I think the first thing to do is to recognise the hard work over many days and weekends of the people, military, academic and civil servant, that have produced the National Security Strategy and the Strategic Defence and Security Review.
Second, it is probably fair to say that in comparison with other departments, the MoD has done quite well from the Comprehensive Spending Review.
Out of this unusually good bounty, what have the MoD chosen to do?
In summary, this SDSR is not particularly radical, different equipment choices have been made, budgets shuffled and organisations re-organised to shift the direction broadly speaking, into the same direction it was already going.
This is not necessarily a bad thing of course and whilst not particularly radical, it is ambitious.
There remain a number of questions and much of the spending promises are contingent on a combination of yet to be realised efficiency savings, heavy reductions in civil servant headcount, ‘pay restraint’ for all within the MoD, and selling off the family brass; the gold, silver and bronze, sold a long time ago.
With all defence reviews, there is always a large amount of political theatre and out and out politics, this was one no different. They are always aimed at both a domestic and international audience and because the standard of defence debate, in general, is at a relatively poor level, it was distilled into a series short punchy ‘lines to take’, with the detail buried in the document, or in many cases, yet to emerge.
The strapline is always instructive of what is to follow.
2010 saw the phrase ‘Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty’, to be replaced with ‘A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom’ in the 2015 version, perhaps, United Kingdom suits the post-independence referendum mood better.
One of the key differences this time around was reported to be the degree of involvement/interference from HM Treasury, if the MoD could make savings, the MoD could bank the money and reinvest it in whatever capabilities it saw fit, the CSR coming pretty much at the same time as SDSR. This is an unusual and positive sign of the growing financial credibility of the MoD across Whitehall. a result of changes instigated by Liam Fox, hammered home by Phil Hammond and deftly managed by the Permanent Under Secretary, Jon Thompson.
Out in front was a statement from David Cameron;
Our national security depends on our economic security, and vice versa. So the first step in our National Security Strategy is to ensure our economy is, and remains, strong.
The deficit reduction strategy and underlying state of the economy are still governmental strategy, and wisely so. Sound finances underpin everything the MoD does. It doesn’t take long for politics to intervene, though, references to the ‘black hole’ for example, still, 5 years later to be fully detailed.
The two underpinning principles of the NSS and SDSR are a commitment to both maintain defence and security spending at 2% of GDO and Overseas Development Assistance at 0.7% of GDP
In other words, defence, and making sure we don’t have to use defence in the first place.
We know the creative accounting used to get to 2%, we know 2% actually represents a decline from previous years and that defence inflation may well outstrip any increases in real term cash delivered by virtue of a growing economy and increasing GDP. Despite this, at the very least there is some measure of stability and control within the equipment plan and other longer term cost centres.
The National Security Objectives
These are a new feature of the SDSR/NSS process; high level and easy to interpret in whichever fashion the Government chooses, but at least, written down and aligned across government departments.
Objective 1; Protect our people,
Objective 2; Project our global influence, and
Objective 3; Promote our prosperity
What flows from these three objectives is the defence and security strategy for the next five years and beyond.
Stung by accusations of strategic shrinkage and disappearing from the ‘world stage’ the document described how the UK has many advantages and attempts to announce that the UK is back.
Ambition, loud and clear.
The Security Context
None is left out of the document; domestic and global security challenges, the resurgence of state-based threats (looking at you Russia), the role of technology and even climate change and an ageing population get a mention.
The risks are grouped into three tiers;
I don’t think this section of the combined document will get the credit it deserves, it seems a wholly sensible view of risks that the UK faces described in a relatively easy to understand manner.
Good work.
Objective 1 – Protect Our People
There are a lot of words in these sections and I am not going to just copy each one but a summary of the key points, below;
4.9 We will increase funding for the security and intelligence agencies to enable £2.5 billion of additional investment in staff and capabilities. More than half of this investment will be on counter-terrorism. We will recruit and train over 1,900 additional security and intelligence staff across the agencies to respond to, and deter those behind, the increasing international terrorist, cyber and other global threats.
Increasing counter-terrorism spend has been widely discussed in the last few days, hard to argue against this.
4.15 In 2011 we established the UK National Maritime Information Centre to coordinate information about our maritime security, nationally and with international partners. We will enhance joint working between law enforcement agencies and the Royal Navy to increase patrolling in our territorial waters. We will also improve aerial surveillance operations and information sharing across government.
Does this mean more surveillance patrols in UK waters and greater aerial observation, perhaps with the announced MPA aircraft in the longer term and civilian agencies in the shorter term?
A snippet that has not been widely picked up is;
We will invest in a ground-based BMD radar, which will enhance the coverage and effectiveness of the NATO BMD system. We will also investigate further the potential of the Type 45 Destroyers to operate in a BMD role.
Beyond RAF Fylingdales, the UK does not have a ballistic missile defence radar so it will be interesting to see how this pans out. It is good that the very effective Type 45 Destroyer will continue to play a role in theatre BMD, even if it is very early days yet.
4.18 We will invest up to £300 million over the next 10 years to enhance operational communications, renew the existing air defence system and upgrade infrastructure
This is for the Falkland Islands, replacing the Rapier FSC with Land Ceptor/FLAADS(L) and a range of upgrades. Has already been announced.
Nothing additional for Gibraltar.
On the Armed Forces
Deliver our commitment to maintain the size of the regular Armed Forces and to not reduce the Army to below 82,000, and increase the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force by a total of 700 personnel, assumed to be 400 for the Royal Navy and 300 for the Royal Air Force.
The Prime Minister had previously made a commitment to not impose any reduction on the regular strength and the additional personnel for the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force will be welcome, despite not being as high as wanted.
Note quite sure what this means, though;
We will also take steps to increase the productivity of the Armed Forces
The document defines eight missions that the Armed Forces will do;
- Defend and contribute to the security and resilience of the UK and Overseas Territories
- Provide the nuclear deterrent
- Contribute to improved understanding of the world through strategic intelligence and the global defence network.
- Reinforce international security and the collective capacity of our allies, partners and multilateral institutions
- Support humanitarian assistance and disaster response, and conduct rescue missions
- Conduct strike operations.
- Conduct operations to restore peace and stability.
- Conduct major combat operations if required, including under NATO Article 5.
HADR is now a core military task.
Building on the 2010 Future Force 2020, SDSR 2015 describes the Joint Force 2025.
Joint Force 2025 is described as;
4.40 We will be able to deploy a larger force more quickly. By 2025, this highly capable expeditionary force of around 50,000 (compared with around 30,000 planned in Future Force 2020) will include; A maritime task group centred on a Queen Elizabeth Class aircraft carrier with F35 Lightning combat aircraft. A land division with three brigades including a new Strike Force. An air group of combat, transport and surveillance aircraft. A Special Forces task group.
When not deployed at this strength, which is the older ‘large scale’ force, it will be able to undertake a number of smaller operations simultaneously;
A medium-scale operation, often drawing mostly on just one Service, such as our current counter-ISIL mission in Iraq. Multiple additional operations, ranging from specialist missions such as counterterrorism or counter-piracy, through to broader, more complex operations such as the military support to tackle Ebola in Sierra Leone or the enduring naval presence in the Gulf. A wide range of defence engagement activities, such as training teams and mentoring.
This is a departure from previous defence planning assumptions that were more detailed about how many of each type/scale of operations could be conducted at once. It would seem to be a reduction in deployment expectations.
In order to protect the armed forces from unjustified legal claims;
We will develop proposals to ensure that the Armed Forces can operate effectively overseas and are not subject to unjustified legal claims that undermine their ability to do their job.
A difficult and complex issue where the answers might not actually be as simple as first thought.
Special Forces will receive an investment increase across a number of areas, again, widely reported before publication.
The Royal Navy
Despite the hype and expectation, still no definitive word on whether the two QE class carriers will enter fully into service and operate in parallel, both fully manned and operation with aircraft, or one in service at a time in such a manner that we are always assured one will be available. Other have read the document to be confirmation that two will be fully crewed and in simultaneous service, not sure, differing perspectives on the text I expect.
They will form the core of our maritime task group, with one available at all times. We will increase the number of F35 Lightning aircraft we are buying in the early 2020s to ensure that we make best use of this world-leading capability, and we will buy three new logistic ships to support the fleet, in addition to the four tankers that will enter service from 2016.
Confirmation that the three Solid Support Ships will be purchased, joining the new Tide Class tankers. The RFA will, apart from Diligence and Argus, have a relatively new and very capable fleet.
The next bit was a bit of a shock;
We will maintain one of the most capable anti-submarine fleets in the world with the introduction of eight advanced Type 26 Global Combat Ships, which will start to replace our current Type 23 frigates in their anti-submarine role. We will maintain our fleet of 19 frigates and destroyers. We will also launch a concept study and then design and build a new class of lighter, flexible general purpose frigates so that by the 2030s we can further increase the total number of frigates and destroyers. These general purpose frigates are also likely to offer increased export potential. We will buy two further new Offshore Patrol Vessels, increasing the Royal Navy’s ability to defend UK interests at home and abroad.
Only 8 Type 26 GCS will now enter service, likely the ASW optimised variants that will pull through Sonar 2087 from the Type 23 fleet. Despite the disdain of two-tier fleets from all quarters, this is exactly what the Royal Navy will get. At least five cheaper, flexible (I hate that word) and lighter frigates, going back to the FSC C1/C2 concept perhaps.
After fighting tooth and nail against this, after all the announcements on Type 26 before, this is a big change of policy. In the plus column is it keeps design capacity going but in most other regards, am struggling to see the upside.
Recognising that the Type 26 design, despite the very expensive risk reduction activities in the Assessment Phase, is not ready for ordering, the two additional Offshore Patrol Vessels are the direct result.
These are vessels that the Royal Navy neither needs nor wants but like the batch 2 Rivers, a direct consequence of the desire to retain onshore complex warship building in Scotland, and the Terms of Business Arrangement (TOBA) that the MoD has with BAE.
We would have to pay BAE in any case so why not just build more OPV’s, all well and good, but this means less personnel and cash available for Type 26.
So, the reduced numbers of Type 26 would, at least on face value, to be the direct result of prevarication and being unable to agree on the design of the Type 23 replacement, something that goes back many years.
Talk of exportability for the new light frigate has echoes of exportability for Type 26, wishful thinking.
There is also a lot of potential for a reversal in the commonality that the RN has been seeking, with multiple overlapping types and equipment in service.
The Royal Marines will see one of the QE carriers enhanced for amphibious operations.
We will enhance a Queen Elizabeth Class aircraft carrier to support this amphibious capability
What this means is not yet clear, perhaps davits for LCVP’s?
No updates on MCM or survey, although the graphic would seem to indicate a small reduction in the MCM fleet.
The British Army
The major change for the British Army is the formation of two ‘Strike Brigades’
The division will draw on two armoured infantry brigades and two new Strike Brigades to deliver a deployed division of three brigades. We will establish these two Strike Brigades to be able to deploy rapidly over long distances using the new Ajax armoured vehicles and new mechanised infantry vehicles. They will double the number of brigades ready for operations. With these, and 16 Air Assault Brigade’s very high readiness forces, we will improve our ability to respond to all likely threats
In the new joint force approach, I would have thought that 16AAB and 3CDO would have been considered and described together.
The Strike Brigades are yet to be fully described and where in the Army 2020 structure they will be drawn from. With Ajax, they make the claim that together with the new Mechanised Infantry Vehicle (MIV) they will be able to deploy rapidly over long distances.
I remain to be convinced by this, Ajax is a 35 tonnes vehicle that will need a HET to move, so unlike a wholly MIV based formation, will not be able to self-deploy by road, where roads are a viable means.
The fact that this rapid reaction force will not be established until 2025 was also the source of much merriment today, irony it seems, lost on the Army.
Apart from the conformation of CR2 LEP, Warrior CSP and Apache Sustainment projects the other major news was the formation or two ‘innovative’ brigades.
Two innovative brigades comprising a mix of Regulars and specialist capabilities from the Reserves able to contribute to our strategic communications, tackle hybrid warfare and deliver better battlefield intelligence.
Is this part of the 77th Brigade or something new, more details yet to emerge?
Finally,
A number of infantry battalions reconfigured to provide an increased contribution to countering terrorism and building stability overseas. They will conduct defence engagement and capacity building, providing training, assistance, advice and mentoring to our partners
Am assuming, these will be stripped down light role infantry battalions.
The Royal Air Force
Anyone looking for ‘the one true word’ on F-35B numbers is going to be disappointed.
We will establish an additional F35 Lightning squadron and two additional Typhoon squadrons. We will invest further in Typhoon’s capabilities, including ground attack and a new Active Electronically Scanned Array radar to ensure that we can continue to operate it until at least 2040. We will maintain our plan to buy 138 F35 Lightning aircraft over the life of the programme.
No details of timings, numbers per squadron, basing (rumour is Conningsby nd Lossiemouth for Typhoon), training, or where the air and ground and air crews are coming from.
‘We will maintain our plan’ is not an order.
By 2023, the UK is planned to have 42 F-35B’s in service, remember, this is a JOINT Combat Aircraft, not just for carrier strike. This translates into two squadrons (809 NAS and 617 SQN) plus the OCU.
Multiple moving pieces are on the table, GR.4 availability and OSD, operations in the Middle East and Balkans, Brimstone and Storm Shadow integration, MFTS and availability contracts. Aligning the swim lanes will be a complex process.
More than 20 new Protector armed remotely piloted aircraft, more than doubling the number of the Reaper aircraft which they replace
This is good, the UK will join France, Italy and the Netherlands in the European Reaper Club, paving the way for resource sharing, more efficient training and enhanced interoperability, within national security boundaries.
Sentinel will be extended into next decade, Shadow until 2030 and Sentry and Air Seeker/Rivet Joint to 2035.
The major announcement for the RAF was the widely leaked decision on Maritime Patrol.
Nine new Boeing P8 Maritime Patrol Aircraft to increase further the protection of our nuclear deterrent and our new aircraft carriers. These aircraft will be based in Scotland and will also have an overland surveillance capability.
During defence questions before the main announcement, Michael Fallon confirmed that this would result in over $1 Billion for UK manufacturers. This was contradicted by Boeing later in the day, describing how each of the nine would include a whopping £3m of UK content.
Expect this to rumble on.
There is no doubt the decision is fantastic news, a gaping hole that needed urgently filling and enhanced interoperability with the US, Indian and Australian armed forces possible, whilst maximising the considerable SEEDCORN investment already made. But we should be clear that the UK has sacrificed a proper competition for an expeditious delivery, hopefully starting in the next two to three years with ISD towards the end of the decade. There are also a few issues like in-flight refuelling and UK weapons/comms/crypto that will need to be resolved, one way or the other.
These are, however, relatively minor issues.
Perhaps the best aspect of the decision is that it provides a medium to long term replacement path for Sentry, Air Seeker and Sentinel, albeit hopefully with new airframes!
We will upgrade and extend the life of our C130J aircraft, allowing them to support a range of operations until 2030
Evidently, the A400 is still having problems with certain tasks and may not be able to replace the smaller C130 in certain roles, especially special forces support. This may be a reflection of that.
A high altitude unmanned aircraft will receive investment, currently assumed to be the Zephyr.
Finally,
A recapitalised Command Support Air Transport fleet to replace the current aircraft as they reach the end of their life. This will increase their operational utility and ensure we are able to continue to transport the Royal Family and senior Ministers cost effectively. We will also adapt one of our existing Voyager aircraft so that, as well as its primary air tanking role, it can transport senior Ministers securely, delivering better value for money than the current use of charter aircraft. The aircraft would also be available to the Royal Family.
A sensible way to utilise the oversized and underutilised Voyager fleet, we are paying for them in any case. Not clear what the rest of the smaller air transport fleet will be replaced with.
FCAS will continue in collaboration with France.
People and Estate
The new engagement model continues to evolve;
We will make the changes necessary to enable our Armed Forces to work flexibly, reflecting the realities of modern life. We will make a new accommodation offer to help more Service personnel live in private accommodation and meet their aspirations for home ownership.
No news on what this means in practice and the document described a number of changes to terms and conditions of employment that will no doubt described in more detail in due course.
The Defence estate will be reduced by 30%, the proceeds of sales going into the MoD’s coffers.
Deterrent
No change on deterrent except confirmation of a new MoD body to manage Successor.
Confirmation of cost increases on the design phase for the four Successor submarines to £3.9 Billion with latest estimates of manufacture costs to be £31 Billion inclusive of inflation. A further £10 Billion will be reserved as risk funding.
Combatting Extremism and Terrorism
The CONTEST strategy will be updated in 2016.
New Counter Extremism Strategy to be published in October 2015.
2016 will see a consolidation of investigatory powers, this will be controversial.
Cyber and Other
£1.9 Billion over five years for cyber capabilities including what I think is the relatively uncommon declaration in Western nations, offensive cyber operations.
New National Cyber Centre will lead the response, led by GCHQ.
There are a number of provisions that I will write about in a separate post, including serious and organised crime and crisis response and resilience, and space.
Objective 2 – Project Our Global Influence
Key defence related announcements include;
50% of the DFiD budget will be focussed on fragile states.
Defence Engagement to be a funded core MoD task.
Establish British Defence Staffs in the Middle East, Asia Pacific and Africa in 2016 with increasing training opportunities for partner nations.
Establish a £1 Billion Conflict, Stability and Security Fund to be used across defence and security, international development and intelligence.
The rest of this length chapter is basically, keep doing what we are doing.
Objective 3 – Promote Our Prosperity
Even wordier than the preceding chapter.
Apart from some news on space, SME’s in defence, more funding for cadets, defence export controls and defence industrial strategy refreshes, this was again; do what we are already doing.
Summary
By the end of reading Chapter 3, I was beginning to flag, the document is packed with lots of information about how great we are and what we are doing, over 40,000 words.
A comprehensive piece of work, although it would have been much better to split the two. The hefty work on the risk section is largely apolitical, rigorous and wholly sensible, but this is not what people will read, they just want to get to the implementation measures.
As per the introduction, it raises many questions and issues yet to be resolved, but the details will work themselves out over the next weeks, months and years.
I like it, it is a much better document that SDSR 2010
Was it strategic?
If the strategy is to pretty much carry on as before, then yes, it was.
There wasn’t a great deal new, with a large percentage of the content devoted to what we are already doing, but it does contain a range of solid decisions and some big ambition, with clarity on military missions and a very good appreciation of the risk landscape.
The implementation measures are less good, short on detail and subject to the inevitable political spin and jam tomorrow happy clappy jargon that so often seeps into these documents.
David Cameron has had a habit of taking big whilst carrying a small stick, the challenge will be to follow through on SDSR 2015 ambition to avoid the same accusation.
There is more in the good column than bad, by a very long way.
The biggest losers, however, are the MoD’s civil servants, a 30% reduction. Some of this will potentially come from the Germany drawdown but anyway you look at this, 30% is a big hit, especially on top of previous reductions. Remember, MoD civil servants support the military. The MoD is the largest user of contract personnel across Whitehall and this will likely increase as more posts are made ‘off books’
Finally, service personnel, lots of fine words but morale surveys, sign off rates and recruitment problems talk louder than words; and ‘pay restraint’ and undeniable erosion in terms and conditions of service are hardly going to help.
The real challenge SDSR 2015 faces is not one of money, or space, or equipment, risk, strategy or even ambition.
It is one of people, see you in five years.
How do you work out A400M is having problems? Or is unsuitable? A life extension of 14 airframes to 2030 is a significant increase in RAF lift capacity, it suggests a real desire to provide greater lift.
That was quite trivial.
Re Strategy, this was very strategic. It was the starkest i have heard UK politicians talk about threat profile for some time and the language was right on the money- the need to manage state and non-state actors. The reference points clearly being Russia and assorted militant muslims respectively. It was an actual argument for why the forces exist and what they will be doing in the nest 5-10 years. That in itself is significant progress.
I think TD are being unduly negative about the revision of the T26 concept. It would be crazy to deploy T26s to pootle around the Caribbean drug-busting or off Somalia scaring pirates. While it is a negative that HMG doesn’t see the value in 13 “full strength” T26s, it is more honest to just order 8 and tell the design team to come up with something more like what we grew up thinking frigates are. You say “frigate” to me, and I think “Leander class”. Versatile, not very big, massively replicable.
The reduction in defence estate was already expected since the NAO report into MoD financial integrity and at 30% actually undershoots (IIRC) the 50% mentioned when NAO were circling.
TD is a bit gloomy, I wonder if it is the lack of announcements about equipment mounted in shipping containers in SDSR 2015?
A surprisingly solid review with some amusing traps laid for Corbyn and the SNP via sneaky inaccurate leaks prior to release.
I agree the five light frigates are a bit nebulous and on reflection is certainly associated with the prevarication over T26 (design issues going on NAB’s dark mutterings over the years – OK I believe you now NAB). Certainly stopping equipment fit creep will be a challenge if they come to fruition. But heck I bet they will have a modular bay with plenty of space for shipping containers so hopefully some things to cheer you TD when concept pictures start slipping out.
I can’t shake the suspicion that the 5 light frigates are already being built, with the last 2 hulls announced just today…
Nice summary, TD. Finished on a good thought, too.
One thing is certain, Seedcorn personnel with VX-1 and VP-30 are probably having liquid celebrations at the moment!
How am I being gloomy, thought I was being optimisitc
Well read the document twice. Because it has holes in it. How can you have 2 Stiker Brigades based on Ajax when it can not self deploy by road. If he meant the US Stryker Brigades then Ajax is only going to get bought in enough quantities for 2 Regiments for the 2 armoured Brigades and the 8×8 replacement should get the Ajax turret placed on a number to provide 2 8×8 Cavalry to support 8×8 MIV plus indirect fire support, can you bolt 105mm artillery on one ? No fire from vehicle anti tank weapon which is a big must for this type of organisation. Finally talk of 6 Brigades left in light role ? So we presumeone of the Armoured Brigades makes up one Strike Brigade and 1 of either the 51st or 7th of the adaptable brigades with the Adaptable Forces logistics to help out and back fill the missing elelments of 16 Air mobile Brigade and 3 Cdo Brigade.
As I say it also leave 56 Challengers swinging in the breeze which at the level of 168 deployable MBT we can not loose another 56, maybe kept to up gun a striker brigade to deploy to Eastern Europe in a Nato Emergency ?
To many holes, to many questions and ripping up Army 2020 to boot which I felt always was away with the fairies. And where are the extra Merlin’s coming from in total 6 squadrons with 2 back with the army, finally only 3 Chinook Squadrons have we learnt nothing from Afghanistan or were we over provided with Helicopters ?
I look forward to the detail coming out from the Army with some detail with interest.
Not much to criticise today, indeed many very positive moves. Seems a pretty thorough job. Some questions remain (Argus perhaps) and some of the timelines are fairly extended but I guess that’s a consequence of it being the longer term view. Let’s face it SDSR 2020 (and even SDSR 2025) can still influence some key projects, e.g. T26 / F35. T26 at 8 would really confirm where most of us, heart of hearts, knew it would end up. That still leaves us with 14 task group escorts, plus at least 5 and hopefully a few move ‘light frigates’. Some of this seems quite ‘French’ – move to a 2 (or even 3) tier navy, the army structure. Don’t think that’s a bad thing
Are the P8’s definately going to Lossie? Its more of a Fast Jet base with it’s HAS’s though i remember the good old days of visiting to see the Shackletons. Kinloss is fully equipped for dealing with Large MPA’s, The RAF Fire Service were still there and active last time I checked and when Virgin were looking for a spaceport they were told by the MOD Kinloss was not available. I cant see them keeping it long term for a few hundred squaddies that are there at the moment??
To accentuate the positive: all these wretched Amazonas class patrol ships can be offered up for salami slicing in future Defence Reviews ;)
@TD
The people are everything in the end. Without their commitment and contribution every bit of kit is just steel and plastic.
I am curious what anyone thinks would have come from an MPA competition. A competition for what exactly? With what competitors? If what you wanted was a full fledged MPA then you only had one real option. One could make a theoretical argument that the P-1 was a viable contender but we aren’t even sure it was officially offered. Plus you would spend a few years determining that buying something with bespoke parts from Japan for a couple billion is quite the leap for a first international transaction. Everything else is a non starter from a cost standpoint.
In short if you determine the requirement is for something as capable or close to it as the P-8/Nimrod was supposed to be then you have little need for a competition unless you seriously consider the P-1. Nothing else is viable. Hence not having a competition.
An analysis of alternatives on the other hand makes sense but hardly had to be done publicly. The MOD almost certainly looked at less capable and hybrid capabilities. It decided not to go that way.
A competition with the existing choices seems a horrid waste of money.
Maybe Lossiemouth will be the forward base and they will go back to Waddington or wherever else for maintenance…
People talking about Leanders being light frigates are going to get a shock. By the time you’ve put a Merlin capable flightdeck, a Lynx hangar (at minimum), an MCG of some sort, an SSGW battery and SeaCeptor or similar, decent (5000nm plus) endurance, plus some seaboats and say berths for 120 people at DS02-107, with stability to DS02-109 and built to LR NS2 notation, you’ll be at 130m and 17m beam – north of 5000te deep. Nothing less than that will be deployable as part of any TG. We will be going round this buoy again – although the mention of a shipbuilding strategy paper to be published next year is intriguing – shot across BAES bows? It was interesting that there was no mention of MHC that I found – at all.
There are no extra Merlins or Merlin squadrons nor are any going to the Army – it’s just where 845/846NAS sit as part of JHC. Grey Merlin badges today are 814/820/824 and 829 and Junglie Merlin are 845/846.
Manning remains the issue. An uplift of 700 total is unlikely to fix the retention issues unless something more is done.
Overall, we knew it wasn’t going to be too bad, given the 2% funding pledge and it could have been worse – at least the ambition to do more is there. Got to say it’s largely (P8 excepted) a do minimum and spin it to the max exercise, but look to Wednesday for what it could have been like had defence been unprotected……
“….degree of involvement/interference from HM Treasury, if the MoD could make savings, the MoD could bank the money and reinvest it in whatever capabilities it saw fit. ”
Saw fit ??? yet other reports are saying for the Trident replacement the Treasury is trying to push the MoD totally out of the picture as they think Treasury and its flunkies are the only ones who can manage the cost.
Seems only fair that if treasury runs the show that 3-5 senior level treasury people should be physically present in the submarine at all times. Chancellor should stand by the hatch on the first deep dive test.
Ginge.
3 Chinook Squadrons are the current level. No cut and in fact 14 extra are being received to part mitigate the loss of 28 Merlin leaving the RAF and going to 845/846 NAS to replace the Junglies.
RAF will have around 60 Chinook which is a very good total. Not sure how many will be in front line use but there will be some extra robustness with an old Merlin unit, 28, becoming joint Puma/Chinook OCU, taking the training role away from the 3 front line squadrons.
Thats must be a mistake in the graphics. The Merlin HC4 is the Royal marine version, 25 of which are being converted out 28 used by RAF. The graphic should show it in the maritime section.
The RN recieved 44 HM1 of which 42 remained and 30 with an option for 8 upgraded to HM2
Still leaves open the future of SeaKing ASC7? next year is out of service for the ‘king. So maybe the upgrade of the leftover HM1 ?
Life extension of 14 airframes ???
Its the Hercules C-130J, it only was delivered to RAF just before 2000 and even then sat on the ground for a while. This sort of plane has a ‘life’ of over 40 years in normal military use. Yes there is some software upgrades being done- badly as usual by LM- since about 2012.
“he Hercules about to restart flight tests for the British was first fitted out as a trial kit installation aircraft for Block 7 in 2012. But following a flight to Lockheed Martin facilities in the US, the machine was marooned for around two years for technical reasons and eventually returned to Britain without undertaking the tests that would have triggered the production phase of the Block 7 update for the Royal Air Force.
A British MoD spokesman said the aircraft was returned to Britain after “the UK Block 7 trial kit installation aircraft underwent a graduated release to test flight process and subsequently returned to the UK under a Qinetiq airworthiness release.”- Defensenews.com
Mirrors the shambles over the Chinook but at least it only involved one airframe
@RoundTower
The reason warships toodle round chasing drug runners and pirates is because when there isn’t a war, there isn’t much else for them to do. Or do you wish to store them in mothballs and crew them with conscripts grabbed off the streets by press gangs when there is a need? If a battleship was all you had, in times other than war, it would probably be doing something similar too, navies can’t afford to have idle ships.
Well they are getting more OPV just for the low intensity roles in Caribbean, Med, Somalia etc.
The river class OPV are at about 2000t deep. or the Echo class hydrographic vessels are just under 4000t deep which seem to be more of a ‘spy ship’ role.
You cannot do a decent frigate on a leander hull anymore, that was established in the late 80s when the T23 was being formulated.
Lot of nothing:
1. Scrap plans for 5 T-26 to pay for 9 Nimrod replacements. Not sure if that’s a great trade off.
2. Get obsolete Typhoons out of the barn to form two brand spanking new squadrons. Wow. BoB flight just got a lot bigger.
3. Junk all Tornado’s before replacements in service. Fast jets numbers to get even smaller.
4. Insufficient sailors to man even the shrunk fleet.
5. Speed up F-35 orders from really painfully slow to just painfully slow. When will there be enough to fill the QE i.e. 36-40? Maybe 2030? 2040?
6. Meaningless Army reorg that reduces numbers available for deployment. Hints of future 8×8 to enable organic deployment. Against who? Putin’s hordes with hundreds of MBT’s? Isis with their Toyota pickups? Presumably French vehicles because sucking up to them might help the EEC renegotiation.
7. Typhoon retirement pushed to the right. But some might get the new radar. Or the ability to fire weapons that the Tonka can already shoot.
8. Scrap Ocean and refit davits to PoW to create the most expensive LPH in history.
9. Keep on obsolete Hercules for SF because the A400 can’t parachute stuff very well.
10. New seats in an air tanker for Dave & Lizzie.
End result. Smallest army for hundreds of years. Smallest air force ever. Smallest navy since they rowed into action.
In face of most imminent threat in 50 years.
Grade F.
How about Veantor 110 for the new frigate?
Defence news seems to be indicating a 1 year delay on T26 with first steel cut in 2017.
Combing NSS and SDSR was a slight mistake; it would have been better to have 2 separate documents detailing Security, and Strategy.
It is strategic to the extent that this is protecting the neoliberal capitalist world order with the military as a part, not centre of it.
@RT
I expect Carribbean patrols to be performed by the Batch 2s, however unsuitable that might be. Frees up RFA and RN ships.
There is so much about your summary that has false assumptions:
Hercules arent obsolete: these are the latest C-130J model, still with 20 years or so life left in them. Turbo prop haulers arent high tech platforms
The Typhoons they are retaining are Tr1. These are barely 15 years old some only, for an airframe that was designed for 30 years. They can operate very capably as air to air , which was designed in, plus there were expensively tested out to operate most air to ground weapons except the longer range guided types. There only limitations in a practical sense are they are ‘multi-role’ rather than the later Tr. which are ‘swing-role’. Anyway they are likey to stay as UK air defence primarily.
There is no spin about whats happened to the RAF, this is a major capability uplift:
14 additional transports over what was previously planned
A medium-term doubling of the Reaper fleet
9 x P-8 plus protection of the entire ISTAR fleet (accept Sentinel come the early 2020s- which is still vague)
And most significantly, a fast ket force structure 50% larger than the previously planned trough
Some people granting “Grade F” clearly haven’t checked the details.
That new frigate raises more questions than it answers. It suggests T26 is now regarded as too expensive to provide 13 hulls. The phrase general purpose suggests someone has a modernised T23 in mind as a concept (smaller T26 with less VLS cells and no mission bay)- time will tell but it feels like the kind of thing that becomes a problem down the line.
I hope the shipbuilding strategy is a short across BAE’s bows, they need it.
On the whole I think the MoD has come out of the SDSR quite well, in fact better than expected. The level of spin was as expected as well, using smoke and mirrors to hide the fact that whilst there appear to be no major reductions this time around their are not any substantial gains. Overall the main issue I have is the timeframe for most of what has been announce to actually enter service. The majority will be post 2020 and a substantial part 2025, and a lot can change between then and now. So what have we got;
RAF.
The RAF appears to have done quite well and in fact should be celebrating. However it is going to have to come to terms with the fact that it is going to have to base its operational plans around the Typhoon for at least a decade as the number of F-35s planned initially are going to be utilised by the QEs if the increased carrier strike aspiration is to be achieved, Yes the F-35s would be available if truly needed but at most levels of operations against realistic threats the Typhoon will be more than capable, assuming that the investment in its capabilities continues. Of particular interest is whether any modification work will be carried out on the Tranche 1 airframes being used to form the 2 new squadrons or will they be used simply as is? Overhauling and retaining 14 C-130Js is a big plus. This will allow the A400 to be used as trash haulers whist the C-130 are used for more specialised roles for which they are a more mature platform with a know developmental path. Expanding the roles of the C-17 fleet would be a bonus if possible, maybe to give the SF an their support units a more timely and greater reach. The MPA buy is the correct one in my opinion. Concerns regarding in flight refuelling should be easily met as fitting the P-8 with a probe would benefit Boeing in the medium to long term. One area that is of concern is the lack of a development path for the RAF’s E-3D fleet up to its OSD, but then again look at how we kept using the Shackleton and its level of capability!
RN
Going against the grain I have been a fan of the C1/C2/C3 idea since it was first discussed. Yes in an ideal world we would have a multitude of top of the line surface combatants, but the Admiralty’s determination to only have the best has led to the fleet shrinking year on year, aggravated by reductions in manpower. This had become a chicken and egg scenario, less ships therefore less personnel, less personnel therefore less ships. Most NATO navies have a two tier fleet with regards to combat vessels, even the USN with its Perry class FFGs and now the LCS, though their idea of affordable is unique to them. What the MoD must avoid is trying to design the planned “Light Frigate” to be a C1 light, trying to incorporate too many capabilities. The RN will have to accept that this platform will not be a fully fledged fleet escort, though able to operate as part of the CVBG or ARG. Its role will be similar to those in service with the French and Italian navies. So the RN/MoD must get its head around this in order not to repeat the FSC/T-26 mess. If it fails to do so then it is quite a possibility these additional platforms will not materialise and the RN will be down to 14 platforms.
Army.
The headline “Strike” Brigades seem to be a result of the fact we have ordered all the lovely new Ajax family of vehicles and are trying to work out what to do with them. As has been talked about often, these lack the strategic mobility of their predecessor platform the CVR(T), but it appear planners at the MoD seem to think anything lighter than a Challenger 2 is readily deployable! These 2 Strike Brigades should be retitles “Striker” Brigades and be based solely on variants of whatever platform is chosen for the MIV. It has been stated that the MIV will become the core of the Army and I agree with that. Unfortunately the Army’s procurement budget has now the ball and chain called Ajax sucking up most of its funding for the next decade and they are buying too many. At most we need sufficient for two Recce/Cavalry Regiments (100-120) and for the integral Recce formations within the Armoured and Armoured Infantry Regiments (50-60). Obviously this would increase unit costs so I would also use the platform to replace the Warrior (240-260) in the IFV role and the FV430 series in place of the Warrior ABSV (100-120). This would require the funding outstanding from the WCIP and ABSV being retasked plus some additional funding but it would recapitalise the Army’s tracked AFV fleet. With the exception of an IFV variant most roles could be filled by variant of the Ajax family already developed. The Challenger LEP needs only be enough to keep it relevant until its OSD and should be a minor expense in the larger scheme of things, so will probably take place under the radar as there would be no major PR gain from publicity.
So I am pleasantly surprised on the whole by the SDSR, though I hope there will be some positive tweaking over coming years.
A classic TDism appears:
“Unfortunately the Army’s procurement budget has now the ball and chain called Ajax sucking up most of its funding for the next decade and they are buying too many.”
You have no idea if any of thats true, the second half almost certainly isn’t.
The long term future of Typhoon Tranche 1 was one of the many things left unsaid, it will clearly be around in 2030 but whats its upgrade path? Whats its new OSD?
I was wondering whether they would be looking at more of the OPV as an alternative. All you have to do is re-name them Corvettes and Jo Public will be suitably impressed. Indeed you are making the case for smaller warships for many needs
http://www.army.mod.uk/news/28058.aspx
How to congratulate yourself–rename your title from “Commander Land Forces” to “Commander Field Army” knowing your control a darn small army with oh! “Strike Brigades” !!!!
In other new (or so some of your might have guessed)
https://britisharmedforcesreview.wordpress.com/2015/11/24/nss-and-sdsr-2015-my-review-of-the-military-context/
Military context only. Strategy to come later…
we were always going to order just eight T26 in the first go. This is in itself uncontroversial.
while i am extremely aware of T45 problem (12 > 8 > 6), is there any REAL indication that T26 9-12/13 won’t be ordered in a follow-on?
is a light frigate the MHC, is it an amalgam of MHC and the batch3+ Rivers, or is it recognition that T26 9-12/13 will be decisively less capable in their equipment?
We don’t know what the light frigate is, the phrase general purpose suggests something like a modernised T23 in concept- but who knows at this stage.
At the moment the RN operates 3 Merlin Mk2 Squadrons with 30 helicopters and 1 Sea King ASAC7 Squadron. When the Sea Kings go there is every likelihood hat the additional 8 Merlin Mk1s will get upgraded to replace them.
@Hohum
Will tranche 1 Typhoons really be around until 2030 (except in the OCU)?
If we’ve got 2 frontline F-35B Squadrons by 2023 it’s not really fanciful to see another 2 set up by 2026 or so and that would mean he withdrawal of the early Typhoons from frontline service. Anyway that’s an issue for SDSR 2020.
What a gloomy bunch :-)
Cheer up atleast we have some new shinny toys and dozens of new online arguments to look forward to. I’m still particularly interested in what capabilities the zephyr style HALE uav is going to have. Can’t be much payload capability for a solar powered aircraft but the ability to sit still 80,000 ft above the ground offers emense potential for ISTAR.
@TD
I see in the above review you talk about 42 F-35Bs by 2023. Is this based on this article http://aviationweek.com/defense/uk-buy-138-f-35s-will-boost-fighter-squadrons or have you another source?
Just checked back to the detail of the UK RAF Tranche 1 capability.:
Full DASS and missile approach warning, direct voice input, Pirate FLIR/IRST, towed radar decoy, laser warning receiver,
The AAW missile is AIM120-C5
The Air to ground capability is : 2000lb GBU-10, 1000lb GBU-16, 1000lb paveway II and enchanced P2 ( all laser guided bombs). The LDP is Rafael litening III
What they havent got for air to ground ( TR.2 and later) seems to be Paveway IV , EGBU-16 ( PW II, dual capable). Standoff weapons such as Storm Shadow and Taurus. As well the meteor missile(AAW). This was tentative at time this information went to press back in mid 2005 or so.
AndyC,
Thats one of the unmentioned in the review. The resuscitation of the 138 number implies that there is at least a tentative desire to pursue the replace of, at least, the Tranche 1 Typhoons sometime after 2025 with F-35s. Which would make sense but it isn’t said.
The 42 number was leaked over the weekend and appeared in several places.
An idea of what the Army might do:
2 Armoured Infantry Brigades each made up of 2 Armoured Regiments (including the reserve Wessex Yeomanry), 1 Ajax Cavalry Regiment and 3 Warrior Infantry Battalions
2 Strike Brigades each made up of 1 Ajax Cavalry Regiment, 1 Jackal Cavalry Regiment and 3 MIV Infantry Battalions
This uses the same number of Armoured Regiments (4 including the reserve regiment) and Cavalry Regiments (3 Ajax reaction and 3 Jackal adaptable now 4 Ajax and 2 Jackal) as Army 2020 but with just one extra Ajax Cavalry and one fewer Jackal Cavalry. There would also be 6 Warrior infantry battalions and 6 MIV infantry battalions instead of 6 Warrior, 3 Mastiff and 3 light infantry battalions in the reaction/deployable force.
This ‘change’ would then leave 19 Infantry Battalions in a smaller adaptable force compared to the 22 in the most recent version of Army 2020.
If I’m right it means that Army 2025 isn’t actually so different from Army 2020 after all!
It’s not just you, it’s all over this and other defence fora, and it’s doing my head in. It’s lose not loose.
http://www.ross.net/notes/loose.shtml
The government was never going to place an order for thirteen Type 26, even if thirteen was their long-term plan; it would be looking too far ahead for something delivered in multiple units over many years.
Whether the Navy gets five light frigates, five GP T26, five OPV, or bugger all after the ASW ships is totally out of the hands of this government. The PM might as well have claimed that there would be a further order for the five GP Type 26 just to avoid giving the SNP something to whinge about – leave some future government to explain the downgrade to corvettte.
UK ship design seems to be a better industry to be in than UK ship building. Why commission bespoke designs and then only build six, eight, five?
If the Navy needs a cheaper frigate after the eight ordered, why can’t they simply leave out a bunch of VLS cells and the ASW suite? Half the T26 seems to be a big empty shed, and even a basic frigate will have a gun, Harpoon (or whatever’s next), and SeaCeptor, plus minor weapons, decoys, and CIWS; so how much money can actually be saved with a new frigate design while still producing a ship that remains a competent frigate? It sounds like expensively and unnecessarily designing out features that can simply be left off further T26 for zero cost, and done at a time when Type 26 production costs will be as low as they are likely to get.
@ Brian black
The Danes did a fair bit on a budget.
http://intercepts.defensenews.com/2014/11/sleek-modern-and-built-on-a-budget-denmarks-latest-frigate/
Going for Diesel engines will save a packet which will make the ship terrible for ASW and probably mean it can’t be part of a carrier strike task force but then that’s what the 8 T26 are for.
It doesn’t take a rocket scientist to work out that the light general purpose frigate is a fiscal crutch designed to absorb the increased cost of Trident renewal in the late 2020s/early 2030s without having to admit to a cut in escort hull numbers in this parliament.
One wonders if the hope is that Trident renewal gets cheaper (the current policy seems to be to kitchen sink it) and T26 gets cheaper at the end of the run, combined with economic expansion, allowing the light general purpose frigate to just become more Type 26s. But at this point the objective is probably balancing the long-term equipment plan.
People and Estate: I rather fear that the Royal Military School of Music (RMSM) at Kneller Hall in Whitton may become a casualty. It is a Grade 2 listed building with 10 acres of ground in Greater London worth about 10 million? In addition the teaching staff are all MOD civil servants.
Rationalization of Bands: Army Bands no longer seem to make sense to me. Guards bands are fully manned and have a high, and well deserved profile at home and abroad. Others like REME and QUEENS(M) are only about ten musicians strong. Would it not be more efficient for the Corps of Army Music (CAMUS) to adopt the Royal Marines Band Service (RMBS) model and have regional bands all of a high military band standard instead of a pick and mix stack of symphonic wind bands, brass bands, pop groups, marching bands etc? There is also the question of operational role. RMBS are trained combat medics. CAMUS are not although I understand that they have a role in Field Hospitals re CBRN.
As military music is military music why not have a purple HQ for all Service bands rather than have Kneller Hall for CAMUS, Wellington Barracks for Guards Bands, and Portsmouth for the RMBS. Portsmouth also has the Royal Marines School of Music, again staffed by MOD civilian instructors.
Recommendation: I would sell Kneller Hall and merge the Royal Marines School of Music with the RMSM in Portsmouth.
Surprised at the amount of negativity from some here. Everyone would have taken this last week when all were in fear over what the next round of cuts may bring.
John Carter, agree with Kneller Hall and often wondered how it survives and what it brings to defending this nation or projecting its military capability abroad. Reminds me of the fuss in the mid 90’s over the closure of the School of Music at deal. Who gives a stuff? Unless Kneller has some covert role then close the place.
RAF Woodvale is another that springs to mind, and Henlow and Linton.
Brian just posted exactly what I was going to ask re T26 vs light frigate. I know almost nothing about this stuff and have started lurking on a few forums to try and learn. One of the mantras I’ve seen trotted out quite a few times in a few forums when discussing ships is “steel and air is cheap, it’s the systems that are expensive” so like Brian my thoughts were why not use the T26 hull design with a far lower level of systems fit? That would also presumably reduce crewing levels (would it?) which I’m sure is a big factor as well.
Apart from not needing a totally new design and having the production capabilities up and running it could also (I assume) offer the opportunity for upgrades to full T26 spec if changing circumstances required it.
I’d be very interested in knowing why the above is a silly/non-viable approach (if it is).
The exceptions to this for me concerning establishments and defence usefulness are the 3 officer training sites BRNC, Cranwell and Sandhurst, and the assorted elements of the Houshold Division and associated barracks with royal functions. To me these are sites of international standing and national importance concerning the heritage of this nation and should be kept.
To have 22 Army bands in an 82,000 strong army is a nonsense, for them to have a school on a majorly prime London site is ridiculous. Drastic cuts needed, and if a school is needed then see if any private music colleges fancy a military annexe.
I have a couple of questions on the SDSR
The table has 8 Shadows – Wiki says there are only 6 at the moment….are we getting 2 more (I thought they were on the chopping list once out of Afghanistan??)
Selling off 30% of the built estate?! 30%?? Where is all this unnecessary estate? Is it empty or are they going to be cramming more and more onto super-bases?
ChrisM, as I understand it, yes, two more and bringing the sixth into full service
Reports of increased crews for E-3D and a modernisation programme to start in 2020 as well. The RAF really is the winner here.
ChrisM
5 at present, plus 1 unconverted, with 14 Squadron. Yes hopefully we are! Unless it is a typo.
Seems government has woken up at how important ISTAR is, and now the RAF has a useful suite of ISTAR assets across 6 squadrons we should keep them, not chuck away the built up capability.
As for bases, there are hundreds of MoD sites still. Much has already been sold, so I think there is only so much one can still dispose of. Yes, MoD already announced in 2010 SDSR the army would be concentrated on fewer “Super Barracks” while the RAF has already reduced its number of stations considerably.
Problem with this that needs to be balanced is with the worry now over terror attacks and mentions of deploying the army en masse to respond to multiple terror attacks the military probably needs to keep a wide enough footprint nationwide rather than going to too few sites. Thus there are several army barracks housing but a single Infantry Battalion, such as Chepstow, Chester, Preston, Tern Hill, etc, which could be closed to save money but they represent a useful regional presence.
I am against closing Naval Bases and RAF Stations due to the associated infrastructure like runways, links to GPSS, etc that would cost an absolute fortune to create again if needed in future due to some emerging major threat. So I myself am more in favour of closing barracks rather than these sites. Indeed many RAF airfields have been taken over by the army since Options for Change 1991.
hmm worrying point, but why didn’t they simply go whole hog and buy proper corvettes BAE has the design? Camm, Hanger, Helo, gun, I know the RN were a but scared of getting less T26 if they could make do with a light Frigate C3 style, well guess what that is what they are getting! Bit worried T26 will now only be anti sub and no deep strike? Back to T45 for TLAM? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khareef-class_corvette like a modern day T21?
Agree. Good isn’t it. :-)
A modernised T23 is a T26, they are an ASW vessel that is also used for General Purpose roles, with the TAS only fitted to 8 vessels.
The new light frigate to me will be the T26 hull, probably with some revisions based on experience with the vessel, retaining the mission bay and helicopter capabilities, retaining the VLS, main gun and radar. It will lose the TAS and ASW kit, it will also lose the noise reduction requirement, this means the pipe systems can be done far cheaper and also it will mean all the equipment won’t need to be individually mounted for noise which will save a lot and free up space.
This will also allow all the lessons learned from T26 can be learnt and filtered into the new design.
ET,
Not really. T26 has the added luxury of the mission bay, Chinook capable helo-pad, 28 CAMM cells and 28 Mk.41 versus 32 CAMM and 8 x Harpoon and considerable space for additional personnel above the usual complement.
Scale back those extras and you could build something smaller- though not necessarily much cheaper.
And if you sacrifice the ASW kit whats the point?
Edit; 48 CAMM cells, 24 Mk.41 in T26
France does much of what we want with the La Fayette Class, it is a 3,600 ton vessel full load. Go for CODAD with the new design and drop the idea of keeping up with a task group imho.
Personally I think the frigate plan is sound. We haven’t needed our navy for anything challenging in probably 30 years, we don’t even know if the current generation of weapons even work, because they have never been used in anything other than tests. Combine that with there being no serious threats currently on the horizon, that would need us to use our navy and their top end hardware (I don’t see Russia as a serious threat, more an annoyance).
Should we need a task force, we have some of the best destroyers in the world and will have a reasonable number of anti-sub frigates to protect our crown jewels in the carriers and f35s
However the number of low intensity threats have never been higher, with the raise in piracy and people smuggling.
So it makes sense to save money by building cheaper vessels to handle these lower intensive tasks and at the same time retain a core of effective vessels in case we have missed a threat. Ideally ensuring the low intensity vessels are designed to be operated with lower manpower.
“we don’t even know if the current generation of weapons even work, because they have never been used in anything other than tests”
Priceless.
@ DM – no need to sell Sandhurst, just sell Northolt, it’s probably worth enough to Pay for the successor program. Seriously a country that has refused to spend a few tens of millions for a decent VIP transport aircraft is at the same time prepared to keep a very large chunk of some of the most expensive land in the world to transport VIP’s makes no sense.
The MOD should have to justify every bit of land and building it has inside the M25 and it should have significantly less than it does. I don’t think we can continue to rely on tradition to justify keeping such buildings. If they are protected buildings they will continue to be so even if turned into flats.
“At the moment the RN operates 3 Merlin Mk2 Squadrons with 30 helicopters and 1 Sea King ASAC7 Squadron. When the Sea Kings go there is every likelihood hat the additional 8 Merlin Mk1s will get upgraded to replace them.”
No. They. Don’t. Look up 814/820/824 and 829NAS. Do not translate faulty understanding of current force structure, compared with the JF2025 graphic to equal a fantasy about the HM1.
Not that I disagree that more cabs are going to be required to maintain both an ASW and ASaC capability. I suspect that one of the four squadrons is going to have to transition to be the ASaC capability parent sqn. Just can’t translate that into the orphan 8 – particularly as their foldy bits are going on the HC3i cabs. It would be cheaper to buy new frames off the line…
Thanks for info on Shadow. I thought they were quite specific for use in Afghanistan and a bit small for use without local deployment? I understand they are particularly secret but roughly what are they for going forward? Do they deploy to places like Mali and Nigeria? Or are they taking over the Northolt Islanders role and snooping about over the UK for GCHQ?
Re needing regional bases for domestic deployments – isn’t that partly what the Reserve estate is for? That is protected space in towns and cities all over the country.
I agree about getting rid of airfields being short termist, hence I like them being taken over by Army units in a way that keeps the runways either usable or quickly restorable (and presumably helps fast/discrete movement of the troops based there if necessary)
Would be a bit reluctant to get rid of Northolt. I know it is hardly secret, but at least it is MOD owned – keeping a military airfield close to the centre of government seems rather sensible for discrete movements and rapid deployments
Whatever the Light Frigate is, it won’t be a T26 hull. The clue is in the word “light”. T26 is something north of 6500te light, 8000te deep and nudging 9000 at end of life. That is what is scaring people – partly because of the huge number of VSO who “know” how much a ship costs just by looking at the full load displacement and partly because of the way the BAE cost model works.
That means, in order to make it politically (as opposed to technically) “affordable” you have to take weight out. If you take weight out, that hullform will float higher in the water – which given the peculiarities of the hullform will make it significantly less stable through reduced waterplane. Meantime – a lot of the weight removed will have come from both above and below the ships CofG, which will leave it largely where it is, compounding the issue. That means you have to start changing the principal dimensions, which means it’s a new design.
That new design will have to have a number of things to make it acceptable to the RN as a warfighting (as opposed to peacetime patrol) asset (what the Rivers are allegedly for). It will need an MCG (choice Mk45 Mod4 as per T26 or something smaller – likely an OTO 76 with associated ammo / support cost). It will need a self defence capability that has common DLOD with the rest of the fleet (so SeaCeptor then) and it will probably need some sort of SCG (ASCG or CIWS), plus some decoys. It will need a couple of boats, probably a hull mounted sonar and likely an SSGW battery. Plus a range of RN comms. Plus a Merlin-capable deck (25m ) and at least a Wildcat-sized hangar (15m) if its going to deploy as a singleton (not much use if it’s not). Then its going to need accommodation for about 120 bodies to RN standards (DS02-107), long endurance (5000nm plus), COLPRO, RN shock, NATO/RN stability, MARPOL-compliant bunker arrangements, LR NS2 Class notation or similar. After the debacle of the T45, you’re going to want a reliable propulsion system – but if you say CODAD that probably means 4 propulsion diesels and 4 generators, which means more machinery spaces and more length. Want to save that? Then use electrickery – but that adds electric motors – big ones if you want speeds in the mid 20s and beyond. Which you do for fleet work. And I haven’t even mentioned a land attack VLS…..
That is not a Khareef – or anything like it – but is not exactly what you’d call a “gold-plated” ship. When you add all that up it will come to at least 5000te, more when you allow for through-life growth. At which point, you’ll find that a weight-based cost model will start telling people its more than the VSO expectation and the VSO will say that its unaffordable because its bigger than a T23.
This conversation will occur in approximately two years, possibly three.
Again going back to the PM’s words and the document the 5 “Light” frigates are not going to be built on he T26 Hull which as far as I am aware is already comming in at over 8,000 Tonne and north of £750m each. In no shape or form can that be considered a “light” vessel.
We should look at 28 Mk41 Cells (quad pack Camm in to them if you want) which should allow Local Airdefence/the New US ASM in the Mk41 and other missiles , plus a hanger and hello deck for 1. Lynx with dipping sonar, anti sub torpedos fitted as it will be the ships only true anti submarine equipment, empty mission deck under the Helicopter Deck for Ribs or Anti Mine warefare equipment. It should come in at under £350m a piece and be under 4,000t , crew of 100 max, Using Diesel/Electric propolsion, Range 10,000km, speed max 30knots. Ability to be networked to a T26/T45 to allow those ships to use it’s weapons, using their sensors.
But this is the problem. It is again more jam tomorrow approach. Can BAe build something cheap, can the Navy except something that is not as silent as a whisper and can do 35knots, doesn’t have a flight deck that is huge etc etc.
My own view is they can’t get there heads around it. Plus the design cost will be 6 times the build cost knowing BAe, there are plenty of designs out there, buy the rights to one and just knock them out in Scotland.
On the light frigate.
If it were to be armed with 24 CAMS, a 5′ gun (lighter than 4′.5 of T23), Merlin capable flight deck and a Wildcat capable hanger, with a hull-mount sonar, a 20 mm CIWS, 2 triple AS turpedos, 27kt dash speed and 6000 nm range, as well as smart-s 3D rader and ship-torpedo-defence-system, IT IS the RNZN Anzac frigate modernization plan (TeKaha & TeMana). It weights < 4000t FL with still good weight margine to equip several SSMs.
Thus, if you omit GT (reduced dash speed to 25kt), introduce automation to reduce crew numbers, omit CIWS, and let the ASW noise as it is, there is a good change to have a <4000t FL GP light frigate.
It will be better to have a Merlin capable hanger, thus the weight will be somewhere around 4000-4200t FL? If you host a Merlin, the frigate will become a limited ASW asset, which will escort the "secondary flottila" such as South Georgia island task group in the Falklands war.
Since the light frigate is there to compensate for T26s cost increase (everything so hi-end), it must be designed to be much cheaper, say, about a half or 2/3 at most ot a T26.
These figures also shows that the RNZN would be a potential customer for 2 (or 3) light frigates, as well as Malaysian navy (Lekiu replacements).
Alternatively, more "cheaper" option will be a modified Khareef class, which is just a patrol frigate and will not be a task group member.
Although a bit fantasy, and I agree it is too early to talk about this (it is way far at late 2020s to start build), this is my "wish list" for the light frigates.
The entire thing screams 5,000 ton ASW/GP frigate in the same mold as Type 23. I fail to see how its going to end up significantly cheaper than a T26 when its going to need many of the same systems.
As I said above, it looks like a fiscal crutch to absorb the Trident renewal cost in the equipment plan without having to cut a frigate.
Odds that in practice the “Five or more” purchased will just be Type 26’s sans ASW kit?
@NaB
To the best of my knowledge 814/820 and 829 NAS are frontline squadrons with 9 Merlin Mk2s in each. 824 NAS is the training unit with 3 Merlin Mk2s and some Mk4s.
Judging by other aircraft and helicopter types the infographic only includes frontline units. So we currently have 3 Squadrons.
849 NAS currently operates 9-10 Sea Kings which are due to retire in 2018. According to the Royal Navy website at that point the Squadron will transition to Merlin Mk2s, see http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/news/2014/december/11/141210-849-nas-deploys
While there is no guarantee that these Merlin’s aren’t simply being transferred from the three existing frontline Squadrons it is my belief that they’ll be the 8 Mark 1s currently that were in service until a few years ago.
Agreed the SDSR is not as bad as feared & has some good in it, but some random thoughts.
The successor SSBN is being put back 5 years. Is that for financial or technical reasons? How do we keep submarine building skills going? Will we need an Astute no 8 to fill the gap?
F-35. I think they only come right with the block 4a software & block 1 engine upgrade. They will not be available until 2019-20. Is it 24 or 42 by 2023 for the UK? Which one is a typo?
For a light frigate, we could look at the Damen OPV 2600, a 103m ship with Sea Axe bow, or the Rolls Royce corvette design for Poland.
T26. I agree with the 8 ASW, but I would also want 6 of the AAW version BAE proposed.
Plus a general rant about the lack of anything on how the UK pays its way in the world. Where is the thought out plan for boosting UK factories, food production & energy security?
On Successor slipping right could this be a consequence of some of the “V” boats now requiring to be refuelled? Having taken the cost to put a new reactor on HMS Vanguard it presumably it means the fleet as a whole will last longer? And sadly I don’t think this gives time for “Astute 8”, simply that they will spend longer of the trials and commissioning of the new SSBN. Some of the cost inflation of Successor is presumably simply inflation from the programme being pushed back. The provision of a large contingency buffer is no bad thing at this stage. Some of that may yet come back to the rest of Defence as the programme matures.
On F35 numbers it’s presumably 42 purchased to generate 24 front line ready and embarked, the balance of 18 being the UK contribution to OEU and OCU.
I would imagine 617 will stand up in 2018 to start training with less mature airframes, and declare some sort of IOC around 2020 in the Fleet Air Defence role. As newer airframes get delivered the original ones will be downgraded to OCU and eventually sent back to the factory for upgrade. Worst case in 2023 is that we have one squadron at FOC and one still at IOC.
Your knowledge is incorrect. None of the Grey Merlin units has nine cabs, nor are there any Mk4s in existence yet. Funnily enough, 824 has seven cabs at the minute, more than any other Grey Merlin unit – all HM2.
I wouldn’t discriminate between operational and training units in the infographic personally – you’ll note there are two Wildcat squadrons – one of which will be 825 and the other (I suspect) the training unit. 847NAS will be under Army/JHC with the other CHF squadrons.
“The reference points clearly being Russia and assorted militant muslims respectively. ”
Yes, with the current strategy appearing to be arming and training Muslim militants in Syria, while demonising the Russians who are actually fighting them.
@Observer,
As an outsider looking in – why not….why can’t you keep the big expensive stuff in mothballs with maybe a single big expensive type at sea and then rotate crews through the big stuff and the ‘little stuff’ (that is actually at sea all the time).
Andy C
Common sense may indicate that we need more Merlin Mk2, but is there any solid indication (a) that MoD agrees or (b) where MoD might see them come from?
How trivial would it be for AW to knock out half a dozen new ones? Is there a production line open somewhere and are there slots free? Or maybe we can pick up some more from distressed allies? Would Italy be interested in selling some of theirs for book value? I can quite believe NAB that the 8 HM1 have been robbed to hulks and would need a total factory rebuild, which might not be the most cost effective thing given their age and the hours already on their structures. Might it even be politically wise to chuck AW a small order for new HM2 to make up for getting the new/rebuilt Apaches off the American line…
Martin
I agree. I don’t want them to sell Sanfhurst!
With the idea of selling off RAF Northolt, over the last several years the MoD’s Project MODEL already “rationalized” the London MoD estate and reduced to 2 core sites – Woolwich and Northolt. Several units, Army, RAF, RN and MoD, moved into Northolt, including new facilities for the DMC ( BFPO ) amongst others, and much of the station was rebuilt.
This spend on the site makes me oppose selling anything but the airfield, which is more used commercially than militarily so cannot see that being turned into flats either.
No idea if there is space at Heathrow for a lodger unit and place 32 Sqn and Northolt Station Flight there. Personally i would keep northolt as is.
@NaB – Many thanks for the great exposition of light frigate/T26 differences. Most illuminating.
A follow-on question if I may. Martin commented further up this thread “The Danes did a fair bit on a budget.
http://intercepts.defensenews.com/2014/11/sleek-modern-and-built-on-a-budget-denmarks-latest-frigate/“. To a lay person that does look awfully impressive for the “$325 million apiece” price quoted in the article. Are there significant compromises there that aren’t apparent to the lay person? Is the price misleading or plain wrong? If none of the above then how did they get that much capability for that price?
I think if you compare the many ‘3 Wishes’ in another Thread and what came our of SDSR15 then what most wished for has been granted. The foreboding of doom and gloom was not realised and every arm of our Forces has now got more certainty of purpose, therefore the ability to plan how to achieve each given objective and the new equipment and funding to make plans a reality. Arguing over the size of a hangar on 5+ Type 26 Lites is somewhat better than crying over 5 lost orders. More Astutes ordered, carriers going well and aircraft ordered for the FAA, new tankers and stores ships for the RFA and 4 new Trident subs for Barrow to build. Not too many upset Matelots today…..
People who say the P-8s are too little too late and the Nimrod was ‘wonderful’ and should never have been scrapped need to get a grip and understand the MR2s had limited life left after 40 years service, were flying death traps and had limited mission capability. The MRA4 was ultimately cancelled in 2010 simply because it was £789 million over-budget and over nine years late. It started life in 1998 for delivery in 2003 and by 2010 the one airframe flying had so many faults it was refused an air certificate. We should have swallowed our pride, bought second hand A340s (we did steal A340 cockpits after all) and fitted all the clever stuff in a known airframe. But that is 20/20 Hindsight. I am not too impressed with Boeing arguing with its British customer over the amount of ‘British’ content. Just tell Boeing to STFU and fit RR engines.
Typhoon expansion, extension and upgrade is exactly what I wanted and the F35 orders and statement of intent also clears us to keep earning $ Billions from EVERY F35 built. (Has anyone done a P & L on the revenue we get via BAE from building F35s versus the cost of buying 138 aircraft?). Not too many upset Crabs today ……
The Army now have a clear vision of their re-tasking. For all the clever talk by ‘some’ the fact remains we are a small Nation and we do not need a huge Army. We just need a very capable, disciplined and well equipped one. We always had the first two and now we have the third part. They now have to prepare for a faster world. The Iraq and Afghan. days were not what the 21st Century British Army is for and why we struggled more than we needed to. We sent brave lads into Iraq without proper kit. Utterly disgraceful. We then overspent £ Billions panic buying. Well now we have structure and purpose and getting the right kit. Lets hope we never abuse the khakis ever again. I suspect there are a few smiley faces in Aldershot today as well …
7 is almost 8 (be they half-breeds, rather than full-boodied Mk4s… Merlin conversions, that is):
“The upgraded Merlin HC Mk3 first flew on 8 April 2015 and completed flight trials at the end of August. Following formal Release to Service in September the aircraft has now been delivered and will be followed by six further aircraft to provide an Initial Operating Capability (IOC) in spring 2016, when the final Sea King HC Mk4 aircraft will be withdrawn from service.”
@ChrisM,
“Drastic cuts needed, and if a school is needed then see if any private music colleges fancy a military annexe.” Why not attach it to a civilian music school and base it in the North…or if a ‘proper military school of music is required’ base it in the North….. :)
@Martin,
As an outsider looking in, given that all operations in the future are going to be based on ‘Joint Operations’, why not have one establishment for training officers? Why three? Why not get junior officers from all three services working with each other right from the off?
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-31012180
Thats a lot of prime land just inside the M25!
My question would be why were only getting twelve billion! ;-)
full thoroughbreds, rather than “full-boodied)
… where does that edit always disappear to?
Comment 82, as this won’t slot straight under it, either
ohh! It did!
– let’s try again (no 2nd level nesting, would be my guess)
No, it did not, in the end. And definitely no nesting of comments, at any level.
So Venator 110
Or Khareef stretch?
“To a lay person that does look awfully impressive for the “$325 million apiece” price quoted in the article. Are there significant compromises there that aren’t apparent to the lay person? Is the price misleading or plain wrong? If none of the above then how did they get that much capability for that price?”
There’s a little clue in the fact that the shipyard shut. That’s usually a sign that they’re not making any money – bit of a necessity for a going concern. Other clues are in the various statements about equipment “not yet fitted” and empty cableways.
Don’t get me wrong – they’re good looking and capable ships, but the devil is in the detail of what the costs actually were – as in was $325M really the unit cost? Was there GFE? Who did what (the RDN did a lot of what is usually done by a shipyard), how long did it take and where did the costs fall.
@NaB,
This may sound dim…..hope you don’t mind me asking but….could the UK not adopt a slightly different approach and make it clear to the world that ‘X’ is the big bag of money on the table…then ask the RN what is their bottom line for that spend (or nothing if they say they only want 15 T-26s or whatever and so the cash used on Health for example) not a penny more and then get the ‘best design’ built in the UK. I know I’m an outsider looking in, and this may be grossly unfair, but it strikes me that unless it is totally ‘gold plated’ and something the Admirals can show off to the USN…..then the RN aren’t interested.
Well it is a shining example of fitted for not with or a shining example of pulling thru tried and tested weapons, whichever way you want to look at it I suppose.
Good looking floaty though!
@Hohum
This is a bigger problem than you might think.
In the falklands, the untested anti-air missiles failed and had to be manually overridden resulting in Coventry being sunk, and we are still unsure if the Rapier actually managed to shoot down anything. In Iraq the phalanx on the US ships completely failed and required a royal navy ship to shoot down the missile, the patriot missile batteries had avery marginal success rate.
All these systems worked perfectly in tests and training, but when it came to firing it all went badly wrong. This is the problem with extremely expensive equipment, its too expensive to properly do live fire testing, so most of it is simulations.
Not to mention that most of the torpedo’s fired from HMS Conqueror also failed.
@Steve
‘ This is the problem with extremely expensive equipment, its too expensive to properly do live fire testing, so most of it is simulations.’
Weapons are live fire tested, you might not seem, them but they are.
Methinks Ozzy has been eyeing up them pretty La Fayette jobbies?
Navy is only getting a couple of T23 frigates worth of extra bods…
Stretchy Khareef with more automation, when does a Corvette become a Frigate?
Don’t shout too loud at me Hohum! 0;-)
Your comment was and remains a joke.
Pity no one has grasped the nettle and shut down a bunch of undeployable light infantry Bn’s in order to keep the number of deployable brigades up. I suppose such obvious solutions will have to wait for hell freezing over :-(
Those “strike” brigades look suitably useless in that they aren’t heavy enough to take on Russian armoured brigades while too heavy to be rapidly deployable worldwide in the way CVR(T) and BV based force would be.
If we’re going to have a light frigate, lets produce something with the requisite compromises, but good enough for home defence / CASD protection / Caribbean / FI guardship duties . Put in 32 tactical length Mk41. No TLAM/SM3, but enough room for Sea Ceptor / VL-Penguin / VL-ASROC. Plain diesel electric propulsion, 25 kt speed is enough. No need for a towed array sonar, but a Lynx / H60 sized hangar and Merlin sized flight deck is fine, usually filled with UAV’s rather than a helicopter. Something like this would be exportable too :-)
Thought so!
What we’ll get rarely matches what we want and the Gov wants cheap!
Personally I believe it’s nonsense that the RAF must have an airfield near the seat of government.
Really for what reason? The queen quite happily take’s a train it Balmoral with one body guard and UK ministers tend to fly commercial to places.
We happily had the G8 summit in Scotland with all the world leaders landing at Edinburgh airport.
No need to take up space at Heathrow. If they need access to an airfield in London then use Biggin Hill. Fair enough with keeping the other military aspects of Northolt just sell the airfield.
As the BBC point out there are 57 MOD sites inside the M25.
The fact remains that way too much of our military establishment is tied to the South East for public school boy related reasons.
If we are going to have a 21st century military then lest drop all the 19th Century crap that costs a fortune.
Jules
There is only so much MOD could sell off within the M25 boundry.
Most MoD office buildings have been shut and functions concentrated in Main Building already.
Old War Office has been sold, not easy considering where abouts it is in the Central London Security Zone and what is underneath it.
Same applies to the Admiralty and the ops functions there, and London District at Horseguards.
Woolwich and Northolt have had assets moved into them from closed sites.
Northwood is obviously a no no.
Wellington barracks is close to government and royal sites, with a big muster area for military or civilian emergency use, and is no doubt involved in security for royalty.
Hyde park barracks will probably be sold, for a massive sum, once they work out where to put HCMR which idealy needs to be close by due to its state functions.
Regents park is a possibility though again there are certain things there that would need new homes first.
I would guess the most expensive site would be the HAC Artillery grounds and associated barracks within the city, though I understand they already tried to sell that off only to discover Mod do not own it!
The comment about having an MOD airfield near the seat of government was less about flying the government around and more to do with most vitally important events happening in London. If they need to fly in lots of people/troops, or fly them out, or need to base a lot of helicopters or some Typhoons near London then it is best to have an airfield that the MOD can act first, without commercial arrangements or force protection complications.
Martin
Not against that concept of spreading the estate away from the south east but I think you will find many of those 57 sites are local army reserve centres, ccf halls and the like, which I doubt will bring in much revenue.
Allan
Having spent quite a bit of time in various RN/MoD circles over the years, I can assure you that not once have I ever heard anything along the lines of “we must be able to impress the americans with this” or anything resembling it.
You do hear – “we must be able to communicate / interoperate (share data) / share the same logistics sources wherever possible” – quite often, but that is nothing but common sense and rarely if ever anything remotely connecting to the mythical “gold-plating”.
Steve
Clearly you’ve been reading the wrong books………
Chris M
If they need to move large numbers of troops around then I might suggest using Brize Norton. I don’t think the MOD has any contingency planning for for moving large numbers of troops around Birmingham, Manchester or any other British city. I don’t think London being the Capital should afford it any special treatment in this regard.
@ DM – no doubt many of those 57 sites are as you say but we can say for certainty that there are some major sites in London still being kept. The airfield at Northolt being the biggest example and the only justification the MOD can come up with is that it must have an airfield inside the M25. Seems like yet another sacred cow in need of sacrificing and it’s one that could generate a massive amount of money plus help London alleviate its housing shortage.
While we are at it might as well get rid of the place guards and associated sacred cows. Give the job across to veterans of reservists or anyone other than front line forces.
Hi again Martin
Can you list some of these sites? I would be interested in seeing what sites you mean.
You also have to factor in the cost of relocating things when closing down sites, vs just keeping them as is. Also some may have Critical National Infrastructure, etc, which cannot be easily moved or yet replicated elsewhere.
Northolt I already touched on way back up thread, especially the non airfield side of the station which has seen much investment previously.
The “sacred cows” comment, and the palace guards, would you disband these units then? Unlike other nations ceremonial units they are also front line Battalions that rotate in and out of ceremonial, public duties and front line roles?
Speculating on the strike brigades, I suggested before the statement that the strike brigades might consist of an armoured battlegroup sized heavy component, and also para, air-assault, and MIV or protected mobility units.
With 16 Air-assault brigade seeming to continue, it’s a reasonable guess that the strike brigades will not contain light infantry units. If more high-readiness light battalions are needed over the Para battalions, then the obvious decision would be to designate a couple of air-assault battalions to sit with 2 & 3 Para in 16AA.
If one of the armoured brigades is disappearing and providing units for the two strike brigades, then I think I’m right about them having an armoured infantry group. Ajax and MIV have alone been mentioned; I’m guessing though that the disappeared armoured brigade will provide the strike brigades each with a Warrior battalion, a cavalry squadron with Ajax, and a Challenger squadron. That could be a reduction (from the 2020 plan) of an Ajax cavalry squadron and perhaps around thirty C2. I think there is a good chance that the strike brigadess do disguise quite a significant further cut to the tank fleet that no one has really noticed yet. Tanks are after all pretty expensive; Challenger needs continuing upgrades; and we have a slight shift of emphasis towards facing unconventional enemies.
At a strength of about 5,000, I assume that along with the armoured infantry, tank and cavalry squadrons, the strike brigades will have probably three other battalions. No lightIinfantry, but perhaps MIV and Foxhound, two units of one and one unit of the other. Integral artillery and other bits and bobs should be about 5,000 bodies.
Some folks have said that Ajax is not suitable for a rapid reaction force, but the force of two strike brigades and one air assault brigade should have a better ratio of lighter and highly mobile units to heavy armoured units than the 2020 Reaction Force as a whole.
I would also guess that the two remaining armoured brigades will lose the planned heavy protected mobility battalion, so consisting only of tank regiment, cavalry regiment, and two armoured infantry battalions.
If the strike brigades get maybe two flashy new MIV battalions each, will there be much/any cash for such vehicles for the stated six infantry brigades? The bulk of the infantry could still be the poor and underfunded mass that the planned Adaptable Force was – seven protected mobility battalions, and the others being light role.
So that’s my wild stab in the dark at the Strike brigades. One Warrior battalion, two MIV, one Foxhound, plus Challenger squadron, Ajax squadron, and mixed-bag RA regiment.
@chish
” I am not too impressed with Boeing arguing with its British customer over the amount of ‘British’ content. Just tell Boeing to STFU and fit RR engines.”
I have a sneaking suspicion the disparity on work share figures is purely down to a slight misunderstanding by the government and Boeing. Boeing are saying £3 million per UK supplied airframe whilst the government are saying £1 billion overall.
Well I say overall of what? Remember every P-8 made has UK content, Marshall’s for example have delivered 200 auxiliary fuel tanks for the P8 program. Is it a simple case the government has presented the figure that is based upon all UK content in the P-8 program whilst Boeing released a statement based upon the 9 procured.
The Boeing tweet that was released was during the SDSR speech so not run by UK MOD pr types.
Also what engine? RR don’t make a suitable engine for the 737 and it would be lunacy to spend money qualifying an alternative to satisfy UK workshare desires. There are better ways of doing that IMHO.
BB – fair assumption. Investment in MIV will be limited and be channelled to where it will be most used / visible. Will be interesting to see if all the Bulldogs go or if they still struggle on somewhere in the Orbat.
Now: we know a couple of Light Role batallions are needed in garrison roles; and a couple sent overseas on training and development missions; and I can just about see 10,000 of the UK Garrison as ‘Aid to the civil power’; but that doesn’t seem to add up to six brigades worth. Lots of square bashing and painting the kerbstones white then. And to be honest I don’t see why those batallions have to be brigaded at all: why not put them all under an adminsitrative ‘UK Corps of Infantry’ HQ and save half a dozen Brigadier roles and the associatied overhead?
Oh I see, that would be why…
Brian
I read your post with interest. Thank you. Am I right in suggesting the Strike Brigades would have a similar CS/CSS set up to the current deployable brigades? That being –
1x RA Regiment. 1 x RE Regiment. 1 or 2 x RLC Regiment. 1 x REME Battalion. 1 x RAMC Regiment.
If so, how does this impact the 3rd RA Regiment of mixed AS90/GMLRS/Exactor, and the 3rd RE Regiment ( Armoured ) of Trojan, Terrier, Titan etc. Would the Strike brigades still use these heavier RE and RA assets or are we looking at the Light Gun being used and thus yet another cut to AS90 numbers?
Didn’t I hear somewhere that the P8 mission kit is largely the same as the MRA4 system Boeing had? Certainly Boeing were BAE’s tactical mission system subcontractor on MRA4, so it wouldn’t be a surprise if the development work done on Nimrod was carried over to P8. If so, there is an argument that with this buy the UK is getting the Nimrod MRA4 it paid for in a newer airframe. Shame we have to pay twice for it though.
Or, is there a possibility they reduce the ChII contingents from a type 56 Armoured Regiment to something smaller and convert a Light Cavalry regiment into an armoured one, thus spreading the remaining Challengers around.
Daniele: “I think you will find many of those 57 sites are local army reserve centres, ccf halls and the like, which I doubt will bring in much revenue.”
That sounds likely – quick scan of the MOD Army website lists two careers centres and 42 Army Reserve units within London (I’ve tried to avoid double-counting where several units are co-located but may have missed some). And no doubt there’s navy and RAF presence too. Not much to be done there – is there much extra capacity in the TA drill halls? Even if there is, the Reserve’s still supposed to be growing by 50% in the next three years, isn’t it?
“While we are at it might as well get rid of the place guards and associated sacred cows. Give the job across to veterans of reservists or anyone other than front line forces.”
Palace guard is a 24/7 commitment and thus not really suitable for reservists. And I am not sure how you save much money by shifting the duty around – you still have to have someone doing it, and they still need paying.
Supplies of cool-aid running low around here.
I’d sure like to see the Admiralty math that says 6 AA destroyers and 8 ASW T26 can protect a carrier battle group plus supporting RFA plus amphibious group. I’m sure assumption #1 is that no ship will be sunk, no ship will go u/s and no ship will be dockside in refit.
And of course, said carrier & amphib group will be carrying thousands of young men & women & dozens of the RAF finest aircraft. Something worthy of protection I would think.
@Fed
Don’t waste your time. Chish is just flat out anti-American on defense issues and his uninformed hissy fit about fitting RR engines is or for the course. No reason to take input from a guy who doesn’t know royals Royce doesn’t compete in that market segment seriously. It is just more uninformed ranting.
I did enjoy the comment that the obsolete Typhoons being resurrected (brought back from the dead) were not at all obsolete, followed by the comment that they could drop & fire every bomb & missile that the UK used to have, but none of the weapons currently in use. I think obsolete” must mean something different here than elsewhere.
No defense for Tornados going out of service way before their replacements are ready. Unless folks think the vintage Typhoons that cant drop Paveway IV or fire Brimstone or Storm Shadow, are an adequate substitute. FJ numbers still dip.
What did George say the other day? The country is going on to a war footing to defeat ISIS. Riiiight.
Ron5 – I tend to agree with others that the “smaller and lighter Frigate” is a figment of uninformed peoples imaginations. Fortunately we have 10 years to figure that out before we have to try and order any. At which point T26 as a known design with a known cost and the production line hot will suddenly look a whole lot more attractive…
Hello A
It’s supposed to be expanding, I don’t have exact details but from what I read and hear they are struggling. A desperate government PR stunt to try and cover the holes left after SDSR2010.
When the future reservist structure was published there was mention of basing, and that still included the closure of many TA centres, none of which I can name off my head at the moment. Agree if they are genuine about expanding the Army reserve then cutting ARC’s is not a good idea, cuts down on the visibility of the military with the public, which is desirable.
Apart from Kneller Hall, which I agree should be sold for as much as possible, I cannot think of any other major sites within M25 boundry that are “sacred cows” as Martin suggests? Cavalry Barracks Hounslow perhaps?? Not sure there are many left as many have already been sold. The remaining I think have direct security implications, for example with the current terrorist concerns it is highly desirable to have at least a Battalion of troops nearby, and not just for Royal or Public duties as in the units based at Woolwich or Windsor.
Even by the abysmal standards of the TD comments section Ron5 is spectacularly ignorant of reality.
He has obviously missed the entire ongoing Typhoon upgrade and weapons integration programme.
Sorry to flick back to the frigates but I support the 8 x ASW notion.
GP T26 was always an expensive concept. What exactly was “GP”? They’d have been better off saying “ASuW” because taking the tail off the “worlds most capable ASW frigate” leaves you with much the same as a T45 without SAMPSON… a chocolate tea cup.
I think there is middle ground where “light frigates” can be optimised for SF support (Wildcat and a couple of RHIBs), peace time counter piracy and wartime ASuW.
SeaRAM style air defence, MFS7000 hull sonar, not quite sure what radar – maybe just a 2D Scanter – plus next gen surface strike missiles… ah, and of course, a dipper for Wildcat :-)
I feel having a single RAF runway within the M25 is pretty sensible, it provides somewhere close by to fly helicopters in and out of London easily, and also provides an emergency runway for evacuating the government if needed, for state visits I believe they use the Royal Terminal at Heathrow. It is also useful as a FOB for aircraft protecting London, and was used in this role during the Olympics. It is also home to the London Air Ambulance, and is an active private airfield as well.
I see no issue with retaining a single airfield, and would rather see other units consolidate onto the airfield and sell off their land, as once the airfield is gone, it cannot be replaced. maybe increasing the civil uses such as basing the police aircraft there could be a way to justify the base better.
RE “GP T26 was always an expensive concept”
Always, in conjunction with “concept”?
Gordon Brown announced the prgrm with a £350m target price for the “de luxe” version, so GP at 80% of that?
– well, that was the concept… and then it became a cruiser
Simon – you may have a point on the branding of the concept.
But for ASuW I would still rather have T26 with its Combat System, Artisan 3d radar, 5″ Gun, Seaceptor in surface to surface mode, 24 full length VLS for NSM or similar, and space for 2 Wildcats with SeaVenom and a scaneagle det. And it can still contribute to the ASW Screen and fire at crossing targets in the air.
Makes your light frigate with a 76mm Oto and a 2d Radar look rather inadequate tbh. And rather better than T45 without Sampson. Good news is we don’t need to worry too much about all that until SDSR25…
Engineer Tom
Totally agree with you re Northolt. Does the airfield make much revenue for the MoD with private/commercial aircraft landing charges etc?
No idea, I think they are limited to 40 flights a day for noise reasons though, also I have looked and Northwood doesn’t seem to have a helipad, as the UK’s military headquarters that surprised me, so another reason to keep Northolt just down the road.
If that is true, then for sure.
P.E. Those six brigades are suggested to include units designated for training/mentoring “upstream engagement” type operations. So one or more of the six may be a HQ and only one or two regular battalions (and perhaps associated reserve units), and may not necessarily be combat ready in any sense.
It will be interesting to see whether the Adaptable Force concept continues. The strike brigades and air assault brigade seem a lot like a “Reaction Force”, and would presumably form the first brigade deployments, which would allow for the Adaptable Force idea to carry on. Or we might see maybe three fully formed infantry brigades (there are three light cavalry regiments, and not really enough supporting units for more than three) and maybe three other brigades for things like training and mentoring.
D.M. I think it’s a bit too difficult to try guessing the make up of artillery and other support regiments for the strike brigades. A step too far to figure out.
As for where the tanks might go if that armoured brigade goes. If my guess at a squadron each for the strike brigades is correct, that is still a margin of about 18 to 30 tanks. I think the best you could hope for those is that they end up in the reserves, keeping a potential full regiment still on the books. Could just be a cut though. And it could even be that Ajax has the biggest gun in the brigade, with no tanks and only machine guns on MIV. I feel it would be likely to have a squadron of tanks though as the armoured brigades are no longer the first responders, having a couple of armoured groups alternating at readiness in the strike brigades seems sensible.
Lose 18 to 30 tanks, because it depends how the new squadron is defined. A squadron could be a dozen tanks in the troops and a couple in the HQ, though they are bigger in the 2020 plan.
Could the ‘spare’ squadron of tanks could resurface in mixed formation recce troops across the 4 Brigades?
I seem to recall the concept of using MBTs in the recce role was tried out in BATUS a while back. A mixed troop of Ajax and Challenger could be quite a potent way of “fighting for information”.
“The aircraft would also be available to the Royal Family.” – Well that’s stag does and hen parties sorted.
As ever the devil will be in the detail. Take the commitment to upgrade Typhoon with Brimstone/Storm Shadow and AESA. Just the tranche 3s perhaps?
As for the light frigates; Fedaykin is right – buy the French ones. Build them under licence rather than reinventing the wheel. The world is awash with light frigate designs. Perhaps with dipping sonar Wildcat. Main gun a bit tricky.
As for raising money selling off MoD property – how about selling our Cyprus bases to the Russians:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34913173
If you buy the French design, you either buy the kit they specify i.e. French kit, or redesign it for British kit. It isn’t just as simple as where the ship is built, it’s what it is built from. The smaller kit is also what sustains the small UK businesses.
Just assume for a minute that Steel for Type 26 is cut in 2018. The Naval Design Partnership needs something to do for the next 10 years after that until its time to design an either or both of an Albion or a Type 45 replacement.
Even if our new design of Light Frigate has no fucntional differences from a French Light Frigate of from T26 FFBNW the experience of designing it and getting it into service will still provide a generation of naval architects with skills vital to design the next set of unique ships that we do need.
If we do decide to buy French it needs to be seen for what it is: the end of indiginous complex warship building, following the end of armoured vehicle buidling, preceding the end of Fast Jet building, and leaving the Submarine Enterprise as our only indigenous strategic capability. It might or might not be the right thing to do, but we should consider it with eyes wide open.
@ PE – “If we do decide to buy French it needs to be seen for what it is: the end of indiginous complex warship building,”
This. Would far put a hole beneath the waterline of
You are kidding right ? The soldiers standing on duty are ‘guarding’ the palace?. Its totally a ceremonial-tourist role.
Its the police job to guard the royal family and secure the palaces. If there is a major incident highly specialized police counter terrorism forces and military special forces would be used. Definitely not a squad of guys in bearskin hats!
22 army bands? Just stick an AC/DC disc on!
@Jedibeeftrix – pardon?
Frankly I’m hoping all this talk of light frigates will just go away. Years away from building the last of the 8 ASW Type 26s; hopefully we will just run on; even replace the Type 45s with a newer version of them.
Also I forgot to ask: these 20 “Protectors.” – what exactly are they. TD assumes they’re Reapers – is he right?
Is this light frigate why BMT are continuing with the venator 110 concept. A naval equivalent to reaper not for high end combat but useful for Intel etc with limited offensive capability.
They are armed, and I have seen odd stories about them intervening in security issues at the palace. I also believe, but am unsure, that they have a role in a major incident, also if there was a major incident the time it took to deploy further police and SF would be too long, there are the police inside the palace but if there were terrorists storming the palace the soldiers would definitely assist.
Also they have a ceremonial role etc that is valued for various reasons including because of the financial value to tourism, that would be lost if they weren’t soldiers, reservists may work but you would need thousands to have a rotation that could fit with having a job as well. There may be a claim to reduce the ceremonial role during an enduring operation, but at the moment what would they be doing if they weren’t on ceremonial duties.
helicopters dont really ‘age the airframe’ like a fast jet does- all those high g maneuvers !. Its more the components and hydraulics and such that can and are replaced during deep overhaul. The US Army Chinooks have been around for ever.
Naval ships are only at sea a limited time anyway. I dont have exact numbers but could be between 20-35% of the time ?
WiseApe
You joking of course re Cyprus? They are about the most important PJOB’s we have.
Beware of Whitehall quoted ‘costs’. For Trident the figure quoted is develop, build and maintain/upgrade of 30 years ( plus the capital cost that gets returned to Treasury)
An example is Typhoon, which the public accounts committee looked into in detail. There was a a quoted total cost over 20 years of around 33 bill pounds, in reality the development cost share was between 6-7 bill, the production costs were 13-14 bill- of course that was originally for around 250 planes , they ended up with around 140.
RE ” plus the capital cost that gets returned to Treasury”
You probably mean the capital charge, not CAPEX which is the upfront capital cost. Not sure, but I thought the former had been done away with?
Even NAO thought it was perverting investment and inventory decisions:
“16 Nov 2011 – HM Treasury has implemented its ‘clear line of sight’ policy, which has removed the cost of capital charge from the approved cost, forecast cost and historic cost variations”
@duker
Depending on the vessel type they can spend a lot more than 30% of the time at sea. I believe that HMS Clyde manages 300 days a year availability to go to sea, so say it only spends 2/3 available days a year at sea that is well over 50%. For problem vessels yes the 20-35% might be true, also deployment time doesn’t equal days at sea, as there are trials and training etc as well.
Dear Brian
I really can not see how any Challenger can be involved with the Strike Brigades. The speach and document are clear the brigade is to be self deployable. To deploy challenger you need Heavy Equipment Transporters, a huge logistics train including drops vehicle which were supposed to have gone out of service.
The hope is that the Chieftans, As90’s, GMLS etc of the 3rd armoured brigade are a absorbed by the 2 ongoing armoured brigades.
Further surely as you have 6 Warrier equiped battalions at the moment the warrior upgrade must supply enough vehicles for 6 fully warrior equiped battalions.
I can see the Adaptable force loosing all its logistics and artillery to the 2nd strike brigade and to back fill 16AA and 3 Cmd to the levels required.
The interesting point is that those 15 Infantry Battalions leave 19 infantry brigades to do Uk ceremonial, anti terror (training needed, as an example troops at Woolwich very handy for London deployment in a Paris type event) oversea training etc all in land rovers, wmik and coyote all vehicles which it has become clearly evident are not up to deployment in a modern northern european, cold syrian enviroment. Plus soft skinned trucks.
For the strike brigades i would suggest googling the US Stryker brigades and look how intergrated logistics, artilery are and the heavy use of vehicle mounted missiles are for anti tank work, inluding 8×8 mounted 105mm direct fire pieces. Since 3 Cmd, 16 AAB, 2 Striker brigades are all going to need wheeled artillery the old 105mm artillery piece is going to be in high demand. God help us if we have to fight Russia or China with proper artilery, rocket, and tanks.
“Even by the abysmal standards of the TD comments section Ron5 is spectacularly ignorant of reality.
He has obviously missed the entire ongoing Typhoon upgrade and weapons integration programme.”
Ha ha, yes I totally missed the part that contained a plan and committed funds to upgrade the obsolete tranche 1’s. Must have been in the (very) fine print.
I agree in the main, but in this “The hope is that the Chieftans, As90’s, GMLS etc of the 3rd armoured brigade are a absorbed by the 2 ongoing armoured brigades. ” I would hope that GMLRS, with the now available AW warhead, would be made available to these two new brigades. It is (bang for metric ton) the most deployable form of artillery.
… putting some on wheels would not be a bad idea, either
Previous RAF fast jet Squadron trough was six squadrons to rise to seven in the early 2020s. That plan hasn’t really changed except for the addition of the two Typhoon T1 Squadrons making a total of nine, one more than there is now. This is a considerable improvement you are just incapable of grasping that.
Thanks Daniele, Info gratefully recieved!
Ron5, if you think the bombs qualified for Typhoon Tr.1 “are not used anymore”, you really should let the RAF know this.
http://www.raf.mod.uk/equipment/
Because on their website, they list the ‘current weapons’, which surprise surprise still includes the venerable GPB at 312kg & 505kg. Not such a surprise really as they form the basis of the paveways such as II, III & IV as well as enhanced P II & III ( which just means an extra GPS mod added)
I can see Typhoon Tr.1- some of which are only 8 years old happily seeing out their extended, nay designed life carrying these weapons or indeed their very capable AAW weapons.
Has anyone worked out how many F35Bs the FAA will get, if any?
DROP 1-4 and CORP funded as part of the tranche 3 purchase is what your looking for Ron. Other options exist to allow further weapons integration if so wanted.
50 odd planes, that are on average 10 years old ‘obsolete’ have you looked at the USAF or RuAF fleets lately, they are mostly well over 20 years.
Get over your references to ‘obsolete’ Ron5. You arent even trying to inform yourself on the realities
The RAF has wisely not taken up BAes offer to pay and arm and a leg to upgrade to Tr.3 and instead said TR.1 have almost all the capabilities we have in main fleet and more importantly fit our needs very nicely. They will of course go through normal overhaul processes which dont need to be a headline budget item
Apart from the fact that I feel the RN will be 1 ASW T26 short, I think the return to a C1 C2 C3 model makes sense.
The interesting statement for me is “These general purpose frigates are also likely to offer increased export potential.” I just hope that UK is not heading down the French route where export potential trumps operational need. Taking it at face value, the big question is how are these going to be different from other, cheaper and more mature models already on the market?
My thoughts, based on a C1/C2/C3 model, and the need to replace the LPDs in the mid 3030s, how about the following:
C1: 6 T45 / 9 T26 – to be ultimately replaced by a single class long term.
C2: 9 Hybrid Frigate / Lite LPD a cross between the Damen Crossover and Enforcer models
C3: 15 Venator MHPC models
@Daniele Mandelli – Fear not, I have very little pull with the MoD. Witness the funeral pace of progress on our third carrier.
“…how are these going to be different from other, cheaper and more mature models already on the market?” – Quite.
I thought I would add my comments:
Absolutely impressed with the SDSR. It wasn’t difficult to improve on the 2010 shambles but here are my additions I’d like to see provided also.
A new landing craft (fast)
Voyager converted for probe
Merlin Mk1 converted
Frigates plan makes sense. Bae were tasked with designing a cheap frigate and given all the help the Government could possibly have offered (with the possible exception of a reduction to a single Clyde site). The sheer equipment being ported over should have made these ships very cheap in both design and build. The proposal of a ‘new cheaper’ frigate sends the design team back to the drawing board. This could have been a delay, it isn’t, it keeps the engineers, naval architects etc. all improving their design and costing skills.
More ships, given escort duty requirements, makes sense. To be honest I would rather an armed MARS SSS of the San Antonio ilk than lots more T26s. Note that the MARS SSS is confirmed. I hope this is much more than a stores ship. I believe, these, not the Carriers should be helicopter platforms. If the Frigates can escort merchant shipping then that should be good enough.
I am constantly concerned about the dropping of the Sentinel R1s, however I noticed that the P8s will include overground surveillance, now if this means LSRS (see http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2014/01/future-maritime-patrol-part-2-dedicated-long-range-aircraft-p-8a-poseidon/) then that would explain the R1s going. I believe we should be able to ‘input’ into the upgrade path for the P8 just like we do for our Airseekers (verdict yet to be reached on how effective this is of course).
I believe the proposals for both the Navy and the Airforce are pragmatic and cover most bases, do we need more drones (Naval? Long Range? BAMS?). I admit not not following the third branch of our armed forces in the same way, but they do appear to be the forgotten party. Maybe they just have bored everyone with their endless indecision on vehicles. I do think we need to understand better the balance between, mobility and protection in respect of vehicles. I suspect the answer is ‘horses for courses’ and that the snatch landrover’s mobility is going to be sorely missed one day.
Finally, all these new toys are great but one thing that needs to be sorted quickly is the ‘installation’ of weapons on our current kit. It is ridiculous that we have kit and fail to use it to its full potential.
@WiseApe
At no point did I say buy the French design :-)
I was just pointing out that the La Fayette class does much of what we are talking about, I wouldn’t buy the design especially as it is rather old and the French are planning the replacement.
My observation really is that when looking at vessels like the La Fayette or the Danish design you get a cheaper vessel if you drop the GT prime movers and the need to keep up with a task group. Even then the latest generation of diesels do allow the ability to keep up with a task group if you are prepared to burn the oil..
I can now understand why politicians like to drip-feed good news to the public. Under normal circumstances, news that three SSS ships for the RFA were being ordered or drone numbers were being doubled would cause an outbreak of rejoicing at TD Towers.
Instead, a whole lot of very positive news is being ignored while we debate what exactly a light frigate is for, or how the army will be changed by the latest round of musical chairs.
My (perhaps naive) view is that Defence has done far better out of the SDSR than anyone wuld have dared hope a year ago. Am I missing something, or is it the nature of the UK that no one is happy unless they have something to complain about?
@Jeremy M H
I made what I thought was a considered contribution (with which people can agree or not) about all aspects of the SDSR15 and say the P-8 was a good choice but you choose ONE comment and infer that to mean I am an ‘anti-American’ having a hissy fit with ‘uninformed ranting’? Really … well I’d hate to see you make a snap judgment old son ….
40 Degrees – I agree it does have something of angels on a pinhead, given that it won’t be a live question for the next 10 years at least.
Still it saves us from proper enquiry into the real subject: where the sailors and airmen are going to come from to operate all those ships and planes that the PM has announced we will be buying. That’s the real mystery…
@ fedaykin
Very fair points there. I guess I was just thinking ‘Hang on we are spending $ Millions with you can you not be so quick to disagree?’ And my engine comment was too flippant and I apologise but yes I did know RR aren’t in that market any more having split with P & W….
@TD,
Thanks so much for the several layers of hard work you (and, in the comment threads, the TD faithful) have put in over the last several days. It’s not mere flattery to say that, at moments like this, or in the long series on FRES and ship-to-shore, this performs a real, tangible public service. The “comment culture” of TD helps shedloads, so good to see that it has survived its hiccups so well for over six years, pretty remarkable standard for the Internet (looks sideways down the bar, not too angrily but mindfully, at a pair of this thread’s commenters.)
Yes this is my own drum but since, remarkably, it has come to rest within the range of what SDSR ’15 puts on offer, I will beat it again. Forget this vague, under-subscribed (only five?) new frigate concept. Go firm on 10 T26 to full spec. We know now that they are valued, and will be built, as first-rate ASW platforms. Not only that, but with highest-spec technology and ship design for the role, and quite a bit of firepower: lots of good new-generation SHORAD, the potential for sixteen very long-range land-attack/ASuW missiles (forget MBDA and their stock valuation, quit doing Perseus except perhaps for export and worry about either an Anglo-French or Anglo-American dual role replacement for TLAM) plus eight cells that some of our own serving RN folk have suggested could pack VL-ASROC and then whatever follows it for another of multiple layers in sub-killing.
This is clearly what T26 will be for. Stop worrying about the “mission bay” business; except in extraordinary circumstances where they gap some other class of ship, there will be just enough of them to properly protect the afloat CBG and have one other on a true APT(N) up in the Gap (rollin’ rollin’ rollin’, towed-away patrollin’….) Plus maybe one that’s in dock but working up that could roll out as FRE if too many Russians showed up in the North Sea. Put that design effort into making sure they carry two Merlins, just as the previous ASW destroyer — the T22 Batch 3 “frigates” — could pack two Lynx in a crisis, and other ASW destroyers like the American Spruances and various JMSDF models could hold multiple helis. But bulk up to ten hulls. Yes that means the added cost of at least one additional 2087 set (and in that case the added maintenance costs of stripping a set off whichever hull is the most impossible to get out of repair/refit in a crisis to make sure that the other nine are at least capable if kept seaworthy.) But ten hulls in to build costs should be dropping — that’s the price the Dutch Navy paid, dealt them by a treasury that is historically *even more* parsimonious than HMT, when they didn’t get the full six DzPs when the price was dropping. But those extra two matter, both for coverage — the most substantial threats to the RN in near-to-medium term combat are some redfor slinging dozens or hundreds of cheap missiles at them until you run out of fancy countermeasures (dealt with by T45 and carrier air), and an enemy sub squadron — and loss replacement in case of an actual, serious conflict. Anyone who looks around these days and doesn’t see at least the genuine potential for such conflicts is fooling themselves. Said so in the early days here when the future was flying Super Tucanos off billion-quid carriers at angry tribesmen forever, and to my horror and sorrow we’ve now arrived.
But what about the Scots and the designers, then? Tell the SNP that when the last T26″frigate” (they’re really going to have to up my meds, come on lads, I know it’s tradition and the same kind of dodge as County-class missile “destroyers” and “through-deck cruisers” so the Treasury don’t get stroppy, but can we call a spade a spade now?) hits the water, work will commence on either LPD replacement or T45 replacement. And the designers should get on to that in time while also, really, doing some proper blue-sky on future propulsion, sensor, and hull-design issues in case of another sudden lurch forward like the dreadnought and guided-missile eras. As Chris lamented in another thread, if they were part of an Establishment, rather than privately-contracted business interests, they would *anyway*.
Beyond that? Get the extra cells on the T45s soonish — *not* strike cells but more SYLVER. With six rather than eight they need to hold more. An extra 16 cells could get you up to 56 Aster 30 and 32 quad-packed Ceptor in the last set of cells, or at the very least use Mk 41 and quad-pack 64 Ceptor in those, saving the Asters for the major threats. Build ten T26 for first-rate ASW. Then go that big Venator/HMNS frigate/Lafayette-sized route for a patrol frigate that also serves as an MCM mothership. Ten of those. Plus there’s the six (hopefully five B2 plus Clyde) Rivers, which could conceivably pack some basic MCM gear for “routine” clearance work in low-threat environments on/in that back deck if not in their normal EEZ patrol role. That gives you a layered set of 32 surface vessels: 6 T45 (and successor with even more VLS cells), 10 T26, 10 some kind of *actually* light frigate, 6 late-run Rivers. And that’s a surface force that would make some sense.
As Opinion3 says the new smaller Frigate will give the design teams continuity in designing combat warships which has to be a good thing IMHO. The T26 evolved over time so maybe one of the earlier, less complex designs will be dusted off and moved forward perhaps, we did see an awfully lot of CGI of various possible T26 over the years. On the French needing a new Laffayette sized design please please noone tell the PM or he will commit to a joint design and we know how that will proceed. On that note though the paper did say we will commit to a Anglo-French UCAS project but that was on the cards anyway as to expensive for any single European nation to try to build as we don’t have a Burt Rutan overhere who can build the impossible for only six figure sums not ten digit sums like the big commercial firms seem to need but that’s another story.
* Correction in the last graf — that’s “HMNZS frigate” which as Donald in Tokyo (IIRC) above mentioned are both getting Ceptor quad-packed in their single MK41 launcher.
@Repulse, ” and the need to replace the LPDs in the mid 3030s” – that’s good value, might need a few refits though!
Seriously, your idea is an option but might be a bit optimistic on MHPC – i feel it will be more like 8-10, and a sensible position in my view would be to keep a few Hunts in reserve for UK port security
@ Peter Elliott
Absolutely right. I have argued for many years that we need to retain high end design, tooling and manufacturing capability here in the UK. If for no other reason we are NOT dependent of friendly allies who may become less than friendly. So a Typhoon is (apparently) more expensive than a Rafale (and lets not get into which is ‘better’)? What price all those very skilled people in BAE on the Dole? It hurt when shipbuilding ended in Portsmouth but at least we (the UK) retained the skills in Scotland. And maybe Scotland itself. We should learn from the French themselves. They fiercely defend their own manufacturing and sourcing capabilities and to be fair they do OK at it as well. So I am perfectly OK with us (taxpayers) paying a bit more, or have workloads spread across the country (as we did with the carriers) or having follow on orders to keep design skills improving. Because what happens this year in defence could be happening in civvy land next. If we have to ‘buy in’ then we pay twice: The profits to the foreign supplier and the welfare to our out of work people. Sometimes we have no choice (like the P-8 deal which is an excellent aircraft and we need it quickly) but where we DO have the choice we should ‘build it here’. IMHO.
Where are the sailors coming fro Jackstaff. I can see the governement building ships if the price is right. But they seem constitutionally incapable of converting Light Infantry cap badges into sailors and airmen. Or indeed into Engineers, Artillerymen, Logisticians or any of the other things a fighting brigade needs. 82,000 is clearly a totemic number for our PM. Maybe we can dump a load of the purple tasks of cyber etc onto the Army cap badges in order to free up blue personnel for where they’re neeeded…
@Fedaykin – Apologies for misquoting you. Used to be a journo you see. Old habits.
@Peter Elliot
On the cyber front the Army will host the 77th Brigade , all be it less than 500 strong.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/77th_Brigade_(United_Kingdom)
Stephen
I don’t think much of the 77 Bde is “Cyber”
More like hearts and minds, media ops and Psyops.
The 3 Joint Cyber Units ( Corsham, Cheltenham, and Reserve ) are tri service, no idea which service contributes the most?
RAF and Army also maintain their own InfoSec units separate to these.
Stephen – I suppose my point being are there many headcount in blue uniforms currently doing cyber or other joint stuff who can be backfilled with green bodies counted within the PM’s 82,000?
The most intriguing line for me in SDSR was acctually the comment about cap badges being “reconfigured” in the non deployable part of the army. Might we see units with an infantry hetitage actually be redirected to othet tasks…?
@Jackstaff
“That gives you a layered set of 32 surface vessels: 6 T45 (and successor with even more VLS cells), 10 T26, 10 some kind of *actually* light frigate, 6 late-run Rivers. And that’s a surface force that would make some sense.”
Plus the flat tops etc but then we would have a Royal Navy that could truly impose our policy on the world , independent of others which we last scraped together in ’82.
To be quite honest I am obscurely disappointed that there was not more jiggery pokery with the RM and the RAF Rgt to achieve the PM’s headline Army number. We expect such devious stratagems from our wonderful pollies…
@ Wiseape – apols – half the comment got gobbled
@ PE – “If we do decide to buy French it needs to be seen for what it is: the end of indiginous complex warship building,”
This. Would put a hole beneath the waterline of the Strategic Industry Warship industry TOBA.
Chish – no argument from me about adding weighting factors to proposals that favour job creation/retention in the UK and penalise imports – our EU neighbours apparently do this and have done it for decades without raising any complaints from the Eurocrats in Brussels/Strasbourg so its obviously a completely legal option. And indeed entirely legitimate – UK jobs not supported (and lost as a consequence) are a direct cost on the Treasury and an indirect cost with loss of export possibilities.
For years now our Chancellor and the PM have told us we can only have strong Armed Forces if we have a strong economy – perhaps they themselves should do more to support UK businesses through Gov’t/MOD contracts then.
TBH Jedi its probably all mush unless the Scots make UDI. The PM spoke truth when he said that the only thing that would stop the ships being built in Scotland is if Scotland leave the UK. And if built there I would expect them to be designed in the UK too. Its only if the Clyde yards go that any serious shakeout can be expected. This is one of those SDSR loose ends that will be tied up next time: like ASW-MPA, Naval Fixed Wing, gapping ASAC etc. By the time we actually get to 2025 we will have a much clearer idea what sort of warships we need after the 8 ASW T26. For me it will probably still be more T26. But doing the preliminary design studies for other things in the meantime can do no harm.
The nickname for 77 Bde is ‘Twitter troops’
The Merlin HM1 are most of their way through their upgrade to HM2 which started back in 2010.
It’s certainly been a very interesting few days!
Considering this SDSR was perceived over the last 5 years to be at best a ‘steady as she goes’ review with minimal change or at worst another round of savage cuts i’d say things have gone very well.
A few thoughts that i have been collating in the brain-box……
-The RAF is the clear winner, with sensible decisions like retaining some older Typhoon’s and extending the OSD to genuine surprises in the shape of a whopping 14 Hercules retained (i thought maybe 6-8 at most), the entire ISTAR fleet ring-fenced and invested in and confirmation on not 4 or 5, but 9 Poseidon which i’m sure provided most of us with a collective sigh of relief!
– With regards to F35 i don’t quite get the fan-fare from some quarters given that the plan remains EXACTLY the same as before, with vague assurances of a total of 138 ordered eventually (as in probably not until it replaces Typhoon) and promises of 24 available for carrier ops, which coming from a fleet of 42-48 air-frames and 2 active squadrons with be a very demanding challenge that it will be interesting to watch unfold.
– This talk of 5 ‘cheaper, general purpose frigates’ really isn’t worth worrying about considering how far into the future we are talking about and how much can change in the interim, these days it’s essentially only worth pondering/looking 5-10 years ahead. 8 Type 26 confirmed is more than some of us were expecting. The crucial thing is that a commitment remains for 19 surface ships and the RN avoided anymore painful cuts. If they have to tie-up a couple of T23’s and use them for training (so long as it’s only temporary) until the manpower situation stabilizes then i reckon they got off very lightly.
– 2 more River’s, even though it’s purely to keep the yards busy, should be made the most of. I’d really like to see in 10 years time HMS Clyde still in the Falkland’s, the 3 batch 2’s currently under construction as successors to the batch 1’s and these 2 additions built to a better spec, with some sort of hangar so that they are actually useful in the West Indies or Horn of Africa.
– New Army structure? Jury is still out for me. I just wish they’d make up their bloody minds! The continued supremacy of the cap-badge mafia was hardly surprising, but annoying none the less.
– Still lots of unanswered questions and fence sitting beyond F35 and T26. MARS SSS, Hawk T1 replacement, the future for the AAC’s older Lynx and Gazelle’s, when those 3 mine-hunters will be scrapped and whether they’ll be Hunt’s, or Sandown’s or a mix of both etc. Also no mentions on the future flying training contracts and possible RAF station closures like Linton-on-Ouse.
I dont quite get it when say 45 F35s are being talked about, it only translates to 2 squadrons worth, say 24. Surely if there is a future requirement of well over 100, then there is no need to set aside any of ‘the 45’ for an attrition reserve or for storage ( upgrades to existing planes will be very expensive, best to buy when needed and get latest model)
There isnt to be a two seat version and a lot of training will be simulator based, so not really a training squadron as well and if you need some real airframes to train in, then for 24 in operational fleet 6-8 would be enough.
Looking at the numbers of 48 and the way they will be used tells be this is the maximum fleet, unless they are thinking of later switching to F-35A model ??
Duker if we are standing up the first squadron of 12 planes in 2018 then by 2023 I would expect those 12 to be back at the factory for upgrade to the latest spec.
There will also still be UK planes in the OEU and OCU.
Does anyone know when the UK OCU is supposed to stand up? I understood the US OCU would be used initially.
duker – good point I’d completely missed that there are no F35 VTOL two seaters for training. (As it stands there are no two seat F35s at all?) Could be a job for BAE if LM aren’t interested? Due to the lift fan the only way to go tandem would be to extend the cockpit forward but the aircraft has a stubby nose. So it would seem a side by side option fits best; the structure seems quite wide enough.
Simulators have become very lifelike and convincing, but there is always a nagging doubt that the computed dynamics might not be as hostile or difficult to master as real life. For day to day flying they would seem entirely adequate – I used to work on civvy jet simulators and taught myself to fly on a 737 full-flight sim; when the job finished I used a bit of the overtime income on a trial flight at the local airfield in which the instructor, when offering the control to me and seeing a light twitch of the yoke not ten white knuckles, demanded “Are you a pilot?” in an accusatory tone. All learnt by Braille in a darkened shed in the Midlands. Based on simulator learning could I cope with flying in benign conditions? Yes. Could I land if there was no option? Probably. Could I navigate by instruments? Tricky. Could I cope with a damaged aircraft in atrocious weather at night and land safely? Oh come on; outside Hollywood that needs real pilots with experience. So simulators are effective to a degree but not the same as real life with all the curved-balls nature and bad luck can throw.
Duker, out of 45 Lightning, there’ll be eight based in the US for a multinational training establishment, five in a UK OCU, and if you allow for another eight hangar-bound aircraft for second line or deeper maintenance, then you have 24 F35 available to the operational squadrons.
Ginge, I suggest that the self deploying bit of the strike brigades would be MIV and perhaps protected mobility units. At a strength of 5,000 mentioned in the statement, there is room for a number of units and different types of unit; having a Warrior battalion with armour and cavalry squadrons doesn’t preclude other higher mobility units.
Note that the armoured brigades are no longer the first responders that they were in the 2020 Reaction Force. The new reaction force (if I can borrow that term) is the two strike and one air assault brigades. There needs to be armoured units held at readiness. Even if they are slower to get where they are going than MIV and paratroopers, you need ready units otherwise the leading armoured battlegroup might take three months to mobilise and get to a port.
There are still six Warrior battalions in my suggested outcome – two each in the remaining two armoured brigades (as per the 2020 plan but minus the protected mobility element), and one Warrior battalion in each of the new strike brigades taken from the dissolved third armoured brigade.
The statement specifically mentioned Ajax being in the strike brigades too. This huge lump of a vehicle would share many of the deployment issues with Challenger. The presence of heavy elements within this new reaction force doesn’t prevent paras or air assault battalions zipping out quick smart by plane, or light and medium wheeled vehicles self deploying or also jumping on a plane.
My view is that the strike brigades are oversized formations that will probably never deploy as whole units; but along with 16 Air Assault brigade will be able to generate any type of lead battlegroup that the Army may need. After that, the Army will look left towards the armoured brigades, or right towards the infantry brigades, for following forces as appropriate.
Duker, “Definitely not a squad of guys in bearskin hats!”.
I was in London on the day that Yvonne Fletcher was killed, and there were plenty of soldiers on the streets after that. Squads carrying SLRs, wearing various uniforms including No2 dress and also ceremonial uniforms without hats.
The ceremonial troops are armed and do have actual security functions, as well as looking pretty. Bearskins can be removed if the task in hand does not require marching smartly upright towards the enemy.
The only other security alert I can think of when ceremonial dressed soldiers were involvedx was when that chump fired blanks at the queen, but they were still part of the security and initial response.
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2015/11/24/hms-ocean-scrapped-defence-review_n_8636364.html?utm_hp_ref=uk-politics&ir=UK Politics
A year ot two premature? Or does it just fit in with the refit cycle?
RTFM Jules!
An MoD spokesman said: “HMS Ocean will not decommission early and will continue in service as planned well into this Parliament. As part of the SDSR process, the decision was taken not to extend her and to decommission her in 2018, in line with her 20 year life span.”
As much as people complain the House of Lors is undemocratic, sometimes they are more knowledgeable than your average MP.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201516/ldhansrd/text/151123-0002.htm
Better Q& A than it was between PM and Commons.
Jules,
That article is just the kind of bullshit I would expect from a far keft rag like Huffpo.
Ocean’s OSD has been 2018 for years, the refit last year was designed to get her to 2018, her replacement will be QE. There has been no change to Ocean’s future as a consequence of this review.
Yep, like on manning:
“As for manning, the reorganisation of manpower within the Navy will ensure that sufficient people are trained and available to man and operate both Queen Elizabeth carriers. The requirement for each carrier is, I understand, a crew of 733 sailors. The planned retirement of HMS “Ocean” in 2018, combined with a rationalisation and reprioritisation of personnel across the naval service, plus the uplift of 400 extra personnel, which I mentioned, will ensure that sufficient people are trained and available to man and operate both carriers.”
If 400 is enough why did they ask for 2,000? Something ‘s got to give somewhere. It’s not as if the RN’s been cruising around the last 5 years in a state of chronic over manning is it..?
As for the RAF will 300 extra bods really enable it to stand up 9 P8A, 10 Protectors and 24 F35B over and above the current FE@R? The only savings I can see to offset that are the Tornado Navigators and the end of the various seed corn schemes. But seed corn was never supposed to hide away whole units worth of personnel. I understood it’s the leaders and instructors who have been away on exchange. The ‘bods’ for the new units will still have to be found and trained: that’s why it’s called “seedcorn”. All looks a bit too good to be true at the moment…
Have to say good points
1. keeping a plane that is still young and can do stuff flying giving the RAF 7 Typhoon Sq. Plus 3 Tornado at the moment being replaced by F35 on a rolling basis.
2. 9 P8’s never thought the RAF would get 9 hence my support for Hercules to get the numbers, but 9 with caveats over Airrefueling and which/what Torpedoes.
3. 8 T26 full ASW Frigates. (Heck the size they are and T45’s better to call them Cruisers or Light Cruisers).
4. Hercules Fleet for SF, hopefully with air refueling and gunship pods to be used to provide support to SF’s and extend range of Helicopters. Maybe those old C130J’s not as flogged to death as we were lead to believe.
5. Army no more cut in numbers.
6. Mars SSS confirmed at 3 ships.
So lots to be thankfull for, but (ain’t there always a but) the problems are;
1. The likelyhood of a future Government following through on 5 Light Frigates (Actualy really what we would all call Frigates).
2. The gap in deployabiility of F35’s and the OSD of Tornado.
3. The Glaring Gaps in the Air Group for F35’s when deployed on QE eg Air Refueling.
4. The fact that with 4 (split 2 Heavy Armour, 2 Medium Armour) Deployable brigades in the Reaction Force plus 3Cdo (swing role Light Inf/Medium), 16 AABB (Light Inf) you lose 1 Tank Reg and Heavy Logistics/Artillery Support.
5. “upto” 6 OPV’s which means we could end up with only 3 and please build the 2 new ones with a Hanger, be it retractable or not and retro fit one of the Batch 2’s, so we have Clyde with Flight Deck and give them light anti air / Anti ship missiles. They fit them on fast attck craft so there must be room on a 90m OPV.
6. People and numbers. Both the RAF and Navy Struggle now to cover requirments with extra planes and boats 700 extra people is not enough. Look at staffing numbers if you cut 30,000 MOD staff at least give some of the saving to these two forces to have the right engineers/logisticians etc.
So overall a good SDR but one in which again there is too much wiggle room for Dave and George to wiggle out of stuff. And really with the kit we’ve got and even with the new stuff how they are going to staff 2 x 5,000 Brigades as a Strike 1,000 mile self deployable units is beyond me.
PS has anybody ever thought of sticking the 105mm towed Gun on to a 7.5 Truck chassis such as a Foxhound ? At 7.5T still “light” and transportable, Shells etc towed in a Trailer, IED protected to a degree, self deploying hydralic spades ? Shoot and Scoot ? Self Deployable by Road over a 1,000 miles ? Give me a welding torch and some steels and I could knock one up.
Ginge now you sound like FBOT ;)
@PE
No 300 won’t be enough to cover that many new a/c as mention as well as continuing the GR4 run on and the Hercs that are to be kept in service and then two Typhoon Sqns. There’s a fair few posts that need filling.
IIRC the “Protectors” are supposed to replace the Reapers IDC, so should not be a massive manpower impact.
I suspect there are going to be some reductions in “staff” and DE&S posts – as is already happening in the RN, where 300 officer posts are going to allow an extra 600 OR, I believe in addition to the SDSR 400.
As for manning the FJ squadrons – don’t forget a proportion of that will come from dark blue in any case. A mischievous type might also suggest one of the “retained” Tranche 1 squadrons ought to gain an 800 series number plate and be dark blue heavy, ready for transition to F35 later in the 20s and significant time spent embarked.
Topman – one presumes Tornado will go. But that resource will be sucked up by the new Typhoon squadrons. An awkward transition to manage in the middle of an Operation but achievable given its 3 squadrons into 2. Once thats done and you bring back the naval aviators who are away flying F18s it might allow you to stand up the first F35 squadron. But Im buggered if I can see where the second comes from: ground crew and maintainers as much as pilots.
Will the numbers of personnel to operate Herc Atlas be significantly diffe-rent from Herc-J HercK? At least the physical skilled bodies must exist in this case, albeit that a previously forecast budget saving is now being reversed out.
I guess with P8 the buildup to 9 airframes could take a while during which heads will be scratched and back offices raided to find the crews…
Ginge, the LIMAWS program looked at sticking a 155mm gun on to a Supacat chassis, LIMAWS(G), and also a six pack of MLRS, LIMAWS(R).
Intended to support air-mobile forces, but eventually abandoned. Do a search on this site for it, TD’s definitely done stuff on it. LIMAWS stands for Light mumblemumble Weapon System (Rocket/Gun).
Peter, already flying Reaper are various helicopter and transport aircraft pilots. Twice as many Protector UAV will probably suck up a few more trained pilots from elsewhere. So all those Chinook, Hercules, Atlas, C17 are probably a bit of an illusionary transport force. Core groups of manpower for each aircraft fleet, and some ability to move fixed-wing RAF pilots from one platform to another, if given enough time (Atlas to Herc or vice versa for example); but no capacity to fully operate all the fixed-wing transport at the same time, and no capacity to fully operate Protector without pulling out trained aircrew from Puma/Chinook fleets or Atlas/Hercules fleets.
There are currently eight RAF fast jet squadrons, the new plan only adds one more to the current total. The difference is against the previous plan which foresaw a temporary drop to six before leveling out at seven.
BB – Are there significant numbers of RAF reservists who could backfill, say, the transport fleet in the event of a “surge” requirement?
How many dark and light blue personnel (Sailors, deck, aviators, ASW) are there serving away with allied navies night now?
Hurrah for pulling senior officers out of DE&S to pay for sailors. Should reduce the paper chase and wheel reinvention effects of procurement considerably :)
The trend goes even further back. Way back it was envisaged we would buy 24 T42 (to roughly a B3 design) and we got 12 of which 8 were the shorter “version”.
As much as I like the RIvers it is a shame we aren’t getting something a bit bigger (a la Thetis sized) but heck we have to keep BAE in work.
No replacement for HMS Protector which can be lumped in with the no replacement for hydrographic ships.
Be careful how you characterise “senior” officers. In the main these are O4/O5 posts providing shore tours – particularly for engineers – and often filling the “Requirement Mgr” posts in IPTs. ADmirals, Generals and Air Marshals, these ain’t. That engineering knowledge will have to be backfilled somehow – and as per the other thread – it’s not like there’s a huge pool of CS ready (or qualified) to take over. A tough choice and it will be interesting to see how it works out.
Replacements for IPS and the Droggies are probably outside the horizon of the equipment plan and review – although as noted before, there was no mention of MHC at all, just a reference to the UK/FR MCM demonstrator…….
@NaB
‘IRC the “Protectors” are supposed to replace the Reapers IDC, so should not be a massive manpower impact.’
I wouldn’t be too sure about that, they require alot more manpower than people imagine, even more than many in the RAF imagined. Doubling the number of aircraft and replacing them with a/c that have a longer time airborne will take a fair few more aircrew than we’ve planned for.
@ PE
We’ve not got the exact time frames of everything entering service and there’s a fair few questions still. Keeping a close eye on what info manning put out in the coming weeks and months would give a better idea. Safe to say that it will be very tight. Nevertheless I’m sure the numbers have been crunched, however IMO I don’t think we’ll get all the people in the right time at the right place.
Don’t necessarily disagree Topman – the “unmanned” reality is certainly nothing like the perception! One supposes it will come down to a FE@R argument – how many orbits to be maintained concurrently….how many “Protector” frames in sustainment…..
NAB – fewer people on longer tours overseeing fewer projects all of which actually deliver must be the way forward.
All those projects that never passed main gate represent a terrific waste of resource. If we’ve finally managed to stop doing that then there will be savings to be had…
Basically Main Gate was always a bottleneck because only those projects that were really really really needed got ordered. But lots of projects got started because people further down the food chain believed they were needed and could be afforded ‘somehow’. Result: colossal confusion, overheating and waste.
IF (big if) we’ve succeeded in devolving the “do we really really really need it” discipline down to the people who allow projects to start then we can save a huge amount of wasted effort and cost. And people like Chris might even find an agile, pragmatic customer willing to consider buying his designs…
@NaB
Agreed, that goes for every fleet, it all depends on how much we want to pay to support them properly. Just my feeling, there are a fair few bumps in the manning road ahead.
While not disagreeing with the fewer people / longer tours element, I’d caution against conflating that with projects not passing MG – irrespective of Graysian legend.
The issues of extended assessment phases (or even more common – failed IGs) are at least as much down to what was happening at the other end of the M4. Something that was largely unf8cked by spreadsheet Phil. Time will tell whether that discipline is firmly embedded in the new FLC budget holders.
From today’s Autumn Statement :
With the Joint Security Fund and a growing budget, MOD will invest £11 billion in new capabilities, innovation and the defence estate. F35 aircraft will be purchased sooner than planned, so that by 2023 Britain will have 1 of its 2 new aircraft carriers available at all times to operate anywhere in the world, capable of deploying with 24 F35 jets on board. The government will buy 9 Maritime Patrol Aircraft to protect the nuclear deterrent and develop plans for a new general purpose frigate for the Navy, as part of a national shipbuilding strategy to be published in 2016. The government will also make the necessary resources available to build 4 new submarines to renew the UK’s Trident-armed nuclear deterrent.
The Joint Security Fund will enable the intelligence agencies to increase their headcount by 15%, 1900 more intelligence officers, improving their capacity to investigate, analyse and disrupt terrorist threats. The Single Intelligence Account (SIA) will also invest in a bigger and more capable global network and enhance its capability to fuse intelligence with the armed forces to disrupt threats and take decisive action in the most hostile operating environments worldwide.
Counter-Terrorism
The UK, like other countries, faces a clear terrorist threat. At Summer Budget, the government committed to protecting cross-government Counter-Terrorism (CT) spend of more than £2 billion per year. This spending has been reviewed and tested within the SDSR to identify efficiencies for reinvestment and to ensure it reflects our highest counter terrorism priorities. On top of that, the government will spend 30% more overall in real terms on key counter terrorism capabilities over the Parliament. Together, this will mean:
•investment in new counter terrorism capabilities for the security and intelligence agencies worth £1.4 billion to enable them to investigate, analyse and help disrupt terrorist plots
•£2 billion of new investment in the capability of UK Special Forces to strike terrorists wherever they are in the world
•£500 million of additional investment in the Home Office to protect UK citizens from terrorist threats, including: a real terms increase to the CT Policing Grant; a new National Digital Exploitation Service to analyse the growing volumes of seized media for evidence and intelligence leads; an increased number of specialist firearms officers; improved intelligence and threat detection at the border; and increased efforts to counter the poisonous ideologies that feed terrorism and extremism
To enable the government to respond to emerging threats to UK interests overseas, including regional stability, the Spending Review announces that the government will expand the Conflict, Security and Stability Fund to more than £1.3 billion a year by 2020 to enable the UK to respond rapidly and effectively to crises and instability and meet our international peacekeeping commitments.
The National Cyber Security Programme will build on the successes of the last Parliament and expand in scope and ambition. The government will create a new National Cyber Centre to be a unified source of advice and support for the country and will continue its investment in the offensive cyber programme to ensure the UK has cutting edge capabilities in this new domain of warfare. In total the government will spend £1.9 billion on cyber capabilities, an increase of 76% on the last Parliament.
All of the departments and organisations involved in defence and security will achieve more within their budgets and deliver significant efficiencies. MOD will deliver £9.2 billion of savings, the SIA will deliver £1.3 billion and £400 million will be achieved from cross government counter-terrorism spending. Some of MOD’s savings will come from freeing up unused assets, including £1 billion from estate sales. All of these savings will be reinvested into capabilities to protect our national security.
To maintain the UK’s global influence, freedom of action and operational advantage, the government will broaden the supply base and encourage new and innovative companies by establishing a £165 million Defence and Cyber Innovation Fund. The government will ensure its buying decisions support defence exports where possible and will establish a dedicated team to support the negotiation and delivery of government-to-government defence and security deals. To further support innovation the government will dedicate 1.2% of its growing defence budget to science and technology over this Parliament.
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/spending-review-and-autumn-statement-2015-documents/spending-review-and-autumn-statement-2015#departmental-settlements
Reading through the Lords Hansard record that HMAFR pointed at this morning, I found this statement by Earl Howe that might interest those of Wavy Navy bias:
“The concept of designing and building a new class of lighter, flexible, general-purpose frigate is, I hope, interesting to noble Lords. We are clear that behind that lies an aspiration to increase the total number of frigates and destroyers available to the Royal Navy. If we can produce something that is more generic—that is less high-spec when it does not need to be state-of-the-art high-spec—that should benefit the reach and capability of the Royal Navy in the round. It should also benefit shipbuilders in Scotland and the rest of the UK. We will publish a new shipbuilding strategy in 2016 setting out the detail of that.”
So that’s more than 19 vessels in the future, and the suggestion the shipbuilding might be desired in multiple locations, not all on the Clyde and the Forth.
Many IGs/assessment phases were little more than make-work processes, many minor project teams for unimportant things became temporary holding facilities for non-stellar personnel.
Shame though, I guess they need the bods for for QE/POW?
NAB – well if there’s 300 fewer IPT people they won’t be able to start too many new projects will they? ;)
Hohum – that’s true as well. By appointing fewer people they will have no choice but you select the best, which will also lead to the right conclusions being reached quicker and with less faff.
Sounds great put that way Chris, you a spin doctor? ;-)
Venator for me but somehow I don’t see them coming in that cheap so it may have to be Khareef (£133,000,000 a pop in 2011) manning is the beggar as those have a crew of a 100, must be able to get that down though?
PE – ref agile pragmatic buyers – I have found many personnel in the briefings so far conducted who are pragmatic and of agile minds. The difficulty is that The System is inflexible; there is a prescribed process and no programme may deviate. It is this which demands big competitions and ensures MOD gets stuff years after the requirement was set and at anything but good value prices. There are better ways to acquire defence materiel in what are (in global terms) small quantities but, try as I might to help, the MOD is unwilling to consider changing its ways. Oh well – it is said patience is a virtue; I must be very very virtuous.
You guys do realise that there’s an “S” in DE&S, right?
It may also interest people to know that starting a new procurement (or upgrade) project in an IPT needs a “requirement” which can only be generated, approved and funded by what was once the EC customer, on the basis of an operational need. In many cases that “requirement” turned out to be woefully ill-justified………
On Chris’ point if the brown-job part of the house is anything like the dark blue, it isn’t the RMs that are the issue, it’s the “commercial/finance” community – many of who are what was once admin types who got sent on a course.
NaB,
Yes, that was the point. The customer often knew full-well that the requirement was ill-justified.
The big motivation for wanting to outsource DE&S was to overcome the admin guys on a course problem.
In my experience, the EC customer usually said “shiny – want one” and was then surprised when it wasn’t immediately forthcoming and then outraged when told he had to justify said requirement.
As for the outsourcing bit – correct, Gray was explicit on that – but that had very little to do with the military posts, with the notable exception of Project Management, where a relatively limited number of senior mil were put in a position where they got found out, badly – as did many of the CS ones too.
Many customers had a ‘get your foot in the door’ policy, get an IPT up and running so they were ready when a budget hole appeared, the approach had the unfortunate side effect of generating essentially phantom opportunities for industry.
Project management was dire, it depends where you draw the line of senior. The whole thing was amateur hour- both mil and civilian personnel. Things are much better now.
Some brief, general thoughts while I carry on wrestling with the little details (I hear you about wearing out by the last couple of sections, TD):
It is *not* a naked exercise in Treasury control, Conservative (as opposed to Tory along with everyone else, ie “Conservative” as the modern, radicalised right wing of classical liberalism) ideology, and wardrobe by Billy Bullshit, as the Osborne Axe in 2010 was. For that may we all be truly thankful. (It was Thanksgiving last month in Canada and this month in the States, and with current connections to both the link between gratitude and overeating is happily on my mind :) There was, as our blog boss points out, moments of genuine strategy, or at the very least evidence of not only thought but direction on strategic issues. So much so in a few places that I felt both surprised and, for want of any better word, warmly happy. Just the thought that there are still sane, considered people somewhere in the machinery getting these things into a final government product made Monday a little lighter.
It was, for want of a better word, patchy. Especially when you read it through a couple of times. That’s to be expected I suppose, particularly in any document that could be linked to the expectations we have of people who 1) want to be elected again in five years’ time and 2) are jockeying for position when Call Me Dave takes his leave to reap the rewards of directorships and an advance on his memoirs. Especially the front-“patting”, if you take my meaning, about economic management. Way to make the back half of the title into a campaign ad, lads. At the same time one of the most interesting and important — devil’s in the details — aspects of this Review is that tension between the very definite and clearly-directed, and the purposely vague or simply unfinished. Didn’t help that there are bits, especially towards the front end, that are mortifyingly edited. (I was an editor in one of my past lives; different standards apply between internet comments off the cuff, where I for one am famous for rambling, and documents where you’ve had considerable time to line-edit and think, as proper bureaucrats do, about the very specific and varied meanings of words and phrases.) Dave Hisownself seems incapable of saying anything that’s not bromides (hey, TD, given our mutual fondness for lowbrow American satires, have you ever seen Bull Durham? Don’t have to “get” baseball to understand it, and there’s a lovely scene early on where Kevin Costner’s character has a long monologue to Tim Robbins’ character about how he needs to “learn his clichés”, ie learn how to speak in them, in order to make it in the big leagues.) It’s the lurching back and forth thereafter that gets interesting.
– Real clarity on some major shipbuilding — and ship-employment — issues, then trailing off into vagueries.
– Some very important good sense about how and where to employ the Army’s resources, and a suggestion of how to go about structuring for purpose, and then more fuzziness.
– The RAF comes off best on that front; perhaps their single greatest success in this exercise was receiving a relatively deep (but again, it’s people, people, people, and how will the service be trained and manned to accomplish what’s laid out) picture of both kit and plans for employment over the medium term.
– On other issues, the lurch gets deeper, moments of vivid clarity on some but not all aspects of cyber security, some really excellent but far too brief mentions of things like food security, crisis management of epidemiology, and the threat of antibiotic resistance, and them more bromides or at least concepts without much detail on counter-radicalization, and procurement processes, and most especially *systemic* thought (not just “that’d be nice and we’re saying we’ll try it) for improving life for serving personnel and their families.
– Also, there’s the matter of strategy itself. To my mind, it is actually possible to draw together the seemingly disparate issues and concerns of the threat assessment under a large heading. We are in the middle of a comprehensive, three-fold crisis of the Westphalian state. Such states where they were set up from the top-down (often artificially) in the wake of collapsing empires, from the Russian fringe and the Balkans through swathes of Asia and Africa, are failing left and right and being replaced by alternatives. The traditional centers of the Westphalian state in the industrialised West are in deep crisis as well for several reasons. Also we’ve got powerful states, often trying to mitigate their own internal crises and stressors, are throwing their weight around sensing openings caused by the weakness of the states that once counterbalanced them (those newfound sparring partners Russia and Turkey are classic examples, and indeed are in this little farrago exactly because of that behaviour.) It would be nice to have a clear synoptic vision on that front.
If I had to pick a single word to describe this SDSR (and what sort of tree would I be you ask? Probably maple, these days. Friend to the noble waffle :) it’d be “headed.” It’s *headed* in useful, often I’d say the right, direction and various points. Sometimes it gets to the destination. More often it goes along very well for a while and then fades out. Par for the course, I suppose. I suppose that’s really the best possible result for the likes of us, because it gives us five years of bloody good arguing ahead!
More substance later. But that’s my own, flawed, personal impression.
The reason Northolt is still there, is Heathrow will have told the Gov’ment to f**k-off… As I supect every other commercial airfield will have- nothing screws up your departure board, and local airspace like a ‘Head of State’ flight… The extra separation required Is a nightmare…
As LHR Is able to chuck an aeroplane into the air every two minutes… And does! The last thing it want’s is a 125-800 requiring a separation normally given to the space shuttle.
@ Chris
It’s a good chance that for one of the blokes up front of your next flight, will have fully converted to type without ever touching the real thing… And indeed all his instrument checks, differences training, safety drills etc… Line checks can be done as part of a ‘normal’ flight.
Comprehensive Spending Review, section 11.1:
“Efficiency and reform
The MOD will deliver £9.2 billion of savings while maintaining the current number of Armed Forces personnel. All of these savings will be directly reinvested into the defence budget to enable investment in new capability to protect the UK’s national security. These savings will be made from military and civilian pay restraint, reductions to the civilian headcount, the ending of military commitment bonuses, reductions in travel expenditure and professional fees as well as further efficiencies within the Equipment Programme by ensuring that the MOD gets the best commercial terms when buying new equipment.”
WTAF is ‘pay restraint’ at a time when we should be investing in our people?
@TAS
That pay thing seems a bit mad to me too when recruitment and retention in key roles if not in general is struggling to say the least.
Bbrssa – the sim I helped create was indeed described as a ‘zero flight time’ trainer, as in good enough to train pilots to fly that version of 737 without need of in-aircraft training. Certainly we tried hard to make the sim as good as we could in line with the comments and suggestions of the airline test team. But whether it fully mirrored the aircraft behaviour in extreme conditions I can’t say. As an example on a quiet night shift I tried to get the simulated aircraft into a spin. There was nothing I could do (with exception of persistent bootfuls of rudder) that would upset the simulated aircraft beyond the point where letting go of all controls resulted in a smooth roll out into straight & level flight (as the trim settings instructed). It might be that the aircraft really does have remarkably safe benign behaviour and does sort itself out no matter what transient stupidity the pilot applies, but it did seem – um – optimistic? So zero flight time conversion to type is probably entirely adequate for nearly every situation and condition, but there’s always the nagging doubt at the back of the mind that the sim has not been as difficult to tame in extreme conditions than the real aircraft would be…
A minor example of sim software hidden flaws; the sim was up on its legs one day and I was wafting about in typically un-pilotlike manner. If I recall it was an eastward take-off from Gatwick with 90 degree bank right over the perimeter, in the middle of which to tighten the turn I throttled back a bit. It felt a bit funny and there was a big bang and stuff fell on the floor. Outside the sim, the onlookers saw the 9t sim take a sudden and suicidal lurch to the right, hammering into the ram end-stops with such force the building shook and there were fears the ‘up’ side legs might have been torn from the ground. There was a single variable in the motion software that had been missed from the ‘motion wash-out’ function. It was found and fixed so there wouldn’t be a repeat, but it turned out the same error was in several sims in service and had never been discovered, because it was a flight condition no real pilot would normally explore. I had put the simulator in a condition close to the edge of flight envelope and there were issues with the simulation there.
I’m guessing as the RAF currently operates 8 fastjet squadrons so instead of 5 typhoon and 3 tornado it will be 7 typhoon and 1 f35. The additional f35 sqn being stood up by the navy guys flying hornets ect. Assuming of course that the current units are fully manned….
As the sentinel will go as p8 starts to ramp up not to mention the seed-corn people but the AWACS fleet is also apparently getting an increase in crews not to mention the increase in shadow numbers..
My guess is that Shadow is used rather like the USAF/US SOC Project Liberty 350ERs, as an adjunct to SF operations, and with an increase in funding for SF, it would seem that a few more Shadows makes sense to increase our capability to deliver offensive SF operations. There are a lot of other tasty projects – in addition to Zephr, Protector and Shadow, which are primarily to improve SF capabilites, there will be upgrades to SF helicopters (AAR for Chinook?) and C-130s. All very good news. The Strike Brigades are one assumes to create a capability to go anywhere quickly, do a job and come home – a different philosophy to the enduring operations that have bogged us down and eaten our budgets over the past 15 years. The 10,000 strong army support for domestic CT is also interesting – implying that UK based light infantry is going to need to retrain on CT ops. A lot of MRAPs will be freed up by MIV and presumably Force Troops or light infantry will get these? Nothing on artillery for the Strike brigades as yet. The T26 decision is a wise one in my view. The aim is to have more than 19 escorts, plus ‘up to’ six OPVs, but on the same budget. All good.
Brian, of course the ‘Royal Guard’ are still trained soldiers and would be useful in some incident, but the idea that they have a major function for protecting HM doesnt stack up.- most of the time she isnt in the centre of London, Windsor castle is seen as ‘home’. The only other place that has a military guard is Holyrood- and that for a fews days a year.
The original suggestion was that the ceremonial part could be done mostly by reserves, and considering that Palace duty ( with includes St James/Clarence House) has been regularly done by units such as RAF regiment, Ghurkas, Royal Marines and even Commonwealth units, this would make fantastic sense, with only tradition against it.
It should become a ‘reserves tradition’ instead which gives them much needed cachet, and with occasional spots for foot guards and regular forces.
Thanks Chris. Simulators allow young pilots to make serious mistakes and conversely practice once in a lifetime situations over and over. Recently I was reading a review of a book by a senior British brain surgeon – it was in the Guardian so they used the fancy term neurosurgeon- and his comments were enlightening. To him the surgery itself was straightforward, the really difficult part was whether to operate at all. For flying , the corollary would be simulators might get them out of trouble, but it takes actual flying experience to have the judgement to avoid the looming disasters.
Mention of Zephyr 8 UAV’s in SDSR, 3 to be ordered.
Curious as to what unit would operate these?
@ Peter Elliott
Given the Voyagers are manned by ‘Reservist’ aircrew employed by Air Tanker I can see that model being rolled out to other non combatant roles. Now when I say that I do not demean in any what the lads and lassies in Fat Alberts, A400s, C-17s and Voyagers do. But they aren’t firing Meteors over the horizon or dropping Brimstones so why not use ‘Reservist’ aircrew employed in related careers and immediately available and that would free up RAF people for the new aircraft? And if the Typhoons aren’t replacing Tonkas on a 1 for 1 basis that provides more pilots (2 per in a Tonka) and ground maintainers to convert. Just a thought ….
@Chish
The reservist aircrew work full time on Voyager, so they are ‘switched’ across in terms of employment rather than jobs, in effect their employer changes. There are already resevists on the C130 in a flight however they are all ex RAF that give their experience and pass it on. However (IIRC) their terms of service are limited than a regular serviceman.
On your point about reservists on ‘related’ careers moving in to the RAF. It’s much harder than many imagine, it’s quite expensive to ensure that they remain current and sufficiently trained on both their civi job and their role within the RAF. You need lots and lots of people, especially instructors, to keep an eye on everything. Do someone countries do it? Yes the americans do it, but they have manpower budgets we in the UK can only dream of.
I am channelling Gloomy Northern Lad – because I am one….. I think its all bollocks, and far too much smoke and mirrors. We will never see light frigates enter service, the Strike Brigades are complete load of bollocks and a way to reduce Chally numbers further, oh and to cover up how few men are in most Infantry Battalions… and at some point in the near future there will be a an uproar when it is made public our super-sub-hunting airliners cannot drop British torpedoes……. :-(
New Typhoon pilots are directly transitioning onto the single seaters from the sim, so we’re gradually getting rid of the two seater training aircraft.
Northolt is too important to be sold off. It’s the preferred departure point for business jets. Bringing a lot of income generation. Heathrow is too costly. It’s the perfect location for visiting heads of state. It’s useful to the people from Hereford.
Barbarossa is right Heathrow don’t like vvvvip flights they cause too much grief George W landed there a few years back and caused massive disruption. Now Airforce one lands at Stanstead. I wonder were the UK head of state aircraft will fly from. Voyager is too big for Northolt, Hearhrow would cause problems, and Brize Norton a log way from London.
Well the SDSR seemed Ok, & so did Gideon’s end of pier comedy routine today, but, but, but, the extra spending seems to have come from lower interest payments the gov would otherwise have had to pay, so what happens when interest rates do go up? Frankly, the BoE should have made the first tiny 0.25% rise a year ago, but they sat on their hands to keep their banker/hedgie mates happy. Result, a crazy high property bubble, which Gideon has made worse with yet more taxpayers cash made hostage in a bigger help to buy scheme. Oh & Britain’s vaunted GDP growth is based on this housing bubble. When it bursts, what happens to the MoD 2% when GDP crashes back down? Sorry to out gloomy, gloomy, but government plans are laid on thin ice. Will that ice hold until 2020? I hope so, but there are no guarantees.
I agree entirely that the Light Frigate should be a stripped out T26. There would be design savings, and ship yard set up savings, also training and logistics savings on a hull that would have the same seakeeping qualities as a T26.
JH – in my ‘umble opinion all credit is a bad idea, whether its Gov’t borrowing or more on Mr Average’s credit card than can be paid off at the end of the month. Any plan that creates ‘growth’ out of thin air but which in reality is just borrowing wealth from the future is just nuts. A certain G Brown MP was a master of the technique, even pinching our pension provision to fund vote-winning gizzits. I really hope our latest Chancellor is not playing sleight of hand with the economy by encouraging little more than credit-fuelled feel-good spending. Personally I would have advocated much heavier penalties on those buying more than one property for their own exclusive use (holiday & weekend pads for example) as in rural areas these mostly empty properties not only steal housing from those that live & work locally but also drive property prices to city levels. An annual tax something like 10% of the market value on second (and third and fourth) homes should sort things out…
You’d end up putting concrete in the hold…
Any chance TD could twist Jackstaff’s arm to do an expanded piece on geopolitics?
Lots of interesting ideas in the previous comment – would be interesting to see them fleshed out.
@Challenger
“- This talk of 5 ‘cheaper, general purpose frigates’ really isn’t worth worrying about considering how far into the future we are talking about and how much can change in the interim, these days it’s essentially only worth pondering/looking 5-10 years ahead. 8 Type 26 confirmed is more than some of us were expecting. The crucial thing is that a commitment remains for 19 surface ships and the RN avoided anymore painful cuts. If they have to tie-up a couple of T23’s and use them for training (so long as it’s only temporary) until the manpower situation stabilizes then i reckon they got off very lightly.”
I wonder if this indicates a better procurement process though. It seems to me “fitted for but not with” , reductions in numbers, redesigns and even prevarication have all been used fairly recently to keep within budget. This sounds more like
‘OK, so I hear what you say, if you can hit a maximum unit cost of £xm for the 8 units then I’ll place the order. We agreed the baseline requirements, but I need you to squeeze more costs out or be absolutely certain of your costs. £xm is way over, so lets look at a cheaper alternative for the non ASW frigates, I’m not agreeing now, you can build some more tonka ships, because I am not striking out the Mk41s and for certain we are not going to redesign and redesign all decade long. FRES this is not!’
What I like is the elements that are happening behind the scenes that the SDSR does not cover and there are lots of them.
Obviously they will come out in time, but here’s one for you TD.
The Army has wrestled CBRN completely away from the RAF. So say goodbye to the Defence CBRN Wing and the 18 months they have spent getting 26/27 Sqn’s RAF Regiment fit for role using LRT’s and IBDS. The Army is taking all those assets. Army also takes the capability lead for all CBRN matters for all 3 Services, so RAF Regiment personnel will be kicked out of their current posts and replaced by Army personnel.
@NAB
I remember you were proposing a “newly designed complex warship” to keep the ship designing skill.
The first T23 was comissioned in 1990, T45 in 2009. They differ by 19 years. T26 (now 2025?) and T45 has a gap of 16 years.
The “light frigate” needs to be there from 2032, differs only by 7 years, very soon. Its designing activity shall start almost immediately, may be right after T26 production start. It looks like not so “far into the future”.
I hope they improved their design skill. If I understand correctly, NAB suggest it is the integration which needs skill and is costy. Every lessens learned in T26 design activity shall be fed-back into the “light frigate”.
I would be happy, if possible, to hear NABs comment on if the “light frigate” will be designed much better then T26….
Personally, I suspect RN itself should gained their skill, not only BAE. To my experience, keeping the requirement to the last digit somtimes require whole-redesign, which is yes quite costy. I do not care if the dash speed of a frigate is mitigated to be 26.5 knots while the requirement is for 27. I would be more afraid of the cost being increased by 10% for just this 0.5 knots, because cost is ALSO an (indirect) requirement. Cost kills number, and number is a requirement, mitigated in so many cases, as you know.
Notwithstanding NaBs comments about tonnage, I suspect that the current thinking (such as it is) for the light frigate is probably more along the lines of an enhanced Holland class. If the intention is to build something that is exportable, then your intended customer base sets the requirements for you – much of which, these days, seems to want a 76mm main gun, medium helicopter capability, an air defence missile system, lightweight torpedos, sufficient deck-space to bolt on some anti-ship launchers and the best sensors they can afford. I suspect that will not change hugely in the next 10-15 years (though the individual systems may well be more capable and effective). Many navies aren’t that bothered about automation and lean-manning – they have either cheap labour or conscripts to fill their crews up. The trick is going to be in designing something that can be built to one spec for export and also to a spec that is useful to the RN.
I think the designers are going to be quite busy, with T26 to finish, the future light frigate (FLF), MCH replacement, MARS SSS, Argus and Diligence replacements (hopefully) and then the amphibs to think about.
@CaribbeanPerspective,
Good points all. As I said somewhere above I hold out hope FLF and MCM replacement end up becoming the same project (since the terminology is now floating around again, a C2/C3 combination rather than the original C1/C2 intent of T26. It’s strongest similarity to the FRES saga is taking a decade to loop round to first principles.
@CBRNGuru,
That is ****ing brilliant. Thank you quite sincerely for that hot tip. That’s not just the third glass of single malt at the in-laws’ talking. Brilliant news there is now coherence in your specialist field.
@40DG,
That’s a much higher compliment than I’ve done anything to deserve, but thank you and I am actually working on such a thing (I owe TD for failing shamefully to make any contributions while he was busy with work, FRES revisions, daughter, and grandsprog — Slainte, boss!) But visiting the in-laws means Thanksgiving in the States, so if the non-zero number of daughter stay busy with the snow in the front acreage, I might get something (awful or not) bashed out over the holiday weekend. Already pacing myself with a whiskey and tryptophan diet to stay fighting fit…
The CBRN thing makes perfect sense in the context of Cameron’s 82,000 pledge and the RAF’s need for more airmen and maintainers. Plus there’s one cap badge found a useful role: tick!
The light frigate will, according to inner circle rumours, be a T23-a-like. Which is good news. It will be designed from scratch, not a custom foreign import, and is likely to be roled for surface and littoral raiding. Design and production is planned to be concurrent with T26 construction (which poses interesting questions about yard capacity), and there is a very firm intent to acquire more than 5. Finally, the current bet for a name is Type 31 – I rather approve, with echoes of the Type 21 in there. Anyway, rumours all.
TAS – looking forward to the Pompy sheds ringing out with the sound of shipbuilding then…
TAS – let’s hope they don’t end up on the bottom of the Atlantic like the Type 21s then :/
Putting them between fleet frigates and destroyers seems a bit odd, given that they’re more like successors to the Type 14/16 “austerity” frigates, so Type 17? Not that logic ever plays much of a role in these things.
Worth noting that the French are now adding towed arrays to the Lafayettes to allow them to do their equivalent of TAPS to protect their deterrent even if they don’t have the endurance to do extended patrols.
If its classification and numbers, perhaps T26 should become T46 and just call them ASW destroyers to partner the AAW T45s in task groups – reflects their size and kit rather than the historic role based classification. Give them county or city names
The light frigates can become T26 – leander names?
Thinking of T26/T31 etc one other possibility occurred to me. With the T26 so close in size to T45, NaB’s talk of T26 displacement “nudging 9000 at end of life”, and previous talk in another thread of the design already being able to accommodate an all-MK41 forward VLS system (48 launchers?) , might a run-on of T26 production after the 8 ASW units provide a base for T45 replacement? The hull should be thoroughly proven by then and build costs and timescales well understood and hopefully on a downward trend. A forward battery of 48 strike-length VLS (which could be Sylver I assume if Aster or some other Sylver-based missile was still the missile of choice) would match the current T45, in fact improve on it because the T45 is only Sylver 50 and not full strike length, and there is the added bonus of the 24 rear Sea Ceptor cells, the then-standard 5″ gun, and the mission bay could add valuable flexibility when it’s not part of a carrier group. The mast on T26 seems to have been getting bigger and bigger as the design evolved so big enough for Sampson? The downside would be that the T45 has expansion capability for extra MK41 so such a T26 AAW derivative wouldn’t match a fully fitted-with T45 but will we ever get T45 fully fitted and, if the efficiencies of using an up-and-running T26 production facility plus some cross-decking from T45s could be exploited maybe it could stretch the budget to allow not the usual 1-for-1 replacement ration but actually get an 8-for-6 replacement ratio.
Disclaimer: I don’t know what I’m talking about and would be interested to know what the issues are with my lay-person’s cunning plan.
The only problem will be that by the time we’ve finished the T26, designed and layed keel on the T31, the T45 will indeed be about ready for paying off or converting to Repulse’s Absalons but getting on for 20 odd years will have passed by then and they’ll just re-invent the wheel? However if they do get on with a bit of concurrent building/adapting in stages, then maybe drum beat one a year then theres a good chance it could happen? I’d like to get to a stage where they are building T31’s in the contruction lulls instead of Rivers.
Six of them is about right for Fisheries/FL and maybe one for Pirate/smuggler bashing, they could always donate the three Mk1 Rivers to the Falklands defence force?
TAS
“and there is a very firm intent to acquire more than 5”
That’s fantastic news if true. Does anyone know the last time our total frigate + destroyer numbers increased?
Blue Water,
Early 1950s, which is why I am not holding my breath.
As I stated much earlier in this thread the phrasing used (“light” and “general purpose”) make a T23esque concept the most likely prospect in mind. It’s not a terrible idea but I await to see how much cheaper its going to be than a T26.
@Julian
Your “possibility” is essentially what the French are doing – they baulked at the cost of Horizon (their T45 equivalent) so bought two for carrier defence and are now planning to do an air defence version of FREMM (their T26 equivalent). Originally called FREDA, in 2012 DCNS produced a concept called FREMM-ER – note that radar technology has moved on and they plan to use a Thales AESA called SeaFire 500 :
http://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=716
The detail will vary, but it gives you an idea of the direction France is going in.
Not wishing to piss on anyone chips but there was a ‘very firm intent’ to purchase 13 Type 26
Light frigates: has anyone in the thread mentioned that Black Swan concept that was floating around a few years ago? Lots of ISO container references as I recall, perfect!
The future for AAW ships seems to be ever bigger and more powerful AESA and much larger hulls to mount them on . The catchy named AN/SPY-6(v) being fitted with much difficulty to the Flight III Arleigh Burkes has driven the deep load weight to beyond the old Washington Treaty limit for heavy armoured cruisers of 10,000 tons.
The AN/SPY-6(v) array is not the one they wanted to fit but is a compromise over a much larger array using the same active modules , 14′ diameter array as opposed to 20′ diameter the USN says is essential. The flight III’s are probably just a stop gap to an even larger Ticonderoga (which draws the same tonnage as Flight III’s ) type vessels which also contain spaces for command and control. Granted with a bit of tinkering by our backroom boys over the next 10 years to when the T45 replacement needs to be firmed up they could produce an equally powerful but lighter and less power/cooling hungry version but hope doesn’t win wars does it.
Hohum
Wow, so if we do go over 19 it’s going to be historic. I think you are wise to be cautious. However it is nice to at least see some ambition to expand the fleet, and it’s also nice to see the recognition that (in my opinion) a light frigate class is necessary. SDSR doesn’t tell us exactly where we’ll be in 5 or 10 years time but it is a useful insight into the attitude of government.
There was mention of ballistic missile defence, with a ground based system announced immediately before referring to the T45 capability.
I was wondering whether this would be another Fylingdales type site (potentially located in Cyprus to track middle eastern launches rather than another UK station); or whether this would be a PAAMS ground station (mentioned along with the destroyers after all).
There was another Sampson system somewhere, a test site used during development.
Might they be planning something like the American’s Aegis Ashore system, but with a landlocked T45?
Who owns that seventh Sampson set? MoD or company? And is it still necessary to have a land test station to develop ballistic missile defence capability for the destroyers now that they’re in service?
If this was a reference to a PAAMS-ashore type system rather than a Cyprus branch of Fylingdales, where would we put it?
I was thinking that Nelson could be taken off his column and a Sampson radar put up there; but then the Scots would definitely demand one, and probably a few regional English cities too. Everyone would be asking why have they got one when my hometown hasn’t.
Any further ideas what the PM was talking about?
@TD
We are get 13 , 8 T26 ASW and 5 T26 Diet :-( Think Eva Longoria and Posh Spice if you will , what would you prefer? :-)
@Blue Water
With Corbyn as leader of the opposition and the shadow chancellor John McDonnell quoting Chairman Mao’s ‘little red book’ and gifting his copy to George Osbourne across the despatch box its likley we can hold this government to its promises (for what they are worth) in 10 years time.
The mentioned BMD radar is probably just a Fylingdales upgrade. I was actually surprised by the lack of commitment to T45 BMD.
I know people here can be very excitable but its important to cynical:
Trident renewal cost has gone up, that has be covered, so take the money from elsewhere in the navy programme thats happening on a similar time schedule. That leaves you with the frigates, but you can’t admit you might have to cut one or two so you concoct a scheme for cutting some the extravagances out of T26 to produce something that is supposedly becoming cheaper thus balancing your still far away budget.
Brian Black
My personal preference is for government to build a new and very large pyramid-shaped MoD HQ and have the SAMPSON radar as the top of the pyramid. To save energy, the section of the pyramid directly below SAMPSON can be occupied by civil servants on fixed bicycles who power SAMPSON by cycling really fast.
I think there a T45 radar set up atop Portsdown Hill north of Portsmouth, at the LBTS used by Qinetiq.
Unless it is linked with Sea Viper missiles I don’t see what its advantage is over the current BMEWS sets up?
I would think Cyprus sites track Middle East activities already. :-)
@BB
The US are building just two sites in Europe for ABMD , one in Romania nearing completion and one in Poland due to finish in 2018. So perhaps Fylingdales is more than sufficient to detect on its own but what shoots down said ballistic missile from home turf? Nothing I think , just a few more minutes warning that your going to die not a flash and bang way up in the sky and huge sigh of relief by every British citizen that their defence taxes are good for something.
@Brian Black: Err, you find BMD radars work at different frequencies than S band AD radars like SAMPSON, eg L Band (for Green Pine) or X Band for AN/TPY-2. If they want such a radar, I’d assume they would buy a couple of the latter on the basis they can buy THAAD later, which frankly makes good sense right now.
@Hohum: The idea of spending billions on upgrading a dead end and numbers limited platform like T45 in the hope that we might have a platform near enough to intercept those Iranian missiles on the way to London is frankly daft. While space based post boost interception via something like Brilliant Pebbles would be ideal, we really don’t have the money and the Yanks aren’t planning on doing it either, so we are stuck with terminal defence.
BTW, look up the next time you’re in Portsmouth. You’ll see SAMPSON on the hill above you :-)
A deployeble BMD radar is hardly challenge. The existing Type 101 deployable system is easily of the same size as the 1045 and 1046 radars on the T45’s, which are evidently BMD capable. You don’t need something the size of the Fylingdales radar if you can deploy it closer to a particular theatre – the anticipated threat is clearly theatre ballistic missiles, not that we have anything to shoot them down with.
Type 101 – http://woottonbridgeiow.org.uk/decca-legacy/chapter7.php
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RAF_Fylingdales
SAMP/T:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aster_(missile_family)#/media/File:Salon_du_Bourget_20090619_110.jpg
Adding BMD to T45 would be relatively easy. They are only “dead-end” if you don’t invest in them.
@ John Hartley.
I hope I can cheer you up. The ‘housing bubble’ as you call it has no real bearing on GDP. Figures out for October 2015 show the composition of the GDP on the expenditure side: Household consumption (65 percent), Government expenditure (20 percent) and gross fixed capital formation (17 percent). Exports of goods and services account for 28 percent of GDP while imports account for 30 percent, subtracting 2 percent from GDP. No mention of a ‘Housing Bubble there.
Personally I think people who nitpick at what GO had to say yesterday forget where we have all journeyed from since 2010. Labour turned spending plans they inherited in their first years that created a 3 years Surplus into a £45 Bn a year deficit by 2005. And then kept on borrowing creating a £69 Bn deficit in 2008 before the ‘crash’. That created a further £154 Bn in 2009 and 135 Bn in 2010. We are now heading for a Deficit of some £70 Bn this year and a Surplus again in 4 years time. Remind me again how many new jobs have been created and who is paying the cash for all the new ships and aircraft we are all discussing now? Oh wait … that would be Osbourne … Maybe some credit where its due regardless of our politics?
Stephen, Fylingdales gives us our four minute warning against soviet missiles. That time is invaluable for allowing us to update our social media before we’re wiped out.
T45 does allow for a fleet ballistic missile defence capability – just a case of more money.
My understanding is that the UK contributes in two ways towards NATO BMD – data from Fylingdales, which was part of the radar arc intended to pick up ACBMs heading to the US over the arctic and northern Europe, and we pay cash contributions to the expanding American operated system which also includes the Aegis ashore sites.
My thinking is that someone has realised that we’ve paid for a seventh shipless Sampson set, and has run the sums and concluded that plugging in some missiles and operating a site ourselves is cheaper than the operating costs of an Aegis ashore site. So such a site could be used as a contribution in kind towards NATO BMD, rather than giving the US cash to operate a similar site on our behalf (perhaps saving tens of pounds every year!).
I said stick it up Nelson’s column, but such a site might actually be more likely located in another NATO country.
My guess is the government don’t want to announce ABMD on T45 until after the Successor vote and Main Gate is out of the way. Otherwise someone might suggst that “now we can shoot down the missiles we don’t need CASD”. Wheras ABMD on T45 would be more about protecting the QEC from a tactical ballistic strike which might not even be nuclear.
Just as a thought experiment if you did try to use ship bourne ABMD to replace CASD you would end up replacing the 4 “V” boats with 4 ABMD cruisers offering “Continuous At Sea Protection”, which in turn would become an HVU needing an ASW screen etc etc. Not impossible but neither cheap nor easy.
@BB “There was another Sampson system somewhere, a test site used during development.”
There’s one on the hill above Portsmouth, and an Artisan radar as well I think
Chish. The housing bubble has an impact on GDP through notional rent income. Also if there is a property crash that will hit bank income & the tax they pay. They may yet need another bail out.
Just quoting the car crash Gordon Brown left is no longer good enough, now even tory papers are spotting that Gideon has picked up Gordon’s bad habits.
Look, I think the SDSR & Autumn statement are quite good, but they rely on things not going t*ts up over the next five years. Good luck with that.
Peter, the nuclear disarmament lobby haven’t really tried to suggest potential missile defence systems as an alternative to having our own nukes. I suspect the reason is that bringing up the issue of missile defence is an explicit acknowledgment that the UK could still be a nuclear target despite unilateral nuclear disarmament. If you argue a case for UK domestic BMD, you can’t help but strengthen the case for maintaining the nuclear deterrent.
If we did have a domestic missile defence system, could it really be delivered by a single cruiser? And would a shipborne system be necessary anyway? If it’s defence of a landmass rather than a mobile naval group, it would be financially preferable to have a land based system.
I thought there were 8 Sampson sets, 6 on the ships, one on the trials / integration site on Portsdown hill, and one on the longbow trials barge. The latter is presumably the one that could be combined with the volume-search radar and set up in e.g. Cyprus / Bahrain as an ABM installation?
BB – I agree. But that’s no guarantee our wonderful MPs wouldn’t get it all muddled up on the floor of the house. So safest to say nothing in public right now…
Just so people are clear, if and it’s a big if you take out the effect of asset growth of housing cost growth over the last 5 1/2 yrs you take out a huge chunk of GDP Growth. for example for every owned house in the UK there is a calculation of what the rental income would be, based as a percentage of the house cost. So (and I am just using an example as I have not got time to go through the various documents to dig it out) if you take a rental return of 4% on a house worht £100,000 then its ental income is £4,000pa, now that house value increases from £100,000 to £150,000 or 50% then the rental income goes up to £6,000 so the allegedly in theory the person who owns that houses “income” has gone up £2,000.
Now as an example in he South East that type of growth has occured, so somebody who has not had a pay rise in over 5yrs has still in the eyes of the government increased their contribution to GDP yet they do not earn a single penny more nor do they have a single penny more to spend.
Obviously this is a gross simplification. But remember this applies to ALL property including commerical. it is then adjusted as a percentage of the total GDP. But we also do this type of calculation on all sorts of assets and capital gains on shares/bonds etc. So most of the GDP growth over the last 5yrs has been asset growth. Which is great if you had enough money to hold large amounts of assets in a semi-liquad state such as Bonds and Shares where you could extract the notional profit.
But since most of us don’t it explains why M&S/Tesco’s etal have not been showing massive growth with sales growth matching GDP growth. It’s why manufactoring output has been stagnent over the last 5yrs as nobodies realy buying anything.
This is not to critise this Government or any UK Government, all Government around the world calculate their GDP figures with little fixes like that.
The problem is just like borrowing it tends to catch up with you when everybody realises that the shares they own are now worth 10 times the actual value of the company and the dividend yield is so low that they are only earning 0.5% on their investment without share price growth that they start bailing out of the market. Same with property, it only takes one or two people to start realising paying 10 times your income to buy a house in London is insanity and the property is massively over valued for the bottom to fall out of the market.
The problem with this is GDP as reported on TV goes negative, experts start talking of recession and we all start hoarding Cash instead of spending it, meaning a full on proper recession kicks in. Thus asset prices go through a sharp correction, GDP collapse for a year and the merry old cycle starts again.
And don’t even get me started on the fiddles in Rpi and Cpi rates.
So as stated Georges plans all rest on a Housing and Asset bubble that doesn’t implode over the next 4 1/2 years fingers crossed.
Forget T26, who is going to build the half dozen or so Bob Hope class we will need to transport the middleweight armour Strike brigade about the globe within days?
Point Class @X ?
SAMPSON is not in the same league as the Fylingdales radar. All this talk of the 7th SAMPSON seems odd (other than protecting London).
Also, when BMD is mentioned, which kind of BM are we talking about? Battlefield, short, medium, intermediate, intercontinental, etc?
I’m not sure an upgraded Aster30 is going to do help much with anything other than the lower end of theatre ballistic?
x – Strike Bde is supposed to be rapid reaction – better make sure Bob Hope class is a hydrofoil
IIRC from my M.O.D. days, there were 3 Sampsons on land, one at Cowes IOW, one at the range in Cumbria (That I used to take bits to) and as you know, the one at MISC in Portsdown.
Whether any are still in those locations I have no idea
Longbow is (or more precisely was) in that part of the world. Not relevant now, nor is Portsdown, nor SAMPSON.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/360808/20140926-Former_Trials_Barge_Longbowl.pdf
So where is the scarlet pimpernel?
Spares?
BAE?
Maybe it went to replace the one that got nicked a couple of years ago ;) Did we ever find it? I guess anyone who knows can’t say…
It wasn’t as bad as it could have been.
However as a serving member.
1) No clarity
2) No detail
3) Extra kit is a long way off
4) Old kit is not getting any younger
5) The world is only getting more busy. We are only getting more busy.
I’m tired. Tired of the bullshit that gets spun. I almost want something bad to happen to the UK so myself and my companions can all go “Told you you wankers”. Except of course we would have all died trying to protect you with too few of us and not enough kit.
Sorry if I seem grumpy. Or ungrateful that the SDSR wasn’t the debacle that the 2010 one was
I think you are confusing the rise in house prices with how that is calculated into the GDP figures. It is as you say a concept called ‘imputed rent‘ or actually Housing services. They are calculated not by house value but more by interest rates, inflation and other costs. In 2014 it was about 7% of the economy even though the total value of property in the UK is of course many times higher. Hope this helps:
http://civitas.org.uk/newblog/2014/05/growth-beyond-property-bubble/
The banks will never get another bail out. The Country wouldn’t stand for it especially as there are far more rigorous regulatory powers now (which Brown removed). And remember only ONE bank actually needed bailing out and that was RBS which was actually a Scottish bank (for the SNPs amongst us). Lloyds only needed help after Brown conned them into taking over HBOS (the other Scottish Bank) without ‘Due Diligence’. We could have let RBS go bust but having sticky fingers in the mess Brown HAD to also bail out Lloyds and therefore RBS as well. Questions and all that. And they had to do it on more borrowed money on top of the borrowing they were already up to their eyes in. So we basically sank beneath a sea of debt.
So I am sorry what Brown left is still with us and IS very relevant especially in Defence terms as he also left (despite what our hosts say) a massive hole in the Defence budget and no money to pay for anything let alone two carriers. Oh and I pay no attention to what any papers say especially the Daily Fail….
Lets just be happy we still have an increasing Defence Budget and some very interesting new bits of kit to discuss.
Anthony,
Althought, like many here, I rather like the new SDSR, I must admit that the more I read, the more it sounded like an international manifesto (Britain’s place in the world) rather than a strategic plan for our armed forces.
On one side I’m happy with this, as it puts in print what I (as a mear civilian) need to hear. From your side however, I fully understand. I’ve heard many that serve say much the same.
The last thing I overheard was someone waxing lyrical about why people wanted to join the navy in the 30’s. Not because we had great ships, but simply because we looked after the people, treated them with respect, and gave them what some describe as a “once in a lifetime experience”.
@ the Ginge
I have to say you just made a very big error in your calculations. The effect on GDP is minimal compared to the value of housing stock. It gets quite technical and is about ‘imputed Rent’ numbers but its all explained here:
http://civitas.org.uk/newblog/2014/05/growth-beyond-property-bubble/
The value within GDP figures is about 7% and is more related to interest rates, inflation and other variable costs. You could have a situation where property values rise while ‘Imputed Rent’ figures decrease.
So your inference that GO has everything based on a ‘Housing Bubble’ is frankly wrong. whether your politics like it of not GO has presided over a massive and structural revision of of the British Economy. It was only 5 years ago the ‘experts’ were saying there would be a million lost jobs. We created over 2 million extra. They said we would never reduce the deficit. It has more than halved and will be eradicated by 2019. Manufacturing is higher than for 20 years, car factories are producing over 1.5 million vehicles of which 80% are exported. We have outgrown the rest of the G8 for nearly 3 years and now have a steady forward growth of about 2.5%.
A ‘Housing Bubble’ didn’t do all that ….
What is the right starting point for a T31 light frigate? NAB says something north of 5,000t to meet RN requirements, but there are some much smaller frigates out there that seem to fit the bill… almost.
For example, take the new 3,100t Malaysian light frigates. (French Gowind design) 5,000+nm range, 28kts, towed sonar, AA and SSM missiles, NH-90 hangar and flight deck so should be able to land a Merlin. Accomodation standards are probably tight, but if you can keep the crew to ~105 men (FREMM like) then the current provisions could work (7x officer single cabins, 6x JO double berths, 5x NCO 4-berths, 11x crew 6-berths).
So what else would you need for a RN light frigate baseline?
http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-UTbCVkZZn0I/UwN4P3oMGjI/AAAAAAAAcwk/N0sTGih0K-c/s1600/SGPV.jpg
@Simon
This is a bit out of date but may help : http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130512/DEFREG01/305120007/
Original naval Aster 30 is Block 0
Block 1 is current Mamba (SAMP/T) land-based Aster 30, which is in service with France & Italy and has taken down Scud mimics (ie ballistic missiles with 600km range, the longer the range the harder they are to hit as they fly faster and higher so BMD effectiveness is expressed in terms of the range of the target missile)
Block 1NT has now been funded with a public target of tackling medium range missiles with 1500nm range.
Block 2 is getting some MBDA money, official target is IRBMs with range 3000km
Geometry plays a big part in BMD, that’s why the Septics were so keen to put missiles in Eastern Europe rather than on a Burke in the North Sea. Putting missiles on land in the UK is even less optimal.
The chain against Iran missile launch is not clearly visible, but starts from the Gulf states and ends in Poland. The Rota based missile cruisers are part of it, though having their port that far away does not make it obvious.
Now we need the tool (again) that changes range circles into ellipsoids…
Has it been confirmed that the Sentinel fleet will drop to 4 in the near future? Or is that just one of the many rumours in the post SDSR confusion?
Seems crazy to me to even consider losing an air-frame from a fleet which is so in demand for presumably rather peripheral savings.
Although if this reduction is a reality then i find it hard to believe that 9 Poseidon’s built up over a decade is a coincidence given that 5 MPA was the minimum number previously touted to fill the core role.
Challenger, what is the source? One Sentinel has been used (=has been modified) for over the sea trials.
– may be building it back to “old” standard has been deemed too expensive?
Chish. TV news is quoting the Institute of Fiscal Studies who think George Osborne’s spending plans have only a 50/50 chance of success.
Meanwhile, the Daily Mail, not known for leftist leanings, is quoting Michael Izza, chief executive of accounting group ICAEW, on the spending review “It is dependent on increasing tax revenues as a consequence of economic growth and low interest rates on debt. But it would only take one major, unexpected event to blow the Government’s finances off course.”
Some good points here, very badly made
Ron5, that is
Thinking about the Light Frigate it is worth noting that the French are putting their La Fayette frigates through their mid life update and laying down the specification for 5 FTI “intermediate size frigates” to enter service from 2023.
Now hear me out here but is that not an opportunity for both parties, both nations want five frigates each that are conceptually similar. Whilst I am not saying that both programs should be joined together I would say there is scope to share technology. For example I think the light frigate should use CODAD propulsion an area we have not got much experience in with warship production. The current La Fayette class uses SEMT Pielstick 12PA6V280, no doubt the FTI will use an evolution of said propulsion system. Is it not logical for the UK and France to align on that and procure enough diesels for all ten vessels to a common specification with the associated economies of scale. The UK buying diesels from SEMT Pielstick is hardly going to threaten UK jobs considering it is not an area that is primary to our industry anymore. In other areas there is systems that are produced in the UK that could benefit the French vessels.
A stretched Khareef (to have better sea keeping) for me would be an option. I personally don’t feel not having a Merlin landing platform is an issue.
I would say however that the RN needs to realise that they definitely now have too few escorts to do anything beyond CBG protection. To repeat previous conversations, no way can a QE go close to shore especially given the focus on carrier strike, which means that any “initial wave” amphibious assault ships needs to protect itself. As such, I’d go for a UK Damen Crossover design.
Tell you one thing this SDSR has done, have had to update the Type 26 article :)
Done now
@Fed
RR, owners of MTU, might be a bit miffed if we bought SMT diesels (owned by MAN).
Still, either way the Germans would be happy – the joys of globalisation..!
What’s happened to our T23 fleet?
You have a dependable capable core fleet in type 26 and type 45. We once were able to design warships that when launched made all others obsolete. Is there enough creative out of the box thinking within the naval design community to come up with something radical that transforms the way we do maritime security and patrol because to me this is were this new light frigate should be something to challenge the norm.
What’s the worst that could happen if it doesn’t work just build a couple more type 26. I would urge them to be bold and innovate in its design and build.
If you can land a Merlin on an OPV surely you’d want to at least do the same on a Frigate? Hangering, now thats different, I’d like enough for a Wildcat plus a UAV but I would like to be able to lily pad the Merlins wherever possible, we’re never likely to get any more, well not new anyway and I’d like to see them be able to fly out to do a bit of ASW or whatever from a Frigate “lite”. I’d like to see dipping sonar on the Wildcat too but I know it would be a miraculous wonder finding a sub with a single Wildcat!
UK/Damen Crossover, like a big Bay, oh no you mean this?
http://products.damen.com/en/ranges/crossover
OOOOh! likey…
Logistic or Amphibious?
El Sid,
Thanks for that. I had seen similar suggestions. But if Aster30 Block 2 NT is going to intercept 3000km, Mach 10 missiles, it’s not an Aster30 in any way, shape, or form in my book.
In fact I’m curious just what of it will be the same and will it fit in an A50? Surely it becomes my long awaited Aster45/60 for LEO anti-satellite and everything else SM3 does :-)
It might be worth remembering that we’re going to have built a total of 7 River Class and derivatives. We will also have exported the same number. That’s 50:50. Forgive me if I’m wrong but when was the last time we manged to build something that other people wanted.
The C3 / light frigate / MCMV needs to be the same. A better La Fayette, a better Gowind, a better MEKO 200, a better Venator (if possible). How about diesel electric? We only need about 12MW for a 25 knot, 3200 tonne, 110m, Lynx/NH90 capable ship.
We will need something bigger and quicker if we are going to grant Call Me David his wish for a rapid reaction brigade of 40 ton monsters with the same pressure signature as Chally 2. I am wondering if we should start on a shipping canal through France…………..
Nuclear powered too. Actually given the weight of Ajax we might as well add foils and reactor nobody would notice the difference. Better google plans for the stillborn USMC EFV…………….
Europe is under siege and the middle east in flames and some loon in Whitehall in a green suit has sold the PM a vision of rapidly deployable armour. Utter rhubarb.
…@Duker…the Guards…leaving aside the fact that serious Countries use proper soldiers to protect their Heads of State and the residences thereof…and that a single infantry battalion available in the Capital City of a serious Country is hardly an excessive commitment in respect of the unexpected…killing HMtQ or destroying Buckingham Palace must be on practically every terrorist bucket list on earth (including the ones who believe Her to be seven-foot green lizard!)…and in consequence certain contingencies need to be in place.
like all contingencies, these need to be shaped by the facts on the ground. Which are that the Palace is a large building in a complex of similarly large buildings, with a number of viable entrances…surrounded by extensive grounds which are walled, but hardly fortified…and which contain a considerable amount of mature woodland (aka cover). Furthermore, it has a number of permanent residents not provided with personal bodyguards, and dozens of staff…as well as being a cultural and artistic treasure-house of incalculable value. In consequence, and in the event of an attack of some sort I rather assume that the bodyguards will secure their principals…and the Guards will do their level best to secure the complex, contents, staff and residents.
As well as providing a reserve that could be airlifted from the lawn out the back if there is significant trouble close by…Downing Street, Whitehall, Palace of Westminster…either with or more probably without bearskins…
GNB
@John Hartley
“TV news is quoting the Institute of Fiscal Studies who think George Osborne’s spending plans have only a 50/50 chance of success”
Think about it and you know that this is another half-baked bit of reporting. If you look at what Paul Johnson actually said, he was merely making a statement of the bleedin’ obvious. Osborne has set himself a target which is completely arbitrary in economic terms, but which is politically very significant, to clear the deficit by the next election. Johnson was just saying that he’s not got much margin for error, and interpreting the headline forecast as being the forecast that assumes median “luck” – so he doesn’t need to go very far into the 50% of scenarios that are more unlucky than median before Osborne’s used up his sliver of flexibility.
But since it’s a political target, the real measure of success is not whether there’s a deficit in 2020, but who wins the general election that year. With the current Opposition, one suspects that Osborne could run a £200bn deficit, sell Mary Berry into slavery, beatify Piers Morgan – and still be a “success” in May 2020….
Hohum, the cost for Trident, if you read the announcement carefully is the cost of development, building and maintenance/upgrades for 20 years in service( plus the Treasury capital charge). The development cost includes the money for RR to maintain its reactor development capability.
For Typhoon a similar sum was mentioned for 25 years or so, when the detail was investigated by the Commons Public Finance, only 1/3 was spent on actually building the things.
Looking at what the T-26 Cruiser is becoming it appears the Navy it getting what it wanted, an ASW T-23 with all the bells and whistles added to make it also effective as a general purpose/land attack platform. They may wish to think themselves lucky to get the eight to be ordered rather than have the design downsized to fit the numbers to the budget. Remember how the numbers for the T-45 shrunk!
The Light Frigates must be just that and we should follow the French lead in this as if we try to do it ourselves there will be inevitable capability creep as the Admirals try to get their wish list fulfilled. Both the French and Italians are pretty good at bringing effective platforms in this category into service, and these designs appeal to other countries as they are far more affordable new than the majority of platforms built for the home navies.
Northern Boy, you forget the US doesnt use its military as its primary presidential guard. The Secret Service do the whole thing, which goes from advance guard checking the water supply to close in protection.
The reason for this is thats its the full time duty protecting the President, and you would expect no less for HM, they go where he goes and Scotland Yard protection would do the same ( as I mentioned central London is not their primary residence.
The idea that you hand over to some boys in bearskins, who are rotated regularly, next month it could be RAF Regiment ? as well having a split responsibility would a recipe for disaster.
All references shows its the The Royalty Protection Branch (SO14) of the Met who do this throught the country. They have backup with the other Protection groups SO1 and SO6. Im sure that can call on , when needed, military special forces who would have people available in London at all times.
Forget the idea that the Foot guards ( they have only a company size unit of which 40 + officers provides the Royal Guards for both Buck House and St James/Clarence House.
Your assumption that similar duties in major countries is done by armed forces rather than a paramilitary police unit is mistaken. France has its Gendarmerie ( who have special fancy uniforms for those on ‘public guard’., same goes for Germany, Bundespolizei does all the close protection while the military have ceremonial duties
@Fedaykin
That’s how the WR21 turbine started out as a jointly funded project for use in both French and British navies so a precedent is there already.
just couldn’t help myself, had to post this here:
http://www.europeangeostrategy.org/2015/11/the-strategic-defence-and-security-review-2015-offshore-balancer-and-strategic-raider/
i love how people get hot and sweaty about the “strategic raider” term. ;)
“That’s how the WR21 turbine started out as a jointly funded project for use in both French and British navies so a precedent is there already”
Yes – that turned out very well.
El Sid. Agreed up to a point. I say again, that there is much in the SDSR & Autumn review to like, but that it is built on shaky ground. I hope Osborne gets away with it, but all those shiny things we have been promised, are still at risk of being cancelled in 2018-19, if the economy goes wrong.
This is not anti-tory, as whoever is chancellor faces a £1.5 trillion debt now, rising to £1.7 trillion before the next general election. If interest rates go up, the repayments will be more than many government departments.
The biggest cost for the deterrent (approx a billion) is not running the V-boats but running Aldermaston with a ratio 1:3.
(That is my testing done. See you all on the flipside. Merry Christmas too)
@Jules
I must admit I like the look of these Damen designs, they even do financing packages! Perhaps TD regulars could scrape together enough for a 3 year lease? ;-)
However I must also admit that I have no idea what I’m talking about when it comes to ship design. There’s a lot of talk on many forums about what this light frigate should include but I’ve seen relatively little on what the vessel is supposed to be able to achieve, which is surely the starting point rather than starting with what kit it should have?
WillS
x – rapidly deployable armour is feasible, but compromises need to be drawn. If the intent is to get significant numbers of combat vehicles to a trouble-spot in short order, and to operate them with a slim logistic tail, then 40t tankettes probably don’t fit the bill that well. Arguably neither do 30t 8x8s. The compromises that present themselves to achieve presence in numbers are lower physical protection and reduced firepower. In regard of firepower though our new Ajax is not so well endowed and that gun can fit smaller lighter armour. So the real trade as it stands is between FRES-like protection at 40t or lighter smaller more agile vehicles with thinner hides. But maybe twice as many could be deployed for the same effort.
Its a choice; there will be different scenarios where each option would work better than the other. And probably the optimum solution would be to create a layered force from light to heavy knowing full well the lighter forces would get to theatre quicker and need to do their best to push trouble back until the heavier stuff arrived in slower time to pick up the fight.
Whether, in a force that could have sub-20t armour armed with CTA40 at the light end and 65t C2 with 120mm L30A1 at the heavy end, there would be a good reason to include a 40t vehicle with CTA40 is debatable. That’s a question to be answered by the Army, not the likes of us here.
Currently it’s pie in the sky it’s not even on the back of a fag packet yet, just an idea and as some have already said may actually never happen but surely if we want hulls it’s what we must do? For something ball park in size to a current T23, there is nothing in our back catalogue except the T23, I couldn’t see us even licensing the Damen design to be honest but it does seem a good one.
They’ll do one of three things: Re-invent the wheel, Stretch a Khareef or just end up building some stripped down T26’s. Expect it to be a fairly protracted process…
This latest review sees a return to Iraq War scale expeditionary forces, from 30,000 bods under the 2020 plan to 50,000 under the Strike Force plan.
What does this mean in terms of support units? Will we see more brigades with their own integral artillery and logistics regiments?
In the 2020 plan, the three armoured brigades were the only full brigades with directly assigned artillery and logistics regiments; the mass of the Adaptable Force basically shared about two brigades worth of support units (giving the overall magic number of five portions necessary for sustaining operations).
I was wondering whether that means the Adaptable Force concept is dead (there could still be an AF with the Strike Force being essentially another RF under a different name).
With Army manpower constant, the infantry could be the losers. Battalions configured for training and advisory roles could easily drop by a couple of hundred heads once various combat elements were removed. Rece, machine gun and mortar platoons not necessarily included in such units; collections of small platoon training teams making up the companies.
Stripped out training/advisory battalions could free up a lot of manpower, perhaps enabling one or two more all-inclusive combat brigades to exist, while avoiding losing more cap badges and keeping treasured Scottish and Gurkha battalions in place. Reduced infantry slots would also allow for the all-army NBC regiment, and a partner hybrid warfare unit and expansion of 77 brigade; the ISR brigade might also be winners under the current trend.
Might we see perhaps two Strike brigades with integral supporting artillery and logistics regiments, three fully formed inclusive infantry brigades, three combat unready hollowed out infantry brigades, a four battalion Air Assault brigade with its support elements brought back up to strength, and maybe the two deprioritised armoured brigades sharing assigned artillery and loggies (the rare deployment of an armoured division drawing on other brigades’ assets as required).
Finally, will we still have the integrated army concept of the 2020 force? The expanded function of the reserves under the last plan was, I think, primarily intended to give the illusion of maintaining an army above the mystical but arbitrary 100,000 headcount. The integrated army plan has served its purpose as a fig leaf to the hack and slash Army reduction to 82,000. It can surely now be discreetly dropped. Reserve forces provided nearly a fifth of the manpower for the invasion of Iraq; so reserve forces can still be a valuable asset without the expectation of providing full combat units.
Re deployable armour. Have you seen the BAE Systems Expeditionary Light Tank Air Deployable Vehicle? Its at armyrecognition.com . It is based on the M8 Armoured Gun System, but modernised with bits from the CV90 & Bradley. A 105mm gun with self loader. 23,580 kg with heavy armour package. So could not be carried by a C-130, but A400M would be OK. It is pitched at the US Army at the moment. If they adopt it, then economies of scale & commonality during operations, mean I would like to see some with UK forces. Perhaps a modern day equivalent of the WW2 Honey/Stuart tank?
@NAB
Certainly we should look at the Great White Turbine at how well intended collaborative projects can go wrong. Remember it wasn’t just an Anglo/French project the US also promised to put it in lots of stuff.
On the other hand I am talking about a joint purchase of mature technology rather than developing some kind of new paradigm shift in diesel technology. The French have plenty of experience of CODAD and they are planning to procure 5 light frigates that closely match what the UK wants out of T26lite. Whilst we should avoid a common overall design I do see an opportunity to lever a sharing of technology and bulk procurement in certain areas.
JH – I hadn’t seen that, but M8 was an interesting concept that deserves revisiting. The write-up suggests quite light protection for the weight (assuming quoted levels are STANAG that is, not upgrade package descriptions), and while its intended for air-drop if the US only have C-130 for the task then according to the spec at C-130 cargo weight it has extremely thin protection. Its not such a big vehicle – makes you wonder where all the weight is…
On a note related to the long comment I put on the C2 LEP thread early on, its interesting to note this is in response to an airdrop combat armour TRADOC requirement in the US (mentioned on TD at the time) and is a 25 year old design with newer upgrades from two other existing products – a result, you might imagine, of the BAE LS engineers getting a week or two to ‘do something’ to deal with M8’s obsolescence issues and beef up the protection a bit. It doesn’t look like the end result of years of diligent product development. That doesn’t mean its a poor product by any means, but it does point to the restrictions all defence companies have on R&D budgets these days.
Chris, I assumed we would not risk sending it into battle without the heaviest armour package on offer, so 23.5 tons. If you must send by C-130, then there is a stripped down 18 ton version, but would anyone risk that in combat?
If the Yanks adopt it, I would quite fancy 100-130 for the British Army + 20 for the Royal Marines. I would not suggest we order it on our ownsome.
Fedaykin,
I am baffled as to what you think you would achieve: Marine diesels already have as much economy of scale as they are going to get as they are COTS anyway. That only leaves you with shafts and gearboxes which are essentially one-off builds however many of them you buy, we also have a UK based gear company in the form of David Brown who we have just shoveled a pile of money at for T26.
I would think the high-velocity gun is close to its come back. It is a pity that they could not find someone who speaks understandable English to do the commentary here https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TuB63n37_oU but he seems to imply that the newest generation of active defence systems have eliminated the blind spot that put a premium on having/ developing top-attack ATGWs.
Beat me to it. CODAD is about as simple as you can get – Type 41 and T61 frigates were CODAD long ago.
Donk suppliers tend to supply their engines on a power by hour basis (ie they provide the support packages as well), which means it would be daft to walk away from Mr Wartsila and Mr MTU(RR) who will still be the OEMs of virtually all diesels in the RN fleet.
However – whatever our “credible GP frigate” – as it is being described – needs to do is ensure that it uses common equipment and components with T26/QEC/RIver/MHC wherever possible / practicable. So-called common hullforms are usually a very small fraction of the overall cost of the ship. It’s the logistic support for the “systems” and the contracts they require that adds cost.
A couple of 16V38 then? 220 tonnes of ballast sorted.
How much for a couple of 10MW motors?
NaB,
Exactly. Incidentally your last paragraph is what is making me question the efficacy of the this light frigate concept, I just don’t see how a “general purpose” frigate is going to come in at any less than 5,000 tons without a significant capability sacrifice. The only things I can see as being realistically sensible things to subtract from the T26 design are the following:
Mission bay forward of the hangar
eight of Mk.41 cells and 16 of the CAMM cells
the Chinook capable helideck
Additional complement capacity
Just about everything else on T26 is going to be needed on this new design if it is to meet the traditional general purpose definition.
I also note the context provided by the document itself:
“We will also launch a concept study and then design and build a new class of lighter, flexible general purpose frigates”
Which says to me that very little thought has been put into this idea. And I am struggling to see how, once £200 million has been spent on assessment phases, how they are going to be much cheaper than a T26.
Diesel sets for 10 vessels rather than 5, of course there are going to be economies of scale. Simples
@NAB
As I see it the French have achieved much of what we want with a CODAD vessel. I am just suggesting one solution, I wish people would not get so precious over it.
Funny that… the USN went “corvettes” and we went “cruisers”, and are both, now, in search of what the quote says.
And so are the French. They only started a year earlier, but are going to launch a decade before us (if 2023 holds), so not a bad idea to be talking; across the Channel as well as the Pond?
The term “light frigate” has led many to jump straight down the corvette rabbit hole, which is probably why the language being used in NCHQ is subtly different.
There are a couple of less obvious things in the T26 design that might just have an effect – a different (or no) GT for example and a less stringent acoustic noise target, which will affect the hull design in a couple of ways. Both may reduce size as a second order effect and cost.
However, none of the above will realise the desired reduction in acquisition cost without a more sensible (and transparent) cost model.
Many of the T26 “problems” can be attributed directly to the VSO tendency to deploy their vast knowledge of shipbuilding cost and demand change as soon as they see the displacement exceed 5000 te. Others have been caused by configuration / arrangement decisions driven by those demands, or by assumptions in the cost model which may not stand up to detailed scrutiny. Still more have been caused by the way BAE do business and the TOBA – which makes it desirable for them to throw manpower at a job to derive information in perhaps excessive detail before they’ve actually got to a sensible place in the design spiral.
NaB,
And that is kind of my point. The acoustic signature target and the choice of propulsion chain didn’t come out of a vacuum, if you start hacking at stuff like that real capability starts disappearing quite quickly.
The jumping at corvettes is just indicative of idiocy, even the phraseology of the document itself provides pretty obvious sign posts about what the objective is.
Humour my ignorance NAB: who are the VSO and how do you get to become one..?
Sink the GCS R&D costs into the price tag of the T26’s with tails.
Order subsequent T26 Batch 2 following the concept study without tails and the encumbrance of the Batch 1 R&D costs.
The cost per hull of Batch 2 will be significantly cheaper…
Without going into detail, some of the signature targets for T26 and its ASW role may not be directly applicable to a more GP ship. The emphasis on these – because of the ASW role of the T26 – may have had larger effects on the design than might be apparent.
The GT (and propulsion) debate is a different beast, trying to balance length, speed, operating profile and topside impact factors, complicated by a somewhat limited supply chain. Different role and design – potentially different solution and not necessarily lower capability – albeit with potential logistic and political implications……
You could remove Artisan from the GP T26 too.
Replace it with Sea Giraffee since that might already be interfaced to CAMM for FLAADS.
Ahh, but then there’s creative accounting and clever use of the word amortisation.
@Simon
;)
@ John Hartley
Well that isn’t quite what he said but someone else has explained THAT bit of ‘media inaccuracy’. All I will say is that the very same people were saying exactly the same thing 5 years ago. “It will end in tears”, “a million more unemployed”, “triple dip recession”, “We need to keep borrowing more” etc etc. And they were ALL proved very wrong. And probably why the Tories were elected with a majority. Something else ‘they’ got wrong as well.
Forecasting is understood to be a ‘best estimate’, ‘an informed guess’ based on what has gone before and what the new policies will bring. In this case the forecast is actually a revision of an earlier forecast. Upwards. So they ‘under forecast’ before as they always err on the side of caution. Every Quarter’s output figures have been higher than ‘forecast’ and then revised up again after the first count. I think given what Osbourne has achieved against all the odds we should give him the benefit of the doubt and at least be relieved he has turned the economy around to the point where we CAN afford the cash for new aircraft, new ships and new kit for the khakis.
My only sadness of SDSR15 is that having become rather good at building very good carriers there wasn’t third earmarked after PoW even if it would be shared with another Nation.
@Hofum
> The only things I can see as being realistically sensible things to subtract from the T26 design are the following:
> Mission bay forward of the hangar
> eight of Mk.41 cells and 16 of the CAMM cells
> the Chinook capable helideck
> Additional complement capacity
I understand you point, but as you said, this will not reduce the cost so significantly. It will be better to have it in T26 hull. I agree this is one option.
However, another option will be without Mk.41. RN is going to have “huge increase” in strike power with CVFs and 8x T26s. Even if the 5 “light frigate” lacks Mk.41, it is minor within the fleet overall.
Thus, another list to be omitted, to have a “low-cost light frigate” will be
– Mission bay
– all Mk.41 VLS and 24 CAMM cells (I read somewhere that it is 12-unit based)
– the Chinook capable helideck
– Additional complement capacity
– both CIWSs
– reduced range by 25% (7800 nm–> 6000 nm @15 knots)*
In addition, GT for 27knots could be changed to CODAD for 25+ knots (this will open up a space in super-structure, to enable Merling capable hanger in shoter hull), and ASW silent hull could be just normal hull.
* La Fayette range is 4000 nm@15knots (bit short). ANZAC frigate range is 6000 nm@18knots (large enough). For me, these are typical “light frigate”.
chish. UK Gov debt is going up. £1.5 trillion now, £1.7 trillion by the next election. Osborne might get away with the SDSR & Autumn review, but there is precious little left for emergencies. He will just have to hope for his luck to hold.
As for the Tory majority, was it only a quarter who voted for them? The Conservatives (&SNP) were greatly helped by first past the post. UKIP got 3.8 million votes yet only one MP. The trouble with FPP (as the Tories found in 97) is that when it turns against you, it takes a big bite out of your bottom.
Forgive my ignorance, as about this sort of thing I know nothing.
But just how can 4 Submarines cost 25 to 31 Billion?? What makes a SSBN so much more than an Astute SSN?? Would size, different reactor, Missile compartment etc boost the cost that much?
I support CASD myself so I don’t object to Trident at all, just seems an unbelievable amount for 4 submarines?
Or does that amount include cost of operation over x no of years too?
Last things first: I didn’t see too many Labour people complaining about FPP for 13 years and one might also point out had those UKIP votes been converted as they should have been there would have been far fewer Labour MPs. But we digress..
I smile when the magic ‘£1.5 Trillion’ figure is mentioned as its always a good soundbite for the Lefties. They fail to mention that in ’97 Labour inherited Debt of £352 Bn (40% GDP) and left Debt at £960 Bn, 62% GDP, and some 300% increase in Debt. So when the good times rolled Labour rolled up the debts. When the hard times came the Tories have reduced the deficits and therefore the rate of Debt to £1,500 Bn, 81% GDP, a 50% increase in debt but a 33% increase in GDP terms. We all need a bit of luck but at least GO is trying to get us in the best place for when the luck does change. Something Labour disastrously failed to do.
….morning @ Duker; we’ll not agree on this, but just by way of being sociable:
> The Secret Service might not be a military unit, but they definitely look like one right down to the uniform dark suit and tie/earpiece/raybans…although their fancy dress owes more to “The Blues Brothers” and ours to the “Yeomen of the Guard” (The G & S comic opera, that is); and if they need extra infantry the President seems to have plenty of USMC types around (every man a rifleman)…plus Federal, State and Local Police all armed often up to the scale of a small European army…
> In the various Napoleonic Systems found in Europe types like the Gendarmes or Caribinieri might officially be Police, but they are very definitely Military up to and including the ability to deploy formed units with light armour overseas…and also operate in a context of armed police forces and Capital Cities with major military bases close by, thanks to the paranoia of previous generations of rulers.
> By contrast, our close protection and firearms operations are very small indeed and operate in the context of an unarmed police service, which for the most parts suits us pretty well…which means we need the extra infantry traditionally provided by the Guards (or indeed anyone else on Public Duties)…and if we substituted some sort of theatrical reserve unit for the tourists the requirement for extra trained men would need to be met by increasing numbers of armed police considerably beyond those currently required…it would cost us more money, as well as being rather more embarrassing than Nixon’s efforts to introduce comic opera uniforms to the White House back in the day…
Have a nice day :-)
GNB
…more generally, I find myself somewhat cheered by the SDSR. Not that I don’t anticipate the Black Flags of the Caliph on the road to Vienna during my lifetime…but the decisions taken mean that as the international situation continues to disintegrate into shambles and chaos, there will be routes open to re-arm in a rather more serious way…and in particular keep the moat clear of sharks and keep our international trade routes open when it becomes necessary.
I’ll miss Turkey, Greece and the Balkans mind you…but at least the survivors who get to a secure frontier considerably further west than it is now will be on our side, and willing to sign up for the counter-offensive; or at least to hold the line. :-)
A surprisingly cheerful Gloomy.
I am afraid even the road to Damascus is blocked… and the caliph that wanted to supplant the already self-declared caliph is so furious he has started shooting jets out of the sky. Turkey has big regional ambitions; try to transpose these two population statistics on each other:
“Muslims of the former Soviet Union number some fifty-five million and live primarily in six southern republics, one in the Transcaucasus (Azerbaijan) and five in Central Asia. Muslims make up a majority in all these Southern Tier republics except for Kazakhstan, where they constitute just 42 percent of the population (Russians constitute about 36 percent). Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have by far the largest populations (20.7 and 16.8 millions, respectively), followed by Azerbaijan (7.2 million), Tajikistan (5.4 million), Kyrgyzstan (4.4 million), and Turkmenistan (3.7 million).
Fifty million residents of the Southern Tier speak various forms of Turkic, some quite intelligible to a resident of Istanbul, others not.”
– now, who else is interested in building/ retaining influence in the ex-Soviet states? Not to mention some high profile conflicts with the entities that did not gain independence at the time of the breakup of the Soviet Union.
Turkey wants to position itself as the manufacturing and servicing base for its “lost brethren” who are energy rich (Turkey is becoming that way, too, but only very recently), but otherwise underdeveloped and lacking in manufacturing. When Turkey was still secular, Turkey’s former prime minister Süleyman Demirel exaggerated only slightly when he called the independence of these states (the ex-Soviet Muslim republics)”the event of our era.” He meant it in two ways: the shrinking of the menacing influence of a boardering superpower and, more narrowly, for Turkey the opportunity to unleash its economic potential, then held back by the constrained domestic demand (high external debt) and the in-doubt access to EU markets. Well, the menacing power is back, in the North, to the North-East, and now in the South and Turkey hasn’t co-opted the new “republics” economically in the way hoped for, so more nationalistic tunes have come to the fore.
chish. If Gideon has promised you a job when he becomes PM, then I think you have earned it. Frankly, many on this site, me included, are not really interested in yah-boo party politics. Over the decades, I have voted LibDem, UKIP, Conservative, Labour depending on what I thought was right at the time.
If it was down to me to reform Parliament, I would drop FPP for the commons & bring in the simplified alternative vote used for police commissioners & London mayor. That would be neutral for the tories. They would lose a few seats in the South, but gain a few in the North. Scotland would no longer be a one party state for the SNP. Do you regard that as leftist?
@ John Hartley.
It may come as a surprise to you but I come from a poor working class family (miners, train drivers, cooks etc) and was brought up to vote Labour. However I saw what the Unions were doing to my country and saw what Maggie was trying to do. And as I had had enough of being battered by their thugs when I didn’t vote as I was told at the gate I joined up. Fast Forward and I have been a Tory ever since out of belief like you.
I didn’t realise correcting some factual errors was ‘yah boo politics’ but we live and learn. I am out.
…@ACC….completely agree, I should clearly have said “the Black Flags of the Faithful”!…Erdogan’s Pan-Turkic ambitions and religious enthusiasms add considerably to the hellish brew that is our near abroad…and matters will only get worse if (as I fear) NATO proves to be a broken reed in the face of the Czar’s Little Green Men; giving the Turks much less interest in even pretending to be on more or less the same side as we are.
As far as the Balkans are concerned, the Turks represent an even bigger risk of adding to the mounting disorder than the Caliph…not much of a stretch to see them stepping in to protect Balkan Muslims or Muslim migrants if things turn nasty in the face of a ceaseless flow of refugees, some deemed to be of dubious provenance…
GNB
Well, they already offered to step in, on the side of the fellow Turkmen (Azeris) in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The first round that was fought without backers (Russia supporting the other side) only made a mln people displaced
… funnily enough, Israel is also backing the state entity of the Azeris (but they and the Turks have severed their earlier friendship). Hmm, who can keep up with all of this?
The Times leader calls the latest step, quite rightly, reckless rhetoric.
Interesting rumour on Defensenews (sic) about our P8s:
“US sources said deliveries could start in 2017 with two US Navy production slots having already been earmarked to be handed over to the British. Other sources said the governments are also considering bridging the gap until the British aircraft are operational by having two USN P-8s with British crews available from the RAF base for maritime patrol work.”
@wiseape
If so its a great deal for the USN. We need to keep the butyrate up to keep cost in control. But if you look at the navy budget you basically are using aircraft buys to balance the books.
Being basically the sole buyer of certain major items (surface ships of all types, subs) and the major buyer or certain weapons (SM-3/6, torpedoes) it is critical to keep those rates at sustainable levels.
The flex in the spending basically is in shared weapons programs and aircraft programs like the F-35 and SH-60 where volume is maintained by other buyers. Every P-8 sold overseas will let the USN have flexibility on buying something else it may need more urgently than the P-8 in that given year.
I do wonder when the associated weapons orders will come down from the UK. I don’t see them taking the time and money to integrate Stingray if that is the target date.
BooHoo. If I am reading FlightGlobal right, then the last C-17 has just gone to Qatar. Pity we did not get it as the ninth RAF C-17.
By Ben Lyon
SDSR 2015 states that “We will maintain one of the most capable anti-submarine fleets in the world with the introduction of eight advanced Type 26 Global Combat Ships, which will start to replace our current Type 23 frigates in their anti-submarine role. We will maintain our fleet of 19 frigates and destroyers. We will also launch a concept study and then design and build a new class of lighter, flexible general purpose frigates so that by the 2030s we can further increase the total number of frigates and destroyers.” (Let us assume the total number will increase from 19 to 22. This would call for 8 new light frigates if they are cheap enough). The SRSR also states that two more offshore patrol vessels are to be built. (So the intention then must be to produce a general purpose frigate which has capabilities somewhere between the Offshore Patrol Vessel and the Type 26.)
For the general purpose frigate there are two options, either a New Class (NC) as stated, or a T26Lite , a T26 with some systems omitted; which must surely feature in the concept study mentioned above. To start with I considered what I would omit from the T26, and what I would retain to result in a ‘flexible general purpose frigate’. I then assumed that the weapons and sensors for both NC and T26Lite would be the same.
This is what I would leave out of the T26 in order to bring the costs down. Sonar 2087 the Towed Sonar Array, the 3 x 8 cell Mk42 VLS, the 2 x Phalanx CIWS, Maintenance facilities and weapons for the Merlin Helicopter, and the Two Rolls Royce MT30 gas turbines, so that the maximum speed would be that obtained from Diesel Electric propulsion only, say around 22Knots, a bit faster than the offshore Patrol Vessels. I assumed the New Class would be no faster.
This is what I would leave in the T26Lite; the Type 997 Artisan Radar, Scot-5 Satcoms, EW systems and Decoys, eight x 6cell CAMM VLS, 1 x BAE 5inch Mk45 gun, 2 x DS30Mk2 30mm guns, 7.62 mm Miniguns and GPMGs, and maintenance facilities and weapons for 1 x Wildcat helicopter. For the A/S fit I would retain the Type 2050 Bow Sonar, and launch Stingray torpedoes from STWS or MTLS or by the Wildcat helicopter using a Match type system.
This would give a weapons and sensor outfit roughly equivalent to the Leander Class general purpose frigates, which were highly thought of; but of course each of the weapons and sensors would be much more effective than those in the Leanders. I consider this would be a satisfactory outfit for a ‘flexible general purpose frigate’, and I doubt if the Naval Staff would want any less.
For the T26 Lite I would provide “For But Not With” (FBNW) facilities for all the equipments omitted. That is the deck seatings, space in the switchboards, fuze panels and junction boxes for the power distribution supplies and other cabling, etc, etc, on build, so that the equipments could be installed readily at a future date if required.
Now let’s consider the costs under the following headings.
a.The Concept Studies would have to include both the NC and the T26L in order to satisfy the politicians that all options had been considered. No difference here then.
b.The Design Costs. For the New Class a full ship design would be required. For the T26Lite most of the design has already been done. All that would be required are calculations and drawings for the ballasting to allow for the equipments omitted. (I envisage slabs of mild steel attached to the FBNW seatings.)
c.The Shipyard Setting Up Costs. These one off costs would be required for the New Class, but have already been met for the T26Lite.
d. The Platform or Hull Construction Costs. The costs for a smaller lighter New Class hull would no doubt be less than for the T26Lite if they both started from scratch. But with the T26Lite the order would be for a second batch of similar hulls, ie the next 8 ships of a 16 ship programme. These are bound to be cheaper than the first eight, partly because the shipyard management and workers will have learnt short cuts and introduced innovative and more efficient working, and partly through spreading the fixed costs over a larger number of hulls. This effect is known as called ‘Caquots Law’. Under these circumstances the T26Lite platform costs could approach that of the smaller New Class.
e.The Equipment Costs. I have assumed that both the New Class and T26Lite would have the same weapons, sensors, and machinery etc. and hence the same costs. But of course the T26Lite costs would be less than the T26.
f. The Equipment Installation Costs. Same equipment, same costs. But of course again the T26Lite costs would be less than the T26.
g.The First of Class Acceptance Trials. There would be lengthy ‘First of Class Trials’ for the New Class, but these have already been carried out for the T26Lite.
h.The Integrated Logistic Support Set Up Costs. Start up costs for training aids, handbooks, spares and other logistic support would be required for the New Class, but these costs have already been met for the T26Lite.
Summarising: Paragraphs b, c, g and h above show where the T26Lite would be cheaper than a New Class; paragraphs a, e and f show where the costs would be about the same; and paragraph d indicates where the New Class would probably be cheaper. Paragraphs e and f show where the T26Lite would be cheaper than the T26.
The advantages of the T26L over the New Class, assuming the latter is smaller are:
Seakeeping. A good big one will always beat a good little one. As the sea state increases the New Class will have to slow down earlier than the T26Lite. The efficiency of a crew deteriorates as the sea state increases. So the T26Lite will remain faster and more efficient than the New Class for a given sea state.
Accommodation. The ship’s company of the T26Lite will be smaller than the T26 leaving even more space available for troops, refugees, evacuated ex-pats, or additions to the crew, etc., probably very much more than the New Class. (In WW2 ships companies increased dramatically, living conditions became vile, and efficiency suffered.)
Flexibility. The T26Lite could be brought up to the standard of the T26 if required by utilizing the FBNW facilities. This may not suit this government at this time, but some future government during the life of the ships may be very relieved to be able to do so. This assumes that the equipment suppliers have retained all the jigs, tools, drawings etc, to restart manufacturing; but as most of them will probably have logistic support contracts for the life of the T26, this may not be a problem.
Appearances, are important to reassure allies and deter enemies and 18 x T26 lookalikes are going to be more impressive than 8 T26 and 8 smaller ships. The government would no doubt be proud to report that they have restored some of the Royal Navy’s credibility by building 18 x T26s. (They won’t mention the bits that have been left off.)
The MOD Ship Dept. and BAE both have vested interests in carrying out New Designs ad-infinitum and would probably oppose the T26L, but the MOD has already made the mistake of spending vast sums on the design of the T45 and then only building six of them. So let’s hope that this time the Board will make the most of the funds spent on the design of the T26.