With the recent confirmation of RAF Marham as the main Operating Base for the UK’s F35B stealth jets the RAF and Fleet Air Arm have been finalising plans for Joint Force Lightning.
The MoD has since confirmed that a similar operating model to the Sentinel organisation model, that sees personnel from both the RAF and Army combined in the 5 (Army Cooperation) Squadron.
It is a truly jointly manned RAF Squadron and the Officer Commanding, Wg Cdr Allan Marshall, has a current comÂplement of approximately 250 personnel, split between RAF and Army. When at full strength, the Squadron will have over 300 RAF, Army and civilian personnel, making No 5 (AC) Sqn one of the largest flying Sqn in the RAF by some margin. The composition of the Sqn is like no other, as it requires RAF from all walks of life and eight different Army cap badges to deliver this hugely diverse military capaÂbility.
Based at RAF Marham, II (Army Cooperation) Squadron currently operates the Tornado GR4.
The oldest fixed-wing flying squadron in the world. Since its formation in 1912, the Squadron has lived-up to its informal motto of ‘Second to None’. Its many achievements include the first use of airborne cameras in 1914, the award of the first air Victoria Cross in 1915 and the first pictures of the D-Day landings in 1944. Today the Squadron remains a key part of the RAF’s front-line, maintaining the capability to conduct reconnaissance and attack operations where ever and when ever required.
When the F35B Lightning II joins the squadron sometime towards the end of the decade it will rename and form the first operational squadron for the new Joint Force Lightning (JFL)
Pilots from the Fleet Air Arm will join the existing complement of RAF personnel.
Commenting on the announcement, RAF Wing Commander Johnson said;
I am looking forward to the challenge of bringing the first JFL aircraft into operational service and working closely with our colleagues from the Fleet Air Arm. The UK must maximise on its investment in the Joint Strike Fighter programme and together with the Typhoon will provide a potent and flexible combination that can be operated equally from land or sea. II (NC) Squadron will form a vital part of Carrier Strike when embarked although initially this will likely be for limited periods as land based training will take precedence. Bringing a new aircraft into service and integrating it with Typhoon will require a considerable effort which will necessarily take priority.
It is also likely that II(NC) Squadron will share many facilities with the USAF at RAF Lakenheath as they eventually replace their F-15E’s with the F-35A.
@Fatman.
Regarding your comment that it is becoming more and more difficult to sustain the standpoint that only an independent air force is capable of understanding and fulfilling airpower strategy. Your view would logically also apply to maritime strategy. For example, If youre argument is valid, then you appear to be saying that it is becoming more and more difficult to sustain the standpoint that only an independent naval force is capable of understanding and fulfilling maritime power strategy.
I agree with you about economies of scale. For example, as the RAF steadily shrinks towards the size of the Danish Air Force, it would make economic sense to absorb the AAC into the RAF. – in fact this is basically what Denmark (and also Germany) is doing. i.e transferring much of their army aviation assets to their air force.
I also think that you have a good point about transforming RAF Regiment into an air commando force. As you probably know, the French have this sort of organisation, i,e the French Air Force equivalent of the RAF Regiment are known as “air commando’s”.
“This makes me think we get better value by collapsing the AAC and FAA into the RAF rather than the other way around.” – I could certainly live with that, provided the RAF could be persuaded to regard fulfilling these roles as part of its core responsibilities, not just “helping out” the army/navy.
My concern, as a layman looking at how others do this, is that no other nation (except China, where EVERYTHING is army) forms its maritime air from its land based (if you follow me) airforce. There is obviously a good reason for this, not just tradition. And then of course there’s the USMC who seem to be a law unto themselves.
Edit – There’s also the fact, as Fatman pointed out, that the RAF is shrinking. A future which includes single seat F35s and UCAVs might persuade the RAF to take carrier air more seriously if they are actually going to provide the bulk of manpower in any “surge” like operation, or even just major exercises.
It’s interesting that TD talks about collapsing FAA/AAC resources into the RAF.
I came to this site over a year ago with the firm belief that the RAF had a structure and remit that was somehow intrinsically inefficient and unworkable. I was convinced that whilst the total disbandment of the RAF was an extreme measure, it would serve the defence needs of the country and the effectiveness of the Armed Forces far better to carve off sizeable lumps and hand them over to the FAA/ACC, so Chinook’s to the Army, F35 to the Royal Navy and so on.
Whilst I still think the RAF could do with a degree of infrastructure and personnel restructuring alongside some evaluation on the remit and doctrinal scope/practices of the entire Armed Forces I am increasingly coming round to the aforementioned point of view.
Regardless of preference, or bias or whatever you want to call it the fact is that (as Chris.B. pointed out) the RAF has a long-standing tradition and infrastructure which supports complex training, maintenance, upgrades, evaluation and active deployments that the Army and Royal Navy can’t hope to rival with the AAC and FAA, for the very simple reason (as someone recently pointed out) that they are support arms to they’re parent services, not independent air-forces.
I don’t think the way forwards is to disband or amalgamate either the RAF, AAC or FAA. However perhaps a solution when pondering the balance between the three is to define and then respect a line between those airframes that purely assist the parent service (so RN Merlin’s and Army Lynx’s) and those which have a more flexible, ‘strategic’ (for want of a better word) role and so belong with an independent RAF.
Just some thoughts on my current attitude to the whole debate. I have to add that of course defining the line between who is entitled to what is a whole other debate that deserves a lot of extra detailed discussion if the principle I discussed above was one that people could run with.
The issue of merging the RAF should always be discussed,, nothing is off limits and as Fatman says, there is nothing wrong with radical thinking when it comes to defence outputs for a given pound but the subject always boils down to a handful of questions
1.
Why, what is the fundamental question whose answer is no RAF
2.
If so, what benefits would accrue
3.
What savings would we make against what operational output and how much would it cost in the short term, so what is the ‘payback period’
4.
What is different now to when independent air forces were born and how would a modern nation without one avoid the same pitfalls that drove the creation of the RAF
For what it is worth, I can see the argument but keep coming back to the economies of scale issue, likelihood of parent services defunding air power and dangers of duplication at every level.
This makes me think we get better value by collapsing the AAC and FAA into the RAF rather than the other way around.
If Tesco’s bought Kwik Save and Somerfield, it would make sense to make them all Tesco rather than split the Tesco stores between Kwik Save and Somerfield
Fatman since you mentioned being a defence economist are you embedded within the treasury or Abbey Wood; are you inadvertently giving us the hot scoop on SDSR 2015 and force structures and capabilities? If so I expect giving away ‘secrets’ like a leaky sieve will have the rozzers round and with words like contravening, offcical, secrets, act, investigation, formal report and so forth?
Personally I have to agree with Jeremy M H. Your doomsday scenario just is not likely purely from an industrial economic point of view. Bae, Thales, Lockheed, Augusta Westland, Northrup, EADS, MBDA would all be lobbying vociferously to prevent that using words like site closure, realignment and so forth. Are you seriously saying after the governent, which has made a major song and dance about retaining key capabilities and increasing sales of technology and platforms, via export orders would kill the very high tech industry (jobs) that enables that and put yet more strain on the economy.
Especially as these companies are already laying off people, closing sites and co-locating in other areas due to the pre-existing cuts and draw down in procurement.
Or maybe the treasury and/or Abbey Wood are even dumber than I realised?
@ Fatman,
“I am not suggesting the UK is another Somalia, but this country is clearly in relative economic decline compared with many others ”
— Not really. The economy is stagnating to some degree, but many top economies are doing even worse (Spain, Italy, etc) and some have difficult times ahead when their growth bubbles finally burst (China – though their new administration is changing tack slightly to deal wih that). Relatively speaking we’re doing pretty well considering how badly the broad economy has been mishandled over the last 10 years.
“Well, all I can say is that if you look at the RAF of 1990 and its strength and compare it with 2013 you can easily see which way the trend is going”
— The forces of 1990 were shaped to counter a large threat. We spent more as a percentage of GDP on defence through those cold years than the US does on defence now. The removal, or at least withdrawl of that threat, has permitted reductions but now we’re sitting at around the NATO mandated minimum.
“The question is one of how much sense it makes in terms of the training and support establishment to run separate organisations for the services”
— You’ll still need to train pilots. You still need squadrons to organise the aircraft. You still need bases to house the aircraft and their crews. You still need the crews to operate the aircraft and keep them in service. You still need people to train those specialities. You still need experienced people to arrange and advise on the purchase of new equipment. You still need people to test and evaluate that equipment. In short, you save very, very little.
“What I find interesting is the aggressively negative psychological impact such a proposal generates from so many readers. This blog is supposed to deal with the future and the different ways in which defence may develop, but we seem to have an awful lot of dyed-in-the wool conservatives who think the UK is still living in a Cold War world where funding is plentiful and change is bad, bad, bad. Why is there so much reluctance to rationally discuss the possibility that we may have to get by with much smaller forces than in the past?”
— Because this has been disussed multiple times, and multiple times it always comes out the same way. There’s been people come here holding your view, very adamant that the navy and air force should be amalgamated, who have been convinced that it’s not viable.
Generally speaking when to go to a forum somewhere with an idea or question, it’s customary to have at least a cursory search through the site first to find out if your question has previously been asked/answered.
Now back to your list of aircraft. As Mark pointed out, Rivet Joint is not even in service yet and has a projected OSD past 2040, but you’ve written it off before 2030? Why? You’ve written off all the Typhoons, despite clear indications that we, as a nation, are keen to get the absolute most life out of equipment as we possibly can. And you’ve discarded the possibility of a replacement because… ? If all you do is buy 50 F-35 for home defence then you now have no carrier capability, which is unlikely. Current plans forsee aircraft for the carriers plus a Tornado replacement.
And yet, at the same time as casting those realities aside, you’ve plugged in 20-40 UAVs which at the minute is by no means anything more than a concept, with nothing like a firm order in place.
That’s why I find it hard to believe you’re a “defence economist”, because your answers seem to show little understanding of economics beyond what can be read in the papers, and little understanding of defence either.
Fatman
Rivet joint gone before 2030? I’m afraid you’ll have to explain that one, 2045 was the osd mentioned as they’re essentially now pooled with the US fleet.
I notice typhoon is also missing from your list odd considering the last wont be delivered till 2018 and much change to support contracts ect over the last 12 months have changed the dynamic some what. Even if typhoon is replaced by f35 the numbers will be higher than 40-50 and if finances are as bad as you suggest the simple answer is not to buy f35 at all.
@Fatman
Again you have stated what might happen if the UK simply stops purchasing tactical aircraft after buying its initial batch of F-35’s. That is well and good and certain possible. People have disagreed with you on that but not loudly.
What people have objected to is the idea that the RAF should be folded into the Army or the RN. Nothing in what you posted above really makes a relevant argument for doing so and you failed to address the key questions behind the issue you raised.
What is the benefit of getting rid of the RAF? If you just bolt its various parts onto the Army or Navy do you really save money?
I said the following in regards to this earlier.
“I don’t see any justification for folding the RAF into the RN (which I guess is marginally sensible on some level) or into the Army (which is bonkers). The application of modern air power is a very complicated activity that takes a lifetime of study to be proficient at. The USN gets away with it by having a large enough aviation component that they have their own institutional understanding of the subject (and in some areas have more expertise than the USAF).
Folding the RAF into another service would provide almost no benefit and a lot of headaches. You would either have to create a bunch of new officer positions to preserve the institutional capabilities and knowledge the RAF already has or risk losing it. If you create the necessary positions your net savings becomes very small indeed.”
You have not addressed the implied question or really explained what benefit you are seeking by folding the RAF into other services. Where are the cost savings? How are they going to be achieved? How much redundancy do you really see out there?
@Chris B et al
I don’t think you understand the difference between my personal preferences (that a reasonable size fast jet force be maintained) and what is actually being planned by a cash strapped MOD (which makes the question of retaining an independent air force worthy of discussion). I am afraid that searching on Google does not cut it in terms of serious understanding of issues such as OSDs and funding streams. The bottom line is that without political change and significant extra funding there is a distinct possibility that the RAF of 2032 will comprise around:
40-50 F-35B
20-40 Combat UAVs (Taranis or whatever)
14 Voyagers
8 C-17s
22 A400Ms
60 Chinooks
28 Hawk T2s
er, and that is just about it (excluding a few communications types) = about 192-222 airframes
There are no current procurement programmes or planned funding for a new maritime patrol aircraft, AWACS, ELINT (Rivet Joint will be gone well before 2030, believe me), light transports, or more Chinooks beyond the dozen on order. The Tucanos will be replaced by something like PC-9 or PC-21, but these aircraft will not belong to the RAF and may not even be operated in the training role by the Service (another PFI).
Even if new programmes were to be instituted we would I guess be looking at no more than:
10-12 P-3s
4-5 new AWACS
3 new ELINT
That takes effective RAF strength up to around 212-240 aircraft, plus any extra F-35s that might be procured (and the word might is very conditional.).
Some people think I am being unduly pessimistic. Well, all I can say is that if you look at the RAF of 1990 and its strength and compare it with 2013 you can easily see which way the trend is going. Galloping inflation in aircraft unit prices is another factor. I am not suggesting the UK is another Somalia, but this country is clearly in relative economic decline compared with many others and given scarce resources it is unlikely that rebuilding defence will be top of the agenda, barring a new Cold War. That may be unpalatable, but it is also true.
The short term solution to the F-35 issue is to dispose of the carriers, white elephants that they are, and switch to F-35A. This would be more affordable and could enable the UK to buy a greater number of aircraft. I suspect Brazil and India would be interested (and maybe China too…). At the moment the carrier requirements are distorting procurement and the shape of UK air power and naval forces, so let’s think about how to get rid of them.
Yes, of course it will be possible to maintain an independent air force of fewer than 250 aircraft. The question is one of how much sense it makes in terms of the training and support establishment to run separate organisations for the services. Which comes back to the original point I made of whether a RN-RAF amalgamation might make sense in a time of extended stringency.
What I find interesting is the aggressively negative psychological impact such a proposal generates from so many readers. This blog is supposed to deal with the future and the different ways in which defence may develop, but we seem to have an awful lot of dyed-in-the wool conservatives who think the UK is still living in a Cold War world where funding is plentiful and change is bad, bad, bad. Why is there so much reluctance to rationally discuss the possibility that we may have to get by with much smaller forces than in the past? Other countries have this problem too, and I suspect we may see some pretty radical and unexpected changes in the coming two decades, many of which would have been unthinkable even 5 years ago.
Now how about a rational and measured answer instead of the blah, blah, I can shout louder than you responses?