Before starting this discussion we should all fully understand that project CVF is not a strategic priority for the current Government, if they could, they would have cancelled them instantly. It is a combination of industrial and political factors that will result in the MoD paying for two, but planning on only bringing one into service, and whether the unwanted sibling will be sold or simply placed straight into extended readiness is not yet clear, as is the likelihood of this second vessel being fitted with catapults.
So for one carrier and a half-completed one that might be sold off or not the UK taxpayer will likely be paying exceeding £6 billion and if I were a betting man, I would definitely have a punt on the final cost going beyond lucky number seven.
And this is without a single aircraft.
Clearly, it is not a good example of acquisition best practice and is a stark reminder of how we should never again let equipment dictate strategy rather than strategy dictating equipment, or, commonly known as the SDSR approach.
Despite this, in many ways the project has been steaming along very nicely indeed, the blocks continue to be built, contracts are being placed and progress is self-evident. When all said and done, CVF is actually a relatively simple, relatively low-risk design.
We should draw a distinction between factors internal and external to the project, fiscal and political issues are largely beyond the control of the project and yet responsible for the overwhelming majority of cost inflation and delays.
The root causes of the problems on Project CVF have been politics and financial ‘short-termism’, can we really blame the MoD and Royal Navy for all these, I don’t think so, but, they must shoulder some.
Squabbling between service chiefs and yes, cock waving, have also joined the supporting cast.
After the 1998 SDR in which CVF was announced, it took several years to place the order and this order was conditional on bringing former competitors together into an uneasy industrial alliance. As the MoD equipment budget experienced more and more pressure, as other projects ballooned in cost and budgets remained static, the need to balance the yearly budget overspend led to a whole raft of short-term decisions, delaying projects and descoping them allowed a short term budgetary crisis to be averted but inevitably pushed additional costs out the following years.
The impact of this was well known so it should have come as no surprise to anyone when another billion and a half was added to the bill for project CVF. The NAO has made several stinging criticisms of the MoD for this practice, paying more by paying later and the practice, commonly known as whistling and hoping the problem will go away, seems very common, arguably one of the more widespread causes of project cost inflation.
It might be seen as unfair to blame the service chiefs for these problems, but they were willing accomplices in the jam tomorrow strategy, instead of changing projects they settled on a strategy of wishful thinking and all three were guilty in this respect.
It is the current government that has ‘called time’ and for this, despite the uncomfortable results, they should be roundly congratulated.
Because of this cost inflation and at a time when the Army was experiencing serious equipment shortages in Iraq and Afghanistan it is any wonder that carriers were starting to come under severe pressure, the debate/argument/slanging match between the services about the relative slice of the defence budget intensifying as costs rose.
This reflected both poorly and somewhat unfairly on the project team but amplified the distortion to the Royal Navy equipment plan caused by CVF. And distort the plan it has, self-evidently, the Admiralty have traded off ship after ship and capability after capability to retain CVF in its original form. As costs have risen the need to make ever deeper cuts has been the painful result, making cut after cut in return for jam tomorrow put the RN in a poor negotiating position with the Treasury and other services, others knew full well they could ask the First Sea Lord to wave his tackle at the cameras in Downing Street in return for CVF, and he would more or less have to do it.
By continually failing to budge on CVF, the Royal Navy paid an ever more expensive price to do so and in what some might see as irony, the very fact that the RN has no carriers and carrier aircraft to offer Operation ELLAMY is precisely because of the desire to have CVF shaped carriers and FAA insignia bearing carrier aircraft.
One might reasonably argue that the inability of the Royal Navy to see any future at all without CVF and a reluctance to consider alternatives has led them to mortgage off the rest of the fleet to get the carriers and rebuild from there.
The strategy it would seem; is the get CVF at any cost and rebuild around there in the long term, again, equipment tail wagging strategy dog.
Personally, I think it was a poor strategy and has resulted in a much reduced surface and sub surface fleet, a fleet that is arguably more relevant to UK security and more useful in the majority of operations the UK and Royal Navy will be involved.
There is also a less visible effect of rising cost, as night follows day, the subsequent reaction to a politically or fiscally induced cost over-run is to get out the red pen and start deleting line items from the design shopping list.
In practice, what this means is a gradual de-specification of the design and unfortunately, it is a well trodden path. At the end of that path lies an expensive white elephant that flatters to deceive. It may well give the impression of being world beating but scratch the surface and the reality becomes only too apparent. These deficiencies may be rectified at a later stage, but it will be several times the cost of doing the job right in the first place.
There have been numerous design compromises, deleting credible self-defence systems, having a smaller than desirable hangar and a lower than optimal speed are just three examples that are paving the way to the end of that elephant width path.
But to repeat an oft repeated phrase, we are where we are and CVF in one form or another is a reality.
Conversations now should be all about how we maximise value on our not inconsiderable investment.
To achieve this we have to remove any trace of sentimentality or desire for prestige and look across the whole of the defence landscape, paying particular attention to the joint capabilities on offer.
CVF is not a Royal Navy vessel in isolation, it is part of a complex tri service defence capability set, and it is in this context which it must be viewed.
Far too many people view it as an isolated maritime capability or as a way of preserving independence, being in the top league, punching above its weight and assorted other sentimental nonsense.
This attitude has no place in modern defence planning and to those that think this way, I would simply say, please, get with the reality of modern joint capability planning.
I am not going to suggest another defence review where the RAF is raped and pillaged and the Royal Navy gets all the toys, throwing a few consolation prizes like support helicopters to the Army Air Corps, I don’t suppose any of you will be expecting this from me, but I thought I would set the scene.
I also still think we should have cancelled CVF a long time ago and instead had three or four smaller vessels to replace CVS, Ocean and the LPD’s but the opportunity for that has long since passed.
In the next paragraphs I am going to explore how I think we can derive maximum benefit for an acceptable cost, not rehearse the reasons for or against maritime aviation, a maritime strategy or why we should have binned Tornado and kept Harrier.
The Strategic Landscape
Most arguments for and against CVF tend to gloss over the strategic landscape and more importantly, entirely ignore fiscal and political reality. Instead of some vague notions of sea lanes, punching above our weight, being in the top division, and we are an island; CVF must be firmly rooted in reality.
The first reality is a fiscal one, after Nimrod, FRES, T45, Astute, A400, Typhoon and numerous others the government would seem to be in no mood for special pleading from the MoD. The fact is, the MoD needs to regain and retain some measure of fiscal credibility. The scope therefore, for significant extra money for new projects, is limited, however much we promise that this time it will be different.
The second major reality is a strategic planning one, it was obviously stated as far back as the Strategic Defence Review of 1998 and reiterated in the SDSR that the direct military threat to the UK is very low and that the future nature of operations would be expeditionary and largely collaborative.
Working in partnerships and coalitions will be the norm.
The UK should be still able to undertake a small scale focussed intervention without external assistance but anything above that scale or for a longer duration will be with others.
This applies equally to air and land forces as well, just in case anyone was wondering, so we must carefully select capabilities and maintain them at a scale that delivers influence in such operations without impacting our obligations and requirements in other areas of defence.
Some might view maritime fast jet aviation as one of those capability areas that delivers this influence in a coalition, but I am sceptical and would not prioritise it above other areas, at least not disproportionately.
Looking into the medium term, carriers do provide some hedge against uncertainty because of their inherent flexibility, but a reasonable assumption would be that CVF is more likely than not to be engaged in operations against non peer or proxy nations and in a coalition with others. The location of these most likely future scenarios will be in the Middle East and Africa although as a system, it has to be able to operate anywhere because it might be argued that equally likely is conflict in the polar regions.
So, setting the strategic landscape we must then consider how it could be used and for what purpose because it all informs equipment and design choices.
Usage
When considering the what’s and how’s of carrier missions the first thing we must ask ourselves is what do we want to achieve. Only then should we determine if a carrier is the optimal method of achieving that objective and if the answer is yes then equipment and other questions would need answering.
We should not be afraid of lateral thinking, if the requirement is first day strike, then are aircraft necessarily the best means of delivery. Perhaps a containerised Storm Shadow that could be carried by any number of surface vessels might be a more cost-effective means of fulfilling that requirement, I am not arguing for or against but saying that alternatives can sometimes be attractive and worthy of consideration.
CVF was originally a pure strike platform, optimised for attacks against land targets.
Our thinking around how we could use CVF should be centred on building up a capability that we already have and the obvious strength in this context is littoral manoeuvre from the sea or amphibious operations. We already have a strong capability in this area and CVF offers the possibility of improving this to an even greater degree if we put to one side notions of it being used a single-minded strike platform with 36 fast jets. It also fits in with my thinking about the UK’s future approach to defence, this being the maintenance of as many capabilities as sensible at a small enough scale to satisfy the unassisted small scale focussed intervention as per SDSR, supplemented with a number of ‘capability plus’ areas that deliver influence in coalition operations and provide for a greater security by virtue of regional engagement and intelligence gathering.
In the recent ‘future of the Royal Navy’ series of posts I suggested that the Royal Navy retain a small but effective striking force or Single Task Group but supplemented it with a greater forward presence to build regional security and provide better intelligence.
The proposal to repurpose CVF is entirely maintaining this approach.
Recent operations in Libya, particularly the joint USN/USMC TRAP operation to recover the downed F15 aircrew have demonstrated the value of being close and having responsive forces. It also demonstrated the complementary nature of land and naval aviation. In UK parlance, the Joint Personnel Recovery mission is one which we are relatively poorly resourced for. I would like to see this change; the value of downed aircrew, special-forces, conventional forces, journalists and NGO personnel etc to a terrorist group or opposing regime is significant. Capture, torture and manipulation of them to change the strategic direction of an operation is a very effective tactic and one to which the UK has very little in the cupboard to counter. This is not an area that I think we should or could rely on others to fulfil.
Unpredictability, choosing an entry point that suits you not the enemy and speed can provide significant results in a range of operational scenarios. It should come as no surprise that in the forthcoming series on Land forces I will place a great emphasis on rapid reaction forces.
[Don’t let that lull you into a false sense of security though, I am not going soft on Strategic Raiding!]
This also allows the UK to exploit the size of CVF, space provides flexibility (a good argument for size if ever there was one) and the ability to embark a capable force from a large deck in a single hop, i.e. speed.
Some missions will be aviation-centric, but these are likely to be less frequent and as would be the norm (operating in a coalition) other nations can carry out these roles, France and the US being the most likely partners.
A reduced emphasis on fast jet aviation, strike, interdiction, close air support and defensive/offensive counter air changes the requirement for JCA, reducing numbers and reducing cost. JCA would still be needed at the scale and capability for the small scale focussed intervention, but that would be the baseline, anything above that becomes discretionary.
What does this mean for CVF?
First, it recognises that CVF has value, a lot of value.
Second, it means that to maximise that value the role of CVF should be changed.
Rather than prioritising fast jet aviation and using it as a strike optimised platform it will become more multipurpose in nature. Operating with a mix of aviation and embarked forces. Many will say it can do this anyway and in some ways they would be right, CVF is designed to offer a secondary LPH capability, but this would mean CVF becomes more akin to the USMC America Class, aviation optimised amphibious vessels.
Strike and high intensity counter air become secondary roles, modifications and the fast jet air wing would reflect this.
Rotary
Whether it be Apache Attack Helicopters, Merlin/Chinook Support Helicopters or whatever comes after there are many options for a blend of rotary wing aircraft.
MASC/ASaC/AEW or whatever we are calling it this week is an area where people assume that just because we might use catapults it is an automatic shoe in for an E2 Hawkeye but again, we must smack those sweet shop bound fingers with a bit of fiscal and strategic reality. It is unclear if there even exists any funding for a Merlin-based solution, post the withdrawal of Sea King in the 2016 time frame. To start with, the baseline must always be a small scale focussed intervention. For this, a helicopter-based solution would seem perfectly adequate. There have been a number of proposals to palletise and transfer the equipment from the existing Sea Kings and lift and shift into a few Merlin airframes. This is a low risk and relatively low-cost solution that still provides an adequate level of capability in fact, the existing Sea Kings are seriously underestimated.
Although flexibility is the watchword, a typical aircraft load would be 6 to 12 JCA and 24 to 30 helicopters (mix of Apache, Merlin SH/Chinook, Wildcat, Merlin ASW and Merlin ASaC)
We all know the UK is light on vertical lift capability, but there is never enough money to pay for, the respective services have never given enough priority to helicopters. So how we do get the money for more, simply have less fast jets.
Fast Jets and the Joint Combat Aircraft
Some missions might require no fixed wing aviation at all and there is no shame in operating CVF without a compliment of JCA, put your teeth back in now!
Once you get beyond the aircraft carrier sometimes with no aircraft theme it is logical, but a normal (if there is such a thing) compliment of JCA would be in the region of 6 to 12. The America Class has 10 as its standard compliment for example, the Juan Carlos 1 and Cavour a similar number. Of course CVF is larger than these vessels, but that is not the point and being larger than these alternatives provide excess space for stores (meaning greater un-replenished endurance), accommodation and the ability to surge up should need dictate.
In defensive counter air and with Type 45, Merlin ASaC and with support from land-based aircraft in some instances should still be able to provide adequate protection against the scale and capability of likely opposition in the SSFI scenario. If there is a greater threat we would still have the option to surge or simply rely on others in the more likely coalition instance. Offensive counter air might also involve land attack, much better to destroy the ability of opposing forces on the ground than in the air and this opens up a number of options, particularly with cruise missiles.
Interdiction, recce and close air support would still be at a high enough level for SSFI, even with 8 to 12 embarked aircraft and again, the ability to blend air delivered munitions with those delivered by long-range land-based UAV’s, ship/submarine launched loitering munitions and cruise missiles allows a reduction in overall aircraft numbers for a given delivered effect.
Thinking in a joint context and with multiple means of mission delivery logically reduces the aircraft count.
The current preferred option to fulfil the Joint Combat Aircraft is the F35C, but it has yet to reach Main Gate so that means almost anything is possible!
When looking at JCA it is important to understand the word joint is there for a reason, both the Fleet Air Arm and Royal Air Force will be operating a common aircraft type for joint missions, the services and MoD grasping the ruthless commonality nettle.
I think this is the reason for so much vitriol, the grown-ups at the MoD imposed an aircraft choice based on sound operational and financial factors, sweeping away service centric concerns and I wonder if either service really wanted the B model. The Fleet Air Arm wanted the C model and RAF the A model, why, because looking at the issue in a service centric stovepipe manner logically leads to a two type fleet.
The B model is a compromise, it is neither perfect for the RN nor RAF, but that is precisely the point, it was supposed to be the perfect solution for the UK.
The STOVL F35B was therefore the outcome of studies about how the JCA would most likely be deployed, initial operations on board followed by a transition to land bases for the sustainment phase. Not only that, it would allow CVF to dispense with catapults and barriers, thus significantly reducing capital and through life costs of the vessel. It would also neatly dispense with the training overhead of maintaining carrier operation currency for flight crew. To safely operate from conventional carriers requires a high level of skill and that skill is perishable. This means regular training and having to use a greater proportion of the aircraft fleet for this training, adding yet more cost.
By using STOVL, this continual and regular training requirement would be dramatically reduced, as regularly demonstrated with the Harrier achieving proficiency for carrier operations could be achieved in days by RAF aircrew. Of course, it would be better to maintain and enhance these skills for all pilots but the ability to quickly surge or reinforce the carrier capable aircrew for the most likely operations was seen as a compromise worth taking because of the cost savings.
What this decision did was impose some order on the squabbling children at the heads of the RAF and RN, no more stovepipes, no more empire building and no more needless duplication. By sharing, the overall fleet size could be reduced and money saved.
This much sanity was doomed to failure.
This was the stated position for a long time until a couple of things happened.
The F35 and especially the STOVL B model started to have ‘problems’ and the keys to Number 10 changed.
Announced in the SDSR was a switch to the F35C or conventional carrier variant, an obvious design change to the carriers (even though they really wanted to cancel them) and a bit of wishy-washy uncertainty about what would happen to the second carrier on order.
Explaining the switch, Liam Fox and David Cameron stated that it would provide better interoperability with allies, cost less to buy and offer better performance.
So F35C it is then.
In subsequent parliamentary questions the MoD has made it absolutely crystal clear that it does not yet know the full-cost implication of the switch and given the widely acknowledged fact that SDSR was rushed I suspect when pennies start to drop and spreadsheets start to have more detail the MoD will be in for a rude awakening.
For the purposes of discussion, I am going to have a look at alternatives to the existing position.
Option 1 – Carry on Normal Jogging with the F35C
Why, I have to admit I was perplexed by the switch to F35C, it annoyed our principal expeditionary operations partner, the USMC and resulted in yet more delays and costs, but I can see the logic in a service centric and more importantly politically expedient fashion.
Cost, the reality of F35 is that no one really knows how much they will cost despite the millions of words and countless spreadsheets, but it is a reasonable assumption that the C model will have a lower price tag than the B model. The real costs, those inconvenient through life costs, have yet to be fully realised. The other truth about the F35C is that the MoD does not know how much extra the non aircraft costs will be. It may well be within their cost model boundaries, but when did the MoD ever make a cost estimate that was worth the paper it was written on?
Additional costs include delay costs, which we now run into the billions and the modifications to the design of CVF, principally for catapults and barriers. The electromagnetic catapult design has not yet been selected, whether it will be the US or UK designs is not certain but one this is certain, they will not be cheap.
Putting the capital and delay costs into the shade will be increased through life costs.
Again, this is a complex set of equations, the B model is more complex than C and will logically cost more to maintain but in looking at the operating costs as published in Parliament of a Harrier and Tornado, there isn’t that much difference. Twin engine v single engine or conventional v STOVL makes an interesting cost comparison exercise for spares and maintenance but the F35 will be single engine in all variants. The B model lift fan will require extra maintenance but the C model also has additional systems and the airframe gets a maintenance intensive battering every time it takes off and lands, however gentle the electromagnetic system will be.
There is also the not insignificant maintenance requirement for the catapults and barriers themselves.
So whilst the differences between the C and B model in terms of maintenance may yet turn out to be fewer than expected the real cost differences lie in pink things.
To manage the catapult and barrier system will require additional staff in the DE&S Integrated Project Team, another set of contracts to manage and additional maintenance personnel to pay for. These are recurring costs whether we fly a single mission or not. The deck crew will need expanding also and training courses changed/added.
Each extra crew slot requires pay, housing, welfare, healthcare and pension payments that will need to be maintained for longer as people grow older.
Behind those extra crew are the logistical and management tail, even an extra course for catapult operations and maintenance will require staffing.
It is personnel costs that are growing proportionally their number, in short, personnel are getting more and more expensive which is precisely why western nations do not carry out labour-intensive manufacturing and are automating as many tasks as possible.
Military forces are no different and yet, we have decided to increase personnel.
Risk, the C model has a lower risk than the B, some think that the B model may be cancelled, and it is on probation according to the US Department of Defence. Risk might have been a significant factor in the decision
Capability, no doubt, the C model beats the B model in terms of performance so in this regard it is a sound decision
Industrial, no change really, yes we have the development programme B models, but that is not entirely wasted and too much is made of this by the press. Whichever model is chosen the defence industrial benefits to the UK are significant.
Politics, this is, I think, the principal reason for the switch to the C model because it allows the Royal Navy to resource share with the French. There has been a strong move to greater military cooperation with the French and short of buying Rafale, a switch to conventional carrier operations means that a CVF could form part of an interchangeable and shared carrier force. The fact that there was a CTOL F35 variant is a happy convenience that means we don’t have to upset the US by switching to Rafale and yet can also still keep the Anglo/French alliance satisfied by sharing CVF. I think it is likely that the second, unloved and unwanted CVF, will be sold to France at cost and the UK and France will maintain a joint carrier strike group, one nation sitting in the hot seat on a rotational basis and covering each other’s refit periods. The Charles de Gaulle will be withdrawn as soon as this becomes a practicality.
So with this politically driven, resource sharing background, switching to CV makes perfect sense.
Option 2 – Cancel F35C and develop a carrier capable Typhoon
Why, isn’t it obvious, cost and commonality, but it would be a significant development effort for some airframes with little export potential.
Cost, the great conundrum when anyone suggests navalising Typhoon, perhaps the Tranche 3 aircraft and that is the cost. Whether the chosen option is to turn Typhoon into a conventional carrier version for use with cats and traps or a STOBAR design with a ski jump and barrier assisted landing system the cost of either option is uncertain. If it is feasible within an acceptable technical risk boundary then the cost benefits of having a single type with as much commonality as possible, should be obvious to all. It is an attractive proposition from a cost perspective, no doubt.
Risk, the detractors of Sea Typhoon tend to deride the very notion and dismiss it out of hand, but I do wonder if those doing the laughing are the ones with most to lose, the RN and RAF because they would no longer be getting the keys to the shiny new F35. As we have seen, both services are keen to get their hands on the F35 and the perception is that a Sea Typhoon would be a retrograde step. Facts are very difficult to obtain about the feasibility and therefore technical risk, some say combining advances in modern avionics, thrust vectoring, the QinetiQ work on F35 SRVL, older work on the Rockwell MBB X31 and the inherently strong Typhoon airframe would allow a STOBAR derivative to be developed within a sensible risk fraction. Others say the idea is barking mad and would result in a complete waste of money.
Capability, we know Typhoon is a sophisticated aircraft and when combined with the full range of UK weapons would be a formidable capability.
Industrial, swings and roundabouts, we may (possibly) lose some of the F35 work, although the F35 development MOU splits the numbers bought from industrial participation, it would be difficult to envisage a situation where the UK purchased no F35’s but carried on with the industrial participation, stranger things have happened, though. On the other hand, there would be considerable work accrued from developing a STOBAR Typhoon.
Politics, it would be difficult to manage the impact with the US of withdrawing from the F35 programme but would leave the Anglo-French CVF ‘sharing’ deal in place.
Option 3 – Cancel F35C and buy another carrier capable aircraft
Why, if we make the assumption than an F35C alternative is worth pursuing because of cost issues and a Sea Typhoon is not feasible then a number of alternative options open up.
F18, Rafale, Hal Tejas, Harrier III and Sea Gripen all sit on a three-way capability/cost/risk matrix, each with different advantages and disadvantages.
Cost, whatever the cost of these alternatives, they would have to be significantly cheaper than the F35 to make it worthwhile, especially given the relatively small numbers in this proposal. Cost is the only reason for even looking at these non Typhoon alternatives and when the ‘small print’ costs like weapon integration are added I am sceptical that the cost savings would be significant.
Risk, some, like the F18 and Rafale M are very low risk, existing aircraft with only weapons integration to complete. Others like the Sea Gripen or Harrier III represent an unknown quantity and might not be available within the required timescale.
Capability, compared to the F35B one might argue that the F18 or Rafale do not fall far short in capability terms and bring different qualities to the mix. The others would offer a greater shortfall in capability but it would all come down to cost. Suffice it to say, most of these alternatives would be good enough for the majority of the mission requirements for the majority of time, whether they would meet the JCA requirements is another matter.
Industrial, a difficult one to answer but likely less than either the F35 or Sea Typhoon
Politics, interestingly, most of the alternatives would offer something positive in political terms
Option 4 – Switch back to F35B
Why, it was originally selected as the preferred option for the Joint Combat Aircraft requirement for excellent reasons and I think we have allowed ourselves to get spooked at the technical issues and rising costs whilst succumbing to inter service machinations.
Cost, by switching back to the F35B we would still of course be liable for the additional capital costs. These costs are rising, and they is no point trying to hide that fact, but I also think that some of the hype surrounding the F35B costs are over played. A switch back would also instantly eliminate the additional capital and significant through life costs of going for the catapult options.
Risk, a slightly risky option because there is a chance that the F35B will be cancelled, but I do think this is a slight risk. The USMC aviation strategy is built upon the F35B and even though they have bought into the C model I can’t see this changing.
Capability, in some aspects, the F35B has the lowest performance of the options, but two things must be remembered. The F35B originally met the JCA specification, and it will still be a step change in capability from the Harrier and Tornado. Reduced signature design and the sensor fusion on offer will mean it will remain relevant for a long time and despite a number of issues with what might constitute an austere location it has the greatest flexibility.
Industrial, the existing industrial participation arrangements will be retained and although the share may come under some pressure as the overall order is reduced the agreement more or less states that order volume has no relationship to the industrial share of the programme, it is the development cash we stumped up (£2b) that counts.
Other, it would be embarrassing flip-flopping
Politics, instead of being interoperable with the French and US Navy we will be interoperable with the USMC and all the former Harrier operators that will eventually buy the F35B.
Option 5 – Unmanned
There are various unmanned options such as the X47 development and even the Anglo-French programme that might eventually come out of Taranis, but it is unlikely they will be practical options for several years and the cost appears to be rather open-ended.
An unmanned system might also require significant satellite bandwidth, even with the advances in autonomous operation and onboard processing, satellite bandwidth that we don’t have.
It is also unlikely that an unmanned system would be able to fulfil the counter air role for several decades.
Unmanned systems are usually characterised by very long range which kind of negates many of the advantages of carrier launch.
In the introduction to this post I wondered if we could actually carry out some of the penetrating strike role with cruise missiles, maybe we can.
Finally, unmanned systems sound far too much like expensive jam tomorrow and the RAF is already trying to ditch yesterday’s news, the Typhoon, in favour of the shiny new model.
A Proposal
I actually think CVF does have a lot of potential, I know you lot might be surprised by this, but my objections have always been on cost grounds. This proposal is one possible method of squeezing maximum value for the investment in the most likely missions it will be required to fulfil.
- Switch back to the F35B for JCA
- Obtain enough to maintain a minimum of 6 on board permanently so that we can maintain a littoral manoeuvre capability and more importantly, the skills to do so, on an enduring, always available basis
- In addition, obtain enough to maintain a minimum of 6 on an enduring land-based operation (rotating with Typhoon as necessary) to support the deployed multirole brigade. the Typhoon would be more numerous and therefore find itself deployed for longer
- This allows for continuous cover for an enduring land operation of Multi Role Brigade strength whilst still maintaining enough capacity for the rapid reaction force to be available at short notice without impacting the enduring operation
- Total aircraft and crew numbers would be determined once maintenance and force generation factors become known
- For a one-off, short duration operation the non deployed force could be used, STOVL supporting greater basing flexibility (land or sea)
- The RAF should stop dreaming about hordes of F35’s and get on with the job of deriving maximum benefit from the eye watering and defence budget distorting entity that is Typhoon. We need to start sweating our assets, not always looking over the fence
- Equally, the Fleet Air Arm and Royal Navy should stop dreaming about having a mini me CVN and concentrate on creating a credible entry from the sea capability with a much greater vertical lift capability, reductions in F35 purchase would provide the funding for this change in emphasis
- The FAA would cease operating fast jets and the aboard aircraft would be RAF operated. We can’t afford two air forces and the largest one, the one that can achieve some economy of scale and is focussed on managing fast jets, should have primacy
- Invest in greater platform diversity for Storm Shadow and TLAM
- Complete both CVF with one maintained as an in-service spare to cover refit periods
- Investigate role of reserve forces to maintain second CVF at a level of readiness sufficient to provide some measure of resilience and refit cover
- Do not replace Ocean, the role to be covered by CVF
- If funds allow, the in-service spare could be bought into full service
- Investigate redesign of CVF to have an enlarged hangar, at least big enough for Chinook, CH53K and V22 across the FULL width and length of an enlarged space. Also, improve command and control and embarked force accommodation facilities
- Invest in a Merlin based ASaC which is sufficient for the role
Some might say the JCA number is too small, but I would ask too small for what?
If we accept the result of the SDSR, then it becomes the baseline, a similar number of aircraft support (6-12) currently support operations in Afghanistan for a much larger force than envisaged in SDSR. 6-12, with a minimum of 6 would still deliver a credible capability and remember, the F35 will be incredibly effective and versatile.
Even if we stuck with the F35C, then the numbers aboard would remain, but the numbers behind would increase as training and currency issues would demand a larger fleet and the overall cost would rise because of it, it would not be the end of the world though and the additional performance of the C model would be very welcome. This option would need both CVF fitted with cats and traps, so the B model saves again and retains the ability to maintain a continual CVF presence.
By keeping the numbers to a realistic level (6) then we afford an opportunity to maintain that fleet on continuous joint training with the RM and other services, something that is currently lacking. If we find a few quid down the back of the sofa then yes, let’s have more, but it is a balancing act and we have to be realistic.
In effect, we have 2 small squadrons or large flights of 6 aircraft each. One more or less permanently on board CVF and one more or less permanently in a rotation pool with Typhoon for enduring deployments. If there is no enduring deployment, then the training pool becomes larger, hours are preserved or more is available for one-off operations. Of course the aircraft and crews rotate in and out of those slots on a normal deployment schedule, the details of which and total fleet numbers would be dictated by aircraft availability etc. I have pegged these numbers for convenience, reality means that the numbers will flex up and down anyway, but it gives us some measure of scaling.
The inherent deployment and operational flexibility of the F35B means this scalability can be maintained much easier than with the C model, whatever its other virtues.
I am agnostic on the FAA operating fast jets, it’s not an ideological issue, purely cost. Logically, the larger force, a force dedicated to the art of operating aircraft, should be more efficient and therefore lower cost. Whilst the US can afford four air forces the UK cannot, now, if the FAA can prove they can operate F35 cheaper for the same effect as the RAF then fair enough, but duplication and resource waste should be our enemy.
Summary
There are many options for maximising investment and getting the most out of what we are about to have. For what it is worth, I think the route to that end state is to turn CVF into as multipurpose a capability as possible, building from a position of strength (amphibious) and not building from a weakness (fast jet maritime aviation)
This means littoral manoeuvre from the sea in the theatre entry phase of any operation, i.e. an oversized LPH with the ability to operate a modest fast air wing with the ability to flex up should the occasional need arise.
Switching back to the F35B is my preferred option for the reasons outlined above; it allows both CVF to enter service, reduces through life costs, still keeps a fifth generation aircraft in the inventory, still keeps us in the largest combat aviation programme of modern times and provides interoperability with a number of important allies.
CVF becomes an air optimised amphibious assault ship pair, combined with the LPD pair in service and the LSD(A)’s.
Mark
“Dominic you must realise that ucavs also require a fully trained pilot to fly them”
Why?
Tomahawks and Stormshadows and Sidewinders are all perfectly capable of self piloting are they not?
So why can a platform to carry and deploy those weapons not be self piloted?
An unmanned fighter might cost as much per hour to maintain, but its simply not going to require 20 hours of flight time a month.
Its fitters will still need to be employed, although far more of them could be T/A, and they can spend their days taking apart and rebuilding grounded platforms to maintain their skills, which doesnt burn jet fuel or wear out airframes.
Yes I know there are “ethical” arguements against it, but they simply dont stack up.
Is the bloke who presses the button to fire a tomahawk from an Astute in any more control than the bloke who presses the launch button for a CAP that goes on to shoot something down?
@ Chris.B.
Your right they are a bit on the low side, it was late and i wass just punting the idea of what we could do in the short term out too see what you guys made of it. Even if the entire project cost increased by 50% thats still only around £600m a year.
It would proably cost the same for about 50 F-35c over 10 years with maintainance. Based on Canadian covernment costs of $18bn for 65 a/c over 20 years, so (18/2)/1.5 = £6bn/65*50+30%(30% increase on the C version)= roughly £6bn over 10 years. And even the canadians aren’t sure about the price now.
So its horses for courses 50 F-35c in the short term, when we still dont know about software bugs and costs and 50 only allows for 12 to be deployed constantly (yes it could be argued that we need less because its more advanced) OR buy around 90ish used frames to allow us to have 16 FJ at sea at all times + (and this is the winner for me) Hawkeye for MASC.
@ Chris – “in the war for the-islands-that-shall-not-be-named”
I’m glad to see my invented terminology is proving catchy among the TD crowd. :D
Also I think a Think Def-Con is a good idea. Any chance?
@Lord Jim
With harmony guidelines of sustained operations 6 months on 18 months off we’d only need four Multi-mmmn brigades there’s some savings…beef up(I don’t just mean Bovril) the infantry manning levels to take the strain…again its a needs must.
Dominic you must realise that ucavs also require a fully trained pilot to fly them also the only difference is there not necessarily deployed. Ucavs will also require maintainance and thru life ugrades. A proper ucav that could properly replace a strike jet will not be less expensive to maintain I believe.
As for the telegraph I’m not surprise it most likely a valid concern. From a fleet of currently on 60 a/c total over 20 are now on ops either over Libya or qra. Due to lack of pilots instructures were supporting the falklands task so it not surprising there is now training concerns with this extra commitment.
Btw just read this on the Telegraph website
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/8412467/Shortage-of-RAF-pilots-for-Libya-as-defence-cuts-bite.html
I am more worried about simply keeping what we already have and/or pland to have than looking for an expansion in aviation assets alone. To gain any or the suggested increased something else laid out in the SDSR has to go so before there are any new ideas about the strength on the RAF/FAA think about what would be scrapped as a result. Remember no new money is cetain after 2015, and given the slow speed of recovery the country is undergoing, is looking more and more likely in any form other than keeping pace with inflation.
@Chris B – I’ll take option 3 if it is on the table please!
“An unmanned system might also require significant satellite bandwidth, even with the advances in autonomous operation and onboard processing, satellite bandwidth that we don’t have.
It is also unlikely that an unmanned system would be able to fulfil the counter air role for several decades.”
I think people really miss the point here.
A Pilot gets something like 200 hours flight time a year right?
And a Fast Jet has a service life of something like 25 years, right?
And costs about £50,000 an hour to fly.
That gives us a cost of £250,000,000 over its service life.
Not sure if the purchase price and various SLEPs needs to be added to that, but even if justs £250mn, thats a lot of money.
A Machine doesnt need practice.
Machine Skills dont degrade over time.
Even if, and believe me, it is an if, a computer pilot is inferior to a human pilot. Is he only one fifth of the pilot?
Because thats basicaly what your looking at. Your 1 human piloted Typhoon comes in at £250mn your 1 Drone Typhoon can be bought for £50mn and put in a controlled hangar for the next decade. Even if we say drone Typhoons do need some maintenace, we will if nothing else require teams of fitters enough for war fighting, they’re likely to be having at least a 3:1 numerical advantage.
Throw in the fact that a head on collision is a win for a drone and, well, all hail skynet…
Some more comments since i can’t sleep…
I forgot Falklands MPA flight
Tranche 1/block5 fine for QRA but if we can off load them and get tranche 3b much better.
JSFB numbers at least 60 we’ll need more attrition replacements/maintenance reserves for carrier operations.
Aircrew and in use reserve aircraft numbers have to be increased if overall units are to be decreased.
Harmonising the harmony guidelines across all services also has to be addressed…surging to half/sustaining quarter is imho realistic/desirable…they’ll be winners and losers but the NSC tier 1 risks didn’t include warmongering politicians so if i was calling the shots…there wouldn’t be that many shots…
@Willy Dribble
My vote goes to Southend then. Just wait until I can afford it!
@Michael (Civ)
“If we were to make the next upgrade the final version we could then spend the money that was allocated for the rest of the Typhoon’s upgrades on more of the F35′s.”
— That is entirely dependent on each individuals view of which is the superior/necessary aircraft.
“The decision should really only be left to the Pilots themselves. Noone else should get a say.”
— Who’s going to pay for 160 Spitfires with diamond encrusted skins? ;)
“So, better make sure you are spending what money you have on the best possible equipment that you can get.”
— Agreed. All the more reason to be sure that F-35 is the right solution to your capability problem.
“One serious point, the Raptor V F15 was a for real example. Five v one all at the same time & they lost.”
— It might be true, it might not. Ask yourself this question though; if the F-15’s shot down the F-22 with anything other than a 1:1 or 1:2 kill/loss ratio, would they tell you about it? The point is mute now, but it was in the interest of the USAF, at a time when the F-22 was in serious doubt, to give every possible boost to their hopes of getting more than just 187 examples. If Congress had gotten wind of a bad result that would have killed the whole thing quicker.
“There have been (in many wars), instances of small numbers of better aircraft & pilots defeating superior numbers & defeating them almost completely. Many times, the people with the superior numbers have had to get the hell out of there as fast as they could go. I mean it has to have an effect on you, seeing your friends getting shot to bits all around you.”
— Most of said examples result from superior crews; tactics, training and morale (and in some cases, big, brass balls). Once the quality of crews and their experience against a given enemy evens out, loss exchange ratios tend to even out a little as well. Superior crew training was the key in ‘Nam.
“To say a 2v2 or 4v4 is more realistic is not stricly true, i once read about a 2v30 & yes the 2 won! They shot down quite a few & the rest hightailed it for home.”
— See above. Also, and I don’t mean to get personal here, but if you’d read the point I was making properly you’d realise it was in the F-22’s favour.
“In a decade or so, will we still be blasting Arab airforce’s before they can even get their bloody jets off the ground? Somehow, i don’t think so.”
— Agreed. With the growing shift towards Hybrid Electric vehicles, we’ll all be shooting up Africa for their Cobalt, Copper and oil. The Democratic Republic of Congo will be a prime ground, the poor buggers. China already has it’s foot in the door. Next on the list will be Bolivia, which has half of the worlds known Lithium deposits. The Brazilians, Japanese and French are already getting in there, but surprise, surprise, we’re not. The main hope to avoid that will be advances in induction motors, but then that would require the UK to subsidise university degrees in engineering, advanced computing, Physics, maths, Chemistry etc, and I can’t see any UK Government doing anything as clever as that.
“Afghanistan, Iraq & Libya are affecting our thinking & our focus. Our focus should be on giving our military the best possible equipment we can get for them so that they can do what we ask them to do while losing as few people as possible.”
— To a degree, but then the argument to the opposite would be that we’ve been waiting for “our type of war” for a long time now and the world keeps inconveniently refusing to play Cricket.
“Finaly, at last, i really think that in our long term stategic interest, it would be better to get as fully in sync as possible, with the US.”
— To be honest, despite the “Special relationship”, the Rebels have never been that keen on us. As long as we do as they ask, they don’t mind. When we try and do things without them, or without at least asking them first, they get a little ancy. People often point to them helping us out with Choppers in Afghan, but that’s because it’s their war and they want our help. If there was nothing in it for them, I don’t think they would be so generous.
“What do you think?”
— Well… wait a minute.
Realistic fast jet numbers 2015+
RAF-160 Typhoons
Coningsby
1 Sqn Typhoon QRA
2 Sqns Typhoon Expeditionary
1 Sqn Typhoon OCU
Leuchars
1 Sqn Typhoon QRA
2 Sqns Typhoon Expeditionary
1 Sqn Typhoon OEU
FAA-JSFB
Yeovilton
1 Sqn JSFB QE
1 Sqn JSFB PoW
1 Sqn JSFB OCU/OEU
Like I said boss i kinda agree with you on making the most of what we have.Post 2015 nudges and winks aside I can’t see the defence budget going up.Even if we reduce the deficit we still have to pay the interest/debt repayments let alone deal with the unfunded procurement programmes(kicking projects into the long grass/capability holidays are just dumb) and pay for Vanguard/D5 replacement(whoa another can of hornets!) out of the main defence budget.
But I just don’t agree with RAF vs FAA thing…I don’t think it is duplication one is carrier based one is land based(hotel based?)…USMC Hornets/USN Hornets thats duplication…selection/training/evaluation/maintenance/stationing/uniforms share all that but operationally different very requirements…
I’m definitely not anti RAF I was born in Princess Alexandra Hospital RAF Wroughton and grew up in Brize/Hendon…
Whoa! I leave the room for ten minutes and I have to wade through how many comments?
@ChrisB 1122 Yep lets have a conference…THINK DEF-CON sounds good to me…Margate/Southend in July…we can all eat fish n chips, drink real ale/cider, buy samurai swords and get matching iso container tattoos :-)
Sorry, but one more thing :)
Think Defence’s idea for a LOG, is, in my very humble opinion, an absolutely brilliant idea from the top draw. I cannot praise it enough. It would not cost that much to impliment & even better it could be your total contribution to a particular operation.
Freeing up the rest of your actual fleet ships of the need to be tied to a fixed point…..using the sea for mobility is the whole point, isn’t it?
@Chris.B.
Hi, we seem to be talking past each other.
The point i’m failing to make is that over the next decade we are going to spend a huge amount of money upgrading the Typhoon with all the bells & whistle’s that the RAF are currently lusting after for that aircraft.
Why are we going to continue with that program?
If we were to make the next upgrade the final version we could then spend the money that was allocated for the rest of the Typhoon’s upgrades on more of the F35’s.
In 10 or 15 years time, what aircraft would you want to be flying if the Gov. ordered you to start offensive operations against someone from Land or Sea?
Typhoon or F35?
The decision should really only be left to the Pilots themselves. Noone else should get a say.
If the Pilots were to say “Typhoon all the way!” Then fine, spend the money on the upgrades for the Typhoon. However, i have a sneaking suspicion that they would opt for the best aircraft that they could get their hands on at the time & in our case that will be about 40’ish F35’s.
There are many people here, who imagine that at some time in the future, the UK will get roughly 60 – 80 F35’s.
That is not going to happen as there will not be any money for them. The pot of money available will have already been spent on upgrades for the Typhoon. Some here really need to accept that there is not going to be any increase in the defence budget at all.
Remember, the target is 2% of GDP, the actual real needs of the military does not come into it, at all.
So, better make sure you are spending what money you have on the best possible equipment that you can get.
One serious point, the Raptor V F15 was a for real example.
Five v one all at the same time & they lost.
If one bloke can defeat 5 blokes who know his aircraft’s weaknesses, then it says a lot about the real effectiveness of the so called 5th Generation fighter.
There have been (in many wars), instances of small numbers of better aircraft & pilots defeating superior numbers & defeating them almost completely. Many times, the people with the superior numbers have had to get the hell out of there as fast as they could go. I mean it has to have an effect on you, seeing your friends getting shot to bits all around you.
To say a 2 v 2 or 4 v 4 is more realistic is not stricly true, i once read about a 2 v 30 & yes the 2 won! They shot down quite a few & the rest hightailed it for home.
Agreed, that was an extreme case in the Korean war but the example should not be forgotten.
For the record, i used to think that the Rafale-M would be good enough, for long enough, for us. Frankly i could not believe how many G’s it can pull if it has to. I thought we should forget all about the next new thing & get something that can do the job soon & that something was the Rafale-M.
I have changed my mind.
In a decade or so, how will it compare to other aircraft in service around the world then? In a decade or so, will we still be blasting Arab airforce’s before they can even get their bloody jets off the ground? Somehow, i don’t think so.
Afghanistan, Iraq & Libya are affecting our thinking & our focus. Our focus should be on giving our military the best possible equipment we can get for them so that they can do what we ask them to do while losing as few people as possible.
Why is anyone interested in giving someone a fair fight?
Finaly, at last, i really think that in our long term stategic interest, it would be better to get as fully in sync as possible, with the US.
What do you think?
@ The Mintcake Maker
Your figures alone for the Intruder work out at a bit over £40 million a pop. Which, for purchasing the airframes, reconditioning them, fitting them out with engines, avionics etc, setting them up to use our weapons, training pilots, training maintenance staff, qualifying them for safe flight etc, seems highly optimistic at best. I would imagine it would cost at least another £20 million per airframe, and that is perhaps being optimistic.
@ the whole F-22 vs Typhoon debate
This is not advocacy work for either side, merely an observation. The argument of 6 typhoon vs 2 F-22 doesn’t stand up, under any scrutiny known to mankind. Firstly, to achieve this hypothetical ratio on a reliable basis you would need a 3-1 ratio of Typhoons versus F-22 in your inventory. If take the 187 number that was quoted to congress once as a total figure, and round it down a bit for various reasons to 150, that would require the UK to own 450 Typhoons. Good luck with that.
Then you have to consider the likely hood of 6 Typhoons meeting a pair of F-22’s in combat. Normally patrols might engage each other, so either a 2 on 2, 2 on 4, or 4 on 4 is more likely/realistic.
@ TD
Superb, but not sure if that means you’ll e-mail me first or if I should send you the thing now, so I’ll take a leaf out of the Politicians book and simply sit on the issue quietly and see how it develops.
Churchill would have chosen the oil powered F35-C over the coal powered B.
For 10 years I mean 2020 to 2030 time period, say first cash handed over in 2017 so a/c can be ready for ISD of 2020.
Hi all,
This has turned out to be a rather interesting so far, and some interesting points made. So now time for my 2 pence worth.
First of all I have to agree with a few of the posters on here and I also believe that the decision to go Cats n Traps is final and won’t be reversed any time soon, no matter how nice it would be. Just before I post my suggestion of what to do with the carriers I have a question:
Q: Since we’ve switched to the F-35C I assume we can’t just transfer over our production slots as it’s a different aircraft and since the USN hornets are getting long in the tooth would they be willing to free up some slots for us (and now also the USMC)?
My guess to answer would be not really. We might if we are lucky, I think the ISD for the F-35c for the USN might have even slipped back a year with program restructuring, have 1 squadron of F-35c by 2020 and definitely no more than 2 by 2025. So that got me thinking and one thing lead to another and so I started to read through the current(ish) listings of the AMARC boneyard to see what bargains we can pick up.
http://www.amarc.info/
Since we still don’t quite know what the cost will be of the F-35, the fact that we don’t have much in the way of money floating around in the next 10 years and the fact that I believe that the RAF should stay a 9 squadron FJ fleet (160 frames Min. needed) by 2030 the Tranche 1 eurofighters (used for AD only) will need to be replaced we could then buy a bigger buy of the F-35c for both the FAA and RAF. That means in the mean time we buy cheap frames from AMARC and trash them for 10 years.
So my plan:
MASC
We need 1 squadron at least. According to something I read (will try to find the link) a few years ago Oman wanted 5 E-2C Hawkeye 2000 (i.e the French type) and did a deal with the US for the 5 + spares and maintenance etc for $400m. We need 12 (4 flights of 3 aircraft, 1 training OCU flight + 3 flights, 1 deployed at all times). AMARC has 26 Hawkeyes at the moment.
Total cost: $1bn or £625.3m over 10 years.
ASW & Ships flight
Ships flight made up of 2 Merlins that haven’t been upgraded to new standard and 3 ASW Merlins for the ASW flight.
Fleet Air Defence
We need a buy of 40 a/c, which allows us to form 3 front line squadrons of 8 planes, an 8 plane OCU/OEU and 8 spares. I’m going to suggest (remember this is just a suggestion so I’m open to ideas and this is only temporary) the F/A-18 hornet (not super hornet) as AMARC has 94 frames to pick from and the Aussie have ASRAAM cleared on it. Offer a contact for 40 at 2006 prices + maintenance for 10 years.
Total cost: $2.8bn or £1.75bn or 10 years
Strike
Again 40 aircraft following the same pattern as Fleet AD squadrons. For this I have selected the Grumman A-6A Intruder, AMARC has 163 frames too pick from. It has good range and can carry 18,000 pounds over 5 hard points (4 wing, 1 fuselage). It would prove very useful in Libya right now say with a RAPTOR pod on the fuselage and 4x triple brimstone launchers on the wings or each with a few AA missiles and a Storm Shadow when the first strikes went in. It would do some serious damage. We would pay for cost in 1998 + maintenance + some weapons integration (brimstone & Storm Shadow ony).
Total cost: $2.8bn or £1.75bn over 10 years
This allows for 3 CAG of 24 a/c, (8x Fleet AD FJ, 8x Strike FJ, 3x MASC, 3x ASW & 2x Ships flight) with 1 always deployed at a cost of around £4.2bn over 10 years for planes and maintenance or £420m a year, which I think isn’t too bad for what we get. Sure we can’t take on the likes of china or Russia but for things like Libya or taking on 3rd world dictators it will be fine. Plus since most of it is “old” equipment (however look what the Kiwi’s did with the skyhawk), the RAF won’t mind the FAA operating it.
Sorry for the very long post TD and all. :-)
Chris, yes, got your message, will reply in the morning, been out and about so have a backlog of stuff to catch up with but of course, the answer is yes
Right. I feel like I’ve just embarked on the journey to the centre of the Earth getting down here. I’ll give this my best shot, but I appreciate my arguments might be mute/out of date by the time they’ve been posted.
Firstly, if in the future TD finds the cash to hire a hotel/motel conference room and have a Think Defence seminar, I hearby swear I will punch in the head anyone who uses the word “Littoral” in their speech. I think you mean “Coastal” chaps. And the experience of the Royal Navy in the war for the-islands-that-shall-not-be-named, should serve as a harsh warning for anyone with grand dreams of building a Coastal style Naval task group.
Secondly, I’m not averse to RAF pilots flying off aircraft carriers, or even being in charge of the whole Naval air thing, but I think it should be a clearly marked career choice when the pilots sign up, so you end up choosing a career in “Fast Jet Pilot (Naval)” or “Helicopter Pilot (Naval)” and so on.
Now, down to the meat and bones of what to do with CVF. I would propose either:
1) Flog ’em: Build them, fit them with Cats and Traps, then sell them to the Colonies or France. Maybe even Brazil or India. The money from the sales is then poured back into the purchase of additional Astutes, with a view for two things;
i) Sea Denial in a major shooting war,
ii) A “Submarine Task Group” for things like Libya, where they do intelligence work, deploy knife wielding ninjas, and deliver TLAM to cover for the first night strike loss of F-35. At least one sub would essentially be the “Hunter”, armed to the tits with torpedos. The rest would carry 4-6 torpedos for defence and then stack up on TLAM’s. Would save having to purchase F-35 at all to do the door kicking role.
2) Landing Platform, Helicopter: Essentially a serious sized assault ship. Maybe a few aircraft purchased for immediate air defense of the task group, but other than that they just carry Helicopters. Bung your Marines and Ninjas on board and away you go. A little lacking in “punch”, but it would make one hell of an anti-sub vessel, and would have the almost unmatched “Capability Plus” of being a serious tool for Disaster relief/support, counter piracy and counter narcotics (which I think we should have kept our old carriers for, even if they weren’t going to fly Harriers).
3) The Full Monty: Forget about F-35 and it’s one day of usefullness and go Rafale-M. It needs to be intergrated with our weapons systems. Lucky then that we don’t need them tomorrow. Gives us plenty of time to prod the French into action and get the work done now. What you’re then left with is a carrier that holds 20-30 jets. Sea Control. Persistent air operations. Take your pick. Not a lot of use in low intensity operations though.
To compensate we also need to make some other trimmings. These would mainly apply to 3 but could be useful in general:
Type 26 – Forget it is the simple answer. There once was a day when the Frigate and the Destroyer did didn’t things, horses for courses and all that, but now…. not so much. So now I think you either;
i) design a small, low cost vessel to fill the Anti-mine and anti-sub role (frigate). It’s designed purely to work as part of a fleet, so it carries maybe a Phalanx or two and some light defensive armaments, but certainly no missiles. It’s a frigate, not a battleship.
ii) Ring BAE and tell them we want a Type 45-Batch 2, with better sonar, the harpoon and CIWS fitted. Not “for, but not with”, just fitted. This way you leverage savings from the Type 45 production line.
If you’re investing in Rafale-M, then that means the RAF has to dump Tornado at some point and just live with its 160 Typhoons. Tough is the word I’m looking for.
And the army would probably be up for downsizing too. The whole point of CAS and battlefield strike is to provide an airborne artillery, which means a reduced need for (but not outright elimination of) things like Apache, Challenger and Royal Artillery assets.
That’s my take on it so far at least. On one final thing, TD, I sent you a message through the “contact us” feature, not sure if you got it or not. Could clarify that for me?
@ Tubby
That is the crux of the issue. I think the Harrier is too blame. It takes an above average aviator to fly one. And that means that they can achieve the transition from land to sea quite easily. You can’t compare Harrier flying to conventional flying. An F35c flyer won’t be able to trap wires without practice; it isn’t a question of jump in and go. The majority will be tied to the carriers.
And Mark hit the nail on the head for me with his comments about the RN uniform bill. As all these aviators come down a common pipeline why can’t they be FAA pilots? Surely if it doesn’t matter if they are RAF by the same token it doesn’t matter if they are RN either? Or is purple code for RAF?
I think over looking the culture of a service is a mistake.
@ paul g
Metric or imperial? :)
@TD
If you were truly dispassionate about the FAA then you need to say how giving all the fast jets to the RAF and requiring them to spend time on the carrier will work, as every time I see something by serving RAF personnel on the issue they make clear that they would not spend more than a few weeks a year on a carrier. Its one thing to say that the RAF would have to do it (deploy for 6 months on a carrier) and it is another for them to actually change their culture to do it – if they will not change their culture then actually all you have done is make the CVF’s even less useful than before.
Mark
Last time I pointed out the problems that might come from trying to opperate CVF east of Pakistan; Various Carrier junkies rubbished the suggestion that we would ever try. I was accused of setting up a ‘Gold plated straw man’.
I challange some of your figures regarding re supply in the real world, it would be a nightmare. Given the need to support the screening group as well. In vietnam the US were resupplying carriers ever 3 days: – the nuclear ones. Not ones with big thirsty Gas turbines that will neeed to be wound up to 28 knots to launch (as will their escorts).
We are where we are. But where we are is in a dire financial crisis, and I mean the UK not just the MoD. Given this state of affairs we must make the best use of the assets we already have. On the one hand we saw the French and Italians flying antiques like the Crusaders and Starfighters well past their sell-by date but on the other hand we are doing the opposite – disposing of perfectly serviceable aircraft little more than half-way through their lives (Tornado F3) or even barely 6-7 years old (Tranche 1 Typhoons). Anyone who thinks this is acceptable is not living in the real world. There is no case for buying any new fast jets, full stop. The F-35 should be cancelled.
Not so long ago politicians were being confidently assured a naval Typhoon was not a practical proposition (fore-planes in the wrong place etc) – now we see BAE exhibiting a naval Typhoon to the Indians. We have 55 Tranche 1 Typhoons sitting in storage awaiting disposal. There has even been insane talk of scrapping them. I am sure it would not be trivial to navalise them but I cannot believe it would be impossible either. It begs a question though – where does a politician go to get informed impartial advice on this? I cannot believe BAE, the Navy or the RAF would give unbiased advice, none of them would favour STOBAL carriers equipped with converted Typhoons, because if it could be done it would kill the F-35 stone dead.
Cancelling the F-35 would free up a huge amount of money, some of which could be ploughed into re-engineering the tranche 1 Typhoons. More money would be saved by not fitting the carriers with catapults and maybe enough money could be saved to guarantee the 2nd carrier does not get sold off.
STOBAL carriers equipped with converted Typhoons would not be anyone’s idea of a perfect solution but that does not mean it would not be the best solution. The best solution is the one that suits the country’s interests best. The MoD does not have enough money to pay for what it has ordered, but every attempt to postpone payment, from ‘re-profiling’ projects to PFI simply increases the final costs and digs them into an even bigger hole. Discarding the possibility of an injection of funds, something has to be chopped in order to get the MoD’s finances into order. Unless the MoD’s finances do get sorted out the services face a depressing future.
Two STOBAL carriers equipped with converted Typhoons would not be as desirable as a load of F-35s or several other options, but they would be a quantum leap forward from the handful of Harriers we had until recently and certainly better than nothing.
X, we don’t measure the worth of a service by who is most at risk but we do so on effect
I didnt want this to descend into an anti RAF rant, nip over to Sharkeys World if you want to indulge in that. For the last time, I am not pro or anti any service, in fact I am pro all services and unlike the vast majority of service centric thinkers realise that the best way to ensure the best for all is to be realistic and pragmatic, seek out wasteful duplication and cull it without sentimentality.
As I said, if the FAA is the most cost effective then fair enough, but my gut feeling is the other way
I agree that expeditionary operations are here to stay and that the Mid East, Africa are the most likely locations for this, though consideration has to be given to operations in the Far east in support of our 5 powers defence agreement and a remote possibly of operation in one of the polar regions.
We do have to accept that UK forces will now only ever do a small scale intervention on our own. So what does that mean well sdsr is not very clear what forces are required for this so I have gone back to the Hoon defence review post Iraq as that is the only one I can see which has actual numbers around the scale of effort it states the following:
Small scale intervention requires 18 fast jets, 2 AEW, 8 attack Helo, 12 support Helo 4 MPA and 26 Tanker Transport a/c as well as 1-2 Infanty battalions 3 RFAs and 1 recon a/c 1 sub 2 DDG/FFG.
What is the best way to operate that force and allow freedom of action. For me it comes from a carrier and amphib group. The issues with basing rights will be an increasingly difficult one as our influence reduces and with regimes more inclined to listen to their people our access will be more limited. Are now limited AAR capability will significantly reduce or ability to use land based aircraft over longer distances in any significant number. At the end of the day I can click goggle maps and find any airfield in the world I can’t do the same for a carrier. A carrier is self contained no need for ashore accommodation or pressures on our air transport fleet to the same level of degree as land based operations.
The QE has been designed for 45 days endurance with a range of 8,000-10,000 nautical miles at 15 knots. Ammunition, aviation fuel and stores for at least 5 days of aviation operations, including first day surge thats with 36 F35s not now the case so it should last longer. Replenishment will typically take place every 7 days. It’s planned that a dedicated fleet tanker for CVF support will carry sufficient fuel (and some supplies) for a further 28 days of on task operations.
A carrier operating in the same way as hermes did in the falklands makes the most sense indeed she operated 36 harrier and seaking a/c as well as have marines and SF aboard. If you look at our small scale force it requires exactly 40 Fast Jet, AEW and helicopters. Add a few SF or marines a full CVF.
A joint JSF force of 4 twelve aircraft squadrons has always been likely I for one don’t think the RAF ever wanted F35A. It is not compatible with any UK tanker aircraft and has less range than the F35C with range being one of the main requirements in a tornado replacement a/c. A 2 FAA and 2 RAF mix allows a navy squadron for the worked up carrier to be reinforced by the second squadron for major deployments only requiring RAF participation in national emergency or due to a lack of land bases this would require a 70-80 a/c buy.
Helicopter operation from a conventional carrier can be difficult but due to CVF size this should be less so indeed employing the US navies standard 1.5hrs between fast jet launch and recovery should allow reasonable flexibility with heli operations.
I do wonder how much the extra training burden is for CTOL the following is the standard US navy qualification process. If the undergraduate phase was done in the US and the increased use of simulators I wonder how much different this is to qualifying a harrier pilot on a carrier.
Undergraduate CQ for Student Naval Aviators, currently completed in the T-45 Goshawk and consisting of 14 day landings (10 arrested; up to 4 can be “touch and goes”).
Initial CQ flown in a newly designated aviator’s first fleet aircraft (FA-18, EA-6B, or E-2C), consisting of 12 day (minimum 10 arrested) and 8 night landings (minimum 6 arrested).
Transition CQ for experienced pilots transitioning from one type of aircraft to another, consisting of 12 day landings (minimum 10 arrested) and 6 night arrested landings.
Requalification CQ for experienced pilots that have not flown from the carrier within the previous six months, consisting of 6 day arrested landings and 4 night arrested landings.
Given the F35s advanced nature and allowing for the current ACLS system on US carriers being on QE the US navy calls an approach utilizing this system to be a “Mode II” approach. Additionally, some aircraft are capable of “coupling” their autopilots to the glideslope/azimuth signals received via data link from the ship, allowing for a “hands-off” approach. If the pilot keeps the autopilot coupled until touchdown, this is referred to as a “Mode I” approach. If the pilot maintains a couple until the visual approach point (at ¾ miles) this is referred to as a “Mode IIA” approach. Not I think beyond the RAFs finest especially if he/she has practise it in a simulator first.
@x sorry mate we only had variable pressure applicators in the reme being a technical corp!! (thought i’d lighten the mood)
@TD aand everyone else :)
I am not suggesting any duplication at all.
I really do mean, give every single jet to the RAF!
Why continue to upgrade the Typhoon, it will not be as comparable to the F-35. Therefore, to get the most from the money we are going to spend why not cease throwing money at it & spend what we can on getting as many F35’s as possible?
If anyone can tell me why they think it’s neccessary to continue with Typhoon upgrades for the next decade, when there will be a better aircraft available for the RAF very soon, then i’m all ears.
About the Raptor, i used that cause it is a low observable aircraft & the USAF have already run a similar test!
I saw a documentry about the Raptor a while ago, (wish i could find you a link!), in part of it the pilot’s who formed the first Squadron (who were all ex-F15 jockeys), ran a test.
Five of them in F15’s V one guy in a Raptor.
The guy in the Raptor won, every single time, not kidding!
I have always wondered why we (the UK), don’t have competative fly offs. It would be easy to arrange one, we take part in exercises at Nellis.
I know that we like to keep aircraft flying for a very long time, mostly due to how expensive they are & i suspect, due to the long programs to upgrade them but why not skip the massively expensive upgrade program for the Typhoon & instead sink the money into the F35 program? Either the B or C version!
I know we have equipment cycles, what i’m saying is why not chop one short & then that would allow us to get in sync with the USN/USAF? With more aircraft, would we not get a better price etc etc?
I really think it would give the RAF a much better capability for the long term. Also you are still hedging your bets, cause you have 100 odd Typhoons if someone invents a sure fire counter to the F35.
I don’t think it actually matters to set up the exact composition of any air group for the CVF. Circumstances will dictate what’s on board at any one time, more F35’s of whatever flavour will simply give you more options in the event that everything goes really wrong & there is a full blown conventional war.
I know it’s trite but plan for the worst, hope for the best.
@ Paul G
I know about the tanks. It was the first thing came to mind. I didn’t think this was the place to give a break down on REME career structure.
(Do airborne have lighter hammers? Or do they just use inflatable ones? )
@ TD
Looking at how the RAF performs I would suggest that flying jets is part time business for them too……….
@ Think Defence
You do so have an axe to grind. If you were as open minded as you think you are you would acknowledge that the RAF is a redundant chimaera that is over manned, over represented, and under performing. Tell me in this Libya affair who was at risk more? The couple hundred matelots who spent hours alongside at Benghazi. Or the Captain Kirks in their 4.5 gen fighters patrolling empty skies looking for poorly equipped, poorly piloted 60s Soviet jets after the USN (with a little bit of help from the RN) TLAMed the 40 year old Libyan SAM sites to death………. ;-)
there are a lot of solutions on how best to use the GE class carriers but almost none of them require any form of alteration, surely proving the case for building them. They are capable of being the platform for enforcinh a NFZ with 48 F35C or being a super LPH.
@ Mark
Thank you. I half remembered a figure like that. I also half remembered a figure that says 90% of the RAF are stationed in the UK. I am not very good at this off the cuff writing.
I know a lot of us like to talk about kit. But it is the culture of the various organisations and how they inter play that drives events. All organisations being composed of humans take on the human instinct for survival; this is deep within the corporate collective memory. Um. The RAF is very good at promoting itself, does “it” know this know? Yes and no. Good PR is PR. But deep down an organisation’s culture will foster certain behaviours and promulgate them. The RN goes to the South Atlantic and wins a war but its culture doesn’t play on this; it is the Silent Service. The RAF goes to the South Atlantic, plays a bit part, comes away with a medal tally that belies that latter fact by a large margin, and the upshot is RAF Mount Pleasant. So…….
Mark, you might be right on the duplication front, as I said its not ideology but cost driven
TD
So you are accepting then that its battle group deployment of land forces independently. I do accept your point about the Libya conflict but I do get the feeling that Iraq in particular has caused a major change in the way this country will accept future military adventures. They will have to be done thru the UN and it is almost a cert that they will refuse a ground troop deployment unless something similar to the Kuwaits invasion occurs.
I do have to ask what saving are to be made from removing the Fleet air arm fast jet squadrons. I just dont see it other than the RN uniform bill. They are co located and structured in the same way as the RAF squadrons they come thru the same training pipeline and jet servicing is joint. The only difference I can see is one does officer training in Dartmouth and the Other at Cranwell. One learns and signs up to deploy on as ship the other doesnt like wise the maintainers. Unless you co locate the 3 single service officer/enlisted men initial training establishments were is the saving. 2 FAA 2 RAF squad providing a single RN air group backed up only in times off crisis by the raf squadrons seems sensible to me.
“Everything has its limits” but the missiles do the turning…
that is the philosophy, as I’ve understood it?”
You gotta turn the plane too to launch the missiles and, especially, to avoid them.
And don’t be fooled be the “shooting the ASRAAM backwards” magic: it is all awesome and good, but it consumes lots of propulsion and actuators energy that, in a missile, are finished.
Range is going to drop sharply, and the enemy chances to escape rise.
You gotta use such stunts the right way. Getting in the right firing position means a lot in ensuring the enemy is caught into a proper “No Escape Zone”.
If it was that simple, wiht missiles doing all the work, then with modern missiles on it you could call a Tucano an air dominance fighter.
But it does not work.
@X, as soon as anyone points out a few home truths about the FAA everyone gets defensive. I have no axe to grind but I know that tough decisions need to be made, I know we all like to talk about those tough decisions but no one ever seems to want to make them if it means their favoured capability gets cut. A tough decision seems to be OK if it is someone else taking the hit.
Now none of us know the costings and doing Google based analysis on sortie rates etc, as others like to do, is far too simplistic. There is much much more to air power than that.
Also, don’t get the impression for one moment that I think the RAF is faultless, far from it.
But, I look at it like this, the fast jet business, its what they do, full time
Operating fast jets is a part time activity for the RN
When I look at the services I see duplication and duplication means waste.
I want to eliminate waste wherever I see it because by doing so it means we can avoid as many capabilities as possible.
Does the RAF need its own police force and light infantry, maybe, but I don’t think there is a convincing enough case to justify the duplication.
If the RAF are deficient in an area, then they should improve it, taking away their toys is not the answer. I am not going to cover your other points about the RAF because it is rather shy of fact, yes they might only deploy a certain number of fast jets to Afghanistan but have you forgot the air bridge, FI, VIP transport, Support Helicopter, UAV’s, rapid reaction transport, force protection and of course Libya, need I go on.
Now who is being blinkered?
The UK armed forces are getting smaller, proper tough decisions are needed and as long as I see duplication I will not shy of saying so.
The US can afford four Air Forces, we can’t.
If I have to choose, sorry, the FAA and AAC aint it.
Its not ideology, its not bias, its nothing but hard nosed financial control sweeping aside little empires and cash sucking duplication.
@Michael(civ), performance is usually the last thing to be considered!
@Ixion, if F35B goes tits up in my master plan then we would have to go C, not ideal and I think more expensive but there are other benefits
@Mark, I didn’t say I wished the UK to operate independently at a small scale, the government did. The last lot said medium scale but remember, we will not have any strategic shrinkage
Libya does not in any way form a template because you know why, thats exactly the same thing I heard before the Balkans, before Afghanistan and before Iraq.
RE “But IF something gets close… in a dogfight the F35 is pretty much dead. It turns slower, it climbs slower, it is slower.
Everything has its limits” but the missiles do the turning…
that is the philosophy, as I’ve understood it?
“I have been wondering about how CVF could be altered as an LPH. I would have a hanger constructed at current flight deck level. There would be landing spots back aft and on the “roof” of the hanger. I would convert the original hanger into accommodation for a commando and a hospital.”
But just WHY? What the hell, there’s already space for 500 soldiers as it is while keeping the ship the way it is. XD
As for lack of vehicles, especially when compared to Ocean…
men, Ocean carries 43 light vehicles, mostly Land Rovers, and 6 L118 light guns.
In the hangar of the CVF, you can fit lots of stuff. You need a crane to lift stuff onto the flight deck, but you’ve got two lifts rated each 70 and i say 70 tons.
Any vehicle that can be airlifted by a Chinook can just be craned onto the deck, driven over a lift and then into the hangar, then lifted back up on deck to be underslung to the Chinook when the landing moment comes.
Why should we make things complex when they are simple??? At the most, the smartest thing to do would be to find a way to incorporate side-mounted Ro-Ro ramps for easier access to the hangar when in ports.
Davits for LCVPs, if needed, could be made into sponsons under the left side of the deck where it stretches outwards, but this already requires lots of work during a refit.
But for the rest… seriously, people.
“Six Typhoons v Two F22 Raptors.
Who do you think would win?”
Another victim of hype about the Raptor.
Do you know that, currently, the Raptor can only receive on data link 16 and not transmit?
That it can only use two GPS JDAM and target only one at a time, and with difficulty…?
That it has no IRST, why the Typhoon has it?
Ok, the F22 is low observable.
Shame that the radar transmission of its AESA can be picked up from immensely afar (who’s got notions of electromagnetics knows that the radar can be detected before the radar can detect the targets, and that’s why SEAD is so effective), whyle the Typhoon can go around with its radar turned off, searching only with the PIRATE in the IR spectrum, sending off no signal.
It can also launch a missile at a target designated externally by a Sentry AWACS without turning on the radar thanks to full data link system.
Its AESA is awesome and everything, but it has a 120° degrees field of view against Captor’s 200°.
Hype aside, the F22 is actually got a good lot of defects. And even just the canopy costs 670.000 dollars apiece. News revealed after one canopy was stuck and to free the pilot locked inside the firefighters had to smash it open with axes.
And do we need to remember the computer system that shut itself down when it passed the Change of Data line in the Pacific?
A tanker had to be scrambled from the Hawaii and the F22’s pilots had to follow it visually to the airbase.
Personally, i take a Typhoon any day, thanks. A RAF T1 FRG4 is fine for me.
The F35, having its own IRST, is better than the F22 and has the upper hand in BVR engagement. With Meteor, it will be next to invincible.
But IF something gets close… in a dogfight the F35 is pretty much dead. It turns slower, it climbs slower, it is slower.
Everything has its limits.
@x, sorry fella i wasn’t advocating that the navy shouldn’t fly their own aircraft, just pointing out that there will be people who will want to fly no matter what cap badge they are wearing. I’m in no way anti FAA (by the way the reme and tank anology wasn’t the best you could’ve used, if a vehicle mechanic goes “A” trade then he is fixing tracked vehicles for his career, not a dig just an insight)!
anyway as others had said we’ve got ’em now lets get the best out of them, I’d get them out on show as well try and beef up some customers, hells teeth the french have sold 3 mistral to the russians (ok not all built in france, but still have to pay for the design) who knows i’m going glass half full!
Oh yes CVF………
For me CVF should be about sea control not all this strike and coin stuff. So I would be happy with 12 F35s, as long as the airgroup has 12 Merlins for ASW/ASuW, 4+2 Merlin ASaCs, plus a few Lynx hacks. Enough to control a good sized area of ocean.
I have been wondering about how CVF could be altered as an LPH. I would have a hanger constructed at current flight deck level. There would be landing spots back aft and on the “roof” of the hanger. I would convert the original hanger into accommodation for a commando and a hospital. I have been wondering whether the spaces now used for aircraft lifts could be used for davits for LCVP; I shall have to have a look. At the for’ard end of what is the current flight deck I would have some VLS silos. I think CVF would make a good home for Sea Viper; CVF would always sit at the centre of the task group and Sampson would sit even higher than on T45. CVF would make a good platform for TLAM and a supersonic missile like BrahMos. The bulk of the air group could be switched between Pinger Merlin and Junglie Merlin as needed. But would always carry a Merlin ASAC.
Random Maria thoughts.
First we should have built a state of the art shipyard capable of building Nimitz size ships or the largest cruiseliners or containerships. Bigger up front cost, but all large RN ships from then on, would be much cheaper.
We are where we are.
The panic to get Charles De Gaule back to sea for Libya, shows the need for 2 carriers to cover for refits.
One fully equipped in “go to war” mode. The other in refit or operating as a training carrier with skeleton crew & tiny airgroup. Training carrier could be loaded up with helicopters,cranes ,bulldozers & sent to civil disasters, without taking “war” carrier off task.
I still want QE class in Russian mode ie. angled deck with arrester wires + ski ramp. Waist cat could be added later if emals works well.
Minimum fast airgroup is ten fighters, ten bombers. Less than that cannot sustain even a small fighting operation. Knowing you are going in harms way, I would up that to 16 of each ie.32.
F-35C is a good strike aircraft, but I have doubts about it as an interceptor. F-35B or Seaphoon would be better for all weather air to air.
In the old days, we would have built a demonstrator, remember EAP? A Seaphoon demonstrator would be good. Most of its kit, thrust vectoring,conformal tanks, AESA is shared with advanced land versions anyway.
We probably need a few Goshawk C/Hawk 128 carrier trainers.
We should have kept one Sqn of FAA Harriers by using grounded RAF Harriers for spares. Cheaper than scrapping FAA fast jets now, only to recreate them in a few years.
We have money to overpay doctors & town hall fat cats, bail out Ireland & Portugal, give an extra 4 billion to third world dictators Mercedes fund. The money is there. It is how we as a nation choose to spend it.
X
In 2009 with 3 commando brigade in helmand the RN had 47% of its personnel deployed on operations. The smallest service has been worked harder than any of the other services but remains the most maligned.
Great debate – glad we’ve moved on from the whole CVF vs no CVF argument and realised that there are real opportunities with the QE design. We should just think of them as two moveable airfields and are joint assets of all three services.
I can see more the parachute regiment doing a helicopter surge from them than the RM for example. The Albions are much more suited to the marines.
As for aircraft, in my opinion the FAA should be primarily providing air defence and anti ship / sub. The RAF should be strike / ground support. Why not the F35C for the FAA and the F35B for the RAF? This would mean keeping the ramp as well as adding the cats. It would allow the RAF to deploy quickly for an emergency. Say 5 x 9 plane squadrons each.
TD
I will take issue with several points of your strategy. You have stated that you only wish the UK armed forces to operate independently at small scale. Thats fine you then go on to say 6 F35 will support one of the army multi roles brigades when deployed. Lets be absolutely clear the Britsh army considers brigade level deployment a MEDIUM scale contribution. Taking forward your analysis the maximum independent contribution from UK land force will therefore be Battle Group Level like it or not.
I think we can start to see the template of future operation from what is happening in Libya at present were by large scale western naval and air power in effect supporting an indigenous army with limited western ground forces as the preferred operandi. This changes the strategic picture considerably from what’s gone before.
You have wrote a interesting piece as always which will require a re-read and some more thought before I comment on the CVF part.
TD and All
Please do not take my RN RAF crack too seriously.
Despite their expressed differnces not sure Jed are in reality THAT far apart?
However I would like TD to address what happens if F35b doesn’t (happen that is) Do we go to C?