability to move up and down the coast for a simple reason like avoiding bad weather, or for more strategic reasons such as supporting an attack on a different flank or supporting a special forces operation (of course this list could go on).
Even in Afghanistan, where we have land basing, the Carrier offers the most viable option for surging air support in theatre if the need arises. Clearly not just for theatre entry, as we’ve already entered!
“The RAF would therefore use CVF as just another operating location until land bases could be established.”
That’s the problem right there and I have seen the current CAS (who by the way I have a lot of respect for) say this himself. And it saddens me, because it totally misses the point of having a Carrier ship. TOTALLY MISSES THE POINT!
“Of course there are some circumstances where a carrier is your only option for all phases of an operation but these are the exception, not the norm.”
I would say the opposite. If you use a carrier strike group as an integrated weapon system to fight from the maritime flank of a joint operation it can prove to be at the very least incredibly useful if not essential throughout the entire operation. Complementing the land based aviation if it can but primarily being used as the key asset in the maritime flank of an operation.
A Carrier is NOT JUST a floating airfield to be used when a terra firma airfield isn’t available.
Also, a “theatre entry” asset is pretty blooming important and one that in my book trumps most other things. As without the ability to enter, we can’t take part and as the recent SDSR identified the need for the UK to do small scale operations on our own then I think we definitely need the ability to enter theatre by ourselves.
@JED
Of course I agree with you entirely. But that’s the point, the treasury need to be kept happy or we won’t get anything. So we are left with looking for ways of keeping both the RN and RAF happy by meeting their needs, and by doing it in the cheapest upfront cost way. We all know that if you priced ‘bang for your buck’ and were to look at how Effective, Efficient and Safe it would be for the RN to ‘do’ carrier aviation itself and for the RAF to get F35A for themselves and ‘do’ land based aviation without the RN then you’d get more ‘bang for your buck’. By that I mean, it’d cost less per effect (far more efficient) but more overall, and it’s the more overall that’s the problem.
@anyone that’ll listen…
But all is not lost. We are getting Carrier/s. JFH proved the concept. We have RN pilots going over to the US every year for the next few to train and operate the F/A18 from Nimitz class carriers. When we bring them home after F35 conversion in the states (2018ish) they should be incredibly well versed in carrier ops (not just how to take off and land but how to best use a carrier as a weapon not an airfield) and will then be able to ‘guide’ the RAF in the right direction!
I do suffer from chronic optimism by the way…;)
Jack, I should have said CVF is seen as just that, theatre entry, niche capability that will be rapidly replaced by land basing
That is EXACTLY how it was seen by everyone who had anything at all to do with the reality, not the 36 JCA strike wing fantasists. I am talking about naval aviation as PRACTICED BY THE UK, not in general terms or as practiced by others. The Falklands you say, the reason it was numero uno for the entire conflict was because the forward operating base, AM2 matting, fuel handling, documentation, tools, spares and munitions went down on the Atlantic Conveyor, perhaps we might reflect on the impact on the operation of that loss.
Hold, what am I saying, the entire conflict, the San Carlos FOB was established a few days after the initial landings and even with the make do and mend approach continued to be used throughput
So even in 1982 the plan was to get the FOB established as soon as possible and transition to land basing, it was hamstrung by events but the fact remains
I know a carrier is not just a floating air base and I know it has flexibility and utility, if you read my numerous dribblings on the issue you will see that I acknowledge that multiple, numerous and varied ways. As dour as I am, I just look at the money and ask about value for money or whether it is worth gutting the rest of the RN for or whether there are better ways of spending the money.
@TD
In a coalition type operation you can easily argue that we don’t need carriers and we can rely in others with similar capabilities and we can bring more to the party in terms of other ‘stuff’ we have. Like the extra FF/DD we could afford that can support anti-piracy, anti-drugs, humanitarian ops throughout the world on a day to day basis.
Very very true.
Or we could be the ones that are seen to be bringing the high end stuff to the party with other nations in a supporting role.
But that’s one for the policy makers. In the words of an old 1SL, “I’m just a simple sailor” and all my focus is on getting the best out of what we will have, i.e., getting the best out of the QE Class when we get it/them.
I see it as my duty to ensure that the CVF is NOT seen or used as you mention above. Because if it is then it’ll be wasted. A Tragedy that all three political parties and all three services would have had a hand in causing. It doesn’t need extra funding; it simply needs a change of attitude!
Also, should the Atlantic conveyor not have gone down and a land base established sooner I very much doubt that the carriers would have gone home. They remained on station long after the end of the war to provide air defence to the islands and would have certainly remained on station to provide air support to the naval task force even if the Gr3s had gone ashore earlier.
Remember that a carrier’s primary role is that of providing air power for naval operations. Just read the US Key West agreement and you will see that (US) naval air power is only to be used to support generic air operations when they are surplus to the naval operation.
So yes, land basing will be established quickly if possible and that will always be the plan. But as I’ve said, the carrier will continue to be of use in its primary role operating in the maritime.
But the Atlantic Conveyor DID go down, and the Carriers were the only option…so there! :)
TD Ref “That is EXACTLY how it was seen by everyone who had anything at all to do with the reality, not the 36 JCA strike wing fantasists. I am talking about naval aviation as PRACTICED BY THE UK, not in general terms or as practiced by others”
Like I said, two wrongs don’t make a right – this is purely budgetary led, not militarily, strategy and doctrine have been replaced by fiscal concerns, therefore sell the carriers ! (Or use them as giant LPH, but get some bits added to the design now)
IF they are used in this way they are truly a waste of money. You always speak of gritty realism, of doing what is feasible; but this is just giving into to idiotic British ‘fudgery’ – use them properly, or don’t use them with fast jets at all, because this is potentially war and peoples lives we are talking about, not some peace time corporate endeavor where compromise is the best policy. The politician’s need to get this through their thick skulls, invest what is required to use them properly, OR “man up” and sign the order to convert them into the worlds biggest LPH’s OR really “grow a pair” and start looking for customers.
Jack, you are correct, if a more capable FOB was available then the carriers would have remained on station but I wager that the majority of Harrier operations would have been carried out from land, except where positional issues dictated otherwise. The carriers did remain on station for some time but on the 4th of July, GR3’s with sidewinders were tasked with air defence duties, operating from Port Stanley.
Here they remained until 1985 when MPA was opened
Where were the carriers in 1983, 1984 and 1985?
In fact, look at pictures of Hermes and Invincible on their homecoming, when was that exactly?
Naval aviation is emphatically not there to provide air power to naval operations, it is there to contribute to joint operations (which of course include naval operations) and it is this that we all need to get our heads around.
That is why we should never look at CVF as a single service capability.
On your other point, using CVF as a contribution to a coalition, yes, could see that.
It does mean an imbalance elsewhere though and might mean accepting a reduction in surface and sub surface stuff.
@ TD re where were the carriers
That is a bit simplistic. The Argentines had lost militarily and politically the fight for Falklands. Argentina was in a state of internal flux. THERE WAS NO THREAT AT THE TIME. I think the Argentine Mirages would have made short work of RADAR-less GR3s. In international affairs events reach a conclusion, chapters end. And I don’t think anybody here disputes that launching an aeroplane from land in your own sovereign territory is easier than launching a ‘plane from a carrier. The problems arise when you don’t have a base in range, overflying rights, restrictions placed on you by host nations, enough tankers, etc. etc. etc. Would the UK be advocating military action in Libya if France and Spain held the same stance as Germany? Even the Italians with the problem on their door step deliberated on whether to allow the UK to use bases. Having a carrier demonstrates a capability for independent action.
As for “Naval aviation is emphatically not there to provide air power to naval operations, it is there to contribute to joint operations (which of course include naval operations) and it is this that we all need to get our heads around.”
Um. OK. You lost me there. I don’t think anybody here disputes that carrier can be used as a strike or CAS platform as well as for sea control/denial. So yes…….
@ Jack re guiding the RAF in the right direction.
Firstly thank you for explaining the FJ pilot pipe and the nature of FAA FJ ops since the demise of SHAR. Not that is new to me; sorry TD.
@ All
From 1688 to 1914 Britain’s fortune was sourced from a global trade network secured by a global navy. We balanced Europe’s land powers, played political games, and never committed too many troops to the Continent. When war came in 1914 we found ourselves needing to build a continental sized land army. And when war came again in 1939 we had to build a continental based airforce too. Our focus remained in Europe because our supposed enemy was another European land power. And with the withdrawal from empire the balance of our forces came to be in Germany and UK. Now I fond of saying the RAF has done very little since 1945 and that everywhere where airpower has been needed the FAA has borne the brunt. But I know this isn’t really true; the RAF existed as a force being, just as the nuclear deterrent. Thank God the RAF was never used. But now that period has ended, heck it has been ended now 20years. The RAF is a regional force and as experienced as it is with aeroplane operations it can’t reach much beyond Europe’s borders as we are seeing now. WHAT SOME PEOPLE need to get their head round is that air-power doesn’t mean RAF. The MoD now starts to think about where the UK will be fighting in the next 50 years. This could be anywhere from coast of Africa to the Poles to the Pacific. Nobody here is advocating shutting down the RAF like some failed enterprise. But that current store of knowledge which is perishable needs to be directed towards rebuilding a small professional carrier force. Carrier squadrons between carrier deployments could easily handle QRA and UK air defence as there is no immediate air threat to the UK home islands. Carrier flying is another perishable skill; you have to look at the USN to see that. Carrier pilots can land on conventional runways. But is it really sensible to expect conventional pilots to flip to carrier operations just because that is there next draft? No not really. Surely the harder to acquire skill should drive decisions? It seems to me as I have said many times now that the RAF acquiring maritime fast air is more about preserving the RAF than doing what is best for Britain’s defence; yet is always pro-navy people who are accused of silly sentimentally. As Jack has pointed out now several times the Navy is learning, relearning, about fast air from the RAF (and the USN) to enable effective RN carrier operations. Not so that the RAF can take on carrier fast air. A carrier’s air group are its main battery; just as the Marines are an amphib’s main battery. But both operations are routed in the effective movement of ships. Jack is living proof that young people join the navy to be aviators. In twenty years time is it that inconceivable that FAA pilots will equal or even out number RAF pilots coming out of training as wars become more distant? Why is that a bad thing to hypothesis about such? Why is it airpower must mean RAF?
TD you have been smoking the jointness joints again haven’t you ?
“Naval aviation is emphatically not there to provide air power to naval operations, it is there to contribute to joint operations (which of course include naval operations) and it is this that we all need to get our heads around”
IF you have such a capability (or capability set), it is there to do whatever you want with and whatever is expedient in any given scenario. It is NOT only for projecting power ashore even though that is currently very trendy, it may in the future return to such roles as air defence of friendly shipping (not just naval) and interdiction of enemy shipping. If you have the right assets (and I presume we are sticking to “carrier fast jet” type assets here) it can include ISTAR, ASW etc.
Of course the rather broad term ‘naval aviation’ does of course include pirate chasing Lynx’s and sub hunting Merlin’s.
Lay off the “joints” for a while and have a wee nip of Pursers Rum – it’s good for you :-)
Just to chime in quickly, people should remember that the RAF has been providing expeditionary airpower to a number of theatres across the world since it’s inception. The Royal Navy is not the only service that can project power abroad.
@ TD re supermarket take overs
When a supermarket chain takes over another supermarket chain it isn’t the retail units (unless there is a real duplication or business case) that get the chop but the head office staff. If we got rid of the RAF and moved its squadrons to either or both of the other two services the cream, the experience, the hardware, the stuff and people that get the job done would remain. What would be chopped the top brass and fat. Now as you know I am no fan of the RAF as a concept. And I am no fan of some of the things the airstaff have done at the expense of the other two services (where is Australia again?) As I said earlier it is generations of Airships that have sold successive governments on the RAF vision of airpower. I have never, ever seriously belittled or criticised the airman or pilot for the work they do and the bravery they show. Apart from deciding to join the RAF they aren’t responsible for the system they work in. As you say all operations are joint. But airpower isn’t an end itself. I ask again why is wrong to take the working bits of the RAF and give them to the to the other services? Let the Navy do has it has done now for centuries project UK power abroad with its own integrated airpower. And let the army look after all its own helicopters and flying artillery (you call that CAS.)
@ Chris B
Now this is an interesting point. You and me are of a similar age. And I bet in your primary and secondary schools there were old atlases in a store cupboard that showed maps of the world where a good number of countries were painted pink. Well those pink bits were ours so if the RAF was dropping the occasional bomb on some poor tribesman who had never seen a steam engine let alone an aeroplane the bomber would have been launched from British sovereign territory. The aeroplane itself would have got there in big bits in a freighter flying the red ensign across a sea patrolled by the RN……..
@ Jed
It is those Greggs sausage rolls, too long on the shelf on a hot day and who knows what hallucinogenic fungi could have grown on it…….
x, air power can be an end unto itself, not very often but still either solo or the principle
Northern Watch
Initial operations over Afghanistan
Libya
Just a thought!
Even Libya is not about air power alone. It is about supporting the troops on the ground. Not the UK’s own, but the rebels, but that does not change the point.
Notably, even such a limited-scope operation is consistently being failed.
Interestingly, most of the initial operations over Afghanistan means strikes from US Navy airplanes coming from aircraft carriers.
Northern Watch went, interestingly, on until the invasion of Iraq in itself started.
As to
“Naval aviation is emphatically not there to provide air power to naval operations, it is there to contribute to joint operations (which of course include naval operations) and it is this that we all need to get our heads around”
True. In part. Because this is actually the role of Air Force in general, while the Naval Aviation also does some very, very, very specific work in ASW.
Ultimately, the point is always the same.
Until you have bases, you are fine with land based air forces as well.
When the bases aren’t there, you are screwed.
An airwing of 36 F35C can do the same work of 36 F35A (actually, it can do something more in terms of range, but let’s skip that), but the F35A can’t go anywhere without a base. The F35C moves into the aircraft carrier and goes whenever it is required.
Same goes with less planes.
We want to assume that 12 planes is the most that which normally flow from CVF? The concept is still valid all the way.
I take, any and every day, 12 F35s that can go everywhere on their carrier or onto allied airbases over 24 which are stuck home because there’s no realistic way to conduct the campaign where it is needed.
If i must cut the carriers, then i cut JCA as well and, in the very best case, buy some more Typhoon from the T3B tranche.
No way in hell i’d fund the FOAS-madness of the RAF to buy a new plane type which in the end can’t do anything that Typhoon cannot.
We always talk about “we won’t have Russia invading tomorrow”. True.
Then why should we keep funding continental, land-locked air force good mostly only to fight Russia back, or anyway fight a European war which likely won’t happen?
Better to have a smaller air force, but have it deployable everywhere it might be needed, at any time, regardless of what others say.
The anti-carriers party is fighting an absurd, lost war: there’s no argument that will dismantle the experience of aircraft carrier usage from 1918 onwards. They have been everywhere, they have been decisive in a way or another in all conflicts.
Because they are flexible means to deploy the most flexible weapon, the airplane.
Land bases are not flexible.
That’s the main point of it.
And do not even bring up the “anti-ship missiles” idiocy, because disabling a land base is ten times easier than trying to sink a carrier.
@ X
Maps in cupboards. Those were the days. Pre-Google.
I don’t doubt that to get to a foreign nation would in many cases require he Navy to give the RAF a lift. But I’m still convinced the RAF should serve as a separate service. I can see the arguments in favour of keeping it. I cant accept any of the loose arguments given for disposing of it.
Again, the argument has come up about transferring RAF staff to the Navy thus removing a separate service while maintaining the expertise. And again I argue, why not go the other way? Why can’t the Army absorb the staff and responsibilities of the other two services?
There is no way you can argue the point in favour of the RN absorbing the RAF without simulatneously making the argument for the Army to absorb the Royal Navy and so on.
@ Gabrielle
“And do not even bring up the “anti-ship missiles” idiocy, because disabling a land base is ten times easier than trying to sink a carrier.”
Can you not see the hilarity of your own position? I’m pro-carrier and as such I see people such as yourself as the main problem; you treat Carriers like the ultimate weapon of war that will answer all questions, solve all problems, and cure all ills.
The Millenium Challenge exercise run by the Americans initially resulted in the “loss” of all their carriers and thousands of “personnel”. It proved in one fell swoop that carriers are not an untouchable weapon of war and are in fact incredibly vulnerable under the right circumstances.
Thus when you make arguments such as you did, treating the carrier as a panacea, you fuel the fire for those who are anti-carrier.
“RAF has been providing expeditionary airpower to a number of theatres across the world since it’s inception.”
Sure. Like in Korea where RAF pilots had to fly on US Sabres or FAA planes.
Or like in the Falklands RAF pilots flew off RN carriers and piloted RN Sea Harriers.
If i need to be really evil, i could also point out that to get twenty-one bombs with a Vulcan bomber to Port Stanley takes one million, one hundred thousand pounds of fuel – equalled[sic] about 137,000 gallons. That was enough fuel to fly 260 Sea Harrier bombing missions over Port Stanley. Which in turn meant just over 1300 bombs which could have been delivered.
Kossovo, Iraq, Afghanistan… all places RAF “deployed airpower to”. True. RN Sea Harriers were there as well, though.
The 800 NAS made tour after tour for 5 years in Afghanistan.
Ultimately, i will point out that, until 1960-some, the RAF had air bases all over the world from which it could deploy air power.
Now it has them NO MORE. And it is about time that they realize it while nothing ugly has yet happened.
The reason i’m opposed to RAF manning the planes which go on the ships is that the RAF does not like to go on ships, and we all know it. RAF personnel also follows guidelines calling for much shorter, much better paid deployments that would not suit well the time they’d have to spend deployed at sea and all this kind of limitations.
If the RAF can ensure a perfectly carrier-capable, carrier-deployable force of F35C, then fine, let them have them.
But it pretty much can’t. Or better, it won’t.
Because “they joined the RAF, not the Navy. They do not want to go on ships.”
No one bitched when the 800 NAS went on land. Were they superheroes? Hadn’t they joined the navy to go on aircraft carriers? Yet they did what they had to do.
With the RAF we have no certainty that it will be true the other way around.
@Chris B.
Carriers are no panacea. They can be sunk, they can break down, all you want.
But it is a fact, though, that even against enemies with capable missiles and huge airforces, a carrier with a couple of Type 45s escorting it and the mobility making it a mobile target “somewhere within 5500 square kilometers of sea” (roughly the area an enemy attacked by embarked F35Cs at full combat radius would have to scan to find the source) is safer than an airbase who everyone can find on Googlearth for free.
I’m not for the politically correct stuff. I’m for facts. Facts do not lie. They are “cruel”. I did not say a carrier is invincible, i listed facts. If they do enflame the anti-carrier guys, let it be.
“Thus when you make arguments such as you did, treating the carrier as a panacea, you fuel the fire for those who are anti-carrier.”
Did i say false things…?
I did say that the carrier can go whenever it wants without having to ask permission and without having the Italian foreign minister that goes “we-want-a-word-in-it-and-it-must-be-NATO-lead-or-we-pull-out-and-we-chase-you-out-of-our-bases!”. Is it true? Yes. Hell, i say it as the Italian i am, and with the embarassment i felt in seeing my government expressing such a childish thought which sounded a lot like the little boy who brings away the balloon when the soccer mates do not give him what he wants.
I did say that 24 fighters stuck back home are not as valuable as 12 deployed where you need them. Is it true? Yes, it is.
And i did say that a carrier is less vulnerable than a land base to enemy retaliation. Is it true? Yes, most definitely it is.
You can of course disable it or sink it. But you’d have to find it, then overcome its embarked fighters and AEW cover, the escorts, and the ships’s own last-resort defences from decoys to CIWSs.
A land base has no decoys to lure missiles away. Its position is well known. It is ‘easier’ to sneak a terrorist inside it.
And in case of the UK, even in the future with CAMM missiles deployed, an air base will have limited air defence and no anti-ballistic cover at all, not even embryonal.
I’d feel safer with the Type 45 and its missiles close. You wouldn’t?
Want me to list a carrier defect…?
It has to go back to port at some point.
But in the balance, and it is not carrier-hype, it brings far many advantages than it brings defects.
And i will also add that with a carrier you have accomodations for the crews without making Italian hotels happy by paying them for 4-stars room for 700 RAF personnel at a cost of 1.2 million pouds for month.
Another uncomfortable truth.
@ Chris B re the Army.
Armies aren’t strategic arms. There reach is always limited to that of their largest “cannon.” Which for the UK that means MLRS, so 37miles. Armies, especially ones belonging to island nations, are dependent on somebody else protecting their supply chain. Wellington wouldn’t have got very far with RN support in the Peninsular War for example. And though the Romans built roads so her legions could travel from the toe of Italy to Carlisle modern armies are dependent on ships, ‘planes, trains, etc. to get the mass of troops into theatre. Again somebody has to protect those troops in transit. Somebody a lot wiser than me said “the army is a weapon best fired by the navy.” The UK’s army can only go where the dominant naval power of the day, the USN, allows it to go. In many ways the army isn’t the tip of the spear, more like the tail of the dog.
Land based air is dependent on the sea too. A sustained air campaign will need a lot of AVCAT. And if your friendly host nation can’t refine AVCAT for you it has to come in from somewhere else. Flying it in by air-tanker isn’t really an option.
I am sure army staff officers have a good a grasp of grand strategy as their naval counter parts. But the former come from a service where the day’s operation can be played out on one map. The army and navy are very different entities. But as I keep on saying it is events on the surface that drive matters. A land/sea split seems logical; air power plays an important, but ultimately subsidiary roll in any operation.
Chris B
To be fair Millenium Challenge was a “all out war in the Pacific” scenario that included the fabled Carrier Killing Ballistic missile, which has not been test fired in a real life yet.
I don’t think Gabriele ever suggested carriers could not be sunk, however I also get fed up of the “there will always be available bases” mantra. Even if they are available, in these days of asymmetric warfare, such bases are far from invulnerable either – so the whole argument is somewhat pointless gentlemen !
TD:
Northern Watch
Initial operations over Afghanistan
Libya
How exactly are any of these examples of “airpower as an end unto itself” ?
Northern Watch – to prevent Sadam interfering with the Kurds.
Initial Operations over Afghanistan – well pick your objective, but it sure as hell was not “offensive counter air” …. :-)
Libya – the no fly zone BS did not last long did it, so air power is an adjunct to the civil war being fought on the ground.
I don’t see how air power can ever be an end unto itself, unless you think of it as part of a strategy to both warn and humiliate an enemy – i.e. “we have destroyed your air force and air defeneces, and so now we can bomb you back into the stone age if you don’t stop doing xxxx / comply with our demands”. In which case you might also suggest the actually “bombing you back into the stone age” is militarily an example of strategic air power, but as your obviously doing that to achieve some other outcome, to me even that is not air power for the sake of air power ???
Apparently it is only about have the figure you quote. To quote the MoD Defence Blog
“The Sunday Times reported that the RAF has run up a hotel bill of £1.2m a month staying in 4-star hotels whilst deployed on Operation ELLAMY. The RAF is operating from Gioia Del Colle in southern Italy where military accommodation is limited and therefore hotel accommodation must be used. The actual cost of the hotel rooms is just over half of the Sunday Times’ claimed figure. Alternative accommodation options are being investigated to try to reduce costs. There are no charges for basing the aircraft at Gioia Del Colle due to a reciprocal agreement with Italy under NATO rules.”
So for the sake argument say around £700,000 per month which works out as £33.33 per night per person, which is bloody good value for money if you ask me, given the cost of hotels.
Oh Gabriel
Where do I start? where do I start….
Sorry Jed, my wording was crap. I meant that these were air centric operations that either had no or very little involvement from the other services. It was a clumsy counterpoint to the argument that the RAF always operate in support of the Army or RN
TD said “x, air power can be an end unto itself, not very often but still either solo or the principle
Northern Watch
Initial operations over Afghanistan
Libya
Just a thought!”
Northern Watch? Well the combined efforts of the Turks, Iranians, Iraq, and Syrians have all failed to dislodge the Kurds through the post-WW2 period. So Northern Watch may have helped the Kurds but how could a weakened Saddam Hussein been any more successful against the Kurds than when had his army intact? Yes the Kurdish uprising in the towns quickly fell apart; but in the villages of the hills were the majority lived life didn’t get any worse.
Afghanistan? Yes the Taliban with their 6th generation fighters and cloak technology were a tough nut to crack. Wait no sorry the Taliban didn’t have any air defence. Weren’t expecting an attack ever. And weren’t a co-ordinated whole. Did air power bring about a complete Taliban surrender then? No. So………
Libya? Well the allies have bombed some tanks. Has Gadaffi surrendered? No. Are we approaching a failed state like scenario on Europe’s southern flank? Probably yes. If we can using airpower will it change anything? Probably not. Would soldiers from the allies, boots on the ground, win the day? Probably…..
So airpower isn’t a war winner by itself. Some poor soul has to go and get his hands dirty.
I say again “bombing for peace is like f*cking for virginity.” Airpower isn’t an end itself. It is a casualty free option for Western government who don’t want to risk body bags being seen on the evening news; even though the reason why troops die is mostly to do with poor soft ROE and cluttered opaque political thinking.
@ Tubby
Is that bed and breakfast? Or full board?
@ X
I understand the Armies/Navies/Air force differences. What I’m saying is, if it can be argued that the Navy could consume the other two forces merely by a transfer of personnel and expertise, then the same argument works equally well in the other direction. So everytime that argument comes up, I always ask the same question; Why not have the RAF consume the Navy?
@ Gabriele
You ended a comment with the whole “And do not even bring up the “anti-ship missiles” idiocy”. I’m being deadly serious here; try selling that “idiotic” argument to the families of the the 12 who died on Atlantic Conveyor. I think they would have a hard time believing that large ships floating on the open surface are as mysteriously difficult to find as you make out.
And you talk about fixed targets (land bases) being so easy to destroy in comparison to a carrier with it’s air patrols and T45 escorts. Really? What happened to the air patrols for the land bases? What happened to their SAM systems, both locally and nationally? This is almost like the disappearing AWACS argument that happens everytime the F-35’s air-to-air capabilities are brought up.
As for your argument about harmony guidelines etc, you seem to be forgetting that you brought this up somewhere else, along with “evidence” from a public report. An argument which – under closer scrutiny – proved to be entirely fallacious and misrepresentative. I can only presume you forgot about that.
You should also look into the work of the RAF prior to WW2, where they were used in a number of far flung theatres as a very effective “police” force. You also seem to be forgetting the contributions made by the RAF to various campaigns such as Malaya and Aden to name but two.
TD
Interesting topic so here are a few thoughts on the CVF and the F35.
First up any new equipment will be rationed if the MOD’s current cost base is not sorted out ASAP.
Need to start from scratch.
Zero based budgets.
What do we need and what can we afford?
Current figures halved and then thrifted.
TQM then work the cost of that quality.
Root and branch reform, New Model everything.
Now onto specifics.
USMC is up a creek without a paddle.
They are 100 years behind the times.
Have they not noticed the PC Expansion programme.
USS America = Fat and slow Essex.
Now the constriction based on lock size is months away from being sorted then the LPH concept can grow to useful.
That means F35C with arrestor wires and a thrifted launch cycle – rolling / ski jump but not fancy and expensive eletric catapult.
Next question is there any other reasons for the size of the USS America?
What the shipyard can build?
What the dockyard can support?
Surely not, then go big or go home.
WL – 290m x 42m x 8-10m = 55-65K tonnes.
Flightdeck = 1000′ long + 180′ max wide.
90MW = 4 or 6 med speed diesels + electric powertrain.
26 knots +?
Increase the size of the hangar by 50%.
Plenty of space for the dock and all the transport.
Marine accomodation = 3’000m2?
Vehicle deck = 1’000m2?
As noted by many others civil hulls are as cheap as chips so there is now need for the usual quart into a pint pot design ethos so beloved of the modern navy and their supply chain.
Maersk Triple E design shows where we should he heading. 300m long containership can be had straight out of a catalogue at a price which proves the value of competition.
4000 human shields in Govan / Scotstoun cost £200mill per year to feed and water. What they build is the big question.
The F35B only works for small conjested flight decks. It is the answer to a question no-one has asked, it lives because no-one wants to say no to it.
Moral of the story:
Company A wins the heavy fighter competition.
Company A wins the light fighter competition.
VFM goes out the window.
Eggs in one basket, never again.
Harrier 3 is the answer.
Where does that leave the UK CVF?
Looking very much like the last steam engine as BR went electric / diesel.
However we have to make the most of it.
Catapults + Arrestor wires = Surely now a given for both.
Aircraft roster is quantity over quality.
The fast jet fleet will be embarrasingly small UK wide in 15 years time if the F35 continues on its merry way.
The ability to put only handfuls of aircraft into the field at any one time is the not the way forward. We will soon be naming individual aircraft if we continue much further down this road.
We need more pilots and more airframes so I would suggest an interim F18 option to get things moving. Second hand stuff form the US and a training carrier made out of a 10yr old containership. Waiting for 2020 was never credible but Libya has shown the SDSR to be a shambles before the pages became creased.
If we are ealy lucky and the QE looks the part then hopefully we can flog off the PoW to the French as their carrier is possibly the worst piece of large scale naval kit since JF got three past the Treasury in 1915.
Finally one point that in itself seems to show up the shambles of the RN procurement process – the top speed / engines of the QE.
Just how much does 1MW of installed power cost?
Main motive spec with transmission – direct vs electric?
Cost to the RN?
Cost to Maersk?
On the second point I suggest £300K / $500K per MW.
60-80MW prime mover range.
Any thoughts on this would be appreciated.
I ask because I find it strange we couldn’t find another 30MW to make 28 knots a “breeze”?
Some of the decisions on the QE suggests that the old automotive maxim holds good for defence –
Want to know how well the financials went on any new car programme went?
Look at the carpet in the boot?
Furry vinyl and you know it was a dog.
FBOT
Agree with the meaning of your post bur not the specifics. making the America class bigger will just make it a smaller carrier, it is an LPD. A increase in size would also see an increase in draft. a Nimitz class CVN draws 11M. An LPD wants to be able to get inshore. Why does it need to go faster than 20kts plus? The f35B which I am not a fan off is designed not only to operate from “crowded flight decks” but also small airfields ashore in the early stages of an operation. Thereby supporting the USMC rifleman on the ground. Suggesting that the USMC is a 100 years behind the times is an outrageous comment, they are without a doubt the most flexible and agile power projection tool the world has ever seen.
All PATS
America class in size terms is hobbled, don’t know why?
Size of the Panama Canal locks looks to the the driver, the 32.5m beam seems to be a giveaway.
However the ship is a dog.
No dock in the original design.
Space was given over to more aero stores I think.
Seems it will be re-instated in No.3.
Consequently bit of a boo boo.
Need to ask what is wrong with a thrifted, not a small, carrier?
It is a LHA not a LPD so I think draught is not an issue and it needs to be a bit faster than 22+ knots.
How would the USN feel if it gets left behind by their “STUFT” ships?
On the F35B I feel that it is on its last legs, short take off is possible with a conventional powertrain and not just a fan assisted one.
Consequently the feeling that the USS America is a fat, slow and limited Essex is bound to grow. The width of the flight deck opposite the island is very poor and is a big limitation with regards to how the vessel handles its aircraft.
Nothing apart from service politics to stop the next LHA to be the ship the America could have been.
300m long containerships are ten a penny now so why are all navies stuck with the outdated notion that to save money ships have to be made smaller than there optimum size?
Cheap = Small or simple.
Small is not simple.
“What happened to the air patrols for the land bases? What happened to their SAM systems, both locally and nationally? This is almost like the disappearing AWACS argument that happens everytime the F-35′s air-to-air capabilities are brought up.”
May i remember you that the aircraft carrier flies CAPs of fighters supported by AEW assets just like those flown to protect bases?
Have i also to remember everyone what the UK can field in terms of land-based SAMs…?
With a battery of Rapier which can’t even try to intercept aircrafts flying above 5000 meters, you won’t be able to do much.
“national” SAM systems are gone by many years in western countries. This is not Libya with fixed batteries of SA-5 missiles waiting to be obliterated by Tomahawk strikes before having a chance to fire a single missile. The Bloodhound does not exist anymore, and also the rest of Europe can eventually deploy a few batteries of good SAMs, but that’s all. And then it is not a UK operation anymore, but a Coalition op, and then the Carrier benefits from it as well, say with more escorts from other nations and maybe also more embarked planes. It is a different scenario.
If we are in a coalition and we want the US to supply Patriots to the land base, then you must also assume that the UK carrier would work along with US Navy assets, which makes it a ten-times harder target.
France has some 9 batteries of SAMP-T as Area defence SAM. Italy’s got 4 frontline batteries. Each nation also has a test/training battery.
MEADS is probably dead after the US pulled out unilaterally leaving Germany and Italy alone.
As to the Atlantic Conveyor, it is not an aircraft carrier. It had no close escort, no decoys, no CIWS, no self-defence. It was a merchant ship which got unfortunately targeted by an Exocet lured by its big sizes.
None of the attacks to HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible were succesful.
Anti-ship missiles are what cruise-missiles and Scud-like missiles are for land bases. Of course there have been succesful hits. Of course from 1918 onwards aircraft carriers have been damaged, disabled or even lost.
But how many land bases, worldwide, have been destroyed/disabled/bombarded in the same years…? Uncountable.
@Chris B.
Your “close scrutiny” is wrong.
RN personnel: 660 days deployment on a 36 months period. 660 deployement days and 420 rest days and a minimum Rest&Recovery figure of 435 days IN THREE YEARS.
0,66 Rest days for each Deployment day, done the math.
RAF: 140 days in 12 months.
365 days, of which 225 of rest.
1,6 days of rest for each deployment day.
A Squadron with RAF guidelines needs 55 pilots in order to be able to sustain a continuative, enduring deployment of just 11 planes abroad if it is not to breach the guidelines.
Besides the RAF “aspires” not to deploy personnel for more than four months every 20 months.
For interest, the Army:
No more than 415 days away in a 30 months period.
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/cm071030/text/71030w0064.htm
@X
Sorry no info on if it’s half or full board. I note that in rebutting the Telegraph’s story they only said it cost just over half and did not give a proper figure. It will likely turn out the 1.2 million a month is the all in figure once you factor in meals, overnight allowance and transport costs to and from the air base, still works out as ~£57 per person per day. I would love to know how much it would costs for an Italian pilot to be based at Gioia Del Colle.
My only worry is that all the pilots and maintainers are going to come back fat and fussy eaters after 6 months (which is how long they have booked for) in Southern Italy, as the food is bound to be better than what they get back home!
@ Gabrielle
The point I was trying to make is that often people talk about all the defences that carriers have while neglecting to mention any that land bases have. If there was a major threat to our land based aircraft you can bet that the defence’s would tighten.
And your right, AC was not an aircraft carrier. But then off you go, talking about CIWS and escorts as if they’re some kind of Superman shield, back into the “they’ll never be sunk…” mentality, feeding the anti-carrier side precisely the kind of fodder that they’re looking for.
The reason no Carrier has been sunk in the modern world is because it’s such a rarely tested thing. How many attacks that stood a realistic chance have there been on Carriers?
And as for the link, two things;
a) That’s not the same link you pulled last time and,
b) It doesn’t matter however, because it’s talking about the same thing; guidelines for Separated Service. Which includes every occurence of service personnel being away from their families… EXCEPT FOR OPERATIONAL DUTIES!
You keep using the word “deployment” in a very disingenuous manner, as if to suggest that the RAF are afraid to go into battle. Yet – once again – under closer scrutiny your “evidence” doesn’t pass the smell test.
Please stop trying to bias the argument against a service you clearly hate by using what amounts to deception and defamation.
@Chris B.
I already made it real clear once that i’m anything but a RAF hater and i won’t ago explain you that my passion for british military born out of the Supermarine Spitfire.
But i see that anything i say does not reach you for some reason.
As to the link being different, i’m not an internet provider. I do not have a library of links. The first reliable source i found, i linked.
I remember the 660 days figure from the other document too, so i believe it said exactly the same things.
“The reason no Carrier has been sunk in the modern world is because it’s such a rarely tested thing. How many attacks that stood a realistic chance have there been on Carriers?”
Few, because it is a difficult thing to do, that only an handful of nations can hope to succeed at doing. The last time a british carrier was damaged by enemy air attacks was, i believe, in Korea.
Launches of Exocets against the british carriers at the Falklands never succeeded, also because the carriers were at the limit of the Argie’s reach.
Part of why they are difficult to sunk, since they can move away and put distance from the enemy planes. The UK had submarines close to shore in the areas of the Argie airbases, and the subs (included at least a diesel-electric one) provided, whenever possible, warning to the Task Force, with the carriers maneuvering away towards a safe zone when necessary.
Which only reinforces my point if you think about it.
As to the Harmony Guidelines, they refer to Operational Duty as well, at least indicatively.
Were do you think that the 9000+ personnel breaching the Guidelines of the army are, for the most part if not totally…?
May i suggest Afghanistan?
Same goes for the RAF. Unless you are aware of another deployement abroad which would see 2000 RAF personnel breach harmony guidelines.
Falklands? I don’t think so.
Exercises abroad? They last merely a few weeks.
Deployments are deployments. No one is saying that the RAF fears the fight. But they have far shorter deployment times.
Terms and conditions of service can be emotive but I think the New Engagement Model will look at these disparities and try and find a sensible compromise that recognises the differences between 6 months separated service in Helmand with 6 months separated service in the Caribbean aboard an air conditioned ship with three square meals or even a 4 star hotel in Italy!
It would seem on face value that the RAF have the most generous guidelines but as with all these things, we should not leap to judgement because they are very complex.
@TD
Being very cheeky here, but will it take into account the times when its six months in the Caribbean aboard a ship without air conditioning, prone to leaks, with faulty fridge, a malfunctioning engine, and playing host to a bunch of posing US coast guard officers and a TV crew who managed to find some of the most numptish sailors to ever swashbuckle their way through a documentary?
PS this is a light hearted dig, there is no way I would ever put up with being a rating on a RN ship given what the RN calls accommodation, it looks cramped, hot and smelly and I reckon they are not paid enough – it looks like a combination of doing hard labour in a third world prison and the weirdest backpackers holiday ever.
In fact, Army (and Marines and RAF Regiment) units deployed “on the ground” between IEDs and bullets, are the branch of the forces who face the worst strain, both physic and psychologic. I think we all can agree on this. Infantry even more than tank crews, in most situations.
Sailors and aircrew, while faced by their own risks and challenges, are somehow lucky when compared to the boots patroling the afghan towns.
There’s little scope, unfortunately, to downsize the army and simultaneously shorten the tours of duty of soldiers, unless Deployability targets are massively downgraded in ambition. But the next review into Harmony Guidelines and service conditions must be realistic and recognize the basic facts.
I do not blame the RAF guys. Ideally, every service member should see the family as often and as long as possible and have fair tour lenght.
But even with all the caution i can master, seriously.
1,6 days at home for each day of deployment, when the Army has a ratio of 1,15 or so, and the Navy 0,66…?
I don’t think it is fair. Ideally, infantry should have the 1.6 rest ratio, not the fighter jet pilots.
There is also other things that i’d like to learn and discuss about. I’ve read a US RAND report about training for Air Forces in the NATO allied countries, and it is an invaluable source of informations about the RAF. Unfortunately, it is now old (2002) and i do not manage to find anything more up to date, which would be an incredibly interesting read.
Anyway, what bugs me is that the RAF uses Squadron-tours of just 3 years. After spending 5.7 millions (on average in 2002) to train a pilot, assigning it to a squadron for just 3 years means that the cost of RAF personnel is obviously going to be monstrously high.
RAF personnel in the RAND report is said to be required to sign in for 6 years (after OCU time) before it can leave. The “goal” is to retain a pilot for 12 years to fully recover the money spent on training him, and the RAF tries to retain personnel by paying them courses of conversion to civilian flying so they can work in air travel companies (for example) after leaving. Such an arrangement is also being used to pay the Harrier pilots of the RAF after they have been made redundant. (it was on the press lately, mostly because Navy Harrier pilots instead get nothing of that)
The report says it is “not unusual” for a pilot to do subsequents tours into a Squadron, or move to another squadron within the same fleet. (thanks god)
However, it still puzzles me. They are not very ambitious targets and achievements. In the same period, French naval aviators followed these lines:
Squadron tour of 7 to 10 years
3 to 4 more years are subsequently spent as instructors or in cargo planes squadrons
Minimum service lenght 15 years
Goal typically 17 to 18 years of service
I’d love to know more of this kind of information. This is what there should be some reasoning about, in order to determine new, updated productivity-targets for the RAF.
It would also be great to have more up-to-date data about simulators usage in the total of flying hours needed by crews to stay ready for service.
Since i find that the report is very juicy, i post the link to it too:
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1441/MR1441.appd.pdf
Chris B – sorry, and I am sure Gabriele is more than capable of defending himself, but as to:
“And your right, AC was not an aircraft carrier. But then off you go, talking about CIWS and escorts as if they’re some kind of Superman shield, back into the “they’ll never be sunk…” mentality, feeding the anti-carrier side precisely the kind of fodder that they’re looking for.”
No he didn’t, he mentioned that the Atlantic Conveyor was a merchant ship without such protection. I do not see a passage where he categorically states that having CIWS or a frigate playing ‘goal keeper’ will prevent a carrier from being sunk, he just did not state that.
Nor did he ever say the RAF were frightened to go into battle – your making this very emotional aren’t you ?
Based on my personal experience of ten years in the RN, and my six years in the TA, including the fact that I have many friends in the RAF, I still say that as a service they have it “easy” compared to the other two – there I said it !! (again….)
Tubby said: ” it looks cramped, hot and smelly and I reckon they are not paid enough – it looks like a combination of doing hard labour in a third world prison and the weirdest backpackers holiday ever.:
LOL or even ROFL…. :-) The best summary of my time as a Matelot ever ! However it’s not all bad, an occasionally decent beer and and less decent (?) female company in the occasionally exotic location….
However as Grabriele reminds us its all relative – action stations at 2 in the morning in the Gulf for unknown inbound aircraft (after 15 minutes in bed, after a 6 hour shift in the ops room) does not compare to being a Squaddie on foot patrol, be that in the Belfast, Basrah or Helmand (or any where else you might get ambushed) !
Tubby said “PS this is a light hearted dig, there is no way I would ever put up with being a rating on a RN ship given what the RN calls accommodation, it looks cramped, hot and smelly and I reckon they are not paid enough – it looks like a combination of doing hard labour in a third world prison and the weirdest backpackers holiday ever.”
In a T45 Jed would get agoraphobia……..
I once blagged the middies’ cabin in HMS Bristol all to myself. It had 8 bunks and covered the same area approximately as the chiefs’ messdeck which could “sleep” 18. It is the air conditioning on ships that I don’t like. Always carry extra socks so you can stuff them into the vents. But don’t get caught doing it…..
@ Jed re foot patrol vs action stations which is worse.
I don’t know if it is that easy to make the comparison.
X – well it is a bit apples to pairs, BUT I have been to war in a “sleek grey bringer of death”, while I have only ever led a patrol on exercises, and only ever been on a patrol with live ammo in fairly benign circumstances.
Based on this experience, I would rather be in the ops room than in the infantry……
Ref T45 – Monty Python springs to mind “you lucky, lucky bastards…. ”
..although I did get a ‘frakkin huge’ 2 man cabin on the Diligence for 6 months !
@ Gabrielle
The figures you quoted for Separated service. They have nothing to do with warfighting deployments which is what you were subtly hinting at. We went through all this before. There are a lot reasons why the RAF has looser guidelines, e.g. they can do a lot of their training by flying from home base. I’m not going through it all again.
@ JED
I’m not interested in political wrangling on these boards. The unwritten suggestion being made by Gabrielle is that Carriers are damn near invulnerable, or that against a foe capable of taking us on in a full war, that carriers are anything more than just slightly harder to destroy than land bases.
I like Carriers. I see their utility. But they are not the be all and end all of operations.
I will suggest we look at this from the other way round can we afford NOT to build them. They will allow us the ability to independently conduct a small scale operation anywhere at a time and place of our own choosing. They will allow us to contribute an almost unique assets outside of the US to a coalition medium or large scale operation. As has been seen yet again in Libya most countries can contribute a frigate for blockages or fighter for air defence but it only the very select few who offer the high end capabilities of carriers and or strike jets and manned ISTAR.
I would like someone to explain what there alternative is to allow us the freedom and high end capability that carrier air (helos or FJ) gives the UK. As I see it we would have 3 options
1 To increase our typhoon fleet and at least double our air tanker fleet.
2 Keep the current air-force structure and introduce a long range manned bomber maybe join the US program.
3 Scrap the carriers and do nothing to mitigate the loss(likely government pos) and accept that we a removing 1/3 of our overseas intervention capability.
Other than point 3 I dont see those options costing less than the 6b for the 2 carriers.
Harmony guidelines “have nothing to do with warfighting deployments”…???
And what the hell are they about, then?
From MOD:
“Harmony guidelines” were introduced by the armed forces to make clear the maximum time service personnel should spend away from their families and how long units should rest between operations.
The recommendations are also used to monitor when troops are overstretched.
From Phoenix Think Tank: http://thephoenixthinktank.wordpress.com/2010/10/18/flying-from-our-new-carriers-%E2%80%93-the-rn-or-the-raf-ethos/
* RN and RM – in a 3 year period a sailor or marine should expect to spend no longer than 60% of the time deployed. The RN shorthand for this is ‘660-over-3.’
* Army – a soldier should expect to undertake a 6 months operational tour, and then have a 24 months ‘tour interval’ before the next deployment. Characteristically, the interval between operational tours is spent initially at home, then preparing for deployment. The Army short hand for this is the ‘1-in-5-rule.’
* RAF – an airman should expect to do a maximum of 4 months on an operational tour, followed by a 16 month ‘tour interval’, predominantly on his or her home base – There is no RAF shorthand for this approach but, for simplicity, we will use the term the ‘4-in-20-rule.’
If you will, you can explain me what i’m missing. Because i consistently fail to see your point.
“The main operational impact occurs when the British Armed forces are engaged in enduring operations, such as in Afghanistan and Iraq – the key contrast is between the RN, RM and the Army on the one hand, and the RAF on the other. Whereas a sailor, marine or soldier is able routinely to conduct a 6 month operational tour, an airman will need to rotate at the 4 month moment to stay within his harmony guidelines.[13]
By way of example, the Tornado aircrew deployed to Afghanistan rotate every 3 months, resulting in additional churn, greater use of the air bridge, and less continuity in theatre. There will be operational impacts in the future, too. A typical deployment period for an aircraft carrier – American, French, or British – is between 6 and 9 months. With their harmony rules, RAF squadrons deployed to RN carriers would need to rotate at the 4 month period, with the associated repatriation expenses as well as the loss of cohesion when a new Squadron arrives on the carrier and needs to be worked up. Fleet Air Arm squadrons, by contrast, sail and return with the ship without ‘breaking harmony.’”
This is from Phoenix think tank, again.
Whenever i go, all over the Internet, i see that Harmony Guidelines determine the period that personnel spends (or should spend) deployed, for example in Afghanistan.
And i believe that Afghanistan is a warfighting deployment.
And you, Chris B. constantly pop up saying “it is something else” while never giving any fact, link or information.
If i’m missing something, i’d like someone to explain it to me. I apologize if i’m making uncorrect thoughts, i’m making it in honesty. For what i know, i’m pretty sure that i’m not misreading the data and guidelines.
If i am, i will be genuinely grateful to whoever shows me the “warfighting deployment rule” (?) or whatever else i’m missing, allowing me to correct my error.
But just saying “it is another thing” is not of any help.
If only the RN could do PR like this….
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0lhpe8TCLX4
Further to what Mark said about overseas power projection. Really has the RAF ever done this? What I am saying has the RAF really been a projector of nuclear age strategic power? Surely in today’s “smaller” world strategic means outside Europe. During WW2 and the early (pre-ICBM/SLBM) days of the Cold War strategic may have meant a good distance but staying west of the Urals. Even if the UK doubled or trebled the tanker fleet at horrendous cost would it make the RAF a global strategic force? No. Only the USAF can do this with the B2. And how big is the US tanker fleet presently about 400 planes and it will be half that once all the Boeing new builds are ready. Why do we then confuse a 3000 mile trip through friendly skies across to the other side of the continent by a handful of elderly jets as a demonstration of potential strategic ability? I don’t see it. As I have said before for the cost of FSTA per year the UK could build 2 fleet tankers, fuel them, and operate them. Placing a carrier off the shore of a southern continent is strategic power projection. And the only we can do that is with a carrier.
@ Gabrielle
In the very first of those links you provided to a government source, it was in the comment section of another article I believe, you were harping on about “harmony guidelines”.
Yet when I checked it the document that you yourself has cited as a source clearly and explicitly stated that the time periods mentioned were with regards to Separated service, while also clearly and explictily stating that this covered all forms of time away from family, except operational deployments.
So in other words, you’re trying to use the harmony guidelines to pretend that the RAF is either lazy or inefficient or whatever, when operational tours and the harmony guidelines are two different things.
And if I remember rightly, having used that link to butress your entire argument and then having had it shotdown, you then mysteriously disappeared from the comments section of that article never to be seen it again. And yet here we are again, with you trying to use the same argument again.
Of course, all this is before we even get onto issues such as airframe maintainence hours dictating terms of deployment etc, but don’t let silly things like reality get in the way. Stick to inflammatory statements designed to blindly push a pro-navy/down with the RAF agenda, regardless of whether that’s actually the best thing for the UK or not.
If you just came out and took the stance, it wouldn’t be so bad. It’s the fact you try to stand as a moderate, middle grounder, while simultaneously taking every chance to talk about stripping as many assets as possible from the RAF.
Right, I’ve managed to skulk away from my night shift long enough to go link hunting. I’ll put the links and quotes from them in the next post, just be aware that because of the inclusion of two links it’ll probably need a sign off from TD before being posted, so it’ll likely have to wait until [i]THE BOSS[/i] gets his arse to a computer.
Link 1:
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmdfence/424/42405.htm
I believe this is the link you posted in another article Gabrielle. Scroll down to the heading “Harmony Guidelines”. There you will find this: “Two measures of harmony are used: Unit Tour Intervals and Separated Service. Unit Tour Intervals measure the frequency of deployment. Separated Service measures absence from normal place of duty or lack of freedom to enjoy leisure at the normal place of duty,” followed by “Separated Service includes activities NOT CAPTURED (capitals added) by Unit Tour Intervals like pre- deployment training, exercises, public duties, recruitment activities, and other duties which result in personnel not sleeping in usual accommodation”
I invite you to then scroll down and read, including Table 5, which makes the point that the Royal Navy hardly ever breaches these guidelines, while both the Army and Air Force do. Not exactly the comfortable life of half arsed tours they’ve been made out to be.
Also, Link 2:
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/cm070307/text/70307w0001.htm
Scroll down a little to the answer labelled “7th March 2007 : Column 1966W” from which the following was extracted: “Harmony Guidelines for the RAF are based on formed unit tour intervals rather than individual personnel, whereby formed units, or sub-elements within them should spend four months on deployed operations followed by 16 months at base.
The RAF Individual Separated Service assumption is that an individual should spend no more than 140 days of duty detached away from home in a rolling 12-month period. This allows for a four-month operational tour followed by three weeks of separated service due to routine tasks, unestablished commitments, unit assistance, pre-detachment training etc”
There. That’s the second time I’ve had to trawl all this out. Please don’t make me do it again.
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmdfence/424/42405.htm
Table 5, Unit Tour Between intervals. Let’s read it.
Naval service
60% of 36 months period in deployment.
Assuming, for comfort, 30 days for month, 1080 days. The 60% of it is 648 days. I believe that the correct figure, with months calculated properly, would give the very same 660 days of Separated Service tour guidelines. 660 days means 22 months in deployments of 6 to 9 months each, just as the Phoenix Think Tank blog underlined at the link i’ve provided, which is a formidable comparison between FAA and RAF.
For the Army. 24 months period between a six months deployment in combat zone (Unit Tour Guidelines) and a maximum of 415 days of combat/training/out of area deployment on a 30 months period. 415 days is a good 13 months.
Over 30 months, army personnel can be asked to deploy once in combat zone, for six months, and spend many more months away from “home” for exercises and pre-deployment training.
RAF personnel is given 16 months between a deployment and another, and in 12 months it can do 140 days away from home.
Which fits in the figure of 4 months tour lenght for RAF Harrier pilots in Afghanistan. For the Tornado crews, rotation is reportedly done every 3 months.
By the words of Mark Lancaster, Conservative MP:
“Harmony guidelines for the RAF are that people should be on operations for four months in 20. A simple ratio would be that we require 55 Harrier pilots to sustain having 11 pilots on operation at any one time. I have calculated that using a four-in-20 rule, so I have simply multiplied by five the number of Harrier pilots in theatre.
The pilots are the most restricted of the personnel. Engineers will almost never do four months on an operational tour. When the MOD talks about harmony breaches for the Harrier force, it is almost entirely to do with pilots, rather than the whole force, so we are talking about a small number of people. As a rule of thumb, the maximum tour length for a Harrier pilot on a front-line squadron is only three years. Within that three-year period, a pilot might do only two four-month tours.”
http://www.theyworkforyou.com/whall/?id=2008-11-19b.89.0
Note that hon. Kevan Jones, who back then was Parliamentary Under Secretary of State and Minister for Veterans at the Ministry of Defence, does not contest the point. In absence of contrary evidence, we have to assume they know what they are saying.
The 3-months Afghanistan tour lenght for Tornado pilots in Afghanistan appears on Phoenix Think Tank if you read the article i’ve provided link to.
Done the math and read the tables and made the comparisons, my point still stands.
Navy personnel can be asked, in 36 months, to make 3 x 6-months COMBAT deployments and more.
Which means making a 6 months deployment each year in a row. They can also, occasionally, face 9-months long deployments. Notably, because of the nature of Navy service, peacetime separate service tours and operational tours are not really different in lenght of time spent away from home.
Army personnel makes 6 months of combat deployment, then waits 24 months before having another.
In these 30 months, however, personnel is required to be away from home base for as many as 7 months more for exercises, training etc. (415 days in 30 months)(6 + 7 x 30 = 390 days, actually, so i’m being conservative)
RAF personnel has 16 months between a tour of combat duty and another according to table.
Combined with Separate service guideline, as you yourself note, gives us a four-month operational tour followed by three weeks of separated service due to routine tasks, unestablished commitments, unit assistance, pre-detachment training etc for a total of 140 days in the 12 months period.
Good.
So, i was basically right from the very start…?
@ Gabrielle
Not really sir. Your overall contention is – and always has been – essentially that the RAF have an easy/inefficient life in comparison to the other services.
Yet the RAF’s guidelines for breaks between operational tours are 8 months shorter than those for the army.
The Navy does spend more time “on ops” than the RAF, but two things should draw the attention. One is from “Link 1” that I provided earlier:
“As expected, given the nature of the Navy’s basing structure and its work patterns, the Royal Navy has met its targets since 2006”.
This was in regards to operational tours. Clearly someone believes that the Navy is under little pressure.
It’s also interesting to note that in ’05-’06 the Navy didn’t suffer a single breach in it’s surface fleet. The only breaches occured in the subsurface fleet. I should also point out that just because the Navy can ask it’s personnel to serve at sea for 60% of the time in 36 months, doesn’t automatically mean they push everyone to this limit.
Then by ’06-’07, the Navy had solved the problem with it’s subsurface fleet, broadly meeting the guidelines. Meanwhile the RAF Regiment were down to UTI of just 10 months. Also Air Combat Support and Service Support Units breached UTI.
The impression I get is that the Navy has tough/harsh guidelines, but never really so much as pushes the boundaries of these. Meanwhile the other two services are often breaching their own guidelines in order to keep up with commitments.
Chris B said “Your overall contention is – and always has been – essentially that the RAF have an easy/inefficient life in comparison to the other services”
No – that’s me !
Gabriele is entitled to his opinion of course, just like you Chris, but he is an Italian civvy.
I on the other hand base my opinion on 10 years in the RN including 6 months of shore time on an RAF base, and 6 years in the TA, in a joint unit that had many good RAF people in it, and a most excellent Rock Ape Wing Commander as the OC; and yet I cling on to that opinion, strange eh……
Just out of interest, without contravening opsec if your still serving, what’s your background Chris?
I’ve made it clear before my background is zilch, zero, civvy street.
I appreciate that you personally may have a had a bad experience with the RAF in comparison to the Navy. But you’ll forgive me that I’ve always been taught to be vary wary of personal experiences in things like this.
Some people have very good times, others have very bad. And essentially all personal experiences are subjective, hearsay arguments.
The thing that I don’t get is this, and I believe it’s an important question; why is Gabrielle not bashing the Army for their harmony guidelines? 24 months between operational tours versus 16 for the RAF? That seems like a no brainer. Yet not a peep against it.
It’s things like this that lead me to believe that sometimes people just pick a side and argue it for reasons outside of fact.
And when that happens, it’s pointless to continue. Nothing I say will convince Gabrielle to give up what appears to be a vehement anti-RAF position. So simply put, I’m not going to waste anymore time on it.
If he wants to do a little dance because I can’t arsed to chase aorund in circles then that’s fine. But I have other things to do apart from banging my head against a brick wall.
I want to reply to Chris’ earlier question about other services taking other services. Or as he put it why does the RAF have to be subsumed by one or both of the other two? Um. I have answer but I am holding off as it will be a ramble. But…….
Surely the structure of the three services and how they go about their business as prima facie evidence if presented to a neutral would lead to the conclusion that the RAF has on the whole got it is easier.
How do each of the 3 go to war?
Navy: In ships with a crew composed of officers and men often a good distance from home. For the ship to be effective it has to go into harms way. When in a war zone the ship is exposed to danger 24 hours a day therefore has to be operational 24 hours day.
Army: Mostly in the corner of foreign field (mustn’t forget Ulster.) Other ranks and junior officers in the field; camping with the added joy of being on a two way range accompanied by HE in varying size bundles. And who knows a bit of hand to hand? Lovely, not. Even if engaged in COIN warfare the soldier is exposed to hazards 24hours day, struggles to keep clean (dirt is as much an enemy as the opfor,) has to use a latrine, eat food in the field though designed to be nutritious can leave a lot to be desired. And this is life for good chunk of the 6mths he is away from home. (Have you seen the state some of army lads are in when they come back?)
RAF: Only the officers and handful of ORs go to war. The guys flying helicopters are in thick of it. And if your aeroplane is shot down it isn’t vary nice. But where are the balance of the RAF? In Afghanistan they are in base sitting in an area well saturated with troops with hot and cold running water, dining halls, NAAFI, PXs, etc. Yes they are away from home and yes they are working shifts but it is a world away from a patrol base. And that is only a fraction of the RAF the rest are back in the UK and Germany. Yes some of them work shifts etc. etc. but compared to the soldier in Afghanistan or the sailor being driven about under the sea for 3months the average RAF bod has it pretty easy. If you were to stand BA technician on side and a soldier 50ft away and ask a well informed neutral to place the average RAF bod next to who he thinks the RAF bod’s life most resembles it won’t be the army bloke.
The above leaves out all the sort of juicy stats that show stuff like as proportion of manpower the RN has as many people in Afghanistan as the army. We are at war in Libya the RAF has what 30 or so (very brave) bods at the sharp end; a fact the media keep reminding us of every time a Libya war graphic is shown with its zooming Eurofighter. Yet the RN puts a frigate alongside at Benghazi, who knows what could have happened, and it is treated as business as normal. Which for the RN it is……..
So yes on balance the 47,000 odd members of the RAF do have it alot easier than the RN or army. Only hand full of that 47,000 are ever at risk. If they are deployed abroad it is to the relative safety of a base with good facilities. A good chunk of that 47,000 work civilian like hours and are rarely parted from their families.
So……….
@Chris B.
You may have noticed that there was a very clear “the navy meets its harmony guidelines by frontline gapping”, which means that ships go to sea with incomplete crews, accepting that the vessel will be undermanned in some areas.
I will also underline that saying that the navy is not under pressure is, pardon me but i must say it, absurd.
Currently there’s Commandos in afghanistan.
CHF in Afghanistan.
RN divers working as EODs in Afghanistan, and so along.
At the same time, a whole Commando battlegroup is involved in an amphibious landing exercise in the Mediterranean sea, as you probably know. HMS Albion, HMS Sutherland, two Bay LSDs, maybe a submarine too.
Elements of the last Commando group and CHF crews and machines have just come back from their arctic role training.
I don’t have the figures, but i believe that almost the whole 3rd Commando Brigade is out on ops/out of area training.
We can break down the whole fleet, if you want.
HMS Talent is back in port from perhaps two weeks after firing missiles on Libya.
HMS Triumph (or Turbulent? There’s confusion here) is outside Libya.
HMS Vengeange was in training until damaged by sea debris.
HMS Astute is currently in Faslane for a brief stop after the shooting, some reparations and then it’ll be back out at sea.
Westminster and Cumberland are back from Libya from very little, and Cumberland bows out.
HMS Liverpool replaced them, along with Brockleberry.
HMS Edinburgh is at sea for FOST trials before sailing south to the Falklands and relieve York.
We could continue.
In 2009 there’s been a peak with 40% of Royal Navy personnel deployed at once. I do not think any of the other two services can claim anything like that.
“just because the Navy can ask it’s personnel to serve at sea for 60% of the time in 36 months, doesn’t automatically mean they push everyone to this limit.”
Thanks god! But think about what you are saying! 22 and more months deployed out of 36! When the hell are sailors and marines and FAA supposed to see the family???
RAF personnel is entitled indeed to “just” 16 months of breaks against Army figure of 24, but
-RAF deployments last four months. Army ones are six months.
-RAF personnel, in the 12 months in which they have been deployed to ops, have at the most 3 more weeks to spend away from their families. Army personnel, on top of deployment, in the 24 months break may be asked to stay away from family and home for up to 7 months more.
-Last but not least, my personal opinion is that this is only logic. Despite the challenges of flying a Tornado in war zone, there’s no comparing the tour of a fighter pilot to that of an infantry soldier. Please. Let’s be real. In particular in a scenario like Afghanistan. It is not me who say it, is the wound and death ratio.
Infatry gets wounded, killed even. RAF pilots did ever suffer losses over Stan? I recognize the strain of flying a fast jet, the dangers and everything… but, as a civilian, because that’s what i am, i really can’t begin to imagine a scenario in which flying a Tornado or even a Chinook is worse than patrolling Sangin’s streets.
Also because then i think to AAC pilots (who make 6 months tours) and FAA and Commando Helicopter Forces personnel who also make 6 months tours, if not longer. Similar work, worse pay and serving conditions. Why?
I can accept the point being made about RAF Regiment. That yeah, i can understand. They are almost as exposed as frontline infantry, and at times arguably even more in some situations.
But aircrews and ground crews, no. It is not hate, it is about really not finding a single reason why they should serve with such terms while crews of the other two services fly with very different pay and guidelines for tours.
I respect the RAF greatly, and they are doing a very good job under most, if not all aspects.
But math is math, numbers are numbers.
The same deployment, done by RAF crews, costs more and lasts less before crews have to be rotated.
This is both morally and economically not acceptable.
I also believe that Tour deployment guidelines should be adaptable to the particular conditions.
(I guess top brass do it out of their own good sense, whenever possible, but it should be an official thing) I mean, an infantry unit who has been involved in particularly heavy fighting, and suffered significant lossess, should ideally be, when possible, granted a longer break before deploying again, to get over it as much as possible.
This kind of adjustements would make things a lot more fair, i believe.
I want the best for all services, RAF included.
However, when the math is done, it does not lies. There are very obvious disparities, and they bit real hard into the budget of the MOD, too, not just into morale factors and inter-service rivalry.
For the last time (hopefully)
@ X
That still doesn’t counter the argument that was being made. People were saying the Royal Navy could just consume the RAF, keeping all it’s personnel and experience but doing away with the red tape. Equally then, the RAF could do the same to the Navy. Or better perhaps, as you pointed out the Army have the toughest time, so how would you feel about the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force being dissolved and their personnel being taken over by the Army?
@ Gabrielle
Nobody was trying to compare RAF tours to Army tours in terms of danger, etc. The point I was making is that people seem to believe the RAF live this absolutely laid back, relaxed and care free life where it’s all champagne and oysters with no work. That’s, pardon my French, a pile of Bullshit.
And just to hit on the 4 month tours again, the point was made in I think link 2 that RAF tours are judged on a squadron basis, not necessarily an individual one.
Thus if we say that 4 months x 30 days equals 120 days, and then assume that an aircraft requires some form of service after 500 hours, that permits a little over 4 hours per day of flying per aircraft before it’s used up it’s hours, presuming of course that it was at zero when it went out to theatre.
Again, how much of this is to do with personnel and how much is to do with the planes themselves.
Here is something that might be interesting;
On the issue of champagne lifestyles, the RAF EOD, Intelligence, Sigs, Logistics and force protection (RAF Regiment) all deploy to theatre and might be in exactly the same place as many Army personnel. Not every person in the Army is in a teeth arm so in some instances, RAF personnel may be enduring more arduous and dangerous deployments than some Army personne.
Just saying!
On the other hand, an RAF squadron deploys with Merlin/Chinook into exactly the same operating location as an AAC/FAA Lynx or Apache but has different approaches to harmony, the RAF using squadron measurement but the Army, for example, operate on a personnel basis.
There are many anomalies and as I have said before, I think the New Engagement Model will create a single set of terms and conditions of service
@ Chris B
As I said I wasn’t answering why it always a question of why it is the RAF having to be subsumed by one or both of the other two services?
If you want the short answer the RAF for the most part are technicians in uniform who work civilians hours rarely get deployed anywhere that is unsafe. The RAF operates two varieties of vehicle one called an aeroplane and one called a helicopter; and that is all it does. For the majority of the time the RAF has been extant the other two services have operated aircraft too. Now people like you and TD interpret this as the other two services operating aircraft as a sideline, like the other services are amateurs. But this isn’t the case. The other two services operate aircraft because aircraft are just vehicles. Modern ships are stuffed full of electronics and gas turbines just as modern jets are. And modern jets are nowhere near as complicated as nuclear submarines. Before the Labour government swallowed the Airstaff’s island base strategy the RN operated a very professional airforce who were as least as technically competent as the RAF and in someways more so. Carrier pilots are above average aviators. Aircraft are one trick ponies that donot approach the same levels of utilty that a ship has. Again aircraft are just vehicles. Landbased aircraft may have reach but they donot have mobility as a unit. You can’t gather up a few hundred maintainers and fuel and weapons and other stores and move them at instant. So in some ways the RAF is less mobile than even the army. A RAF squadron can only move where it safe to go. Meaning somebody else has to secure the place first. The majority of aircraft don’t have a great range; so if you are landbased ‘plane and some state stops you flying from through their airspace it can add thousand of miles on to the sorties taking lots of resources to do so. Image if France wasn’t leading the charge in Libya and was taking a similar position to German. Those Tornadoes would be flying what an additional 2k miles probably more. So if you haven’t a base close to you are stuffed. And in the future we won’t be fighting wars in Europe or on Europe’s doorstep.
The RAF’s record since coming into existence apart from a few months in 1940 on the whole hasn’t been that great. And even in 1940 it was sea power that persuaded the Germans not to try their arm and the Luftwaffe cocking up more than the RAF (and the Poles, and the FAA, etc.) winning anything. The only thing the RAF has consistently shown any flare for is PR.
@ X
Absolute rubbish.
Let’s turn the argument on it’s head shall we:
The Army; all they operate is two kind of vehicles – trucks and tanks.
The Navy; All they operate is two types of vehicles – Ships and submarines. That’s all they do.
There you go. There’s a nice overly simplistic argument for you. Is it as much a pile of horseshit as your argument? Yes it is.
“For the majority of the time the RAF has been extant the other two services have operated aircraft too” – The Army Air Corps wasn’t formed until WW2 and even then it operated gliders and a few observation planes. In the ’70s they got hold of some choppers, but I’d hardly say the Army was on the cutting edge of aviation.
“You can’t gather up a few hundred maintainers and fuel and weapons and other stores and move them at instant” – Like you can on a Carrier for example which, as you put, “in an instant” can move what? One nautical mile. Two? It takes a full hour to move 30 n/miles. It takes days/weeks to deploy to a warzone. I’m sure in the same time, with the right will, you could fly a few planes and some crew etc to another base.
This is precisely what I was talking about with mouth foaming Carrier whores being the worst enemy of the rest of us who would like to see Carriers in British service. You sell carriers like a double glazing salesman, pretending they’re the be all and end all of military ops, that can solve every problem a military might face, which of course the anti-carrier lot will jump on like rabid dogs and tear to pieces, undermining the legitimate arguments in favour of carriers.
“The majority of aircraft don’t have a great range” – If our politicians weren’t so bloody obsessed with getting involved in everyone else’s wars, that wouldn’t be an issue. We would have more than adequate range to protect our borders and help our allies in the event of invasion, which is what we should be doing, no pouring the blood of our young men onto some shitty, sandy plain in some arse water country that nobody in this country gives a toss about.
“The RAF’s record since coming into existence apart from a few months in 1940 on the whole hasn’t been that great. And even in 1940 it was sea power that persuaded the Germans not to try their arm and the Luftwaffe cocking up more than the RAF (and the Poles, and the FAA, etc.) winning anything. The only thing the RAF has consistently shown any flare for is PR.” – So remind me, who flies all those troops and supplies in and out of Afghan? The Fleet Air Arm perhaps? Maybe it’s carrier borne aircraft? No? Who ran support and supply missions for the infantry/special forces in countries like Borneo, or during the Malayan emergency? Surely not the RAF, the useless “crabs”.
If people have legitimate arguments that’s fine and we can all sit down with a cup of tea and debate the merits of various points. But there’s no debating with people like yourself. You’re like a politician; you’ve already made your mind up and that’s that. No matter how much bollocks you have to spout to try and justify your untenable position.
TD said: “the RAF EOD, Intelligence, Sigs, Logistics and force protection (RAF Regiment) all deploy to theatre and might be in exactly the same place as many Army personnel.”
Indeed, very true, and some may ask what exactly any of these people have to do with airplanes or air power in a direct sort of manner (e.g. civvy technicians deploy to support US aircraft, I don’t know that we do the same, but I don’t know that we don’t either !). So again, “some” might ask why these bods need to be in an “air force” !
Chris B
while I reserve my right to have a highly cynical opinion of the RAF as a service, (despite my many friends who are actually in the RAF, and I have had no ‘bad personal experiences’ except for when some Snow Drops tried to arrest me once….), I am NOT one of those who ever suggested it should be completely disbanded.
At no point has any Admiral of the Fleet ever suggested the same as ‘x’ might have done at his most extreme, that the FAA should take over the RAF’s roles. However it does appear that nearly every Air Marshal, Air Vice Marshal who ever existed is on a mission to ‘own’ all aircraft (something indeed that TD has suggested in one of his own thought experiments), and they certainly have put a lot of effort (much of which is on Parliamentary, and other official records) into killing of the FAA.
As my Mum taught me two wrongs don’t make a right, I have never suggested the opposite as a ‘form of revenge’ ! Am I a “foaming at the mouth carrier whore” if I suggest the RAF flying F35’s (or anything else for that matter) from the QE’s is militarily NOT the best option ?
Is it cutting off my nose simply to spite my face to suggest that having carriers whose decks are occasionally graced by an RAF squadron which also has a land based role is simply not cost effective, nor militarily effective ?
As for your parting shot: “You’re like a politician; you’ve already made your mind up and that’s that. No matter how much bollocks you have to spout to try and justify your untenable position.”
To me it appears that your doing exactly the same simply because you don’t agree with Gabriele or x. You already stated your not a “carrier hater” so why not write a full article for TD that lays out your position on these things, and he can post it here for you?
Hmmmm… not a bad idea that one.
As for the “foaming at the mouth carrier whore” bit, that’s with reference to when people tend to flex the truth (to be generous) about the capabilities of carriers and what they can do.
Fighting on behalf of the Fleet Air Arm is not a sin. Honestly I don’t have a huge beef with them. I do have a beef with people trying to wipe the RAF off the map without providing valid reasons why.
And that’s the difference I feel. If someone I trusted came to me and said “right fella, I’ve sat down and run the numbers, here’s my 300 page document on why we should disband the RAF. It’s water tight” then I’d read it and if it was legitimately water tight, I’d join the band wagon.
But all I get from X and Gabrielle are half baked reasons to support the suppression of the RAF and what is essentially Navy propaganda (not that the RAF are absolved of that sin by any means).
What I’m trying to do, the reason I’m here, on this blog, as a civvy, is to see the best done by our forces. That’s what I want to promote in the hope that someday, someone important enough will see these ideas and make changes.
For me that means stripping away the layers of politics and finding the facts. That means not advocating the dissolution of certain elements of the forces, just because people don’t like them or because they pose a threat to their personal empire.
Chris B – all fair enough old chap, x and Gabriele are big enough, old enough and ugly enough to defend themselves.
What does make me foam at the mouth is the RAF being guilty of some of your charges itself:
1. Tend to flex the truth about capabilities
2. Trying to wipe the FAA of the map without good reasons why (I am sure AAC will be next target)
3. Actively advocating for the dissolution of the FAA because it poses a threat to their empire…..
OK, I admit, 2 and 3 are the same thing !
That’s fair enough, and the RAF is far from innocent in these matters.
Hi Jed,
RE this one “1. Tend to flex the truth about capabilities”
– a glaring example (or two) about the current fleet/ weaponry?
I am getting fed up with all this talk of the RAF only working 9-5 and the other 2 services working 24/7 and being driven by whip carrying slave drivers. As has already been said this is a load of bulls%$t!! Where I work is full of SNCos and Officers from all three service and they all work “Office Hours”, yet visiting units the engineers have to work far from socialbe hours alot of the time.
The Army needs to train in the field and so obviously this can be counted as 24/7 on exercise.
When deployed on ships Naval personnel have to be available 24/7 even when off duty.
Deploy an RAF squadron and the engineers and other support personnel are doing far more hours to keep the planes flying the 9-5
Put all three in an headquarters or behind a desk and usually 9-5 it is.
If people want to pint fingers point then at the Scrambled Egg Officers of all three services, the Senior Civil Service and the Politicans and leave the the other officers, NCOs and junior ranks alone
We all know squadrons on deployment are working the same hours as the service they are supporting.
But until RAF Brize Norton sets sail for 6 month deployment into the Gulf the majority of the RAF will be working civilian hours, seeing their families every night, and be far removed from anything that goes bang. That’s what the difference is.
@ Jed
I say it as I see it. Aircraft are vehicles; yes complicated but still vehicles. The RAF spends the majority of the time supporting the Army. RAF helicopters spend their days moving Army “stuff” around the battle field. CAS comes about because of a need from troops on the ground. The worlds second biggest airforce and biggest operator of helicopters is the US Army; so why not have all those helicopters in the AAC? Now saying we aren’t the US isn’t really much of an argument is it? What is the answer to that “we are smaller than the US so our helicopters need to belong to another organization?” CAS is just highly mobile artillery. And the need to defend airspace above a battle wouldn’t be there if there was, well, no battle on the ground. What do C130 and C17 spend the majority of their time doing? Moving stuff around for the Army. And so on, and so on. As we are seeing in Libya and has been shown many times before airpower on its own is often useless.
Now I will grant you that perhaps during the 1960s with the withdrawal from Empire and the looming Soviet threat I can see why a government would want to concentrate air power in Europe. Even if that airpower was nothing more in reality a force being that would have been shot from the skies in the opening days of WW3; nothing at all do with lack of skill more OpFor having overwhelming numbers with equipment that despite the propaganda wasn’t far behind the West’s. But that threat disappeared twenty years ago. The threats are now again well outside Europe; so surely the budget for airpower should be shifting away from airpower in Europe towards that traditional conduit of power the sea? Is that happening? No all we are seeing is the RAF trying its utmost to keep hold of fast air. As I have said flying a handful of elderly jets three thousand miles through friendly skies and hailing it as demonstration of the flexibility of land based air power really is a bit much. As “Jack” said FAA pilots come down the same pipe as RAF pilots, so all we need to do is increase the supply of the former and decrease the supply of the latter. I struggle to see how 24 F35 is a fantasy fleet when an organization the size of the RAF, a land based organization and supposedly the most efficient way to deploy air power, can’t do put out much than 20 odd air frames themselves. If the former is a fantasy then the latter is a disgrace.
The sad fact is that we are stuck with what we have. Doing away with the RAF is as seen as unconscionable as doing away with the Guards. Yet history and facts doesn’t support its rather glorious reputation.
x, I think yours is a very blinkered view
The RAF do not spend the majority of their time supporting the army, they spend it supporting joint forces and their are numerous incidences where the RAF contributes a range of capabilities to the joint force or to a coalition.
Look at Libya today
Air power on its own is often limited but then again, so is naval or land power.
Your thinking is from the sixties and just not reflective of the modern world
A little point i think is worth making is that, yes, deployment of aircrafts is influenced by how many hours the planes themselves can fly before they need replacement/overhaul.
So we need X airframes to ensure we can deploy Y planes to wherever they are needed.
Good. We have one Cost and Capability driver, that can’t be changed much.
Next comes the Personnel factor.
With the RAF, personnel rotates at the 4th month of deployment. Done the math, it takes 5 pilots to ensure the deployability of one.
Ideally, to be able to deploy a squadron to a war front and stay within its service guidelines, the RAF needs each fleet of airplanes to count 5 deployable frontline squadrons.
Interestingly, there will only be 3 Typhoon squadrons (two are tied to QRA and homeland air defence duty all the time) and 1 F35C squadron (at least for some time).
Unless the guidelines change, the RAF will never be able to deploy a full squadron for an enduring operation, and will struggle even to deploy a detatchment.
This while staying considerably bloated with personnel.
It is not necessary to close down the RAF, but i find that is next to VITAL to change the guidelines for personnel towards longer Squadron tours and towards an army-like 6 months operational deployment time at the very least.
And economical and operational factors dictate that, to achieve efficiency, the F35C fleet should be a FAA thing. It would cost less, and work out better.
This is a complicated matter.
Three elements (at least) have to be reconciled:
1. personnel harmony guidelines (rather flexible)
2. aircraft maintenance schedules (rather rigid and complex with different interwoven schedules for airframe, engines, electronics, …)
3. training and currency requirements (some flexibility)
So it may well be that the most flexible element is adapted to best match the requirements of the two other elements. A 4-month deployment tour could make perfect sense taking into account all elements involved.
The FAA, and abroad services such as US Navy, French Navy and others magically manage to deploy carriers (and carrierborne squadrons of jets) for up to nine months and the RAF can’t deploy for more than four months before rotation…?
There is something wrong then.
Not really TD. I think it is you for somebody who espouses defence reform who is blinkered.
I will continue to read the articles here but I think I will stop commenting.
x
You have to remember that The RAF’s existance is sacrosanct here.
The catholic church keeps telling scientists that they can research this, that or the other, but that stuff over there is the province of god; and not to be studied by mere mortals. (OH yes it did! 10 years ago said scientists should not research pre big bang theories..)
Here, you can say anything but you are not allowed to challange the existance of the RAF.. That is the first Commandmant.
1) Thou shalt have no gods but Trenchart
2) Thou shalt not covert thy RAf’s roles
3) Honor thy Air Vice marshalls
4) Thou Shalt not steal the RAFs Limelight.
5) Thou shalt not committ re roling units out of Light Blue
6)Though shall not make graven images of the FAA or AAC.
7)For 4 months out every 24 shalt thou labour
8)Thou shalt keep Battle of britain day sacred
9)Thou shalt bare false witness as to just where Australia is.
10 THOU SHALT NOT TAKE THE NAME OF THE F35 IN VAIN.
do anything liek that here X and out will come the cry
‘He’s a witch burn him’!
(Please do not take the above toooo seriously folks).
Ha ha – excellent :-)
More Monty Python needed to raise the level of the conversation…..
Pontious “PILOT”: “So, your not a Cwabfat are you”
Able Seaman Brian: “I’m sorry a what?”
PILOT: “Stwike him Centurion, very woughly!”
Staff Sgt Centurion: “throw him to the floor sir?”
PILOT: “Oh yes, thwow him to the floor!”
Yes and all those guards based in and around london also do not work unsocialble hours! The same goes for naval personel currently shore based. There is a huge differnece between being operational and routine duties. All three services are in the same boat with obvious differences but you join the navy to go to sea don’t you, and current deployments see far more Army overseas than both Navy and RAF, but people know what they are in for when they join up. This is not a reason to bash one or more of the services. In fact if current plans go forward as a percentage more RAF personnel will be deployed on operations than in the other three services.
@ Gabrielle
How many aircraft are those Carriers carrying? If they carry 30 but routinely only fly maybe 6 or 8 airframes per day, that helps them rotate. Maybe they have more flexible servicing guidelines?
@IXION
7) should read “4 months out of every 16”
8) Battle of Britain day is sacred to many, like me. It is a day to remember the dead. Not just those of the RAF, but those of the civilians who died in the Blitz. The memorial flight may be nice to watch as the roar past, but they also serve as important symbols.
10) That’s right, because the vast majority of the arguments against the F-35 have shown to be rubbish.
“How many aircraft are those Carriers carrying? If they carry 30 but routinely only fly maybe 6 or 8 airframes per day, that helps them rotate. Maybe they have more flexible servicing guidelines?”
An aircraft carrier, in particular a US one, does not fly “6 or 8 planes per day”.
Most scheduled overhauls on airframes are a day worth of work, and involve replacing a number of “boxes” which, even if still working, are replaced inexorably after a number of hours considered their safe life.
The plane gets serviced on board of the aircraft carrier, 90% of the times.
“There is a huge differnece between being operational and routine duties. All three services are in the same boat with obvious differences”
And what the hell does that mean?
When shore-based or airbase-based or barrack-based is a thing.
When deployed on ops or, anyway, away from family and home, it is another.
The RAF has far shorter, far less challenging deployment rules.
It takes 5 men to deploy 1 with RAF guidelines.
With RN/RM/FAA it takes 3.
The point is only that. It is not hate, it is not a lie, it is not a makeup.
It is cruel, true math.
There was this very interesting study, the “Newton study” on carrier manning.
4 Squadrons of 12 F35 each. (original plan for carrier-capable JCA force)
On an assumed RN-RAF manning split of 50:50, the naval component required to man half the force was 81 pilots, including 9 commanders. The RAF’s figure to man the whole of the force, on the other hand, was 232 pilots, including 32 Wing Commanders. Simple mathematics shows that, were the Fleet Air Arm to man the whole force, it would require 162 pilots, of whom 18 would be Commanders. In other words, the Fleet Air Arm would require 30% less pilots and over 40% less senior officers.
If we want to ignore the math, the guidelines, and everything, and go on saying that everything is fine the way it is, then let’s go.
Do not expect the budget to work out the right way, however.
RAF: 4 month tour per 16 months = 4:1.
Where did the “With RN/RM/FAA it takes 3” come from?
4 months tour on 20 months.
16 months are the break after 4 months of deployment. 16 + 4 = 20.
Royal Navy personnel can be asked to do 3 tours of six months each with break intervals of around 9 months, and still have over four months for outside-area training, for example pre-deployment FOST exercises at sea, or for making longer, nine months-long tours.
On a 36 months period, assuming 6 months of tour lenght:
RN —> 1 formation deploys. 2 formation deploys. 3 formation deploys, and then again 1 formation deploys, 2 formation deploys, 3rd formation deploys.
36 months covered with continuous deployment, without breaching the guidelines at all. Actually, i’m being generous in the tour lenght.
Same period covered with RAF personnel:
1st Squadron deploys for the first 4 months. For the next 16, it will not be deployable unless guidelines are to be breached.
2nd Squadron deploys for other 4 months.
Then you need a 3rd.
Then you need a fourth.
Then you need a fifth.
At this point, the first squadron has completed its 16 months break, and can redeploy again and re-start the cycle.
Simple.
Hi been reading a while so thought I’d start posting.
Gabriele, you say the RAF need 5 sqns they don’t. Look at Herrick with JFH; NSW, 1 and 4 sqns were all there once 3 had gone to typhoons. Only 3 sqns and they managed for literally years.
The current op over Libya has typhoons again with only 3 operational sqns.
Tonkas are in both Italy and afghan with 5 sqns to split between the 2 ops, so only 2.5 sqns per op.
True the navy might be able to deploy them that much, but very few do. When a ships is away for months on end some of the crew are rotated through. I don’t think any of them do the full stint with the ship. I think the system was/is called topmasting, might be wrong about the name.
‘Most scheduled overhauls on airframes are a day worth of work, and involve replacing a number of “boxes” which, even if still working, are replaced inexorably after a number of hours considered their safe life. ‘
I think you’ve got that a bit wrong. I don’t think any scheduled servicing would take a day, it would be far more than that. For example Sea Kings majors used to take about 10 months. Generally speaking black boxes would be on condition servicing not on lifed servicing, so it would involve more than that. It would be more the mechanical side of things.
If you do have 3 sqns you leave yourself pretty thin, say there were only 3 of whatever service how would react to the unknown how could you do a second op in libya, you can’t.
welcome to Think Defence Topman
There is not a squadron worth of Typhoons in Italy, just as there is not a squadron of Tornados in Afghanistan. There’s a small number of planes, which get crews from ALL the squadrons back in the UK and, particularly for the Typhoon, even from the OCU, so much so that training on the plane is slowed down by the lack of instructors, too busy flying operational sorties.
To deploy a full squadron and stay within the harmony guidelines, it takes 5 squadrons. To deploy a small “flight” it takes planes and crews supplied from multiple squadrons, rotated consequently, and it also takes breaching the deployment guidelines more often than not.
There is a sqns worth of tornados in afghan, all the crews come from the sqn that is there, pretty much. There might be a few from other sqns but they are, the vast majority, from the sqn that is on rotation as is true for the groundcrew.
Oh and people do go away in between dets for longer than 3 weeks as you suggested earlier.
The aircraft don’t really come from any particular sqn, they pooled in an ‘afghan’ fleet. The sqn markings on the side are meaningless with regard to ownership.
The need for 5 sqns isn’t true like I said look at the navy and raf did JFH in Herrick. Only three sqns.
Btw how do you define a sqn and a flight. A flight, to me, is like the one in FI 4 ac.
In Herrick there were 8 to 11 Harriers deployed, and there were 48 crews rotating to keep them manned. Many of these crews and ground personnel were 800 NAS, and followed Navy guidelines. That’s why it was possible.
Had it been RAF-only, 55 crews would have been needed to keep 11 planes deployed and stay within RAF deployment guidelines.
The RAF is forced to breach harmony guidelines with a lot of personnel, in fact, because there’s not enough crews to keep faith to them.
If they must have planes flying, it means someone has to break his/her guidelines and lose part of the time they are entitled to spend at the home base.
A Squadron, for the RAF, should mean 12 planes and 15 frontline crews, normally. Tornado squadrons should go up to 18 crews each as the crews from the two squadrons that close in June will be redistributed. 18 pilots is also the pilots figure once planned for JCA squadrons, but normally i believe the figure is 15.
I said “flight” because it was the first term that came to my mind to describe a detachment of planes inferior to a full squadron deployment.
“In Herrick there were 8 to 11 Harriers deployed, and there were 48 crews rotating to keep them manned. Many of these crews and ground personnel were 800 NAS, and followed Navy guidelines. That’s why it was possible.”
Very bold, pro navy statement. Evidence?
I say the above because of this link, which claims that the deployments were covered by two front line RAF squadrons (1 and 4) a reserve squadron (20) and two Naval squadrons (800 and 801) which appear to all have been doing 6 month tours in rotation.
Helps when you provide the link:
http://www.armedforces-int.com/news/raf-harrier-afghanistan-deployment-to-end.html
I also found this interesting:
http://www.navy-net.co.uk/fleet-air-arm/37595-801-squadron-disbanded.html
Scroll down till you read the comment by “avoiding_action”. I’ll even quote it for you;
“However 800 is up and running and as we are so well off for manpower within the Wing (awaiting more aircrew) our maintainers are doing significantly shorter rotations in theatre as opposed to the crabs !”
Naval personnel admitting to shorter tours than the RAF!!!!
If I had the ability to do emoticons I’d do the one that demonstrates “shock horror”.
Very funny. Demonstrates your maturity when approaching the argument.
If you check the story of the Joint Forces Harrier you will notice that 801 NAS, while planned, was never re-activated, with part of its personnel working in what for a few years has been known as “Naval Strike Wing”, until 2010 when it reverted to single 800 NAS identity.
Similarly, the 20(R) Squadron was disbanded long ago and the OCU role went to 4 Squadron, which ceased being a frontline squadron.
Not casually the Special Colors Harriers which flew from Ark Royal for the last time wore the colors of 800 NAS and 1(F) RAF.
http://www.theyworkforyou.com/whall/?id=2008-11-19b.89.0
The four month figure appears in the words of Mark Lancaster, Conservative MP, if you care to read the thing.
And please note that hon. Kevan Jones, who back then was Parliamentary Under Secretary of State and Minister for Veterans at the Ministry of Defence, does not contest the point. In absence of contrary evidence, we have to assume they know what they are saying.
Note that the comment you link me to, even assuming the commenter is genuinely well informed (more than the MP and minister i quote) is dated 13-07-2007.
Just months before, the 800 NAS had been shut down along with all other Sea Harrier squadrons, and had been re-commissioned in March 2006, had to convert from SHAR to GR9 (VERY different plane) and had undergone the last restructuring, becoming the Naval Strike Wing, in 2007. It had literally months of life as a fighting squadron, and was already into war.
You can hardly blame them for underperforming for the first times.
Have you an idea of how long it took the RAF Typhoon squadrons before they could send a flight to the Falklands, and not 8 planes to war in Afghanistan…?
Please.
It came from the very mouths of FAA personnel. Not just one comment but their was another later talking about counting weeks instead of months like their RAF comrades.
Bites that doesn’t it?
I just find it incredibly amusing. The FAA doubtless do a good job but you seem so dead set against the RAF, despite the very thin facade of saying how much you like them.
Yet you just can’t except that the RAF really aren’t all that bad. They’re not perfect by any means, nobody is. But neither are they as bad as you make out.
You totally refuse to recognize the unique situation of the 800 NAS squadron, just reformed, on airplanes that were RAF-owned, under RAF command.
You totally overlook facts, just to try and somehow demonstrate that the RAF “isn’t that bad as you say”.
I’m not saying it is bad, anyway. I’m saying that it sets low targets for its own deployments, and this causes it to be IMMENSE in comparison to the fleet of aircrafts it makes fly, and even more so in comparison to the number of planes that it is capable to deploy on operations abroad.
I suggest you check the performances of squadrons such as 800 and 801 NAS when they were true navy squadrons and not RN personnel “borrowed” by the RAF to fly RAF Harriers.
And check what kind of operational availability Commando Helicopter Force squadrons have, or even more so how much is done by 815° NAS.
This is done with less airframes and less personnel. If the RAF tried to learn something from that, it could greatly enhance its own deployability.
That is the point.
The Royal Navy had a string of firsts( Dreadnought,angled deck, mirror landing, ski jump,etc.) Shame we do not have that spirit now.
I keep dreaming of X-bow tankers to replace the Rovers. My latest whimsy is a Panamax (970ft long, 106ft wide) catamaran aircraft carrier. If it was a SWATH type, i.e. torpedo shape under water , then thin blade cutting through water with minimum resistance, then normal cat hull, then these ships are very stable in rough seas. Operating aircraft, you want a stable deck. Any thoughts?
Gabriele, you can keep going on about the low levels of deployment with regard the RAF and JFH but it isn’t true. Everyone, RAF and FAA, the days they spent away and time between deployment were similar. This probably won’t convince you, but it is true. Most went once a year, I know of some RAF groundcrew who went twice a year. There was no great split in regards to deployment times as you suggest, nor do they RAF require lots more people either.
They weren’t ‘borrowed’ by the RAF, they merged into one because the FAA couldn’t sustain the amount it said it could when JFH was formed. They bit off more than they could chew.
I did read the link to the MPs, but a lot of the figures are wrong, so I’d take most of what’s in there with a large pinch of salt.
@ Gabriele (just one “L” look)
“You totally refuse to recognize the unique situation of the 800 NAS squadron”
– Would this be the same situation which earlier you were touting as the model of Royal Navy efficiency? Till it went tits up?
@Chris B.
I will explain it just one more time, and then, if you really want to reason on things and not just use cheap oneliners and dumb irony like you did at least twice already, you can wait for the article i’m writing, in which i’m putting all the evidence that can be found.
Because i’m significantly tired of providing facts and data in answer to claims, irony and bibble-like assumptions that somehow ignore any and every evidence.
You may have noticed that i always provide tons of info, links and as many reliable sources as i can. If i was to counter your “points” without providing anything as you do, i would not be tired.
Anyway, the “unique situation” is due to the fact that the Naval Strike Wing is not real FAA anymore from 2006.
Let me explain.
In 2006, the Sea Harrier is retired and the last FAA squadron disbanded. The announcement of the retirement of the SHAR dates back to 2002, with 800 NAS disbanding in 2004, 899 NAS in 2005 and 801 in 2006.
Personnel is lost. Who remains needs to transit from the radar-equipped fighter-bomber FA2 to the radarless strike plane GR7, and it is not like moving from a petrol car to a diesel car.
800 NAS recommissions later in the same 2006.
It is now under RAF Strike Command control.
Not all its personnel is RN, but partly is RAF. The planes themselves are not RN-owned anymore, because the GR7 is RAF-owned: the planes are second-hand airframes coming from 3rd Squadron RAF as it converts to the Typhoon.
October 2006, the 800 NAS deploys to Afghanistan. Being now under RAF control as part of JFH, the squadron spends four months on tour, until January. February, in fact, sees another JFH squadron arrive (either the 1st or 4th RAF).
The 800 NAS gets back to the UK, but without planes. Those remain in Afghanistan as you can read here. http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/mod.uk/defenceinternet/defencenews/militaryoperations/navalairsquadronreturnsfromafghanistan.htm
Still the squadron soon deployed on HMS Illustrious, which later made up for lack of Uk Harriers by embarking 14 US Marines Harriers and 200 related personnel in order to keep carrier expertise alive.
In the following years, it happened in other occasions, with embarkation of Spanish and Italian Harriers on exercises.
800 NAS continued to alternate 4-months/4.6-months tours along with 1 and 4 RAF, and to those added periods on the carrier (Illustrious, then Ark Royal) and in 2008 it was finally allowed to bring Harriers at sea again, too, which the squadron did in April, soon after getting back from Afghanistan.
The squadron did not work to RN guidelines, but from 2006 this was impossible. It did not work with RAF guidelines either, however, despite having RAF-sized afghan tours, since it added significant carrier-related activity.
But then again, can you see the RAF asking the FAA to do longer Afghan deployments than its RAF compatriots in the very same Joint Force…?
No, obviously.
The effect on the press would have been as devastating as a nuke. It would have been the ultimate point in favor of the RN.
801 NAS was to re-commission in March 2007, but this proved impossible because not enough personnel could be retained and retrained/converted after the loss of the SHAR. Additionally, the 20(R) Squadron, the common Harrier OCU, had to deploy almost half of its instructor/pilots to Herrick tours, and this further complicated training for the necessary personnel.
What did exist of the 801 NAS was fused to 800 NAS in the Naval Strike WIng. You can see its strenght in an answer down this page: http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200910/cmhansrd/cm091215/text/91215w0002.htm
Note that it is personnel only, no planes.
I hope i was clear enough this time.
@Topman
“I did read the link to the MPs, but a lot of the figures are wrong,”
Which figures would be wrong…? The data reported there fits with all the other info i’ve met seeking Tour dates and figures, i did not spot any error.
It’s the figures to do with Tornado, which leads me to question the rest.
@ Gabriele
You should be a politician. In fact, I wouldn’t be surprised if you were:
“Because i’m significantly tired of providing facts and data in answer to claims, irony and bibble-like assumptions that somehow ignore any and every evidence.
You may have noticed that i always provide tons of info, links and as many reliable sources as i can. If i was to counter your “points” without providing anything as you do, i would not be tired.”
I find this highly amusing propaganda, considering I provided four links to cover various points. If you choose to simply ignore them or not accept them because they didn’t mesh with your argument, then that is your problem not mine. It doesn’t change the fact that however that I provided links to back up arguments.
Nor does it change the fact that one minute you were touting the abilities and long deployment tours of 800 squadron FAA, highlighting them as a model of how the Navy is better than the RAF etc, only to then back down from that argument and start making excuses when evidence was provided of 800 squadron personnel saying about how cosy their life/tours were in Afghan compared to their RAF brethen.
It is a boring argument, going in circles. I’ll agree with you on that much. But don’t try and pretend that you’re merely presenting the facts and I’m just making assumptions up up as I go along, when quite possibly the reverse is true.
Two of the links you provided were one of the links i earlier provided, and once we read the tables we found out that i had read them correctly all along.
Another link was to an (reliable?) forum, in which anyone, hidden behind a nickname, can write what he wants.
But i won’t bitch about this.
And i did present the history of the Joint Force Harrier in Afghanistan and exposed the work of 800 NAS in and out of it and demonstrated why they arguably couldn’t do it anymore.
They were under RAF command.
Without planes of their own.
Short on personnel.
Still, barely months after re-commissioning, they took on a RAF-mandated deployment in Afghanistan, and once back from tour trained and deployed again, this time on HMS Illustrious.
And we do not know how many naval personnel, during the years of Joint Force Harrier in Afghanistan, did serve outside the 800 NAS-badged tour.
While the Joint Force Harrier deployed nominally a squadron at a time, for four to 4.6 months each tour, personnel which flew the Harrier had to rotate and be taken out of the Joint Force as a whole in order to fit as much as possible into guidelines.
It is possible that RN personnel made more frequent or longer deployments: they work under RN guidelines, and could have easily without breaching them as a consequence.
But i have this feeling that RAF Strike Command had, in fact, no interest in exploiting the possibility, since it would have made the game of the FAA officers arguing before government for funding.
RAF Guidelines which were breached and breaches that were used by the RAF as part of the arguments they made in order to obtain funding to swap Harrier for Tornado GR4 in afghanistan.
Swap that should have happened by 2009, but could only be done in 2010 because Tornado needed over 40 million pounds of UORs before being ready.
And unsurprisingly, as soon as the Harrier was retired, the RAF could offer it to government as a saving, and 20(R) Squadron was closed and 4 Squadron degraded to OCU from its previous frontline role.
Again the Harrier was thrown away in the SDSR as we all know, again to save the Tornado, and arguably again to hit the FAA.
But as i said, i’m writing a long article covering all the story, and when i finish it i’ll see if TD can find a spot in which to fit it.
‘Swap that should have happened by 2009, but could only be done in 2010 because Tornado needed over 40 million pounds of UORs before being ready’
They did go in in July 2009.
Gabriele, you really are missing the point.
Joint Force Harrier is just that, JOINT
So it was not an RAF mandated deployment, it was a joint deployment to support a joint operation. This constant comparisons is so 1980’s, it just does not work like that anymore
How much was spent on GR7 to GR9 upgrade, or Enhanced Paveway II, LITENING or Capabiliy E etc etc
Strike Command, that was disbanded in 2007 (before the JFH deployment of course but nevertheless)
The very notion that the RAF threw Harrier away in the SDSR as some sort of Machiavellian plot to do in the FAA is frankly ludicrous and so far removed from the reality of difficult decision making in a joint environment. There were very good reasons Tornado was retained instead of Harrier and everyone I have spoken with, including those in the RN, see it as regrettable but wholly correct
That is the fact of the matter
On this, TD, we will most likely never agree.
There is substantial reasons to contest the very decision of even going GR9 in the first place, and there is more than a reason to doubt of how Joint Force Harrier was managed, and there is even more reasons to keep the FAA dear for the job they make and for how they make it.
1980 or 3000, for someone like me who never served in the UK armed forces and gets no money and no support from anyone, be it RN, RAF or whatever, for someone who like me has never (yet) even been on UK soil, the comparison is totally justifid by good reasons and not spurred by friendship with either Woodward or Sirrup. It is a case study i make in order to see what arguably delivers the best effect and value for money.
Just because the FAA fixed wing is no more and now things are (were?) “joint”, we should not flatten on the (unjustified) assumption that it was succesful jointery, and that it delivers advantages, and even less there’s reasons to sustain that having the FAA merged into the RAF is a good thing.
It simply does not ring true, and even in “unified” single-command joint armed forces in the world, there’s real difference between navy aviation and land aviation.
Arguably, there’s not a single place in the world where land based aviation is responsible of shipborne air ops.
And Joint Force Harrier was Joint in the name but under RAF command.
The jointery of it is arguable to say the very least.
@Topman
My bad with the date. The delay with the Tornado was not to 2010 but to June 2009. Thank you, it was my mistake.
JFH ended its role in Stan on 24 June 2009.
@ Gabriele
“Two of the links you provided were one of the links i earlier provided, and once we read the tables we found out that i had read them correctly all along”
That doesn’t make a whole lot of sense, but we’ll put that down to cross language communication. However I must pick you up on the tables point. The tables and their associated descriptions proved you wrong.
You had been talking about separated service and passing this off as tours of operational duty. Which it wasn’t. As we proved. In this comments section, and the comments section of another article.
Yet here you are again, claiming a victory that never happened by trying to tie together various loose strands from previous arguments and claiming that’s what you’d been talking about all along. I just don’t understand it. It’s just complete madness.
And a complete wasted of time.
Don’t think so, man.
@TD
Joint Force Harrier dates back to 2000, and the plan is as old as 1999.
The Harriers were moved under RAF Strike Command in 2000, with the first Sea Harrier squadron disbanding in 2004 and the other two by 2006. The fact that the strike command later re-named means absolutely nothing, as the RAF continued to maintain control of the force as part of Group 1.
TD
How exactly is Afganistan a “joint” operation?
Well it is “joint” because all of the armed forces have had to pull together, work together, to provide support for a land locked, army centric, so-called COIN operation. Fair enough. Once upon a time the Army would have been big enough not to need Naval EOD personnel, and the RAF had lots and lots of squadrons of Harrier GR3 and Tornado, and would not have needed naval contribution to keep Harriers in theatre. So again, there is “joint” for good, operational reasons, and their is “joint” because you have been cut to the bone, and it’s “all hands in”.
Afghanistan is not “joint” in its CONOPS or execution, per se. It is not “joint” in the required or desired effects (where is the naval blockade, the air defence or counter-air element ? Not needed / required of course). Iraq was actually more of a “joint” operation because it had a maritime battle space as well as a land one. If we follow this train of thought, USN F18 Super Hornets flying from carriers in the Gulf, tanking from RAF tankers to maintain their orbits, responding to US Army JTACS embedded with Danish or Canadian infantry are indulged in “joint” operations (successfully so it may be argued). The only difference is the US does not need to create hybrid USN/USMC/USAF Harrier units, because it can AFFORD not to.
JFH may well have been “joint” in truth, but the RN was the junior partner, and the external observer may decided that is correctly so. Whether you call it Strike Command, or HQ 1 Group, JFH was under RAF operational control, carrying out a traditional RAF role, close air support of ground troups, from land bases. There was, operationally no “jointness” required for this operation, however there were budgetary reasons. It was a budget decision to get rid of SHAR, it was a budget decision to cut the number of RAF Harrier squadrons, and you can say it was a budgetary and political decision to create the fudge that was “JFH”.
However, I contend that in your desire to be completely rational and even more so “pragmatic” you are missing the same strategic, big picture element that HMG did; and arguing over the historic facts with Gabriele does not help us poke an accusatory finger in the right direction.
How much would need to be shaved off the welfare budget, the NHS, the Education budget, or god forbid, foreign aid, in order to keep the Ark Royal / Harrier combination in service until it is actually replaced by something else ?
Anything less than considering this is exactly what the Treasury wants, divide and conquer via inter-service in-fighting.
If HMG cannot truly answer the difficult questions (oh, yes sorry they got rid of Nimrod, so they have deep track record of actually making difficult decisions…..) then they absolutely must stop committing British Military power to politically dodgy operations; unless they are willing to pay for the operationally required capabilities, which means not paying for something else.
Todays Telegraph has an item by Christopher Booker saying that the RN will not get any fast jets, but French Rafales will fly off the QE carriers as part of a European Fleet. Have no idea if this is true or some mad anti EU conspiracy theory.
JH
Quite possibly it’s a mad anti EU conspiracy. Not a fan of the EU and quite like Booker’s writing but sometimes he and Richard North see EU’s under every bed.
Gentleman:
If you don’t mind I would like to throw out a suggestion.
Why doesn’t the UK ask the US to lease the USS JFK for say a $1 in place of one of your QE class carriers? The money saved would surely purchase the aircraft for the ship, pay for the extra crew, and probably pay for a couple escorts and their crew. Not to mention you would have the ship within a years time.
Welcome to Think Defence Chris
Chris in virgina
Your proposal is prima facie quite sensible.
However
Doubtlees a full refit with uk spec equipment would be required.
Retubing boilers etc
Running what for RN would be very large crew
Limited life left in the hull
The ‘Shame’ of RN running 2nd hand US kit.
Etc etc, (And if it was ever floated seriously) I suspect Crew and hull life arguements were the reasons why it was rejected.
CiV
I would love the RN to get the JFK in service quickly, but we have no naval base or dry dock that could take it.
One of my many rants, is that we should have spent a few hundred million on a state of the art shipyard, before we started building the QE carriers. We would have saved money in the long run.
Dry Dock not a problem we do still have the largest dry dock in the world in the UK. However it would require a crew of about 1/6th of the entire RN to run it.
Sounds very like one of Lewis Page’s suggestions that we buy two CVN instead of QE and PoW
Crew USS JFK without air wings 3,297 HMS Ark Royal 685. Couldn’t you sell it too your labour pols as a ‘jobs program’? What did they do put the crew in the street, btw?
Regardless, If you ran the numbers, I just don’t see how having $2 billion dollars (cost of one CVF?) to put towards the aircraft, and/or escorts shouldn’t at least be given more than a passing thought.
I bet Boeing would push it through Congress if you bought E/F-18’s for it.
The size of the training and manning of them rule them out. They are simply too big for the navy to man.
Mark
Where in the UK is the dry dock big enough?
I know Barrow has a large dry dock that has been mothballed for decades. Always hoped that would be revamped. Harland is too shallow.
JFK would fit into harland and Wolff. They built the fort Victoria and she has a similar draft to JFK. They were also in line to build the CVF if Thales has won the construction contract I believe.
Quoting from “British Naval Aviation in the 21st Century” printed by Lancaster University in 1997,Harland” has a huge dry dock which can accomodate any vessel up to 556m in length & 93m beam. Its severe limitation is the draft, which is limited to 8.38m(the high water point at the dock sill).
Strip everything out of JFK & you might get the empty hull in, but ten you have major work elsewhere to re-equip it again.
Why can’t you dry dock her where the Queen Mary 2 dry docks. even if that is in france?
Defense Industry Daily just reported that CVF costs spike to GBP 7 billion due to the catapults. JFK has catapults..
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/design-preparations-continue-for-britains-new-cvf-future-carrier-updated-01630/
That Lend Lease program worked out well in WW2. We could even throw in the USS Kitty Hawk; she was actually retired a little later. Put your ship builders to work on the escorts… politics solved? Defense needs met, and for goodness sakes, bringing 6,000 or so more sailors into the service is too much of a burden?
Your politicians should be ashamed of what they are doing to the UK military… seriously!
@ Chris in Virginia; they should be but they won’t be. Either through political cynicism or believing their own BS ( a much scarier proposition,) they will convince themselves that they are doing what is best for both the nation and the services.
Rant over, normal programming resumes.
CiV
The French would charge us three times the going rate.
With UK youth unemployment rising, I would rather have them in the Royal Navy manning carriers, rather than being idle claiming welfare.
With dredging Harland could take US carriers. That was proposed some years ago. NuLabour Government spent the money (£200million!) on a bloody sunday inquiry lawyerfest instead.
Please understand that Britain is stuck with a political elite that hates Britain. They will always side with foreignors & never do anything to build Britain up.
RE “could even throw in the USS Kitty Hawk; she was actually retired a little later”
– was offered to India (to push the fighter deal through; no deal on either account)
– we might see a big ex-US amphib turning up in that navy, though
Chris, yes at the moment and for the foreseeable future there is no chance of getting 6000 more sailors, it may as well be 60000 sailors. Plus all the support needed for that it would cost too much. Rumours say in 2012 there will have to be even bigger defence cuts, so it’s a non starter.
John Hartley says:
“Please understand that Britain is stuck with a political elite that hates Britain. They will always side with foreignors & never do anything to build Britain up.”
We got that same problem in the states, and his name is obama; and his tribe is the Democrat party, who are closely related to the GOP establishment tribe.
Luckily, the ‘Tea Party’ is on the rise, and taking heads. Still this will lead to cut backs in defense spending. What I am saying is, ‘chin up’, because your govt. may well be forced to refund your military.
The USA’s largest threat right now is higher interest rates, which could cause us to default on our debt… along with our devalued dollar… Now which politicians hate their countries most?
Regardless, How many jobs could be created by taking our two carriers? Dredging of ports and pier improvements, building the escorts domestically, which would drive down the cost of escorts, to sell to India, Chile, Brazil, etc.
South Korea is making a huge push in that market. I find it hard to believe your ship builders, and their unions couldn’t be sold on it?
It’s all about the jobs, and the money!
CiV
Please understand it is not party political. Labour, Liberal, Conservative are all anti British & obsessed with increased foreign aid & EU contributions. An extra £450 million pa to Europe, an extra £4 billion in foreign aid. That money spent on UK defence & infrastructure could transform Britain for the better.
I am not even anti EU. I just want our politicians to man up & stop giving them more than we can afford.
@ John H.
“Please understand it is not party political. Labour, Liberal, Conservative are all anti British & obsessed with increased foreign aid & EU contributions. An extra £450 million pa to Europe, an extra £4 billion in foreign aid”
I’ll accept Labour and the Liberals without question but the Conservatives as I understand it would very much like to detach themselves from Europe at some point.
The trouble with our EU contributions is that a certain political party that used to be in power tried its hardest to get us intergrated into the EU, and part of that meant handing over large sums of cash into the collective pot.
I’m frankly stunned that any sane person in this country would consider voting Labour again. They’ve dropped us right in the shit, will continue to do so if they ever get back into power, and don’t give a toss about anyone but themselves.
In a hundred years time when all the facts have come out and the long term impact has been assessed, history books will record the last labour government as one of the most corrupt and disgraceful of our current times, on a par with the shady governments of places like India.
Chris B
The Tories have been split on Europe back to the battles in the Thatcher/Major cabinets. The right might want to pull out of Europe(not my choice), while Cameron/Clarke types may say the odd harsh word, but never stand up to the EU for long, before giving in. I wish we were like the French, at the heart of Europe, but when a directive comes along they do not like, they just file & ignore it. Thatcher/Major/Blair/Brown/Cameron have all folded to EU demands/ treaties, yet in all that time the French haven’t given a millimetre on the common agricultural policy. So for the first & only time I will write this, VIVE LA FRANCE!
@ John H.
Hearing that made me want to rush out and make a longbow. I don’t know why, it’s just an instinctive thing.
@ Chris.B
I bet the thought of sharing a carrier with the french just kinda made your skin crawl :-) Toulon was one of their most epic victories!
Chris B
To clarify. My View is stay in the EU, but be ruthless & immovable on pushing/defending British interests.
While the French exasperate me, I cannot watch “Casablanca” without joining in singing “La Marsaillaise” when they drown out the Nazis.
I would suggest that we should make a joint Anglo/Franco Aircraft Carrier and name it “The Duke of Wellington and his good chum Lord Nelson”, but knowing the bloddy French they’d assign a special naval air wing to serve on it called the “William I, Duke of Normandy” squadron.
The problem is that the natural state of an Englishman is to be at war with france.
We were at our greatest when at war with france both our heros, Our millitary prowess and our economic power. It’s just an all round good thing.
Income tax was introduced to pay for the war with France; Whilst we are still paying it, I live in hope…
Again don’t take that tooo seriously.
@ Chris B
Actually William the Bastard was a Viking who happened to speak French…..
And a good chunk of what we now know as Southern France didn’t speak French at the time but spoke Occitan.
I don’t have a problem with les Francaise. The British Armed forces will probably most often encounter the FFL anyway, and aren’t they 1/4 to 1/3 British nationals anyway?
RE “FFL anyway, and aren’t they 1/4 to 1/3 British nationals anyway”
– would match the ex-SS contingent from WW2 to Dien Bien Phu (that period)
Since the fanfare around the signing, what happened to that 6.500 strong joint intervention force? FFL would surely figure in it strongly. (What I did not know, is that their Marines are also a fully voluntary force, and can be used at the President’s discretion – until they complete the transition to a fully pro force, all through, and the ‘body bags of conscripts from the Algeria part of Metropolitan France stigma’ fades away)
@ X
“Actually William the Bastard was a Viking who happened to speak French…..
And a good chunk of what we now know as Southern France didn’t speak French at the time but spoke Occitan.”
Sssssh! You’ll undermine our argument that America is still a British colony.
“Sssssh! You’ll undermine our argument that America is still a British colony.”
If King George III wasn’t so looney, chances are we still would be!
Chris I V
Don’t worry this ‘Of the people, For the people, By the people’ experiment won’t last much longer.
One is confused. Surely the Americans lost the Revolution?
Further if George was mad what about Madison?
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tRwiH18QwpU&feature=related
http://warships1discussionboards.yuku.com/topic/16628/RAF-RN-Co-operation
I have just read this on ARRSE,
“I’d have an aircraft carrier with no aircraft – leave the enemy in no doubt he’s up against a real nutter who’s capable of anything.”
in this thread,
http://www.arrse.co.uk/current-affairs-news-analysis/163811-fantasy-armed-forces.html#post3773655
Lol, when can we make that guy a general.
@ X
Thanks for that link on the warships1board.
Did you read the post by NewGolconda ref – Career paths for naval aviators? Makes some interesting points.
@ Mike Civ
Do you mean this one?
http://warships1discussionboards.yuku.com/sreply/223307/RAF-RN-Co-operation
Yes I did read it. Very interesting.
My current obsession with STOBAR continues. I have just noticed that Rafale has a thrust/weight ratio of 1.1 with 100% fuel and carrying 4 missiles. Most STOBAR fighters seem to have t/w ratios above .9. F35c can only manage that ratio on 75% fuel.
@ x
The Rafale is a good aircraft, newer than the F-18E/F, can pull very high G (+11 in an emergency), and reportedly has a low IR signature. The thing is is that it’s expensive and will it still be good enough in 9 years time?
The main reason i really thought (at first), that we should go for the Rafale is cause we know what it costs, whereas with the F-35C, we have no idea of the costs yet.
I’d rather go for the full Cat n Trap system so you can carry more and, to carry more and have a better chance of coming home again i’d rather the F-35C. Especially as it is going to replace the Tornado in RAF service.
On the other hand, if the Gov. were to suddenly find Jesus, i’d easily accept Rafale’s for Carriers and F-35A’s for the RAF.
@ Mike (Civ)
The more I look the more confused I become….. :)
Hi,
I apologize for responding to such an old thread, but one thing I wanted to add to the discussion is that for all the talk about CATOBAR vs STOVL that has been made, its unclear to me that anyone has addressed the added ship fuel costs associated with putting catapults and arrestor gear on a ship.
While I don’t have specifics on the new EMALS catapults, I do have a paper on older type catapults which suggests that on USN type ships each Mk13 steam catapult could add about 2500 tons to the ship’s overall displacement. I suspect that this number may well be lower for an EMALS system, but it does point out that the total weight impact of something like a catapult can be significant.
Specifically, if you are cutting an axial line along the length of a flight deck up to 300 ft in length, then there will likely be a need for substantial deck reinforcement in way of this (likely in the form of a heavily constructed trough that contains part of the catapult gear). In addition to that, there are also the weights of the cabling, electical equipment and such, as well as the weight of the extra crew, and their loads (food, etc) which will make the ship heavier, and thus also make it likely to require more power to reach a given speed (and hence a CATOBAR variant of the ship will likely burn more fuel @ 20kts than a STOVL variant, etc).
Beyond all this though is also the fact that the catapults require a fair bit of power themselves. As such, every time a plane is launched the ship will need to burn fuel to provide power to the catapults that a STOVL ship would not have to do.
It would be interesting to see a more full accounting for all the cost differences between the two options.
FC