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What an exceedingly glossy update. Love the buzzwords, no doubt dreamt up by some marketing goon who gets paid a wad and a half to brainstorm nonsense for a living.
Telling quote:
‘The Army must be able equally to react to an enduring stabilisation operation and engage with partner nations overseas to develop their military capacity to address causes of instability as demonstrated by the ongoing military training programmes in the Horn of Africa’…
Tell me that the army actually couldn’t do this five year ago, before the 2020 guff what first propagated? Absolute drivel. Tell it like it is Army chiefs, its going to be a Homeland Defence Force, with a micro-USMC brigade thrown in to allow us to partner US, France etc, for foreign intervention.
Not that to say we really need full on expeditionary warfare, big old army, lots of tanks and multiple divisions as in the past. But basically this means the only expeditionary assets the UK armed forces have will be in the RAF and RN. End of. No more invading, only stand off bombing.
That said, its certainly a very shiny package. No expense spared in trying to tell us why expenses have to be spared in all the fun and crucial departments.
Military training programmes have been ongoing for over a decade. Spent time on one in a country in that area beginning with a Y and ending in an N but that was an RN/RM programme.
Quick question: How big is the Airborne taskforce? Batallion? Smaller?
Excellent. I am re-assured that at 0001 1 Jan 2020, the Army will at long last attain perfection.
Very nice. Almost makes you confident that the plans will deliver the expected force.
There’s a nod in there towards the uncertainty of vehicle programmes. Force troops supporting protected infantry in the AF left relying on unprotected vehicles.
Can you remember when the in R-WMIK used to stand for Ricardo, seems it now stands for refurbished
– Some really odd things about that structure, like the imbalance in the size of the adaptable brigades. Presumably 1 of the brigades with a light recce unit will be paired with one without during their cycles, which begs the question as to why not just reduce the number of brigade headquarters in the first place?
– If we’re going with a fleet management system that only has a certain number of Challengers actually in use at any one time, then why have we cut the number of armoured regiments in favour of “Heavy Protected Mobility”, excepting of course the desirability of more infantry for COIN work?
– “Homeland Security”? Fuck off. Maybe Phil the spreadsheet has been working his way through the West Wing DVD’s or something.
– What was the point in rebranding all the Scottish regiments as the “Royal Regiment of Scotland” if they’re going to persist in using the old names still? What a pissing waste of money that all was.
– And on the subject of names, given how hard the army has fought to save regimental cap badges why was the fairly iconic 7th Armoured Brigade just dropped into an infantry brigade? There are three armoured brigades now, how much of a stretch would it have been to just use 7th armoured as one of them?
– 25% uplift in blank ammunition. So there’ll be almost three and a third magazines of blank ammo per man now.
– Is anyone buying the general “this had nothing to do with cuts in the budget, this was all about a long-held vision for the army” theme? Anyone?
I think the most telling line is the one that states the UK’s economic position is a strategic threat !
The one thing that confuses and annoys me is the virtual removal by stealth of a Battalion of the Parachute regiment into the “special forces support role”. With both the RF and the AF training and readiness cycles on a 36 month “rule of 3” – and of course with 3 x RM Cdo’s this also applies to 3 CDO Brig.
However instead of giving the third Para Battalion back to the Air Asslt, Brig for the exact same training and readiness cycle as everyone else, they have some weird 2 battle group “1 on, 1 off” setup !
I am sure we could have afforded 300 to 600 less redundancies across all the services with a tri-service “SF Support Group” being set up from those qualified.
Aren’t there four Cdo’s, as one was stood up to cover the stealthy removal of the roulement army bn?
– the fourth one having special duties, and hence not part of the cycle?
Good one, TD. I could not believe that they are still refurbing those
Agree that tha AF only really needs 2 or 3 deployable brigade headquarters – enough to fill the roulment cycle. All the rest is just administrative overhead and could be boiled down to a Force HQ in an office somewhere.
Other one to look at is the Rapid Reaction forces. Surely a single deployable Brigade HQ commanding whichever 4 manoeuvre units of the Parachute Regiment and Royal Marines are at highest readiness, plus a comprehensive logistic support package, would be more efficient from a planning point of view? Either of the existing brigade formations is likely to need support from elements of the other in order to deploy rapidly and in fighting strength. So why not recognise reality and save the duplication?
@PE – re RM and Para Brigade HQs – Because they do different things. “Rapid Reaction” is not a skill or particular type of unit. We have a airborne/air assault specialist force and a amphibious warfare speciality force.
Further to that the Royal Marines don’t just deploy Commando Groups, they also deploy smaller groups for maritime security tasks (part of the reason for brining 43 Cdo under 3 Cdo Bde HQ). They also have to work with the RNs timeframes and deployment cycles.
“What an exceedingly glossy update. Love the buzzwords, no doubt dreamt up by some marketing goon who gets paid a wad and a half to brainstorm nonsense for a living.”
and
“Tell it like it is Army chiefs, its going to be a Homeland Defence Force, with a micro-USMC brigade thrown in to allow us to partner US, France etc, for foreign intervention.”
Got it in one, Overseas. So, 20,000 personnel are withdrawn from the regular Army but the real loss of capability is glossed over by the language of subtle propaganda. In fact, in places it is made to seem that we can do the same or even more! What utter bilge! Does it remind you of Orwell and “1984”?
“It appeared that there had even been demonstrations to thank Big Brother for raising the chocolate ration to twenty grammes a week . And only yesterday, he reflected, it had been announced that the ration was to be reduced to twenty grammes a week. Was it possible that they could swallow that, after only twenty-four hours? Yes, they swallowed it.”
Chris.B
“why was the fairly iconic 7th Armoured Brigade just dropped into an infantry brigade? There are three armoured brigades now, how much of a stretch would it have been to just use 7th armoured as one of them?”
Agree absolutely. No sense of history or tradition.
@Tom
Do we have the means or doctrine to deploy 3 Commando as a seabourne brigade any more? With 1 QEC, 1 Albion and 3 Bays we are talking about a single Commando group aren’t we? Anything else will have to follow on by Points, STUFT or Air. In which case you might as well send the RF Army brigade with its heavier punch.
Similarly for 16x have we got the assets to air deploy and sustain even a two batallion demi-brigade by air? And for an operation wouldn’t we want to add more manoeuvre units anyway to form a more serious fighting force? Thus making it even less air deployable.
If either force is tasked to deploy just its single high readiness battle group by its chosen means fine but that’s not a brigade deployment and will be pretty constrained in the tasks it can undertake. Is a single light battlegroup (even a scary elite one) really enough to secure a port or a major air head long enough for the Army RF to arrive? I fear not.
So from my persepective if we are serious about being able to project a light brigade with serious fighting power, self deployed at a disatance, it is always likely to be an ad hoc formation of both RM and PARA, depolying from a mixture of amphib ships, helos and transport planes. Such a formation would have a much better chance of securing theatre entry and defending itself long enough for the RF and other allied forces to arrive than either 3x or 16x acting alone.
Organisationally I am aware that both 43 Cdo and 1 Para have special duties and are therefore out of the equation. That leaves 5 manouvre units of elite light infantry. Assume 1 unit is doing forward engagement, public duties, civil defence or otherwise standing down for some reason. The other 4 are always going to provide the teeth of any serious light rapid reaction force. So why not organise and train together for that scenario? And practice sustianing each other logistically from whatever balance of air and sea support is available?
One of the great strenght of Slim’s 14th Army was the ability to switch seamlessly on demand from air supply to land supply to coastal and river supply lines as the tactical situation demanded. Shouldn’t our light forces practice doing the same today?
Actually the question above raises the point: what are brigades really for?
Are they an operational task organisation? Or are they about trianing and force generation?
Putting 43 Cdo under 3x for reasons of training and culture looks like a real fudge. Becuase it will never depoly with them as part of a formed brigade.
You could then ask will either 3x or 16x ever again deploy to the field in its specialist role (as opposed to taking a spell in roulement)? Or are they just there to generate single battle group each at high readiness that will then be tasked ad hoc? If so then do they need spearate specialist tactical brigade HQs?
Same question for the AF brigade HQs. Are they really needed for operational tasks? Does ‘homeland security’ really justify that many sets of red tabs? Or would some form of corps command suffice for force generation purposes?
And if we do need a core desingation for specialist force generation shouldn’t be the regiment? 43 cdo could then remain under the RM ‘regimental’ command for trianing and force generation. Even though it never will deploy with 3x or any other formed brigade in the face of the enemy.
FWIW the confusion is historical and comes from the evolution of the UK Forces from a small professional force to a mass imperial army and back again. But it would really benefit from being sorted out if we want to get the overhead back in line with the level of tasking we now aspire to undertake.
I dont think this is necessarily a bad job given a few factors in play
Politics; i.e. little ceremonial cuts or marching band reductions and a focus on kit
Service politics; i.e. no effort to consolidate light role forces
Army politics; i.e. an overweening desire to maintain cap badges and a note from mum for the posh boys
The homeland bollocks is just a lifebelt to a drowning man, the civil resilience sector don’t need the Army, don’t want them either and the last decade in this area has been characterised by the Army telling the sector to bugger off and sort your own shit out, which they have duly done. A bit rich for the Army to try and muscle back in, expect them to be told to do one by Cat 1 responders that have invested heavily in capabilities over the last several years.
So, not a bad job, but fundamentally an generational opportunity missed and the saddest part was hearing General Wall publicly stating that preservation of cap badges was one of the main factors in the re-org.
The other side of me thinks this is less important that might be thought because if history is anything to go by, deployments generally get cobbled together with whatever units are needed, not how they are organised in peace time.
Concentrate on capabilities not organisation
Refurbished WMIK’s indeed
We’ve had Joint Force Harrier, Joint Helicopter Force, Joint Force Lightning, Permenant Joint HQ, Joint Forces Command. UKLF has been around for a long time.
Why not Joint Elite Light Force ??
[ “J – ELF” Think Legolas at Helm’s Deep]
They can even keep their separate regimental HQs and different coloured hats if they want. But why perpetuate the fiction that we have two deployable light brigades when we clearly don’t?
Isn’t the “homeland bollocks” supposed to be TA?
@ TD
When you say light role do you mean it in the world wide accepted sense as in true light infantry (paratroopers, commandos, mountain troops, etc)? Or in the British sense as all-we-can-afford-is-a-four-tonner-to-mount-them-in-if-they-are-lucky? :)
@RT: “Concentrate on capabilities not organisation” – couldn’t agree more. I would like more thought (or transparency) in what structures / numbers mean for capabilities. Not just for the army, but across all three services – the world is purple you know :) Also, would be good to get some true capability training exercises – when was the last time the RFTG / ARG trained with a full Army brigade?
@Simon
No the “homeland bollocks” is the excuse for why we still need so many AF Brigade HQs.
@ Simon
No, not for a long time.
Google the Norwegian and Danish home guards. Especially the latter.
@Repulse
Argee with that – would like to see our elite light forces seize and secure a beachead followed by a RF brigade decanting out of the Points and onto dry land across some sort of mexe pontoon-pier.
Doesn’t have to be anywhere exotic. From Warminster to Marchwood to the Isle of Wight would do to prove the concept.
x,
I got the impression that was what we were moving back towards?.. With the new balance of “reserves” being part of the adaptable force, which looks to me like a non-expeditionary home defence force?
All this swapping and changing is very confusing ;-)
@ Jed – “However instead of giving the third Para Battalion back to the Air Asslt, Brig for the exact same training and readiness cycle as everyone else, they have some weird 2 battle group “1 on, 1 off” setup !”
Agreed.
16AAB should have three principle maneuver units based on para’s so that it can work to the same routine as the other reaction forces: work-up / deploy / work-down.
“The other side of me thinks this is less important that might be thought because if history is anything to go by, deployments generally get cobbled together with whatever units are needed, not how they are organised in peace time.
Concentrate on capabilities not organisation”
Exactly TD. Too many people (incl myself at times) read too much in official orbats, which always go out the window when something actually needs to happen. The Army 2020 organisation is just a convenience to try and manage an organisation of over 100,000 people.
Show me any organisation that can do better.
@Peter – But your missing the point of specialist forces – it doesn’t just apply to the battalion level organisations – it applies to higher formations as well. They are centres of defence excellence.
– HQ 3 Cdo Bde is the specialist HQ for amphibious and Arctic and Warfare operations.
– HQ 16 AA Bde is the specialist HQ for major Air Assault operations.
– Armoured Brigades are specialist HQs for armoured warfare operations, etc, etc
Any of those forces can be a “general” HQ for a variety of operations (as seen in Iraq & Afgan) commanding a variety of units with different capabilities, but its useful to have these specialist HQs so that we cover all the bases, and have somebody with more authority than Lt Col to act as champions for these specialist capabilities.
“One of the great strength of Slim’s 14th Army was the ability to switch seamlessly on demand from air supply to land supply to coastal and river supply lines as the tactical situation demanded. Shouldn’t our light forces practice doing the same today?”
And they can/do. A jungle trained light infantry battalion will have trained to move via helicopter and by small boat.
@Jedibeeftrix
Depends on the assumptions. The three mechanised RF brigades have between them a dual role of generating a single VHR battlegroup AND a HR deployable brigade.
What this structure uncovers is that the purpose of 16x is different. Under FF2020 16x appears to have the sole purpose of generating a single VHR light battlegroup. The brigade isn’t to be a deployable fighting formation itself any more: it would have to be augmented ad hoc and worked up if it was ever actually going to deploy.
FF2020 has at least 4 different animals masquerading under the name of “brigade”, and they are really quite different creatures.
“16AAB should have three principle maneuver units based on para’s so that it can work to the same routine as the other reaction forces: work-up / deploy / work-down.”
The “Air Assault Brigade” originally had two light infantry, air-mobile battalions paired up with the two para battalions to make up a combat brigade.
It looks very much like that original idea is dead and buried. There’s no mention of battalions rotating through that role, and there’s specific mention of the on/off readiness between 2&3 para.
The brigade certainly seems to have changed from an “air assault” role to “rapid reaction” role. Less about parachuting and rough landing C130s into battle – more about having a lead company with their bags packed for the Voyager flight.
Peter E said “Putting 43 Cdo under 3x for reasons of training and culture looks like a real fudge. Becuase it will never depoly with them as part of a formed brigade.”
They are all RM. There will be no cultural differences. 3 Cdo is a joint RM and Army formation. 3 Cdo isn’t a synonym for the Royal Marine Corps.
What strikes me most is that despite substantial cuts to manpower, we seemed to have settled for an army where such a big chunk (the AF) looks quite anaemic.
Half a dozen light protected (Foxhound and other bits n’ bobs) battalions, nine light infantry battalions, three light cav (Jackal) battalions. Three garrison battalions, and the reserve infantry battalions and yeomanry get Wolf and WMIK Landies.
Thousands of redundancies, but we still seem to have been left with an overlarge army considering that the only bit that looks to have retained any fightiness are the three armoured brigades. Even 16AAB looks anorexic and past its best.
I think I’d prefer to see a bit of mechanization in that adaptive force. Six APC battalions – something that could at least support the armoured infantry. And perhaps three regular, and three reserve light protected battalions – which would give us a substantial pool of protected vehicles. The remainder in the light role, with the Air Assault roulement restarted. That’s a modest improvement, adding a bit of extra oomph. Not to drastic?
Jedi said “16AAB should have three principle maneuver units based on para’s so that it can work to the same routine as the other reaction forces: work-up / deploy / work-down.”
Um. Think of it this way. If the RN sends a minimal ARG to sea once a year for six months. We will have one at “sea” even if t is about to go, one working up to go to sea next year. And one returned. That is a lot more sea time than RM have had for a long time and about the same length of time as a USMC MEU (though not quite.) So 3 for 1 works.
Considering not all Parachute Regiment soldiers are jump qualified. We don’t have a large number of C17s etc. They don’t really have lots of trick kit to shift. Then I doubt any emergency will find us sending the whole of a battalion. If it is some rescue mission in a Libya like scenario and the SAS are going and say an airport needs to be secured they will send personnel from 1PARA. They will be some notice to go. I don’t think Parachute Regiment’s skills suddenly degrade and they will main competent at the core skills if troops from other battalion need to go because troops from high readiness battalion are missing. If a whole battalion is needed for 6 months or so send the battalion from high readiness reaction brigade mounted in Mastiff. And the ARG might be close to the point of crisis anyway or could be moved. Of course lightening does strike twice. And if they want helicopters to play with in serious numbers they would have to be moved into theatre anyway so that is the heliborne assault business up the wazoo. (What you need for that ideally is a ship to land them on. Yes that is the ideal platform. A Landing Platform Helicopter if you will……)
What I am sort of driving at is if we had a bigger pool of C17 so we could move a xPARA battlegroup at will, a long with some fancy kit (Wiesels, Stormers whatever), and other support elements then it would be having 3 Parachute Regiment battalions in an new air assault/rapid deployment brigade. The working up, high readiness, and stood down model would work. But we don’t. And so they are wasted. Just the same really that we don’t quite have the shipping to do an ARG properly in a mini-MEU style; say 3 JC/Canberra’s fand 3 fast LPD’s.
So the UK has good troops that could head off all sorts of crisis and stop them becoming more expensive but we don’t have the assets. A bit like having a wonderful car but having no wheels and/or needing to lease an engine. Something I have been saying all the time I have been commenting here. Better a standing army with tanks and heavy kit times three than an army that can be deployed anywhere tout de suite.
BB,
I thought that about the AF until I included all the “Force Troops” stuff.
As for 16AAB. I think this is what we can deliver either by copter or by fixed-wing. It’s obvious that it is designed as a true sharp-end brigade.
However, I do agree with your last paragraph. I preferred the 5 x adaptable brigades of the original design. Seems more sensible for roulements too. I guess it didn’t work because of the way they wanted to shoehorn the TA into the structure. This new one leaves the TA/reserves in a slightly less “hard” organisation that look like they will either stay at home as a home guard or do the expeditionary logistics and support work (there are a few exceptions to this of course).
@Brian Black
“Even 16AAB looks anorexic and past its best.”
You’re quite right. 16 AA Bde has lost two infantry battalions and, I believe, its Air Defence troop some time ago. Now there is some talk about D Squadron The Household Cavalry Regiment, which has been one of its units, also being withdrawn from its organization. Only a rumour and I have been trying check it out but the document TD included in his post: “Transforming the British Army – An Update – July 2013” now seems unavailable. Hope it’s nothing we’ve said! Could be adding another update, I suppose (“10 Infantry battalions restored to British Army” or some other piece of good news!).
Surely all this hollowing out is bound to enfeeble any Army, isn’t it?
Another concern, the incentives for recruitment seem a little skewed.
Join certain regiments and you have an increased likelyhood of deployment to a “war”. Join others and the only fighting you’re likely to see is part of another Afghanistan/Iraq COIN deployment. Which one has historically been more successful and which has historically resulted in lower casualties? That’s a tough sell trying to convince someone to join the adaptable force over the reaction force.
Meanwhile the reserves have gone from “we’ll only call you when we really need you” to “we plan to call on you on a semi-regular basis to fill up the shortfall in regular manning, even for tasks like overseas engagement which probably don’t really require you”.
The whole thing looks like a plan drawn up on a paper napkin down the pub during someones lunch hour.
BB – As I understand it, the original 5 Multi role brigade concept went out the window for few reasons:
+ Money – We couldn’t afford all of the kit to make it work properly.
+ Basing – Because all of the armour would of been concentrated in Salisbury Plain/Catterick, the brigade based in Scotland would never of been remotely close to its heavy forces.
+ Jack of all trades, master of none – the MRB concept was fine if you want to do is send a mixed bag of forces to theatre, but not if you want to send a well trained and worked up armour brigade.
@ Mike W,
You’re right, the link is dead now. I saved a copy of the document to a folder though, so until the link comes back up if anyone has questions that need checking, leave it here and as I dip in and out I’ll have a ganders.
And just to spam the shit out of TD’s thread a bit more, a new transcript for an evidence session in front of the defence select committee has just been released. This would have been done last Wednesday I think, on army 2020:
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmdfence/uc576-i/uc57601.htm
@Brian Black: seconded. All these “light” bns aren’t going to be much use unless the preferred deployment is with the UN. Raise properly manned and equipped units, and if there’s a shortage of money, cut the number of units and cap badges be damned
Just reading that house of commons session. It’s fucking hilarious. At some points it literally goes along the lines of “What’s your plan B if plan A doesn’t work?” “… we don’t have a plan B. We believe – despite any evidence or questions to the contrary – that Plan A will work. If it doesn’t, we’re fucked”.
1. The AF brigades are exactly that – pools of units to be used as and when that between them generate 6 units every 12 months to go off and play or stand ready to play. The regional brigade system is not a luxury – plenty of things need doing at Bde level. Also don’t forget that only 3 of those 7 brigades are going to have deployable HQs and I believe actually only are needed for on-going operations. I also imagine that a lot of factors come into play with what units are under what brigades and I am equally sure that if you got down to the spreadsheet nitty gritty there are good reasons for it.
Really though it doesn’t matter because no AF Bde is going anywhere without a 12 month workup so they’ll draw units across the pool.
2. AF versus RF – personally I think the AF will see more opportunities to go and do something than the RF and more than likely people will be cross and trickle posted anyway. Other armies across the world manage just fine with that sort of arrangement.
3. Names. No idea what the motivations are. Sometimes I think there are the traditionalists who want all the names to stay and those who want a nice tidy numbering system that breaks with the past. There definitely seems to be a conflict betwixt them. I’m pretty sure all the numbered brigades have seen some action and 7 X has been disbanded and chopped and changed several times.
4. As for 16X – you join the PARAS to get lobbed into some shithole on your own and with next to no support ala Market Garden or HERRICK 4. You don’t join to prance around on “other tasks”. It looks to me like the PARA units have been excused a lot of the other taskings line units do so they can concentrate on being one off and one on. Seems logical to me.
cheers Chris:
“Q172 Sir Bob Russell: Is there anything the Defence Committee should be doing to help make sure that you have sufficient funding to implement Army 2020 or do you think everything at the moment is-
Lieutenant General Sir Adrian Bradshaw: The answer to your question is that there is sufficient risk in the programme for us to conclude that if the current resourcing were to reduce again we would be in the business of looking at whether these plans are achievable.
Q174 Sir Bob Russell: I am grateful for that as it leads me into my next question. What happens if you do not get a real-terms increase in your funding from 2015, in other words after the next general election?
Lieutenant General Sir Adrian Bradshaw: I think the degree of risk then increases and we would have to look at that stage at whether the plan was deliverable.”
Can we get an entire AF brigade into one Point class?
Excluding the troops of course.
@Chris.B
“so until the link comes back up if anyone has questions that need checking, leave it here and as I dip in and out I’ll have a ganders.”
Well, you could, if you have the time, Chris. look to see whether D Squadron, The Household Cavalry Regiment is listed at all and if it is, whether it is shown to be still a part of, or supporting, 16 AA Bde? Ta very much.
@ Mike,
There’s no indication on that chart of a Household Cavalry presence in 16AAB, just the whole regiment as part of one of the reaction brigades. There could be a number of explanations for that, but it does seem on the face of it that they’ve been removed.
Can we get an entire AF brigade into one Point class?
The whole point of an AF brigade is that it is adaptable. There’s no fixed ORBAT to wonder about fitting on a ship.
@Chris.B
Many thanks for that, Chris. As you say, there could be several explanations for that but on the surface it does not look too good.
“Q172 Sir Bob Russell: Is there anything the Defence Committee should be doing to help make sure that you have sufficient funding to implement Army 2020 or do you think everything at the moment is-
I know I sometimes sound like an apologist for the Army but all that is being said here is that the Army is cutting its cloth according to its means and if the means are reduced the cloth gets re-assessed. It makes perfect sense to design a force that gets the most of a budget and is tight.
Everyone knows that any significant contingency funding or cushioning would not only reduce defence capabilities it is in reality just going to be so much carrion for the Treasury.
OK – a few questions; being just a civvy I want to just make sure what roles the different battalions are to perform, particularly in high intensity warfare. Obviously the C2 and Warrior and scout battalions are a given, but…
1 – The Airborne taskforce will be battalion sized?
2 – What roles will the a) heavy and b) light protected mobility battalions perform?
3 – What roles will the Light Cavalry perform?
4 – What roles will the light role infantry perform?
Phil,
Sorry, I meant an armoured infantry brigade from the RF.
The one with the 56 Chally2s, Warriors, CVR(T) and Mastiffs.
@Phil
Your first paragraph makes perfect sense to me:
“and if the means are reduced the cloth gets re-assessed. It makes perfect sense to design a force that gets the most of a budget and is tight.”
Agree absolutely. The re-configuring of Army resources for 2020 is not a bad job in itself, given our present poverty-stricken national state. However, my previous arguments on this thread have been to the effect that it is only an increase in global funding that is going to retain our capabilities. To argue otherwise i.e. that cuts will not reduce capability, as official publications appear to do in places, is sophistry of the worst kind.
It is your second paragraph that I cannot understand fully (and it is probably my fault in that I am not in possession of certain pieces of information ):
“Everyone knows that any significant contingency funding or cushioning would not only reduce defence capabilities it is in reality just going to be so much carrion for the Treasury.”
I fail to see, in at least one case, how contingency funding will actually reduce defence capabilities. Take the example of the protected mobility vehicles procured under UORs for Afghanistan (Mastiff, Ridgback, Warthog, etc.) I know that it is the case normally that the Treasury eventually claws back money for kit purchased as UORs but in this case, haven’t those very vehicles proves to be a lifeline or godsend to the Army, in that it is placing them in the Core for future use. Surely in this case it must be that the Treasury has actually helped the Army solve a problem and, presumably, the money will not be claimed back (or if it is, then the cost of those vehicles will be less to the Army than if they had to buy new?) I am not in full possession of the facts, Phil, but that’s what it seem like to me. Or have I completely mistaken your argument?
@TD
“The homeland bollocks is just a lifebelt to a drowning man, the civil resilience sector don’t need the Army”
That is a totally incorrect statement TD.
TRF are a key component to a multitude of scenarios that involve multi-agency tasking.
The military have specialist ability way beyond the capabilities of MAIAT. Your assumption that Ryton, the New Dimensions and HART programmes do provide certain assets for certain tasks that were bought at great expense and those assets are being re-evaluated, but for more than a decade the military has been entrenched to deliver critical First Response components.
Fair point on specialist areas like CBRN and EOD but in the main, my general point is valid
I believe my comments ref Para Battalions and 16 AAB might have been misconstrued. It has been acknolwedged for some time that we no longer have a “parachute brigade” but with the removal of 2 x light inf battalions 16 AAB is no longer meant to deploy as a brigade with 3 to 4 manoeuvre units including Apache regiments etc, instead it is to generate a high readiness battle group, just as the 3 Commando’s of 3 Cdo Brig are to provide a single battalion sized battle group based on a single Commando and supporting units.
However with only 2 battalions surely only a reinforced Company sized very high readiness battle group can be sustained ? This may well fit in with the amount of personnel we can maintain as parachute trained, and deploy from remaining RAF fixed wing transport assets; BUT a full battalion would offer greater operational flexibility, particularly as we have enough Chinooks and Merlins to deploy them. Don’t forget the non-parachute, non-air assault role played by the Paras in the Falklands as elite light infantry deployed from the sea.
I just think when the whole of the rest of the Army (both RF and AF) and the RM is on a 36 month 1 in 3 cycle, the Paras are not, it just seems “cheap” as my son would say !
“I just think when the whole of the rest of the Army (both RF and AF) and the RM is on a 36 month 1 in 3 cycle, the Paras are not, it just seems “cheap” as my son would say !”
agreed.
I don’t see what the problem is with only two paras if they are never considered “deployed”. It’s only when they are working on cycle that they need the train/deploy/rest cycles. If they don’t actually deploy then it’s just train/rest – train obviously also means “ready” for contingency operations.
So I read it as 16AAB is never expected to remain deployed. Similarly I read that 3Cdo and/or the RF is intended to remain deployed for long periods on roulement. I especially liked the original five brigade concept as that meant a less strenuous roulement with the inactive brigades forming a training/home defence force OR the ability to surge up to three brigades into theatre and roll one in and one out. I don’t see how this is achievable using the new structure.
What has happened to the link? Could someone point to a copy?
Thanks
http://www.army.mod.uk/documents/general/Army2020_Report.pdf
To me 16 x needs another regular battalion. I know they say para training is expensive, yet it would be very simple to convert one of the Gurkha battalions to a parachute battalion. Then 4 para could be used to reinforce in a more appropriate way. The training/deploy/rest cycle is critical even for paras.
As for 16X – you join the PARAS to get lobbed into some shithole on your own and with next to no support ala Market Garden or HERRICK 4.
Still depressed that when Stuart Tootal said this: “‘running out of supplies when surrounded was part of our history. When I talked of what conditions must have been like for paratroopers who held the bridge at Arnhem for nine days against ferocious German assaults, having only planned to hold it for two, in 1944, people got the point that I was making.’”
no one in the press conference stuck their hand up and said “Colonel, didn’t the Paras lose at Arnhem?
“… convert one of the Gurkha battalions to a parachute battalion. ”
Gurkha Para battalions date back to WW2, 153(?) Battalion serving with particular distinction and Imphal as I recall. Later, 2 Para had a Gurkha company as recently as 2001 (?, memory is getting worse) because of problems recruiting native Brits.
Might be a better idea to recruit a new Gurkha battalion, than convert an existing one. At least there will never be a problem with recruiting and the little buggers are guaranteed good in a scrap.
Good idea Llama, that is if their government was not cutting down on the recruitment of mercenaries to clean up their image internationally. There was a bit of a scrap a few years back on that.
BTW, image cleanup is not my idea, blame it on their government. Their image was never bad in my opinion.
Edit: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/9153296/Gurkha-service-in-Britains-armed-forces-under-threat-from-Nepal-government-bill.html
Found a link for that.
The idea of the UK ever conducting helicopter warfare like the US was completely potty. Firstly you have to have enough helicopters. Secondly you have to get them into theatre. Thirdly, and mostly, you would have to have a very bizarre extraordinaire reason to actually want to do it. Who would you be fighting not a peer and it would be overkill against terrorist insurgents? So what scenario. 16AAB went to four units for the same reason 3Cdo went to four unit because that was being operated on the ground in Afghanistan; there was never ever an intention for 16AAB to be a mini-101st. All this talk so many light infantry battalions this and parachute battalions that isn’t realistic. It was all about attaching 4 manoeuvre units to one brigade HQ. An instance thereof organisation not capability.
Again it this issue of parachuting that everybody gets hung up on. I think it has been proved now that the average British infantry soldier (though he is an above average soldier!) can climb in and out of helicopters. I know. Frightening. I have seen them do it! It really isn’t a speciality and certainly not a skill you can build an organisation’s legend (in the more prosaic sense) unlike jumping out of a perfectly serviceable aircraft doing several hundred knots several hundred feet above the ground. I don’t like to the use word elite too much as it is perhaps a bit loaded; rather like how the word hero has become loaded of late. There may be little need to jump into theatre of operations (though the French find reasons, then there was the RLI), we certainly don’t have the aircraft to land a large force and sustain it, and yet it is something I believe we should keep and nurture just in case and most importantly as a differentiator that separates the Parachute Regiment from the rest of the British infantry. We don’t expect Grenadiers to spend their days throwing grenades, fusiliers to spend their day lighting fuses, we have lancers in heavy tanks, we have rifles acting as heavy infantry, destroyers that are frigates, and fighters that drop bombs. Tet we, some of us, get very hung up on that word parachute and expect parachutists well to parachute. We don’t have the resources for a (demi-)brigade based on the Parachute Regiment to be a mini-101st. I hope the irony of the Army’s largest brigade being its supposed lightest and it dwarfing the other light formation (that could be moved anywhere and had its own organic helicopters) by a few thousand isn’t lost on everybody. But we could move a battalion-lite if we so chose. **
As for affording things we, well HMG, choose not to spend money on defence on our behalf. HMG choose to borrow £10bn to give the DfID a budget; I will use £10bn to make the maths easier. How much value the UK taxpayer gets from that budget has been discussed a lot here. And we might as well discuss it again. I would wager that we could buy just as much influence with a well managed £8bn as could we that budget of £10bn. Really nobody really knows what that £10bn gets us. I do know what £2 billion on the MoD equipment budget could buy us spent over 5 years. It could buy us enough vehicles to mount 5 brigades in modern (Third World friendly) MRAPs, a modern (Third World friendly) cavalry vehicle, and some modern light artillery. It could buy us enough C17 so we could move a light parachute battalion based somewhere with enough stores and a clutch of light support vehicles. And it could buy us 3 modern fast LHD/LPD. If the UK get to the point of crisis more quickly and be more of a threat to the villains to the Third World we might actually derive some real value from the DfID budget.
Sadly HMG won’t do any of this which means Army 2020 is basically about maintaining a core capability. And really it is a very core capability,. Keeping a few thousand men who know how to shoot, do extreme camping, and play with HE. Just in case. As I said above a car without wheels. It could be so much more just spending money we already borrow in a different way.
** Really is there is no excuse not for the MoD not to “own” to one or three aircraft so that all Parachute Regiment soldiers are parachute qualled. Would it take more than one say Islander? I wonder how many of that specialist RAF Reg squadron are not parachute qualled? Again the MoD chooses to maintain 2800 RAF Reg bods. What’s that? Enough to operate all our Bays for a year. So please none of this we can’t afford to do stuff.
Their is a lot to commend in Army 2020 and I think in a broad sense they have tacked the severe manpower reductions and new strategic priorities well.
The one thing I still struggle to wholeheartedly get on board with is the presence of essentially 3 armoured brigades as the Army’s principle manoeuvre formations. They may be officially termed ‘armoured infantry’ but in composition they have a weight and structure which most would recognise as armoured formations through and through. If it were down to me I would have tried to have a single armoured brigade and generate 1 heavy battle-group at constant readiness and on rotation alongside 3 Commando and 16 Air Assault, with 3 more medium balanced, mechanized brigades to provide 1 at high readiness for operations in the same ‘rule of 3’ rotation.
I understand that circumstances have made it very difficult for the Army to get the right balance and structure that it needs to future operations, but I do despair a little at the continuing focus on heavier armoured warfare. A single armoured battle-group would enable quick reaction to any sudden crises that flares up, and the entire brigade could be brought up-to scratch and deployed with a few months notice. Considering we would only ever really want and need a single armoured brigade in action and those kind of Granby/Telic style operations have a fair amount of warning and build-up I fail to see a problem with the idea of a singular armoured formation.
P.S
I would definitely seek to have three manoeuvre battalions for 16 Air Assault.
Also I quite like the adaptable concept and see no real problem with a force split between a larger amount of essentially regional ‘static’ brigades but which can act as parent formations and generate units for active deployments, but also a couple of brigades earmarked to be larger and more comprehensive formations which could with sufficient notice work up and then slot in with the 3 regular brigades for a long enduring rotational operation (should we be as unfortunate as to get stuck in that situation again).
How long would it take to deploy the whole Rapid Reaction Armoured Division (3 armoured brigades) plus other support troops to the European mainland i.e. Poland for example?? should Ivan decide, however unlikely in the near/medium term, to pay an uninvited visit to Baltic countries or Poland.
Considering
(a) British treaty/political/unofficial commitments to defence and deterrence in NATO/EU.
(b) British heavy forces are not expected to be used in UK territory but to be deployed far away from home.
(c) the inevitable future creation of EURO armed forces due to budget cuts, European political integration, etc.
wouldn’t it make more sense to leave the Armoured Division forwardly deployed in Germany? where it could train in state of the art facilities/camps with the old masters of armoured warfare and other EU allies. leaving the light infantryand 16th AA in UK territory they are easily deployed anyway.
Integrating the armoured infantry divisions/brigades of Germany, UK, France, Netherlands, Denmark, Poland now that would be a force to be reckoned with.
Mr Observer,
From that article you quoted:
“Padam Lal Bishwakarma, chairman of Nepal’s Parliamentary International Relations and Human Rights Committee, last night told the Daily Telegraph he wanted the recruitment to end but not until the country could offer the men alternative jobs which matched its pay.”
I don’t think the UK need worry yet about the supply of Gurkha recruits drying up. There are some other social issues that the UK needs now (since Gurkha soldiers were granted full UK pension rights and the right to remain) to think about, but really they are trivial compared to the continued immigration of people who have never and never will contribute to the common good. Not many Gurhkas living in self-imposed ghettos and planning terrorist attacks in the UK.
Sgt Pep,
Leaving British Armour in Germany to contribute to a counter to a possible Soviet thrust into Poland or the Baltic States, would be eminently sensible, but only if the UK had any intention to go to war to protect Poland etc.. We did that once before and it didn’t turn out too well. We will never do it again. NATO is now a nonsense, a paper tiger, a talking shop. at best an over-arcing HQ for out of area operations by coalitions of the willing.
What’s the point of retaining an armoured division then?! if not for conventional warfare and defence/deterrence.
So Britain has absolutely no geopolitical/economic interests to protect in Europe then? good to know.
Sgt Pep, not that the UK doesn’t have interest in Europe, but that there are very little problems that can be solved with the addition of a sabre squadron. Now if only parking tanks on the front porch of the Greek parliment can get people to see sense (for both sides, politicians and protestors), then that might be a good idea, but as getting people to see sense is about as likely as Her Majesty adopting me as her long lost son, I’d give that idea a miss.
More likely usage areas for them are Africa and the Middle East. Still a bit of a Wild West frontier over there.
Llama, just pointing out where the winds are blowing. Might be a future problem.
And quit calling me Mister or I’ll return the favour and make you sound like a character from a children’s book. :P
“Look!! It’s Mr Llama!!”
@Hurst lama
Your comments on NATO are amusing given the fact that it operated exactly as it was meant to in order to provide 2 component commands, Air at Izmir and Maritime at Nisidia commanded by a US and Italian 3 star respectively. Operating under the umbrella of JFC Naples.
We also have the even more recent example of Germany, US and The Netherlands all deploying 2 patriot batteries to Turkey which are operational under NATO command.
Then we have ongoing TF 508 ops in the GOA, Afghanistan, former Yugoslavia.
Yet you have decided that we will simply discard article 5?
The other thing is I can’t see a 3Div Reaction Brigade ever deploying with 2 x Warrior and 1 x Mastiff. Another brigade’s Warriors will go in the Mastiffs’ places. Seeing the time taken between the balloon going up, decision to send them, put ships in position, move vehicles to Marchwood, ships from Marchwood to who knows where, from the port there to the base, and so into action will take weeks and weeks I can’t see the need for the brigade to be held at high readiness. That is high readiness in a QRA or fire engine or ambulance or doctor on call sense. It will be never as quick FIW and they weren’t moving heavy vehicles. So two brigades working turn and turn about should cover it. I would go down two (one actually but let’s meet them halfway) armoured brigades I would put the Mastiffs into a third brigade that was working split into three battle groups under a work up, deploy, rest rotation. Keep one scale of equipment at Marchwood. Split the rest of the kit between three battalions for training. And then if there is a need for a rapid intervention with protected vehicles, again say a Libya style scenario and the Army is evacuating refugees, ex-pats, whoever then all we need is a Point or a Bay or Albion or a combination. Again not ideal but we have to work with what we have.
Mr. APATS,
Never have I said we would discard Article 5, I said we (the UK) will not go to war if Poland, the Baltic States or, come to that Bulgaria were to be attacked. Do you think we would? What about some of the other NATO countries? Belgium, for example, think they would join in?
Do, please, read again what Article 5 says. There is no actual requirement to go to war, only to take such action as each member state deems necessary and to jolly well tell the UN Security Council. The days when it was all for one and one for all (if they ever existed) have long past.
You cite the example of three members moving anti-aircraft batteries to Southern Turkey under NATO command. Suppose, in a year or two, Syria decided to attack Turkey. Local attacks, you understand designed to drive “rebel” elements back from the border regions. Which NATO countries do you think would send in troops/planes in the spirit of Article 5?
In 2006 the NATO countries agreed to keep their defence spending at at least 2% of GDP. How many have done so?
Sorry, old boy, but NATO is now a paper-tiger.
@Observer
Fair go, on the Gurkhas, Mr. Observer (bugger; sorry, I forgot – I can only claim a lifetime of being polite to officers, at least I don’t call you, “Sir”) , but I don’t think we need worry just yet.
As an aside have you seen this article:
http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2013/07/16/the-submarine-race-in-the-malaccan-strait/
All about submarines in your back yard. I’d be interested in your views.
@HL
“You cite the example of three members moving anti-aircraft batteries to Southern Turkey under NATO command. Suppose, in a year or two, Syria decided to attack Turkey. Local attacks, you understand designed to drive “rebel” elements back from the border regions. Which NATO countries do you think would send in troops/planes in the spirit of Article 5?”
Ourselves, the US, the Dutch, the Italians amongst others. I respect your opinion, though find old boy a bit condescending.
My opinion differs and I have worked within the NATO organisation extensively over the last 4 years.
“Ourselves, the US, the Dutch, the Italians and others”
Wishful thinking there, in my view. However, aren’t there 28 members of NATO? What will the others be doing? The same as the UK will do if the Sovs steam into, say, Bulgaria – making speeches at the UN, calling for a cease fire, issuing press releases and generally giving every support short of actual help.
Have you seen that Georgia has today declared that it will join in NATO reaction force from 2015. Silly sods. If they think that will save them the next time Russia wants to give them a slap they are in for a disappointment.
P.S. Sorry if you found the “Old Boy” condescending. I didn’t mean it to be. Observer found being called “Mr” objectionable too. Guess I am getting too old for the internet.
“at least I don’t call you, “Sir””
That’s even worse. :)
As for the arms race, well, welcome to the war. It really has never ended, just cooled down and went a bit shy.
As for locking up the Straits, possible, but the shallow waters will really cripple the sub’s abilities. You want them to play, look at the other side of the countries. Surface ships and preferably ground artillery can lock up the Straits of Malacca at the choke point, the sub/surface ship playground is the entrance and exit. Look at where Malaysia based its subs, Sabah, not the mainland.
Not to mention you want to keep the lanes open, not interdict them, so a sub/surface fleet to keep the South China Sea approach open as a deterent is needed.
You got to remember that to the countries in the area, there are 2 enemies. China and their neighbours. Each have their strengths and weaknesses. Diplomatic ties have improved a lot, but all it takes is one racial riot or international incident to screw up the whole deal. Which means keep your friends close, and your possible enemies within smacking range army wise. Hence the arms race.
As for more subs, not likely. All the countries involved are still digesting their aquisitions and formulating tactics and doctrine of usage, logistics and maintanance. Apparently, one of the Malaysian Scorpenes have a bit of a diving problem due to defects. They will sort it out in time, but this is the kind of problem that illustrates why time is needed to digest aquisitions.
@HL
What do you base you opinion that we would ignore an article 5 issue on? NATO has been reinvigorated by Libya last year where the command system worked very well. It has had more ongoing ops world wide than ever before.
It still runs operations in former Yugoslavia from JFC Naples. I am curious as discussions I have had with both NATO political appointees, my old boss (UK 2 star), and his boss (German 3 star) would indicate none of them share your concerns.
remember that any non response to an article 5 violation equals the end of NATO. It is not something that can be shrugged off.
@Observer,
Thanks for that. I had thought that the local countries wanted to subs etc to ensure that the Straights stayed open am I right in thinking that they do, but also want the ability to close them?
@APATS
I repeat what I said earlier, I don’t believe the UK would ignore an attack that would invoke Article 5, any more than any of the other 27 countries would. I just don’t believe that the UK would go to war over an attack on Eastern members of the alliance, firstly because there isn’t much we could do and secondly I don’t think the UK public would stand for it.
Please do re-read Article 5, it does not commit any member of NATO to go to war in support of another. As I said, it does commit all members take whatever action they deem necessary to support the attacked party and restore the integrity of the NATO area, and, of course telling, the UNSC. Should the Russians go into Bulgaria the UK would join Belgium and others, including, I suspect, Germany (your 3 star boss not withstanding), in calling for a cease-fire and possibly tabling a motion at the UN, every assistance short of actual help.
If all those members of NATO took their commitments so seriously as to be prepared to go to war why have so few honoured their commitment to maintain defence spending at a minimum of 2% of GDP?
Sorry Llama, no one wants the Straits closed. No one benefits from that. Just because the equation works in one direction does not imply it works automatically in the other.
As for NATO, I think you might be a bit too hard on it. NATO is primarily a defensive alliance, why it had no chance to show off recently is due to the lack of aggressors, hence lack of focus. An attack on any member country will be having the whole lot very, very focused on a target and drooling to show off. Like pit bulls, if they are sleeping, they don’t look that impressive but if you disturb them, expect big bites. Any chance for action will have officers all dreaming of promotions and raring to go. For now though, all they have are COIN-like bushfire wars.
@HL
“I just don’t believe that the UK would go to war over an attack on Eastern members of the alliance, firstly because there isn’t much we could do and secondly I don’t think the UK public would stand for it”
On the first point, a squadron or 2 of Typhoons/F35/Tornado depending upon time frame and other actions show our political determination. It does not require an instant armoured brigade, think tri service.
I am well aware of what article 5 says and even more aware how it is interpreted in the corridors of power.
Obviously you know more about a likely German response than a 3 Star Admiral, I respect that.
The whole 2% thing is something that has to be justified every year, a response to aggression (what the alliance was set up for) is a once in a generation response.
@observer
Thanks for the clarification about the Straights.
As for NATO, sorry that my views differ, but I see nothing to persuade me that all members of the Alliance would do more than honour the letter of the treaty.
@APATS,
We are going around in circles here. You believe that if the wheel falls off, everyone will muck in and go to war to protect, say, Bulgaria, and I don’t. Let us leave it at that because to continue we would be wasting each others time.
@HL
Indeed and I have validated the reasons for my opinion. What brought you to yours?
Isn’t that we are letting all the Bulgars and Romanians come here in the new year so they can live on a nice island protected by an update nuclear deterrent? That is what we call a cunning plan……..
http://content6.flixster.com/question/56/30/21/5630216_std.jpg
Proposing scenarios of an invasion of NATO is simply being over-dramatic.
NATO is a defensive organisation. When Austria or Ireland begin massing their armies against NATO’s borders, then NATO would deploy the relevant force package to deter the threat. Just like sending Patriot batteries to Turkey, when a possible threat emerges NATO positions itself accordingly.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exercise_Armageddon
BB, most likely. And proves that an ounce of prevention is better than tons of MBT “cures” moving around, though much less spectacular.
@x
Have you recently taken upon yourself the role of resident devil’s advocate? :)
@ Observer
The older I get, and in your Earth years I am very old, the more I discover there is an exception to every rule, a contrary argument to every logical assertion, and a proof for every impossible formula.
I don’t do pedestrian thinking.
If I you find me insufferable now you would never have coped with the younger mentally healthy me…..
X, I didn’t really follow the point you were making on 16AAB earlier. Seemed to poo-poo the idea of parachuting and air assault generally, but ended with a call for more parachute training.
Smaller aircraft are already used for various parts of jump training. But falling out of little aircraft half a dozen at a time does nothing to prepare aircrews, for whom airborne operations apparently become very complex very quickly – multiple aircraft, multiple waves of aircraft, low level tactical flying, night flying, field landings; I can imagine it’s quite tricky stuff to pull off.
Adding further couple of light infantry battalions to the para battalions would not make it a UK 101st Airborne, which is a division. And having four battalions is not a result of the Afghan war; 16AAB was formed in the 90s, years before New York exploded, with the Paras, Gurkhas and Royal Irish.
In relation to the 101st, their brigade combat teams consist of two rifle battalions and a light cavalry battalion (and a support battalion with artillery, HQ, medics etc). Despite several units disappearing, and several thousand redundancies, someone somewhere determined that the Army should maintain an ‘air assault’ brigade; so is it wrong to expect it to be capable of air assault? In an army where there is an apparent requirement for an air assault brigade, an army of 112,000 warfighters, I don’t see how a brigade on the scale of a 101st BCT would be disproportionate. As it is, 16AAB is not keeping the infantry and cavalry that it used to hold.
If there isn’t a need for an air assault brigade (there’s plenty of light infantry that can ride the Chinooks, and perhaps with modern helicopters parachuting has become a niche special forces technique) then why keep this unremarkable little half-brigade. We could cut one expensive Para battalion at least, shift the remaining to the SFSG, JHC retaining the attack helicopters.
I don’t understand what the Army’s idea is, and why it isn’t either beefed up or gotten rid of.
As I said BB, he’s just being a devil’s advocate :)
“I don’t do pedestrian thinking.”
No, I dare say you would probably be the reckless driver, as opposed to the wreckless driver.
“you would never have coped with the younger mentally healthy me”
No worries, as far as I know, no one has ever met a younger, mentally healthy you either.
Hi PE,
Agree with this one:
“Depends on the assumptions. The three mechanised RF brigades have between them a dual role of generating a single VHR battlegroup AND a HR deployable brigade.
What this structure uncovers is that the purpose of 16x is different. Under FF2020 16x appears to have the sole purpose of generating a single VHR light battlegroup. The brigade isn’t to be a deployable fighting formation itself any more: it would have to be augmented ad hoc and worked up if it was ever actually going to deploy.”
And it is a much better solution than to have an air assault bn in each of the RF bde’s – with not enough helos. Not to mention the CoE aspect, which I think is perfectly valid, and other units can benefit from training with them.
@ Observer
I am actually a very careful and safe driver. Go figure.
@ Brian Black
I shall break it down for you……..
1) Parachute training isn’t for everybody. I said it should be retained as a differentiator to reinforce the Parachute Regiment’s status as an elite regiment. Even though I feel uncomfortable with the word elite.
1a) To reiterate my other point Grenadier Guards don’t spend their days just throwing grenades. Parachute Regiment soldiers may rarely jump into battle, but that doesn’t mean we should remove the Parachute Regiment from the ORBAT or change its name. Even though it something that has come about in living memory it is still historic it still carries weight.
1b) I was talking about training the soldiers to jump not the aircrews; transport aircraft crews are trained to drop supplies by parachute, I don’t think dropping cargo that has loaded itself should be much different.
2) We don’t have the aircraft to deploy a brigade by parachute and sustain it. We could though just as the French have done in Mali perhaps drop a company or two in very specific situations if needs be.
2a) But if we had enough transport aircraft we could say a couple of companies and light equipment to an airfield to cover evacuations, secure a humanitarian aid station, or basically draw a line in the sand to stop an aggressor. Deter an aggressor you need aggressors of your own. You need formations that your enemies may have heard of whose reputation if not to be feared then certainly respected.
2b) Light scales of kit mean it could be shoved into ships as wells as planes to back 3 Cdo as in ’82.
3) I mentioned the 101st because they specialise in helicopter warfare. I was talking about the role of the formation not its size. The difference between 16AAB in any of its various formats post 5 Airborne is that the 101st has always had lots of organic helicopters. Oodles of them. The US Army oddly is the world’s second largest air force because of the number of helicopters it operates. Not only do they have lots of helicopters but the US also has lots of transport options to move the helicopters which we don’t have. They even have extra helicopters prepositioned. 4 battalions in a brigade call “Air Assault Brigade” doesn’t magically make them an “Air Assault Brigade” because without the helicopters they are just light role infantry. And in British parlance that doesn’t mean one step below SF it means we can’t afford enough vehicles. In Afghanistan and Iraq units other than those of 16AAB have been climbing into helicopters. being flown to a spot, getting out of helicopters, and doing their job. Or do you a sort of Vietnam scenario where a flock of Merlins lands in a field under heavy fire disgorging dozens of death dealers? Do you know how much a modern transport helicopter costs? And you want to expose it to mass fires? Eek. How would it work against a peer enemy? Do you realise it takes 18 Chinook lifts to move a battalion?
3a) Similarly 16AAB can never be like the 82nd Airborne in terms of parachute capability because we don’t have the aeroplanes. How many C17 do the US have? 170 or something or more? Are we up to 7 or something? It is mass UK brigade or battalion sized operations that I question for the UK because we can’t do them.
Hi Simon, I must disagree:
“I preferred the 5 x adaptable brigades of the original design. Seems more sensible for roulements too. I guess it didn’t work because of the way they wanted to shoehorn the TA into the structure. ”
– the multi-bde’s were not fit for a hot war
– now we have something better (even if less of it), plus lots to back it up with
Hi Mike,
Surely this will turn out positive: ” talk about D Squadron The Household Cavalry Regiment, which has been one of its units, also being withdrawn from its organization.”
– instead of having such a customer-facing (i.e. fighting) unit, they will introduce an enabling, corporate-level (for any part of the bde) unit, just like the one in the RM … not a unit for doing stuff on its own
– and allocate all those 50+ generation2 Scimitars, or whatever they are called (as they are for several roles, not just recce) to it
Hi wf, isn’t that the way the Irish army is set up:
“All these “light” bns aren’t going to be much use unless the preferred deployment is with the UN.”
– so we are following suit… it is a multi-lateral world now… hey kids, play nicely! And that will do it (not)
Hi Phil, well, yes, despite the good contributions, what keeps coming up is that “there must be good reasons” over and over again… I’ve never asked what they might be; but been tempted
RE “I know I sometimes sound like an apologist for the Army but all that is being said here is that the Army is cutting its cloth according to its means”
– as a comment, other than the vehicles bit (SPGs included, not so much the behemoths… or MBTs, as they call them) the job ( a Road Map?) looks not so badly thought out
A400m can transport uk helicopters and uk helicopter forces have shown self deployment capability to both operation highbrow and pallister if I’m not mistaken.
ACC, but most war tasks are not “warry”, you don’t do an assault every day followed by dinner and repeat the next. Most of the time, it is simply patrol, patrol, patrol and that is what light battalions do best. Patrol and defend sensitive areas while the razor sharp teeth of armour and mechanised infantry go bite into the enemy.
There are units for attack and units for defence. Light infantry are defensive units usually. And no. Urbans are best dealt with by mechanised infantry, not pure infantry. They need the firepower to blow through strongpoints or the armour to push past MG chokepoints.
Is there not an opportunity here? Build up the surrounding area around Marchwood a little, park a battlegroup in hangars nearby, claim a chunk of the new forest for the high readiness battlegroup to do troop level exercises on? Just a thought.
And I can’t see major Syrian aggression against Turkey going unpunished, if it ever comes to that.
Hi Tom,
How can that ” yet it would be very simple to convert one of the Gurkha battalions to a parachute battalion”
be simple when the one in the Folkestone barracks and the one (acclimatised Theatre reserve, is that still a valid name) in Brunei have a roulement of their own: to swap places every three years?
@ Mark
Never said didn’t we have aircraft that can’t carry helicopters. The US Army has 400 or so Chinook and more than 1000 Blackhawk. The UK being able to summon up two or three Chinook to move a company is hardly high end helicopter warfare. How many hours would a Chinook be in bits after flying 2000 miles? And when it gets to the other end of those 2000 miles how did the spares, tools, fuel, maintainers, FP, command elements etc. etc, get to be in place to service the self deploying helicopter?
I thought there was already a training ground close to Marchwood?
SPTA or something….
:)
x, if you are talking about logistics, then won’t the Chinooks of the USAF have the same problem if forward deployed beyond established logistical bases?
x
Funny enough we’ve done it now on numerous occasions heck we have even more than 2 or 3 right now in afghan. We deployed nearly twenty to the gulf. We will have a fleet of 60 chinooks and a similar number of merlins and apache I’m sure we could find one or two to use.
How do the maintainers spares arrive most likely how they always do by raf air transport.
Hi x,
Are you sure you have bought into this idea that there are no fixed lines which to defend and which to attack? – Like an infantry bn can hold 3 km of front line for x days, until it needs to be rotated
If, just hypothetically, we say that a single brigade’s sphere of influence might be 70 miles from its not defined, but not-so-hard to calculate central point, and the threats not to be well defined across that area. And then, if you commit your units on tracks towards one side of that overall area, is it not a good idea to have a full manoeuvre unit that can traverse a good distance at two or three times the speed that they can sustain? Should the situation change
– I must have mentioned this “mobile reserve” positioning for that bn before
@ Observer
Well if you look the USAF have bases everywhere, the US has leverage to get the USAF into places where they don’t have bases, and still oddly have a need for lots of ships to keep them supplied.
@ X
I’m talking a 5 min walk on your doorstep. It’s also another excuse just to pinch a bit of real estate for military use.
I was not sure what to make of x’s long expose of helicopter warfare, so I just wanted to chip in the statistics for the scenario when they are your “B” class (is it? soft skinned) vehicle substitute: Total helicopters destroyed in the Vietnam War was 5,086 out of 11,827
1 205 was destroyed (Air America)
270 AH-1G were destroyed
1 AH-1J was destroyed
1 BELL was destroyed
14 CH-21C were destroyed
2 CH-34 were destroyed
1 CH-37B was destroyed
1 CH-37C was destroyed
7 CH-3C were destroyed
7 CH-3E were destroyed
94 CH-46A were destroyed
58 CH-46D were destroyed
83 CH-47A were destroyed
20 CH-47B were destroyed
29 CH-47C were destroyed
12 CH-53A were destroyed
2 CH-53C were destroyed
9 CH-53D were destroyed
9 CH-54A were destroyed
2 H-37A were destroyed
21 HH-3E were destroyed
7 HH-43B were destroyed
6 HH-43F were destroyed
2 HH-53B were destroyed
7 HH-53C were destroyed
147 OH-13S were destroyed
93 OH-23G were destroyed
45 OH-58A were destroyed
842 OH-6A were destroyed
3 SH-34G were destroyed
8 SH-3A were destroyed
3 SIOUX were destroyed
60 UH-1 were destroyed
1 UH-1A was destroyed
357 UH-1B were destroyed
365 UH-1C were destroyed
886 UH-1D were destroyed
90 UH-1E were destroyed
18 UH-1F were destroyed
1313 UH-1H were destroyed
1 UH-1N was destroyed
6 UH-2A were destroyed
6 UH-2B were destroyed
176 UH-34D were destroyed
Source: http://www.vhpa.org/heliloss.pdf
“The UK being able to summon up two or three Chinook to move a company is hardly high end helicopter warfare” – x
The bumf mentions the Army’s plan to purchase an additional 14 Chinook (I guess that’s not the same 14 Chinook the RAF were getting…). As Mark mentioned, it’s been done before.
“In late June and July [2009] we took part in Operation PANCHAI PALANG. We landed in a one-wave assault with 350 men” – CO 3SCOTS
“Do you know how much a modern transport helicopter costs? And you want to expose it to mass fires?” – x
I don’t want to expose any British vehicle to mass fires. Are you suggesting though that we shouldn’t have any transport helicopters? Should everyone be driving everywhere?
“we don’t have the aeroplanes. How many C17 do the US have? 170 or something or more? Are we up to 7 or something? It is mass UK brigade or battalion sized operations that I question for the UK because we can’t do them” – x
What happened to the 22 Atlas? Or this release from this year’s Joint Warrior…
“1,300 troops from 16 Air Assault Brigade, the British Army’s rapid reaction force, and 300 French troops from the 11th Parachute Brigade arrived by air in the West Freugh area of Scotland.”
You seem to suggest, x, that four battalions would have to go everywhere together either all by helicopter or all by parachute. Air assault can be any combination of helicopter, parachute or transport aircraft. And that’s what was envisioned for 16AAB from the moment it was conceived. Further infantry units would help with readiness and training cycles; cavalry would add flexibility. But just like the armoured brigades, you wouldn’t be obliged to take all of it every time you want to deploy.
You seem to suggest that as any fool can fall out the back of a Chinook, we don’t need any units specifically filling an air-mobile role. You can apply that simplistic logic to anything. Any fool can fall out the back of a MRAP, but we’re still going to have battalions earmarked as protected mobility. Why not scrap the Royal Marines, just get the handiest army light infantry battalion to chopper in from a spare aircraft carrier? We have rolled units to have them ready the moment they’re needed.
BB, x just acts as the voice of dissent here, don’t take him too seriously. He was being a bit tongue in cheek about scrapping the whole armed forces and pouring the funding into a supernavy somewhere earlier, so you can guess how serious he is about all this. Or not. :)
He is serious about the supernavy, Observer. We’d all be bobbing around in little boats if he had his way.
Obs, BB – not a term I’d noticed before but it does have a ring to it:
“is it a bird? Is it a plane?? Is it a Spanish fishing fleet??? Is it an elephant, white, ridicule, for the use of???? No! Its a SuperNavy!!”
Actually the super navy makes some sence.
FAA take over RAF. Marines take over army. Sigle command automatically ‘Joint’. Not purpke but dark blue…..
We have (or will have) 8 C17s, 60 Chinook, 24 Puma, and 100 attack copters (Apache and Wildcat).
That’s easily enough to insert and support a parachute regiment and a “reaction” brigade with the available front line transport aircraft and copters.
@Simon: we don’t need parachute trained troops to be transported via helicopter, any infantry bn will do. That being said, 8 C17’s and 22 C130/A400 is enough to transport a couple of parachute bn’s methinks
The CH-47s are wonderful for basic parachute training though. No need to waste your time moving to an airbase to be loaded up for a single jump, just find an open field, climb aboard, pilot climbs to a decent altitude, jump. You can cycle a lot more training this way than waiting for a tactical lifter to be free or waiting for it to fly to the dropzone from an airbase and fly back for the next batch.
IXION, sometimes I really do think that having a long history can be a lot of baggage for an armed forces. Structurally resistant to change. FAA/RAF can be combined,but you will need a new name or they will start fighting to call themselves FAA or RAF :)
Marines, same thing, but much easier to work the other way, basic infantry skills taught by the army then subdivided into mech infantry, light infantry, armoured infantry, airmobile infantry and amphibious infantry (Marines) for subskills training, so it is actually easier for the army to absorb the Marines than the Marines absorb the Army.
@Brian Black
“And having four battalions is not a result of the Afghan war; 16AAB was formed in the 90s, years before New York exploded, with the Paras, Gurkhas and Royal Irish.”
This is part of your reply to x, putting him right on when and how 16 AA Bde was formed. You are quite correct; it was constituted with four infantry battalions. If memory serves me correctly (and I am willing to be put right on this), 16 AA Bde was established in 1999, with originally the Parachute Regiment’s three battalions plus a Ghurka (?) battalion. Then the Paras’ 1st battalion was permanently assigned to the Special Forces Support Group (SFSG) but for a long time after that the composition of the Brigade was fairly settled, boasting a fairly fixed or near permanent ORBAT, including four infantry battalions. The 1st Battalion, the Royal Irish Rangers, the 5th Regiment, the Royal Regiment of Scotland (Argyll and Southern Highlanders) and the 2nd Battalion, the Royal Ghurka Rifles took it in turn to serve as the other two (non-Para) battalions.
So x wrong on that, but brilliantly right in a comment in the same post when he says,
“As for affording things we, well HMG, choose not to spend money on defence on our behalf. HMG choose to borrow £10bn to give the DfID a budget; I will use £10bn to make the maths easier. How much value the UK taxpayer gets from that budget has been discussed a lot here. And we might as well discuss it again. I would wager that we could buy just as much influence with a well managed £8bn as could we that budget of £10bn. Really nobody really knows what that £10bn gets us. I do know what £2 billion on the MoD equipment budget could buy us spent over 5 years.” and he proceeds to describe how much it could buy! Right, right and right again, x.
Observer,
Completely agree with the Marine/Army “absorbing” thing.
I wonder if we should have all jets under something called the RAF, which is composed of three sub-branches: Fighter Command, Bomber Command, and the Fleet Air Arm? That way we keep all the names and stop any bickering.
@ Mark
Having though about it the point I was tortuously trying to make is that our light forces are only light for the last few miles. Whether helicopters (or anything else) got there under their own steam or in a ship they still cost a lot in all terms. What makes the Parachute Regiment light is the men not their platforms. And I think what I was driving at that for some reason here “helicopter” and “light infantry” get conflated. There is nothing light about the support needs of a helicopter. Given time you can get anything anywhere. Aren’t we all familiar with that recent RAF add that showed the young lady directing ops on that dusty Third World dock with all those Chinook?
@ ACC
Yes. I see what you are saying. But I have never said the helicopter wasn’t useful for that sort of thing. Have you read much on the RLI ops in their Bush War? They did mighty well with very few resources. All I said was that getting in and out of helicopters wasn’t a special skill that needs to be tied to one regiment whose raison d’etre is getting out of aircraft. And I am sceptical about the mass movement of troops in helicopters against a peer enemy who has the technology to track and kill large slow moving aircraft. What allows helicopters to be used in COIN as such great distances is the like of parity. If you remember it is me who constantly goes on about recce vehicles that fit inside helicopter to facilitate manoeuvre. What needs to be preserved is the idea of Parachute Regiment as an elite, the differentiator is “parachute quall” this idea of jumping head long into danger/battle, they need to be equipped with light equipment that can be stowed in aircraft and slung out of aircraft; and equipment with those characteristics will eminently be suitable for ship to shore movement so that they can be used to reinforce 3Cdo.
@ Brian Black
A helicopter is not an APC. The West has been able to use helicopters for secure movement because their opposition, the likes of the Taliban, have no effective counter. If the Taliban were suddenly to gain MANPADS and several batteries of radar laid guns then that freedom of movement would end. That is an example. Don’t go off down a rabbit hole discussing terrorist getting MANPADS. I am purely illustrating that the lack of a considerable threat allows the West to use helicopters. Let’s pick on a peer or near peer enemy in crisis situation. Do you think we would be glibly flying Russian AA sites or Chinese AA sites? And that if the helicopter force didn’t land they wouldn’t be countered and that is without the helicopter force flapping back over the enemy? Never mind having to go back and resupply them? War apparently is a risky business aircraft of all sorts are shot down all over the place. Helicopters are slow compared to other aircraft, they are loud, and they carry relatively little. It would be a waste of men and material to throw them at a peer enemy. The helicopter is best used flying over “relatively safe” territory to the read of the forward edge of battle. Not for nothing on Apaches built with armour.
As for any fool climbing out of anything. Wow. I think you should track down some of the infantry that have been deployed tactically from helicopters to mount such operations as vehicle checkpoints and re-enforcement that to get out of a helicopter require a maroon beret. I am saying that the average British soldier is competent and has been shown to be competent as getting out of helicopter yet you interpret that as me saying any fool can do it? How dare you twist my words? I went to pains to qualify that the standards of British infantry were such they can turn their hand to most things,
“Again it this issue of parachuting that everybody gets hung up on. I think it has been proved now that the average British infantry soldier (though he is an above average soldier!) can climb in and out of helicopters. I know. Frightening. I have seen them do it! It really isn’t a speciality and certainly not a skill you can build an organisation’s legend (in the more prosaic sense) unlike jumping out of a perfectly serviceable aircraft doing several hundred knots several hundred feet above the ground.
And though I have seen soldiers quite literally tumble out of the back Warrior into heap I think there is more to armoured infantry warfare training is a bit more involved that practising debussing. We have troops mounted in protect vehicles because that is all we can afford to have them mounted in; even though the back door of a Mastiff is someway off the ground. If you think getting in and out of vehicles is the bedrock of infantry training perhaps it is you who think are infantry fools?
Actually if you look I have speak often about battlegroups with a brigade standing up and rotating through various states of readiness. Oddly that is what ships do. Isn’t that where this started? All I said at the top of page was that 2PARA and 3PARA could work turn and turn about and that their “readiness” could be gapped without need for 1PARA to provide a rotation. Not ideal. But if the jumping off point every time is the UK then it could be done seeing as they are specialist troops used in specialist roles. Unlike say an RM Commando that will be away from home for 6 months. Further on this not deploying everything all the time given the UK’s small number of strategic lifters and other options I covered that as well……..
Considering not all Parachute Regiment soldiers are jump qualified. We don’t have a large number of C17s etc. They don’t really have lots of trick kit to shift. Then I doubt any emergency will find us sending the whole of a battalion. If it is some rescue mission in a Libya like scenario and the SAS are going and say an airport needs to be secured they will send personnel from 1PARA. They will be some notice to go. I don’t think Parachute Regiment’s skills suddenly degrade and they will main competent at the core skills if troops from other battalion need to go because troops from high readiness battalion are missing. If a whole battalion is needed for 6 months or so send the battalion from high readiness reaction brigade mounted in Mastiff. And the ARG might be close to the point of crisis anyway or could be moved. Of course lightening does strike twice. And if they want helicopters to play with in serious numbers they would have to be moved into theatre anyway so that is the heliborne assault business up the wazoo. “
Oh! For the record. Most Marines I know don’t think there is anything special about getting out of helicopters or indeed jumping out of aeroplanes. That all you see when it comes to amphibious operations is helicopters speaks volumes.
I take your comment about “little boats” as a complement because at least I am known for having a point of view. Even though I don’t know where it comes into a discussion about the Parachute Regiment. I would like to come up with a witty rebuttal in kind, but I am not sure what you stand for. As I say to Chris B and Phil if you don’t like what I say don’t comment about it.
x, problem is that you have a rather roundabout way of getting to a point and tend to argue both sides of an argument at once so people do get confused about what your point is.
I for one support the designation of “light” forces, it helps to tell at a glance what you can use the unit for. Once you see “light” you know it is infantry and won’t send it to attack a position unsupported thinking that it was mechanised infantry. Less chance of any “Light Brigade” incidents.
As someone who has been heli-trained, there is actually a subset of skills you need to be heliborne qual, getting in and out is a small part of it. There is Terminal Air Guidance, where your infantry has to learn to direct helicopters, basically something like a traffic marshal for aircraft. Landing zone clearing, cargo loading especially belly loading (don’t physically touch the hull of the helo before you ground it, the static charge can knock you flat). Safety proceedure. Rappelling/fast roping. It takes a bit of experience. You can probably load any Tom, Dick or Harry on a CH-47 almost literally as cargo, anything less like Puma, I’d advise against it.
As for peer to peer fighting, yes you WILL use helos in situations like that, that is what you got them for. HOW you use them is a different story. If you use them like a light brigade charge, then the officer formulating the plan should be in the first bird and get sent off solo. He would really deserve to die for gross stupidity. Helos are tools in a much larger plan, not a lone ranger unit. You would go in only after wild weasels, SEADs, air denial, and you go in low to avoid giving missiles a LOS. That was why US UH-1s in Vietnam liked to follow rivers, it let them fly below tree top level and avoid giving SAMs a target.
I think you underestimate the degree of difference between light infantry and air-mobile infantry.
@ Observer
I know personnel have to be trained with all equipment whether it is boots or helicopters or SSBN. British infantry have been getting in and out of helicopters for decades now. We were doing it en masse before the Americans did it at a little event called Suez. The trouble is with this conversation is that others are conflating “light infantry”, “light role”, “heliborne infantry”, “parachuting”, and the “Parachute Regiment”. I won’t apologize for trying to unpick those terms and bit a more rigorous. Helicopters are damned important but they aren’t a panacea which many here seem to believe them to be especially when it comes to land warfare. 60 Chinook doesn’t mean we can have 18 assigned to one formation permanently; it doesn’t work like that. I set out trying to show we needed to keep the Parachute Regiment as a mobile light infantry force with a worldwide reputation; that parachuting is a niche skill these days but perhaps has a more subtle existential purpose as a delineator between the Parachute Regiment and the “rest”; that given the limitations of our hardware inventory that the idea of mass helicopter or airborne assaults is silly but what we do have allows us to do some far reaching stuff if we have a body of troops to call on; and that finally given the numbers in the Parachute Regiment, their skill levels, their current base and starting point for operations, plus once again our limited capacity to move stuff then we can get away with just 2PARA and 3PARA. And what I wrote bears that out. To be accused of saying the opposite and then to have a go at me for my preferred position on defence matters is a bit rich.
I have a friendly rambling style of informal writing my posts. If others don’t like it don’t comment or read it. What we write here will have no bearing on UK defence matters at all.
“… not all Parachute Regiment soldiers are jump qualified …”
Why are such called parachute soldiers? Do those that cannot jump (I assume they have all done P Company) wear a different cap badge? Come to that if its members are not all qualified to jump what is the basis for retaining a regiment called the Parachute Regiment? Could not a more accurate name be found? Or even, I suppose, just retire the regiment and recruit for the SFSG from existing units. After all nobody found it odd to remove archer companies when the long bow became obsolete, why should parachuting en mass be any different?
@ Hurst Llama
We don’t expect Grenadiers to spend their days throwing grenades, fusiliers to spend their day lighting fuses, we have lancers in heavy tanks, we have rifles acting as heavy infantry, destroyers that are frigates, and fighters that drop bombs. …. some of us, get very hung up on that word parachute and expect parachutists well to parachute.
The reason why they have aren’t qualified is to do with money. Yes they would have done P Coy. SF are recruited from all the services; it is just that certain units (Guards, Paras, and RM) generate more SF recruits.
x, ah, so that was what you were trying to say.
Your rambling sometimes goes into the opposite camp territory, which gets us confused on which side you are actually talking about. It ends up looking like you are actually arguing both sides of the situation and sometimes, people only caught the side that you do not support, hence the argument that you said the exact opposite.
Paragraphing for different sides of the argument might help a lot for us poor readers to keep straight.
@ Observer
An argument needs more than one side. Everything can be defined equally as well by defining what it is not as what it is. How do you validate your own position if you have no appreciation of the other side’s position? And lastly and very importantly to me I may be just wrong; unless I explore the other side’s point of view how will I know?
A common misconception here is that I am pro-navy before all else. I would love the UK to have 200,000 man army with all the kit, a 250 FJ fleet, 24 C17, and a proper sized navy (you would call that a big navy.) But we can’t afford it. On a limited budget you need to select an option and go with it. The best compromise as I see it a maritime approach. Many here don’t have an opinion and default to a simple tri-service model based on “the army shoot guns, the airforce fly stuff, and the navy does ships”. Though what the RN does seems a mystery to many here why I don’t know why as does the importance of the sea to us maintaining our way of life.
I will confess that I am a bit naughty when it comes to the subject deploying land based air at a distance. I know it can be done and it is done often and we don’t always need ships to move them. But saying the reason why I am bit naughty is that it seems land based air’s (indeed any “air”!) long logistical tail is sort of conveniently ignored. During operations in Sierra Leone the RAF flew two Chinook a few thousand miles across Africa. They self-deployed. But it was just two helicopters. They were flying into a secure base. They flew over safe air space to get there etc. As I said further up it takes 18 Chinook lifts to move one light battalion. 18. Nearly 10 times as many as flew into Sierra Leone. So ten times the support effort. And as we all know support efforts rarely scale in a linear fashion because size brings problems all of its own. Remember it took 8000 tons to support FJ for Op Ellamy. All that stuff has to be moved. The route has to be secured. By that I don’t mean escort groups of ships and planes fighting off an enemy attack I mean secured in broad terms. That is somebody had to negotiate and spend capital (both political/diplomatic and treasure) etc. with those through whose territory you wish to move. That is a cost. Nothing is moved for free. A lot of our freedom of movement is derived from us being on the US’s side. I just some here would acknowledge that a bit more.
What’s this obsession with air assault/parachute infantry?! It is a capability that should be retained for some special ops, absolutely, but it represents a tiny proportion of forces and possible defence scenarios.
Mind you, the Germans are also keeping only 2 parachute infantry regiments plus 1 attack helicopter regiment in their future force structure, and they are in far better economic shape than Britain. If 2 PARAs and 2 attack hel Bn’s are all Britain can afford so be it. There is no money for more. The Germans and Dutch are integrating their airborne/air assault forces in a unified command and Britain should consider it’s force structure in view of future integration with European partners in a EURO army.
Sgt Pep,
For me, the obsession with 16AAB and 3Cdo is that I’ve been lead to belive it is those that will “kick the doors in” prior to arrival of the British Army for any rapid reaction requirement.
x,
You keep mentioning the 18-20 Chinook lifts but keep avoiding the C17s which could easily deploy a battalion, return home (1000+ nm) and then airdrop supplies. That does not involve projecting the “base” forward like it would to provide Chinook “service”. Obviously we really need both and having the paras deploy inland whilst 3Cdo get on with securing the beachhead. Once done we’d have all and sundry supportable from a complete lack of helicopter aviation ships the other side of the world ;-)
@X
” … fusiliers to spend their day lighting fuses …”
*sighs*
Fusiliers were so named because they were equipped with fusils, a flintlock musket, rather than the more common, at the time, matchlock. The reason for the fusil was that the fusiliers job was to escort and protect the artillery and it was felt, not unreasonably, that having lit matches around kegs of gunpowder might breach health and safety regulations.
As a fine point of interest, the origin of the function of the fusiliers can be seen in the original name of the old Royal Fusiliers (7th foot, the City of London Regiment), which when formed in 1685 was called the Ordinance Regiment. If that isn’t as fine a point of interest as you require let me know; I can bore for hours on the Regiment’s history, including the disgusting merger of 1968 (posting a cockney into 1st Battalion of the RRF was cruel and inhuman punishment, who knew what the Geordies were actually saying).
Nothing to do with the point in hand of why we should keep the Parachute Regiment. I have this afternoon been reading up on the history of the Gilder Pilot Regiment. A very fine body of men, who in action performed superbly, but the Regiment was created in WW2 to meet the needs of the time; those needs went and so too did the GPR. Isn’t keeping the Parachute Regiment going just an exercise in military sentimentality?
” Many here don’t have an opinion and default to a simple tri-service model based on “the army shoot guns, the airforce fly stuff, and the navy does ships”
Might I point out that for them to have that stand is already an opinion? :)
And I do agree that air logistics makes them dependent on airbases, which is why airfields and airports are critical strategic targets. It is hard to find a place without even a small airfield nowadays.
Simon, don’t fall prey to those buzzwords. You “kick the doors in” against a decent enemy before any friendly force is in support range, your men had better be very well supplied and good or they won’t be coming back out. Stabilization, maybe. Assault/raiding? Wait.
@ Simon
I have mentioned C17 several times. How many C17s does the UK have? Have many paratroops does a C17 carry? How many tons of stores on the first drop? Any vehicles? How long in maintenance would the C17 spend on return? I assume that once in country they will remain static because of securing the drop zone? What I am asking is how exactly would you conduct such an operation? Say 3000 miles out from home?
“3Cdo get on with securing the beachhead”
I have never said this was an either or situation. I have constantly spoken of the need for the UK to have 2 well equipped light infantry brigades. That is so the UK can tackle two crisis or use air to rapidly reinforce the ARG. Sometimes I have even spoken of raising a third one. I know definitely I have spoken about another reason why we need spare capacity (not overload) on amphibs is so a force landed by parachute can be recovered to ships.
@ Observer
Yes it is an opinion. Um. I was just hoping that if you come here you would live up to the website’s name. ;) I did realise what I sort of said when I said it.
The only person who comes up with anything truly different is young IXION.
As for airfields yes they are everywhere, damn them, damn them all. But there is a little more to it than a stretch of concrete tarmac. What about say, water? Fuel? Sanitation? Food storage? Accommodation? etc. etc. Again the RAF moved 8500 tons to an established base in Italy. How much more stuff would be need to be moved if say that had been Mozambique? Or northern Canada? Or somewhere else as equally as random?
I’m with Observer on this. also skeptical of 16AA or 3CDO “kicking the doors in” against a decent enemy or organized opposition. May work in some African crapholes like Mali but highly unlikely against even semi organized opposition. If you want to “kick the doors in” in most scenarios you need ARMOUR.
@ Hurst Llama
Whoops! Yes that is sort of coming back to me a bit now. But isn’t that what I sort of said? Is there a need for fusils equipped hackle wearing Toms to escort artillery? No. So shouldn’t we do away with the remaining RRF battalions or change their name. (Noting they lost a battalion as we lost our county regiment in the last review. Despite both units (as well XIX Foot) attracting lots of recruits unlike some regiments past the border up north.)
x, if the unit is self-supporting, 8,500 tons. Support is the same amount to an established airfield or darkest Africa.
Deployment time to new airfield is 2 days if in a hurry, 3 on average, stores and all. We cheat though, Polet air AN-124 rentals :) Germany does the same thing in a NATO structure though they have theirs on a 2 plane full time charter.
Hi Sgt, hadmissed that German-Dutch integration. Do you have a source, not that I doubt it, but to read more?
Hi x, haven’t readabout RLI. A friend of mine was bored, and went and joined them. A couple of years later I was in stithes as on his retturn he was called for his conscription of 8_11 months.
But have read about the flying column tactics in Angola, may be the Bush Wars would make a nice post?
@X
Oh. no. Mr. X. You are not going to win me round by the use of logic, at least not on this argument. The Paras have been in existence since what 1941(?), most of the line infantry have been around for at least a couple of centuries. Now that the need for a parachute regiment has disappeared, or, at least, our ability to pay for one has gone, then lets get go for the old last in first out principle.
At the very least the Paras should be renamed the “Some of us can, probably, Parachute (if only the government would pay for it) Regiment” and, given the fuss they have made about “crap hats” over the years, those members not qualified to jump should wear a sand coloured beret (unit cohesion, be buggered, in every other regiment everyone has met the minimum standard).
My opinions about the Parachute regiment has nothing, absolutely nothing, to do with the third time my nose was broken, which occurred in that Salvation Army “pub” in Catterick (anyone know if it still exists) and the fact that the RMP intervened just as I was about to deliver the coup de grace to my assailant by kicking him in the fork.
Oh my.
Parachute Infantry are useful but we must all remember that this usefulness is very bounded by their natural constraints.
Parachute infantry are good in high intensity warfare for only very sharp and very short actions. We’re talking 24-48 hours if they can dig in- much shorter if they’re constantly attacking.
In semi-permissive environments they can last longer but they will still need a DZ to deliver in supplies which means they are tied to a DZ which massively limits their operational radius.
Delivering those supplies in either high intensity or semi-permissive environments needs airlifts and resources. The bigger your force the more intense the resources needed. But even if your force is a divisional sized element it remains constricted in time and space even though you’re consuming enormous resources. You’re really starting to get into the realms of diminishing returns.
What this means is a brigade sized airborne operation is a fantasy and probably has been since Suez, maybe even before. And that’s if it goes right. There is no point having a fighting unit that is far too big to be useful, consumes enormous resources to keep it in action and yet has a very limited endurance and operational radius.
Parachute infantry will remain useful for short sharp raids, or parachuting into Mali style operations. But it’s a niche – so 2 battalions of flexible troops able to conduct everything short of high intensity warfare is plenty for us. So the brigade does not need to be bigger – making it bigger is pointless as everything the bigger brigade could do can be done by other line units.
What justifies 2 PARA battalions being under a brigade, and I have argued it time and time again, is that 16X is the SME on combined arms heliborne operations. Despite what people argue an air assault operation does not simply involve the OC asking for the number of helicopters he needs according to his TAM, the choppers rocking up, being told where to drop them and everyone hopping onboard and stepping off. Heliborne operations at any level upto BG level need the appropriate expertise. On the ground for the average Tom he simply gets a quick brief, steps on, steps off and that’s it. But enormous staff work and liaison goes on for that to happen. And it needs to evolve and lessons need to be learned. There needs to be an entity that can do that and pass this on and lend the staff work needed to line units.
A light role battalion can’t just mount Warriors when they fancy it. And a general, line light role infantry battalion can’t just shit out a BG level helicopter assault when it feels like it. Not without support. Support generated by SMEs working closely with the RAF and other elements and then loaned to them.
If you want to “kick the doors in” in most scenarios you need ARMOUR.
Couldn’t agree more. Which is why all this talk of 16X needing to be beefed up to deliver a proper brigade via parachute means is bollocks. Even if we could afford the enormous resources this would take Arnhem shows what happens when light forces meet what I will optimistically call medium forces – they were stopped dead in a matter of hours apart from 2 PARA who only got to the bridge as it essentially snuck past Jerry. If Jerry had spotted them no bastard would have made it to John Front Bridge.
It’s a waste of time. In many scenario’s being able to lob in a small unit is going to be very useful indeed but you don’t need a brigade to generate an ABTF, the brigade is there to do other things too. Not least I have no doubt it could still be worked up and reinforced with AF units if it needed to do something like OP TELIC again.
Wow! Some serious debating going on here.
RM and para battle-groups with appropriate transportation (which without any further reductions in current and future capabilities they should have) for rapid reaction and 3 reaction brigades so that 1 can be kept at high readiness for deployment seems pretty sensible to me.
Coupled with the ability to 1. deploy either an air assault or commando brigade with enough notice, 2. put together a complete division with a sufficient amount of time and build-up and 3. use adaptable units to keep an enduring brigade sized operation going should we need to and I think future force 2020 (if properly resourced) will produce a pretty decent mix of capabilities for a 21st century, western army to have, especially when it will be a small force of only 82,000 regulars.
As I put in a post yesterday the only thing that really bugs me is the continued focus (albeit not quite as heavily) on armoured formations. Not being an insider I have no idea if it would have been feasible or not but personally I would have gone for a single heavy armoured brigade which could have 3 manoeuvre formations in rotation to provide 1 at high readiness and a full armoured brigade with more warning (1 is all we are ever realistically likely to need) and then 3 ‘medium’ infantry brigades with a mix of mechanized and light battalions, in many ways emulating the modular and flexible aspects of the previously planned multi-role brigades which can be tailored to suit the operation and provide 1 full brigade for deployment at any time.
Maybe it’s a view that I alone share, but my above suggestion creates a more balanced force of heavy, medium and light forces which I would be pleased to see the army end up with.
HL, “Isn’t keeping the Parachute Regiment going just an exercise in military sentimentality?”
I get the impression from looking at the release that someone decided “I don’t want to pay for an air assault brigade, but I also don’t want to be the one that tells the Paras their brigade isn’t needed any more”. After all, look at all the fuss kicked up when they only lost the Pegasus patch – worse than the Scottish regiments’ reshuffle.
@ Observer
The 8500 tons may cover fuses, thingymebobs, widgets, and whatnots for the aeroplanes. But I doubt it covers a whole host of other equipment that may be needed, even in one of the better Third World countries, to support personnel, their equipment, etc. For example what about clean water?
For a bunch of folk who bang on about everything being concentrated in single sensible places, where else would one propose putting the ABTF if not in the “Air Assault” Brigade? Perhaps it should be attached to an Armoured Brigade? Or to London District?
As I put in a post yesterday the only thing that really bugs me is the continued focus (albeit not quite as heavily) on armoured formations.
You mean the continued focus on being able to fight high-intensity conflicts?
If we binned armour we may as well call it a day and bring back the Militia and the Garrison Artillery.
x,
Enough C17 for a para regiment. No vehicles. Multiple caches of stores dropped on a single wave.
Personally I think the ARG should reinforce 16AAB. It’s the only thing that can bring enough equipment. That’s why I said 16AAB inland with 3Cdo at the beachhead. They then push forward (with the Army RF) once the beachhead has been secured. The paras are (in my stupid mind) a number of strategic raiding parties that help break-up the enemy forces, essentially from within their mass. This is essentially a continual out-flanking manoeuvre.
Many,
I shouldn’t use the “kick the doors in” phrase. I don’t even like it myself. I use it to mean they are the first on the scene.
I think there are obviously two schools of thought here: 1) those that believe you need heavy armour, 2) those that believe that quickly out-maneuvering the enemy is the most effective strategy.
I just don’t see armour of any particular use against a peer enemy any more. Just like anyone else’s armour is useless against our own loitering ISTAR, CAP, Apache and lots of artillery, once in place.
those that believe that quickly out-maneuvering the enemy is the most effective strategy.
You EARN the right to manoeuvre against an effective enemy. You don’t chose to. Nobody chooses to smash up against the enemy time and time again unless they have to or the enemy is forcing them to.
I just don’t see armour of any particular use against a peer enemy any more. Just like anyone else’s armour is useless against our own loitering ISTAR, CAP, Apache and lots of artillery, once in place.
Tom Clancy get yer coat…
P.S
I wouldn’t want to completely scrap the parachute regiment but at the same time I wouldn’t mind them being re-branded into a kind of elite army ranger unit….which is essentially what they already are in all but name.
.which is essentially what they already are in all but name.
No they’re not.
Phil, didn’t we go through this last year? :)
I do get your point, defence lines are damn pains and blindly ramming into them will simply re-enact the Germans at Kursk, but the potential payoffs are so good it almost ensures that you have to try it, and try it with the best effort you got, which means artillery, air, ISTAR, engineering and every single type of other support you can think of.
My opinion is that it is possible to open small windows for maneuver where you grab as much as you can before the lines resolidify, and yes, you earn the right to maneuver, usually paid in heavy artillery, armour and air ammuntion usage and unfortunately lives. The first unit in a breakthrough maneuver has a hell of a tough job to open a hole for the followup unit.
Simon, another boo-boo. Armour IS a high-maneuver unit, you don’t choose armour or maneuver, you choose armour AND maneuver. Phil’s point on the ability to maneuver withstanding.
And the idea that armour goes solo against any enemy is so wrong it is insane. Tanks are a cog in the army machine, not lone rangers.
@Simon: we’ve heard all these “the tank is dead” nostrums way too many times. It’s bollocks because all this wonderful ISTAR tends to be predicated on flat deserts, no jamming or deception, and good weather. Reality says that even in these perfect conditions, the Yanks managed to miss an entire armoured brigade in 2003. And don’t get anyone started on what happens when you move into close country or urban terrain. It’s noticeable that the Israelis put great emphasis on armour for maneuver, precisely because it’s protection makes it possible.
Paras are theatre entry troops, just like the RM. They can appear very rapidly, and can be staged from a long distance away. I can see in a major amphibious attack a brigade level para drop to be very useful, as the RM storm the beaches and the immediate area, one bn can seize an airhead while another screens an approach to the bridgehead. Does this mean a Race to the Swift style force hammer storming our enemies rear areas (narf narf!)? Not quite. But a coordinating headquarters is required.
@Phil
‘You mean the continued focus on being able to fight high-intensity conflicts?
If we binned armour we may as well call it a day and bring back the Militia and the Garrison Artillery’
I didn’t quite say bin all the armour did I!
I said that the most we will probably ever want or need to deploy in the future will be a single armoured brigade, which I am all for retaining, I just don’t think maintaining 3 ‘armoured infantry’ brigades with a heavy focus on tanks and tank support is the best way to go about it.
It means the lions share of the army is still focusing on a capability that we need to utilise on average once every 10 years when the day to day stuff should be getting more of the attention. This isn’t about a choice of black or white either/or, it’s about having the balance weighted one way or the other.
Armour and maneuver sounds brilliant. How do you outflank an enemy that can move its ground forces quicker than you can (which I’m assuming by the very nature of a defensive campaign, they can)? I suggested you do it by having already outflanked them with a para drop, or use 100+ knot copters to reposition (yes I appreciate these are vulnerable) your forces.
I appreciate that tanks work alongside everything else – that’s what makes them slow.
Phil, didn’t we go through this last year?
We did. You have more of an eastern view on these things than I do.
It means the lions share of the army is still focusing on a capability that we need to utilise on average once every 10 years when the day to day stuff should be getting more of the attention.
There’s 8 battalion sized units available every 12 months for every day tasks. The heavy armour is the hardest thing to regenerate – if we only use it once every 10 years so what? We still use it. The Army is deliberately concentrating the vast majority of its fighting power into a unit that is sized and supported so that we can still have influence in a coalition and bring a shedload of fire-power to the party. Seems a very sensible plan indeed to me.
I think the fact that the ORBAT of the Army is now more wishy washy (it has in reality been wishy washy forever) and there aren’t these clean little lines in the AF anymore, has blown some minds. Seems many would prefer a nice clean sheet of paper with neat reporting lines and everything laid out even if in reality it is completely ignored and worthless.
Simon asks “How do you outflank an enemy that can move its ground forces quicker than you can (which I’m assuming by the very nature of a defensive campaign, they can)?”
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E81KQ7u3-7s
@Phil
‘No they’re not’
OK….seen as your the expert please enlighten me, what exactly are they?
Given that the last proper combat jump was over Suez 57 years ago and they don’t even get launched into enemy territory via helicopter’s on mass I am struggling to see how you can call them real parachute or air assault infantry any-more.
yes I appreciate these are vulnerable
That’s like walking into an Aston Martin salesroom and saying “I appreciate I am penniless”.
Nobody in their right mind ever would do an airdrop or a heli op against a peer enemy. They’ll be smashed to bits – the Soviets only fancied their chances because they had 7 divisions! And expecting a light force to sit tight and fight heavy armour with no support – good luck. Also, anywhere that might provide the roads needed for a quick advance is going to be defended by a clever enemy, if he has an open flank you can guarantee there will be puddles of men in areas they know you’d need to get around them. A light role battalion dug in on a road junction is going to ruin your Para’s day.
Simon, can you tell me the average advance speeds of infantry and armour?
And if you locked your armour with your foot infantry formations….
You need a new staff officer.
Phil is very very right in that defence lines resolidify fast and the cost to break through one is hellish. And you want to let the enemy have time to consolidate his position by slowing your armour to foot infantry speeds? If you don’t cut your armour lose in a breakthrough maneuver, you have wasted the lives of all those who died to buy you the chance to cut a chunk out of the enemy. That is why armies have self-propelled howitzers and APCs/IFVs, so that they can leave the slowmovers behind without losing capabilities. If you breakthrough, cut EVERY single slowmover from your force and keep moving. Hit hard, hit everything before they can get their act together again or the price you pay to take another defence line is going to make you cry.
“Nobody in their right mind ever would do an airdrop or a heli op against a peer enemy”
Hey… :P
I do understand they are high risk, that doesn’t mean I have to go about it in a stupid way. First order of the day would be air superiority and SEAD, then very heavy ISTAR and artillery and CAS with LURPS and recon sweeps to try clearing a “lane” through the enemy air defence net and suppress enemy strongpoints. And I know, all this just gives them a “chance” to get in, not a surefire tactic. Just have to think if all this risk is worth the possible reward.
Life sucks.
x,
What’s our inventory of these then :-)
Phil,
I’m not deliberately trying to annoy here but I really don’t think you get my point. I’m not just maneuvering, I am outmaneuvering the enemy. We are repositioning forces and using feints and deception to unbalance the enemy. What do you call it? Tilting the threat axis? It doesn’t necessarily mean that infantry have to go up against heavy armour. It means they can mine the roads, set up booby traps, seal off areas to make it look like an invasion is coming from somewhere it isn’t. All stuff way too big for covertly inserted special forces, but something a para battalion might be able to achieve.
Getting them in is defiantly the hard part though against a peer enemy. However, if it’s a true peer it will hopefully be slightly lackadaisical to its early warning. Perhaps they all just wander through customs.
“It doesn’t necessarily mean that infantry have to go up against heavy armour.”
Hope not, but prepare for the worst. Just in case.
Which is why there was a very heavy insistence on getting Spike onto our heli-borne LSVs. Think of them as short ranged EXACTORs. Not much, but beats the alternative of “lie down and die”. 11 rounds carried, twin tube launcher preloaded. 13 rounds all up per LSV.
Actually, I worry about using light infantry on a heli-borne, they simply can’t move fast enough to exploit the grand opportunity they are given if they do make it behind enemy lines, all they would end up is a stationary temporary roadblock when they could do much better.
Observer,
Sorry, didn’t read your response until I’d sent my last comment.
I think I understand the strategy you imply. It makes perfect sense to push your faster assets forward (assuming they have the relevant cover) keeping the enemy on the back foot. Couldn’t an enemy use that very strategy against you though? You’ve left the cover of your air defence batteries, you’ve left the infantry that can move through woodland to outflank the next enemy position. Are you not in an “all out” situation that is irrecoverable if it goes wrong? Could the enemy not have more than one line of defence?
Did it again, sorry.
ROFL, no worries, just one of those things.
Foot infantry has a roadmarch speed of 6km/h on paved roads, rough terrain, it goes out the window.
Armour has, conservatively a tactical speed of 60km/h.
Don’t expect the infantry to catch up any time soon without transport.
And yes, defence lines tend to in depth, so you grab what you can, then bunker down again. It sucks.
If you can get a decent force behind them, it is a jackpot for any commander. You can cut their supply lines blitzkrieg style and starve them out, you can pin them down from the front while your infiltrated unit comes at them from behind where they have no defences, you can ignore the enemy static lines and turn his command, control and ISTAR into confetti etc
But first, you have to be able to do it.
@Simon
I think the best way to look at such forces in a major conflict is really to look at how they were used in Desert Storm. Really the 101st was mostly pushed forward to establish a series of forward operating bases for its Apache’s. I don’t think that you could find a lot of us for an airmobile force without strong attack helicopters. And in a highly opposed air environment I am not sure such forces would be used at all. They found them a role in Iraq basically going around the whole of the Iraqi army and operating in its rear where air superiority was absolute and there was tons of wide open space.
As far as I can tell neither the 101st nor the 82nd division in the US Army had explicit NATO roles if things went bonkers in the 1980’s. Now I am sure if there was a sustained conventional war of any length a role would be found for them but I don’t think you see them on the Central Front where the big armored formations are going to be.
Helicopter forces have a huge amount of utility anywhere that the other side can’t deploy a lot of SAM’s (above and beyond MANPADs level that is). But if we are talking major armored forces we are likely talking about fairly major air defense assets as well and they are just not really suited for that.
Jeremy M H,
Looking at 101st and 82nd in DS I understand where you’re coming from and must agree that it’s pretty unlikely that they would be used in a similar way without full air superiority and land based forces.
Just as a side note though. They don’t have to be used like 101st were in DS. Having the ability to rapidly deploy a battalion and take advantage of a weakness in cover is a great string to have in your bow. Perhaps this is the reason 16AAB is only the shell of its former self.
The Paras were used as line infantry in Northern Ireland, the Falklands, Telic and on Herrick. Some Paras do operate more akin to Rangers. They’re in the SFSG. Your comparison is incorrect. They’re parachute capable infantry.
Simon you’re not doing anything. You’re trying to. The enemy will have a say in your actions. History is full of flanking attacks that ran smack on into the enemy. At Arnhem despite being launched 64 miles behind the enemy in the mother of all outflanking attacks we ran right into a Panzer Corps. A corps which was there because there was something of importance in the area.
Arnhem and flanking are not exactly the 2 words I’d link in that campaign.
More like “right down the middle”. :)
On the other hand, if you had changed the goals to “liberate Holland” instead of “Germany by Christmas” and simply blew the bridges into Germany by air to cut reinforcements, things might not have been so bad. The constant flow of reinforcements and supplies took their toil on the paras.
I have 16AAB’s ORBAT in front of me from 2002 – 2003. It only shows 1PARA, 2PARA, and 3PARA and no other infantry. So……
Arnhem and flanking are not exactly the 2 words I’d link in that campaign.
It boiled down to seizing terrain to off balance the enemy – kind of like a flanking attack.
Well, that is true, especially if you look at the air as another axis to exploit. The entire campaign was seriously overoptimistic though. Think the top brass saw the fruits of victory so close that they tried to lunge to get it and fell short.
What is your opinion if they had went “screw Germany, lets’ take Holland first” and simply cut the lines into Germany? Without supply and reinforcements, it is the German forces in Holland that would end up on a time limit, at worst bringing their supply situation into similar condition with the paras, giving the forces more parity. And the tank reinforcements from Germany that gave the Allies hell would have been cut off from the fighting too. Think that is likely?
@ Observer – “11 rounds carried, twin tube launcher preloaded. 13 rounds all up per LSV.” – Ohhhh – I thought it was only 6…
“Actually, I worry about using light infantry on a heli-borne, they simply can’t move fast enough to exploit the grand opportunity they are given if they do make it behind enemy lines, all they would end up is a stationary temporary roadblock when they could do much better.” – Working on a mumber of posts about this and rapid deployment in general. Will see if I can finish first one tomorrow…
Now that we went over the maneuver argument again, it struck me that there seems to be a certain amount of desperation and risk taking in the way my country operates its’ army as opposed to Phil’s slow and steady approach. Wonder if it is due to population levels. The UK can afford to be stuck in a static war of attrition, painful and publicly displeasing, but it can, while we on the other hand, if caught up in attrition tactics, will lose eventually, which makes us desperate to avoid the situation. Interesting POV.
Plus you have to import water. :)
What is your opinion if they had went “screw Germany, lets’ take Holland first” and simply cut the lines into Germany?
I can’t see how they could have done it. Even if 1st Airborne only had to blow the bridge and withdraw into the urban sprawl, blowing that bridge would have been a proper endeavour and hard to achieve even if you had plenty of time.
Landing on top of an SS Panzer Division is “Murphy” on steroids! Not much you can do after that.
Blimey, odd thread drift!
– There’s plenty of examples of parachute infantry being used for less than brigade/division work. Task Forces deployed for lower level operations have a place.
– As do heliborne forces. Again, plenty of examples of the use of helicopters at night, at low level, usually on a flank somewhere to avoid heavy enemy concentrations to deliver heliborne units to all manner of places for a variety of tasks.
In short, there’s plenty of legs left in the 16AAB yet.
x, we arn’t as stupid as to let that particular weakness stand forever :)
Phil, not even if it was bombed by air? If you don’t want to capture it, I fail to see why anyone even has to go near it unless you are out to harass any repair work.
Damn, the irony. I was looking up the bridge to see if it could be brought down by air and what do I find?
“Although the bridge survived the battle, it was bombed and destroyed by B-26 Marauders of the 344th Bomb Group on 7 October 1944 to prevent the Germans from using it to send reinforcements south of the river.”
So they brought it down all the same.
APATS, considering that they had aerial recon of the divsion, I call it more “willful bllindness” than Murphy, but I get your point.
@Chris B “…plenty of legs left in the 16th AAB yet”…greatly inclined to agree. Surely if we have:
> The Brigade HQ maintaining operational and organisational experience, supervising training and updating doctrine.
> Some key units specialising in the work.
> The necessary equipment.
> Well trained and properly equipped units elsewhere in the Orbat (RF and AF) who can be integrated into operations led by 16th AAB as required
> Then we can still – within limits – put together such operations; possibly even disseminate the necessary expertise more widely across the Army as a whole.
GNB
@observer
The problem with recon is that people still see what they expect to see. This was a classic example.
The best way to deal with photo recon is simultaneous assessment by a team in the loop and a team with no brief other than to tell you what they see.
APATS true, but with one unfortunate side effect. You now need 2x the manpower to get a single job done.
Which is how bureucracy develops :)
Interestingly the RAF reserve is using such a team as their recruitment advertisement… So the manpower problem sorted, just that it will take some time to bring the extra teams on stream
“I have 16AAB’s ORBAT in front of me from 2002 – 2003. It only shows 1PARA, 2PARA, and 3PARA and no other infantry”
2003 ORBAT, Source: MoD.
Brigade HQ and Signal sqn
D sqn Household Cavalry
1st bn Royal Irish Regiment
1st bn Parachute Regiment
3rd bn Parachute Regiment
7 Para RHA
23 Regt RE
3 Regt AAC
13 Air Assault Support Regt
7 Bn REME
16 CS Medical Regt
156 Provo Coy
Someone asked earlier…
http://www.thetrumpet.com/article/10649.18.0.0/world/military/dutch-paratroopers-integrated-into-german-army
Dutch Paratroopers Integrated Into German Army
A brigade of Dutch paratroopers will be integrated into a new German division of rapid reaction forces, German newspaper Rheinische Post reported on May 22. The 11th Airmobile Brigade—a mobile force of 4,500 troops that is equipped with light vehicles, mortars and anti-aircraft systems—will join 8,600 German soldiers to form the new division under German command.
With paratroopers and special forces, as well as combat and transport helicopters, the group is designed to respond quickly to new threats and help evacuate endangered German and Dutch citizens. Until now, only Britain and America had a similar type of military structure.
The Dutch brigade could be deployed anywhere in the world within 20 days. The new force will presumably have a similar sort of response time.
The Dutch De Telegraaf newspaper revealed that drastic cuts to the Dutch military budget were partially responsible for the merger. The Dutch forces won’t leave their bases in the Netherlands, but the joint procurement and training with Germany will save money.
The merger is seen as a major step for the Netherlands. However, the Netherlands has only one Airmobile Brigade. If it needs to deploy troops in a hurry, it will only be able to do so with German cooperation.
This is not the first Dutch-German initiative. The I. German/Dutch Corps is made up of one Dutch and one German division. The corps is a high-readiness land force designed to be able to deploy within 20 to 30 days.
Many nations, particularly Britain, have been reluctant to pool their military resources. But with Britain shifting toward the fringes of the EU, military cooperation among the other states is becoming more feasible.
The new merger shows how Europe’s economic troubles could revolutionize its military. All across Europe, nations are under heavy pressure to cut budgets. Politically, it is easier to cut military budgets than many other areas of state spending. Cut the defense budget, and people grumble. Cut social spending, and they riot.
At the same time, European nations are keenly aware of the need for military spending. They see the spread of radical Islam in northern Africa, and the retreat of America. French President François Hollande committed to keeping France’s defense budget at €30 billion (us$39 billion) a year, despite calls to cut it. That’s not too surprising, since the nation just spent an estimated €205 million (us$265 million) in Mali.
The pressure on leaders like Hollande will get stronger. In a way, military pooling is a win-win scenario. All the nations involved get to cut their costs, while the resulting army is stronger than the sum of its parts. Ten battalions, 1,000 strong, from 10 different countries cannot be as effective as one division, 10,000 strong, provided the division is well-integrated. Not only can the larger division work better together, but all the support staff can be organized much more efficiently.
As the economic crisis bites, we will probably see more EU countries “go Dutch,” heading toward forming a common European army.
The big downside is the loss in sovereignty. But the Netherlands’ decision to place its rapid reaction forces under German command proves that EU nations will, under some circumstances, accept this. The new brigade could even be a proof-of-concept—a baby step toward much closer cooperation.
The idea of joint forces might work in money terms, but are there not risks when it comes to deployment? For example we are told that with the Dutch/German airborne tie-up the Dutch troops will only be able to deploy in a hurry with German co-operation. Now suppose a mission comes up that the Dutch, for whatever reason, feel they have to deploy but the Germans don’t want to get involved. What happens? Do the Germans have to put their troops in harms way even though their own government think it against their national interest? Anyone see that as realistic?
The Dutch and Belgian navies have,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Admiral_BENELUX_(ABNL)
and we have,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Netherlands_Marine_Corps#UK.2FNL_landing_force
@ GNB
The HQ is probably the key benefit of 16AAB; probably as much as the units below it.
We would be silly to get rid of it. We could easily make more out of it. We shouldn’t get hung up on troops in helicopters or jumping into hot LZ’s (!), but concentrate on enhancing its deployability. All good fun. :)
At a time of diminishing defence budgets, it boils down to a choice between having a capability, although dependant on allied support, or having NO capability at all. I know which option I’d chose.
If there is a need to evacuate Dutch citizens from unstable countries, most likely German citizens will also need to be evacuated.
Sgt Pep – Interesting development, which doesn’t seem to been reported anywhere else. Do you have another link other than TheTrumpet?
Take a look at the Franco-German brigade; two decades in existence but without a single joint deployment.
Even in Afghanistan, where both countries sent forces, there was no joint deployment. Though both countries did apparently take various units from the joint brigade to make up their own individual contributions.
I suppose that what could really bugger up the plans of a junior partner in a bi-national brigade/division would be if they were relying entirely on key components being provided by their bigger partner. In an airborne tie-up, not having sufficient air transport of its own could scupper individual ambitions of a junior partner, for example.
x
This might amuse you in an idle moment, if you have any! The question of how many infantry battalions 16 Air Bde had in the early days gets confusing but I am quite convinced that since its inception the Brigade could call on four. The BBC reporting on the Brigade in 2003 gave a rather ambiguous picture.
“Two battalions of the Parachute Regiment are always deployed alongside a battalion of regular infantry soldiers to make up the brigade’s ground fighting elements.”
followed by:
“It is made up of a large number of different units, including the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the Parachute Regiment …”
However, the display put on at Wattisham at the formation of the new Brigade in 1999 was reported in the “Wattisham Chronicles”:
“Main units involved in the new Brigade are numbers 3, 4 and 9 Regiment Army Air Corps and the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the Parachute Regiment, but integral to the Brigade are combat support and combat service support units, all of which have an airborne (parachute trained) element. These consist of an Air Assault Infantry Battalion … etc. etc.”
So seemingly four available at the beginning. And Tim Ripley, in his book on the Brigade, published in 2008, says that the Brigade as unique in the it was the first modern British Army brigade to boast a near fixed or permanent brigade ORBAT after it was formed in 1999.
“Although the bridge survived the battle, it was bombed and destroyed by B-26 Marauders of the 344th Bomb Group on 7 October 1944 to prevent the Germans from using it to send reinforcements south of the river.”
So they brought it down all the same.
Well every day is a school day. I would have said that it was unlikely they’d be able to drop it from the air – but they did.
No worries, I thought so too initially. Was thinking they needed something like B-29s and a huge bombload to do it.
@ Sgt Pep – “The big downside is the loss in sovereignty. But the Netherlands’ decision to place its rapid reaction forces under German command proves that EU nations will, under some circumstances, accept this.”
Well yes, it is quite easily acceptable to place your troops under nominal german command… provided you’re pretty sure they will never be used.
The only problem is the loss of operational sovereignty, but they have already accepted that by gutting the mobility of their brigade, so this is perhaps lipstick on a pig!
RE: EU defence cooperation:
http://m.rand.org/blog/2013/07/fighting-fit-why-europe-needs-fewer-soldiers.html
http://m.rand.org/randeurope/research/projects/defence-added-value.html
@ Mike W
Thank you. My ORBAT for 16AAB comes from a credible source too. I have decided never ever to defend the retention of any Army unit ever again. Unless they reinstate the county regiment or give back to the RLC lots of ships and boats. ;)
http://www.rfanostalgia.org/gallery3/index.php/RFA-AMPHIBIOUS/Army
‘x
“I have decided never ever to defend the retention of any Army unit ever again. Unless they reinstate the county regiment …”
Unfortunately I doubt that that will ever happen now. Think of us down here in Cornwall. We lost the magnificent DCLI (Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry) – a Regular regiment – years ago and now they’ve gone and taken away all our TA /RESERVE infantry, leaving only two reserve units (Medics and Logistics), one of which will probably be working in Plymouth .
@x
Incidentally, x, I mentioned Tim Ripley’s book on 16 Air Assault Bde . In it, he extols the virtues of personnel working together over some considerable time, conditions which build coherence and brigade spirit. I quote:
“Time and again over the past decade, the “Toms of the Parachute Regiment have flown into action in helicopters crewed by the same RAF pilots and loadmasters. They have shared the same desperate conditions and been shot at at the same time.” He also mentions how the RAF helicopter crews have always been on hand to fly into harm’s way to lift out wounded paratroopers.
He goes on to develop the argument that such a level of familiarity with each other means that that when the Brigade deploys on operations, it does so with a verve and confidence and concludes by saying that such a Brigade esprit de corps is a major factor in its success.
Such convincing arguments, based on first-hand observation, seem to me to run counter to the theories we have had expounded on this site for so long about how organizations, formations don’t really matter that much, how building coherence is not that important because the British soldier, being trained as a British soldier, can fit seamlessly into a different unit, how capability is more important than organizations, etc. etc. You know how such arguments go and who the proponent of such arguments are. Here is someone saying otherwise and, do you know what? I think he is right and right again.
Not that I am against capability. Of course not . The more of it the better. However, it goes hand in hand with organization, coherence and esprit de corps. We ignore such qualities at our peril.
Mike W said “Such convincing arguments, based on first-hand observation, seem to me to run counter to the theories we have had expounded on this site for so long about how organizations, formations don’t really matter that much, how building coherence is not that important because the British soldier, being trained as a British soldier, can fit seamlessly into a different unit, how capability is more important than organizations, etc. etc. You know how such arguments go and who the proponent of such arguments are. Here is someone saying otherwise and, do you know what? I think he is right and right again.”
Yep.
Depends what you mean by coherence and cohesion.
That units are frozen and people learn to work together better over time is a myth. It never happens. Personnel churn over all the time which means personal relationships are constantly changing. There is no cohesion at that level.
I would argue that true cohesion is generated by institutionalising the lessons learned from operating with different units. The more exposure you have, the more requisite variety is generated and the more respectable certain outlooks become: this aids organisational learning and familiarity. If this knowledge and learning is deposited in one organisation or type of organisation and properly exploited and accepted because the cultures are very close in outlook and people see things in the same way then you’ll get improved co-operation and more efficient operations. The closer units missions are aligned the more likely they are to improve things and learn lessons.
This is why you need centres of learning and excellence and doctrine. This is why you need 16X and 3 Cdo and why you need heavy armour concentrated in particular formations. You create nodes of learning and then you cross post and build bridges to other parts of the organisation.
Names and traditions have a place but the 31st Potato Peeling Battalion will start to peel potato’s better if it works closely with the 92nd Potato Mashing Company who will start to mash potatoes better even if the 31st Potato Peeling Battalion was then renamed something like, I dunno the Kings Regiment. The 32nd Potato Peeling Battalion would also then potentially benefit from the same lessons gleaned from the 31sts time with the 92nd – it would take far less time for the 32nd and the 92nd to work together than if the 31st had not already been there.
Paras assault from the air, helicopters fly in the air and are meant to carry those para’s. Round peg, round hole job done. If the helicopters then need to carry Royal Irish Regiment Rangers – the Rangers will immediately benefit from the lessons learned from working with the Para’s which makes the whole process much smoother.
In short and to conclude a slightly tortured post – it doesn’t matter a whole deal if the units change as long as the replacing unit does broadly the same thing as the one it replaces. So if 12X hasn’t worked with 19 Support Regiment before it is not such a drama because it will have worked with 10 Supply Regiment before and the institutional lessons will be there to enable 19 Support Regiment to slot in.
Phil, THAT particular lesson was drummed into me a few years back when my recon unit linked up with a LURPs unit for heli-insertion. When the CH-47 hit the ground, my unit went with our SOP and formed a perimeter. The LURPs went with their SOP and broke into teams and simply ran off into the forest. It looked pretty bad, we ended up with half a perimeter and the other side totally open.
Lesson learnt. LURPs have a different protocol for LZs, tie down proceedure before or during lift on if we want to disperse fast or secure a perimenter first.
Can’t be helped, their training was different from ours. Ours made sense in a larger unit context, theirs made sense in a small infiltrating unit context.
And Mike, unless you want to freeze promotions, transfers and the right to quit, personnel will always change. What is needed is common training, not friends for life, which can be pretty short sometimes if someone catches a bullet the hard way. This way, units and replacements can slot in to the unit fast and act on the same page, not get lost on what they are supposed to do.
@ Observer
Does SIngapore’s army organise its cavalry and infantry along British or American lines? That is “proper” regiments as opposed to just “named/numbered formations”.
Phil and Observer
Thanks very much for the really interesting replies. No time to assimilate the answers and reply in detail tonight.
Tomorrow AM is out too. I go to a keep-fit class and “die” afterwards. However, as General MacArthur once said, “I shall return!” Tomorrow P.M. , if all is well, with another few paragraphs of inane ramblings.
Phil, I think I chose the wrong word. I meant “cohesion” rather than “coherence”. I dunno, though, perhaps both.
x, depends on what you mean by “proper” and “improper” :)
We use Arabic numerals for unit designation then a role designation, not enough history or regions to differentiate, but for units, we tend to stay in it for years, though with recruitment every 2 years, you end up with a variaty of age ranges, so you see new people every 2 years, but also see old friends leave.
Been with my current unit since 96, so that makes about 17 years? SOP has evolved since then, lots more toys and gadgets now.
Thanks.
@Phil
Have now had a chance to read your post and digest it properly. I do not find it to be a tortured post in any way. In fact, it has a clear spine of argument and I was pleasantly surprised to find that I agreed with most of it.
Can’t really accept the argument in your first paragraph completely, though:
“That units are frozen and people learn to work together better over time is a myth.”
Try telling that to a top school like Eton, which probably has a staff that does not change that much over many years. Such stability helps create continuity, strength and a group spirit that fosters common values and standard and, ultimately, excellence. Oh, I know that there is the danger of any organization becoming fossilized, rather like the university college in “Porterhouse Blue”, but you can guard against becoming too hidebound by tradition, against becoming encrusted, if you like. Now I know that you are talking here about the military, which as Observer points out, is an organization in which the personnel in units change fairly rapidly (“And Mike, unless you want to freeze promotions, transfers and the right to quit, personnel will always change.”). However, I do feel that too easy an acceptance of change can lead to a kind of maelstrom of uncertainty, to people living in a constant state of flux, which is detrimental to standards. I remember talking to a Royal Engineers’ officer years ago now and asking him what morale was like in the Army at that time. He replied that morale always dropped during a periods of change and disruption and, because the Army was then undergoing yet another period of re-organization, spirits were not high. The British Army has undergone, if not continuous, then continual, re-structuring over the last twenty years and I think that the results have been de-stabilizing to a considerable extent.
Anyway, I agree with you argument in the paragraphs that follow, particularly when you say:
“This is why you need centres of learning and excellence and doctrine. This is why you need 16X and 3 Cdo and why you need heavy armour concentrated in particular formations. You create nodes of learning and then you cross post and build bridges to other parts of the organisation.”
You state as much when you say in one of you earlier comments:
“Heliborne operations at any level up to BG level need the appropriate expertise. On the ground for the average Tom he simply gets a quick brief, steps on, steps off and that’s it. But enormous staff work and liaison goes on for that to happen. And it needs to evolve and lessons need to be learned. There needs to be an entity that can do that and pass this on and lend the staff work needed to line units.”
I don’t know whether it is just my imagination but it seems to me that perhaps you have slightly modified you views over time and that instead of thinking that because the British Army soldier is infinitely adaptable and flexible and, because trained in the same way, can like a standard 3-point electrical plug, fit into any socket. In other words, perhaps you have come round to a belief that organization or structure is more important than you previously believed. Maybe I have got that completely wrong.
@Observer
See my comments to Phil but also:
“What is needed is common training, not friends for life, which can be pretty short sometimes if someone catches a bullet the hard way. This way, units and replacements can slot in to the unit fast and act on the same page, not get lost on what they are supposed to do.”
Yes but specialist skills, highly specialized skills, some of them, also exist, many of which mean that units and replacements cannot “easily slot in”. An example of such would be members of 28 Regiment, RE, who have spent probably most of their Army careers working on M2/M3 rigs, suddenly being asked to become more general purpose, all-round engineers and work in a field unit. Can’t be done quickly and if a contingency should come by in the meantime, then you are in trouble. We cannot have the Army living in a perpetual state of change and instability.
Mike, in that case, if you can’t train a replacement for casualties due to how specialised his skills are, then you just have to lose the skillset.
It becomes a null topic, even if we were to turn an organisation static like you proposed, loss of such a rare skill still cannot be compensated anyway. In fact, the common training/common soldier method holds the most chance of fielding a like-for-like replacement. If even that can’t work, the static organisation method stands much less of a chance.
Regarding the school comparison, a better comparison might be to look at the soldiers not as staff, but as the students, who once their years are up, move up and out. Sure, you can have the old salt teachers (NCOs), long serving Principles/Head of departments (long service officers), but most of the people there are only there for the duration of their school term (contract), and would leave for the civilian workforce after that. Which is why you teach the same thing over and over again to maintain regeneration.
It is not an easy acceptance of change, it is accepting the inevitable. People serve their term of service and leave, that is a fact, and crying about it isn’t going to help. This goes into retention rates and all, and it can work both ways, leaving early means you intergrate easier back into the workforce, signing on again, the army gains experienced personnel, but you have greater culture shock later when you finish a few army contracts. We had a lot of Company and Regimental Sergeant Majors end up as taxi drivers. So be polite to taxi drivers just in case. You don’t ever want your CSM to get a complaint from his old friend about you. :P
Observer
“even if we were to turn an organisation static like you proposed”
I have never suggested that, Observer. “Static” is entirely the wrong word. I know that units change personnel. I am merely suggesting that we try to give them more stability and continuity. I was, in fact, thinking of staff when I suggested greater emphasis on stability.
Phil, in his post, actually suggests this in a way too when he says:
““This is why you need centres of learning and excellence and doctrine. This is why you need 16X and 3 Cdo and why you need heavy armour concentrated in particular formations. You create nodes of learning … etc”
That is my very point.
If you can manage to retain as many of your ranks as possible, well, that’s all to the good. We live in an age that tends to laud mediocrity and ordinariness and tends to look suspiciously at excellence. The British Army has some outstanding organizations and units, ones built on tradition, on ethos, esprit de corps, individual culture, etc. etc. To destroy the individuality, colour and flair of individual units and to create in their place a homogenized system based on the notion that all soldiers fit all roles and can slot in anywhere (you’ve seen those old films of 1940s/50s telephonists plugging in at a telephone exchange) is a destructive philosophy and one that will lead to diminished performance.
I’ll watch out for taxi drivers then! Actually my old man was an RSM. In his case he got quite a good Civil Service job when he came out. Trouble was he just couldn’t adjust to civilian life and ended up a bit like the character in the Kipling poem (Is it called “Me”, or something like that?). Anyway, thanks for the discourse. It’s been fascinating.
I think you are all agreeing just using different terms and weights in your description of the same thing.
War is a young man’s game so long term is a relative term. Variety is important I suppose to some; I thought removing the Arms Plot wasn’t clever. But I have modified my point of view somewhat. Lots in civilian life work at the same job for decades. Many of the world’s armed forces don’t deploy beyond their own border. So perhaps re-roling, perhaps being more static in structure is achievable? Soldiering is still soldiering, there is a basic skill set so much of the job actually changes? This all goes back to my thinking on the Army having just one (large) armoured brigade instead of this new structure. Like all things there are swings and roundabouts.
Perhaps we need to look how many soldiers join and stay in for more than 3 years and then 6 years?
It is good that Phil keeps putting that point into various streams as it is a good one:
Phil, in his post, actually suggests this in a way too when he says:
““This is why you need centres of learning and excellence and doctrine. This is why you need 16X and 3 Cdo and why you need heavy armour concentrated in particular formations. You create nodes of learning … etc”
That is my very point.
Now, we will have to go and find something we disagree about…
Hi Mike
Oh, I know that there is the danger of any organization becoming fossilized, rather like the university college in “Porterhouse Blue”, but you can guard against becoming too hidebound by tradition, against becoming encrusted, if you like
Some of my MSc relates to organisational learning – it’s a complex subject as you can imagine. The only way a frozen organisation is going to be effective is if it has worked out the perfect way to operate in all contexts at all times. I think we can all agree that doesn’t happen. Even the Post Room in your average Office has to adapt to change. If you have an ossified structure what tends to happen is that the culture unchanges and if senior management culture doesn’t think certain changes are “respectable” they either don’t happen full stop or they don’t stick as management has no committment. There’s a number of theories such as “sensemaking” which argues that organisations make sense of things according to their prevailing culture – the prevailing culture is always the managements culture. So freezing organisations is poor organisational management. You need to refresh key positions from outside on occasion. How often and how much is difficult to judge.
But we also have to think what the Army is – it is a mixture of units a lot with similar roles. If we ossify units we freeze expertise in those units at the expense of the rest of the Army. This is often what happens when SF pools become too large. So you might have the unit that is excellent – but one excellent unit is a very bad way to run an Army. You have to cross post, you have to expose people to different units and roles and contexts and you have to develop them – this means moving them around. Even soldiers in units like the Parachute Regiment get around a lot.
The other point are the nodes. It depends on your level of analysis. At the high levels you do need to concentrate specialisms in their operational context (ie concentrate units in armoured brigades not put all tank regiments in one brigade, all infantry in another brigade etc) if you want to operate units at that level (it doesn’t matter if you never intend to fight with a combined arms brigade for example). But at other levels the cross posting of individuals does not matter so much because the Army has achieved something a lot of civilian companies can only dream of and that’s standardised training programmes and procedures. Individuals can slot in very easily – obviously the learning curve is steeper if they are posted to a different type of unit but the fact that are being embedded with more experienced men (trickle posted) the slight drop in efficiency is a manageable risk – to not trickle post is a worse risk as explained as you hold knowledge captive in units and don’t spread it out.
So it’s a complex picture. Completely overhauling a unit is obviously going to have massive effects on efficiency and readiness (like in WWII when forming US divisions were regularly stripped of their best men to act as replacements) but you need to have at one level concentrations of knowledge and you also need to cross fertilise all that knowledge throughout the whole organisation.
Its not just in the fighting arms that you can argue for longer postings to key roles.
Anyone giving serious input to equipment procurement probably needs longer than 2 years at their desk. Otherwise, and howver good their work in aboslute terms, the churn of personnel risks destabilising the project rather than advancing it.
The danger is of course ‘dead mens shoes’ where you get the best jobs blocked by steady men while the real talent checks out becuase it can’t get on.
Another thought, I wonder how much change or variety (whether it is personal need or driven by organisational needs) does a thirty something want?
x
“I think you are all agreeing just using different terms and weights in your description of the same thing.”
That could very well be the case.
I nearly agree with you on the business of having just one (large) armoured brigade Perhaps two of a similar, or slightly smaller, size than the ones that are going ahead. The other three could then be genuine multi-role brigades . Then we might see some true cohesion created. Phil, though, would probably maintain his argument that once deployment and action occur, things change and and conventional organization is ignored anyway.
@x or to their families. Disruption to their oh and kids lives is the biggest issue in being posted all over the place.
If he does argue that conventional organization is ignored, he would be right, ad hoc units get matched up all the time, even in training, that was what “adaptable brigades” probably acknowledges. On the other hand, the meta-structure of the brigade or division is still more or less intact, so it isn’t totally freewheeling.
Mike, what you describe and what Phil is pointing out as “centers of exellence” is a sub-organization in the armed forces known as training schools. It is where you get your basic and specialised training before you get sent to your unit and where your basic “lightbulbness” common training is taught.
“To destroy the individuality, colour and flair of individual units [….] is a destructive philosophy and one that will lead to diminished performance.”
Turning an individual soldier or unit so specialised that they can’t be replaced is even more destructive and in fact, out right suicidal for an army. Losses in that unit would be irreplacable and attrition in that unit so destructive that they would only be effective in the field as long as they don’t take severe casulaties. Once they hit 30-40 percent losses you can kiss the unit and any specialised capabilities they have goodbye. More likely than not, the survivors would be split into ad hoc units and canibalised into other units as replacements. Provided they are not so specialised that they cannot be intergrated into other units. Luftwaffe field brigades anyone?
In the Market Garden example we were taking about, the 1st Airborne was so badly mauled that they were withdrawn from combat for reorganisation (read replacement of causalties) and never took part in any action in the war again.
Combat IS losses, and any which cannot be replaced, must be suffered the lack of.
You MUST not have an irreplacable unit or person. That creates a node of possible failure where a single loss can cause the whole system to collapse.
@ Topman
Well yes. The thirty something NCO wants different things than 21 year old soldier. And they view things differently. It is all complex.
@ Mike W
Well it is a bit more plug and play that organisational charts would suggest. Company added here. An extra troop added there. The other factor is the size of the army itself. It is smaller. The preferred building blocks today appear to be battlegroups not brigades, companies not battalions. etc. etc.
The one armoured brigade came from how much we actually do this high end BAOR style warfare. My thinking was concentrate everything into one place. Everybody mounted in Warrior; no need for FRES and simplify vehicle numbers and types. The Chally regiment with uprated export engines. Top notch kit across the board; lots of budget for training. So if it needed or part of its needed it is a very well equipped world class formation. And then rest of into 6 brigades to be rotated in 6 months away in 36 months pattern mounted in simpler vehicles. And them to supply say an additional tank regiment, FRR, and additional Warrior battalion as a re-enforcement. Training to this role after standing down from high readiness. More to maintain skills and give a bit of variety. With the one brigade plus that small reinforcement it would be similar in size to what was deployed in GW1 (less support but……) Basically as a structure, it it were me in charge(!), it would be; one intervention division (SF, SFSG, 3Cdo, and a tweeked 16AAB), the armoured brigade (supported by the TA/AR), the field force (6 battalions in protected vehicles plus wheel cavalry) etc. etc. then odds and sods like the Household Division and Ghurkas as a sort of reserve. :)
x
Not so very far away from my own thinking on structure. However, I do think that the earlier MRB idea had a lot going for it. It’ll be interesting to find out how the Aussies get on with theirs.
Incidentally, talking about using only Warrior (not FRES), you might possibly be interested in my comment on the “FRES and Warrior – Ammunition order” thread. Shan’t be in to see many replies (if any). Night out.
Have only just seen Phil’s post too. That (and others) will have to wait also.
@ Mike W
The MRB idea was silly. The opposite to what I mean by “static” or “fixed”. The Army can and will send who it has available, always has and will continue to do. Unexpected events and exceptions drive reality. But you can’t you build or plan on unexpected events or exceptions therefore you need broad lines to cover everything. We know we need will need to intervene rapidly somewhere, we know that despite assurances to the contrary a brigade of British soldiers will be somewhere for 6 months or more peacekeeping in the future, and every so often there will be need to kick a door down with armour and destroy an a clearly identifiable enemy in a uniform. If the peace keepers needed rapidly reinforcing send the light forces; if the armoured formation needs FP send some troops in the protected vehicles. A battalion is low numbers for whatever send a company from another battalion. All formations have their own culture, but at the base of it there is the one culture, the British Army.
All good fun.
That’s odd, some posts only appear after others were posted for a long time. I just saw Phil’s post too. Probably verification time.
It does make a lot of sense in that too fixed a culture brings about a co-related resistance to change, which may not be for the best.
Yes sometimes I post from somewhere other than my laptop and I can never remember my password so TD Towers has to approve my post in such cases.
As for moving – I think the most important people in the Army, the SNCO’s and Field Officers mostly prefer to stay around a place due to family etc.
Delicate one really – I think the closest you can come to a general solution there is to ensure there is no across the board fixed time limit. Some Officers won’t tolerate flying a desk, others are more comfortable doing just that but if you let them do what they want you end up with some Officers knowing how everything works on operations but don’t have the experience to influence equipment and policy and others who have such experience but are disconnected fro the front line.
Starting to think about the SDSR 2015 – I cannot see the Army structure changing significantly from the one currently being implemented – it would be politically very difficult and actually I think the structure makes a lot of sense.
If we accept that in the future the Paras and RMs are seen primarily as enablers (door openers) then I think that these are two units that could benefit from a fresh look at as part of the SDSR both from a structural point of view and also equipment used.
Also, if the main focus of UK land based defence policy (beyond pure defence) is the ability to project a Reaction Armoured Infantry Brigade Force anywhere in the world – then shouldn’t our “land focused” logistics (sea and air) be primarily aimed at the delivery of this force?
A radical option for sea based delivery could be to:
– Downgrade the current Albion LPDs to RFA LSDs
– Allocate these, the Bay LSDs and the Point Ro-Ros primarily to the Army for the delivery of this force.
– Build the three MARS JSBL (Joint Sea-Based Logistics vessels) to support the land based operations (2 Solid Store ships also would be needed separate from these to support the CVFs)
This would mean that the entire Brigade force could be transported relatively quickly by sea – supported by additional RFA Tankers / RN ships as needed. Outside of the US, the UK would be the only other country to have this capability.
New ships would be required for the RMs that a specialised on securing a beachhead (my favourite is a LST class that can also act as a LCVP mothership – Indian Shardul class ;)). RMs would operate from these and also from the CVFs in a helo assault role.
@Repulse, that’s the sort of thinking that is needed. No point in having a reaction force that does not have the logistics to be able to react on a timely basis
Battalion sized reaction force. Brigade is the followup. All you actually have to worry about is getting the RM/Paras to theatre with the military LPDs etc, the rest of the brigade can follow in STUFT. Much more efficient to buy up a 2nd hand RO-RO transport even if you have to nationalise a shipping company than to purchase an LPD long term.
Another idea might be to further mechanise the airborne/heliborne forces. Changing them from light to light mechanised infantry gives them more reach and mobility from LZ with increased payload, but their equipment is going to have to be very specialised for light weight and air-portability.
@Observer, I agree the initial force would be a Battlegroup based on on a strengthened battalion, but what I feel needs to be revised is using the Paras / RMs as light infantry on an enduring basis as happened in Afghanistan. With the exception of maritime security for the RMs these should be seen as “door openers” or for use on targeted ops – e.g. seizure of key sites etc. The Rapid Brigade Force should be the core of any significant land operations.
Whilst, it is true most personnel and some light kit / supplies can go by air, sea transport will be needed (and sometimes quickly) in virtually all scenarios. In some scenarios (a Falklands2 – it would be the only way).
We should need to rely on STUFT to move follow on brigades or a Division, not a the Rapid Brigade in my view… That would be a real differentiator for UK capabilities from other allies (outside of the US).
what I feel needs to be revised is using the Paras / RMs as light infantry on an enduring basis as happened in Afghanistan.
That is exactly what has happened.
With the exception of maritime security for the RMs these should be seen as “door openers”
1. Airborne troops as door openers – I have already spoken about their massive limitations in this role and if you wanted to open a brigade sized door you need at least a division of airborne troops. Brigades need space to be able to deploy and get ashore. Considerable space. The idea of a Brigade sized opposed landing is ridiculous mainly for this reason. Against an aggressive enemy determined to hold you around the beachhead a brigade sized frontage simply isn’t big enough to offer many or more than likely any options.
2. RM troops as door openers. Every limitation mentioned above except whilst we can actually physically lob paratroopers in to their ultimate deaths we don’t even have the kit to conduct an opposed amphibious landing full stop even if someone out there was batshit mad enough to try it. Even the Yanks doubt their ability to do it and the only reason they stand a chance in hell of ever succeeding if they did is that they have 3-4 Marine divisions they can churn through and gut – that sort of mass counts for something.
Brigade sized airborne and amphibious operations are almost completely practically useless. An unopposed amphibious operation at brigade level is far more serious a prospect but you need more than a brigade to land a brigade, you might use the entire RF division but again you need serious force to be able to hold an area big enough for the division to spread out.
We’ve just not had this kind of force levels well ever really – we couldn’t have even done it in WWII without US and Canadian troops enabling a huge frontage.
I just cannot see a scenario where building your force around such a Pyrrhic capability would be useful at all.
Slightly off topic, but I am alarmed by the fall in AAC helicopter numbers. Found the bumf on the Lynx 3 prototype. It had an extra 11 inch fuselage plug, so could carry an extra soldier or more missile reloads. If we ever get to order more Wildcat, I would suggest those extra 11 inches would be useful.
I would suggest those extra 11 inches would be useful.
Steady…
“The idea of a Brigade sized opposed landing is ridiculous mainly for this reason.”
Did Repulse mention, or in any way suggest, opposed landings?
Door openers implies opposed.
Come on now @phil, any landing not conducted by football fans on a Channel ferry will be “opposed” to a degree. Just making the point that the RM could do with some LVTP’s doesn’t mean we’re prepping for Tarawa part II, it’s just that packing a company at a time into LCU’s is idiocy of the highest order.
When it comes to parachute operations, declaring something impossible is going way too far. The US conducted opposed operations in Grenada and Panama without mass casualties, with the latter being a brigade drop.
jedi, not much choice, a brigade frontage is 50(?)-150(?) km wide, you are almost sure to hit something deploying.
Repulse, deploying a brigade purely on military assets alone is a very, very heavy undertaking. A brigade is 3-6 battalions + 2-4 more support type units. You want to deploy it in a single wave, you would need to double or triple your current amphibious fleet. How many Type-45s or Type-26s are you willing to sacrifice for 6 more LPDs?
Hopefully with Viking to hand or similar they will be packed into LCUs in a troop not a company. Better a fast landing craft in numbers than a slow (in the water) armoured vehicles. 4 fast craft carrying 4/5 Viking would be a company in one wave. Keep the amphibious capability to wear it is needed that is dealing with the surf zone. Remember demonstrations that show these vehicles in quite lumpy seas are to show that it can easily cope with “normal” conditions and not to show how it can be used. Amphibious operations get called off in quite lowish sea states.
I have thought about “us” acquiring some AAV but nothing to do with fighty stuff. They can carry 4.5t (as much as a Merlin!). I wondered whether there was a logistical niche for a truck that could move a load from say a Bay to point of need. Or personnel even. Or indeed as a command point for beach operations. In an established AOA not a raid or whatever. All very niche and probably not worth the logistical support or loss of stores volume.
Marines and paratroopers are all about the flanks and lightly defended areas. Lightly defended often because there is nothing to defend (!) because it is hard to get there. They aren’t door openers. On the 5/6 June the invasion fleet would have arrived whether Pegasus Bridge had been taken or not. The invasion fleet did bring with them the true door openers, massed fires. (And of course the same from air forces!) That is what gets you through the door. If the US didn’t have Kuwait in 1993 what would have put stick in their wheel wouldn’t have been how quick the USMC could have got ashore but how much ordnance they could have dropped across Iraqi narrow littoral front. They would have probably got away with it because of the quality of Iraqi forces. Against an organised, well motivated, and well equipped enemy with depth no way Jose.
As for moving the LPDs to the RFA good idea as it increases our RFA lift and landing craft capacity; back to 2 logistics vessels per ARG. That is If we get the brace or troika of replacements in the form of a large LHD/LPD to do the fighty stuff, which we all know isn’t going to happen. :( Being a bit a real world I wonder how you could reduce the crewing numbers to something more RFA sized. It could be done I think. A question for NaB and APATS.
@ Jedibeeftrix
I think Phil is scared we want to turn the British Army into a mini-USMC. I have told a zillion time him if he watches Platoon and eats cheese at bed times he will have nightmares. :)
Personally I like the idea of a British Army configured to move across beaches with ease instead of one that appears to be waiting for Ivan. But heck we have the tanks and Warriors and we don’t have the money for new amphibious 8x8s and other lightish kit or to fund an increase in RFA tonnage (and RLC tonnage) to move them. Luckily we have the Americans to open doors and gain us temporary basing rights and chartering ships suits the suits in HMT. Sad really. An army that onced employed troops with a fearsome fighting tradition from the fringes of the Empire has become the troops with the fearsome fighting tradition from the edge of someone else’s empire.
@Phil: as I Jedi rightly says I definitely do not mean opposed landings. FI San Carlos style being the most heated scenario in my book. Don’t agree either with the width of front as that was not the case in FI, nor would it be in place where the enemy was not.
Most of what we will be doing is either small scale, landings in friendly ports or in partnership.
Repulse, the frontage length was from my old notes when I was in training school, think it was taken off the US Army’s aide memoirs. Do you have an alternate source that shows a different FEBA width?
x, you may have Warriors and Challengers, but they can actually be considered leftovers from the Cold War. Challenger was ordered in 1994, back when there were worries of rogue Soviet states and ultra-nationalists seizing some of them for a USSR-resurgent rampage into Western Europe. These days, justifying new stuff is rather hard to do. Guess you could say it is a 50/50 situation. No conventional threats is good for security, but bad for justifying a military reserve.
“Most of what we will be doing is either small scale, landings in friendly ports or in partnership.”
Probably, probably.
When it comes to parachute operations, declaring something impossible is going way too far. The US conducted opposed operations in Grenada and Panama without mass casualties, with the latter being a brigade drop.
Yes the US did the drop. Not us. And the force was hardly dropped amongst the II SS Pzr Corps either. I am not arguing about the US – they can do things we can only dream of. I am talking about us. Now if you look at those invasions whilst we’re on them you will see small units being dropped hither and thither to seize important objectives in what was a semi-permissive environment. I don’t argue there is not such a role for our ABTF – on the contrary it’s the perfect type of mission and shows there are real world problems the ABTF capability can potentially solve as part of a bigger mission. Same for the ARG of whatever we are calling it these days.
But when people are genuinely honest with themselves how far up the list of “shit that can go wrong” is something that would require us to unilaterally move a brigade by sea in one lift and dump that one brigade somewhere where it can drive off into battle over the beach? I can’t think of not only a single likely interest we have: I can’t even think of a single physical location we have an interest in that would necessitate such a response before we think about the likely enemy who would need to be nearby who wants to do such a thing. And I am ignoring the Falklands because it’s a silly proposition and about as likely at the moment as Ivan rocking up in Hannover.
Where is the utility in having this capability which would mean completely re-altering the entire armed forces? When would we have ever used it? In Iraq in 2003 the US conducted an airborne drop and the coalition conducted some amphibious operations down south – yet the 82nd Airborne and the USMC divisions despite both being supposedly the units of choice for such missions instead were landed in Kuwait in ports and then attacked over land. In 1991 the US used them as a diversion – it didn’t land them on the coast in order to draw in the Republican Guard and fix them around the beaches – instead again the USMC largely went over land after being landed in ports. Instead of jumping a Bde into the middle of nowhere to set up a FOB instead the 101st air assaulted in.
There are lots of missions for the BG sized airborne and Commando units, an awful lot. But brigade sized amphibious operations hardly ever happen and with the support assets we have this makes them have almost no utility. There’s no point designing an armed forces to do something it is almost certainly never going to do.
@ Phil – “Door openers implies opposed.”
that was never the impression i had on the role of the marines!
to quote AndyMed from Warships1:
“The RM isn’t in the business of opposed landings but is instead a raiding force that is designed to skirt around defended positions and penetrate inland with great speed capturing and holding strategically important positions. Al Faw was in fact a classic example of this type of operation.”
Or this:
http://www.defenceviewpoints.co.uk/articles-and-analysis/how-much-might-be-done-with-a-hundred-thousand-such-as-these
“As a military concept, Littoral manoeuvre (LitM) is the means of gaining relative advantage over a shore based enemy by integrating activity across the land and sea interface. It fits clearly within the British ‘manoeuverist approach’ which directs forces to attack an enemy’s will and cohesion, his weakness rather than his strengths, through a combination of focused tempo and surprise. It is not about isolating light forces on foreign beaches or attacking defended hard points with all the associated ‘Saving Private Ryan’ imagery. As the Commander of the UK Amphibious Forces told RUSI in July 2010, Littoral manoeuvre is about ‘manoeuvre not attrition, nimbleness not mass, adaptability not fixity and discrimination not prescription’.”
My reading of “door openers” was as reference to making available port facilities to disembark an armoured force via Points and STUFT, but perhaps i misinterpret Repulse…?
@ Observer – “jedi, not much choice, a brigade frontage is 50(?)-150(?) km wide, you are almost sure to hit something deploying.”
To my admittedly inexpert eye, use of 3Cdo in such a manner would be a gross misuse of their true function, as per the above.
@ Observer
Yes they are Cold War relics because they who purchased them had (understandably) a Cold War mindset. The politicians may have be dismantling the West’s armed forces for a quick financial gain but military minds were stuck in their tanks. Remember they had just fought a lovely heavy armour in the Middle East which reinforced their understanding of the West’s military requirements. It would be nice if you human history mapped neatly on to the calendar but it doesn’t. Google “long 19th century” or “long 16th century” as an illustration. I am too busy to ramble on about GB having no place playing Continental land power in the 20th century and how an Army view of our physical security has skewed our strategic perspective.
@Jedi, correct, perhaps I should rephrase “door openers” to “door holders”… Securing lightly defended landing grounds.
@Observer: No clue on FEBA width but wiuld like to understand more. I was going on what happened in FI. Also, to be clear a D-Day style landing is at the opposite scale to what I’m suggesting.
jedi, the problem was not with usage, the problem is that a brigade level force is huge in terms of the space it occupies and the amount of control it projects over territory. This means that sooner or later, it is going to bump into something or something is going to bump into it. Factor this in with the fact that units don’t fight over flat plains but strategic locations like high ground and choke points, the risk of bumping into something increases exponentially as both sides go for the same target. The only question is what is going to bump into the brigade. If it was irregular milita, good for 3Cdo. If it was an Egyptian Army Brigade, that could be a problem. Once you get engaged, forget about maneuver. Even crossing the street becomes a problem without carpetting supression fire.
Which is why tossing a brigade in may not be the best idea. A battalion is approximately 6 times smaller, much more agile and stand a higher chance to avoid heavier units. Brigades are huge, and in return they have feet of clay. Battalions are weaker and smaller but are much more agile in terms of command and control.
Repulse, FEBA (Forward Edge Battle Area) are planned limits to the area where you can deploy your unit, the sides are usually buntressed on a physical obstacle like a river or an axis (road) for easy recognition. This seperation is to ensure better control over an army so that there is less interference in operations. For example, if Brigade A assigns a combat team to take Objective X, and Brigade B unfortunately does the same thing, the chances of “friendly fire” goes way up. This seperation also acts as the unit’s “working area” where he deploys his logistics and support units and gives an idea of how much space a brigade has to work with. FEBAs are very, very sensitive info as since co-ordination at the edge of 2 FEBAs are the weakest and an attack there has a chance of causing command confusion as to which of the 2 units is responsible for containing the attack.
As you can guess from my disagreements with Phil, which I believe stems from deeper strategic concerns like manpower/firepower disparity and the secondary effects of a “Total War” strategic doctrine, I’m more pro-maneuver, and it is my belief that while a brigade is good at holding frontage, when it comes to agile maneuver, battalion level independent units are much more effective due to shorter command loop, less units to track and the smaller physical size of the unit itself.
x, not even going to touch that anti-army rant. Know better than to go dancing in a minefield :P Let us just say I disagree and leave it at that.
And jedi, gah I’m starting to get an allergy to the term “littoral”. What is wrong with the old fashion term “coastal hook”. “Littoral Maneuver” indeed. Though the term is rather old, dating back to WWII and may be region specific. But anything other than Newspeak please Big Brother?
@ Observer
Dude. I said never said I was anti-army. Lord forbid. They are my people. All I am saying is that the imperial gendarmerie, sorry Army, yes the Army need to get back to what they were good at doing that is supporting the RN. ;) :)
“The RM isn’t in the business of opposed landings but is instead a raiding force that is designed to skirt around defended positions and penetrate inland with great speed capturing and holding strategically important positions. Al Faw was in fact a classic example of this type of operation.”
Which is lovely. A very potent brew indeed. Now add a big dollop of Peer Enemy to the recipe and what you then get is this:
“The RM isn’t in the business of opposed landings but is instead a raiding force that [attempts] to skirt around defended positions and [attempts] to penetrate inland with great speed [hoping to avoid the enemy] capturing [if it has avoided the enemy] and [hoping to hold for a very short period of time] [any]strategically important positions [that happen to me within 4-5 miles of a coast]. Al Faw was in fact [not] a classic example of this type of operation.”
I get that the RN cannot and won’t consider an opposed landing. But the idea it can dance around a coast against any serious aggressor is equally ludicrous. D-Day even with all of those ships and logistical effort still occurred effectively a stone’s throw from the UK. Even low grade troops and weapons can put your landing into serious difficulty – that perfect inlet will be mined and the obstacles covered by mobile AshMs for example. And that other quiet beach far away from the action – that’s mined too and being watched.
We were very lucky in the Falklands. The Argentines stayed put. You’ll notice that pretty much the first thing we did was expand the lodgement because a small lodgement is a danger not an advantage. We don’t have the force for anything other than an Anzio scenario unless the enemy is monumentally stupid.
@Phil: I don’t disagree with what you are saying, but the budget is not there to even seriously consideing a large scale peer on peer situation, unless we are takking about someone invading the UK mainland where I think we would make it bloody difficult.
What we are talking about are small scale operations or participating in a multinational op. Largest scale independent op we need to plan for would be a FI2 operation which as discussed before would be fought differently than the first.
The reason for boasting the RFA in this way and assigning it to Response Brigade is as more to do with ensuring a quick and efficient move to a crisis zone (via a safe harbour) than a suicidal re-run of Gallipoli.
Securing an airfield / port / beach against local militia is about it for the RMs / Paras. Planning for anything more than that is pure fantasy…
@Observer, thanks for the info on FEBA.
Repulse, think Phil is agreeing with you there actually. Just that he phrased it in more drastic tones. So basically we are in agreement that opposed landings with the current force and budget is suicidal and that the units are more for stabilising friendly areas under threat than opening an invasion corridor?
The reason for boasting the RFA in this way and assigning it to Response Brigade is as more to do with ensuring a quick and efficient move to a crisis zone (via a safe harbour) than a suicidal re-run of Gallipoli.
But the bottleneck isn’t the shipping. In GRANBY, CORPORATE and TELIC shipping was requisitioned or laid in pretty fast. The bottleneck is the drawing, movement and loading. You just seem to want a capability that is already there but re-engineer it in a far more expensive and therefore debilitating manner – we can get the ships (especially with emergency powers) pretty fast. In addition – you’re massively under-estimating the number of ships you’d need to dump a fully supported brigade. It took about 50 ships to deliver 7 Bde in 1990, about 122 to deliver the entire force and its ammunition. It took 98 ships for Operation Telic. It took something like 26 cargo and landing vessels of varying types to support Operation Corporate.
So not only do I see no utility in dumping a brigade in one go – I think you are massively under-estimating the number of ships you need and you are wanting efficiencies in an area where things are pretty slick – other parts of the logistical effort are the bottlenecks. You’d do better investing more in being able to draw the kit, move the kit and load the kit.
So @Phil just to be clear you want more trucks rather than more ships? Do they need to be special trucks? Or do we just need more warehouses near Marchwood with clever material handling systems? If you had a magic wand to iron out the logs bottlenecks how would you go about it?
If you had a magic wand to iron out the logs bottlenecks how would you go about it?
I don’t know the first thing about how to go about mounting a force myself. I’ve just read up on the process and it’s pretty clear that getting shipping is not the major drama people here think it is – even without emergency powers. That certainly explains a lot about how we have mounted forces far and wide for decades with no dedicated sea-lift force in being.
TD has been posting about it recently – in the Falklands a massive drama was had just getting the kit to the Port.
I imagine the answer isn’t more trucks, special or otherwise – it’s being quick off the ball with emergency powers and making the big decisions to requisition rolling stock and mobilising vehicle fleets and firing up the dormant contracts. Every deployment we’ve made has been hobbled more by a refusal to pull out the stops and move from a peacetime posture to an emergency posture in terms of movement and control. BR couldn’t handle the movements for Corporate and we got the TA working on it during the weekends, during GRANBY we had to purchase the shipping on the Baltic Exchange like any other bastard because everything was to be done under peacetime direction and we still got our ships in good time.
Having the balls to make the call on emergency powers and other out of the ordinary decisions would probably help far more than any sexy kit.
I guess it also helps if there is enough kit on the shelf if the first place. Rather than having to rush around UORing stuff that may or may not be available or in the right place or in the right quanitities or in the right timescale.
@Observer, I think we are in agreement – though would include a “Falkland Style” operation in the planning scenarios also.
@Phil: Assuming 6 Points (we need the other 2 back on the lust :)), 5 LSDs (inc the current LPDs) and 3 JSBLs you have 14 sizeable ships which would be the core. You are right in that more may be needed but that is a hell of a start. I am not disputing that more thought / resources could be put into other areas to make this a slick process. This could be an area where the UK could be different.
France for example has 3 LHDs and 3 small Ro-Ros…
What scenarios could this be useful? Ican think of a number where a quick movement of a force of this size either independently or as part of a coalition could make a real difference. Look at what a carrier and brigade did to prevent an earlier invasion of Kuwait in the 70s. Or what if a safe zone was needed in Libya or another African state prior to UN peace keepers arriving.
You are right in that more may be needed but that is a hell of a start.
So all that is achieved by this shifting in posture then is a half-baked level of support which means the entire idea is unworkable not least because we’d still need to requisition some ships (even though we’ve bought some at great expense) and we’d still have the same dramas moving and loading stores. All that to gut the remainder of the Fleet and pervert the structure of the Army to shoe horn it into this logistically flawed idea. It’s not a case of more may be needed – more WILL be needed.
You’ve taken a mission that is very unlikely to occur and mashed into this mission a force structure that couldn’t be useful with the level of support you have assigned it unless you go back to doing things how they are done now anyway: but this whole force and the whole expensive has come been predicated on not to do things the way they are done now.
The idea just doesn’t stand up to scrutiny. The reality is the Army and the RAF don’t have massive dramas with shipping. There’s no need for large dedicated fleets for sea lift. We can get it when we need it even when we’re out touting for it.
PE, drawing and stowing of kit is not by vehicles, it is individually issuing the kit to men and telling them where they are to store it and where they are to sleep, eat, exercise, who to report to etc. More trucks won’t help, this is just irritating long winded admin which is unfortunately necessary.
They probably already have the kit, it’s queueing up to collect it that takes a hell lot of time. Then finding out which ship you go to, who your on ship OIC (Officer In Charge) is, where you sleep and where you store your junk, then help loading of unit stores from trucks to ship etc.
And don’t forget the damn paperwork and shipping manifests you have to create. And safety issues etc with ammo and POL storage.
Been deployed to Australia for Exercises 4 times, every time it was always a pain. With the added joy of Australian customs quarantine, which means we had to scrub everything clean before we could even seal and load them.
Is it a coincidence that loading point M and co-basing area S are nearby? Are we not making a mountain when there is clearly only a mole hole, and plenty of lessons learned?
ACC said “Is it a coincidence that loading point M and co-basing area S are nearby? ”
I said something similar earlier. If RAF can transport 8500t (nominally in weight terms half of what a light brigade needs for 30 days) to Italy I am sure in a similar situation that required the Army then the RLC plus other MoD assets (like the RAF transport squadrons) plus civilian contractors could move twice as much in the UK with relative ease for a few months. Um. How many 4 tonners does the Army have these days?
“Are we not making a mountain when there is clearly only a mole hole, and plenty of lessons learned?”
Depends on which molehill. Shipping is easy to come by, especially at the moment with a bit of slum, but with continuing advance of the “seacan” break bulk/general cargo ships aren’t as common. Something for NaB to speak about. But we have lost quite a bit of specialist shipping over the years. Look at the variety be it MoS/MoT LST, RCL/RCT LC and lighters, troopers, RFA LSLs** , or civilian builds with MoD input (eg ASNC back in the 1950s and ACL after 82) a huge amount has been lost. Now this was all during our retreat from Empire and consolidation on the German plain. The Points go someway to addressing that gap; modern shipping is larger and more capable. If we needed all that specialist shipping back then now we are looking beyond Europe perhaps we need to regain some of it. Of course moving the Army has never really been the RN’s job. But this is nothing to do with RN, the term seapower goes beyond the purely military. I am starting to gain a new respect for the RAF. Libya happens. They strap Storm Shadows onto the Tonkas and off they go, whoosh! No messing. If what I read here from those who are a bit more green around the edges they would rather wait a while, get some shipping charted, wait for it to term up at Marchwood, load up, toddle off to the point of crisis. etc. etc. Perish the thought of having equipment loaded in ships ready to go. Specialised ships that do not need access to conventional or large ports. Good God no. How much was wasted on not buying FRES again? £1 billion was it? Enough to buy what 3 Bays and operate them for 18 years. Wow. And why didn’t FRES get off get off the ground, sorry couldn’t help myself, because they tried to get it to fit into a C130 and be fully protected. What a silly idea it is to just buy the same vehicles as every other army and accept they will only be moved by air on very rare occasions. As I alluded to further up I wouldn’t mind this but the Army always had access to specialist shipping. It is only in recent years that they have been cut back. Years where the threat from the Third World holes has grown. Is that a BMP-2 I hear across the border?
http://www.rfanostalgia.org/gallery3/var/albums/RFA%20AMPHIBIOUS/Army-Vessels/Army-Landing-Craft/Andalsnes-L4097.jpg?m=1352235910
** Admittedly the LSLs replaced LST and were MoS/MoT vessels but the LST filled a niche size wise between the Army’s LCT and the LSL.
x, if Phil is correct in his assessment that the primary bottleneck is not in shipping but in individual kit/unit movement, more vehicles isn’t the answer, it is the equivalent of building a superhighway before/after a one lane street. You will still get a bottleneck and slowdown.
If kit issue and unit movement orders are the primary causes of bottlenecks, the only solutions are more effective issuing of personal kit and improving administration, both in local unit movement and in general planning. Not sure how fast this can be hurried along though, the faster you plan/pack/load, the higher the chance of you leaving something behind by accident or overlooking something in planning. Not to mention it is extremely disruptive to the lives of the men.
Imagine training in the UK one day only to be told you are being sent to Africa in 24 hours. You won’t even be able to see your family before being forced to leave, the best you can hope for in such a situation is probably a phone call to say bye, and you may be back in 2 months if you are lucky, never come back if you are not. How many “Daddy went to work on Monday and never came back” stories are you going to end up creating? You have to give the men at least a day off or a Warning Order a day in advance if they are with family to get their affairs in order, even if that affair is simply getting a will written or binge out in the nearest bar.
I don’t think the bottleneck is personal kit issue. It took about 30 mins for the reserve mounting centre to issue me all the kit I needed. It’s the unit stores, the war reserves of ammo, spares, food and the thousands of bits of this and that. A 200 bed field hospital alone requires 60 odd ISOs to be filled.
And I don’t think proximity is an issue. This isn’t the 18th Century. The actual driving time is probably less than the time spent marshalling, loading and then releasing the packets down the road.
The drama is one of volume and co ordination. The sheer number of road, air and sea movements places a massive strain on the system.