To start with, how about a moody picture of aType 23, HMS Westminster, to set the scene
https://www.flickr.com/photos/73614187@N03/7247932114/
Then ask yourself if this is a proper use of probably the world’s most effective anti-submarine frigate and definitely the world’s most effective anti submarine helicopter.
Hold that thought!
As with many future programmes, there is a steady drip drip of information, snippets here and there but not really a great deal of solid information. This should be expected, the project is pre main gate and the final design will not be known for some time. I do have a sneaky suspicion that the information is deliberately released in small tantalising pieces to sustain the online ‘marketing buzz’ rather than to inform any serious debate and have long since stopped commenting on every new blurry video or vague interview, will leave that for others.
Discussion on the previous F35 post veered off into Type 26 territory and whilst in general, I quite like thread creep; it seems about right to do a post on the Type 26.
Start from the Beginning
The beginning of the conversation should start with a look at future risks, tasks and high level means of meeting those tasks and addressing those risks.
The Royal Navy has a requirement for major surface combatants in order to contribute to the national security requirement. Now of course, we might have a discussion about what the armed forces as a whole need to do, how they can address UK strategic objectives and indeed, what those strategic objectives are but that is for another discussion.
Are those strategic needs best met by a cross Saudi Arabia gas pipeline, shale gas exploitation in Blackpool or sending a powerful RN task force to the Gulf of whatever it is called these days are interesting conversations, but for the purpose of this post, lets simply assume that we need a broad set of military capabilities and that includes fighty ships.
We have the Type 45 Destroyers which primarily address the area air defence requirement and the Type 23 might be reasonably characterised as being focused on addresses the threat from under the water and on it.
Many acknowledge that the Type 23 (and not forgetting her crew) is the most potent ASW system anywhere in the world so why change a winning mix?
One thing I do find rather frustrating in these discussions is how one sided they can become, many proponents of a ‘stronger navy’ are quick to relegate the Challenger tank to the TA and slash their number despite them being of continued and demonstrable utility in recent operations, or condemning the Tornado as being a Cold War anachronism despite it being used in every conflict to great effect since the end of the Cold War yet holding the Royal Navy at their pre-eminent Cold War position in the world of anti-submarine warfare is taken as a given.
One might suggest that given the Royal Navy has not faced a credible submarine threat (the Santa Fe doesn’t count) for many decades is an indication about the utility of such capabilities. We have devoted vast sums on the anti-submarine mission but if ones asks if continuing to do so is wise, they look at you as if you have just farted in the presence of Her Majesty whilst malleting a baby seal cub.
[Edit: Jonesy (in comments) made a good point about the Argentine Navy San Luis submarine being a credible threat, fair one, as they say]
We must therefore ask with the same level of rigour that they direct at Tornados and Challengers of the Type 23 and ultimately, the Type 26.
What threat would a Type 26 act against?
On this subject I think we need to think not so much about threats today but potential threats over the next twenty to thirty years. We all understand how a small number of Royal Navy submarines effectively neutered the entire Argentine surface fleet in 1982, submarines have a hugely disproportionate effect, in short, are the most effective sea denial weapon in existence.
Given our defence posture is generally of an expeditionary nature, or fighting in other people’s back yards so we don’t have to do so in our own, we need to consider access denial, or enemy forces stopping us going to where we want to.
Mines, submarines and anti-ship missiles launched from land or the near shore are the most effective means of denying access. We already have an effective MCM capability and to counter anti-ship missiles we have a range of offensive and defensive options so submarines should be considered equally.
One thing is certain, the technology of submarines, especially propulsion, is advancing rapidly and this advancing technology is proliferating equally as rapidly so the threat is both real today and increasingly real tomorrow.
Modern SSK’s have extremely low thermal, magnetic and acoustic signatures, using fuel cells and high capacity batteries reduces vibration to almost zero, slow speed propellers that turn at less than 20 revolutions per minute, small size, extremely precise maneuverability that allows them to exploit sea bottom topography and even shipwrecks to hide among and hull shaping and coatings to reduce sonar returns makes them one of the most difficult threats to counter.
I am not actually sure of the threat of modern submarines and the impact of modern technology is truly appreciated by many.
So if the submarine is a serious threat, and it is, then we need to be serious about countering it.
A secondary, but not by much, role for the Type 26 is surface/land attack and in some missions will be its primary role and might be fulfilled in a hostile environment.
Design Philosophy
Quite simply, the Type 23 Frigates are approaching the end of their planned service life but could we extend their life would be my first question.
We see life extension programmes across many defence equipments and we are poorer than a church mouse who has just taken out a payday loan.
We also have many other pulls on the finite defence Pound.
If this is not feasible then fair enough, there may be many engineering, stability, spares availability and operating cost reasons why it makes sense to procure new ships with the latest components and automation systems that reduce manning
We have of course contracted with BAE to carry out the initial design studies for Type 26 so this question of extended the Type 23’s seems moot, but hey, why not?
With the caveat that we don’t actually know what the final design will look like, there are many that accuse the Type 26 of pouring old wine into new bottles, very little innovation and no imagination
Given that we are migrating most of the combat relevant systems from the Type 23, the Type 26 will not be a step change in operating capabilities like the Type 45 was compared to the Type 42, it is an opinion that is easy to find sympathy with.
My opinion on this, as you might anticipate, is that taking this low risk approach makes a lot of sense.
If the MoD is to regain financial credibility and start delivering on what it promises, reducing risk and adopting an evolutionary rather than revolutionary approach seems wholly sensible and if the new wine bottle has growth room and low maintenance costs even better.
The second question would be what can be reused from the Type 45 and CVF design and build process.
The idea of a Batch 2 Type 45 sans Sea Viper does have some appeal, maximising commonality and reducing design and operating costs across the RN surface fleet as a whole but I think the time to grasp this opportunity has passed and many make the point that the design of the Type 45 is sub optimal for the ASW mission, so much so that cost and commonality benefits would be outweighed by operational compromise.
Seems reasonable
An ASW optimised Type 45 Batch 2 might actually end up being a new design anyway so we should concentrate on optimising the Type 26 for the mission, not shoehorning that mission into an unsuitable design. We could still take advantage of many of the sub systems in Type 45 and I would expect this to be the norm in any case. If, for example, accommodation or internal communications systems are not common between the two designs then we should be asking why bloody not.
Many benefits accrue from this type of sub system commonality; even having the same deep fat fryers (chips, for the use of) saves money across the fleet maintenance budget.
The final issue to address before we get to the slide rule is to ask that eternally unanswerable question, multi role or specialised?
Although by definition, all modern warships are multi role it has been Royal Navy practice to flex designs towards specialism.
One argument says that in an age of reducing hull numbers we simply cannot afford to have specialists and a single batch of multi role ‘universal escorts’ should be our goal but there is a competing argument that says the exact opposite, instead, we must leverage our technology advantages to the maximum and make each class of ship the very best they can be at their primary role, this means divergent design and specifications.
The Type 45 is a good example of the latter, at the expense of ASW and surface attack they are single mindedly focussed on AAW.
Driving the desire for multi role vessels is the simple fact that for the majority of their time, those primary roles will remain largely unused. The Type 45 might conduct any number of missions for which the Sea Viper and associated systems are totally overkill, thus creating the impression of expensive gold plating. By so called gold plating we pay the penalty in hull numbers and limitations in the ability to deliver the 90% of day to day requirements that are predicated on actually having a hull in any location.
The argument that it is easier for a Type 45 to conduct an anti-piracy mission than it is for an anti-piracy corvette to conduct an area air defence mission is well made but this assumes that we live in a land of unlimited funding.
[Edit: APATS (in comments) corrected this in so much that an anti piracy corvette cannot do the area AAW role at all, not a case of better or worse, another fair point]
It is one of those endless circular arguments but my opinion, for what it is worth, is that it is better to rely on our hard won qualitative advantages even at the expense of lower quantities. This means, in practice, that I would sacrifice quantity for quality to such a degree that it provides a smaller but high end core and enough funding for proper low end capabilities for those 90% of times when we don’t need to hunt submarines or down Mig 29’s.
A two tier fleet in other words with a wide disparity between the two, so no C1 and C2 in old money and no ASW/GP split in the latest Type 26 discussions.
When we actually need it, and one day we will, I want the ASW capabilities of the RN to be tip top, even if that means a lower quantity and accepting the operational and defence planning scale limitations that this results in.
If we look at how a Type 26 might be deployed across a range of standing and contingent commitments it should be obvious that the majority of them will be as singletons and not needing those ASW capabilities or Sea Ceptor. Using the standing tasks to define hull numbers of top end ships seems a poor justification and short sighted.
The top end vessel numbers should be based on realistic operational assumptions where those operations will actually make use of the full breadth of those very expensive capabilities, not on how many times a year we should be using them for smuggling interdiction and disaster relief.
An opposing view is that hull numbers are the most important consideration, capabilities can be sacrificed and the fitted for but not with approach to hoping for future improvements can eventually deliver both quality and quantity.
It is an equally valid approach.
One of my previous suggestions for all three services was the ‘capability plus’ model that sees a wide spectrum of high end capabilities maintained, but crucially at a scale that is appropriate for those high end capabilities and achievable, not the hum drum of day to day ‘less than war’ commitments for which they are gold plated.
It is that well-worn cliché about going to the shops in a Ferrari every day when you only go racing once a decade. I still want the ability to win that race though, but financial reality means I might have to accept trade-offs. So, a small but very hard core surrounded by selected capabilities that provide influence in coalition operations and utility in the most likely kinds of operations we tend to find ourselves in.
The Royal Navy has a unique perspective on what many call gold plating when compared with the proud owners of MEKO’s, FREMM’s etc and that is it has actually learned these lessons the hard way in recent memory, it is this that has driven the uniquely high specification of the Type 45 and should equally drive the same specification of the Type 26 because the likelihood is that the Royal Navy will likely use them in action, and the others won’t.
This may be a harsh viewpoint but still I think valid.
We should therefore have a no compromise attitude to capabilities.
In summary, a top end Type 26 design, optimised for ASW and surface attack, sacrificing numbers if needed in order to fund more numerous but lower end vessels and other capabilities. This lower end, at least for me, does not mean another Type 26 with no Sonar 2087 but a genuinely low end and cheap Ford Transit type vessel, for example, those Black Swan, Venator, SIMSS type concepts we have been discussing.
Therefore, I would like the design of the Type 26 to concentrate laser like on its…
[/BULLSHIT ALERT ON]
War fighting capabilities
[/BULLSHIT ALERT OFF]
Might have to go outside and have a word with myself now.
And very definitely not how many ISO containers it can carry on its flex deck for humanitarian supplies. (did I really just say that!)
Industry
The contract for the Assessment Phase of the Type 26 was for four years at a cost of £127 million. I must admit to having some trouble with the length of time and cost for this, assuming the low ambition and high degree of reuse from the Type 23/45 but if it produces a stable design that enables production to commence at a reasonable cost then who am I to argue!
People might look at other nation’s designs like the SIGMA, MEKO or FREMM for example and wonder why we can’t just buy from them but it is the government’s industrial policy to retain onshore the ability to design and manufacture complex warships with complex weapons.
This means BAE will be designing and building the Type 26 whether anyone likes it or not and because of the advantages of onshore design and build feeding money back into the economy they might not seem as expensive as imagined.
Whether Type 26 will actually find partner nations or overseas customers in such a crowded and well provisioned market is debatable. India and Brazil have been mooted as potential partners rather than simple export customers but instead of the whole ship, I tend to think we should concentrate on the export potential for sub systems like weapons, propulsion, combat management systems, sensors and countermeasures but we will see how the export potential of Type 26 plays out.
We also have the 15 year Terms of Business Agreementwith BAE to consider, the build rate and location might dictate the overall cost, capability and quantity mix.
Systems
Once we have decided to build the ships we must look at systems and as usual, a complex mix of requirements and trade-offs will need to be considered.
Propulsion, Hull and Engineering
The ASW mission influences the hull design and means of propulsion, the ability to tow a sonar array and carry out ‘sprint and drift’ with a low acoustic signature is essential to anti-submarine warfare. Whether this will continue to be the preferred tactic or off-board meshed sensors carried on UAV’s will become the preferred option in the future might inform discussion, but in the timescales that the Type 26 design must be finalised i.e. now (or even a few months ago), those traditional concepts will still be relevant.
There are many variations on a theme when it comes to propulsion systems and modern developments provide even greater options, LNG and fuel cells anyone?
The Type 45 design required a significant investment in propulsion and power generation and we would be silly not to leverage that investment, even if the electric propulsion system of the Type 45 is not completely suitable for the Type 26. CODLOG stands for Combined Diesel Electric or Gas, the diesel is used to power an electrical generator with the turbine being used to provide increased levels of power for high speed sprinting. The propellers are then driven by electric motors, themselves powered by the diesels or gas turbines through generators.
The Intercooled and Recuperated (ICR) WR-21 is based on RB-211 and Trent technology and is designed to provide high levels of economy at part loads, in comparison with other turbines which are inefficient at anything less than full load. The cost of the WR-21’s and associated machinery was £84 million for all 6 Type 45’s. Click here for a detailed document on integration details for the WR-21, very interesting reading for people like me who don’t have a clue!
By using the Rolls Royce WR-21 turbine, the same as the Type 45, we can provision a simple extension to the recently signed 6 year £20m support contract that uses the Class Output Management approach, or contracting for availability.
The higher power (36kW instead of 25kW) Rolls Royce MT-30 turbine, based on the Trent, will be used in CVF. If we went for the MT-30 then it would equally make sense to combine the support arrangements with CVF.
Either option provides commonality benefits, very neat.
Rolls Royce are developing a more compact variant of the MT-30 and some reports indicate that this combined with 2 MTU diesels will be the preferred option for Type 26, although the final configuration remains unclear, as much of the Type 26 is.
The South African Navy’s A-200 Meko ships have an interesting propulsion concept called CODAG-WARP, this stands for Combined Diesel and Gas – Water jet And Refined Propeller. A pair of 6,000kW MTU diesel engines drive two controllable pitch propellers through a combining gearbox and should high speed be needed, a GE LM 25000 turbine kicks in and powers a waterjet style propulsor. It is quite a simple system and has a reasonable degree of resilience because any one of the diesel engines can power both props. Other configurations might see each diesel only driving one shaft and therefore eliminating the need for a complex gearbox that combines the output from the two engines, reducing complexity and cost even more. Further enhancements to the propulsor/waterjet design such as injecting compressed gas into the flow might offer significant thrust increases without additional power requirements.
http://youtu.be/4slDVLHtG1w
Power cells, hybrid diesel/LNG and high performance batteries are rapidly maturing, driven by the need to reduce fuel consumption in large commercial ships. It might be a step to far for the Type 26 but in an all-electric integrated propulsion set up that has the ability to drive conventional fixed or variable pitch propellers, azipods, waterjets or any combination thereof using either LNG/diesel engines, gas turbines, fuel cells or even batteries makes for an interesting proposition. The noise disadvantages of azipods and waterjets might rule them out of a Type 26 design though, with a conventional pair of fixed pitch propellers offering the best solution and whether operating on batteries or zero vibration fuel cells would offer appreciable external noise reduction over any other power source is again, open for debate.
Wartisla have an interesting brochure on naval propulsion including the WARP system mentioned above, click hereto have a read and another on reducing noise here.
Many horses for many courses here but the balancing act between economy, straight out performance and acoustic signature should be skewed to combat performance in its primary ASW role.
This is not to say fuel economy is unimportant and there are many ways of reducing fuel use ranging from hull coatings to transom flaps, specifying energy efficient lighting or low power electronic equipment but these should not be allowed to compromise combat capabilities.
One factor that is inescapable is the rising cost of people so any new design should utilise the maximum level of automation to reduce the number of crew, within the bounds of maintaining sensible levels of resilience and workload. Modern systems also have reduced maintenance requirements and this should also both reduce crew numbers and maintenance cost.
Boat deck, mission deck or flex deck, take your pick. This should be a large component of the design, not I hasten to add, so we can carry humanitarian supplies or go all multi-role, but to accommodate future unmanned surface and sub-surface vessels in support of the primary mission.
Whether this is underneath the flight deck or more central on the superstructure is a detailed point but for the intended role, not sure it makes a great deal of difference either way.
One factor we should expect from a new design is that of signature reduction and/or management. One would imagine a great deal of work will have gone into this aspect of the new design.
Sensors and Systems
Having invested so much money in BAE/QinetiQ ARTISAN Type 997 3D E/F-band radar and other electro optical and ESM systems across the Type 45 and Type 23 it would seem basic common sense to fit them to the Type 26. One might argue the finer points of performance between one radar system or another but the simple fact is, those arguments are moot, click here for a datasheet.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cl9JmItkR-A
The Thales integrated mast concept is said to provide a number of benefits and I think it would be worthy of serious consideration for the Type 26.
Sonar 2087 is a very high specification Low Frequency Active Sonar (LFAS) fitted to 8 of the Type 23’s. Although it was primarily designed for blue water operation it still has a great deal of utility on the Type 26, despite the increasing trend towards operations in shallower waters.
https://www.flickr.com/photos/73614187@N03/7247932906/
Detection in shallow waters is a problem because underwater obstacles might prevent the safe deployment of long towed arrays, fresh/sea water mixes, tidal impacts on water conditions, unpredictable and variable salinity/temperature, reflections from the sea bed and underwater obstacles and even concerns about underwater wildlife may limit the use of low frequency devices. Ambient and directional noise from manmade and natural sources also confuses the overall acoustic picture.
Because of the smaller areas involved accurate sea bed surveys and sediment analysis, sometimes called Rapid Environmental Assessments can be used for ASW. This kind of technology and processes are more often used for survey and mine countermeasures but research continues at a pace and one capability may very well utilise another. We might see the kinds of USV’s now routinely used for covert survey and seabed analysis carried aboard a Type 26 in the future. Other promising research avenues include exploiting so called ‘non-cooperative’ sound sources of opportunity, other ships that just happen to be in the area for example. The returns from these can be passively received into the detection and analysis software, cunning eh.
To cover the shallow water detection requirement active dipping sonars from a Merlin helicopter and hull mounted high frequency sonars seem to be the way to go for the short term although the subject is a fiendishly complex one, real science.
In the future, these higher frequency systems may be operated from unmanned surface vessels or even helicopter type UAV’s with sensor information relayed back to the Type 26 or an airborne Merlin.
The hull mounted Type 2050 sonar on the Type 23’s has a long and complex history but the base product is now part of the Thales UMS 4110 family and utilises much of the processing and display console systems as the CAPTAS 4 or 2087.
There is also potential for small unmanned aircraft able to use thermal, radar or even engine particulate detectors to contribute to the ASW mission and I will cover these in the aviation section, later.
The same Increment F COBLU CESMsystem as installed on the Type 45 would be another desirable equipment fit and the same, or modernised, broad range of communications, electronics and data link equipment as fitted to the Type 45/23 including the recently announced UAT upgrade.
DNA(2) combat management system as fitted to the Type 23’s, yet again, seems an obvious candidate for a simple transfer as long as it can make use of modern, adapted off the shelf, computing equipment.
Most of the sensors on Type 26 will therefore be from existing programmes, either direct transfer of equipment from the Type 23’s or more of the same from other vessels.
There may be opportunities for modest incremental upgrades and a technology refresh, making greater use of modern computing systems for example, but in general, a sensible and evolutionary approach, building upon investments already made.
Countermeasures
Countermeasures are not often discussed but are advancing all the time.
There are many military off the shelf systems from Rheinmetall and Terma. The most common is the SeaGnat decoy system which uses what might be described as a mortar to fire a range of IR, Chaff and Active Decoy rounds to confuse and seduce incoming missiles.
Chemring manufacture the NATO Standard Chaff round but also produce a newer range of slightly larger rounds including IRand RFrounds. To support increasingly larger decoy payloads they have also created an oversize round that still uses the 130mm form factor called the Large Payload Carrier.
Type 23 frigates also use the BAe SIRENso again, a straight transfer might be the most appropriate solution.
Instead of using the traditional fixed tube launchers Chemring have recently developed the Centurion trainable launcher that can carry 12 130mm rounds.
The Airborne Systems IDS300 inflatable RF decoy as fitted to Type 45 Destroyers could also be fitted.
Short range protection against torpedoes could be provided by the Ultra Sonar S2170 Sea Sentor Surface Ship Torpedo Defence System that comprises an acoustic passive towed array, towed acoustic countermeasure, single-drum winch, processing cabinet, display consoles, 2 expendable acoustic device launchers and 16 expendable acoustic devices.
It is an impressive system and in already service with the Royal Navy.
Close in Weapons
Beyond the manually aimed automatic weapons a modest upgrade path might include deck mounted remotely aimed medium calibre weapons like the MSI 30mm systems currently fitted to many RN vessels.
MSI Defence has also developed the Seahawk SIGMA, a remote controlled system that mounts a 30mm ATK Bushmaster cannon and a 7 cell launcher for the Thales Lightweight Multirole Missile. It is a compact, relatively low cost mount, already in service (in its basic form without missiles) with the Royal Navy and appropriate in terms of firepower.
https://www.flickr.com/photos/73614187@N03/6998243650/
Although the effectiveness of the Phalanx CIWS has been called into question, as part of a layered air defence system, combined with countermeasures and the Sea Ceptor it should hopefully provide sufficient protection and easily transferred from the vessels going out of service. It also has an upgrade path to SeaRAM and even future directed energy weapons, using the same basic, non deck penetrating mount.
The latest video snippets on Type 26 show them mounted between the Sea Ceptor missiles and main gun and on the roof of the hangar.
If space can be found for the lightweight Stingray torpedo great, but not sure of it is necessarily a vital system given the range of other weapons available, looks good for Top Trumps though!
Anti-Air
The Type 23’s Sea Wolf missiles will start the upgrade path to Sea Ceptor before the Type 26 build process and Sea Ceptor will also be fitted to Type 26.
A number of silo arrangements are possible, using a Sea Ceptor specific design or quad packing in Sylver silos, multiple versions have appeared in the various marketing videos released so far.
Although using them in Sylver silos might make sense from a commonality perspective this would come down to a straight cost comparison, especially given that on a Type 26, the silos will likely be used exclusively for Sea Ceptor.
The simple dedicated silo arrangement might make more sense.
Surface and Land Attack
Surface and land attack should be the main secondary mission for the Type 26.
The Future Maritime Fires Concept Phase is due to complete in around mid 2012 so no doubt the lessons from Libya will play a large part in informing the study. With the cancelling of the BAe 155mm TMF project the choice of a naval gun has narrowed but there are also missile and UAV delivered systems worthy of consideration.
Question
Julian Lewis (New Forest East, Conservative)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what his policy is on the replacement of existing warship guns by ones of 155mm; and if he will make a statement on his policy, with special reference to (a) the future frigate fleet and (b) Type 45 destroyers.
Answer
Peter Luff (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Defence Equipment, Support and Technology), Defence; Mid Worcestershire, Conservative)
No decision on the calibre of the new Maritime Indirect Fire System (the new naval gun) has yet been made. This will be taken when work to consider the available options under the Future Maritime Fires Concept Phase is complete in around mid-2012.
Guns
The Maritime Fires Concept, of which the Maritime Indirect Fire System (MIFS) is part, is being delivered in conjunction with the Niteworks Partnership and is expected to be met by a medium calibre gun (MCG). The other part of MFS is the Maritime Indirect Fire Precision Attack (MIFPA) is expected to be delivered using missile systems, potentially Fire Shadow.
Moving away from the 4.5” Mk8 main gun is attractive but it is not an automatic decision, with barrel wear, maintenance costs, commonality with the Type 45 and ammunition stocks for the Mk8 all be considered before looking at the inducements on offer from others.
Naval Gunfire Support has a great deal of utility and used much more often that many of the more esoteric systems, the Falklands, Iraq and Libya being recent outings; it is much cheaper than using air delivered munitions if circumstances permit and can use a graduated force model where a well aimed smoke or illumination round that signals loud and clear the next one will be of the type that goes bang can influence subsequent activity or neutralise threats both on land and at sea.
The existing 115mm/4.5” Mark 8 Mod 1 gun aboard Royal Navy vessels has its origins in the late sixties and has given excellent service but how reliable they are now apparently an open question. The HE Extended Range round uses base bleed to propel the round to a maximum range of 27.5km and the existing illumination nature is also still available. In order to maintain a sustained rate of fire of 16-20 rounds per minute and accommodate the more powerful ammunition types the barrel is 62 calibres long. It has seen extensive service including action off the Falkland Islands (8,000 rounds), Iraq and Libya.
As we know though, there is not a large installed base on which to spread development costs of precision, proximity and IR illumination or smoke natures so the open market seems an obvious place to look, especially given the 155mm TMF concept has now been cancelled.
There are a number of options but probably only two realistic ones, the BAE 5” Mark 45 and the Oto Melara 127mm Compact and Lightweight.
The Mark 45 Mod 4 from BAE, as used by the US Navy, South Korea, Denmark, Australia and others, is a 5”/127mm system with a 62 calibre barrel and is capable of a rate of fire up to 20 rounds per minute.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QpXjshw_eT8
The Oto Melara system comes in a Compact form and the newer Lightweightversion with a 64 calibre barrel.
In 2010 Babcock and Oto Melara signed a Memorandum of Understanding to offer the Light Weight Medium Calibre Gun System to the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) for the Type 26 frigate.
To quote the sales blurb;
The Oto Melara 127/64 LW gun is capable of firing up to 35 rounds per minute. The production turret weighs less than 29 tons and the ‘peppered’ muzzle brake with an aluminium shield keeps cost down, improves maintenance and reduces radar cross-section. The gun uses an advanced ammunition handling system, consisting of four revolving drum magazines holding 56 ready-to-fire rounds of more than four different types, allowing flexibility in ammunition selection and a high rate of sustained fire. It is capable of anti-surface and anti-air defence, and area engagement. The new Vulcano ammunition is capable of precision engagement at ranges previously only achievable by missile systems but at a fraction of the cost.
Very impressive.
After many years of very expensive trials the US Extended Range Guided Munition was cancelled, leaving the USN without precision gun launched land attack round but Oto Melara have continued to persevere and have introduced the Vulcano range of munitions.
Vulcano has both an extended range unguided and long range guided nature that is used with the 127mm gun to deliver rounds out to 120km.
The Type 26 doesn’t necessarily need the precision guided ammunition straight away, it would provide a simple upgrade path and despite doubts about the explosive content of guided shells it would still offer a significant upgrade, have the potential to reduce the need (therefore cost) for air delivered precision munitions and allow the Royal Navy to take advantage of a mature user base.
Missiles
When we discuss missiles for the Type 26 many people automatically assume that it should include Tomahawk and whilst having diversity of launch platform is always ‘a good thing’ it would take up a lot of space and add significant cost as we would need to introduce the US Mk 41 vertical launch silo.
I am not sold on the idea of Tomahawk on Type 26 for that reason.
A post Libya Jane’s Defence Weekly reported on a Royal Navy lessons learned document in which the two major shortcomings were a lack of precision land attack capability and organic unmanned ISR.
It quoted Colonel Pierson RM, the Deputy Director of NATO Operations in Libya;
It was evident that the Libya campaign showed the need for precision fires, [perhaps the Lockheed Martin] Guided Multiple Rocket Launch System (GMLRS), from the sea base, deep into enemy littoral territory.
He added that there was a requirement on RN Warships for;
Unmanned intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), such as the brilliant live feed, full motion video provided by [Boeing] Scan Eagle unmanned aerial vehicle
More on this last one later.
Complimenting a large calibre main gun could be the Harpoon missiles transferred from the Type 23’s or even a purchase of the Naval Strike Missile from Kongsberg. This will also be integrated onto the F35 so commonality benefits could be realised if we chose to purchase it for the F35’s, unlikely, but it is an option.
With a 150km range the NSM weighs 400Kg with a 125kg warhead and can attack a mix of land and surface targets. This would also have the added benefit of being integrated onto the F35 for commonality all round. The Stand Off Land Attack Missile, based on the Harpoon is another option.
Another system that is likely to be a shoe in is the Team Complex Weapons Fire Shadow that is a difficult system to characterise, half missile and half UAV it is called a loitering munition.
I tend to think that Fireshadow makes a lot more sense in a maritime environment than it does on land.
If we really want to spend a fortune the CVS401 Perseus concept missile from MBDA will also provide plenty of options, potentially replacing Storm Shadow, cue an enormous bun fight between the RAF and RN.
The latest video from BAE seems to have deleted the Harpoon missile fit from previous incarnations but if a simple empty space for future missile armament like that found on the Absalon be incorporated into the Type 26 design it would provide a simple means of improving the attack capability of the Type 26.
https://www.flickr.com/photos/73614187@N03/7247932778/
If we do end up upgrading to the 127mm gun from Oto Melara we have the potential for precision engagement out to 70km with a potential to extend that to 120km although sacrificing explosive content. The Fire Shadow again provides a measure of precision engagement out to about 150km at a low cost and the NSM to the same range but with different utility for different targets and a higher cost.
It could be argued that this is enough and integration of either the NSM or FireShadow would not present insurmountable problems because they are both compact and relatively lightweight.
I still like the concept of a maritime version of GMLRS/ATACMS as mentioned by Col Pierson RM, above, for precision fire out to 300km with a large payload but this seems a remote possibility and we wouldn’t want to be pissing on Storm Shadow/CVF/JCA’s chips now would we?
A maritime MRLS/GMLRS is not a new concept, the US Navy initiated a study into something similar called the Precision Over the horizon Land Attack Rocket (POLAR) that used the MRLS rocket as its base, although the motor was nearly a third larger. This was cancelled in favour of the Land Attack Standard Missile that was also itself, subsequently cancelled.
300km, or 160nm circles are below, just as a random illustration of range, don’t read too much into the centre of the circles, they are just examples.
What was that about 90% of the world’s population living within 10 miles of the coast again?
A single podded launcher able to launch 70/150/300km precision land attack weapons would offer a genuine step change in capabilities and although I tend to avoid predicting development costs, it would not seem to be hugely expensive because they would be in lightweight sealed canisters, reuse completely existing rockets with only the engineering challenges of moderate stabilisation and exhaust management issues to resolve.
There may be simple design rather than engineering answers to some of these or simply accepting compromises. Instead of reloading at sea, accept that it is an alongside task, instead of expensively making everything corrosion resistant, design in semi protected components and accept a higher frequency of replacement and instead of creating a complex exhaust gas management system or replacing the propellant design the system so that it can only be fired at right angles to the axis of the ship thus facilitating exhaust management.
What is certain is that a naval GMLRS would be invaluable, potent, have some degree of commonality with land forces and be relatively low cost.
What is even more intriguing is that should we be able to integrate a GMLRS launcher aboard an RN vessel open up the possibility of using the same launcher for the 300km BROACH warhead variant, ATACMS, 1 per pod.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SjzvNo7bmt0
IMI also make the 150km EXTRA rocket that fits two to a G/MLRS pod or the 180km DELILAH.
Standing 25km offshore (with that indefinite poise thing) a ship launched ATACMS would be able to attack targets up to 275km inshore.
If I could choose one development item for the Type 26, this would be it.
Not going to happen though, is it?
Over the horizon targeting does not necessarily have to be organic to the ship although that would be extremely useful, will cover it in the next section.
Aviation
If the design could accommodate a hangar for two Merlin’s that should be a no brainer, of course, a compromise design for a Wildcat and Merlin or a Wildcat and couple of unmanned aircraft might be equally flexible but all things being equal, the larger the hangar the better.
Helicopters and UAV’s provide the full range of utility, ISR and offensive capabilities.
Merlin HM2 will be the normal embarked helicopter but Wildcat or other types might be carried as needed.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NR-hlPPBfws
Retaining the Type 45’s ability to accommodate a Chinook on the flight deck should be retained.
Merlin HM2 is an incredibly powerful system and perfectly suited to the ASW mission but it might be equally sensible not to carry any at all and use the space for Wildcat, retaining flexibility is the key.
Stingray lightweight torpedoes and the Lightweight Multirole Missile plus automatic weapons complete the armament for the Type 26
A few different configurations have been shown for the LMM on Wildcat, either 5 or 7 tube launchers.
https://www.flickr.com/photos/73614187@N03/7127422829/
The ability to extend the sensor reach beyond the horizon is of obvious benefit and usually this would be carried out by a frigate or destroyers helicopter but when there is a threat from surface fire, helicopters become more difficult to deploy so many solutions exists for deploying sensors (and sometimes weapons) using unmanned systems.
It is depressing to think that the Royal Navy has been so slow to unmanned party, the reasons are of course largely financial but despite testing a number of systems like the Insitu Scan Eagle several years ago nothing has been introduced into service.
One might assume that an unmanned air vehicle operating from a ship must be vertical take-off and landing, like a helicopter, but that is not necessarily the case although the emerging VTUAS requirement would seem to dictate a vertical take-off and landing solution. The initial target date seems to be around the 2020 to 2024 mark, incredible given the range of low cost off the shelf solutions available and obvious need now.
The debate seems to be whether to opt for something that is just used for ISR or a system that offers a greater payload for weapons or even stores.
Greater payload generally means shorter endurance and range so there is a balance to be struck. Whilst carriage of larger payloads may be useful, to match the endurance of the smaller ISR systems would mean multiple vehicles, increasing cost and of course, most ships are not overflowing with space and the Type 26 will be no exception
A few options from the sweet shop;
Schiebel Camcopter
Similar to Skeldar, the Camcopter S-100 from Scheibel has an hour longer endurance than Skeldar at 6 hours and can carry a range of sensor and communication payloads weighing 34kg in total. An external fuel tank can also be fitted to extend endurance to 10 hours.
It has also been shown armed with a single Lightweight Multirole Missile from Thales.
Gizmag wrote a good article last year on the Camcopter in which they describe the cost of a two air vehicle system complete with control station, payload, ground equipment, logistics package and training to be in the order of $2m.
The Camcopter is in service with the UAE, being introduced into German naval service, has been demonstrated from a French Gowind class offshore patrol vessel and Libya also ordered 4 systems in 2009, wonder where they are now!
Click here to read the brochure which includes an interesting picture of the Camcopter being used to drop leaflets.
Saab Skeldar
The Saab Skeldar V-200 is the latest version of the Skeldar rotary wing UAV in both land and maritime variants. Although having a much shorter endurance than the ScanEagle the advantages of VTOL and hover in flight are obvious.
Saab have also demonstrated the Skeldar operating from a CB90 which highlights an interesting combination of smaller patrol craft operating at distance from the host vessel and extending their ISTAR reach even further.
The maritime version has a 40kg payload, an endurance of 5 to 7 hours and uses a diesel engine, important for ship safety reasons.
The Skeldar has an interesting ISO Container system that houses the air vehicle, all maintenance equipment and spares and can be configured to have a roof mounted landing and take off platform so the whole system can be easily hosted aboard a variety of vessels and transferred just as easily.
Firescout
The Northrop Grumman MQ-8B is a mature vertical take off and landing unmanned system with a long development background and proven deployment credentials with US forces. Developed from the Schweizer 333 it is a much larger aircraft than the Camcopter or Skeldar as shown by a comparison of payloads, for short missions the Firescout can lift over 300kg. Normal endurance is between 5 and 8 hours.
One was lost over Libya though.
Its stub wings also allow the carriage of a variety of missiles such as Hellfire or guided 70mm rockets.
Click here for brochures.
Hummingbird
Although still a rotary winged UAV the Boeing Hummingbird is very different from the others and arguably, much more cutting edge. Its unique propulsion system allows the rotor speed to be varied and this provides advantages in altitude and endurance, where it can operate at 15,000 feet for in excess of 20 hours carrying a payload of up to 130kg.
httpv://youtu.be/KaIr7k33Mo8
The Hummingbird was tested with the FOliage penetrating REconnaissance, Surveillance, Tracking and Engagement Radar (FORESTER) system, click here for an in depth article, although it had a few problems in Belize
Moving beyond Gorgon Stare is the DARPA sponsored ARGUS-IS project being developed by BAe.
This ambitious programme will create a 1.8 Gigapixel camera system able to cover a 40 km2 area at 15 frames per second from an A160 Hummingbird or Reaper UAV. To process this enormous data volume it will use an airborne processing system to deliver up to 65 windows that users can zoom into or out of on demand. The software makes the difference; its advanced target recognition algorithms provide movement detection and target tracking.
Other payloads might include the ubiquitous EO sensor pod, SAR or multiples of the same.
It is ARGUS that has been in the news recently with a planned deployment to Afghanistan very soon.
If one compares the Hummingbird with the Fire Scout, the former can fly higher and longer but carry less.
Boeing Insitu Scan Eagle
The ScanEagle has an interesting history, initially introduced in 2001 to assist tuna fishing fleets it has evolved into a mature, low cost, flexible and highly effective family of vehicles and payloads. A few months ago it notched up its half million flying hours milestone.
In Libya the Scan Eagle demonstrated its capabilities and after, Insitu released a press release
“What happened over that period of time, no one expected,” says ScanEagle Detachment Officer in Charge Lt. Nick Townsend. “ScanEagle was locating contacts of interest that no one else could find. After the dust settled, ScanEagle was credited with locating a host of contacts of interest due to its ability to capture superior image quality and to operate covertly at relatively low altitudes.” Captured imagery was delivered from the ship to the task force via secure networked channels provided by the Secure Video Injection system from The Boeing Company, Insitu’s parent company. The UAV-provided, near-real-time video helped enable quick, tactical decisions.
The compact launch and recovery equipment is reportedly very easy to use.
To reinforce just how compact the Scan Eagle launch mechanism the image below shows one being launched from US Navy Mark V Special Warfare boat.
https://www.flickr.com/photos/73614187@N03/7149573201/
To see the full specs, loads of video and images click here to go to the Insitu website.
ScanEagle can be upgraded to NightEagle specification only a few hours.
The Scan Eagle is a mature system and has many optional extras and a full range of sensors and supporting payloads in addition to mission planning and image analysis tools. It really is an off the shelf system.
Integrator
Scan Eagle has a bigger brother, the Integrator can carry a larger payload yet still use the same launch and recovery method. The Integrator has been selected by the USN and USMC to fulfil the Small Tactical Unmanned Aircraft System (STUAS) requirement.
One of the strengths of the Scan Eagle and Integrator is the modular payload bay that has had many systems already integrated; electro optical, infra red and synthetic aperture radar as imaging payloads for example. Other useful payloads include communications relays of various types and an intelligent ships AIS interrogator that matches a received AIS signal with imagery to confirm the identity of a ship.
The 24 hour endurance is certainly impressive but limited to certain sensor payloads.
Click here for a brochure.
Two payloads that will be of particular interest in the ASW role are the Magnetic Anomaly Detector (MAD) and diesel engine particulate detector.
Using these in combination with the hull and helicopter based systems would seem to cover all the bases for deep and shallow water ASW.
Gazelle and SW4
These are interesting not only because they are conversions of existing manned helicopters (like many of these rotary UAV’s) but because of their UK connection, which makes them likely contenders for any RN programme.
Northrop Grumman and QinetiQ proposed an unmanned Gazelle and described their solution as ‘short term and low cost’
The unmanned Gazelle would use the control systems of the Northrop MQ-8B Firescout which does kind of beg the question why not just buy the much more mature Firescout in the first place.
Using the Gazelle as a platform makes sense – it’s a proven system with low support and operating costs.
Speaking at DSEi 2011, Qinetiq’s assistant technical director of avionics, Jeremy Howitt, said;
Qinetiq would be responsible for programme management and integration activities under the proposal, which would also include flight test activities from the West Wales UAV Centre at Aberporth. Unmanning an aircraft is the relatively easy part. The difficult part is providing the multiple levels of redundancy and failure management required that allows you to deliver military effect. We could do an initial demonstration within 12 months, and within the order of £10 million
12 months and ten million quid for a demonstrator, mmm
Given that Gazelle is due out of service soon and the maturity of competing systems it is hard to see the advantages of reinventing the wheel.
At around the same time Agusta Westland (now owners of the Polish helicopter manufacturer PZL-Swidnick) announced a possible conversion of their SW-4 light helicopter.
The first unmanned flight is scheduled for ‘this year’
Both these were aiming for an endurance of 8 hours depending on the payload weight.
Growth
The Type 23 is probably at the end the growth curve so it is good to see the emerging conceptual Type 26 designs having growth provision. It is not just about empty space but ensuring power systems can accommodate extra load, using blown fibre, making sure computing systems can exploit improvements in commercial advances and many other factors.
Within the lifespan of the Type 26 we may well see the emergence of off board unmanned air, surface and sub-surface vehicles that use mesh network technology, creating an all seeing mosaic from multiple micro sensors. Merlin might be used to control a swarm of unmanned aerial vehicles, each carrying half a dozen sonobouys and an engine particulate detector.
Type 26 must be in a position to exploit these emerging technologies.
Growth potential might actually be the single most compelling argument for Type 26.
Numbers and Wider Context
This is the golden question.
Given my arguments above for a ‘hard as woodpecker lips’ central core that is only used for the full on fighty stuff I would settle for reduced numbers as long as a few things happened.
First, a fundamental re-appraisal of the RN’s standing tasks, how they are provisioned and a realisation that you can’t get two pints out of an egg cup. A reduced in number and reduced in length (for Type 26 and Type 45) deployments will equally reduce separated service times and aid retention whilst still providing opportunities for career progression and variety on other platforms. I do not want more pressure on RN personnel, I don’t find longer harmony guidelines something to brag about and when the you know what hits the fan I want RN personnel equipped with the very best and at the peak of their training efficiency, however infrequently it might happen.
Second, we really do invest in quality on a continual basis and that includes high intensity, realistic training at a scale and in groups of vessels that provides maximum benefit against the primary role, fighting and winning. This means a singleton deployment of a Type 26 on tasks such as anti-piracy, as useful as they are for defence diplomacy and training and a variety of other things, would be the exception. When a Type 26 deploys, it should generally go mob handed with other vessels and fully tooled up in the expectations that things will cut up rough. That means no anti piracy, smuggling or humanitarian assistance missions as a means of justifying numbers, these are for others nations and other RN/RFA ships.
Third, in accepting sacrifices in numbers there must be a pay-off in terms of provisioning other capabilities such as UAV’s, investment in ASW research and development and the creation of a second tier fleet of Black Swans, Venators or SIMSS, more investment in MCM and amphibious ship to shore capabilities that can do the majority of so called ‘peace time taskings’ and address capability shortfalls that seem to be continually identified in lesson learned document after lesson learned document.
Much like my thoughts on needing fewer fast jets and more ISR/SH/AT, this is in the same vein, it is not a smash and grab on ones services budget to assist another, simply a re-appraisal of how best that same budget can be used. Type 26 is not just a like for like replacement and should not be thought of thus, despite what the those crusty old Admirals and Think Tanks would have you believe, muttering about Nelsons heart and the want of frigates, we need to think a little more seriously about things these days because we don’t have the cash to do otherwise.
Now I accept that this is unlikely to happen and hey, it’s only the internet but I thought I would be a little bit provocative because the sensible posts don’t seem to attract much discussion :)
We want eight and we won’t wait, how about 6 Type 26 instead?
Has anyone spit out their cornflakes yet?
Does anybody know the precise dimensions of the F35b’s internal weapons bay? :)
TD
Interesting article, possibly a bit too detailed to be taken in at a single sitting although noboby will ever be able to accuse you of skimping on the detail.
However a couple of points to ponder –
Do you have detail on the ongoing T23 upgrade programme?
Ships / kit / timing / costs?
Do you have detail on the costs of the GT buy for the T45 class?
The figure you give of £84mill for the class is new to me and seems a bit low?
With your suggestion of going to 6 do you have any thoughts on what would replace the 2 ASW and the 5 GP hulls of the current T23 roster?
Is the Merlin the most appropriate platform for helo ASW?
I ask because it is not a successful civil platform and it is a bit big / expensive / servicing unfriendly?
Do you have any extra info on Naval 155mm developments?
Looking for some understanding where the land version is going, its cost base and what needs to be sorted before it gets its feet wet?
In terms of hull numbers, one thing that I’ve been running through my head is the importance of our European allies in the event of a Libya or Lebanon (’06) crisis.
We think of escort numbers in terms of how many we need to do things by ourselves. Would increasing our ties with the Dutch and French to joint-force composition task groups be the way to go, despite public scepticism on Europe in general? The UK-Netherlands Landing Force could be made more formalised within the EU Battlegroup concept, and expanded to naval assets. There’s a lot to this that I might not have thought through, but how does this sound?
The EU NAVFOR off Somalia is centred around a French heli-carrier and it’s own national escorts, enhanced by willing EU partners; potential source for inspiration/confidence?
As for 6 T45s and 6 T26s for 2 CVs, 2 LHDs, and multiple auxillaries; you know, I hate the looks of that roster, but it is close to the composition of the Spanish fleet. Now I grant that they have less standing commitments, but their escort units are meant to be dedicated to task group protection/multi-national contribution.
I know little of the details regarding Spain, but if it works for them strategically, could we follow suit except with the addition of numurous low-end (but high diplomatic) impact vessels? We sure as hell can afford it more than Spain can at the moment in fairness!
unless we are talking about a 8000 tonne through desk cruiser embarking two merlin asw then my short answer is: not less than twelve.
i am led to undrstand that a single asw frigate cannot provide area defense for a task group, therefore we need two, and thus double the number of t45’s planned.
the thirteenth can be thrown in the 1.4b MHCP pot to buy a few more black swans.
Good Post as usual TD.
As Russia has announced recently, that it is going to rebuild their submarine fleet. Whilst other Nations are also building up their Sub Fleets. I don’t think that cutting UK ASW hulls is a good idea. A Minimum of 10 ASW T26’s might be enough. Whilst 15+ Black Swan Sloops or equivalent for the boring Colonial Policing and MCM/Surveying Roles.
@x
– Re: Does anybody know the precise dimensions of the F35b’s internal weapons bay?
NSM is said to fit inside the F-35B internal bay. Length 3.95m. The bay’s are not a perfect box.
Great read (really long…) :)
One important point I think relates to the ship’s engine systems and future adaptability. In this regard, a full-electric system is definitely the way to go. This is, I think, my favorite part of the T45 – huge amounts of room for future adaptability in terms of more powerful sensors, computers, and other systems. Although I realize that carrying over the T45 power systems to a smaller T26 isn’t feasible, I still think that a full-electric system is the only feasible way to go if you want any reasonable adaptability for the future.
Now, if only we could convince the USN to build more DDG-1000, instead of their hair-brained Burke Flight III plans…
@jedibeeftrix
– Re: 8000 tonne through *desk* cruiser
Like this one?:
– http://www.woodworkingtalk.com/attachments/f13/11636d1258389591-omg-aircraft-carrier-desk-pic30227.jpg
@ Jedibeeftrix re Merlin numbers
Absalon has space for 2 on 6500t.
Brown did a sketch for 6000t design to carry 4.
I don’t understand the problem young sir.
@ FBOT
Not for nothing is Merlin known as the Flying Frigate; it is freakin’ awesome. The only downer is that the RN doesn’t see the need for it carry an ASM unlike out Italian friends. I would happily scrap two T26 if it meant another 2 squadrons of ASW Merlin (plus ASM). True sea control asset.
@ TOC
Thank you kind sir. ;)
By the time you’ve added all your toys, you’re going to need a lot of space topsides. And as you go through your list I kept thinking “Hmm – that could go in a VLS tube…and that….and that”. VTOL ISR? There’s a VLS drone for that. Fire Shadow? Fits SYLVER or Mk41. Tomahawk – ditto, would obviously need some integration work with SYLVER but would be cheaper than stuffing Storm Shadow into A50. Stingray? Bit short-ranged on its own for modern use, but if it was in an ASROC package… Sea Ceptor – quad packable. I could wait until T26 Batch II though.
On fixed wing drones – don’t forget the RQ-7 Shadow with Shadow Hawk munitions which the USN has flown from ships – it uses a similar rail launcher to Fire Shadow etc.
In answer to your original question – I think the T26 is the right answer over SLEPing the T23. The current hulls are being stretched way beyond their intended purpose as TA tugs, all the systems have been upgraded but now it’s the hull that’s the problem. Better handling for small boats and UUVs is at the top of the list, and accommodation for Marines/SBS is becoming increasingly important.
Kinda off-topic but you did mention AIS in passing – Galrahn on ID posted this fantastic talk from one of the guys behind Google Maps on their take on information warfare using consumer technology. I hadn’t heard that for a couple of $m they’ve launched a couple of small satellites that can track AIS across the globe – would be very handy for pirates. The bit on mapping the ocean bottom has unfortunately been redacted but you can imagine the possibilities there. The stuff about virtual reconstructions of buildings based solely on people’s holiday snaps is just…cool. Well, well worth an hour of your time.
http://youtu.be/Dk3IIOimGwE
TD
Solid piece of work again. One thing did leap out:
“One might suggest that given the Royal Navy has not faced a credible submarine threat (the Santa Fe doesn’t count) for many decades is an indication about the utility of such capabilities”
Santa Fe does not count indeed, but, the San Luis most definitely did. Just as our Fleet subs gave their surface units an insurmountable problem that one little German SSK had us hopping about torpedoing hapless marine mammals left right and centre. The initial conviction that Shiny Sheff had been torpedoed was indication of the clear unease at our inability to localise and deal decisively with that threat caused in the Fleet.
Back in the day everything ASW was blue water, deep sound channels, thermoclines and towed-array envy. SSK’s sneaking round bumping rocks in the littoral were generally Scandinavian and intended for anti-invasion defence i.e torpedoing Soviet LST’s!. No-one paid a lot of attention as no one was really interested in working out how to defeat that kind of threat….we didnt drive the Sov LSTs!.
Until it turned out we had to. Then the Scandinavians laughed mightily and told us we should have listened to them in the first place!. Everyone else suddenly caught on to the idea of listening to the Scandinavians talk about littoral sub ops. The upshot of that work hangs off the back of the T23’s and will port across to the 26’s.
ASW is still very relevant, in fact, it is moreso now as many states, some with a fair degree of antipathy towards us, have cottoned on to the fact they can get just as much deterrent effect, on an aggressor, with relatively cheap sea denial as opposed to relatively expensive sea control!. Dropping below 8 2087 ships I dont think we want to do and if we can augment that in the littoral with ASW-USV (or similar) off the non-2087 T26’s or off the tier-2 hull so much the better!.
First of all, a very thorough post and an enjoyable read. I agree with the majority of your conclusions but have a few points as per usual.
1. It is not easier for a T45 to do piracy than a Corvette. The is better at Piracy and can do area air defence. The Corvette can do piracy but cannot do area air defence. So you do not get area air defence without the 45 and for the piracy to be done by a Corvette you must buy both or accept the capability loss. This is nicely swept up later in your post.
2. Some of the standing tasks we have such as ATP(S)/FIGs and the standing commitment in the Gulf are FF/DD type tasks for a reason. Could we have them done by less capable “war fighters”? For if we were to accept going down to 8 fully booted and spurred (T26), I will return to my ideas on that separately. In order to gain 8-10 Smaller vessels for the rest of the T26 budget then these smaller vessels have to be capable of completing the tasks and free up our escorts to concentrate on escort duties, operating in company and maintaining a high degree of readiness in core war fighting roles.
a. If we decided to say bugger the Argies sensitivities and upgrade the FI defences by giving airfield defence to the RAF regt and cycling a larger number of Army assets through for “training purposes” then we could potentially accept the loss of the FF/DD presence. Especially if it was replaced with 2 of the new “tier 2” vessels (had to call them something). The design would have to be capable of operating in SA conditions.
b. The problem with the Gulf unit is more difficult to resolve and with our reduced escort numbers I do not want to tie down any to provide this presence. Here again the solution may be tot think outside the box. Speak to the US to see how much of our presence is flag waving and how much capability based support to 5th Fleet. The MCMVs definitely offer a different capability but does an FF/DD? If that is the case we could forward base another 2 of our “tier 2 assets in Bahrain in order to show our continued support.
Realising I have already forward deployed 4 out of my 8-10 then why not in for a penny in for a pound and send 2 to the Caribbean and a 3rd to bahrain allowing them to also cover anti piracy.
As these “tier 2” vessels are coming out of the T26 budget they should not affect the River class and with Clyde returned to the Uk she could either supplement the FPS or be used for patrolling coastal waters. The remaining 1-3 “tier 2” vessels would be retained in the UK for training.
Have just realised that I do not have enough to allow ships companies to rotate back to a UK based vessel every 6 months so manning will require some careful consideration.
Anyway my initial thoughts on how we “may” be able to cope with less top end assets.
Lots of missile and gun options there, but if the primary mission is anti-submarine, what of the anti-sub weapons? Are depth charges and whatever ASW Merlins drop still the right answer, so not considered further?
Another thought: at what point does a guided torpedo turn itself into more of a USV with a warhead, doing a lot of its’ own acquisition, loitering, etc? Sort of like an underwater Fire Shadow.
…that would be a recoverable underwater Fire Shadow, if the target disappears or the enemy sub doesn’t arrive in the preset ambush position. Couple of packed air bags to get it to the surface, collected by a SAR helicopter, refuelled / reprogrammed back on board. Can’t be wasting money these days with expending weapons unnecessarily.
If we follow TD’s logic that the T26 should be desinged around its blue water escort role then the logic of purchasing 6 * 8,000T 4 Merlin cruisers seems pretty powerful. Four of them at high readiness would make a twin centred Carrier / ARG feel pretty secure.
But: it is worth remembering that part of the ASW role is also snooping around sea lochs and litterols hunting down sneaky SSK. For that a smaller shallower draught vessel is probably required. On balance I would therefore settle for 10 twin-merlin Frigates, allowing 6 with the task group, including detatched reconaissance in the litterol.
Both solutions with the provisos as given by TD that we spend the balance of the budget on some progression in terms of strike missiles and Scan Eagle for the T26, and half a dozen big flexible gunboats to fulfil the balance of the standing tasks.
X @ 14.41
When it comes to the Merlin and its “wow” factor, how much is the airframe and how much is the ASW sensor load?
When comparing the Puma upgrade and some new Merlins with regards to the best way to spend £340mill of taxpayers hard cash I was struck by the fact that the Merlin was a very good airframe but that quality had not converted itself into civil sales and the Super Duper Puma was a very capable aircraft that was up to date and still selling in a manner that the Merlin could only dream of.
Merlin vs Puma Mk 4 / Caracal, Civet Cat?
If the issue is payload then electronics are going down in weight.
A modern version o the ASW warload would be a lot lighter than the original design.
If the issue is performance then what element is causing the problem – range / ceiling / time on station?
Nothing against the Merlin, just a case that it is not an efficient platform in its current state. I do wonder why a twin engine version has never seen the light of day – anything to do with the NH90?
Just what was the size and performance of the original Sea King?
Twin engined Merlin?
Consequently I see the need for Tier / Level 1 Helo ASW capability just a case that we should try and make it more efficient / affordable.
The end point of the ‘big is beautiful’ development path would be a split between the blue water cruisers (12,000T, 4 Merlin, Sampson & Viper) and the inshore frigates (3,000T, 1 Merlin, Artisan & Ceptor).
Given our budgetry position and the fact we have already got T45 then a flexible fleet of twin-merlin frigates is perhaps better value.
@ X – Its 17 inches shorter than the A or C I think. It won’t carry the NSM internally.
Just so everyone knows, X was taking the piss when he asked about the F35B bay :)
Cheeky monkey that he is
FBOT, Merlin is just a bigger beast. It has a 290Nm range advantage over super Puma and ist Max take of weight is 3,000kh higher. A tier 1 ASW helo would be something like the Lynx Helos with a dipping sonar used by the Dutch.
APATS said “It is not easier for a T45 to do piracy than a Corvette.”
Say again station. I didn’t quite get what you said and the more I read it the more confused I got.
@ TD
Your minions just bite so quickly I can’t help myself. :)
X, I missed out the type 45 in the next sentence. what I was driving is that it is wrong to say “The argument that it is easier for a Type 45 to conduct an anti-piracy mission than it is for an anti-piracy corvette to conduct an area air defence mission is well made but this assumes that we live in a land of unlimited funding, as not only can the 45 do piracy better than a Corvette, the Corvette cannot do Area air defence at all. So the options are use 45 for both accepting that 1 hull cannot be in 2 places. Buy both or buy the Corvette or even 2 but lose the area air defence capability.
What i explored later was whether I thought we could for the same money as T26 move to a 2 tier escort/tier 2 fleet.
How much “intelligence” can you build into a torpedo / Underwater autonomous vehicle these days? What sort of sensors work underwater? Would it be possible to preload from onboard a frigate a 3-D underwater box for an unmanned vehicle to go to, then look for an enemy sub itself using onboard active sonar, finding it and going in for the kill?
Just musing. Couple together a longish endurance motor (6 hours) and some onboard sonar / intelligence and would that be a big step up in anti-submarine weaponry? A sort of combo underwater UCAV and loitering munition, with onboard ISTAR.
@ APATS
Thank you. You see I have no problem with T23 or T45 doing police work. We use Tornado because that is all we have and get we value from the platform and that is seen a good thing. Use an escort for something other than its intended role and it is a stick with which to beat to the navy. During the Libyan affair how many Typhoons rescued Westerners and then went on to do their primary role? None. Those RN units East of Suez are self-deployed at strategic distances. They have high endurance. The ship is a high utility platform. What if we had an Army unit in Somalia? As well as the infantry it would need cooks to mechanics etc. no different than a ship’s company really. But the Army would need help getting into theatre and support to maintain itself most of coming from the sea.
And if we could afford 36 or so of the “sloops of war” what would the first rate ships do with time. Exercise endlessly for a war that may never come? Would they be paddling around the Indian Ocean waiting for Iran to play silly buggers? Is there any difference really between a T23 chasing down a surface contact on an anti-piracy mission and a Typhoon on QRA doing an air intercept? How many Bears have the QRA Typhoons shot down? None and that isn’t the point. Both of these expensive platforms are doing in peace what they would do in war. As I have said several times these less than war missions for RN ships are “productive training”. If we must talk about costs Typhoon dwarves T26 by some margin; but which platform has the greater utility?
x
“As I have said several times these less than war missions for RN ships are “productive training”
Ditto for the RAF as well.
I am not sure why people are debating T26; as some belive it should be like for like and used as the T23 or more specialised.
The only ‘specialised’ vessle the RN has – and I really mean a ‘one trick poney’ then its only SSBN.
The system we use re frigates doing other ops than hunting phantom U boats, currently works and has gone well, especially when you look at the training it does for the crews, why cant it continue when a similar number of ’26s replaces them? But I’m not Navy minded enough to be sure on the matter.
@ Mike
Well I was going for a pro-RAF stance by comparing QRA to pirate-bashing.
Nobody is saying lets run QRA with Hawk or Gulfstream are they? No.
Having the right platform is important.
Did I hear somebody at the back mention Snatch Landies?
Hi TOC,
RE “NSM is said to fit inside the F-35B internal bay. Length 3.95m”
– Oz and Norway, the two that have shown interest, will be flying “A”s
TD
Without wishing to apear thick.
I would like you to clear up something. Are you clear you are saying if push comes to shove, when the chips are down, etc etc.
Given the lack of cash, you would rather have 6 realy top of the tree ASW AND NOTHING ELSE, in the way of OPV ‘Colonial sloop’ SIMMS etc etc?
In know the ‘we must afford 12’ etc crowd are out in force, but I just want to be clear that’s what you are saying, if we can’t afford 12 + and some colonial sloops (god I hate that name).
In effect is it’s Simms or ASW the Simms goes?
I happen to think that the modern SSK is the a genuine maritime threat. Rather more than some of the apparantly deadly surface ships.
X,
funny how times change. Back in ’88 Snatch Landies were considered the dog’s b*llocks in the Province. However, they still had that totally crap West Midlands British car industry feel to them. I was coming back from a prisoner escort duty from the Crumlin Road gaol and doing all of about 50 mph in one and the f*cking bonnet – with mounted spare tyre – decided to open with the wind and insert itself into the cab. Spooked me and Drives quite a lot. Another occasion, the sodding gear lever (aluminium?) broke off right down in the central tunnel and the only solution was to hammer a London screwdriver into the remnants with a rifle butt, select one gear only and drive around in second gear until we got back to base and the REME’s could set to for repairs.
@ x
‘Nobody is saying lets run QRA with Hawk or Gulfstream are they? No’
Having seen some comments on here, I wouldn’t be too sure about that ;)
Topman
We ought to look at that in particular QRA by Dasault Falcon etc.
@ Topman
I know. It was probably me too………
@ James
I own a Lightweight. I know I wouldn’t want my life to depend on a Solihull special in bandit country.
I don’t see how we can reduce the frigate numbers to get money for a third tier unless we reduce the numbers of RFA vessles.
We need second-rate “escorts” (frigates) for the 12-13 RFA vessels because they are unarmed but take part in war fighting. (first-rate here is the T45+Astute combo used to escort the capital ships).
Now, if you’re talking about replacing River, Hunt and Sandown with a “third-rate” ship (which would be a useless escort), I’m all ears… in fact, I was, on the other thread, re the Black Swan.
Re the SeaCeptor video…
A range of 500 miles ???? For sure, they meant something like “covers an area of 500 square miles”.
X,
I’m currently considering blurdging some spons on one of these:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h04tQRpBgp4&feature=related
Ditch the sub-teen cash-extractors for a day and go for a spin with the main squeeze.
It will have to be called “Moggie”, but not include some of the rather garish Kevin style roundels, bullet holes or shark’s mouths painted on that the company offer. Thinking of deep metallic blue with a red nose, cream leather seats. Build your own here: http://www.morgan3wheeler.co.uk/sportcreate.html
TD – to the crux of the matter – numbers ! As alluded to by Jedibeeftrix – what exactly to you think you want to protect from the enemy submarines ?
1. Single large task force (combined CVF and Amphibs) plus a single international choke point ?
2. 2 task groups, an international choke point and the approaches to a friendly port ?
It makes a big difference. 6 x T45 is NOT enough to adequately protect 2 seperate tasks groups, for example an Amphibious group and a CVF and it’s accompanying AOR – don’t believe the MoD(N) bollocks about how much better the technology is !
So, no – I am afraid 6 super-duper ASW T26 is not enough, even if you only want to protect a single large combined task group.
#1 – Refit / long maintenance period / dry dock
#2 – Training post refit / long maintenance – with FOST and for arguements sake not worked up enough when your “balloon goes up”
#3,4,5 – fully worked up and deployed with single large task force. 3 ASW ships with active-passive tails allows you to deploy at distance from main body in a blue water environment in order to get the best from passive towed array, also spreads the Merlin’s around.
#6 – for arguments sake is on South Atlantic patrol.
3 in my experience, and I was not a “TAS Ape” (Sonar specialist) is not enough. With no TT on the T45, and allegedely a less than brilliant sonar to guide it’s Lynx/Wildcat to a drop point, where is our inner layer ? Additional Merlin’s on the carrier ?
Now what if we have to split our forces and this is not a NATO / Coalition operation ?
Lets admit that if we have 8 sets of T2087 we may as well have a minimum of 8 ships to pull them, that provides at least a little slack past your 6 ?
Also, why load them up with land attack capabilities if ASW is so important ? Simply add the additional 16 strike length Sylver to the T45 and buy enough SCALP-N to fill them up – giving T26 nothing more than a highly useful OTO Lightweight 64 Cal 127mm (with a big magazine).
Does SIMMS / Black Swan / BMT Venator have a littoral (shallow water) ASW role ?
OR HOWABOUT we turn that around – why not use SIMMS as a T2087 ‘tug’ with a Lynx for local engagement, while making the T26 a 2 x Merlin carrying “inner layer” (active pinger), with a rocket delivered torpedo, and 120mm automatic mortars as depth charge throwers…….. and the capability to take on some of your additional land attack elements …. ? Mmmmmmm’ SIMMS would need to be fitted for (but not with) at least SeaRAM if not CAMMS though – so negative financial impact there.
@TD: Very comprehensive post – thanks!
The point I would like to raise is that I believe that the T26 is actually turning out to be the wrong vessel. Why are we using our first rate escorts to chase and hunt subs?
We would be better off trying to seperate the first rate Global Combat Ship concept from the main ASW RN role in my view. For the GCS role build a second batch of 6 GP T45’s which are have a larger hanger, ASuW missiles, 127mm Oto Melara and a half decent hull sonar and upgrade the first batch when the funds come available.
The ASW role should be covered by:
– Extending the life of the 8, 2087 T23’s to the end of 2030’s. Use the parts from the other 5 to keep them going if possible. Some of the Leander class friates were over 40 years before they got decommissioned. Then replace with simplier like for like further down the track (a modified Black Swan II perhaps?).
– Buy another one or two Astutes… Recent reports of the RN (Astute class) vs USN (Virgin class) were very impressive.
– Merlins carried from the QE class (it’s got space ;))
– As you say look at UUVs and even mini subs in the longer term.
I would even go as far as saying that we need a small (<500t) mid shore patrol vessel with sonar to assist in ASW in litterol environments.
Any money left over should be used to buy more Black Swans / Venators…
turkey has announced that the T26 is not for them as an export customer. Mind you if you read what they wanted to do (ie stick all their kit in it, many design changes) not too bad an announcement.
Turkey is after an air defence frigate, they want to use the SM2 missile but mate it with a Turkish phased array radar (CAFRAD) and combat system (GEMESIS). Lockheed martin want to sell them a Aegis/Spy system utilising SM3 but this would see the Turkish companies that have developed CAFRAD and GENESIS lose out massively.
Could never see T26 being a goer here.
Dear Repulse – that’s Virginia class matey, as in the state, I don’t think the USN has a Virgin class – at least the USN nurses who looked after me once left me with that impression :-)
As for: “Some of the Leander class friates were over 40 years before they got decommissioned.”
Oh yes, I know I served on one – not fun, “two wrongs don’t make a right” as in, just cause we did it then, doesnt mean we should do it now !
An interesting point raised here:
“Why are we using our first rate escorts to chase and hunt subs?”
Present policy seems to be that Frigate + Merlin = universal tool for all our anti-submarine needs. No doubt it does a very decent job. It seems however that there are at least three different sorts of task:
1. Litterol sub hunting
Which could be done by a smaller vessel.
2. Blue water defence – ie proetction of a task group
Which could be done by a combination of modified T45 & Astute.
3. Blue water offence – ie actively locating and hunting SSx
Which could be done by MPAs and Astutes.
As @Repulse suggests in an extreme scenario we could theoretically get by without any Frigates at all – which is what the USN appears to be trying to do.
Issues with such a plan are (a) how to transit the small coastal sub-hunter across the open ocean to where its needed. A Frigate can just go there even in bad weather. (b) We don’t have any MPAs or enough Astutes to do offensive sub hunting that way (c) T45 batch 1 has poor Anti-Submarine warfare characteristics and it would be an expensive bodge job to try and change them.
Given that lot it looks like we are pretty committed to building frigates – but let’s not give up on regenerating our other anti submarine capabilities too.
A good piece very thought provoking. I have to say i think the type 26 looks right for the roles we want it to take and should over time be the sole surface combatant. I also like the street fighter/black swan/simss vessels idea of multiple smaller vessels come together to for a total capability by the sum of its parts. The ratio of 1 type 26 or 4 smaller vessels is a gd one but i can see the capability creep adding slowly but surely little bits to the smaller vessels ect.
Type 26 size and capability we probably need to support the alternating high/low task group in a high threat area and the fleet ready escort and the falklands tasking not sure how many this is.
The smaller vessels could support all other tasking as a group of 4 vessels to each task again dont know how many this would be also need to take into account training ect. In this i do like the black swan concept but worry if we have enough helicopter or the ability to buy the uav systems to adequately balance this out. the armaments looks about right would change the 30mm for a 57mm.
How effective are our Trafalgars and Astutes in ASW roles?
@ TOC re ASW SSN
Very good.
@ Jed re serving……
In, in, in, in, in, in, in, in, in, in, and not on. :) ;)
@Jed, my bad on the “Virgin” class – my phone is struggling to handle the size of this thread…
@PE, not trying to get rid of frigates, just not sure why the RN wants to make them into all seeing and dancing multi role cruisers with Tomahawk etc.
A 3-4000t ship can give good sea handling and global presence as the T23 does now. 12 upgraded T45s and 8 T23s (minus Harpoon) alongside a significant number of Black Swans / Venators / SIMMs would be a good well balanced fleet.
Just thinking about it, could we not order more Bays/Albions to use as the second tier vessels to cover some of the less serious fighty tasks?
As a non scientific way to illustrate my point above:
Gin palace cruise –
Cvf
Wave
1x t45
2x t26
Arg deployment –
Cvf
Wave
Mars
Lpd
Lph
Lsd
2x t45
4x t26
Oh no, the islands that must remain unnamed –
2x cvf
2x wave
3x mars
2x lpd
Lph
3x lsd
3x astute
4x t45
8x t26
You would need half the escorts to provide a suitable screen away from the main group in a high threat environment!
That leaves one t45 in deep refit and another doing something else terribly essential, double those numbers for t26.
How do we cope with just six as currently envisaged?
X,
It is indeed “on”, not “in” for those of us who remain convinced that the Captain cannot be trusted, the sea is an unnatural place, and who seek accommodation well above the waterline. Such was the strength of my feeling on this that the Andrew very graciously converted the Chart room on Bristol (yes, “on” as it was above the waterline) into my cabin for 3 months, having previously tried to foist me off in some electrically lit hellhole about as far underwater as Davey Jones’ locker.
Good post, I agree with most of what was said.
This isn’t about competing budgets or service rivalry, this is a fundamental look at what the RN actually wants and needs from it’s surface fleet, keeping in mind how tight money is these days.
As TD said it’s no good admirals and historians talking about Nelson’s frigates. It’s equally not useful (actually downright lazy and damaging) to simply want to replace a class of ships 1 for 1 without actually looking at the contextual situation (money, threat, capabilities).
It seems really obvious to me that the best way to get the most from the surface fleet is to have a 2-tier balance with no middle ground.
So yeah a group of ultra sophisticated and platforms that have specialisation but also enough general-purpose usefulness to justify the cost and allow them to steam in-to dangerous environments with enough capability to go the distance.
Match this with a group of ultra simple and cheap platforms (Black Swan, Khareef, whatever).
The only thing I disagree on is numbers.
6 Type 45 together with 6 Type 26 is too small an amount for any kind of serious fighting.
I personally think something between 8 and 10 Type 26 is about right. Surely a drop of either 3 or 5 ships would put either enough or mostly enough money aside for a low-end purchase?
Then couple that with 2 additional and discounted Type 45s (not sure if that’s possible, but assuming it is) and we get a high-end fleet of 16-18, which sounds about right to me.
Fill that number out with 10 corvettes and we are back to a healthy number not seen for many years.
Well that’s my 2 pennies worth thrown in!
It has been announced that as a result of PR12 the RN is scrapping all plans to fit CEC to the T-45 and T-26. So in all probability the T-26 is going to be a T-23 Block II, solving space issues and not much else. Is this a bad thing? well in reality NO.
@x Re: ASW SSN
Compared to T23? Worth expanding the Astute fleet for ASW duties? Send a fox to catch a fox?
Regarding the rifle armament, is it at all possible to have a twin (treble even) 5′ turret? Previous engagements have shown just one rifle too unreliable for continuous bombardment. Itbalso provides better anilti-ship capability.
I don’t see the need for T26 to be an ASW destroyer, fitted for but not with all sorts of land attack gubbins. Money spent designing that into T26 could be spent realising the potential of T45. Keep the T26 as a straight forward ASW frigate – which might make it worthwhile looking at extending the eight T23 instead.
If we need a GP vessel, with land attack and anti-surface capability, then perhaps a GP T45 would be better – a batchII T45 but with double hangar and dumbed down air defence. I’m convinced the five proposed GP T26 are just BAe’s product demonstration models anyway.
@James
I see now how cockups like the Astute grounding happen. This trend towards jointery means that all the useful bits of warships are being decked out in Laura Ashley for visitors who fancy themselves as Leonardo DiCaprio.
The problem with your loitering torpedo is ….well, that’s sort of how they work already. The trouble is that you’re working in water, so you end up trading speed for endurance and not getting hugely much of either. If Fire Shadow loiters 4-5 miles away from a target then it’s not really a problem, start a torpedo 4-5 miles from its target and it may well make the difference between a hit and a miss. You might only get 5-10 miles range at 50kts, or 20 miles cruising at 35kts. As an aside, this latter fact is one reason for the popularity of gas turbines, something like a T23 can outrun a torpedo on cruise, whereas you’d get a bit wet in an Absalon. So really you only want a torpedo out there using up limited battery life/fuel if it’s got a real target to go after. And for that you need “heavy” ASW sensors, which in RN language means 2087 and Merlin.
Quick check in
@FBOT, I think the T23 has been continually upgraded over many years but not sure of the individual costs. The contract cost for the T45 turbines was just for the turbines and associated machinery, the rest of the power and propulsion system were in separate contracts. The Merlin is widely regarded as ‘the best’ ASW helicopter if that means anything. The UK 155mm development was cancelled so we have a simple choice of stay with what we have or upgrade to either the BAE or Oto systems
@StephenC, we already cooperate with other nations across many domains as you rightly state but defence planning assumptions must reference the scale and complexity of UK only operations. It is a good point though, there has to be realism about what the UK can/should be able to do alone.
@Adun, most people tend to agree that power requirements are only going one way so electric propulsion is the way to go but as I said in the post, it is a very complex balancing act
@El Sid, yep, watched that Google vid, pretty amazing stuff
@Jonesy, fair points, will update the post text!
@APATS, yes, agree on the T45/Corvette thing, as above, will amend because you make a fine point. I agree about the actual utility of maintaining FF/DD singleton deployments and whether a reality check is in order, it seems very hard to let go though
@Ixion, what I am saying is we cannot afford 12/13 Type 26 and for them to have all the systems they need and for them to be doing singleton deployments of limited value and have a presence and everything else. So, my approach is to reduce numbers, invest to achieve a qualitative advantages whilst accepting reduced numbers and compensate by opening up the gap between a tooled up T26 and a ‘Tier 2’ design for the 90% of missions we don’t actually need 2087, Sea captor etc. A two tier fleet where the second tier isn’t the same as the first tier minus a few bits and bobs.
@Jed, your scenario 1, so perhaps slipping up to 8 would be reasonable but that’s the crux of the matter. The maximum effort we need to do alone is a single combined task group but then have a think in what scenario would the UK be going up against a nation state that could pose a credible under and over water threat. I know we can never predict the future but we do at least try and have some realism. In a coalition operation, frigates would not be in short supply and neither would decks on which to base additional Merlins. The FAA is looking to run a combined Wildcat/HM2 fleet of what, around 60. Could you see this UK only effort against a credible threat not going to sea with any less than 20 HM2’s and a similar number of Wildcats? Must admit I didn’t give much thought to a full on fighty role for SIMSS but your suggestion is not unreasonable.
@Chris.B, an interesting point on using a load more Bay’s for secondary roles, they only cost £10m a year to run and are extremely versatile so maybe our Tier 2 fleet isn’t a Black Swan or SIMSS but simply more Bay’s. In general it is a myth that being small equals being cheap, supersizing as per your suggestion gives you all sorts of flexibility options. One to consider I think
@Brian, the land attack stuff I proposed would be pretty straightforward, a gun and a bit of flat deck like the picture of the Absalon. To be fair though, we could do the same on the T45.
@Harry, welcome to TD, I think most modern systems now are reliable enough not to incur the cost and complexity of twin mounts
@ TD – I agree with your high low balance. However given NATO commitments not to mention the finer points of ASW I don’t see 6 as a feasible number. That being said the navy obviously feel that 8 ASW escort’s is what it needs. I would say build the 8 ASW and switch the budget for the other 5 GP into MHPC.
Given our tiny budget we really need to examine all standing tasks. If vessels cost up to £ 1 billion and we need three to have one on task we have to be careful about the rational for having those standing task’s. Swaping the budget for the 5 GP versions into the MHPC might give us a total MHPC fleet of 16. Forward basing these in 2’s with crews than can be rotated by air seems like a more affordable solution.
For the islands that shall not be named we may have to think about increasing the army and air force presence there. However if we are going to star oil extraction then arguably we need to do that anyway.
@ X – I agree that if they don’t have any training to do and it does not leave us at a strategic disadvantage there is no issue with a T23 or T45 chasing down pirates. That being said with escort numbers cut to the bone we need to keep a number of them back for in home waters ready to form a task force or take on an urgent requirement.
The comment about Nelson makes me laugh. Nelson was not asking for more high end ASW platforms but rather a larger number of cheaper smaller vessels that could be in more places at once.
I think if Nelson was afloat today he would favor more MHPC and less ASW.
@ Le Boss a La TD,
I was sitting around looking at alternative “cheap” vessels that could be used for the lower intensity operations, and it turns out the Bays and the Albions just happen to be bloody good value for money, even considering the possibility of conversions of ‘for sale’ civvy tankers.
Come complete with plenty of space for helicopters, well decks for launching whatever bonkers arse small boat combinations people come up with, cheap on the running costs and have utility still in a full on dust up.
@ Chris B – I like the idea of the Bay’s but I think we need a hanger on them. Something more than just an extendable temporary job. Also need some way to have a covered work area for Mission modules. A little bit more fire power than a GPMG would be nice as well. That being said when you have 16,000 (t) to play with adding in stuff is pretty easy.
The Bay’s have to go down as one of the best success stories of recent MOD procurment. Even though they have not as yet been used for their primary mission they have been of great utility and if it was not for having them we would have been in a much worse position over the last few years than we have been.
I hate to be the voice of reason but in the real world we need to get the capability from the T26 budget. So 3.25 billion is the top line. if we go for 8 T26 ASW role and ensure they come in on budget that leaves 1.25 Billion for a suplementary class of Ships to take up less “warry” roles. Alternatively we build 13 T26 and muddle along as we are.
So to get 10 we need to come in at 125 million.
The question is, is the T26 designed to be a first rate warship or not.
If it is a first rater then our budget is such that it needs to stay close to what is protecting (ARG, Carrier group etc). From a ASW force you need a wide area screen to stop subs before they get too close. Therefore, in my view we cannot afford to have the T26 as the primary ASW asset. If it’s not an ASW platform, then what is it, and what does it give that a modified T45 cannot do better? Also, I do not really get a mission bay on a first rater – second rater yes as it is more expendable and can get closer to shore, or a Bay etc of course.
If the T26, is in reality a gold plated second rater the RN really is fucked.
On the Bay/RFA theme, for those not aware, RFA Fort Victoria has been in the news relatively recently demonstrating her continued worth in the anti piracy role:
– http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/piracy/9016276/Hunting-pirates-on-board-the-RFA-Fort-Victoria.html
Also on the civilian/military crossover theme, the USA’s refitted HSV-X1 Joint Venture [1] can be found ferrying in the Irish Sea as the renamed Manannan [2] together with the ship that HMNZS Canterbury [3] was based on [4].
[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HSV-X1_Joint_Venture
[2] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HSC_Manannan
[3] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMNZS_Canterbury_(L421)
[4] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MV_Ben-my-Chree
Repulse, when was the last time you designed a screen? All sorts of thing need to be taken into account. The threat and limiting lines of submerged approach vs MLA. Will it pop up for a visual look. what range and type are its weapon systems? Does it need to get inside the outer screen. If it goes for a visual look prior to attack what do we know about its night optics. Its sonar capabilities. is it a multi threat environment?
How many assets do we have? How many helos can we put them as dipper in the likely “look zone” ahead of the force if we expect it to pop up. Are we up against an SSN so do we need to protect against a trailer?
The frigates are generally pushed further out from the TG covering the limiting line of submerged approach. Spacing is calculated using a formula based on type of sonar, water conditions, coverage and overlap required. Inside of these Frigates we will have the air defence units. We may have another frigate covering the rear if we believe there is a threat. Helos will also be assigned sectors or dip randomly in a look zone ahead of the force.
It is an integrated screen and talk of first and second raters etc is not part of the calculation. You protect the HVU, the further out you move from the HVU the greater the space you have to patrol so the actual outer limits of the sector screen are based on the ability of the threat to actually target the HVU will almost always be shorter than the max range of the weapons they possess.
So, PR12 has confirmed the top line figure at £ 3.25bn
If MHPC still stands (even if not confirmed at the same level of “strength”) at 1.4 bn, I wonder if anyone can advise on the rough cost of the specialist mine hunting modules (consumables/expendebles, like the one-shot part of the SeaFox systems coming in at some reasonable ratio per deployable system)?
We would then have (3.25 + 1.4)bn minus (say, a dozen)times X = budget available and the constraint to optimising the hull mix
– it is only the M(ine) and H(ydrological)that are the exclusive preserve of the new class and the rest of the functions are overlapping, even though perhaps not quality-wise
– the requirements consolidation contract for MHPC, over one year and let to Frazer-Nash, ran to its end early this year, if memory serves
TD,
can you post something mentally land-based on your Pin Board? Something like this? http://www.militarypictures.info/misc/light-strike.jpg.html I suspect the platform cost is quite reasonable for that one, and in terms of strategic effect, probably on a pair with several QEC. Also, sod the SF, that thing has FRES SV written all over it. Just need an AGL.
Otherwise, it is all getting depressingly Andrew on the blog, over the last couple of weeks. :(
@ James re Depressing Andrew
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bau6aDnLgcQ&feature=related
Would you like some pictures of some Soviet tanks to get off on? :) ;)
How much is 2087?
X, About 20 million a set.
A couple of modified Bays with hangers and capacity for up to 4 medium helos each would certainly have a wartime role.
It would go some way to alleviate the lack of a propper LPH after Ocean goes – both increasing the rotary aircraft capacity of the taskforce and allowing the duty QEC to lurk a bit further offshore.
And in peacetime perfectly adequate for mothership and presence duites of all kinds.
The other point to re-emphasise is that *if* we can manage to afford Astute batch 2 and/or a small number of half decent MPAs *then* the number of ASuW frigates required will go down. We only think we need so many frigates beacuase we have robbed those other capabilities so heavily.
The ability to sweep the Clyde approaches, sanitise ahead of the taskforce, fix the enemny sub location or track and kill their subs with ours as they leave port will mean less requirement for screening and picketing by surface units.
Just to defend the “loitering torpedo” idea: There’s no reason why the loiter can’t be done by umbilical – shedding its uplink to the mothership when commanded to attack.
Difficult to warrant the purchase of more Bays though isn’t it – mud on face and all that ;-)
Can someone explain what would escort the supply line(s) if you dropped T26 numbers?
I don’t think a frigate is a first-rate warship – it’s an escort. T45 is our first-rate ship and paired with Astute makes a T26 look like, well, £250m quids worth against £1.6b! Our frigates therefore need to be designed as “escorts” i.e. ships that provide defense for another higher value/utility ship. This means we can skimp on offensive capability (no land attack missiles, etc). I really don’t understand the “slipping” of T26 into being a first-rate attack vessel.
Simon, we talk an awful lot about supply line but why? What is the threat to them? After an initial deployment what will we continue to deploy and what will the enemy be able to do to them? A lot of people seem to write as if we are going to engage in a Ww2 style 5 year conflict with convoys etc. We tend to deploy engage and return. Fuel can be sourced locally in almost all occasions and weapons carried on RFAs or flown out to close in theater. I suggest that any conflict that lasts long enough and is of sufficient intensity to both require a resupply and see a substantial threat to that resupply would see us in a position where the budget is less of a consideration.
On the topic of land and surface vessel attack, options are looking a little light going forward, at least at the moment.
Any more detailed news on what the plans are in that area for the fleet?
e.g.
– Upgrading T45 Sylver launcher from A50 to A70?
– Fitting additional M41/A70 cells forward on T45?
– Transfer of Harpoon or confirmation of M41/A70 near funnel on T26?
– By A70/M41 I’m assuming TLAM for land attack.
– Other than transferring Harpoon what other realistic ASM’s are likely to be equipped on T26?
Oh, and what do the Sylver/M41 reloading procedures involve? Are these normally handled on-ship at sea from stores or is there Auxiliary involvement on all reloads?
X,
how many wheel nuts on a T-62 road wheel, and which has 15 and which 16, so illustrating Soviet and East German forces? Are the T-72s Sagger-equipped indicating the enemy’s main effort axis? If you see 3 radio antennae on a BRDM are you looking at the Combat Recce Patrol of a Motor Rifle Division or the command post of of Brigade within a Tank Division? Within 3rd Shock Army, is the Guards Motor Rifle Regiment composed of identifiable Asiatic faces?
All good recce questions.
That’s enough recce porn, circa 80s.
Quick point; not sure where TD found that video of Sea Ceptor, but that looks like an entirely different weapon to the CAMM-M. The graphics look a bit dodgy too…
I’m still not sold on the numbers.
I have no doubt that with the Type 26 quality over quantity is the way to go. I want to see a properly capable, high-end ship that primarily slots in-to amphibious and carrier groups.
However 6 seems just too low. The cost is supposed to be between £250m and £350m (though how many people really think it will stay in budget). So surely that means if the numbers go down by 3 we save somewhere in excess of £750m, and if we cut 5 we save a billion!
I think there is some kind of compromise to be had in this. I think 6 is too low a number to justify the programme. However 8 or 10 ships I find more acceptable, plus the savings would probably be enough to plough back in-to a low-end cheap ship.
James has solved the TA recruitment problems for good http://www.militarypictures.info/misc/light-strike.jpg.html
RE PE’s “A couple of modified Bays with hangers and capacity for up to 4 medium helos”
– can’t remember now which thread had Jed’s shipbucket drawing of a mix of a Bay and the Dutch JSS; should come pretty close?
Simon, re umbilicals and trying to preserve battery power.
Let no-one suggest a T26 with some form (mini-well dock or davits) of launching 4 remotely controlled RHIBS each with a torpedo mounted, ready for launch. Controllable out to about 30 miles, small little data link back to mother, targeting data included. Four of those station keeping 20 nm off a frigate is going to give an enemy sub 4 x the problem. After dropping off the torp, the RHIB heads for home.
(I always liked the parable of the writing in space competition. The Americans spent $1 million on developing a special biro that wrote upside down in zero gravity, the Russians bought some pencils)
RE “Oh, and what do the Sylver/M41 reloading procedures involve? Are these normally handled on-ship at sea from stores or is there Auxiliary involvement on all reloads?”
– or, is it a port call that is required!?
APATS,
Without a supply line we cannot sustain the “enduring” operation as defined/implied in the SDSR.
How do you land a battalion of tanks without Bay operating a supply line? Okay, two can shift 48, but in the initial wave I’d guess they’d be carrying other vehicles.
Even if you extrapolate and assume we’d only be doing this if we’re part of a bigger force (e.g. NATO) we’d still need to defend the tiny part of the supply line that we’re providing.
“…any conflict that lasts long enough and is of sufficient intensity to both require a resupply and see a substantial threat to that resupply would see us in a position where the budget is less of a consideration”
I see what you’re saying but… 1982. And besides it’s not like you just run down to the shops to pick up a couple more Bay, T26 and Astute is it? How long would it take to build them in an emergency? 6-months???
James,
Didn’t the original TOW missiles have wire guidance? What were their ranges? Surely we can provide power to a UUV and get data back? I’d have thought at least to the horizon… Not sure we even need the RHIBs!
Love the “space biro” analogy :-)
@Simon
A frigate can be whatever you want it to be, just like any other ship. Why should a type be defined by it’s past role? The term destroyer is a good example of a name that was first applied to a small/fast escort but now means a large, guided missile, high-end platform.
I would also say that although costs of different classes do often reflect capability that isn’t the end of the story. If we end up with a ship that costs around £350m it doesn’t automatically mean it’s useless in high-end roles and should be relegated to 2nd rate tasking.
The Type 45 coming in at over a billion pounds a pop wasn’t a good thing, it’s not a case of ‘the more you spend the more you get’. Type 45 was an example of starting from scratch and essentially in AAW terms reinventing the wheel! Type 26 will be cheaper because it utilises pre existing tech and takes an all round smarter approach to design and procurement.
@ Peter Elliott
Problem with Astute Batch 2 is that we can’t squeeze anything past Astute 8 into Barrow without further delaying the Trident Successor which I don’t think can wait any longer. If we wait until after the build of Trident Successor then it might be post 2035 until we see Astute 9 well after the entire T23 fleet is out of service.
Does anyone know how the 2087 sonar is affected by the towing ship’s acoustic signature. Is a high level of noise reduction required to operate it. If it is it makes the MHPC/Black Swan towing a 2087 a none starter.
Simon,
it’s slightly a response to El Sid’s observation that loitering torps sort of already do that, but only for 10 minutes. OK. Let’s take the cost out of a loitering UUV. Make it a RHIB – unmanned, but if we are really tight on cash manned – and sling a Mk 48 Torp on the side. Now that really has got 6 hours of endurance, maybe even 10 if there are bacon butties and a flask of coffee loaded onboard. Send out 4 of them in a box around the frigate. Small datalink so the RHIB has some idea of the contacts the frigate is prosecuting. The RHIB may be noticeable to the submarine, but is not going to be so interesting as the frigate itself. Fire order, 4 torpedoes in the water, and the submarine has got a hell of a job to escape.
Apologies to FBOT,
Looks like we only have 7 of the 8 2087 sets in the water, as per January:
“HMS Kent, one of the Royal Navy’s (RN’s) most advanced Type 23 frigates, has been fitted with Thales UK’s Sonar 2087 system as part of a multi-million pound upgrade to her systems and operational capability. Kent now becomes the seventh Type 23 frigate to be upgraded with the Sonar 2087 system.
HMS Kent will emerge as one of the most capable anti-submarine warfare frigates in the world…”
Having entered dry dock in November 2010, Kent has now left the dockyard fresh from a comprehensive upgrade to her systems and equipment, and sailed under the famous Forth Bridges to begin her sea trials.
The ship has benefitted from a £24m overhaul of her hull, upper deck and complex weapons systems.”
Which Duke is now having its refit?
– assume the 8th is for that one, if not for testing and training
– these overhauls have been £10-24m a piece; There is no mention of the radar & SeaCeptor, so another round forthcoming?
To me the wide range in the figures
“overhauls have been £10-24m a piece”
suggests that the condition of the (getting-old)T23 hulls is quite variable?
Simon, In 2003 we managed to deploy plenty of armour overseas. We utilised the point class and STUFT shipping and port facilities. i cannot envisage a scenario that you seem to be describing with Bay class doing relays to pick up tanks to offload over the beach. We shared the escort duties with the US but these things build up and Donald Cook who was initially doing STROG escorts was in the Gulf in time to fire TLAM on H hour.
How often did we even have to resupply in the Falklands whilst the Argentineans presented a threat?
How many nations can present a threat to resupply shipping outside the immediate AOR that would not be neutralised very quickly in a conflict.
The most likely scenario would be a terrorist style attack in a choke point in which case the “tier 2” escorts would be good enough.
The build up to an enduring conflict would see enough time for ships to at least begin to built.
I am sorry but being realistic about budgets, a mythical “enduring conflict” requiring continual heavy equipment to be put over the beach against an opponent capable of interdicting supply lines without any noticeable political change to allow build up of forces and change in posture should be files alongside repel Martian invasion plan and not used as a justification to have more escorts in a tight military budget.
Challenger,
I suppose you can call something that sails underwater and launches nuclear missiles a “frigate” if you like. But there is usually a reason why things are called what they are. A frigate is (at least to my mind) a mid sized escort with most of it’s weapons on a single deck.
My real point is that our wonderful ASW frigates are still no match for a destroyer and attack sub combo for both offensive and defensive tasks. They’re just good value for money – not too big and expensive to procure and run, and therefore suit the multi-role niche.
Perhaps this is the reason that the T26 is being called the Global Combat Ship, rather than the Next Generation Frigate?
TD @ 1.20
My question on upgrades and contracts related to the situation now –
T2087 – ongoing / supply contract sorted / fitting to the hulls uncertain.
I think the first boat has been upgraded but I do not know the current situation regarding the other 7.
CMS – Not sure if this is going to be upgraded, therefore the question.
Artisan – supply contract sorted / timing and numbers unknown – is it 8 or 13?
CAMM – again development and supply contract has been sorted – timings and numbers unknown.
An Other / Odds and Ends – not sure if there is anything else.
Consequently any info on this would be appreciated.
@ APATS
Is that all? I knew there weren’t much (in terms of kit, I know we spend billions here each day) but I didn’t think they were that cheap. So we are talking to get 4 additional sets £80million about a weeks “fighting” in Afghanistan. FFS that is nothing. It is about one F35. Just under half of a one C17. Wow. When I read that Black Swan document I nearly fell off my chair when the author wrote he wanted £65million per hull, built to commercial standards, and his criteria was that low most of the world’s commercial operators would have laughed their cotton socks off. But that £80million takes the biscuit. As I am fond of saying we choose not to have this equipment cost has little to do with the issue. (I know cost does have something to do with it. But you all know what I am saying.)
@ James
All good stuff. Just so you know I do know there was more to your job than shooting stuff and a bit of map reading. Your comment sounded like a paragraph out of that book so beloved by wargamers “First Clash”. And know I am not I a wargamer…… :)
James, interesting but my thoughts would be small UAVs, rotary wing that can loft a single torpedo into the air and drop it where we want quickly and undetectably. How many could we fit in a Merlin Hangar? especially if we had twin hangars with a Merlin in other.
APATS,
“…being realistic about budgets, a mythical “enduring conflict” requiring continual heavy equipment … not used as a justification to have more escorts in a tight military budget.
I’d have thought it’s almost exactly the opposite. It’s the perfect justification to make sure we have as many “effective” escorts as we can afford rather than waste resources on ships that have little military significance and whose role can be done by the coastguard.
Coast Guard Sloop?
X, 20 Million was based on the procuremnet cost that I could find for the project, I am not sure if that includes the consoles installed with the system or how much they may be now.
no not know Sorry.
ACC @ 10.15
Thanks for the info.
One further question, what is the servicing / refit schedule of the T23?
In dock every year – weeks
In dock for a refit every 5 years – months
In dock for an major upgrade – every 10 or 15 years – year +
Is this close to the truth?
Do you have ready info on the 8 hulls chosen – youngest / best?
HMS Kent – £24 mill + the cost of a T2087 set – starting to get expensive.
I hope the job of swapping out this unit from Kent to a new T26 hull is a bit cheaper.
Simon, we do not have a coastguard. I am in two minds but if the choice is between 13 T26, 8 of which will be 2087 ASW equipped and 5 will not be and 8 ASW escorts and 10 corvettes/OPVs which can do Caribbean deployments, FIGS, chase Pirates and cruise around the Gulf and do choke point escort duties for deploying STUFT ships it is close.
Remember we are looking at different ways to spend the T26 budget. Would be interesting to look at what 120 million pound actually buys before dismissing them out of hand as insignificant.
We need to use defence planning assumptions to make our case and we all know that an “enduring conflict” will be maritime only during the theatre entry stage. After that any maritime contribution will be in the main power projection.
@Simon
I do agree with you’re point that broadly speaking we all agree on what a frigate is, and it isn’t a sub!
In my previous post I was essentially dancing around my main focus which was that there is a clear choice when looking at surface fleet numbers and capability, given our lack of cash and the low number of hulls in water. If you agree that a 2-tier system is the way to go then it has to be high-end and low-end. I think it would be seriously wrong to allow a medium capability vessel to slip in-to the force mix.
However I do accept that there is a rational balance to be had. We can’t relentless pursue the advancement of capability on the Type 26 regardless of cost. We should of course have a ceiling height in the Type 26 budget, but we should also strive to get as much high-end capability out of that as possible.
I think that if the latest specifications on the programme are followed we should end up with a very capable and useful ship. Essentially an evolution of the Type 23 in being ASW specific but also general purpose enough to provide that all important defence in depth.
APATS,
“…if the choice is between 13 T26, 8 of which will be 2087 ASW equipped and 5 will not be and 8 ASW escorts and 10 corvettes/OPVs which can do…”
I agree, as long as the 10 corvettes can actually do “escort” duties and don’t just end up being ships with just GPMGs and some RHIBs. I’m not sure the Black Swan Sloop (etc) was enough to provide escort cover.
@ACC
– Re: Reloading procedures for a VLS (e.g. Sylver/M41)
I’ve not found much, the DCNS brochure lists a reload time of <90 minutes per 8 cell module on the Sylver:
– http://www.dcnsgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/6141.pdf
No mention if this can be replenished while underway (UNREP), with the assistance of an Auxiliary or only at port. Nor can I find mention of additional stores or magazines on board.
Can anyone else enlighten us?
APATS,
I think you’ll end up with needing the “corvettes” to do max 18knots, 8000nm at 15knots, embark a Wildcat and carry Sea Ceptor.
Would these really end up any cheaper than T26 GP?
Bottom line is 8 x T26 ASW and 5+ of any other effective escort is enough.
Simon, note my choice of words, “choke point escorts”. Which would be a tertiary duty for them as only required possibly in a war role where the main threat would be a terrorist type FIAC attack. in this case supplementing the ships weapions fit with RM Javelin teams would make a massive difference.
Other wise they are about presence. So maybe a slightly more war like version of the Kiwis Protector with a 76MM gun two remote 30MMs and mounts for a couple of 50 cals. A helo hangar and if the budget stretched a RAM launcher.
@Simon
The case study hull for the mothership platform in the Black Swan concept listed an 18knot maximum speed in order to engage in Fleet activities.
Not sure I’d want to run the engines that hard just to keep up though. Less of an issue with electric motors if the generators would otherwise be idling at that power output.
I’d prefer @TD’s X-Bow, @Chris.B.’s Bay class or @x’s Fast Sea Hull as the platform though.
– Re: Mud on the face with purchasing more Bays. One trait that Mr. Hammond has demonstrated is not worrying too much about political face when performing a U-Turn. If the need, recommendations and the funds were there, I get the impression that the idea of purchasing more wouldn’t be a problem, assuming it isn’t too late for production?
All PATS @ 10.31
Have you been to Damascus lately?
The possibility of you becoming a fan of the Colonial Sloop suggests that you have.
Have a look at the RSN Endurance, that is the closest existing vessel to my thoughts on a cheap hull to pack the batting for the RN.
Size – 141m x 21m x 5m’ish / 8-9K tons full load / well deck can take 2 x LCUs / pretty upmarket sensor and systems fit out.
My thoughts are that this provides a good reference point to start from – great picture of the Endurance up close to the Enterprise – one for the Trekkies amongst the TD crowd to savour. It is this context that my ideas for a low cost escort should be appraised. The Colonial Sloop would come in varying widths / CSAs – 23m / 25m / 27m.
Base ship set up for Patrol role would be 148m x 23m x 5-6m / 11K tons full load / 18 MW for 22+ knots.
WD – 400m2 / FD – 1200m2 / Hangar – 300m2.
Looking at a sensor / systems suite in keeping with the fit out of HMS Clyde + 2nd hand sonar.
Looking at £45-50mill for the navigable hull / civil systems £10-15mill for the warload.
Looking at a charity shop 4.5″ / refurbed VP CIWS / 30-40mm turret / basic decoy suite / RM support section carry on AAW + A/T missiles.
NGS with 2 x 155mm pieces would be 160m x 25m x 5-6m / 13K tons full load approx / 24 MW for 22+ knots.
WD – 440m2 / FD – 1400m2 / Hangar – 360m2
Looking at £55-60mill for the navigable hull / civil systems + £20-25mill for the warload.
Proper CMS / better NBC citadel / better air radar / parking sensor quality hull sonar.
The next big step here would be a small scale CAMM installation – 32 tubes – and what level of radar / CMS would be required.
On the option list would be a 16 cell Mk41 at £8mill and a VLRS system if I could get one or two to fall of the back of a fast moving Army lorry.
APATS,
I guess there’s no reason we can’t use man portable missiles for both anti-ship and anti-air should the need arise.
The Other Chris,
You know I like the Bays :-) I’d have a total of six each capable of operating an entire ASW squadron of Merlin (6) – hangar for two-three, etc. The second batch would also have a lift from flight deck to vehicle deck assuming the vehicle deck is high enough for copters.
Basically you end up replacing Argus with ASW + Hospital ships… which can also be pretty effective assault ships.
TOC @ 11.02
The Black Swan concept is pretty close to an in joke.
It is so bad that I am going to offer my services to them so that they understand the concept, they understand the history of the original and why it failed and they understand the real lessons and how they can be applied now.
Never send a stoat to do a weasels work.
FBOT,
Endurance Class – absolutely excellent ship! How much did they cost?
@Simon
A corvette with a Wildcat, Sea Ceptor and some guns shouldn’t cost the same as a GP Type 26. If it does then something has gone seriously wrong.
@Simon
Hangar deck filled full of containers!
@FBOT
I’m unfamiliar with the failings of the original Black Swan but would love to know more, especially on how the lessons could be applied now.
Would it be possible for you take a few minutes to expand please?
Simon @ 11.08
Latest ship – single hull export order – is going out the door for £90-100mill.
Includes some LCVPs / upmarket – relative – sensor + system fit out / training and support / profit margin for the builder and the designer.
Given its naval heritage and it’s lack of PSV / AHTS heritage I think the design could be thrifted down to Colonial Sloop numbers.
Challenger,
“A corvette with a Wildcat, Sea Ceptor and some guns shouldn’t cost the same as a GP Type 26. If it does then something has gone seriously wrong.”
Really? I suppose I was really thinking about the hull. I guess you could leave the GT out of the T26-GP ships (assuming the diesels can get it to cruise at 18 knots).
So are we saying that T26 (hull and powertrain) are likely to be £250m? If so does anyone have any idea how it adds up to so much?
FBOT,
So if we do what APATS suggests (8 x T26 ASW + others) – I make that £1.25b we can spend on Endurance class –> 12 of the blighters!
The cost in 2008 was 100 million built in Singapore. The problem we have is an agreement with BAE to build ships here and the Govts insistence on not building warships aboroad! Would love a couple if not 10 because want some OPV/Corvette to be a bit smaller and go places these cannot but for reasons above am afraid it would be a non starter.
APATS,
Seriously, we have an agreement to build all our warships here in the UK?
So given that the nearest thing we can compare is Bay at £250m in todays money (ish) we’re paying somewhat of a premium to BAe. I’m assuming the cost of weapons if offset by the increased cost of propulsion on Bay and that the increased size of Bay is not going to alter the price significantly.
Perhaps we should just rent them out from the RSN? That might get us out of the “arrangement” (or stranglehold) with BAe.
Would be useful to find out how much money makes it back into the UK economy when we do build equipment here (salaries, taxes, supplier chains such as stationary/lunches/buses/etc).
Does the supply chain in military contracts respond similarly to the Nissan estimates of four local supply chain jobs [1] required per single construction job?
How much would that offset the apparent cost advantage of building abroad (e.g. MARS)?
How much cost difference would we still left with and is that an acceptable premium to maintaining sovereign design and construction capacity?
[1] http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-17266087
The Other Chris,
I think we should build all simple, mass producible hulls wherever is ultimately cheaper (including all your offsets).
We should retain sovereign design and construction for the technological edge (T45, T26, Astute). Trouble is, we don’t do that anyway. Most of the systems that actually make the majority of the things we have work well are European (e.g. MBDA).
TOC @ 11.21
It was the RN’s full on escort ship of the late 30s.
The sloop concept had been upgraded / gold plated over time from its humble WW1 MIne sweeper beginnings.
The BS turned up with 3 dual 4″ mountings / top quality ASW outfit / RN design standards / 2 year build cycle and steam turbines.
My understanding is that steam turbine capacity was the big bottleneck in RN ship production along with modern DP gun mounts.
Consequently the BS and the later Mod BS were very resource intensive.
However they were produced throughout the war but could never generate the numbers of escorts required.
Then comes reality, war experience, the Flower component set and potential starvation.
Out of this comes the River / Loch / Bay frigates that do the job in the numbers that were required.
So we build Tier 1 Mod BSs while churning out loads of Tier 2 Frigates.
All with TE engines / 2 x single 4″ guns / merchant standard hulls / ever improving ASW kit and then AAW kit.
The 2nd EG starts out as all Mod BS hulls – sort of RN All Stars ASW team.
However as some are damaged, one was sunk, move on to other gigs they are replaced by Lochs.
As a certain Russian mentalist once said – Quantity has a quality all of its own.
Now turning to the big picture in the late 30s RN build plan.
Look at the constraints that were placed on the other RN late 30s escort – Hunt class – thrifted the steam turbine plant to the extent that the hull was reduced to a beam of 29′ to meet the speed target and they fell over in the dock when fitting out.
Adding the two elements together – what was wrong with RN policy –
The BS were too expensive and complex for the job they had to do.
No work was done in the design space until it was too late and they had to steal a commercial whale catcher hull to get guns on the water.
The Hunts were a good idea but they were thrifted to virtual irrelevance – anti E boat patrols was just about their level.
If they had used design re-use and a proper RCA of the issues and challenges they faced then they could have used the I class hull or the new J class hull as a start and just installed 50-60% of the power to generate a long legged fleet escort that was more labour and resource efficient compared to the fleet destroyers then in build, which was a real ocean player rather than the Med / North Sea gunboat that actually turned up.
The lessons we can learn today?
RN build costs are too high.
We do not have enough hulls in the water.
Very narrow perspective on ship roles and capabilities.
Design is very project based leading to a jobs worth design culture.
Not enough humility and thirst for knowledge in the current officer cohort.
Simon the Bay class cost 100 million each as well, had we bought all 6 unit cost would have been closer to 90 million.
FBOT,
1. RN build costs are too high. BAe monopoly.
2. We do not have enough hulls in the water. Because of 1.
3. Very narrow perspective on ship roles and capabilities. Because of 1 and 2.
4. Design is very project based leading to a jobs worth design culture. No investment in education and long-term strategy..
5. Not enough humility and thirst for knowledge in the current officer cohort. Same as 4?.
FBOT, Am not going to get into it with you merely to say we are not going to fight WW2 again. On the narrow perspective on roles and Ships, how can a GP Frigate that in 2 years may be in active contact with a submarine, catch drug smugglers in the Caribbean, conduct disaster relief in the Caribbean. chase Pirates off Somalia, host a UK trade delegation in Dubai, contribute to a NATO reaction force and escort an HVU be considered a narrow perspective?
All PATS @ 12.10
Area AAW – That will be the T45 then.
TLAM – That will be the Astute then.
Even though a Mk41 VLS tube costs £500K we will not put any on a surface ship.
Albion class – The only LPD in existence that does not have helo facilities.
ASuW – That will be the Astute then if Harpoon won’t do or the ship is a T45.
The RN today is a bunch of one club golfers.
They are so bad and demarcation so rigid that Red Robbo must be the 2nd Sea Lord.
The drive to be a small but perfectly formed USN is killing the RN.
Who cares about numbers when we can play Top NATO Trumps with our Mk1 Thick Colonial Cousins.
@FBOT 11:55
Appreciate you spending the time to provide your perspective, thank you.
I have been wondering for a while if we could get Hyundai Heavy Industries to build us some patrol frigates on the back on the Incheon. Bit short legged, and underweight I know, but with CODOD propulsion, stripped back iMast sensor fit, a 76mm gun, a couple of 30mm guns, aviation facilities for a Wildcat, fitted for but not with Phalanx 30mm and CAMM it looks like a cheap patrol vessel
@ FBOT
Have you seen a frigate in re-fit? I don’t just mean pictures but actually seen one in the metal? Been on the dry dock wall and had a good shufty? They are basically stripped clean and rebuilt. It isn’t a lick of paint and an oil change.
1. Area AAW Spanish F100, German Saschen, Dutch De Zeven Provincien, France and Italy, Horizon until FEMM AAW comes in. Canada Tribal, Australia Uk T45. Unless you go to a single type of escort like the Arleigh Burke which suffers massively as an ASW asset you will always have one type. Type 45 will evolve but we have budgets.
2. Tomahawk, that will be UK and US only then, not bad capability to have. Trafalgar class still main carriers but yes would like to see Mk 41 silo on a ship.
3. Albion Class, absolutely no argument here. Criminal decision to save money and remove a deck. of note Bulwark still carried 2 Lynx Mk 3 for her 2006 deployment utilising an inflatable hangar!
4. ASuW yet again everyone simply writes off harpoon, what a lot of bollocks. The 45 does not have harpoon or an AShM missile at the moment neither did T42. Would like to see it.
The drive to maintain a broad spectrum over arching capability able to carry out the likely tasking of HMG and taking into account the likely threat and standing tasks is stretching the Navy. Choices have to be made to operate within the existing budget and we are at times hampered by Govt policy with reference to deals they make and policies they have with regard to domestic construction.
However your smug, superior attitude and constant criticisms off the back of fag packet costing s you bandy around without any operational background or knowledge is frankly insulting.
X @ 12.38
RN refits – yes I do have an inclantion regarding the workload.
My issue related to the cost variations – why some are £10mill and why some are £24mill.
However I would want to know how this level of refurb compared to civil ships of the same age.
All PATS @ 12.45
On the specifics – where is the second string area AAW?
We cannot rely on 6 hulls to do everything.
What would be wrong with the T26 hull having space for 8 / 16 Aster 30s to worry the opposition at 100kms?
They would not be able to fend of the Russian fleet in full WP / NA / KS mode but they would offer an ability to expand the controlled air envelope in small scale conflicts.
As for the other 3 questions – glad we can come to some sort of agreement.
As for the insult – not meant but please take it if you must.
@AAC and anyone else with knowledge of VLS UNREP
Re: Underway Replenishment (UNREP) of VLS
Looks like all VLS systems needs to be reloaded with Port Facilities. The USA tried a system that included missile reloading called FAST in the 70’s (?) which was a precursor to STREAM [1] for UNREP in general, however it required crew who were needed elsewhere.
In 1988, the “UNREP Journal” [2] (sounds like a candidate for the Have I Got News For You Guest Publication of the Week!) carried an article before the launching of Arleigh Burke:
– “When the going gets tough a great amount of ammo will be expended in a short time. The next urgent requirement is to quickly reload those empty magazines and be ready for whatever follows. Underway replenishment is the only answer for the fleet commander and we need to do it better.”
More recently in 2009 an UNREP engineer from NAVSEA reported on the status of Rearming Cruisers and Destroyers at Sea [3]:
– “There is no system to rearm VLS weapons at sea. Cruisers and destroyers must return to port to rearm.”
These are american documents, however I’m sure they represent the current situation for the Royal Navy as well.
Niche development opportunity for a forward thinking supplier?
[1] https://www.navalengineers.org/SiteCollectionDocuments/2007%20Proceedings%20Documents/Automation%20and%20Controls%202007/2-4-17%20Paper.pdf
[2] http://defensetech.org/2010/06/10/vls-underway-replenishment-when-will-the-navy-get-serious/
[3] https://www.navalengineers.org/SiteCollectionDocuments/2009%20Proceedings%20Documents/AD%202009/Papers/MillerMO.pdf
(@TD – Apologies if these links have broken out of their box, is there any BB code we can use to neaten links up in future?)
FBOT, The problem is that in order to fit Aster we need to fit PAAMS/SAMPSON and costs would skyrocket. We look at the air threat seriously and if we were going to take an HVU into harm’s way we would have at least 2 T45. Potentially 96 long range missiles depending on loading. If we go for a silo that allows quad packing of Sea Ceptor then a 24 cell silo would offer another 96 missiles per T26 out to 20Nm. Just who are we fighting and would we be fighting the sort of opponent that needs that sort of missile load out on our own? More likely we would be part of a NATO or European force and even if we were supplying the HVU/Carrier the addition of a De Zeven Provincien or 2 and maybe a Saschen or an f100 would help massively. defence planning assumptions simply do not ask the RN to be able to engage opponents requiring 100s of long range SAMs on our own.
I would like to see another silo on 45 taking missile load up to 60 but it will cost money and may happen later.
We have to balance the “likely” threat against where we spend our “limited” money.
Could someone who knows explain what it is about the ‘Burke’ that makes it rubbish at anti-submarine warfare?
Is it something that could be fixed by tweaking either the design or the docterine or is there something very fundemental about an AAW destroyer that stops it from being good at the ASuW job?
ps – I have purchased DK Brown’s book as instructed and am currently reading it.
Re: PAAMS on T26
Does the T26 need to designate itself or can T45 designate for it?
@Peter Elliott
Is this the Rebuilding the Royal Navy book and if if so were you able to find a paperback for less than £60?
@ The Other Chris
It was recently estimated ( I think by RUSI) That HMRC takes 30% back straight away just in the taxes from wages and national insurance straight off.
Estimate on Fiscal Multiplies for capital expenditure by government is 1.8 or so (If you are a Keynesian)
If the Government spends say £100 million on a new ship it then extra spending should generate GDP growth of £180 million. The UK tax take is around 40% of GDP so if we boost GDP by £180 million then we can expect to see an extra £72 million in tax. So in theory the government can basically recoup almost all the cost. If that expenditure as with something like the turbo jet goes on to generate a significant level of exports then the multiplier can be much higher.
There is allot of debate about how big the multiplier is but there is no doubt it exists. It really is better to buy domestic in most instances unfortunately there is no mechanism for the MOD to benefit from the extra taxes raised.
Re: cost of Bays
The original contract was £148 million for two. Actual cost £596 million for four c. 2007 (paid from 2000-2006). NAO report well worth a read.
Peter Elliot, Rubbish is perhaps too strong a word. They have a capability in line with a GP ship. for starters they are GT only driven with CPP so particuarly quiet. Up to fligh 2 they have a towed array but no hangar. from flight 2A they gain a hangar for 2 Sea Hawk LAMPS helos but lose the towed array.
@TOC
No – Future Surface fleet, options for a medium sized navy (1991).
Hardback cost me about £12 including postage.
Anixtu, 496 million wasn’t it? The 2 built at Swan Hunter ended up costing over 316 million and the 2 by bAE on the Clyde 187 million.
@APATS
So in theory you could design a blue water escort able to do both jobs well from a single hull? Big, tall and stable enough for a top notch radar and missile platform; quiet, with a towed array and a pair of good ASuW helos. Three such ships to escort a HVU. Total RN fleet of maybe 10 hulls?
Albeit you would then still want to have a couple of frigates in the task group for forward recce / picket line, and a mix of sloops and Modified Bays for mothership tasks.
Yes, the Bay’s were not one of our finest shipbuilding hours were they, especially given they are a licence design but that said, I think we would do better today.
This could spark an interesting debate if we think the option for a hi lo mix is worth exploring
In the LO part, comparing big and flexible like an evolved Bay, or small, like a Black Swan/Venator, how would the following compare
1. Cost
2. Capability
3. Flexibility
Jed did an article a while ago that explored the big and boxy evolved Bay concept, its a neat idea I think.
Given the low cost of running (although ackowledge that is influenced heavily by being RFA manned) and sheer size derived flexibility of a Bay would this be a better option, I think so. When I was doing the SIMSS piece, the same thinking applied, small does not equal cheap and large does not equal expensive, but large gives you flexibility
The other Chris, you mean if T26 had Aster? No as we do not have Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC).
Peter Elliott,
We do have those top notch escorts you speak of: it’s the Daring + Astute combo. Of the ones we have (6) we can pretty much guarantee that two will be available to escort the CVF/ARG fleet. I’d push that we can actually make three available regularly with four at a push.
APATS,
I had the NAO report in front of me when typing that. Swan Hunter was paid £342 million and delivered one and a bit ships, and the design. BAE was paid £254 million and delivered two and a bit ships and took over design authority at the end.
BAE’s original contract to build two was for £122 million. If Swan Hunter could build for the same price we would have an original contracted unit price of £61 million per, plus £26 million for design.
It is rather difficult to pick over the various contracts to come up with a realistic unit price based on the final costs.
TD,
RE: ‘licence design’
From the NAO report:
“Under-estimation of design maturity at project outset. The Swan Hunter design was based on the Dutch ship builder, Royal De Schelde Enforcer concept, a derivative of the existing Dutch ‘Rotterdam’ class vessels. There was shared optimism within the Department that the design of the ship was far more mature than it actually was.
The immaturity of design at the outset led to significant difficulty for Swan Hunter in fulfilling its role in the development of the design. Only seven per cent of the design drawings were provided on time and over 52 per cent were over a year late. This led to significant delays in BAE Systems’ build programme and a subsequent cost of £54 Million to the Department in delay and dislocation claims from BAE Systems.”
Peter Elliot, have you ever tried to hunt a submarine and fight an air battle at the same time? Then you have limitations of one hull not being able to be in 2 places at once. So yes one more expensive hull be capable of fulfilling both roles. However this would not necessarily translate to being able to do both at once.
@martin
Really interesting, thanks.
Given the 10 year funding requirement on new programme requests, perhaps these offsets will be included more often in future decision making.
These offsets could suggest the Type 45 programme cost the Treasury only £4.5b in the final accounting, or £750m per ship. Not taking into account wider supply chain benefits, just the direct clawback through taxes?
Unless these offsets are already included in the Headline figures?
@Peter Elliott
Appreciated, thank you.
@APATS
Aster, yes.
And CEC has been dropped from PR12?
TD,
The load per unit fuel used increases to the power of 2/3 (ish) of the displacement so basically bigger is better because less of your load is fuel.
However, a big ship cannot be in two places at once.
I think that because of the above two competing drivers we need to define how many small ships we need and then build big ships with the remaining money, if you get my gist.
Oddly this is the other way round to how we all seem to be discussing it. I must be wrong!
Meeting! Must go.
oops, fair one Anixtu
Maybe licenced design not so good after all then!
Anixtu, not to mention the 84 million pounds given to Swan Hunter to keep it going!
If we have big a boxy boat are they supposed to operate close to the shore because most countries that have done that for years have shallow ships with water jets. If they’re big and box and close to shore do you not require more self protection as there a bigger target.
@Simon
T45 is not quite evolved to the point I described. No towed array, poor hull sonar, no twin hangers. Also not sure it is quiet enough.
I don’t agree that the one or two available Astutes should be tied to a defensive role under the task group. They are too potent an attacking weapon to be used in that way. We need to design our capabilities so that the Astutes can be sent forward to act offensively against enemy shipping, infrastucture and home bases. That means that the surface escorts must be defensively capable both above and below the waterline.
In the real world we seem set firmly on a split fleet of DD and FF, but if I were SoS for Defence an evolution based on the T45 hull form but able to perform both AAW and ASuW really well would lead to a more efficient fleet profile in the future.
All PATS @ 13.07
We are talking about a second tier capability.
Why would we need a full on Tier 1 sensor + systems fit out?
Surely the feed from an Artisan set worked through the planned T26 CMS could get an A30s into the right “box” at the right time to allow their AR head to finish the job? Please note the first person to go “Ooh Matron” will not win a prize.
On the basi point regarding the cost of the PAAMS / Sampson system going forward – just how much kit is involved?
What is the contribution cost to build another of each?
@Peter Elliott
T45 is only an M41 [1] or A70 VLS away from TLAM…
Edit: Just reread and saw ASuW. Hurried comment. Sorry.
[1] £500k?
@APATS
That’s why I sent 3 hulls to escort the HVU. Three multi club golfers instead of 2 DD & 2 FF.
I agree 4 hulls can be in more places than 3 but I’m not suggesting that 2 ships do the work of 4.
Also notice that my solution puts 3 sets of Sampson and 3 towed arrays in the water, rather than just 2. More redundnacy, more coverage. Fewer crew. Less cost.
@TD
In terms of justifying cost and increase/reduction in hull numbers and the big vs small debate remember that Argus replacement is also in the mix.
If we assume that the hospital on board QEC replaces the hospital on Argus, then the 2 or 3 Modified Bays with big boxy hangers can be seen as replacing Argus in the aviation support role.
So, even though Bays are big and boxy compared to frigates and patrol boats we are actually getting more units and smaller when compared to Argus.
FBOT,
We were discussing T26? A first tier ASW platform and useful air defence capability. Now we want to put 8 or 16 missiles that I have explained will probably never be needed onto T26 that cannot even be used without a t45 present and an upgrade we neither have nor are likely to get in the immediate future.
FBOT Sampson is a phased array radar capable of multiple fire channels specifically designed to manage multiple missiles out to long range whilst scanning and tracking other targets.
Sea Ceptor and the fact that she is based on a fire and forget AAM allows for the fact that Artisan is a far more conventional non phased array radar so I am afraid that it cannot provide the required updates to an aster 30.
Did I miss the bit where QE & PoW were fitted with Role 3 medical facilities? :-/
Peter Elliot, No you actually have overlapping radar coverage and not eenough sonar coverage. There is a number that when you drop below you really do not have an escort screen anymore. In a true multi threat environment I would want the inner core protected by T45 with 4 T26 providing the outer ASW screen if we were acting alone.
Peter Elliott,
I understand but don’t quite agree in so much as I think both the offensive and defensive capability of the pair will be better than any ASW frigate anyone conjures up.
T45 can operate 1 x Merlin or 2 x Wildcat. Merlin can do active dipping whilst the massive array of hydrophones down each side of Astute can do some extra listening. Target is triangulated and Merlin (or Astute) launches a torpedo.
T26’s equivalent of the sub is a towed array and in my mind much less expensive but much less capable. In addition only Merlin can launch the torpedo regardless of how many you embark.
Granted, two Merlin makes a bit more sense but you can’t operate 24-7 ASW with just two Merlin. So that means 3 x T26 to cover the fleet.
Even if it hasn’t happened I bet that’s the fudge we get offered when Argus rusts away.
“Did I miss the bit where QE & PoW were fitted with Role 3 medical facilities? :-/”
Quick question on the medical facilities on Argus for you Anixtu, how big are they, the surface area.
Do you think they could be modularised for example
Anixtu, No, the problem is people including people who should know better refer to the Role 2 facility as a hospital!
@TD
You thinking along the lines of these?:
– http://www.karbox.cz/products/containers/medical-iso-1c-containers/iso-1c-intensive-care-unit-containers.html?lang=en
@APATS
Sounds like there is a doctrinal split then as well as the hardware issue.
What you are saying is that optimum ASuW is performed a lot further from the HVU than optimum AAW, which is why separate hulls are preferred. Makes perfect sense in the context of T42 / T23.
You could however argue that given the wide area capability of Sampson having the AAW nodes spread further apart would actually improve the protection offered to the HVU (ie move the AAW screen out to the optimum ASuW distance). Even if you had 4 of them you are still saving ships compared to the separate roles (2+4). Only issue I can see is that the HVU is now looking a bit lonely in the middle of the ring – so either put some Ceptor cells or SeaRAM onto the QEC to give it an inner layer of its own.
Other cost issue is that Sampson sets cost much more than towed arrays to buy – so the capital cost of setting up a fleet of ‘multi-club golfers’ would be pretty steep.
Arguable but accademic – becuase we’re committed to the FF / DD split.
APATS,
The sickbay on any RFA (or Merchant ship) is the ‘hospital’. ;-) Argus has a hospital AND a PCRF, though the hospital is run by an RN doc and LMA. On a Bay the hospital can perform Role 2, though is normally only manned and stored for Role 1. Anyone confused yet?
TD,
I’d estimate (very roughly) on the order of 1500-2000 m². Over 100 TEU without allowing for the inefficiencies of containerisation.
Anixtu,
So it would nicely fit in the vehicle deck of a Bay ;-)
Gives a whole new meaning to the phrase “Sick Bay”.
How many patients does that cater for?
Anixtu At sea it’s a sickbay, I will have you know!
All PATS @ 14.03
You just don’t get it do you?
Why can’t a Tier 1 ASW hull not have a Tier 2 area AAW capability?
If it can’t and it is reduced to a life of PD AAW then it is half the ship it could have been.
What happens if it is in transit with RFA tanker, can it provide an acceptable level of air defence?
The same question was asked of the T42 and ASW in that it had a second tier capability.
That has now gone from the T45 and the RN are a poorer service because of it.
Everything has now been thrifted to within an inch of their credibility and you salute the new norm.
So back to my original question –
Can an Artisan radar and a T26 class CMS route an A30 to a place close enough to a fast moving threat at 30 / 50 / 70 km so that the missiles AR head can close to the kill?
If not, why not?
Is it range?
Is it accuracy?
Is it processing power?
FBOT,
Is you last set of questions to do with having a T26 screen way out from the main T45 AAW screen?
If so, surely the question is really can our AEW asset direct the missile? If not, why not?
Simon@ 14.39
No, just looking to give the T26 some sort of an area AAW capability above running away and looking for the nearest T45 which as luck would have it is 3000 miles away.
On checking a few things it might be closer to 1000m².
PCRF has a single operating theatre with two tables, separate dental/minor treatment suite and labs, stores and offices. 10 bed ICU, 20 bed HDU and two 35 bunk wards. All split over three levels with internal lifts.
FBOT,
Sorry, I read your question as though the A30 was launched from the T45!
What does the T26 need area AAW for? The HVU is defended by T45 (or several).
Peter Elliot, I assume you mean ASW rather than ASuW. Quite often the HVU will have a Frigate in very close to act asa goal keeper, this was of course when PDMS was measured in NM very few rather than the capability that Sea Ceptor brings.
The closer the shooter is to an HVU the easier it is to provide all round protection, if you can guarantee to be up threat, e.g you can see the raid is building then you may elect to shift the screen.
For instance (attempting to keep it simple) my MLA is 000 and I have 4 T26 frigates pushed out between 4 and 8NM each covering 70 degrees giving me coverage from 000 to 140 and 200 to 000 as I am content that there is no SSN threat the limiting lines of submerged approach at my speed prevent a attacking from astern.
I have 2 T45 close in from 1-4Nm 180 degrees each when AEW sees a raid building on an axis of 030 at 120NM. I may choose to rejig the screen giving 3 of the T26 125 degrees each pulling 1 back and placing it in on the starboard quarter at 1000yds whilst keeping 1 t45 in an all round sector at 1-3Nm and pushing the other up to sit just behind the T26 screen on the threat axis for max engagement range.
It is about responding to the threat whilst maintaining coverage and trying to be 1 step ahead.
APATS,
That’s more like it. Nice example use of resources.
One question: “…content that there is no SSN threat the limiting lines of submerged approach at my speed prevent a attacking from astern”. How? Just the speed you are going?
All PATS @ 14.03
You just don’t get it do you?
Why can’t a Tier 1 ASW hull not have a Tier 2 area AAW capability?
If it can’t and it is reduced to a life of PD AAW then it is half the ship it could have been.
What happens if it is in transit with RFA tanker, can it provide an acceptable level of air defence.
Sea Ceptor will have arange of about 16NM and in even a 24 cell Sylver or Mk 41 silo could carry 96 missiles so yes I would say it has a tier 2 capability and is more than capable of protecting in an in company asset.
So no it would not be running away to hide behind a Type 45.
Simon, a formula involving the amount of sonar coverage you have around the HVU “circle” and the speed you are going at. Obviously the greater coverage you have then the cone that any sub can approach from the rear becomes narrower and more of a stern chase, therefore they have to go faster.
Hi Challenger @11:18
That “A corvette with a Wildcat, Sea Ceptor and some guns shouldn’t cost the same as a GP Type 26” is a Visby, and they come @ $ 180m a piece
– mainly because of a v advanced construction method for stealth
– for the cost of it, the AA missiles got stripped; so between so two, call it plus/minus zero from the base price
… would need to be a bit bigger for sea-keeping and endurance, though
@James
Exactly what problem are you trying to solve? It sounds like you just want something akin to ASROC, but which takes up a lot of precious space and which lacks the all-weather capability. It’s not a completely stupid idea, particularly if you had a pinger on your RHIB for bistatic sonar – the US were toying with something similar for the original ASW module for the LCS, but they gave up on it and are now going for a more conventional layout with a 2087 sonar onboard the LCS, about 10 years after the RN.
I appreciate the thrust of the space pen parable – but factually it’s a load of nonsense. Both the US and USSR used pencils up until about 1968. NASA didn’t spend $1m on a space pen, it was a private development – and the guy sold them to both NASA and the Soviets. Pencils weren’t ideal – the leads kept breaking, which meant that you had bits of conducting graphite floating around near mission-critical electronics.
I am a bit troubled by all this littoral business and ASW work. You don’t have to go many miles out before you are well into the dive envelope of many submarines. You wouldn’t take a submarine where it is hard to “drive” it isn’t the nature of the beast. (Though the stories of WW1 RN submarines in the Baltic are astounding.) I am troubled also because once you are say 30miles out you are over the visual horizon. And if a RADAR can see you well that is no different than another ship’s RADAR seeing you. And the job of the navy as JP Jones said is to go into harm’s way. And I don’t think many states can do much harm to Western naval power from their own shore. And those that can would be facing the threat out at sea. Also don’t forget go within 12nm and you are inside somebody’s territorial waters. And yes I know coastlines are crinkly but…..
Also I am troubled by this idea I see behind some of the think here about “escorting” merchantmen. I don’t think it will happen. If the West needed massive supply lifts of basic goods we would be using container ships. Even for grain. And as was found in the WW’s speed is a good anti-submarine weapon. A charging 25kt container ship would be a good target for any submarine commander. But I just can’t see it happening. It should also be remembered in WW2 only 1 in 10 convoys actually saw a U-boat. And of those 10% the majority of ships escaped.
And the more I have thought about that Black Swan document the sillier it becomes. 18kts really? That’s rhubarb. The second fundamental weapon of naval warfare is manoeuvre. Float, move, fight. There is no excuse for not building a “sloop” cheaply that can’t do 20kts easily and economically. And there is no to reduce accommodation standards either. Compare the £65m cost and specifications of the Black Swan to the £72m cost and specifications of this vessel,
http://www.motorship.com/news101/south-african-polar-vessel-is-launched
The whole paper is Duncan Sandys-meets-SeaQuest-meets-Yes, Minister-with-a-dash-of-googling-Asimo.
And I am bit trouble by how it appears
Ref numbers and “tiers” of capability:
1. towed array, even in my day could pick up Soviet era SSN at “2 to 3 convergence zones” e.g. out to 100nm on a good day – that is obviously just a bearing, and you can guess range based on strength of the signal. Got two widely spaced T26 towing their arrays in passive mode and linked via SATCOM for a tri-angulation, Merlin has the range to close and start to localize / prosecute. Closer in, or “shallower” water, or other factors, then 2087 can go LF active and we start getting into sophisticated territory like bi-static / multi-static, which obviously requires multiple platforms (ships OR helos).
2. Subs being used as “close escort” for surface ships is frought with communications issues, and thus deconfliction issues
3. Because T45 is allegedly pants at ASW, you can’t bung it up threat as an AAW picket if there is a substantial / real ASW threat
4. Both AAW and ASW require the “inner layer” around the HVU; be that dippers or frigates for ASW, and frigates in goal keeper mode, or the the HVU’s being equipped with suitable PDM / CIWS
5. What if you have to sortie some of your screen as a “surface action group” (SAG) either to undertake a land attack mission or to neutralize an enemy surface threat (ASuW) ? Do you have enough units to maintain the screen and deploy a SAG ? Does the SAG require both a T45 to provide highest quality defence against shore launched missiles AND a T26 to protect the T45 against an ASW threat ? How many helo’s can the T26 carry, to contribute to either land attack / ASuW (targetting, missile carrier etc) or to the local ASW effort ?
As you can see I am just trying to build on APATS excellent little scenario by pointing out to the land lubbers amongst us (and I don’t mean that as an insult) that picking a ship type and desiging it is not as simple as: T45 does this, therefore T26 does that. There are many interlinked dependencies.
As I am sure APATS knows, it’s great fun to watch a junior officer under training panic on the bridge as he manouvres to defeat a torpedo and then the FOST Green Foulie bastard’s throw in a pop up sea skimmer from the same threat sub, and PWO(A) starts screaming for weapons arcs….. ahh memories…. :-)
x,
“…You don’t have to go many miles out before you are well into the dive envelope of many submarines. You wouldn’t take a submarine where it is hard to “drive” it isn’t the nature of the beast…”
I’m not sure I understand your “troubles”.
@X
I agree that in terms of a wartime role a couple of Evolved Bays providing aviation facilities, space for a containerised hospital, and a couple of extra landing craft would be worth more than any number of lightly armed sloops lurking around maritime choke points.
If the price tag of either comes in below £120m you are well ahead of the game compared to GP Frigates at £250m but the ability of the Evolved Bays to act as peacetime motherships for a wide variety of fancy gadgets above or below the surface again tips the argument their way.
X – I am with you on the Black Swan malarchy.
As someone noted earlier, I have posted previously on the Bay and Dutch JSS evolutions of the Damen Schelde Enforcer class family of vessels and how going big could provide a “standard” flotilla that could do MSO, disaster resonse, replace the remaining Rovers, the Argus and even the Diligence.
Add a couple of TD’s SIMMS but based on the smaller Ulstein boat that Jedibeeftrix suggested, the one that could do 21Kts plus and we have:
1. Mother ships for ASW helicopters
2. Mother ships for ASW oriented USV if you really want to hunt in the shallows
3. a multi-role el-cheapo work horse that could tow a towed array if required (and provide torpedos from a Lynx Wildcat)
BUT I still think we need at least 8 or more “ASW Frigates” able to manouvre fast enough, to actively ping, and throw ordanance into the water in close proximity to the HVU’s if the threat sub pierces the screen.
I have asked before and will ask again, do we think the weight of HE in a modern 120MM mortar round would be sufficient for it to be used as a depth charge when deployed in rapid fire from something like a NEMO or AMS ?
Re: Manoeuvring
Does the RN still operate the “Handbrake” command adopted after Sheffield was hit?
i.e. On suspicion of missile attack; turn towards the attack; accelerate; launch chaff.
El Sid,
“Exactly what problem are you trying to solve?”
Merely taking the Queen’s bayonet* to the Queen’s enemy, and delivering it into his gut with maximum violence. What I used to be paid to do. No other proper job for a soldier or a sailor. Not so sure about the RAF Movers though – I think they actually serve Beelzebub, or if not him, then the Queen’s enemy. The rest of the Kevin’s claim to serve the Queen, but only through union-negotiated terms and conditions, with every weekend free for golf.
* Torpedo in this case, obviously.
Jed,
I don’t really understand your points 2 and 3. If they work as a pair then they can be moved “up threat” surely?
Simon, Point is that once a sub is dived you have to let it get on with its job. You cannot talk it other than through some shit uw garbled stuff which sends noise through the water or by it either towing a VLF aerial (not clever for an SSN) or coming to a depth where it cans send and receive by tacsat or HF/VHF which is not a god idea in a warzone. You effectively give the submarine a bit of water which may be stationary or may be moving and let it get on with it. You do not drop weapons in there; any other subs in the area are the responsibility of yours to deal with. Even if you had a positive contact and Ided it as a hostile you do not drop a weapon as your sub may be lurking undetected close by and may be acquired by any weapon.
Subs operate best in associated support doing their own thing in a supporting role, so sanitising water in a moving box ahead of the TG, or lurking behind to pick up any enemy snoopers.
As for point 3 well you are removing 2 ships from your screen instead of 1, is it worth it to engage the enemy aircraft x miles closer, will it make the difference between engaging the aircraft and the missiles in which case it may be worth removing 2 ships if not probably not. Lots to think about.
JEd, re FOST throwing in challenges.
Clearly, I have no experience of FOST, but the Pongoes do similar sort of stuff, no doubt to the same level of challenge.
Point No 1. Any sign of panic, stop exercise, bin young officer to some logistic unit. Can’t afford to have panickers in a combat unit.
Point Nos 2-n. No further points.
We used to have scenarios mounted one on the other in NI training. Start with escorting the RUC to deliver a summons to some flat in West Belfast, throw in a “he’s not here”, add in an aggressive neighbour, mix in a small crowd getting increasingly aggro, throw in (literally) some petrol bombs, escalate until you’ve got a small riot, then a big riot, add in a sharpshooter taking a few potshots, coffee-jar bombs, then a mechanical issue with the APC, add in some media coverage and an aggressive local politician, then open up into the full-blown IED with multiple civpop casualties*. All makes for a good enough test of a young officer.
* We had to stop blowing up buckets full of pigs’ guts with a thunderfalsh as the WRAC playing civpop got squeamish. We were allowed to ladle them out over the casualties for a while, then even that had to stop. Shame.
Hi APATS, RE
“Tomahawk, that will be UK and US only then, not bad capability to have. Trafalgar class still main carriers”
– conventional Spanish subs carry them
APATS, Jed,
Sorry, I’m not trying to be thick or annoying but…
“…Subs operate best in associated support doing their own thing in a supporting role…”
Doesn’t this then mean that you let the sub do its “thing” whilst the T45 does its “thing”. In other words, you have the best sub-killer (another sub) and the best jet/missile killer (T45).
i.e. T45+Astute is a first-class deployable escort unit.
PE @ 15.56
A Bay is just a long version of a Colonial Sloop that someone has decided to build.
All it needs is an extra 15m added to the foredeck / bow ahead of the bridge to make the hull comfortable at 23 knots.
Looking at 190m x 26m x 6m approx / 16,500 tons full load / 4 x 12V32 gen sets – 27MW.
The extra space up front would allow a 4.5″ gun and a VP CIWS to be installed.
Consequently looking the part and a hangar can be added to home a couple of helos.
My thoughts on a Tier 1 ASW vessel using the Colonial Sloop platform / component set / build efficiencies would probably be a bit bigger and faster with the capacity in the well dock to transport two Damen 4207 sub chasers so that the net can be spread wider when the need to do ASW becomes apparent. In the context of the FI this would be at StH / TdeC where the beasts could be unleashed.
Looking at 54MW of motive power to get the ship up to 28knots +.
One doctrinal change that I would push for is the move away from single ship deployments.
They do not need to hold hands all the time but support within 12 / 24 hours should be the way to go.
As @Peter Elliott highlighted, Astutes may be great at ASW but they’re also great offensive weapons in their own right.
Best to use them to prosecute the enemy rather than escort?
@APATS & @Simon
Based on that very lucid description of how a SSN operates the obvious tool to pair it with is not T45, T26 but a long range MPA.
The SSN can then go far ahead of the task group, right up to the enemy home ports, and snuff out any underwater threat before it comes anywhere near our surface fleet, while the MPA sanitisies the space around it and from time to time sends it a new ‘box’ to go and play in.
Moreover once the enemy subs are sunk the MPA can then continue to verify the absence of a threat, allowing the sub to carry on and play havoc with Land Attack and Anti Surface Warfare.
All in all much better than sitting under the task force’s feet getting in the way of our own Merlins. (Just a pity we have no MPA then…)
ACC, The Spanish order was cancelled in 2009 I am almost certain.
@Jed
“with a rocket delivered torpedo, and 120mm automatic mortars as depth charge throwers…….”
I didn’t know you were keen on 120 mm mortars, Jed, but it doesn’t seem like a bad idea. Tell me, because I’m a landlubber and all at sea in such areas , if you’ll pardon the pun, are depth charges still carried on Royal Navy ships or is anti-submarine weaponry confined to torpedos (rocket delivered or not).
Re: “pity we have no MPA then”
Interestingly relevant if not an actual option:
– http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/general-atomics-selex-team-up-for-predator-b-sensor-demonstration-372176/
RE: Bays
That’s what one gets for messing with off-the-shelf designs “2 built at Swan Hunter ended up costing over 316 million ”
– the doubling of cost
The reason for keeping the T45 in close is so that it can protect the HVU. It is not difficult in a lot of cases for aircraft to bypass an air Defence Destroyer by flying around it and never being engaged. The 45 is a defensive asset to ensure that the HVU or perhaps another phrase the Mission Essential Unit (MEU) arrives. Personally if I never saw an enemy aircraft I would be happy. They can be bombed on the deck or captured by pongos for all I care but I want my best missile shooters in the right place to protect the MEU if they do show up.
James and the lurking torpedo – previous post
You may be onto something.
What you need is a two stage torpedo.
Launched from the shore with initial targeting instructions.
Big Torpedo – 42″ or similar – gets out to 50km and then contacts the shore for an update.
New info fed to the Small Torpedo – 21″ – and off it goes to do its duty.
If the threat has moved off then it either returns home or is moves further out.
Not sure of the best carrier – Big Torpedo or Yugo style 2 man sub.
If the standard A-Torp tactic is to crank up the T23 and try and out run it then this would be good method of area denial using a whole series of old fashioned / surplus stock torpedoes.
@ Simon
I get the distinction impression some here think that the sea will be thick with SSKs at paddling depths and we will be scuppered. I don’t think so. I know how much work it is to con a big surface ship in shoals let alone a “ship” reliant on being submerged to work with only tiny pings and dead reckoning (by the Pilot) and inertial guidance (by a computer) to no where it is.
@ Jed re SAGs
When I play fantasy navy I break my “fleet” down into blocks thus,
1 x T45
1 x T26 (ASW)
2 x second raters (my CODAD frigates)
Seems to answer most of my problems. The carrier has one of these groups, another for say NATO/OST standing tasks, another for ARG/FRE etc.
ACC @ 16.31
Never buy a ship from a Dutch dreamer with a yard on its last legs.
It is not as if the design was a leading edge concept unique to the world.
Whoever did the due diligence / contract negosh on this should now be counting toilet rolls.
FBOT,
you may be thinking of this old cavalryman’s “Mexe-Torpedo Andrew Area Defence Weapon”.
Small Mexeflote, covered in waterproofed batteries, with a small receive only data radio. All sea-grey painted for camouflage.
Torpedo underslung.
Several thousand feet of chain and a big old concrete block to keep it anchored.
Deployed from some 4th rate little boat to form a temporary anti-sub screen. Batteries good for a week or more, torpedo activated and given attack instructions over secure datalink from a frigate or helicopter.
Given that in wait and listen mode, it is completely silent, the enemy sub may have no notice at all that it is there. If it is not needed, recoverable by cutting the chain.
TD
“I tend to think that Fireshadow makes a lot more sense in a maritime environment than it does on land.”
Why the volte face, TD? I thought in the earlier posts about Fire Shadow you were very much opposed to its use on land. What makes its maritime use so different?
IMHOP:
For me, it seems that the purpose of the Type 26 will be primarily ASW, and ASuW, with land attack as a strong capability as a supplement to this.
What I don’t understand is why we don;t simply have that requirement covered by actual submarines? Submarines would be harder to detect and engage than a frigate, and it could be argued that they would be far better suited to engaging other subs. For land attack, they have cruise missiles, and if you want to argue about not having helicopters then I should remind you that there are a number of UAV designs that can be deployed from subs.
Of course I’m not talking about a dozen more Astutes (I wish I was.) but a new class of SSKs, smaller, with ship to ship combat above and below the surface as a priority. And if you’re worried about choppers dropping depth charges on them, I turn your attention to the sub-based AA missiles the German navy has at the moment.
As for the anti piracy and fleet numbers, I’d add some more T45s, which could be deployed to theatre with constellations of corvettes. Corvettes based on the Dutch and German designs, a couple of dozen of which would provide the navy with an inexpensive escort/counter piracy/ humanitarian support platform which could be quickly reconfigured to specialise in certain roles.
Just my thoughts. I’m a submarine/ destroyer kinda guy.
James,
“Mexe-Torpedo Andrew Area Defence Weapon”
Sounds like you’ve invented a CAPTOR mine, only your one floats and isn’t as autonomous.
Anixtu,
beaten to it by the Septics. Oh well. Although I’m pretty sure you want it command-initiated and floating, to ease up on the sinking of fishing boats by mistake, and so you can re-use it.
I’ve got a vision of these things being put out in Falklands waters in times of raised stress, operated by Clyde and the SAR helos to deter Carlos Fandango until the Cavalry arrive (once the RAF Movers have done their ritual buggering about with moving of troops).
….and to make the deterrence complete, the runway at MPA to be equipped with those metal poles that rise up out of the street (there’s lots in Cambridge, probably loads of other cities as well), each pair 5 metres high and solid as in f***ing solid, and pairs at 50 metre intervals along the runway. That’ll stop any surprises.
Hi APATS, v interesting
“The Spanish order was cancelled in 2009 I am almost certain”
– not just range/ endurance, but also the ability to influence events on land (SF, TLAMs) are at the heart of the Oz submarine requirement
– the best match (not counting BMT vapourware) is the Spanish sub, or its evolved model (admittedly never built yet, but much improved AIP through inserting an extra block to the middle of the design; 21 days if memory serves)
…well, perhaps having it in the design is good enough, rather than proven
TD’s Pin Board went all fighty and not depressingly Andrew! Ya-hey!
Although he is missing the obvious one… http://www.britishbattles.com/waterloo/waterloo-june-1815.htm
Thanks, TD. ;)
James,
Re: command initiated CAPTOR
Although the ability to switch a minefield off and on would be useful, modern mines know the difference between the sound of a fishing boat and the sound of a submarine. AIUI you could programme one to sink a particular boat the third time it passed, if you had reason to. Or, for example, to ignore MCMs and escorts and only detonate if a landing ship or craft came within range, provided you had the relevant acoustic signature on file.
“The immaturity of design at the outset led to significant difficulty for Swan Hunter in fulfilling its role in the development of the design. Only seven per cent of the design drawings were provided on time and over 52 per cent were over a year late. This led to significant delays in BAE Systems’ build programme and a subsequent cost of £54 Million to the Department in delay and dislocation claims”
I hope everyone thinks of this before they criticise the £127m assessment phase for T26. It’s a classic Bernard Grey thing, putting more effort into settling on a mature design before commiting to a multi-£bn procurement, rather than the usual half-arsed making it up as we go along.
On the T23 refits – they are partly dependent on the state of the ship, but the recent ones have involved a lot more new toys. The first mid-life refits didn’t have the new CBRN filters, upgraded Sea Wolf and DNA(2) for instance. From memory Somerset will be the last to get 2087.
On this taskforce ORBAT – the whole multi-function thing is a lovely idea but it just doesn’t work out in the real world. You use Burkes as an example – well for one thing they cost twice as much as a T45 in serial production – nearly $2bn a copy. And they still don’t have both a helicopter and TA which should be your baseline for serious ASW work. So you’re looking at something that looks more like a Ticonderoga cruiser – and even then the USN designed the Spruance for ASW work using the same hull (well, actually the Tico was based on the Spruance hull, but anyway).
For the sake of argument, let’s say that a bog-standard T45 is £650m, T45 with some extra ASW goodness costs £700m, a T26 costs £350m and an Astute is £1300m. Then 3xT45-ASW costs £2.1bn, 2xT45+2xT26 costs £2.0bn, 1xT45-ASW + 1xAstute costs £2.0bn. Obviously the running costs would be a bit different but broadly you’re not saving any money and you still have this problem that you don’t have enough ASW escorts in the right place for sonar coverage. It’s not just a question of having two ships to get a bearing (you really need three, in case there’s other ships in the way) – it’s also about being close enough to pick things up on sonar. For standard taskforce defence, if I had to pick one of those three combinations, it would be the T45/T26 combo every time. OK, maybe the T45/Astute combo if I was transiting some chokepoint like the Suez Canal and could just put the sub up front….
@James – Anixtu beat me to it with your CAPTOR…. Seriously though, Queen’s bayonet etc – yeah, yeah, rah, rah. What requirement are you trying to meet? At the moment you seem to be just offering a fun solution and then looking for a question. We have technologies already that can deliver bundles of torpex joy out to 30nm or much more – they’re called helicopters and ASROC. Except helicopters give you dipping sonar and sonobuoys, and ASROC gives you all-weather capability. OK – the RN doesn’t have an ASROC at present, but it’s an established technology, it wouldn’t be beyond the wit of man to adapt RUM-139 into a Stingray version for SYLVER. If you’d said – I’m trying to do a similar capability to ASROC but cheaper, a sort of Iranian ASROC – then I’m listening. Ultimately I’m not sure it ends up quite working out like that once you’ve allowed for the manpower, integration and space on the ship, but it’s a nice idea.
Since we all seem happy that T45 should remain close to the HVU/MEU why the hell isn’t Sea Viper installed on CVF? The Italians seem to think A15 at least is okay on Cavour. The Americans put RAM all over their Wasps. Why don’t we free up a couple of T45s by doing similar?
@ Simon
A question I have asked myself. Sampson was removed from CVF to save money. And the Invincibles had Sea Dart to make up for the small fixed wing contingent. But some forget that CVA was to have Sea Dart so the RN must have seen some value in fitting a missile system.
As the HVU CVF will sit at the centre of any group. It would leave the T45 to move on the axis of threat. Makes sense to me. As I have said nobody at the Admiralty thought CVF through properly. We needed a mega-Cavour (modest fixed wing capability, optimized accommodation for marines, easy access to the hanger for vehicles, a good all around of armament of missiles and guns, and who knows space for TLAM/Scalp-N) and what we are getting is an under armed mini-strike carrier that we will push to do those things I listed for mega-Cavour.
El Sid,
it is simply trying to track back to TD’s original point, which is ASW work. OK, 90% of the thread and comments is about what other things the boats can do, but for a thread on a new anti-submarine capability, there does not appear to be much actual anti-submarine debate.
So perhaps the real question should be phrased as “don’t sweat the other stuff, concentrate on killing submarines. How is that best done?” Who knows, maybe the right answer is more SSNs or some SSKs, or MPA, or maybe another follow on frigate 23.5 with the same kit in new hulls.
That’s the difficulty I have with phrases such as “T26 Assessment Programme”, because it pre-suppose the answer is new frigates. And in the last 10 years, the Sea Lords have amply demonstrated that they are incompetent and incapable of thinking beyond classes of ships, no matter what the capability need.
@ El Sid
We could buy the Italian ASW missile. The one they put into their FREMM with their Slyver launchers……
@ James
The ASW question is easy T26 needs CODLAG, Thales UMS 4410 CL Hull sonar suite, 2087, and Merlin(s). That is why it isn’t being talked about as there is nothing to discuss.
James, the best way to kill a submarine is with another submarine. The point of a T26 and indeed an escort in general is to prevent a submarine or a missile or an aircraft killing the MEU. If an active policy and good use of assets ensured that the enemy did not push home its attack and the mission be it an amphib offload or a strike mission to take place without any in contact time then it is a successful mission!
@ James
“I always liked the parable of the writing in space competition. The Americans spent $1 million on developing a special biro that wrote upside down in zero gravity, the Russians bought some pencils”
— Not sure if this was answered by someone else, but that’s actually an urban myth :( Pencils were used by both the Colonials and the Russians, then Grease pencils (once the fire hazard of wood and loose graphite were brought to the fore), then felt tip pens and even just standard pens. A private manufacturer did make a “space pen” which has been used (more reliable, quite light).
General re; ASW work,
Two questions; 1) do RN ships carry disposable sonar bouys, ala, Nimrod/Merlin? Might be an idea for helping out Type 45 as an emergency solution should the need arise? 2) Anyone know what the quality is like of the dipping sonar that Lynx Wildcat is projected to carry? Might facilitate a move towards a single heli fleet, at least for the provision of escorts (and again, make Type 45/any ship, more useful as an auxillary ASW asset).
@ The Other Chris,
“Would be useful to find out how much money makes it back into the UK economy when we do build equipment here (salaries, taxes, supplier chains such as stationary/lunches/buses/etc).”
— Again, not sure if this has already been answered but the estimates are between 25-40%, depending on what is included and how far down the supply chain you go, right down to issues about people paying fuel duty to drive to work versus sitting at home, unemployed, claiming benefits. There are also variables, such as capital expenditure by a company to improve its facilities then leading to increases in other orders.
The down side however is that while all this is good news for the treasury, the MoD does not get a credit to its budget for keeping money in the UK economy. £4bn to the MoD is £4bn, regardless of whether that cash stays in the UK or goes to Spain for example.
@ FBOT,
“Why can’t a Tier 1 ASW hull not have a Tier 2 area AAW capability?”
— If Type 26 gets Artisan and SeaCeptor, it will have Tier 2 AAW skillz.
@ Simon,
“One question: “…content that there is no SSN threat the limiting lines of submerged approach at my speed prevent a attacking from astern”. How? Just the speed you are going?”
— Don’t forget that to catch a Task Force travelling at 18 knots you’d have to be travelling even faster (to close in). That’s going to make an awful lot of noise, which isn’t ideal if the task force is trailing 2087 units behind it, or has a lurking Sub bringing up the rear. And just like a missile engagement in A2A, if the target is heading away from you then it impacts on the useful range of your weapons.
@ Jed,
“have asked before and will ask again, do we think the weight of HE in a modern 120MM mortar round would be sufficient for it to be used as a depth charge when deployed in rapid fire from something like a NEMO or AMS ?”
— No idea, but props to you for finding a way to get 120mm mortars into the discussion! You really ought to write a post about all the available options and their uses. Would make a nice change to see another army based article. I’m gradually seeing the light of your favoured tool of warfare.
Even if we were really set up for offensive anti submarine warfare (ie MPA and more SSN) we would still need a defensive screen on the task group. Belt and braces. In a tense situation you never know who else might have a sub out there waiting to take a pot shot and then deny all knowledge.
From what has been explained on this thread the best (and most cost effective) tool for that defensive screen does still sound like 3 or 4 frigates – which is why I don’t have a problem with us building about 10 new ones.
How to spend the other £750M in the budget is an open question. Not enough for an SSN sadly (The money for the 8th Astute is effetcively gone due to all the faffing about). However roll in about £100M for Argus replacemnt and we could perhaps manage 3 or 4 Evolved Bays and some mid range turboprop MPAs like the C-295.
All in all a pretty useful mix for both anti submarine warfare and standing tasks.
@ Chris B re Jed and anti-submarine mortars
This is what he wants us to bring back……
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Limbo_(weapon)
An awesome thing. A thing of beauty. I don’t think a lightweight what 30lb to 50lb 120mm round is going to do much. Chucking it further doesn’t make up the smaller nature. There be a reason why the Mk10 used 400lb rounds.
He will be wanting to bring back hammocks next and 60 bod messdecks……. ;) :)
BTW there is footage somewhere on YouTube of the SAAB system.
@ X
Personally I think you Naval types should sleep on fireblankets, with rolled up fire blankets for pillows and another fire blanket for a cover ;)
If it wouldn’t breach security, just what measures have been taken to fire proof the living quarters on things like Type 45. Only the FI boards of inquiry were quite critical of the flammability of crew quarters back in them days and suggested it be taken into consideration going forward. Just wondering.
Chris B @ 20.34
You miss out one very important word – “Area”.
As in Area AAW rather than PD AAW.
CAMM / Artisan as I understand it is Set up for PD AAW.
Consequently if the T26 is paired up with a RFA tanker the tanker is on its own regarding AAW.
My question relates to what would constitute a Tier 2 Area AAW system?
Then what do we have that could meet this requirement?
My thoughts are that Tier 1 relates mainly to capacity and then secondly capabilities.
The missile / launcher would remain the same, that is the cheap and easy part.
Looking at £8mill for 2 x 8 Sylver 50 or Sylver 70 silos.
And while we are at it we could pony up another £8mill to generate a TLAM capability.
The capacity issue would be the sensor / CMS ability to deal with a number of threats.
My thoughts are that Tier 2 would be 25-33% as good as Tier 1 in this respect.
Capabilities would relate to range and refresh rate which would probably be 50-67% of Tier 1.
Also included would be the quality and quantity of information that the ship can send to the missile.
The T45 is full on Tier 1 Area AAW – that is NA / WP / KS fighting at its worst.
The T26 should be able to stand its ground – ie Area AAW – against a FI style attack both in numbers and relative / updated 30 years technology.
If the T26 as currently specc’ed can’t do this then why not?
Is it the Artiisan radar that isn’t up to the job, or is it the CMS?
What other alternatives are there for Tier 2 Area AAW?
How do other navies approach the issue?
Intermediate tech or VFM / Thrifted Tier 1 capability?
From the numbers talked about on here the T45 Tier capability cost £390mill per hull.
Seemingly for hulls 7 + 8 the figure fell to something close to £300mill.
What Is the budget for T26 PD AAW?
What extra should be the budget for Tier 2 Area AAW?
Would an extra £50mill cover it?
Chris B,
another myth popped (space biros). However, one that I know not to be an urban myth – this really happened – but still only semi-serious and an example of Russian humour.
End of Cold War, and the 3 western Allies in Berlin decide to hold a beating of rereat / parade / cocktail party to which they invite the no-longer-enemy Soviets. Commander Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG) is himself invited. Massive amount of rehearsals and titivation goes on behind the scenes, and all goes well. Comd GSFG is at one point during the cocktail party asked by a French one star what the real plans for attacking Berlin in the event of war breaking out.
“Easy. It would take two trucks and about 8 men. They drive around West Berlin, and every 100 metres put up a sign saying “Prisoner of War Camp. Stay Out”. Cue lots of slightly nervous laughter. No doubt a foreseen interchange by the Russians, no doubt a long way from the truth, but still in itself quite telling.
FBOT, only you could keep going after being told you are wrong. OK it is not a spreadsheet exercise. Without AEW you will not detect a sea skimming missile much beyond 10NM, most aircraft will launch missiles well beyond that.
So basically a tier 2 AAW capability is a fallacy, something you have created in your non ops mind. You can either engage the aircraft prior to launch at long range or you engage the missiles on detection. for a singleton unit relying on shipborne sensors that is 10Nm roughly.
PDMS is the ability to defend yourself only, for instance sea wolf will not engage a crossing target it is designed to defend the ship. sea Ceptor can engage what it can see out to about 16Nm+. hence it is not a PDMS!
It can defend that area against things it can detect and be launched at.
James, my favourite cold war story was the honey trap for the French Ambassador to Moscow who when presented with the photographic evidence and the threat to release them to both the press and his wife simply said fine but can I have a set as well?
@ TD – yet another excellent post!
Coming late to this discussion but have read through the comments – very interesting and informative.
RE: RFA to replace Argus, etc – a number of options:
Endurance 160
http://kementah.blogspot.co.uk/2010/11/lots-to-deliver-singapore-technologies.html
MESHD
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/meshd.htm
http://www.globalsecurity.org/jhtml/jframe.html#http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/images/meshd-200-image01.jpg|||
RE: Large floating box/evolved Bay. Sounding like the “Mothership/Daughter craft” concept:
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA245236&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf (Pages 10-17, picture of mothership p.15)
http://www.nps.edu/academics/gseas/tsse/subpages/1994Project.html
http://www.informationdissemination.net/2008/08/5th-fleet-focus-singapore-deploys-again.html
RE: Through-Deck destroyer
http://www.shipbucket.com/images.php?dir=Never%20Built%20Designs/Great%20Britain/GB%20CH%20Escort%20Cruiser%20Series%2021%201961.gif
http://www.shipbucket.com/images.php?dir=Alternate%20Universe/I%20CVS-LHD%20DHE-7500%203%20AU.gif
@ James,
Russian humour I guess. You never know whether they’re joking or deadly serious.
@ FBOT,
What APATS said. Artisan can cover the full range of the SeaCeptor, which is effectively enough to cover a task group if absolutely needed. It could certainly cover itself and a tanker. Unlike Type 45 though it wouldn’t quite have the ability to handle longer ranged, high flyers, and perhaps that’s what you mean by being tier 2?
APATS,
if you cannot detect beyond 10 nm without AEW, how does the Sea Ceptor work out to 16 nm?
(There’s got to be a better name than “Sea Ceptor” – that sounds like a nasty disease. Even Sea Slug was better)
All PATS @ 21.30
You have the good old fashioned service arrogance that lost us the 13 Colonies to the poor end of our Mk1 Thick Colonial Cousins.
You will recognise Tier 2 Area AAW when it is used to flog ships at the expense of the T26.
There are more holes in your analysis than their is in a jumbo Swiss cheese.
However no use in carrying on the discussion – you have been told the RN is right and questioning the status quo is not really your strong point. So now I understand the “All PATS Gap” it is the missing credibility between 25km and infinity when a T26 is on its AAW lonesome without a T45 for company.
The RN dog that never barked, and the question your nevervanswered – running A30s under the control of an Artisan set – would it work?
One final question, when would a T45 have been able to engage the SE’s that fired at and hit the Sheffield / AC?
If the answer is never then they really are a waste of money.
Chris B @ 22.05
Thanks for the reply.
My question relates to the gap between what the T45 can handle – range / threat tracking numbers / missile control numbers.
And what the T26 / CAMM / Artisan can handle – range / threat tracking numbers / missile control numbers.
As I mentioned above what are the capabilities of a T26 handling / controlling A30s?
Could it run a single unit out to the full A30 range against a full on target?
Or could it handle a couple out to half the full A30 range?
From what I understand a threat could just circle a T26 at 26km approx all day and wait for its chance to attack while the ship would just have to grin and bare it. Think of it as the 1941 style FW 200 problem, how do you solve it without welding a catapult for a clapped out Hurricane to the bow of our next gen ASW escort?
@ James,
“if you cannot detect beyond 10 nm without AEW, how does the Sea Ceptor work out to 16 nm?”
— Depends how high the target is and how high the radar is. Obviously radar height is something we wont know until they actually build the thing. Target height depends on whether we’re talking about an aircraft coming in for a low level bombing/strafing pass or a missile, and then what type of missile? 10 miles to the horizon is a good average working point for a sea skimming (<50ft) target.
@ FBOT
"And what the T26 / CAMM / Artisan can handle – range / threat tracking numbers / missile control numbers."
— That depends on how much you trust BAE, which based on history I would suspect you don't. According to the sales bumpf you're looking at 185km to get a track on an aircraft and 50km for a missile, with the ability to track over 800(!) targets, which is probably bollocks but suggests that the radar should be able to cope with just about any realistic raid that might be generated.
"As I mentioned above what are the capabilities of a T26 handling / controlling A30s? Could it run a single unit out to the full A30 range against a full on target?"
— At the minute, none, that I know of. I'm sure if you've got the money someone will be more than happy to program it into reality.
"From what I understand a threat could just circle a T26 at 26km approx all day and wait for its chance to attack while the ship would just have to grin and bare it,"
— Except that realistically you wouldn't send a single T26 into a scenario where it was expected to single handedly take on such an air threat. If the danger from the air was considered high, you'd send a Type 45. And regardless, who cares if the enemy circles at 26km? If he's doing that it's because he lacks the ability to attack the T26 without getting very close, so let him stay out there. The T26 has an endurance measured in weeks and months. It can wait for action a lot longer than the aircraft can.
@X
“The second fundamental weapon of naval warfare is manoeuvre. Float, move, fight. There is no excuse for not building a “sloop” cheaply that can’t do 20kts easily and economically.”
Exactly. Please believe I’m standing on my chair applauding that. 20yrs ago the Danes built the Thetis class – able to top 22knts on a very modest diesel machinery fit (4MW or so if memory serves) on 3500 tons displacement with a 3″ forward and an organic chopper capability….and give it an icebreaking double hull and 4 months patrol endurance!. Something wrong if we cant do better today.
Italian ASW missile is called MILAS:
http://www.mbda-systems.com/mediagallery/files/milas_ds.pdf
Basically an Otomat Teseo SSM propulsion and flight control section with a torp where the seeker and warhead would sit…launched from an inclined box not a VLS. VL ASROC (VLA) would be a better fit if we could jam them into a Sylver A70.
James,
AMOS, in my view, is a perfect weapon for MHPC. High RoF, useful range, plunging fire, ready navalised and very low deck penetration. It was the system I was looking at as a foward mount, on an extended weather deck, on the FSF SWATH. I dont think its going to be a flyer as an antisub weapon though. At 10km or so angular resolution on the sonar will make if very hit and miss that a small charge will get close enough to do real damage. VLA is definitely the way forward at the range.
Closer in mortars can be useful, but, only if they are negligible ship impact systems like this ASW601 system – which pulls double duty as a cheap and simple way of getting accoustic decoy rounds into the water at the rush: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6rXc9FUGfEU
Artisan is claimed as being able to detect an antiship missile target at 35km if it is conveniently above the RF horizon. Otherwise it will detect and start the engagement sequence when the inbound crosses the horizon…same as every other inner-layer missile system.
Sea Viper users Sampson to guide the Aster missile for the reason that its inended target set, principally, is over a much wider scope than the much more simple FLAADS Sea Ceptor. It has to track and engage above-the-horizon targets out to 70-odd kms and, simultaneously, track the horizon-range picture for local defence. You cant do that with Artisan…you cant do that with Arabel either which is why it was sold as the MFR for the local-area only Aster15’s on the Saudi FFG’s and te French CVN. FLAADS/Ceptor is a local-area defence system only so it requires no more of its TI radar.
James, you are correct; Sea Ceptor as a name sucks. I used 10NM as a range against sea skimmers as that is roughly when the radar would pick it up. Obviously a higher contact would be detected further out.
FBOT, where do I start. You do not define secondary AAW area capability. You do not acknowledge the difference between PDMS and area capability.
I clearly explained in an earlier post why aster 30s could not be controlled by Artisan, not the correct type of radar. No ability at the range the Aster 30 requires or the ability to steer beams to maintain the update rate required for an Aster 30 to engage hostiles at the range it is capable of. So many holes but your complete lack of ops awareness means you cite precisely none.
If all the aircraft do is circle at 26km, 50km or 80km who cares.
To answer your Sheffield question, the answer is yes but the fact you do not ask about ESM detection of aircraft radar etc as part of the process only hardens my opinion that you do little more than wiki maximum range of weapons and post comments.
That is not a bad thing but the manner in which you assume you are always right and the professionals are always wrong does grate. we are not always correct but we do have a complete understanding of the issues and are party to info and capabilities that cannot be posted on here. for instance there is a reason for the general gap in missile capabilities between short and long range. most medium range missiles being ones that were considered long range when they were designed.
@ FBOT
Missed this because it was aimed at APATS,
“One final question, when would a T45 have been able to engage the SE’s that fired at and hit the Sheffield / AC?”
The raid was spotted by nearby HMS Glasgow at 40 miles (likely when the Super E’s did a pop up to obtain targetting data for the Exocets) and reported. Invincible caught tracks at 50 and 30 miles from its position, which correlated with Glasgow’s report. Apparently the CAP was asked to check it out, found nothing (not sure how that was possible so quickly), and thus the AAWC is recorded as having dismissed Glasgow’s report as spurious. The AAWC net was not manned on Sheffield, according to the BoI.
About 15 miles out, the Super E’s swung away from Glasgow and headed for Sheffield, which they obviously attacked. Afterwards they flew south withing radar range of the pickets, presumably to conduct a damage assessment.
A type 45 would have been able to match the Type 42 for detection range, and indeed would have detected the Exocets inbound (providing SAMPSON was switched on). Given the height and speed of an Exocet, a Type 45 probably would have had about 90 seconds to engage the missiles. It’s almost certain that the escaping aircraft would have been engaged.
None of Sheffields external weapons were manned, or apparently even loaded. No chaff was fired in defense. Sheffield had no jammer. Inadequate provision had been made for simulator training against low level targets. The list goes on.
Chris B @ 22.54
My conjecture harks back to the FW 200 issue of 41.
It kept an eye on the convoy and sent back details of speed / location / direction / numbers / escort …
The damage was done by others who used that information to formulate an attack plan.
Consequently if it can’t hurt you it can help others who could.
If the T45 is now the main element for the RN in real – near peer or not really near peer but very resourceful – war fighting then we are going to be a very focused naval power as no T45 = no Go. Not sure this is where we need to be or would want to be.
Any thoughts on doubling up the antenna – front and back – of an Artisan or winding it up to 60rpm?
Chris B @ 23.18
Any similar attack would be a bit of cat and mouse game with the incoming assets working the radar horizon to try and keep hidden up until the last minute.
I don’t think any AAW ship / missile would be able to engage based on a series of short pop up tracks while the aircraft fly low for longer periods in between.
Now would things have been different if as a rule a number of ships had a tethered “Electro-copter” on board so that a continuous AEW feed from 500m or 1000m altitude could be maintained? Not sure what the spec of the radar would need to be to guide an A30 towards the targets at 50 or 80kms out.
FBOt as Chris B said “Except that realistically you wouldn’t send a single T26 into a scenario where it was expected to single handedly take on such an air threat” so what range would you accept an MPA because that is what you are talking about be allowed to circle?
We have to deal with realistic scenarios and budgets. When would we want to send a singleton frigate into an area where it is likely to come under serious air attack by a highly capable for capable of monitoring by MPA and the launching a massive missile assault. By your reasoning an infantry platoon should never recce without at least a couple of Challenger 2 in company.
Horcalc data
AEW altitude – 500m
Incoming altitude – 10m
Detection range is 105kms.
CAMM – Sit and wait for the missile(s).
A30 / Electro-Copter / Artisan lash up – Try and take out the plane.
FBOT.
So we now have a UAV mounting a AEW radar, an upgraded artisan and aster 30 on t26, if only you had the budget control.
Once again I note no mention of how this actually makes a difference to realistic operational profiles and Op patterns. You are like a mad Q that would insist Bond took all his gadgets and use them regardless of costs or requirement.
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2011/11/lm-vigilance-pod/
Vigilance uses APG-80/81. Those sets can MCG for AMRAAM already. Should be a software mod to get them to talk to Sea Viper. Who cares about CEC anymore!. Better still an array like this on a real high endurance platform like A160T off into the distance….game changer for fleet air plot generation.
FLAADS is a missile soaker and, wit high density and no fire-channel restriction its well set up for it. Most adversaries we face will be able to generate a specific, modest, number of competent strikefighters for a specific number of missiles in a single attack wave. That number will be defined by the numbers of strikefighters possessed, need/capability for AAR support, etc and number of serviceable AShM’s in the inventory!. If your expectation is Clancy’s swarms of antiship missiles coming in you may be a bit dismayed at the reality.
That also assumes the opposition have managed the hardest trick as well.The ship and its charge have to be located, positively identified and tracked before the strikefighters can be called in. Two surface contacts in line astern a few miles apart chugging along a sea lane at 18knts, emitting on commercial nav sets only, aren’t necessarily going to scream shoot me!. The opposition search asset may well have to close in to get a visual ident if he hasnt got a SAR spot mode in his search set.
@ FBOT
I’ll have to do these seperately and on the understanding that while I’m typing this, someone could conceivably respond with a decent answer thus making this redundant.
“My conjecture harks back to the FW 200 issue of 41. It kept an eye on the convoy and sent back details of speed / location / direction / numbers / escort … The damage was done by others who used that information to formulate an attack plan”
Again, if the enemy has an MPA and there is a distinct possibility that they would organise an attack on you as soon as spotting you, then the Type 26 shouldn’t be in the threat area alone. I’d be less worried about the Type 26 and more worried about the wally that sent it there in the first place (I’m looking at you Mr.Cameron).
Trouble is it’s all relative. You might have a transmitting Type 26 which gets picked up by the passive sensors of an MPA. So it thinks “ahh, we’ll go and have a peak at that…” flies within 50 miles of the Type 26 at 20,000ft and then lights it up using it’s own radar. At this point the MPA radar operator calls up his pilot and queries why there’s a fishing boat sized contact a few miles away from the Type 26 and whether they’ve got the right boat? Then they realise they’ve just been baited into the firing window of the Type 45….
“If the T45 is now the main element for the RN in real – near peer or not really near peer but very resourceful – war fighting then we are going to be a very focused naval power as no T45 = no Go.”
— Depends. Libya was covered without a Type 45 by taking down the air force using other means. Additionally, if the enemy is a peer, near peer, or kind of close to being a peer, it would be very odd for you to not drop everything and turn your full attention to them. I’d imagine if the ballon went up over “those islands” you’d want to send a task force made up of the very best equipment you had to offer. If it’s anything like last time you’d be ringing everyone up that you knew and politely asking if they could cover your other taskings. If not, then the phrase “bollocks to it then” would likely become the default opinion of all non-urgent tasks.
“Any similar attack would be a bit of cat and mouse game with the incoming assets working the radar horizon to try and keep hidden up until the last minute. I don’t think any AAW ship / missile would be able to engage based on a series of short pop up tracks while the aircraft fly low for longer periods in between.”
— All depends. Can’t fire the ASuW missiles without targetting data, so no choice for the enemy except to pop up and light up. Gives the defenders plenty of options, not least the fact that they’ve been pre-warned of the engagement.
You could fire a missile as a distraction, hoping that the mere presence of it would act almost like suppressive fire. So the enemy pops up once and gives the game away. Then when they pop up again you’re ready for them and fire the “suppressive shot”, which they’ll pick up on their radars. Might force them to turn away and possibly ditch their weapons.
Even if they don’t, or you don’t get off the shot, and now you have a pair of Super E’s pressing an attack, at least you know they’re coming, how many there are and what direction they’re coming from. So now you turn into the attack, put out some chaff, get your lads out onto the machine guns, give a threat axis to the Phalanx, warm up your jammers and get ready for a pair of high speed-low level contacts. As soon as the radar picks them up you engage; you already know what they are. Then you start looking for the crossing tracks of the aircraft as they try and leg it.
jonesy, finally someone who posts about the most difficult part of the engagement process. Finding the target!
I’m guessing most people have now retired for the night, so I’ll leave this here like a cheeky christmas present slipped under the tree on Christmas Eve. Except this present isn’t acutally about giving, it’s about receiving. Mwwwhahahaha. Although it should return the thread to its earlier ASW focus.
General re; ASW work,
Two questions; 1) do RN ships carry disposable sonar bouys, ala, Nimrod/Merlin? Might be an idea for helping out Type 45 as an emergency ASW solution should the need arise? 2) Anyone know what the quality is like of the dipping sonar that Lynx Wildcat is projected to carry? Might facilitate a move towards a single heli fleet, at least for the provision of escorts (and again, make Type 45/any ship, more useful as an auxillary ASW asset).
@ Chris B – As far as I know the dipping sonar has not been contracted yet. Must be in Phil the spread sheets £ 8 billion some where. I agree though that having it makes a big difference to auxilliary ASW. Deffinatley something the T45 could benefit from.
@ Jonesy re two targets at 18kts
Well said. Have a house point. :)
@ APATS re targeting
Actually I already sort of said something similar above in my odd (emphasis on the odd) ramble about how the word littoral is used here. Basically I said once over the horizon you become yet another blip. I just wasn’t as eloquent as young Jonesy.
I also said similar about submarines in the littoral in that you don’t have to go to far out before you are already in water deep enough to exceed most submarines’ “published” maximum depth. And further you wouldn’t want to take a submarine in to close because of the difficulties of steering/controlling that nature of platform.
I thought the dipping sonar on Wildcat was one of the best new features – shame they’ve been deleted. Makes a mockery of T45 being able to embark two Wildcat doesn’t it… back to one Merlin then.
Someone mentioned the neat Thetis class as 4 MW installed power – I think it’s more like 10MW (there are 3 x 3MW diesels direct drive + about 1MW on thrusters… Mr Sulu).
I have a couple of non Type 26 questions on my mind this morning, perhaps people can help me out….
1. The carriers, specifically the crew requirements. Having enough manpower to crew 1 at a time and alternating between the 2 seems like practical and fine for normal use. However, what happens if we want both ships in operation at once? If we ever had a situation that needed a maximum effort surely we wouldn’t have the means to get both to sea?
2. Sentinel? No word has been officially given on whether it’s still to be withdrawn or not. What’s going on with that?
Ok – if the helicopter is THE ASW weapon, do we increase the capability of our ASW vessels by increasing the number of helicopters they carry? The size, sensor/weapon fit, and overall capabilities vary depending on how many helicopters it needs to carry and its intended role. Some examples of past/present ships:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shirane_class_destroyer
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_cruiser_Jeanne_d%27Arc_%28R97%29
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Italian_cruiser_Vittorio_Veneto_%28550%29
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hy%C5%ABga_class_helicopter_destroyer
Some proposed but ever built designs:
http://t1.gstatic.com/images?q=tbn:ANd9GcQ9pwPq2AIRqs_Q76AnfTwYigrwhIfeWNuQG2QgH37s7e1dniHsp_b0Tku6
http://t2.gstatic.com/images?q=tbn:ANd9GcQySR-NT5aCDjvHcYi2kOe5lApyE4COi1w2MlR7pfACzwiFrZ78AUfD9H2Cow
http://www.shipbucket.com/images.php?dir=Never%20Built%20Designs/Great%20Britain/GB%20CH%20Escort%20Cruiser%20Series%2021%201961.gif
Challenger,
If we’re going to operate two carriers on rotation we’d need two crews other wise the single crew would never get a break.
I guess there may be some way to rotate personnel within the departments so we actually have ~1.5 crews on live rotation?
Also, if we do ever have both carriers available (not that I think we ever will) the second could be a lean-manned LPH.
Gareth Jones,
“the helicopter is THE ASW weapon”
I guess it can be considered “the” weapon, but it’s not “the” detector. A little like Sea Viper being Aster and Sampson, with Aster as “the” weapon.
Besides in order to increase the number of Merlin we carry within the fleet we simply put a few on CVF.
@Challenger
Re: Sentinel R1
The services of the Sentinels have been offered to NATO [1] as the UK’s contribution to the Alliance Ground Surveillance fleet rather than contributing funds towards the Global Hawk purchases.
France have offered Heron’s as their contribution.
[1] http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/nato-inks-17-billion-global-hawk-order-372113/
@ Gareth Jones
The helicopter is part of a synergistic system with the ship. It isn’t the weapon of choice, just part of the optimum weapon system of choice.
Consider whether it would be better to buy an ASW ship with a 40-60 VLS filled with an ASW missile.
@ Simon and X – But isn’t a Merlin with dipping sonar, sonar bouys and on board processing a complete “Weapon System”, hence the nickname of “flying frigate”?
Also, if the helicopters can be based on the carriers, what capabilities do the escorts need? DK Brown envisaged a hi-low mix of escorts, with a helicopter destroyer carrying 4 helicopters and a squadron of towed array tugs/corvettes acting as sensor platforms and “Lillie pads” for refueling and rearming the Helicopters. If the Carrier takes over the role of the DDH and we have Type 45’s for area air defence, then wouldn’t all we require is a number of Brown Corvettes or Black Swans to tow the sonar arrays and extend the endurance of the Merlin’s?
x,
You say that Sampson was removed from CVF to save money. Seems a bit daft doesn’t it. £200m for Sea Viper on CVF or £650m for Sea Viper on a T45 hull that has to sail alongside at all times.
Hardly saves much money ;-)
In addition, it allows the T45 to move up-threat and act like a CAP station.
Perhaps 12 T26 is enough – use the remaining money (not that there will actually be any) to put Sea Viper on CVF.
Gareth Jones,
Well yes, and no. How many Merlin do you think you need to maintain 24-7 sub detection? It’s about 6! These chaps will then burn about 32 tonnes of aviation fuel each day. On a 22 day voyage that’s 704t of fuel. That (along with AEW) is Invincible.
This shows the value of the towed array on a frigate/sub.
@James
The blue-sky thinking stuff is all good – but you still haven’t demonstrated that your Iranian ASROC does a better job than existing kit. I’d disagree that there’s been no AoA on our escorts – we’ve had 10 years of messing about with that, and the conclusion seems to be broadly that we stick with the weapons and sensors that we’ve got, in a slightly bigger hull. Which isn’t too surprising – for the last 20 years T23 has been the best in the world at what it does (only recently superceded by the newly-launched FREMM-ASW, but include the wetware and T23 would still shade it). There’s not many programmes where we can say that, but T23 is one of the real success stories of MoD procurement. It’s just a shame that few other countries have a requirement for carrier escorts.. It’s demonstrated a lot of the things we talk about here, having the flexibility to evolve to changing requirements, with spiral improvements to kit and reuse of eg software from other programmes. The Sea Lords deserve their fair share of criticism, but frigates are one area where they’ve done alright.
@x Did I miss the bit where Milas went VL? I thought the Italians had chosen not to integrate Otomat on SYLVER, they have the old launchers instead.
The stuff about 2nd-tier SAMs seems to be well into angels on the head of a pin territory, it’s kinda getting divorced from anything that’s militarily relevant. But if you’re looking for examples, then compare the “convoy protection” systems like the SM-1MR on the Perrys and the SA-N-7 Gadfly on the Sovremennys. Intended to give cheap and cheerful area coverage, 15-20nm range, rail-launched so can’t generate the volleys of a VLS system, around 40 missiles in the magazine, fine against aircraft but would struggle against half-decent missiles. I’d say Sea Ceptor stacks up pretty well against that kind of benchmark. (James – you can take out aircraft at maximum range, sea-skimming missiles are harder to pick out).
The “FW200 problem” is inherent in all battlegroups that don’t have fighter cover. The Cold War solution to MPAs tracking you was a Kiev or Invincible with a couple of VTOL fighters – but that already means you’re into small battlegroup territory. We’re wanting something that’s “good enough”, not some super-battlecruiser. By definition, any missile that’s a threat to you is going to come within Sea Ceptor range, anything that is 40nm away is just part of the scenery. FBOT, perhaps you could tell us which threats could be dealt with by shooting a bomber between Sea Ceptor and Aster 30 range? These days any serious anti-ship threat is designed to be fired from out of range of “heavy” SAM systems – Brahmos and Yakhont are 250+km, Kitchen/Kingfish are twice that. Even with Aster 30, you’re not going to be hitting the launch platforms.
@Gareth Jones
It’s a tradeoff – the ships you mention were major units, of which no more than two were built. Don’t forget that a pair of naval Merlins costs £80m, almost as much as the original cost of a T23. Running costs will be close to a T23 as well. Adding one helicopter to a ship without one gives you a massive increase in capability, adding a second is a big help for “serious” ASW ships but it’s diminishing returns after that. For finding subs, there’s no real substitute for having tails in the water, and a frigate with two helicopters seems to be the sweet spot if you don’t have unlimited budgets.
PS: I have changed my gravatar in order to represent the “grumpy old man” that I often am :-)
Gareth Jones,
Sorry, I’ve now read the whole of your comment.
Yup, that would work nicely and is essentially how our Invincible fleets operated.
However, if you’re escorting just a single ship (e.g. fuel tanker) you wouldn’t want to waste the carrier resource to provide the escort. You therefore need a small, cheap ship that can do ASW and local AAW.
You’re getting dangerously close to the Sea Control Ship (SCS) concept ;-)
The reason you have a dipping sonar is primarily to localise a sonar contact (detected from another platform), classify it and prosecute if required. Dippers are also quite good at providing a random element within a wider screen, usually defined by your limiting lines and your torpedo defence zone. If you’re doing a big group, it’s almost certain you’d have Merlin present either from a QE or from an RFA (assuming available flightdeck), so sticking dipping sonar on a Wildcat doesn’t necessarily get you much more ASW capability.
If it’s a 45 on it’s own, then the detection range you get off pretty much all HMS (not just the Ultra one) is limited, so whether you’ve actually got time to get a cab off the deck, classify, localise etc is an interesting question. You might actually be better with something akin to ASROC to get a fish in the water quickly, forcing any sub contact to react (prosecute to classify as we used to call it, only that was usually with a mk 11!). Trouble is, you need a low false alarm rate or you’ve emptied the mags (or used up your crew flying hours) pretty quickly.
The thing about ASW is that it isn’t quite the same engagement model as AAW/ASMD. That is characterised by things happening relatively quickly, where you can be reasonably certain if something is about to / is coming at you and (RoE permitting) do something fairly swiftly back.
With UWW the picture is much less clear and much more effort goes to defining it over a much reduced water volume. It’s called Awfully Slow Warfare for a reason! Even so, your false alarm rates can be high and it’s not a question of reaction drills, but more like practice and experience – something the RN has seen wither a bit since the 80s.
Essentially what I’m saying is that there is limited comparability between AWW and UWW. You can’t really do UW point defence in the same way you can for AWW, so “beefing up” T45 ASW capability for if operating alone is of limited value. It can contribute to the plot if in a force, but that’s about it.
@Gareth Jones
A helicopter has strengths and weaknesses. Compared to a ship it’s obviously more mobile and can prosecute subs when they’re out of torpedo range of any ship. On the flip side they have much less endurance, are more dependent on good weather, and their sonar is a lot less powerful. As ever, you get a much more powerful system by combining elements that complement each others’ strengths and weaknesses.
Your mothership + sonar tugs concept was the original idea for the Forts and T23. The Falklands persuaded their Lordships that maybe Sea Wolf might be a good idea, and hence T23 started its evolution into the more balanced design you see today. Call it requirements creep, call it sensible response to reality – up to you. You could argue that LCS is going back to that kind of concept, but really it just comes down to costs and the tradeoff between having big capital ships with a flotilla of small single-purpose vessels in tow, or a fleet of a single design that’s more general purpose and can be detached for independent operations. The US can get away with building lots of “heavy” AAW cruisers (which is what the Burke really is) at $2bn a pop, most European countries find the trade-offs favour general purpose escorts.
Not a Boffin,
“…sticking dipping sonar on a Wildcat doesn’t necessarily get you much more ASW capability”
It does if you can then fit two on T45… and as I keep suggesting, there’s always the Astute skulking around beneath the waves.
As APATS said though, the difficulty comes when Astute needs to notify T45 (with two active sonar Wildcat) that a contact is there. This, in itself, makes Astute an emitter and the game is over (well sort of) as it may as well go “active” itself.
OK – Going to follow a logic path and see where it takes me = If the Merlins are based on the Carrier, and the escorts are dedicated to protecting the Carrier, towing a sonar array and possiby refueling the Merlins occasionaly, do they need a hangar?
The Type 82 was intended to be an escort for the CVA-01 class of carriers. As another ship, the helicopter crusier I’ve linked to before, was going to carry most of the taskgroup’s helicopters, it was thought that the Type 82 should be equiped with the Ikara ASW system, as well as the Sea Dart AAW system, rather than a helicopter/hangar. This would allow rapid response to a suspected submarine contact close to the Taskgroup which had got past the outer screens of ASW aircraft and helicopters (or so I read somewhere…):
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_82_destroyer
Back to the present/future; if the CVF provides the ASW helicopters, then wouldn’t a vessel like the Type 82 make more sense, with area AA and a ASW weapon system? Perhaps a Batch 2 Type 45 (if the hull is suitable) with the hangar replaced with a VLS for an ASW missile/rockets, like x suggests?
Gareth Jones,
My stance on this is to do with “eggs” and “baskets” when operating as a fleet and to do with precious little ASW capability when the Type 82 is simply operating as an escort on its own.
Can I just add [this picture] to demonstrate the reason why copters on their own are not great.
Remember, it’s still dead calm below ;-)
That was my attempt to be menacing!
Simon – no it doesn’t, as you have worked out by yourself wrt the Astute. Either APATS or El Sid identified the issue of deconfliction earlier. There isn’t a seamless datalink / comms envuironment underwater. What there tends to be is a confused picture and the last ting that the ASWC wants is random contacts in his screen. There also the slight issue that radiating from either HMS or dippers tends to illuminate friendly sub-surface contacts as well.
Given that the dipping sonar is of limited range and given that the HMS on the 45 is of limited range, what exactly would the Wildcats be doing to improve ASW?
Not a Boffin,
Hmmm, given that there is a problem with comms from Astute to Daring there’s little point in my going on. Personally I’d solve that problem (e.g. spread spectrum comms or similar).
However, here goes:
1. Astute detects contact.
2. Astute notifies Daring of contact bearing and range.
3. Astute moves so that it is in strike range of the contact.
4. Astute waits for active ping from Wildcats.
5. Astute fires torpedo salvo.
It doesn’t matter that Astute is illuminated it has the advantage of position and an active ping from a different and confusing location to the other sub. In addition Wildcat can launch stingrays to annoy the aggressor sub even more.
Everyone seen the news about the RN, Gibraltar and Spain. We could use a Black Swan or GP frigate there. Lets face it HMS Sabre a Scimitar-class fast patrol boat would be better for trips around the bay then any serious conflict resolution.
http://www.portsmouth.co.uk/news/defence/naval-ship-in-gibraltar-stand-off-1-3878914
@Simon
Yeah I was thinking that it could maybe be done with 1.5 crews rather then 2 full sets. You’re right about the 2nd probably having a lower crew if it was used as a massive LPH. I guess regenerating crew is one of the easier aspects of the carrier package.
@The Other Chris
Cheers. I had actually already seen the NATO surveillance stuff. I am a little perplexed why that commitment has been made and yet there has been no official reversal of the SDR retirement?
@ El Sid
I thought Milas was integrated. Sorry. I was more interested in the concept of ASW missile as an alternative to or subsidiary to an ASW helicopter. FYI I don’t see a missile as a possible complete helicopter replacement. But it may be a low cost supplementary system to be scattered across auxiliaries to OPVs to even big units if queued by another system.
@ APATS and Somewhat and Anxitu
What do you good people think of STWS? I note the Ozzies are fitting a system to the Hobarts and Europeans fit them.
@Challenger
Maybe details haven’t been finalised yet.
Though back in February the Alliance Ground System Fact Sheet [1] contained this statement:
“In addition, an agreement was reached to make the United Kingdom Sentinel system and the future French Heron TP system available as a national contribution-in-kind, partly replacing financial contributions from those two Allies.”
[1] http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2012_02/20120203_120203-ags.pdf
@Simon
How did you embed the hyperlink in your earlier post at 11:32?
@ Simon re extra helicopters
Yes. I think that many see the helicopter as second class to “proper” planes. If they don’t say it explicitly they imply it through their writing, whether deliberately or not. I think there would be immense value in CVF having a 12 cab Merlin squadron. And as I have said lots of times especially if ours came with ASM. With a ASaC platform in the air they would be more than a match for most of the world’s navies’ submarines and surface ships. Out in the ocean where most ships move at less than 20kts and the fastest cargo vessels about 25kts a platform that can move 150kts has some advantage. I try to see a bit beyond F35x and helicopters as just airborne trucks when it comes to CVF. And I make no apology for being seemingly obsessed with ship sinking. Glug. :)
@ Jim
When the Euro goes tits up the Civil Guard will probably not show because they aren’t getting paid.
The Other Chris,
Just type <a href=”url_to_picture”>text here</a> in the reply window.
@Simon
Heh heh, and there I was thinking it was some form of BB code rather than standard html, thanks.
I think the RN helicopter tends to get a poor press in general – it’s either treated as “hmm, but it’s not a F-35B” or else “ooh, isn’t it a bit expensive, couldn’t we get away with the Magic Pony UAV’s war-winning combination of a CCTV camera like the one on the Dog & Duck and one smallish rocket and no ASW, radar or SAR capability” or even “I’ve got this brilliant idea to replace the complexity and advanced technology development risk of helicopters with….a constellation of autonomous undersea robots communicating through a mesh network of blue-green lasers, launched from a 45kts trimaran”.
That’s basically my only concern with the Black Swan concept; as it stands it’s very dependent on robots that we haven’t got and that may never work, while spending a little more on steel and diesel engines would make it fit with kit that does exist and make it very useful indeed.
(A question – how are all these “networked” UUVs meant to “network” given that you can’t use radio except for ELF down there and you can’t use sound because you’ve got to be quiet?)
Alex,
“how are all these “networked” UUVs meant to “network” given that you can’t use radio except for ELF down there and you can’t use sound because you’ve got to be quiet”
Have you not heard of the new sub-etha radio ;-)
Flashing lights, like the funny ugly fishes! (Seriously, I’ve seen a demo of a flock of modular robots in a fish tank that flashed at each other. Hardly stealthy, though…)
Simon
And the reason that Astute doesn’t prosecute the contact all by itself using a far more lethal and enduring weapon (Spearfish) than Stingray is…..?
Not a Boffin,
My point 5. was Astute fires torpedo salvo.
If you’re asking why even bother with the Wildcat bit at all then my answer is you don’t really have to but using Wildcat/Merlin to do the active ping means you never give your own position away.
I appreciate that the ping also “lights Astute up” but not as much as if Astute actually does the targetting.
I’m assuming here that Spearfish can’t do everything itself?
If Spearfish can be launched silently, move a couple of clicks, allow Astute to move out of obvious position to have fired from, re-acquire the target, and home in, then great – stuff the Wildcat.
???
Not been able to follow this thread much as been busy in real world practising the old ‘Having to earn money to feed wife and kids’.
So apologies if this has been said.
Lets scrap the ASW surface fleet in it’s entirety.
Buy 2 or 3 or 4 more Astutes (my cynicism about the published potential unit cost of t26 knows no bounds). Astutes are V good ASW platforms any way are they not? Spend the rest on some Bay/other LPD based patrol ships, type wise pick your poison).
That way we get hulls in the water, for the job we are doing with secondary amphib and transport capability.
@Simon and @NaB
Earlier on, @APATS made a convincing argument as to why an Astute would not be operating near another vessel. Would this designation scenario occur?
It wouldn’t. That’s the point. Deconfliction is one of the hardest things to do in ASW. that’s why you would never get a boat trying to operate together with a surface warship.
@ Alex re Black Swan and helicopters
Exactly. Merlin is our cheap frigate. In some ways Merlin off CVF is what Black Swan is supposed to be but can’t be for those failings you point out.
So to get value out of Merlin we still need the high endurance, area sensor provided by a ship.
It isn’t hard is it to get your head round is it?
I am still trying to track down an accurate figure for the cost of 2087 after APATS offered a guarded £20million. Even if we double that to £40million, which spookily enough is the price of a Merlin ASW, 2087 is good value.
Um. Yes that is spooky. To have a good ASW capability requires us buying 2 systems that cost £40million. I suppose £80million sounds a lot but if that is the equipment that is needed to perform the primary task out of a total unit spend of say £500million it isn’t bad. Actually complaining about the cost is rather like building a kit car complaining the engine costs a large percentage of the project or similarly building a PC and complaining about the cost of the processor. Another thought F35 will come I bet at around £80million too.
As I keep saying we choose not to buy these things. Anyway once we leave the EU will have to spend our contributions on something……
@James
Think it might be more convenient to put a torpedo armed USV there instead of a UUV. Easier on the comms.
I’m totally going to go off base here and ask. Trade the helo for 2-4 USVs? Longer endurance (you can just park on the water), greater numbers and more “sacrificablilty” traded for slower response time and slightly less flexibility (no beyond horizon ship detection)?
What are the pros and cons of this approach?
@Gareth Jones
You’re assuming most of our escorts are escorting a carrier – they don’t – certainly not when we have 19 escorts and only one carrier. Aside from the eggs-in-baskets aspect where your entire ASW screen depends on the continuing functioning of just two elevators, it’s really useful to have the flexibility to eg have one T45+T2x escort an underway replenishment group to meet up with the CVBG, and then a different pair escort the supply ship back home again.
@x I’d agree with you, ASROC/Milas would be really nice to have, particularly in SYLVER, but is very easy to set aside in the face of greater priorities.
@ El Sid – A good point. I was merely taking TD’s idea of a dedicated “battle fleet/Carrier escort” to an extreme. Under this fleet convoy/UNREP task groups would probably be escorted by the 2nd rate escorts – Brown sloops, Black Swans, etc.
@ El Sid
Yes I realise it is a gold plate capability. And though I am helicopter everywhere person I think there may be a place for such a missile as I explained. How many missiles per helicopter (airframe, crew, etc.) if we can’t afford more Merlin or are stuck with Wildcat? We can’t espouse ubiquitous long range robotic weapons with tiny sensors in one concept and then dismiss another “automated” system using tiny sensors at long range in another. If you get my drift.
Hi Simon,
If you back track to the Future of the RN threads, we had frigate/ hr costs and Merlin/hr costs (not sure if crew or just the fuel burn was included), and the base load + surge argument becomes apparent, RE:
” On a 22 day voyage that’s 704t of fuel. That (along with AEW) is Invincible.
This shows the value of the towed array on a frigate/sub.”
– I think your new “measurement unit” is quite good!
@Observer and James
Re: “I’m totally going to go off base here and ask. Trade the helo for 2-4 USVs? Longer endurance (you can just park on the water), greater numbers and more “sacrificablilty” traded for slower response time and slightly less flexibility. What are the pros and cons of this approach?”
I like going off base. Combine the two.
Set a Merlin to porting not a torpedo, but a torpedo armed USV. Pick and drop from mother ship. Leave to float, seek and persist. Helo acts as an internet node or controller too for v.long range deployment. Pick up and move ’em around when you want. Or programme floaty USVs to return to a pick up point at time X or when fuel at Y.
Just a thought.
Hi El Sid,again:
” Brahmos and Yakhont are 250+km, Kitchen/Kingfish are twice that. Even with Aster 30, you’re not going to be hitting the launch platforms”
– I think on some ancient thread we were discussing the range of anti-AEW missiles (which for that reason have been modified from the ASuW families; an AWACS will not turn much more than a ship when taking evasive action)
– I just can’t remember any more what sort of ranges we were talking about (not that those missiles would be available in the int’l arms bazaars)?
Hi Jim,
I would say that the Gib Sqdrn is for getting between an Al-Qaida RHIB (looking like a tobacco, of whatever kind, smuggler)with a load of explosives, even a torp a la James, and a supertanker passing through the strait
– can’t be done without intelligence, true
– but speed will be of essence (does not equal a Black Swan)
hi x @ 16:33,
“Exactly. Merlin is our cheap frigate.”
– No, Merlin is our expensive to operate, but cheap to add SURGE FRIGATE
” In some ways Merlin off CVF is what Black Swan is supposed to be but can’t be”
– No, because the point of cheap hulls is being in many places
– sorry for my laziness; what the second order reference said, I did not check (hope it does not contradict my statement)
Gibraltar Squadron is mostly for ‘coast guard’ maritime security roles and force protection within Gibraltar TTWs, not for escorting things in the strait.
Hi Anixtu,
I know that that is the official line
“Gibraltar Squadron is mostly for ‘coast guard’ maritime security roles and force protection within Gibraltar TTWs, not for escorting things in the strait.”
– and with the kit, the reality is just too close to that line (in capability, should it ever be stretched)
– not that I would talk about “escorting” but “intervening” at speed
Can I therefore conclude that the Army doesn’t want Wildcat, it wants Blackhawk and the Navy doesn’t want Wildcat it wants more Merlin?
I really no longer see the point of Wildcat if it doesn’t have a sonar. It just becomes a small (not very cheap) utility copter! The Navy may as well embark Blackhawk too.
The actual Strait of Gibraltar is Moroccan and Spanish TTWs. Up to Morocco and Spain to police and protect.
@ACC
‘not that I would talk about “escorting” but “intervening” at speed’
I think they wouldn’t be doing that, they look after the area around the rock and that’s it. They don’t do that sort of thing, they don’t even ‘intervene’ with the spanish when they enter gib waters and start causing a bit of scene.
@ ACC
A matter of interpretation I think. If ASW Merlin costs £40million per copy and if we pick a modern ASW asset in the water now like FREMM and not some BAE CAD drawing lwe see we can buy 12 Merlin for the cost of 1 FREMM. So that is 48 crew and let us say 62 maintainers or 110 pensions which is a small crew. A top speed of 150, about 5 times that of T23, and able to range out to 750nm. Which means a swathe of ocean 1767857 sqr nm can be covered from the CVF. Not saying it is perfect as it is only a cheap frigate. And of course helicopters can be in the air as long as ships remain in the sea. And they would be need to be in the air constantly.
As for CVF plus a Merlin squadron being like Black Swan. Well Black Swan is about dominating areas of ocean launching vehicles from a mother ship. I think that is what an aircraft carrier does is it not? If we put scale to one side the advantage CVF and Merlin has we know that will work unlike Black Swan and its flotilla of aquatic Robbie the Robots.
@ACC: you are thinking of the K-100
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Novator_K-100
If they sell Yakont to the Syrian’s, they’ll sell this too :-(
Trying to understand why we are trying to fit various missiles that launch just fine from Mk41 to Sylver, when it’s far easier to adapt Aster to Mk41 :-)
RE “I really no longer see the point of Wildcat if it doesn’t have a sonar”
– but, but… there is a hole in the floor for it!
Damn edit function
Helicopters can’t be in the air as long as ships remain as sea. And anyway they wouldn’t need to be in the air constantly.
OK – What about a small fast boat armed with lightweight ASW torpedoes and a dipping sonar (same as helicopters)?
This is a basic Iranian torpedo boat(designed for a different purpose) but I could easily imagine something similar operating from a RN ship, particulary one with a well dock – Mothership concept:
http://img239.imageshack.us/img239/7352/peykaapjm5.jpg
Hi x
The latter part of your two-part response escaped me, but on the first part:
” we can buy 12 Merlin …So that is 48 crew and let us say 62 maintainers or 110 pensions.”
– What is the the skimped down crew on a modern, automated frigate?
” A top speed of 150, about 5 times that of T23, and able to range out to 750nm. Which means a swathe of ocean 1767857 sqr nm can be covered … And of course helicopters can be in the air as long as ships remain in the sea.”
So far, so good: still a surge frigate (but deployable from various, more multi-use platforms)
” And they would be need to be in the air constantly”
– wrong!
– true for a frigate; not true for a “surge frigate”. Only when the need has been established
Are we now on the same page?
Simon says:
“I really no longer see the point of Wildcat if it doesn’t have a sonar. It just becomes a small (not very cheap) utility copter! The Navy may as well embark Blackhawk too.”
Oh bloody hell, not the Blackhawk again……
I can understand Pongos not wanting Wildcat, but for RN it is smaller, cheaper to operate partner to the Merlin for non-ASW tasking, such as delivering Hellfire / Brimstone (?), FASGW(M) (aka son-of-sea-skua). It has good radar and sensors littoral role, and can even venture over the beach and in land in the armed scout role – and yet does this in a smaller, cheaper to run package than any Seahawk variant.
It does not need a Sonar – horses for courses, 1 size rarely fits all, and Wildcat and Merlin are an excellent combination – for the RN !
What about a small fast boat trailing a passive sonar and armed with a Wildcat with a dipping sonar? :-)
I reckon 3000t with one WR21 and a couple of 2MW diesels. Just ditch the WR21 and you’ve got your sloop/littoral ship too!
With Jed here “It does not need a Sonar – horses for courses, 1 size rarely fits all, and Wildcat and Merlin are an excellent combination – for the RN !”
– and RM, they come off various sizes of ships – even more so in the future?
– a little bit of overhead CAS & recce can’t hurt?
CAS and recce…
Isn’t that what we’ve spent money navalising Apache for?
@x The other nice thing about ASROC is not just the 24/7 availability, but the speed. Not so relevant in a cosy battlegroup with lots of helicopters around, but when you’re off on convoy duty you might only have 2-3 helicopters in the group, which means that for “oh shit” moments you might only have 1 helicopter in the air, 25nm away from your new contact. Even at 150kts, it’ll still take you 10 minutes to get there, plenty of time for the sub to do its stuff – and even if it doesn’t do anything, you’ve got to search a much bigger area to find it again. A 600kt missile will start to distract him within 2.5 minutes – a big difference.
@ACC – I assume you’re talking about Russia’s AA-13 Arrow, India’s Novator K-100 and a possible derivative of China’s YJ-91 (in turn derived from the Kh-31P). In each case you’re talking about ~200km range, possibly up to 400km.
Long-range AAW missiles open up all sorts of nasty tactics. If you’re attacking a Burke/Tico/Daring SAG, you could knock out first the AEW helicopters, then the ASW helicopters and any UAVs – and then send in the submarines to finish the job. Or just use MANPADs fired from fishing boats – helicopters are really quite easy to take care of.
@ ACC
– I
– am
– never
– sure
– which
– page
– you
– are
– on
– because
– of
– the
– way
– you
– post.
I did correct myself by saying the helicopters wouldn’t need to be in the air all the time. There is a lot of interplay between various naval systems that multiply force levels. I am now writing to a long list of aircraft and naval journals telling them not to refer to Merlin as the “Flying Frigate”. I am not sure how “cheap” and “surge” are exclusive terms. And I am not sure how many OPVs with a crew less than 110 can cover nearly 2 million nautical square miles of ocean so I think a crew of 110 is good value for my “Merlin” frigate.
@Gareth Jones
ASW-USV
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8am7miqeANI
Payloads under study include LWT’s. Personally I think keeping the torps sat securely in the Mk41 as the business end of VLA is the smart view but hey new toy syndrome gets everywhere. Just to reiterate an earlier point that a T26 with 4 sets of davits, as per the diagram, could embark a couple of these without impinging on its MSO capabilities etc a bit.
El Sid. If the SAG cdr was an imbecile I would agree with you.
X / ACC,
I’m not sure which of you is making the great claims for Wildcat capabilities (who has the time to go through several pages of competing claims and counter-claims), but just a point on basic maths. There is no way on God’s green (land-centric ;)) earth that Wildcat can cover 1,767,857 square nautical miles, even if its’ combat radius is 750 nm (which I doubt). That is the size of the Western Med, by itself.
Assuming the thing can fly out and back 750 nm before running out of juice (and I repeat, I doubt it can), it will only be “covering” a thin slice of water. Not the full π R squared of 750 nm. So depending on the definition of coverage (could be only a mile either side of track) it might cover 1500 square nm, not over 1,000 times the amount claimed.
Not sure the concept of a zillions of Merlins flying from a QEC is valid compared to a frigate and its crew. Either
(a) If you are on a pure sea control misssion then as well as the Merlin flight and maintenance crews you have to count all the QEC ship’s crew.
Or
(b) If you are on any other sort of mission the QEC will also be packed with F35, Apache, Chinook or god knows what else so you will not get all you flying frigates in.
Marginal cost accounting cuts both ways.
Jed,
So with the exception of smaller and a bit cheaper what exactly can Wildcat do that isn’t already covered by the hoards of Merlin or Apache embarked on CVF, LPH, etc.
My rationale goes something like this…
In a task force Wildcat has nothing to offer that isn’t covered by Merlin/Apache (see above) – AEW, ASW, assault, CAS, recce, etc.
As the embarked copter on T26-ASW it does not provide any ASW help so you’d need Merlin.
T45 is unlikely to operate in the littoral environment that makes Wildcat useful and if you’re landing your ~60 marines you’d really want something a little bigger.
So you’re left with Wildcat on 5 x T26-GP. Seems as waste of time having a different type of aircraft for only a few platforms.
Does any of that make sense?
PS: I’m not really advocating Blackhawk for the RN.
Wildcat: I suppose you need something to fly off your modified Bay Class chaing pirates and drug runners. No point sending a Merlin on that mission and more units and cheaper is probably better for such a use.
Simon,
you forget that Wildcat is the bastard love-child of the BLUH and SCMR programmes. The Army wanted more Lynx 9s for tactical utility use, the RN wanted to replace rotting improperly marinised Lynxes with some more effective weapons on board. Along the way the two requirements got mashed together, Westland put together an effective lobbying programme for make-work in Yeovil, and all of the staff officers in both the the RN and Army who were rotary wing pilots happily voted for it in balance of investment meetings, because it is sexier than the old Lynx. No one really cares whether there is a need for it, or the fact that the battlefield utility helicopter could be had for half the price – that was last thought of 3 postings ago.
@ Jonesy – ohhh… youtube linky goodness! Thank you.
The craft is smaller than I was thinking but can carry a range of sonar sensors…
Came across this impressive video of a SAAB multiple mortar system (somebody mentioned it up thread?) – another armament for our USV sub-hunter in the littoral?
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6rXc9FUGfEU&feature=related
Peter Elliott,
Agreed – trouble is we don’t have my modified Bay class… yet ;-)
What we really need is a small cheap ship designed to operate in the littoral and riverine systems that can… hang on, that’ll be the sloop thing-a-ma-bob ;-)
James,
I’m all for Lynx (or Wildcat) on HMS Ocean – great idea.
Trouble is we’ve spent loads marinising the Army’s Apaches for that role. Are we going to just hand them back a bit heavier and saltier and say “cheers” we’ll use Wildcat now… oh, by the way, we haven’t got an HMS Ocean replacement to use them on.
@Simon
Although we don’t have the ships yet we do have the missions. Whenever we send a frigate or an amphib to do those sorts of tasks there’s no need to embark a Merlin.
Apache flew of a ship it is not marinised and will need money spending on it for that purpose. Along with better das system for gd measure
http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/uk-eyes-apache-modifications-after-libyan-experience-363865/
@ James
What has Wildcat got to do with anything? And I am talking about potential area of operation not covering it all…..
Peter Elliott,
I guess. Still not convinced there’s actually much point though. You send a Merlin capable ship with Merlin spares and maintenance facilities and then decide to send a Wildcat. Why?
It’s a great use for a Lynx but you’re sort of making a role that can be fulfilled by another asset.
With the exception of CAS on a small LPH (HMS Ocean) I don’t really see a need for Wildcat. In fact, I’d just use Lynx rather than Wildcat for the CAS anyway – just make it Brimstone capable.
Mark,
Cripes! I thought they were already fully operational. Libya was the first outing then? Oh dear, how very incapable the RN really is at the mo.
@ Peter Elliot
CVF won’t go anywhere by itself. There will be a T45 and a frigate or two. Should we include the crews of those ships too? What about everybody back at RNAS Culdrose or in HMS Excellent or any other shore establishment? What I am talking about is where we spend the “cost” of a frigate. Would the cost of one of the escorting frigate be better spent on a full squadron of Merlin? Not saying CVF should go anywhere with just helicopter as escorts. And I am also saying that if CVF’s air group has a full squadron of Merlin it shouldn’t be seen as a loss or a make-do measure compared to 12 F35b. That is what I am on about.
Just came across this picture – one way to deliver replacement USV’s to the littoral? Yet another use for transport aircraft….
http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_aks0cupRxl0/TFtna8ZlSCI/AAAAAAAAAH4/04JjKz4PXBk/s1600/Piranha_AirDrop_g.jpg
Does anyone know the length/width of the well docks of the Albion’s and Bays?
Use the dimensions of LCU………
X, You get 4 LCUs in the dock of an Albion. 2 in each lane with the lanes split by a wooden wall.
@ APATS
I know. It was the boy Gareth who asked…..
Actually somewhere I have the real dimensions.
The real question is do we have an ARG to land a Brigade over a beach, and how quickly can they do it?
Anything more than 6 hours is not really an act of war. It may appear so with A-A optimised F35s flying about and a big useless carrier some several hundred miles away in safety, but it isn’t.
Ah Wiki…
LCU Mark 10
Type: Ro-Ro landing craft
Displacement: 236 long tons (240 t)
Length: 97 ft 7 in (29.74 m)
Beam: 24 ft 3 in (7.39 m)
Draught: 5 ft 7 in (1.70 m)
so roughly over 60m in length and over 14m in width? Do the Bays take 2×2 as well?
Bay dock is sized for 1×1 LCU Mk 10.
James, we have been round and round on this. Show me where HMG require us to put a Brigade over the beach or where it is laid down the Carrier will be hundreds of miles offshore. Utilising 1 CVF 2 Bays and 1 LPD we will be able to put a RM Commando on the beach simultaneously using a combination amphibious offload and aviation assets whilst providing overhead air cover and fire support.
We could put 2 Commandoes on the beach inside 2 or 3 hours.
OK- Very rough back of the fag packet calculations but…
you could replace the 4 LCU’s with four fast patrol/attack craft; the three linked below might be slightly too big in certain demensions but give a rough idea of what could be carried:
MRTP 33
LOA: 35.60 m
Beam, max: 6.70 m
Draught: 1.40 m
http://www.yonca-onuk.com/products.asp?id=5
Brave Class (old but still nice :))
Length: 90 ft (27 m) wl
98 ft 10 in (30.12 m) overall
Beam: 25 ft 6 in (7.77 m)
Draught: 7 ft (2.1 m)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brave_class_fast_patrol_boat
Russian Mirage Class
Length 35.35m
Width 6.6m
Draught 2.7m
http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/mirage_boat/
Not sure about height but retractable/folding radar, etc, shouldn’t be too difficult. Start off manned, experiment with unmanned; use for different roles – MSO, sanctions enforcement, amphibious support/escort, MCM, littoral ASW, etc.
Obviously could do with some helicopters…
How much for a LPD compared with a Frigate?
APATS,
It’s difficult to state a particular case for a Brigade over a beach in any particular theatre, as it does not work like that as I think you’d know. However, every SAG is predicated or includes a Brigade insertion in a non-permissive environment.
As for the doctrine of having the CVF close by, I refer you to 1982. The Navy simply won’t do it. So let’s not try to force them. That removes, completely, any aviation support such as Chinook. All you may have is the sky clear of enemy aircraft (which is good). What you will be left with is maybe a couple of Bays and possibly an LPD.
James, In 1982 the loss of a carrier was considered a Political mission kill. I think I am quite up to speed with how we plan to use and utilise Carriers in support of Amphibous landings thank you.
As the Chinook has a range of 400Nm and the flight decks on the Bays and the LPDs are Chinook capable then even in your world with a Carrier 300Nm offshore the Chinooks simply drop their first loads on the beach and then ferry backwards and forwards from the Amphibous assets taking fuel as required.
Hardly removed!
2 Bayd and an LPD only able to offload 600 troops per wave by LCU and LCVP is hardly to be sbiffed at either. Especially if you also cross decked the 4 Merlin from Fort Vic before they went in, giving you the Chinooks from the CVF and 4 Merlins to land troops from the Amphib assets.
The T26 flight deck is also Merlin capable but would probably operate a couple of Wildcats for recon and fire support if required.
APATS,
A Brigade is several thousand strong in the F Echelon, and we cannot do it from current resources. It is a capability gap that is annually raised, and annually ignored.
Hi Jonesy @20:55,
Very interesting “gadgets” – thanks for the link.
From the comments it would seem that using them from any old davits is not straight-forward (?):
“LCS 2 has an exendible rail system that will extend off the stern and lower a catch cradle assembly where the edm will be driven into and then raised up.
[- the above as a response to this question:]
How do you L& R this unit from the LCS ? Can’t be done.The back of the boat is sinking in the water without mission packages. You have to be insane, $47 Million !!!”
-our 2087 @ £20m starting to look like a bargain? Either figure in the comparison could be wrong, though
James! You’ve spent this long on the blog – and still can’t tell x’s logic apart from mine?
– anyway, I had to dust off this same formula “Not the full π R squared” the day before when not all commentators seemed to get the difference between AAW and local area air defence (as in Sea Ceptor)
Hi PE @ 21:30,
I am with you on this one “more units and cheaper is probably better for such a use”
We just have very perverse cost figures (because of the very different programme sizes):
– a Merlin (without the ASW kit, ie, the use you were referring to) one can get (as a bulk buyer) @ a £21m commercial price
– so far Wildcat is a captive programme (no commercials to spread the fixed costs to) and each machine comes @ £27m (!}
– cost per operating hour must tip the balance over a longer period
James, Maybe we cannot do thousands but we can land an entire RM Commando in one wave. Currently Ocean, 2 Bays and an LPD would allow all 3 RM Commandos to be transported. Offload timings would be dependent on how close to the shore you went and what rotary wing capability we possessed.
Losing Ocean without a replacement will be a blow but CVF will allow more rotary wing assets. I would love to put a Brigade over the beach in 1 wave but in a time of finite resources it would be platinum plating an already adequate capability.
Hi GJ,
Too heavy (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6rXc9FUGfEU&feature=related) for any easily deployed (L&R, I mean) USV
But very sexy as you say. Think of the old RN Squid as a shotgun; this piece is then a heavy MG (with the kind of sights that were purchased for use in A-stan, so much has the targeting improved, too)
In Mark’s link about marinising the Apaches, the 2015 mention was just about competing demands for (the not so good) availability
– the investment has not been approved
– in the US there have been two serious studies about marinising the Apache. V difficult as it is so top heavy; hence the USMC remanufactured their old AHs into Zulus, instead
Hi APATS,
They are 4 now “all 3 RM Commandos ”
– of course the renaming was a pure propaganda trick, and the 4th is differently assigned
ACC, Completely slipped my mind that somebody had decided to change FPGRM to 43 Commando! Technically there is also 29 Commando (RA), 24 Commando (RE)and 30 Commando (Information Exploitation Unit). I was referring of course to the 3 RM Manoeuvre Battalions.
APATS,
Ocean, LPD and 2 x Bays carry about 2600 troops*** in overload. That’s not a combat brigade. That is the F echelon of 3 commandoes with 24 hours of combat supplies, no guns, no sappers, no aviation support, no C2, no CSS, and 80 vehicles in total. Hardly an act of war to land 2600 men ashore and leave them with their feet and 24 hours of supplies only.
You may think it is “platinum coating an already adequate capability”, but I don’t. We need to get 3,500 men ashore in 6 hours with the combat supplies for 3-5 days minimum and all of their vehicles, guns, etc. For that we need a proper ARG that does not rely on a port.
I don’t follow the routine maintenance cycles of the ships, but can we actually generate Ocean, Albion and 2 Bays all at the same time? i.e. within the 30 day warning cycle? I expect we probably can, but is this a stretch?
*** That is the total non-ship’s companies, in overload, of the ships without any air group . If your calculations involve lots of helos to transport some of the troops ashore, you would need to deduct from that total the manning of the air group. Not sure if the loading of helos also interferes with the amount of overload space you can have.
@GJ, re: fast attack / patrol craft. I think you are spot on exploring this option . I think that the current P2000’s and Sabre’s are in desperate need of replacement . With future wars expected to be mainly in shallow water / coastal and river delta environments, vessels of this size is becoming increasingly important not less. The USN for example has just upgraded their Cyclone class to operate in the Gulf.
If you think about the Iranian style threat, we have to defend ourselves as much against. Mini subs and speed boats than coastal missile batteries and air strikes.
Something around 100-300t armed with a 40mm gun, LMM, depth charges and a couple of mini guns would be perfect in my view. Add the ability to operate small UAVs and have a ASW capability and I think relatively cheaply the RN has a massive step change in this area. Would also put the wind up the Spanish :)
I remember BMT had an interesting patrol boat mothership design… Must see if I can find it again.
@ ACC
“in the US there have been two serious studies about marinising the Apache. V difficult as it is so top heavy”
— Preach brother. Apache comes in at about 8,000kgs loaded, with a MTOW of about 10,500kgs. To marinise it to the standard they’re talking about with floats, folding rotors, newer rotor brake etc you’re looking at a sizable bloody chunk of that payload, or else running on quite a bit less than max fuel (empty weight is just over 5,000kgs currently).
@ James
As I am fond of quoting UKNL landing force (3Cdo + 1 battalion of Dutch Marines) an on ration strength of just under 6,000 needs 17,000tons of stores for 30 days. Round it up 20,000tons divide by 20ton (per our favourite loggie unit here the container) equals, obviously, 1000 containers which in shipping terms isn’t a lot. Some of that though won’t be easily containerised being outsize or “awkwardly shaped” break bulk cargo and liquids. I would hazard a guess and say to give us three months (plus a reserve) supplies afloat would take about £1billion in shipping.
It is the amphibians the actual warship themselves that cost. But I am convinced in years to come having a mixed arms light infantry battle group at sea, able to cross a good percentage of the world’s beaches without too much difficulty, and available at a “moment’s notice” will be worth more than an armoured brigade getting somewhere in 4 months.
The trouble is there are too many wedded to the idea of a huge(?) army that is virtually immobile (by nature) and radical ideas like virtually scrapping it for its budget to buy and operating amphibious groups goes heresy. The bi-polar static Ivan-across-the-inner-German-border world is gone. Going down the Eurocentric route has cost the country dear.
Re: Fast Attack Craft, how did the Royal Marine 6-month loan of the CB-90 go?
One more thing. I don’t mind thread drift in threads about unimportant topics like Eurofighter or what little tank the Army should spend a billion researching and not buying, but in naval threads we should concentrate solely on the topic and nothing else. These are important issues people. :)
The conclusion we reached last time discussed this is that we have plenty of shipping for a medium brigade and its supplies. Three Point Class ships would do it. What we can’t do is unload the Points over a beach.
One thought that occurred to me upthread is that if we do purchase a couple of ‘modified bays’ as Argus replacements then whichever one is not being used by the containerised hospital could also fill the role of ship to shore connector anchored 2 or 3 miles out.
It brings 4 rotary assets to theatre but on “D Day” these will all be off lily padding so you could lash up a Point class at right angles to the flight deck and drive the trucks straight off, down a ramp to the vehicle deck, and onto the landing craft.
You will have up to 14 LCU available (Albion, Bulwark, 2 Bays & 2 ‘Modified Bays’), allowing you to get a Point class unloaded comparitively quickly.
X,
this thread should be encouraged to drift. Far too much concentration on floaty little boats whose only purpose is to keep submarines away from the amphibious group.
You won’t find me arguing for a static Army. I do think we should however have a global intervention capability in reasonably quick timescales (ie I fully support the FRES concept, if not the bungled execution to date).
The FRES concept is actually fully Joint, even if most people think it is a porky little mini-tank.
I think we need to think in terms of a FRES (emphasis on S for System) capability in modular building blocks, the purpose of which is to put a credible intervention force in most places on the planet within the right timeframe to make a positive difference. Clearly, for different scenarios, those timeframes vary. However, for simplification, let’s look at small, medium, and large in terms of both numbers and (no longer than) existing timescales.
Small:
Either the Spearhead battalion, or a RM Commando, within 48 hours, air-deployed by VC10 or A400M or similar, even civair if an option. Not the C-17s.
Appropriate number of support helos transported in C17.
Flight of FGR Typhoon plus maintainers for austere base operations.
SSN x 1 if appropriate.
Pathfinder Platoon or SF Troop.
Bde Fwd HQ.
Medium (Land):
16 AA Brigade, within 7 days (first boots on ground in 48 hours).
Recce Sqn in light strike vehicles or similar.
UAV Battery.
Rest of Typhoon Squadron.
Lots of Support Helos.
Div Fwd HQ, and POLAD.
Medium (Littoral):
3 Cdo Brigade, within 3 days notice to move plus sailing time (I reckon that is 17 days total to the FI).
UAV Battery.
Rest of Typhoon Squadron.
Some Support Helos.
ARG shipping, including 2-3 escorts with NGS capabilities.
SSN x 2
Div Fwd HQ and POLAD.
Large (Land):
Army Brigade of required type to convert Large Brigade into light Division. Sea-borne for the kit, possibly airborne for the soldiers, if not shove them into ferries STUFT. Deployable anywhere in the world within 30 days including shipping time.
An SOP would be that once the small deployment occurs, both Medium Bdes come to reduced notice, and a decision is made as to which “might” next deploy. Contingency staff planning then goes on to work out how to get it to where it is going if the call comes from PJHQ to step up to a medium. The non-deploying Brigade then stays on reduced NTM to reinforce. Ditto for the Large scale deployment: reduced NTM as SOP when the medium is deployed.
What that gives you is a permanent high readiness Division with options for both sea or air transportation to intervene in Brigade strength in 7 days, Divisional strength in 30 days, and even reinforceable to Division plus if the non-deploying Brigade is used as well. It preserves a readiness cycle that units can rotate around.
Kit implications? Interesting, but a second order question. I actually think that we probably already have 95% of it, except we need to sort out the ARG shipping. Buy some light strike vehicles as well, don’t bother with Porky the FRES SV.
Sorry, should have made clear notice to deployment times:
Small, either Spearhead or single RM Commando: 24 hours.
Medium: 3 days, reducing to 48 hours on small deployment.
Large: 14 days reducing to 7 days on medium deployment.
Those NTD times are shorter than present. This is possible, as the current times are over generous.
What it would do is to add to training costs, as reduced NTD times imply slightly higher levels of training for medium and large scale.
Staff institutions and enablers such as port operators and movers to match those timeframes.
Can you get one of these in the back of a bay class I wonder. May be an interesting littorial option
http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120524/DEFREG02/305240006/New-Patrol-Boat-Coming-U-S-Navy?odyssey=tab|topnews|text|FRONTPAGE
@James – like the analysis. I’ve often wondered, notwithstanding any potential inflammatory effect, shouldn’t ‘small’ be practised once in a while, to some certain islands down south. Not just a benefit to testing their defence but testing the theory wherever it needs to go
@Mark – nice boat and an option for replacing the p2000s possibly. A sensible upgunning of coastal / main estuaries / Gib patrol capability is long overdue I think. Something like these would also have littoral benefit fit they could be deployed e.g. in bays or modified bays
On another point, if Apache is going to cost a fortune to marinise (properly), have other options been fully considered, e.g. wildcat force or a small buy of AH1-Zs for permanent at sea flights?
MickP,
yes, I agree entirely. Let’s make it cost-neutral as well. Ditch 1 x BATUS exercise per year (not the same one, as it gets predictable).
Stick Spearhead into the FI at zero notice or publicity, along with a reinforcement of the Typhoon, a pair of support helos, and an unannounced port visit by either an SSN or Tsomething, preferably both. Have in place a contract with the farmers on West Falkland for access to open land for training. Do a 3 week live fire exercise including some NGS.
Even better, make the first few exercises undertaken by Paras or Marines, or Ghurkas, or Guardsmen (i.e. the 1982 crowd, let’s also include a couple of ship’s companies also bumbling along in Naval marching style), and let the Mayor of Stanley confer the freedom of the town on them after ENDEX. Big media shindig, get the locals out cheering and the red white and blue bunting. Show them we care.
Do a refueling exercise to put something unexpected like a pair of Typhoon straight from Coningsby into MPA (followed by some kip for the pilots – that’s a long haul).
Even even better. Get the Staff Course there for a series of TEWTS once a year, media briefing that “Britain’s next generation of senior officers” are putting collective and Joint mental effort into exploring cutting edge rapid deployment techniques. That will cost peanuts.
Also, lease QinetiQ some land on the islands for some of their wilder experiments into all sorts of weird and wonderful technology, particularly UAVs and radars.
Basically, leave Carlos Fandango at a complete loss as to what, who, when and with what is going to turn up to do some good training or R&D (that we’d be doing anyway), get the islanders publicly enthused and on the media, and put some cash into the economy. Can’t be bad.
@Mark
In terms of buying a new fast patrol craft OTS, and without looking at any of the specifications at all, I bet something scandinavian would turn out better VFM than something gold plated from our American friends.
Aforementioned CB-90?
@James
That all makes so much sense, its bound never to happen
@ James re drift
I was taking the pee out of myself as much as anyone. I drift more than anyone.
Jonesy @ 20:55
I meant to mention LCS-ASW Increment 1 – it’s a lovely idea in theory but ASW from USVs didn’t work in practice and got cancelled. Combination of some technical problems and it being much better suited to static barrier operations than “in-stride” ASW. So instead they got a CAPTAS4 set from Thales to try and replicate what we’ve had with Sonar 2087 since 2004.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL33741.pdf
“NAVSEA’s Integrated Warfare Systems office had been working with the British Royal Navy to develop software for a continuously active sonar, streamed by a towed array mounted on a ship. The Brits, operating from Type 23 frigates, “have been doing demonstrations at sea with the sonar for about five years,” Ailes said.
An advanced development model of the Thales Captas-4 VDS system was delivered to the U.S. Navy at Brest, France, on July 25, according to NAVSEA, and should arrive in the U.S. in early September [2011]. In place of the type 2087 sonar used by the Royal Navy, the U.S. version will use the TB-37 multifunction towed array, feeding an enhanced version of the SQQ-89 sonar processing system.
Land-based testing of the system, NAVSEA said, will run through mid-2012, followed by at-sea testing of the system aboard a chartered commercial vessel operating for the LCS Mission Package Support Facility at Port Hueneme, Calif. A VDS competition is planned to follow the test program, Ailes said, with an award planned for 2014.”
As I said, ASW is one area where we are genuinely best in the world.
@ James
I want an ARG with ships big enough to carry two thirds of a brigade so when we want to move a brigade it just happens.
I also want more C17, some BAE146 (that’s one we discuss here I think isn’t it?) etc. So that the Parachute Regiment can be lifted into theatre ASAP to support the ARG. Or vice versa.
What is you Army bods say “Move now! Move now!” ?
Amphibious lift will keep the Army relevant. More air lift will keep the Army and RAF relevant.
Now can we get back to the T26? :)
There’s been a lot of news recently on the patrol-boat front. NECC have just announced the procurement of some new toys for the newly established CORIVFOR. They’ve ordered 5 (48 planned) Mark VI patrol boats from SAFE Boats at $6m a pop (more than double the cost of a CB90). It’s an 85′ design based on the Archangel lifeboat, with a range of at least 600nm (so 50% more than a CB90) :
http://www.navytimes.com/news/2012/05/navy-launch-new-class-patrol-boats-052412w/
A recent presentation from Bob Work showed how they would fit into all the different ships of the gator navy, they’re roughly the size of an LCAC. It’s already gone beyond Powerpoint, here’s LSD-51 with a Riverine command boat : http://www.navy.mil/view_single.asp?id=101898
I think we’ll be hearing quite a bit more on this, particularly as the US loses interest in dry sandy places and starts thinking more about wet sandy places.
@ X – “I want an ARG with ships big enough to carry two thirds of a brigade so when we want to move a brigade it just happens.”
Abso-effing-lutely!
@ El Sid – I hear the USN is using an old LSD (USS Ponce?) as an “afloat forward staging base” for MCM, MSO, SOF, etc,which sounds suspiciously like a mothership.
Going by the Albion we could have 4 100+ ton fast patrol/attack craft in the well dock (with endurances of up to 7 days if they watch the fuel) and 4 CB90 sized craft on the davits (already proven to operate hellfire, AMOS twin 120mm mortars, etc)- the lack of helicopters is disappointing but they could be provided by another vessel or a hangar built on a “batch 2″…
NOW… IIRC the Albion’s were considered expensive for a LPD but how does that compare with Frigate? How much would 5-7 new Albion’s (or other LPD design) cost? If we have the 6-8 Type 26’s as TD’s more battleship than escort and sailing with the Carrier task group (more like a modern “battle fleet” now?), could these new “mothership” with their embarked “Daughters” do the every day, 2nd rate missions/roles AND give us extra capabilities during the occasional, first-rate engagements – Such as MCM, escorting the landing craft, raiding, NGFS, Littoral ASW, etc. Essentially acting as skirmishers or the old fortilla?
@ El Sid – by the way, do you have by any chance a link to the Bob Work presentation?
@ Jedibeeftrix
I spared you we need LPD big enough to carry 6 (six) fast landing craft. And that maximising FLC numbers is probably a tad more important than helicopters. The Karel Doormen can carry 6 NH90 and at 28k tons should be big enough to carry 6 FLC with ease and 1000. I would forego a Juan Carlos size ship just to maximise FLC. If we had 9 KD we would have enough helicopter capability for our modest Jungly fleet. Off load them on to CVF. Which takes me back to mega-Cavour.
If we did have a fantasy ARG of 1 x JC and 2 x modified KD that would mean 16 FLC. If each FLC can carry 4 Viking that is 64 Viking across the beach; the old Saxon based mech’ infantry had 50 or so vehicles; so that is more than a battalion across the beach in one wave. If one company goes by air that first wave could include the cavalry element or the guns or the engineers or the NAAFI wagon. It ain’t rocket science.
TD, nice article, obviously well received since we’re at 300+ comments already.
I agree completely with everything in the article except the numbers. As much as I like the idea of more, but less capable hulls, I don’t think we can afford to not have anything other than a fully capable warfighting platform deployed around the world. We need all 12 Type 26’s, preferably 16 and more if we can get them.
If we put a ship out around the world, we have no idea what emergent task will arise. A few years ago we were patrolling around Iraqi oil platforms, conducting piracy patrols, counter drugs, deterring Russian submarines, Falklands patrol, etc. Libya then leapt into the frame requiring land attack, propaganda broadcast, airspace and battlespace management, sea control and non-combatant evacuation. All UK FF/DD have one thing in common – they have always been able to contribute something to whatever incident has arisen; not necessarily a perfect or even desirable capability, but a capability nonetheless. If you deploy a less capable ship, some sort of corvette, then the initial reaction from our ship is more likely to be ‘there’s nothing we can do’ – result, the RN loses face and ergo the UK.
Losing face sounds like a poor argument for lots of shiny expensive warships but the impact of UK excellence in the maritime with NATO and other organisations is huge. We can leverage significant amounts of influence at the highest planning levels – case in point, Libya. The political utility of that influence should be obvious to all.
We are NOT the world’s policeman. However, we need to be able to step in wherever UK interests are threatened, and at least contribute to stabilising that situation. Piracy is a case in point – now the warships have established a pattern the local coastguards and private contractors move in to take over. Our warships are free to continue their missions and be both able and capable of reacting to emergent tasking.
Finally on deep strike and the MLRS idea. If we are placing a singleton ship in harms way launching deep strike missions inland over 200-300km, then there needs to be something else to support it. That something is an aircraft carrier or land based air cover. Give the T26 the long range gun and leave the rest of the targets to the flyboys.
@ SomewhatInvolved
I’m still in doubt about the balance between first rate and second/third rate naval vessels for, and indeed whether there is a requirement for second/third rate vessels for maritime security and patrol ops.
Assuming a Type26 indeed can be build for that magical 250M (+ hand-downs from Type23) and the budget for 13 (but nothing else) indeed is available, would you then stick to the 13 Type26’s or would you be prepared to trade one for e.g. 3 River-type or NZ Otago-class OPV’s (with maybe a bit more punch) for anti-piracy/anti-drug/etc.?
Other question. If there was a(fantasy-fleet) budget for 16 Type26, would you then trade some for this upgraded River/Otago, e.g. 14+6, or would you rather have 16 Type26 and nothing else?
Appreciate your opinion.
@ X – “I spared you we need LPD big enough to carry 6 (six) fast landing craft. And that maximising FLC numbers is probably a tad more important than helicopters. The Karel Doormen can carry 6 NH90 and at 28k tons should be big enough to carry 6 FLC with ease and 1000.”
Not a detail man – don’t have the background to add to it – but i know that our principle warfighting unit is the brigade, and thus that should be our ambition.
“This could spark an interesting debate if we think the option for a hi lo mix is worth exploring.” – @TD
Introduction
I’ve been filtering through various comments, articles and documents that we’ve been discussing and what follows is a summary and an interpretation of recommendations expressed by the exveryone here.
Please correct me if I’ve misinterpreted information (likely!) or if this review of comments has revealed a new line of thinking or discussion!
Platforms and missions aside, the key specifications of the various concepts (SIMMS, C3, Black Swan, Venator, LCS, etc) are relatively similar across all concepts and case studies so as to not bear repeating in detail here.
For example common concepts include, but are not limited to:
– Cheap
– Numerous
– Often on the Lo side of Hi/Lo
– Light gun(s)
– Littoral focus
– CAMM / Sea Ceptor
– Helicopter pad
– Small craft launching and recovery
– UAV/UUV/USV (aka Asimo’s Army)
– Modularisation/Containerisation
– Criticism of being too “Lo”
Starting Point
A recap of the position that we’re in includes but is not limited to the following assumed points and opinions:
– Astute production will not exceed 7 boats
– T45 production will not exceed 6 ships
– CVF programme likely to deliver 2 ships
– T26 is going ahead
– Significant transfer of equipment from T23
– T26 likely to take on specialised role of T23
– T26 hull numbers are likely to reduce further (8 or 10?)
– MHPC Programme is on the horizon
– Hull lifetimes are a motivating factor
– Hull numbers considered too low to fulfill standing tasks
Hi/Lo
– Astute class regarded as very capable attack submarines
– T45 class regarded as very capable AAW ships
– T26 anticipated to be very capable ASW ships
– Mixed feelings on CVF but likely to prove highly flexible in coming years
– Assumption that a common class of Low-end vessels can help restore hull numbers for task-fulfillment without compromising High-end acapabilities.
– Intention that this common class of Low-end vessels may be able to increase capabilities.
Candidate vessels for replacement with Low-end vessel
Some vessels are relatively new but may be considered aging by the time the MHPC programme delivers vessels.
4 x River class (Ocean Patrol Vessel inc HMS Clyde)
8 x Hunt class (Mine Countermeasures)
7 x Sandown class (Minehunter)
2 x Echo class (Survey vessel)
1 x HMS Scott (Ocean survey)
16 x P200/Archer (Patrol)
2 x Scimitar (Patrol)
1 x HMS Gleaner (Coastal survey)
I’m certain I’ve missed some. If you know of more, shout out!
Additional missions
In addition to the missions and tasks handled by the above classes, some additional missions and capabilities that are either desirable or that we have found lacking discussed so far include:
– Supplementary ASW
– Supplementary AAW (local, point, area)
– Amphibious Assault
– Supplementing Arctic/Antarctic Patrol (likely specialist role)
– ASuW
– NGS / Land Attack
Again if I’ve missed some of what’s been discussed, shout out!
Candidate hull-forms
A variety of vessels have been mentioned both here or in other articles. Prominent platforms include:
– Coastguard (e.g. Black Swan)
– Offshore Supply Vessel (e.g. SIMMS)
– Bay class
– Fast Sea Frame
– Bespoke Corvette (e.g. BMT Venator)
– Modified Khareef class
– RSS Endurance class
The elephant in the room
Mine Countermeasures is a specialist task. It is currently carried out by plastic/wooden hulled vessels which limits the size of the vessel.
The two alternatives to this form of construction are:
– De-gaussing the hull
– Stand-off Mine Countermeasures
I have no knowledge of Mine Warfare. It is entirely possible that Mine Countermeasures should be elevated to a specialised High-end
Whether the role can be carried out as effectively by a magnetic hull using Stand-off techniques and equipment compared to the Hunt and Sandown class is fairly pivotal to being able to use the MHPC program as a springboard for a common vessel.
Mine Countermeasures are as vitally important in a Warfighting scenario as during peacetime. We do not want to have to consider another ship as expendable and send them in as a blunt manned makeshift minesweeper as we did with HMS Alacrity in the Falklands Sound.
I will assume that we can perform Stand-off Mine Countermeasures effectively from here on, meaning our resulting platform remains a candidate for this role.
Some relevant considerations
– Sea Dart effectively denied high altitude attacks in 1982
– Low Altitude attacks / Sea Skimming missiles penetrated air defences in 1982
– Atlantic Conveyor radar cross section too large to decoy with chaff and Sea Kings (Aside: One was piloted by Prince Andrew)
– Fire damage caused significant ship losses in 1982
– Opposition submarines, such as SSK’s, are a major threat and difficult to deal with.
– 25mm Bushmaster took a long time to sink the Ryou-Un Maru
– Bay class delays and overruns were due to maturity of design before construction
– Estimated 30% defence spending can be clawed back directly in taxes if spent in this country
– Estimated benefit in GDP to the country is 1.8 times spending overall, if spent in this country
Warfighting
Especially given the reduce numbers of High-end vessels, any platform that we construct for the Royal Navy will be sent into Harm’s Way.
Consequently any candidate platform should be designed from the “Fighty” direction down, rather than the “Civilian” direction up.
At a very minimum, organic abilities should include:
– First rate fire fighting equipment
– Consideration to detectability
– Ability to defend herself against appropriate threats for the mission
Hull Form
A common platform vessel will need to
– Reduce development risks: Conventional monohull
– Blue Water aspirations
– Ability to operate in heavy Oceanic conditions
– Ability to manoevre in the Littoral
– Draught ~5-6m?
– Medium size suggested (5,000-8,000 ton range?)
– Space for Hull Sonar
Power plants
– Future proofing
– Fuel type considerations
– Range considerations
– Speed 20+knots
– Power requirements likely to increase over lifespan
– Electric drives (pods?)
– Electricity Generation
– Diesel/Turbine/Hydrogen/Anti-matter/Whetever
– Drive power and power plant ratings can vary for exports.
Environmental considerations
Beyond fuel efficiency, these are warships first and foremost. CO2 emissions will have to drop down the list of priorities. Apologies to the Polar Bears, I’ll hug you later.
Self defence
– Need for self defence without support is likely in some missions
– High sensor mast required to increase low-level/sea-skinning detection
– Continuous target tracking and illumination not required?
– Initial attack vector, MCG and self-guiding terminal approach sufficient
– Is there much difference in cost between specialised CAMM launchers and Sylver launchers (e.g. A50 and smaller)?
Helicopers
– Force multiplier
– Not a Force replacement on it’s own
– Provides additional capabilities on-demand
– Will need a dedicated hangar if embarked for a length of time
– VERTREP considerations
– Large Helicopter deck desirable
– Merlin sized Hangar preferred
– Deck capable of supporting a Chinook desired
Small craft
Various kinds of small craft for different missions:
– RHIBS
– Fast Attack Craft
– Landing Craft
– Mine Countermeasure Vehicles
– Search and Survey craft (including ROV’s)
Means of carrying small craft:
– Well deck
– Davits
– Transom deck (e.g. Ramps)
Mission deck
– Space to be made available for flexible missions
– Sensible to think of this space in terms of ISO Containers (TEU’s?)
– Ro-Ro style access to the deck when docked for ease of loading
– Carry modular “capability packages” as and when they are developed. See aforementioned ISO/TEU Containers.
– Consideration to exposing mission deck or containers to upper deck, helicopter deck and small craft deck
ASW/AAW/ASuW
The Type 45 is designated as the specialist AAW. We’ve designated the Type 26 as the specialist ASW and it may also become an ASuW vessel as well. CVF also brings capabilities in these areas.
No reason why helicopters/small craft facilities/mission deck facilities/generic VLS launchers can’t supply supplementary capabilities, but not the primary focus.
NGS and Land Attack
As per the ASW/AAW/ASuW above, however a lot of the missions that this vessel is likely to face (survey, MCMW, patrol, humanitarian, Amphibious – see below) is likely to take place close to shore.
– NGS useful in Libya
– Potential for TLAM in generic VLS launchers
Asimo’s Army
I’ve deliberately steered away from Unmanned units so far as these are a relatively immature technology, albeit almost guaranteed to play more of a massive role in the future than they currently do.
If our platform has enough facilities to handle helicopters, small craft or has a mission deck then unmanned equipment should not be much of a stretch.
Recommended Platform and specifications
Priciple is different equipment will be loaded or installed for different missions.
RSS Endurance style vessel
– Military origins
– Frigate/Destroyer sized
– Operate in a rough atlantic or in the Littoral
– Consideration to radar cross section / angled sides / shuttered Davits / etc.
– Endurance class size with San Antonio stylings?
I-Mast
– I-Mast 10/100? Bigger?
– High above the waterline
– Single mast, little clutter
– Navigation and initial target
– Illumination in addition to tracking not required – single radar set?
– In theory Thales can “weld” a larger mast on during a refit
Electric drive pods
– Improve manoeverability for littoral and port visits
– Vary rating of the motors
– Speed 20+ knots for task force, dash and self defence
– Proven on RMS Queen Mary 2
– Vary rating of Generators for exports or future upgrades
– Power generator approach can help with humantarian missions
– Available power on board likely to become important in the future
Helicopter deck
– Hangar for a merlin
– Deck space for two merlins, helps with VERTREP
– Deck to support a chinook
– Merlin sized lift to mission deck too expensive, Hangar on same level
– Ramp or small lift to mission deck.
Small craft
– Well deck
– Sized for at least one LCU Mk.10, preferably two
– Davits for additional craft such as RHIBs
– Access from mission deck
Mission deck
– Sized to hold ISO Containers (TEU)
– Access to Hangar Deck and Well Deck
– Side door/ramp for easy loading when in port
– Hold equipment for various missions
– Embark troops/vehicles
Phalanx
– Block-1B with surface engagement for aircraft, missile and small craft defence
Deck Gun
– Oto Melera 76mm Lightweight
– Different ammunition
– Want to be able to sink stubborn small craft
– Supplementary AAA
– NGS (maybe with Vulcano) if vessel is in Littoral anyway
– Possible ASuW via precision Vulcano?
Sea Ceptor
– Receive initial attack vector from I-MAST
– May receive MCG via Sea Ceptor datalink
– Active seeker handles terminal phase
VLS
– Do we pay more for a SYLVER/Mk41 cells or save money on CAMM specific launchers?
Possible Missions Fittings
Some examples of how the common hull may be altered for different mission types, either as a more dedicated ship or as a more flexible/modular ship.
Hydrographic
– Ocean, Survey and Coastal
– Dry dock required for fitting
– Survey motor boat
– Other ROV equipment from Well Deck
– Fit Sonars, magnetometers, etc
– Echo class carry armaments
Patrol (Fisheries, Falklands, Ocean)
– RHIBS and/or Fast Craft
– Helicopter (Lynx, Merlin) for search, interdiction, SAR, etc.
– Fit deck gun
– Option to load cells with CAMM’s
Mine Countermeasures
– Stand-off method (non-degaussed metal hull)
– Oropesa, Seawolf, PAP/ROV, Self-propelled Acoustic/Magnetic Minesweeper from Well Deck
– Fit deck gun as likely operating in Littoral for NGS and self defence
– Load CAMM into cells
– Optional aircraft with dippling sonars?
Amhibious Assault
– Fit deck gun for NGS and Self Defence
– LCU’s in Well Deck
– Fast Craft in Davits
– Helicopter deck for lilly-padding or organic operations
– Fit deck gun for NGS
– Full load of CAMM’s in cells
– Troops/Equipment in passenger accomodation/mission deck
Humanitarian
– Whatever equipment is already loaded.
– Ship out aid supplies/equipment to Mission Deck
– Helicopter Deck for operating relief missions
– Dock in port and provide Power Generation
– Medical facilities
– Well Deck and Davits for operating Fast Craft
Costs
– HTMS Angthong (Endurance class) exported for S$200m or ~£100m. Production run of 5 vessels in total.
– Build in Britain.
– Heavily push 30% clawback of costs and 1.8 boost to GDP
– Paced production to maintain industry security, enhance exportability
Conclusion
There we are. A summary from all of your ideas and some (mis)interpretations. Something to build on/debate?
Would it help the high/low intensity situation if the mandate of the Coast Guard was expanded from SAR to SAR and anti-piracy? This simplifies the problem of the Navy having 2 different and mutually contradicting requirements and allows them to focus on the high intensity end.
Corvettes/OPVs for the Coast Guard, destroyers and frigates for the Navy. Which is the situation now, though.
@WW
I’d build heavy cruisers stuffed to the gills with AAW, ASuW and a VLS similar to the Korean Burkes on a plug and play design. Maintainance? Yank the component out, send it in and plug another one in. 8 of them. 4 for the carrier in operation, 2 in maintainance (sorry, there is a limit to plug and play, and the cleaning the hull is something that isn’t modular) and 2 more for independent ops.
2-3 helos (standard), 64 VLS tubes (AAW/ASROC/Land Attack), 1-2 76mm guns, 2×3 swivel torpedo mounts L/R, standard chaff/flare dispensers, sonar decoys, towed array, AESA radar and (James will like this) a company of marines and 2-4 small craft on divots or 2 small craft + rear well dock for 2 Vikings (Small potatoes, but with 4 to a CVBG, that’s a battalion even without LPDs). Speed? Carrier speed +5 knots. Not an ambitious speed, but with all the bells and whistles, practicality demands something has to give, and best to let it be speed. If you’re king of the road or are escorting the king of the road, you don’t run from others. Others run from you :).
Observer,
there may be some issues with your Coast guard proposal, although they may be surmountable.
1. UK Coast Guards don’t join up for global deployments to fight pirates. That’s a huge change in both personnel and training, legal, ROE and equipment issues.
2. Pirates are not normally found in UK waters (apart from the one who charged me a £50 “clean up fee” when my little boy got seasick on his fishing boat about 500 yards off Newquay beach). And it was me that did the ruddy cleaning up! Wouldn’t put into harbour until I paid up. Reported him to Newquay cops, who seemed completely disinterested. I think he was their half-brother, they seemed to share the sloping forehead and webbed hands.
Under “Some relevant considerations” I forgot to list that there is currently no system or equipment that we can find that allows reloading of VLS cells during UNREP.
The Other Chris, A very good summary but I would take issue with a couple of points which are linked.
1. The only talk of T26 reducing to 8 or 10 hulls has been from ourselves considering the best way to spend the T26 budget.
2. The hi lo mix was purely a different means of spending the T26 budget and not a discussion on the MHPC concept. So actually the vessels we are discussing replacing are only the 13 T23 Frigates.
Under “Costs” I also forgot to mention an extended design process (reference £120m odd with T26) to reduce maturity of design issues.
In the US they have certain published targets, e.g. 300+ fleet. Should the RN have the same? 100+ for example?
If I reluctantly agree that the T26 should be focused for ASW, which is limited to 8 (though I’ve read 9 elsewhere) 2087 towed sonars, what are the other 5 GP T26’s really for in first tier escort terms? If you give both T45 and T26 ASuW missiles, then in my view we either want more AAW destroyers or more numerous patrol ships, or both.
@James
The legal, ROE and training issues you brought up are extremely true, but the Navy also has the same kind of problems though in a different direction. The Coast Guard would be reluctant to shoot, being primarily SAR. The Navy on the other hand (or rather, our navy lol) had an itch to shoot everything :P
Different ROEs. In war, hostile ship in perimeter = KILL!!!!….
OTOH, I do think it’s easier for the Coast Guards to learn a ROE than for a Navy to have a dual track ROE.
@The other chris
True on the missile replenishment. In the old days, VLS came with cranes, but apparently the reloading was too troublesome and risky at sea.
@Repulse
Maybe numbers are not the unit we should be looking at, but “combined arms divisions”-navy style. Determine how many escorts and mission ships a single “module” needs (like my 1 CVF/4 CAs [air interdiction squadron] or 2 LHD/2 escorts [light intervention squadron], or 8 corvettes [coastal security squadron]), then determine how many “modules” you need to service all your basic requirements. After all, you can get 100 ships, but if they’re all dingys, it’s hardly going to be able to do the main job it was meant to do. Purpose 1st, then numbers.
Observer,
unless you have a proper RM boarding party, you will find that the Royal Navy has a seriously friendly attitude to boarding and being boarded. Just ask the Iranians. From Trafalgar to being bought off with a few iPods, in about 200 years. Sickening lack of forward thinking and balls at all levels from CNS, through the Joint and single service command, certainly including the Captain, down to the young officer, and including the NCOs on those RIBs. If your Singaporean Navy has a rather more grown up attitude, I congratulate your nation.
For those who may want to excuse this, the real question is how the hell did it ever happen that the Iranians got so close? Not “what could they do when surrounded by patrol boats with heavy MGs?” Way too late by then. Even at the very last step, the young officer should have been fronting up to his Captain and demanding a proper overwatch. Christ, I did often enough, got busted from Acting Rank back to substantive twice, but there is no way on God’s Green Earth that I was ever going to put my boys into danger if I was not sure about top cover. Even got a reversal and a GOCs commendation once, and and found myself a marked man by that particular CO (he won, eventually. Never got that posting I wanted).
If ever there was a case for multiple courts-martial, that was it. But no, never happened.
@Observer, I agree with the purpose first then numbers next approach as in a normal world that makes sense. Problem is that in the world which is the MOD regardless of the purpose not changing the numbers get significantly cut – there is capability in numbers as well having all singing and dancing shiny toys.
A 100 vessel fleet, could be 2 CVFs, 2 LPDs, 14 first tier escorts, 30 MHPCs, 24 Fast Patrol craft, 16 SSNs. / SSBNs and 12 RFAs for example…
james, The incident was covered in the “Fulton Report” which although never made public basically identified an attitude of complacency in a mission that had become routine and a couple of other one off factors which led to the proverbial “3 lemons in the window”.
I can tell you it led to a massive shake up in training and boarding procedures.
The reason behind no Court Martials was that there was no single person made a large error of judgement.
@James
Peace James, peace. The boarding parties in the Iranian incident were in unarmed craft, no point committing suicide in defiance. In all honesty, I’ve no idea how our people would have reacted in a similar situation, but we do have a bigger advantage to you in that we are not as hated and that we do have Muslim crew that speak the same language with similar religions and a potential religious headache if they were interned. It won’t have been “Muslim vs White Crusader”, it would have been “Shitte Muslim vs Sunni Muslim”, and that would have oppened a really big can of worms Iran won’t want to touch.
BTW, this is also one of the scenarios of why we’re pushing USV tech very hard. Less people in the firing line, and if you used a remote control boarding craft with missiles and MGs that can suicide easily, people are less likely to sas you. Just unload onto the merchant or go over the side and let the USV go wild. In normal ops, no people to harass = no confrontation. They yell at you, pretend the phones are off :)
I’m fairly sure there’re quite a few muslims in the Royal Navy as well… what with there being nearly 3 million British muslims and the religion being present here here since the 18th century.
@Mark – sorry for duplication on Mk VI, looks like we overlapped during moderation or something.
@Gareth Jones – 2x Albion cost £450m in 1996, exactly what the last 4xT23 cost to build at about the same time. So I’d guess you’d be talking something like £500m per ship for a new Albion – and that’s before you started adding things like hangar facilities, Artisan, £20m-worth of small boats etc. You’ve already said that these are for operating away from the main fleet, so you can’t assume the helicopter fairy will come along to help out – if you want helicopters for ops, you have to support them yourself.
In fact just about everything about the Albions works out as roughly two T23’s – crew, running costs, refit costs.
The San Antonios cost nearly £1bn, and you wouldn’t want one anyway, they’re up there with MRA4 as a procurement nightmare. Rotterdam is cheaper, but is too narrow for LCACs and lacks flag facilities. Mistral is mebbe closer to what you’re looking for – the Russian ones cost about £600m.
The Work presentation at CATO is at 25-40 min of http://www.cato.org/event.php?eventid=9152
It’s only a passing mention of the coastal/riverine stuff but it’s so new that they haven’t really got their PR together yet. Given that Work has posted a few times on Information Dissemination and Galrahn is taking an interest in the Mk VI’s, I guess something may turn up there in coming weeks.
I liked the description of the anti-piracy mission as providing a coastguard for someone else’s coastline….
@Repulse
I’m not greatly in favour of a target ship number – it becomes a totemic thing that becomes more important than a rational consideration of tasks versus assets. Plus you get people gaming the system – HMS Victory would get included, and STUFT and all the old SS(B)N’s awaiting disposal, that kind of thing. On the flip side it would give PTT something new to mither about, so I guess it deserves consideration just to protect their wives’ sanity.
@TOC
SYLVER is a lot more expensive than dedicated Sea Ceptor launchers – they’re much bigger (hence being able to quad pack) and more importantly they need a lot more engineering as you’re dealing with exhaust gases from a hot launch, whereas Sea Ceptor is cold-launched. It’s a shame, as it would be really, really nice to see T26 with VLS tubes – the GCS design does allow for SYLVER/Mk 41, but it looks like Batch 1 at least won’t have them.
You also missed out us lot over here in the ASROC fanclub.
@The Other Chris
Then including a few of them in the boarding party would have been an … interesting idea. Massive media distraction.
How up to date is their Arabic?
Observer,
they were not unarmed, they had SA 80s. And your general description only fits the excuse-making culture. They should not have been in that situation to begin with.
APATs,
as above to Observer, except systemic. And frankly, if no sufficient fault was found, the digging was not deep enough. This would apply to all 3 services, but in the case of the RN there are demonstrably very few senior officers, and they all know each other.
It is literally incredible that the incident happened, and worse in that no one took the can. For a service that quite happily court martials reasonably senior officers for bashing a ship into a rock, or deliberately leaving documents on canal towpaths (for service and budgetary advantage), it was a total dereliction of service duty to not follow through on this. There is no excuse whatsoever for putting our country into that position, of being nationally humiliated, and for some doddery old naval soak to get quietly pensioned off to run the sailors’ welfare charity or whatever. It really verges on treason, the incompetence was so bad. Saying that there was a big shake up afterwards is completely inadequate.
(And yes, the West Side Boys / Op Barras debacle falls into the same boat. I am equal opportunity in my disgust of a basic lack of balls, no matter the uniform)
“They should not have been in that situation to begin with.”
That’s true in a sense. There should have been contingency plans, especially with a known hostile. Or a few Australians…
BTW, where was the parent frigate when all this was happening?
“There is no excuse whatsoever for putting our country into that position, of being nationally humiliated”
Tough luck. It happened, deal with it. But I do agree that the political and international cost was quite unacceptable. A reprisal raid (aka burn all their patrol boats in their harbour) and a SAS prisoner extraction might have been in order. Israeli would have given that direction a strong consideration. And personally, I think the Foreign Office would have been better off spitting on the “gift” of returning prisoners, even if it meant them having to sit a few more weeks in jail.
….and because this occurred later. What the f*ck is the point of any of the 3 services’ Commissioning Courses ** if not to equip the newly minted young officer with the biggest, shiniest balls the Queen can give him (or …gulp…her)? The sort of balls that doesn’t give a toss about the enemy, but in fact faces up to his own chain of command and tells them they have it wrong, if they have.
** Clearly, for Guards Officers, it is the drill and an encyclopaedic knowledge of London nightclubs. But apart from them…
@ Observer: “deal with it” involves finding 1-5 officers and crucifying them (not a play-Court Martial that the Andrew normally go in for. One that involves prison and total loss of pay and pension). That did not happen.
James, would you have started a war with Iran and got your “boy” killed? is that the sort of “balls” that would make you happy? Have you seen the report? Sometimes you come across as the sort of “relic” that would have thought one valley is as good as another in 1854!
James
i do seem to remember several members of the army getting lost and captured by a street gang in serra leone without much of a fight. Where should we send the army for such a humiliation?
@El Sid and @APATS
Sincere apologies to the ASROC Club!
Line of thinking on T26 is that for the Hi/Lo mix that T26 production could possibly stop at the 8-10(?) mark with T26 being considered High-end ASW.
MHPC (assuming stand-off Mine Countermeasures, err, measures up) adopts the general purpose ship model as the base and production continues from there.
Though it’s entirely possible that T26 achieves its goal and goes on a lengthy production run with major exports.
Either way, we can load ASROC up on the T26? ;)
I like the look of the SAAB grenade launcher, looks impressive but also looks like the pattern lands very close!
@Observer
The Muslim’s I know personally speak Arabic. I’ll contact them now to find out which dialect because I’ve realised that I’ve never asked before!
Perhaps my biggest criticism is laid at the feet of higher command who continued to allow boarding in unarmed Rhibs especially in the far Northern Gulf.
There was an incident in the Summer of 2006 involving an LCU and LCVP and the Iranians. The aformentioned LCU and accompanying LCVP were conducting a “security sweep” of local fishing dhows in the NE Gulf.
This somewhow involved the LCU stopping and Royal having a naked “hands to bathe”. The good old Iranians pitched up obviously mistaking the LCU for a dhow and there followed an interesting stand off between partially dressed Royal and infuriated Iranians. No one is sure whether it was the nakedness or the 2 50 Cals mounted on the LCU that convinced the Iranians to beat a hasty retreat.
I spin that dit for 2 reasons, one because it was hilarious although the CO of parent LPD did not think so and the other it should have served as a warning that the Iranians were upping the ante.
APATS,
no, the key is not getting into the situation in the first place. It may have seemed routine, but then so did the 500th street patrol in West Belfast in a 6 month tour. It does not matter how routine it seems, you practice, rehearse, think of any number of contingencies, work out plans. And if there is clearly a vast set of contingencies that collectively say “so we put 2 RIBS into the water in disputed boundaries, there’s only a dozen of us, armed with popguns and some of them girlies, 3 miles from the frigate, and with no helicopter, then we are likely to be f*cked”, then the young officer in charge of said patrol should damn well have fronted up to the ship’s CO and told him it’s not good enough. And the ship’s CO should have fronted up to the Commodore in advance of the mission and told him the ROE weren’t good enough. And the Commodore should have seen that coming and pre-emptively got his theatre lawyer off his fat backside and got with jindi’ing up PJHQ. and PJHQ should have seen that one a mile off and got MB to clarify the national position on irritating the Iranians, and where the f*ck are these boundaries anyway, and should we be cautious or aggressive? And the CNS should have realised (if he can stop dreaming about spastic carriers) that Naval personnel are simply inadequate for boarding operations, and to re-jig his force so that he’s got some properly trained Marines to do this sort of thing, and that putting tearful little girls and she-men onto RIBS in the Persian Gulf is an accident waiting to happen.
It’s hardly rocket science, and before you declare “wise after the event”, it’s the sort of thinking that should be – and often is – drilled into young officers’ heads when they take the Queen’s Commission.
So, about that Valley?
James, I agree with you ref the higher authorities, see my next post about the other incident. Not having the helo was definitely not planned. I think you sum it up when you say “the same as the 500th street patrol in West Belfast”. Imagine the previous 499 and had been completely benign, how good would the guys on the 500th been? That is what happened.
So the Court Martial should have been for:
Young Officer
Ship’s CO
Commodore
A 2 star in PJHQ
CNS
(EDIT)
@ APATS,
your latest crossed with mine. The point is that you took just as much care with the 500th patrol as you did with any other. That is completely the point, and why the young officer bears responsibility along with much more senior officers. You don’t put your men in any danger just because it is the 500th time and 499 times it has gone OK. some may say that is human nature, but that is the point of the self-discipline and training – you get that out of the way.
(I handed over once to a RM Cdo in South Armagh. They were just as good as we were. That’s another point. You’ve got these fellers in the Andrew – use them).
@Observer
Quranic (Modern Standard), Egyptian and Hadhrami. Though they say they’re in the minority in that regard. Quick overview of Islam in Britain.
On a side topic, James, you ok? I seem to sense a bit of stress coming from you these few days. Rough month at work?
Ok, if they’re up to Mod Quaranic, they should be able to talk to Iranians though slowly.
James said “they were not unarmed, they had SA 80”
Much the same thing really………
But I think for all your tongue in cheek hyperbole you may be onto something. I can’t think how to say this without being a blunt and perhaps a bit sexist and dare I say being a bit political too. My experience of the Royal Navy began just before women were allowed to go to sea. And if you recall that is just before or about the same time as a culture of “everybody is a winner” and “soft discipline” (Left wing inspired) took hold in our schools. The RN I first experienced seemed to be “manned” by blokes similar to those I had encountered in the Army through my uncles and father. Skilled men who did their work with pride. Not hardmen but men’s men who when treated like adults didn’t need to be lead but were responsible. And the officers seem to be worthy of respect.
Over about 15 years I saw all that disappear. Somewhat may not like me saying this but I speak as I find. You could into a call centre grab a reasonable random sample of 18 to 25 y-o stick them in 4s with the appropriate haircuts and not know the difference. Actually you could do the reverse stick a sample of 18 to 25 y-o ratings into civies and stick them in a call centre. I don’t think you could perform a similar exercise with a random selection of Toms. Soft is too soft a word. They lack a seaman like quality and a level of pride. I am going to upset somebody else now in that even with my very limited exposure to the RAF a lot of young ratings remind of the “light blue culture”. And now I am going to be sexist and say I don’t know how some of the women actually get through Raleigh. I am not expecting crews in warm climes to jump overboard at the first opportunity with a knife in their teeth ready to fight sharks. But there is something missing that was there twenty odd years and probably for centuries before then too.
National Geographic channel have been showing that programme about the RAN ship deployed to the upper Indian Ocean. The crew seemed switched on. It seems PT isn’t an evil to be endured but something that is enjoyed. I am going to be sexist again. The Australian female sailors deported themselves just as well as the men and, um, how shall I say it, um, looked quite “healthy”. If they were British, not in uniform, you would think they were officers. Not saying all British ratings hate PT they don’t. And I am not saying all British female ratings are, um, slightly overweight shrill or incompetent. All I am saying is that in my experience the a significant minority in the RN, men and women, who aren’t as good as perhaps I as a taxpayer would expect them to be with my, admittedly limited, knowledge of other services. As I am not in the best of humours I will be sexist once more and say I think women at sea in a warship is corrosive. And I will be political too and say that Labour’s and the Left’s education policy has damaged 2 generations of British children on a moral level.
Finally this is one of the reasons why I don’t think this forward presence/gunboat/little ship idea will work. The RN doesn’t produce the sort of sailor to crew those vessels. Not saying some couldn’t be trained. Not saying some wouldn’t absolutely love it. But to man those vessels the RN would have to produce “marines” quite literally “sailor-soldiers” The only way that forward presence m’larky would work is if the crews went through some specialist “skill-at-arms” course like the USN MAA branch; the sort of sailor that wore the Black Beret in the Mekong Delta. Not just do the course but pass at sufficiently high level; there is more to using small arms than a range qualification. A while back somebody here laughed at me because I mentioned Narvik, “The Navy is here”, and cutlasses. I did it for a laugh but I sincerely believe the average ship’s company couldn’t pull that off today if faced with moderately trained opposition or one that display a considerable resistance.
As for F99 well that was as much to do with a failure of the Labour run HMG to fund their wars and a lack of imagination or gumption at the top of the Navy. We shouldn’t have sent a frigate to do the job; we fight with what we have I suppose. HMG should have purchased 8 or so decent patrol boats and anchored a support vessel (Galahad perhaps?) at a good position with Iraqi territorial waters to cover ops. No way could the party from F99 have taken on the IRG. “But” I do detect a sense from some here that fighting would have been a no-no from the get go. Would a US or Israeli or, dare I say, French crew backed away from a fight? (Just a second the MN doesn’t have Foreign Legion contingent so…..) Perhaps no, perhaps yes. Reminds me a bit of when I said about T45 going south with Harpoon just in case. “Can’t do that! What would the Argentines think? Or the international community think?” is the impression I got from some here. What impression do we send to our US allies when they had to send boats to cover our boarding operations? I don’t like to think of our young at risk in war. But the RN just like the Army exists as James says to stick the Queen’s bayonet, or cutlass, into the belly of the Queen’s enemies.
I am going to upset some more of you now. When I was involved in cadets the lads who went into the county regiment were not that academically inclined and came from the rougher parts of the city; street smart, not book smart. The ones who went into the service were more academically inclined and came from shall we say the nicer parts of the city. Why should the former group know joining meant going to war and the latter group see it more as alternative to working in a call centre? I think that’s what James is driving at…….
Christ this site moves at speed. Haven’t had change to track back through the last hundred posts or so, but, have to respond to X’s post above and James’ earlier regarding the incident in Iran.
One thing to note about the whole thing was the courage and duty of the young officer and people in that party. A few days later the Iranians tried the same trick again on a team from the RAN which history has somehow recorded as the better performance despite it being absolutely unforgiveable breach of standing orders. When the Iranian capture group closed in the RN team moved back to their RHIBS to take the risk away from the civillians aboard the merchie they were inspecting. The RAN team reboarded their target “as a more defensible location”. In short the RN team acted to protect innocent civillians where as the RAN put theirs directly in harms way to cover their own arses.
There were plenty of wrongs to go round on that, very sloppy procedures and personnel failures. There SHOULD have been a number of courts martial in the aftermath of that, but, the RN team that got back into their RHIBS knowing they had no chance cannot be accused of a lack of nerve.
I went through Fisgard Sqdn at Raleigh in the early 90’s. Anyone who’s been over the Torpoint Ferry will testify that its not the most arduous of crossings, yet, we had three lads who were decidedly queasy and, it later turned out, another four who couldn’t swim!. That was just out of a single three-tonner load used to ferry the gormless and clueless from the train station to the base. I was part of Sherval division which had 20-odd lads and precisely 2 girls. One was a netball player and figure skater and dear god so many uniform fetishes were kicked off by that girl….the other was a portly lass, very plain, who fought past her limits every PT session who, it turned out, was one of the brightest engineers I’ve encountered before or since and had a hand in designing the 2016 sonar!. Hard to say she didnt belong in the dark blue!.
Obviously, as tiffs, booksmarts were more important for us than for the junior rates, but, we had a PTI formerly of 42Cdo instruct us in Fieldcraft we did pressups every time we tick-tocked…every time a hapless right hand-marker (I’m 6’4″) went left when a right turn was ordered he got beasted inside out etc, etc and we had ourselves switched on. After I left though they created the OM rate and all those troglodytes who could get by lurking in the darkness staring intently at screens suddenly found themselves doing jobs that hairy-arsed matelots used to do. Technology advanced and the TAS-apes suddenly had to evolve opposable thumbs and an ability to wield a screwdriver as opposed to an SA80!. I was out of the mob by the time the OM change really bit but there are, I’m told, more technically demanding jobs now than physical ones. Nature of the service is changing…very likely not for the better.
I am very familiar with who did what and the RAN incident. And I know which navy gained the better rep during the post GW2 era.
I know some excellent young ladies who went into the service. And I know some who got through Raleigh who struggled to get through a week’s camp. And to be honest really weren’t much up too much as people. I was never one of those the “children are future” hip with the kids leaders. By a time a kid reaches their early teens you can tell with experience how they are going to turn out. Of course you never tell the kid you don’t think they are up too much. You look after them. Push them. And hope they prove you wrong. I speak as I find.
Soldiering is a skill. As I said if forward presence is to work, especially with small crews, all sailors drafted to such ships would need to have a skill-at-arms beyond that needed not to shoot your toe off on the gangway.
@ x
Re; armoured brigades, commando brigades and the like,
How often between say now and 2030 do you anticipate a scenario where we have to pour a commando brigade and its kit over an undefended beach? Compared to say, having to launch a land operation from a neighbouring country (and its port facilities)? Which have we done more of in the last 30 years? (accidental invasions of Spain aside)
I just find it odd that you would prefer the ability to launch a battlegroup from the sea with say 48 hours notice, over the ability to put down an armoured brigade in 4 months.
To me, the second seems more useful and something we do more commonly.
Chris B, It is James and X that talk about it. Given a bit of notice and lateral thinking we cpuld almost do it at the moment. The cpability we do have whilst not perfect certainly seem to fulfill any likely requirement.
The second capability is one we already have.
@ APATS
“The second capability is one we already have.”
— Indeed.
But the quote from x was that he would (presumably looking into the future and reduced budgets?) prefer the smaller, over the beach ability for the slightly longer but larger, armoured ability. I was just wondering why that would be?
Naval guns were anti-ship and occasionally used against land target. Medium calibre guns post WW2 had AD as their raison d’etre, FI seems to have highlighted that this was not one of the better RN ideas (something RA could have told them a few decades earlier) so now guns are to be for land attack, this requires their integration into joint fires. Whether or not naval gunfire against land targets is effective is a tad moot. There are certainly at least some seniorish commanders ashore in FI who concluded at was unreliable and therefore useless because it could not be reliably integrated into land operations. One u/s gun in a bty doesn’t matter, when it’s the only gun on a ship or the ship moves out of range for whatever reason it’s a show stopper.
Any consideration of land attack will need input from Director Cbt Spt at HQ Land (combines what was HQ DRA and HQ Engr in Chief), it is not a private RN matter. Of course in accordance with MoD policy all DLODs have to be considered, including who is going to train the UAS pilots and imagery analysts (and maybe who provides them).
The first question is the capability for predicted as well as observed fire, gridded meteor may enable this but changing met conditions at the land sea boundary may make it problematic. Of course an onboard UAS capability would provide an integral observation capability instead of relying on 148 Bty. Nevertheless the nature of naval guns means that dispersion is relatively large at longer ranges and this makes them less than ideal for close support of troops and generally less suitable in these days of proportionate force and collateral damage avoidance. Clearly precision munitions are the way to go, but they are not cheap, although course correcting fuzes due to appear in the next few years may be a useful option. Of course precision munitions require precision targets and precision targeting. And you have to query whether a guided shell in 127mm with a pissant payload and marginal effectiveness at the target is worth the bother. Not big enough for serious destruction and full precision is very, very expensive for suppression when sustained firing is required.
Missiles have attractions and a navalised Loader Launcher Module should be possible, however reloading arrangements could be a challenge on a frigate size ship (serious size ammo lift and storage space). Without this one or two pods (6/12 GMLRs or 1/2 ATACMs) is pretty puny stuff compared to a troop of 3 SPLLs with 6 pods and the ability to reload within minutes (and in Afg RA has done a simultaneous attack with 9 GMLRs on nine targets). Of course navalising LLM is one thing but whether the individual msls and pods are designed for the maritime environment and underway replen is another matter.
@ Chris B
I suppose it is more the way I look at things. If the cuts go ahead the Army falls to 82,000. Lump the Marines and dare I say even the RAF Reg in and round it we will have ground forces that number 90,000 or so. I won’t cheat and hope that HMG have to cut back on cuts so I end up with 100,000 just to make my maths even easier. All I am saying let us have just over 1% (1 battle group) of that 90,000 in ships at sea, worked up, with stores ready to respond to an event or an emergency.
Since I have been coming here one of the constant themes is boots on the ground and What does the navy do? Blah, blah, blah. But the Army can’t deploy on it its own. It can influence out only to the range of its largest piece of ordnance and that piece of ordnance can only get as close as a secure supply chain allows. And it is even worse for us in that we sit on an island in what has rapidly become a strategic backwater. And then we have, well we are doing OK in Afghanistan without a big navy. We might not have a big navy but the principal player in Afghanistan, the nation calling the shots, has the world’s biggest and best navy. There has to be seapower somewhere in the equation. GW1’s land and air efforts depended on SLOCs protected by the USN. I don’t think this dependence is forgotten, I think it just doesn’t cross minds. I make no apology for banging on about how there has been a shift in how the British public see and regard defence during the 20th century and that impacts on how we regard naval power. Many here like the idea of little ships showing the flag, but seem to struggle with the idea of having a limited MEU concept and then next thread will bang on about boots on the ground……
As for we will always have host nation support well so what? The US have bases everywhere and yet still have troops at sea. No we aren’t the US that is correct, we don’t have bases everywhere. China is exerting its influence world wide through its cheque book. Even “close” allies sometimes render support conditionally. Look at the Italians over Libya or the Balkans. Sometimes nations don’t want the troops of even their allies permanently (or long term or large numbers) based in their country. The best example of that is Norway; that is the reason behind UKNL. What if we fight at some remote piece of geography where there is no infrastructure. Look at a world map. The coloured shapes mean to me complications, the large blue areas mean freedom of movement and action.
And even if you have amphibs it does mean you can’t put them alongside a dock wall to unload and deploy, but you can’t easily put a conventional ro-ro into a remote bay and unload it. Yes it can be done but slowly and it isn’t optimum. It is odd, and again it speaks more for how we regard equipment, in that I say the RM need 12 helicopters at £20million a piece nobody here will argue on the need, maybe the cost, but not the need. Helicopters are the supa-dupa panacea to all military questions; hang the cost. Argue for 12 large landing craft (I know I said 16 somewhere here) and minds melt. Much cheaper than a helicopter, lift big loads, and economic but, but, but they don’t do all the stuff helicopters can do. What if you want to lift 20 men 100 miles in land that is worth £20million. It may well be a need at some point. Helicopters are useful but they are limited in some ways and expensive. The same people here who would think 12 land craft excessive will then in another thread argue about the need to containerise everything. Again lack of joined up thinking. Can’t cope with the idea of having the means to land those containers easily in big numbers, but want containers. Want containers, but don’t really want to have the ships to move them. It is the inconsistency of some of the thinking here most of the time I find annoying. We can afford a 100,000 man army (that fields about 6k in combat) that is logical to many here, saying a smaller army (UK land forces whatever cap badge really) that can be moved in purpose built shipping at a moments notice makes no sense to them. And these same individuals will next thread bang on about being light and agile. It must be me I must be missing something.
Think we all need to get with the fact that after the cuts the army will still number over 110k only 30k will be TA this is repeatedly over looked.
We need to put people Into a country from land and sea the whole al faw operation showed that. Not sure that needs to be an armoured brigade mind only done that twice in the 2 gulf wars at both times we deployed 2 many tanks according to the public commanders reports and not really what the coalition wanted but all we had. I’m sure James will tell us about the Balkans but that appeared to be only squadron level for mbts and none in afghan and I can’t see it being any more in the future so I think x’s point to look to restoring the amphib force is prob more important for the future.
The problem is, what does one battlegroup deployed over a beach do exactly?
Both Iraq wars saw multiple battlegroups put down into the field with tanks, IFV’s and artillery support, yet some say that our contribution didn’t really matter, so how is one battlegroup of any real use compared to that?
And why do they need to be at sea? Surely they’re better off at home with a ready task group?
If I had to make the choice between an amphibious battlegroup capable of going over a shore or an armoured brigade that took a while to arrive and deploy, from a friendly port, I think I’d take the brigade.
As for Helicopters versus landing craft, the problem is that the landing craft is a one trick pony in many regards. It can’t be tooled up to do the other missions that the helicopters can or perform away from the sea as an in theatre transport. And whereas the helicopter gives you a choice of landing zones anywhere between the coast and the range of the helicopter from it’s launching point, the landing craft are restricted to the coast.
Not saying that landing craft are useless, but helicopters have a lot more utility which is important in an era of declining budgets.
@ El Sid – thanks for the info. As I feared the large LPD/mothership concept would be too expensive… ah well, back to the drawing board…
@ Other Chris – a very useful summary of the debates/comments on this and other threads… didn’t mention the Auxiliary cruiser concept but thats OK *wipes away a tear*
there is some interesting comments made in an USNI Proceedings article that ties in with what you wrote:
“Amphibious ships are the prototypes for future surface combatants. Their design essentials make them perfect carriers of unmanned systems. Amphibious ships by design provide strong interfaces to the air, surface, and subsurface domains.
The new combatants would actually be “carriers,” but rather than carrying aircraft, they would carry an array of unmanned systems. A balanced Fleet would have a mix of small, medium, and large unmanned carrier combatants to cover the range of Fleet functions. One near-term option would be to truncate production of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and replace both the LCS and the Dock Landing Ship (LSD) with a common hull displacing around 10,000 tons.
That small amphib would have a flight deck capable of handling all naval rotorcraft and a well-deck that could accommodate current ship-to-shore connectors, as well as future unmanned surface and subsurface vehicles. Building 60 of these combatants would provide significant strategic flexibility to the Fleet, allowing ships performing LCS missions to be easily sortied as amphibs in support of a large amphibious mission, should the need arise. Those ships would be the utility infielders of the Fleet, providing a tremendous platform for engagement missions and humanitarian-assistance/disaster-relief response at one end and amphibious operations and sea control at the other.”
http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2011-05/twilight-uperfluous-carrier
@Chris
Most of the time, battlegroups are deployed over the sand for 3 reasons.
1) To open a new front against the enemy. Historically, this has shown mixed results, Gallipoli being a negative example, and Normandy being a positive one, within limits.
2) To cut an enemy’s lines of communication and supply like what MacArthur did at Inchon during the Korean War and trapping a part of the enemy forces. In short, a blitzkrig by sea.
3) Deterrent. A sudden boost of forces along a route of advance like a coast road might cause a pause in enemy action as they stop to reassess the situation and protect an ally.
Observer, Your post against the use of guns in the naval fires role would have made more sense prior to OUP. If you cannot get a battery of Artilley ashore NGS offers us something CAS does not.
What we learned was that the Libyans knew how to count and could identify which aircraft were dropping on them. They simply hid and then came back out, they could see and hear the aircraft coming and it became obvious which target they were going for.
The beauty of NGS was that by putting the shooter in a box and the 148 battery in an MPA with full authority for the 5 pillars and engagement we had a flexible undetected capability which could fire multiple rounds and switch targets quickly.
With the advent of such systems as the new Oto Breda Gun and guided munitions with UAS NGS will become more important.
A few 5 inch bricks which are much more difficult to track than a missile and infinitely more difficult to shoot down can easily have enough punch to kill a SAM site opening the way from an F35 or Apache to proceed to target.
APATS, that wasn’t me…
:)
Observer, Sorry! Thought you had abbreviated your nick name!
A few – once again late – thoughts on this once again exceptional post.
There are IMO two parties: one proposing quality over quantity, one vice versa. Nothing new.
And then there is the question about GP, ASW and land-attack, all mixed up, behind a wall of fog called ‘flexibility’.
IMO, quantity matters. And while I see how some proposals about corvettes or sloops may add numbers, I think none of the options will be widely accepted.
A sloop is basically what the USN tries to build with LCS. Underarmed, not survivable, no suitable sensors … they have their advantages, but they are not warship intended to come in harms way. At least, if we believe their opponents.
IMO, we need a basic frigate design having the basics, adaptable for various tasks. I once proposed a SIGMA-based T27, but I view the latest T26-pictures as equally acceptable. The only shortcoming IMO is the lack of green water capacity, but we will most likely be capable to somehow compensate this.
If we can built them for £250m a pop, then we should not hesitate. And here is the problem: this price is only achievable if we keep the yards working.
The question to me is: do we really need them to be multirole?
We need to keep premium @ ASW, but that’s hardly a matter of hull-form or vessel-size. We need continued investment in tactics, sonars and – of course – aircraft. In many ways, the eventual Merlin-successor-requirement will be the cornerstone of this investment as much as for optimizing CVF. IMO, a tilt-rotor for shipborne long(er)-range ASW, AEW, SIGINT, COD and AAR. One development I see upcoming is the advent of submarine-launched SAMs. We need to enable the helo to outrange those SAMs. Some will cry “ASROC”! I envision a easy to implement alternative. When developing Fire Shadow further over the next years, we should aspire to make it a simple payload-carrier, one of the payloads being a Stingray.
Back to topic, the T26: do we need them to do land-attack? Or more precisely: do we need special equipment like strike-length VLS? The sensible approach TD suggests i.e. using the main gun, occasionally Fire Shadow and the helo is built-in IMO. For what a Tomahawk-capability beyond that provided by the subs? And if, why do we think that an escort would be the optimum platform? We could easily build the next LPD-class with 2 or even 4*48 Sylver cells, making them “littoral-strike-cruisers”.
Observer, and
4) to provide a diversionary attack, Kuwait 1991 :)
@ Observer
Aye, but the post was in reponse to x’s “cut one/keep one” suggestion about amphibious bg vs armoured brgde. I’d keep the armour and cut the amphibious if needed.
I see the merits of amphibious BG’s but it is a slightly over rated capability outside of a small group of scenarios.
Normandy excluded because it was an entire mass invasion, as opposed to one BG. Inchon, again a big op. The ‘principle’ of both of those though (open new front, cut supply lines) I can see in a way, but a little BG will have problems with that, depending on who we’re cutting off.
Deterrance? Hmmm, maybe. But again, it would be a sole infantry BG, might not have the impact intended. TD’s diversionary point holds merit, but again suffers from the small size.
If forced into the bizarre situation of having to choose between the armoured Brigade and the Amphibious BG, I think the armoured brigade would have more use.
@McZ
Nice summary, and a lot of your thinking parallels mine, though I would also strongly suggest waiting for a better economical climate before starting. If you started now, you’ll be constrained by finances (i.e cut x,y,z out of the ship to meet cost). In better financial times, you’re less constrained and can build up to a better design.
BTW think lot of subs carry MANPADs in their conn towers, stingers for the US, blowpipe was thought of for the UK and Russians had it since the 80s, not sure what type.
@Chris
Amphibious Armour Brigade? :P It’s called having your cake and eating it. lol
The types of Amphibous Op are normally classified as on eof the below.
1. Assualt.
2. Raid.
3. Demonstration.
4. Withdrawal.
The following paragraph summarises Amphibosity nicely IMO.
Amphibious operations seek to exploit the element of surprise and capitalize on enemy weakness by projecting and applying combat power precisely at the most advantageous location and time.
Amphibious forces provide the joint force commander (JFC) with a balanced, mobile force flexible enough to provide
the required capability at the right time and place with sufficient endurance to accomplish the mission.
You forgot TD’s 5) Distraction
:P
To be fair though, I don’t think “Withdrawal” is classed as amphibious “assault” unless it’s “advancing in the opposite direction” :)
Or to use milspeak, Retrograde.
Hi Mark, RE May 25, 2012 at 09:58
– well spotted
– the same yard built a CB90 under license; I wonder if this new one is an evolution of it (originally the CB90s were conceived as command boats for the Riverine Sqdrns, this Coastal Riverine would seem to be a new formation)
Observer, That is what a “demonstration” is. I was using the official Doctrinal types. The US have recently started talking about Envelopment.
Observer,
“Amphibious Armoured Brigade” – I’d argue there is no such thing, merely an Armoured Brigade that got landed from some ships. Once ashore, it is no different to any other Armoured Brigade.
The training is everything. Once the Army has got over the terror of being embarked upon a strange flat terrain that wobbles, it is merely a matter of housetraining the Navy to ensure that the point of delivery is as efficient as possible in land tactical terms, which means that the boats need to be lined up to support getting the right forces ashore at the right time and in the right order – this often conflicts with how the Navy would like to line the boats up, for their own internal strange reasoning.
I saw this done terribly in the early / mid 80s (and that was soon after FI War), but by 2002 when I last did it it was as sweet as a nut. Oddly, both services understood each others’ needs and there were no arguments.
There also comes a point in space/time when proper grids are used instead of some base 60 nonsense***, and left and right are re-established as being the proper way to refer to left and right. This is difficult for the Andrew.
*** We don’t care if the base 60 nonsense makes sense over oceanic distances and allows for curvature of the earth. The terrain 500 metres in front of you is best defined by proper grids.
James, left and right limits have always been gunnery terms even in the RN. With WECDISS and modern Command systems making sense of some rubbish grid system has also become far easier.
AS for easier in “land tactical terms” occasionally nav limits, tidal heights etc do interfere! It is not done to piss you off, honest.
APATS,
no, only RAF Movers have the pissing off of the Army in their job spec.
Also, “making sense of some rubbish grid system”… did no one in the Navy learn to count in tens when at school? Or were you all brought up spouting such nonsense as “fifteen points off the larboard bow, wind blowing a ‘nor’nor’nor’souwester”?
Acc
I think it’s improves on cb-90 because it has berthing capacity even if this is a day or so it would allow the larger mother ship to stay well over the horizon. As el Sid says there based on the all weather lifeboat they build. We do a bit of that in the uk too I assume so maybe a project for a smaller shipbuilder. Add to these type of vessels a Hover craft or two and you have TD littorial force he talked about in his navy posts last year. 4 of these could I guess fit in an Albion class ship so when it’s not deployed as a amphib it could be an littorial control ship could you get two in a bay?. Restore the second Albion ship and return the amphib capability to brigade strength would solve x and Chris brigade v battlegroup argument. After all 16aab and 3 Cdo have been to almost every op weve ever don’t many more than armoured brigade has anyway.
APATS,
I do confess that on my four months on Bristol I used to have some fun by issuing steering orders in proper mils (trusty prismatic on the hip) and distances in kilometres. The Captain was tremendously indulgent about this, and always ensured there was a properly qualified officer to convert this plain English into Andrew-speak. Apparently, it was also good for the RN officer to do some mental maths. I also kipped in the old chart room as the ship had recently had the WECDIS installed and did not need the paper charts on a frequent basis. I had been offered some cabin down numerous staircases, but elected to kip above the waterline.
Happy days, those.
Hi APATS, RE
” The hi lo mix was purely a different means of spending the T26 budget and not a discussion on the MHPC concept. So actually the vessels we are discussing replacing are only the 13 T23 Frigates”
– I did try to bring overlapping capabilities, and therefore overlapping/ combined budgets to the “mix” discussion
@James
That was the point I was trying to make. Anything landed from ships can end up with the moniker “amphibious”, even armour, so there is no point going amphi force and no armour or armour with no amphib capabilities when all that it needs to “amphibianise” armour is training and lift capacity.
And a lot of anti-nausea pills.
Re: Envelopment
That’s what you get for milspeaking your force, weird names for things you’re been doing for years. Unless they mean shipping tanks to enemy territory by mail. :)
Observer,
what is needed to “amphibianise” an Armoured Brigade is some JCs, and some balls among our politicians to turn around and say “we got it wrong, and now we are going to put it right”.
We are not so far off the 68th anniversary of D-Day. My mother is off to Normandy as she does every year to lay a wreath to her favourite uncle Captain Peter Bowes-Lyon of the 13/18 Hussars who died when his Sherman DD tank was hit by a naval gun on Sword beach. She still has the teddy bear he gave her on a home leave when she was about 3, and she’s into her 70s now. The teddy bear has gone to Normandy more than 50 times since then.
“we got it wrong, and now we are going to put it right”.
Be fair. I’d say neglected rather than “got it wrong”. “got it wrong” implies that the doctrine was flawed in the first place, not simply chucked into a corner and forgotten.
And blame MoD, not the politicians. The pols won’t even know the difference between amphibious and air mobile, they depend on the MoD to tell them what the Forces need, and this was obviously not brought up.
james, Hindsight is a wonderful thing. if I could magically move the 2 CVFs and replace them in build at the same stage 2 45-50k LHDA similar to the proposed Flight 2 America class but faster and with a ski ramp I would.
12-18 F35B
MV 22/Merlin/CH53 capable.
Accomodation for 1000 Embarked troops.
Well dock for LCAC and LCU.
In the mean time we work out how to improvise and overcome with the capability we will be getting which at the moment would when in Service give us a total “max effort”e.g with a bit of notice and it being of critical importance. Amphib capability of 2 65k tonne carriers.
2 LPDs and 3 Bay Class.
Or a single MLP ship, crewed by the RFA, which will allow us to unload the Point Class into LCUs off the beach. Allegedly costing the Americans $115m to design and build one. About 4% of the cost of two Juan Carlos LHD?
“what is needed to “amphibianise” an Armoured Brigade is some JCs”
A bit more digging suggests the $115m is the design contract and it is then $500m to build three MLP ships.
So the unit cost of 1 ship including design is still just £204m – a fraction of the cost of any LHD you care to name.
These discussions always seem to forget that we already have tons of shipping capacity in the Point class and all that is missing is the ship-to-shore connector: for which a relatively cheap technical solution already exists.
Get BAE to turn their LHLD from powerpoint into reality, stick a ramp on the front and Bob’s your uncle.
http://www.baesystems.com/product/BAES_020359/amphibious-vessels?_afrLoop=26663338930000
Edit; ski jump, not ramp. You knew what I meant. This was pointless. Back to the football.
“Fuck ’em up Gerrard, fuck ’em up!”
APATS,
“…In the mean time we work out how to improvise and overcome”.
You missed out “adapt”… “adapt, improvise and overcome” – second best line Clint Eastwood ever said.
APATS,
I appreciate the hindsight, but the worst of all is that our vehicle lift is totally rubbish on what you sketch out. It is all about transporting 1/2 – 70 tonne vehicle payloads to the beach. Troops are easy. It’s the wagons and logs that make a difference from putting 3 naked battalions ashore. And no, for the same reason as the carrier bunnies declare we cannot depend on an airfield, we cannot depend on a port either.
James,
Why is our “vehicle lift” rubbish?
Chris B,
try not to give BAE Systems any more contracts, as we only have a little money. There are plenty of other naval yards that will knock out amphibious boats.
@Simon
“Second best line Clint Eastwood ever said.”
Second only to “Right turn, Clyde”? ;)
Simon,
look up the lift figures per class of ship, try to work out if they work outside of a port environment, and have a look at what even a light infantry Brigade has on the ORBAT. It is a three-way train crash.
If you want to lift containers into a friendly port, you don’t have a problem. If you want to put F echelon vehicles onto a beach, you do.
The Other Chris,
Bugger – third best line then – got to include the “I know what you’re thinking, did he fire 5 or 6…” soliloquy as number 1.
James,
I tend to work on two active Bay with 48 Challenger II in total. That’s quite a bit to storm a beach with isn’t it?
Obviously you’d have to land the engineers to build a jetty to get the four active Point Class RORO to unload their stuff. But I thought that was the easy bit ;-)
Having “wireless keyboard” problems again! Either that or I’ve had too much wine (hic).
Somebody on here has I am sure posted how many Linear lane Metres a brigade required. My other choice is to attempt to do it by vehicles and that would be a nuisance.
Simon,
48 Challenger on 2 Bays is 24 shuttle runs. It is not an act of war, particularly when AH can do the same direct fire job in the beach area.
If you take the tanks at all, they are in the wave that offloads by driving onto a jetty (i.e. considerably after the amphibious landing).
APATS,
about 5,000 LIMS, depending on all sorts of stuff. That gives you 5 days combat supplies. About 3,500 LIMS if you only want 24 hours.
@APATS
“if I could magically move the 2 CVFs and replace them in build at the same stage 2 45-50k LHDA similar to the proposed Flight 2 America class but faster and with a ski ramp I would.”
So, we are exchanging a proven airfraft-operating algorithm called ‘the carrier’ against an unproven F-36B+LHD-combo? Despite the fact it’s already outcosting the proven alternative? And why should we trade aircraft capacity for unnecessary welldecks finding themselves at the wrong place in any thinkable scenario?
@James
“And no, for the same reason as the carrier bunnies declare we cannot depend on an airfield, we cannot depend on a port either.”
True, but are we capable to draw the right conclusions? That well-decks are a dead-end. That we absolutely need seabasing. And that the latter costs half the price of the current amphib force.
@Simon
“Obviously you’d have to land the engineerings to build a jetty to get the 4 active Point Class RORO to unload their shuff. But I thought that was the easy bit”
Amphibious op, 2020s seabasing style:
Phase one: MLP and multiple ro-ro vessels sequentially connect offshore, the former having multiple LCAC-lanes to load heavy vehicles.
Phase two: the same MLP brings in mexeflotes to construct a jetty to offload a stream of vehicles directly to the secured shore.
This model scales so much better than the current LPD-lot. If you need more ‘bandwith’ in any phase, add an MLP. If you need more vehicles, charter any COTS-ro/ro-vessel in the world.
James,
“I also kipped in the old chart room as the ship had recently had the WECDIS installed and did not need the paper charts on a frequent basis.”
When was this? Bristol ceased to be a seagoing ship about a decade before WECDIS started appearing.
@ APATS
I think somebody said 10,000m because I said all was needed was 3,000m.
But all I did was count the vehicles in T58 reg, 2 x armoured infantry battalions, and times it by 10m per vehicle. Of course I didn’t include guns, wedgeheads, and other baggage etc. I would say 10,000m seems excessive.
Sorry I have been unable to comment today; sorry because my throwaway posts seem to have caused a bit of disagreement. First day of the TT 2012 and my internet goes tits up. :(
James, So if we had 3 Bays and 2 LPDs we are only 400 LIMs short. Selling that Bay seems pretty stupid now. I am wondering if the idea is not to build a basic spec RFA, commercially all dock and deck to maximise LIMs and space for an offload. Forget troop accomodation, mission briefing rooms etc, this thing has one job only to act as an offload platform for her vehicles over a beach. Make the dock LCAC capable as well.
Could it also be able to act as a conventional Ro Ro so sub contract as a car transporter when not needed by RN?
Anixtu,
Feb-May 89. I may have got the ECDIS / WECDIS designation wrong. It was when Bristol had the cadets from Dartmouth onboard for a few weeks, then did a Baltic cruise. They’d certainly had something electronic installed to replace charts, hence the chart room becoming available.
@ APATS said “so sub contract as a car transporter when not needed by RN”
Um. No.
@ James
I think what I am trying to say is I want “Spearhead Plus at Sea”. If you get my drift.
@APATS
Do you not like the MLP Concept?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_Landing_Platform
It seems to me like a dead cheap way of upgrading our existing capability. For half the price of a frigate (circe £120m) we get the ability to unload all 6 Point Class over the beach. Enough lane metres to deliver @James’ requirement for not one but two army brigades.
How quickly they can unload will depend on how close to the beach we come, sea states, whether we upgrade for LCU to PASCAT etc etc. Bearing in mind the landing area would have already have been secured by elements of 3 Cdo or 16 AAB I don’t see this as a huge drama.
X, um no why? It is about capability and value for money.
APATS,
can’t speak as to type / design / shape / size of the boat, but what it needs to do is to stick down a ramp and let the Army drive ashore or some dinky little LCsomething ferry the wagons ashore.
Not sure it should be sublet to the Dover-Calais ferry run though – I’d rather it was in service full time, so available for exercises etc.
Also, no need to build a new one if a suitable design exists. Buy one on the used market, paint it grey, give it an Andrew name, Bob’s your uncle. It’s only got one job to do. So long as it can make it down to the FI or somewhere similarly remote, who cares?
@ Peter Elliott,
what, no love for RFA Fergie? She’s cheap as chips.
x,
“I think somebody said 10,000m because I said all was needed was 3,000m.”
10,000 LIMs is closer to what I had in mind for a light amphibious brigade, all inclusive.
James,
Electronic chart plotter thingummies might have been available at that time, but they really shouldn’t have been navigating on those in place of a paper chart. Naughty!
DK Brown had a serious issue with the survivability of RO-RO ferries…
Peter Elliot, No I do like it, very much. Each point Class gives us an extra 2,600 LIMs. Also the MLP should let us offload virtually any RO RO. Of course by this point it is an offload and not an assualt but we do not do opposed landings and we have enough traditional amphib capability to secure the beach.
@ APATS
The idea is that the ARG is at sea, not sitting alongside in Guzz. Might work for RFA or a similar arrangement to the Points not for a ship that is in use and has to be fought.
I am trying to keep you and Somewhat in a job. Work with me…..! :)
I can’t believe that the idea of having about 1% of UK land forces at sea, ready to swing into action at any moment is such an outlandish idea. Especially for an island nation on the edge of nowhere…….
My internet connection is dodgy so forgive my terse replies.
@ Anixtu
Thanks. Saved me counting up. I can’t find a reference in Brassey’s for LM.
Are the Point Class ordinary Ro-Ro? Or being RFA perhaps they are built with some basic survivability features that a commercial ship lacks?
Not surprised about DK Brown’s concerns: Atlantic Conveyor’s radar cross section was so large that decoys had a difficult time.
Chaff was launched and attempts were made to extend her radar return with Sea Kings holding station nearby in the hope that missiles would pass between conveyor and the helicopter.
Mr. Brown also highlights that civilian construction usually means that risers for fire fighting equipment are usually kept dry due to cheaper, less salt resistant materials compared to military vessels who usually have their risers wet with salt water ready for instant use.
@ APATS
It isn’t about opposed landings. It is about landing at a place of our choosing. It is about not relying on Third World ports. Think of it this way. You load up your flotilla in lovely Devonport. Travel 8000nm unimpeded across the international open highway, the global common, that is the sea and then you don’t think the ability to land at any place of our choosing is needed? That is like going all the way to Florida, queuing to get into Disney Land, getting to the front of the queue, and then buggering off home. It is about using the sea flank to our advantage. “Engage the enemy more closely” as a wise man said….
PS I am also grumpy because Tigers lost; I will be difficult now until July at least.
X, wait a minute I never said we should not be able to. Merely exploring what the requirement is, what the current and planned capability offers us and how best to bridge the gap.
Can anyone explain why Sky had the premiership all season and ESPN the final? Needless to say I do not have ESPN.
As regards the ‘Atlantic Conveyor’ scenario that’s why we are going to have 65,000T of CVF parked just behind us loaded with Lockheed Martin’s finest, and a T45 or two to zap anything that gets past the Kevins.
X,
my sympathies (well not so much as I’m hard over on the ‘Quins being brilliant). We played them once having won the Army inter-Regimental (93 or 94, can’t quite remember). I think they stopped being serious at about 55-5, Lord knows what the final score was. The evening at the Stoop was memorable – including a pair of identical twin strippers that someone got in from somewhere. They put £3,000 into SSAFA as well, which was brilliant. Still got a ‘Quins shirt in the wardrobe from that day.
Peter,
“parked just behind us”…. you may want to check the doctrine on that. Last time it was serious, the boys nearly qualified for the Far East Medal, and the Far East was two oceans over from where the action was.
You have to wonder at the thinking of the Andrew when the SHARS were only able to offer 10 minutes on station CAP, with 40 minutes transit either way.
A bit late but might be of interest:
http://www.informationdissemination.net/2012/05/some-thoughts-on-coastal-riverine-force.html
http://cgblog.org/2012/05/25/the-navys-new-patrol-boat/
@ APATS
I think when Sky bought ESPN they saw it as a good revenue move. So Sky Sports subscribers end up with Heineken, some Premiership, and the Championship. While ESPN subscribers get lots and lots and lots of Premiership rugby. Some Saturdays they have 3 matches. TBH I couldn’t give two hoots about Heineken. The Championship is rather good. Of course if you are Sky subsriber and are a rugby addict you can watch BBC regional programmes too like Scrum V on BBC2 Wales. Assuming of course you don’t live in Wales and get it anyway…….
James, The biggest bitch by the army ref the positioning of Hermes (as command platform) in 1982 was the comms difficulties due to their HF limitations. This led to difficulties in requesting air cover. The loss of a Carrier in 82 was seen as a mission kill.
Of course we may have learned from these issues, maybe we look at threat, defences available, AEW capabilities and the coverage and mission required before deciding on where to operate from.
X Sky sports normally has a game on and all the Heineken Cup which is a bit more entertaining than the attritional Aviva.
@ APATS
HC is only interesting if Tigers are in it and winning. I do take your point about the Aviva. Not because of the HC because of the Championship. Clean, hard, ball to hand rugby with commitment. Some of the behaviour I see now in the Aviva reminds me of that in soccer. I think Exeter’s success is partly down to them still being at heart a Championship side. And I think in a way the same could be said of how Saracens go about their business.
Back on the subject of Type 26. A lot of people have mentioned how the UK has the best anti submarine warfare capability in the world. I wouldn’t deny this or it’s usefulness.
Having 8 Type 26 frigates with 2087 will keep us at the cutting edge of this field of warfare. Even more important is having a fleet of 30 ASW Merlin’s because depending on the level of the threat these helicopters can be spread across the fleet, providing fantastic ASW cover. We don’t need anything big and better than this.
For me though a couple of points arise here.
The first is why are we building 5 GP Type 26’s? Taking away the sonar leaves us with a ship that is neither high-end capable or low-end and cheap. Lets spend that money somewhere else, ideally on cheaper and more numerous corvettes.
The second point is that TD is right in saying we haven’t had to deal with a really potent submarine threat since WW2. You need to cover all the bases and keep a sufficient capability going but not at the expense of other more relevant areas. Air defence, anti submarine warfare and lots of other things are ten a penny out there amongst our allies. Amphibians, nuclear subs and mine hunters are less available and things we do really well, it’s what we should be focusing on. As many people have said it’s about bringing something useful to the table that in demand and in short supply.
I think the figure of 3-5 “GP” vessels stems from the idea of replacing 13 Type 23’s 1-for-1 and the transfer of 8-10 2087 sonar sets.
It’s possible (!) that T26 vessels will be produced in greater numbers than 13 and/or that more 2087 sets (or their eventual improved replacement) could be purchased.
I think the Merlin fleet is vital to the success of 2087, the two systems working in conjunction to overwhelm a submarines defences.
With regards facing submarine threats, I agree with the counter position that San Luis was a credible threat during the Falklands. Submarines are arguably the modern Capital ship / Man O’War / 1st Rate Ship of the Line.
@ Chris B and Observer yesterday p.m.
Agree with almost everything you say, but for one: a friendly port to deploy from/ through is a far too restrictive planning assumption?
Add Dieppe to “Gallipoli being a negative example, and Normandy being a positive one, within limits” and it proved that taking a defended port should not be relied on (lacking a friendly one in the area).
– has this changed, with sizeable vertical lift and an OTH, lightning surprise raid? I have my doubts
And if over an undefended beach is then the option, many have raised the question: what could a BG achieve? Hence I am all for the “brigade planning assumption” and sizing the fleet accordingly.
Hi PE, RE “missing is the ship-to-shore connector: for which a relatively cheap technical solution already exists”
– I agree
– but building just one would make for a colossal single point of failure
– I would be happy to see two of them as “Ocean replacement”, taking into account what CVF can do to cover capabilities for which there currently are no substitutes
usni.org on its blog laments the gap between LCSs (not there yet) and our linked patrol boat (news), and makes an inventory of what a fully deployed US coastal navy looks like (before calling in the USCG, which I would guess would only be done in war):
“a force posture shift in the Gulf. Right now, four additional Avenger-class mine countermeasures ships are enroute to Bahrain to reinforce the four already forward deployed there — as well as British and other allied minesweepers. Additional MCM helicopters and the USS Ponce (currently being converted) are not far behind. They join five Cyclone-class patrol boats. ”
– if the original Streetfighter concept had been followed (rather than the two LCS designs) there would be no gap
Could not at first find the reference I wanted, from McZ, for the above
” I once proposed a SIGMA-based T27, but I view the latest T26-pictures as equally acceptable. The only shortcoming IMO is the lack of green water capacity, but we will most likely be capable to somehow compensate this.”
– which I agree with
– I am just wondering what that “somehow compensate” could exactly be?
@APATS
“The beauty of NGS was that by putting the shooter in a box and the 148 battery in an MPA with full authority for the 5 pillars and engagement we had a flexible undetected capability which could fire multiple rounds and switch targets quickly.
With the advent of such systems as the new Oto Breda Gun and guided munitions with UAS NGS will become more important.”
As I said precision munitions need precise targets and precision targetting. UAS might help with this, but a bloke with binos in an a/c is not doing precision targetting. A 127 mm rd does not offer much by way of lethality, and given the dispersion of naval gunfire its totally useless for close suppressive fire. Acknowledging that costs should come down, its usefull to note that the prices of 155mm Excalibur and a GMLR are much the same (the later has a much more benign ‘launch environment’). However, in terms of effect there is no doubt which is better. Naval gunfire did not affect the Libyan outcome one iota, its use was nothing more than a naval stunt to imporess the punters, laughable if it wasn’t so pitiable.
James,
I didn’t mean we would take 48 MBT. Just that we have that kind of capability (and that’s limited by weight not size). In addition it’s not 24 shuttle runs when you have 4 LCU on Albion too (6 LCU in total would unload 48 tanks in 8 runs – or about 8 hours).
You could, instead land about 4 times as many trucks/Viking in the same time!
Also, Bay’s dock is LCAC capable so you could speed up some of these runs… if we actually had a couple of LCAC!
I’ve had chats with Observer about the whole amphibious assault process as I see/saw the assault, primarily by air, securing the beach to simply offload at their relative leisure. Seems I was wrong!
Air assault + LCU/LCAC/mexifloat offload ?
As discussed, alongside the T45, (reluctantly) T26 ASW and Black Swans IIs / Venator’s / SIMMS, I believe the RN needs a decent smaller patrol craft which would replace the current P2000’s / Sabre’s. These vessels would be larger than the current ships and capable of independent md shore / Littoral patrol and survellance operations. Something with a reasonable range (3-4,000 nm), endurance ~21 days and a range of light weapons.
Some examples:
– Armidale Class: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armidale_class_patrol_boat/
– Cape Class: http://www.austal.com/en/products-and-services/defence-products/patrol-boats/cape-class-patrol-boats.aspx
– STX Canada Marine PV62: http://www.stxmarine.net/pdf/PV62-br-web.pdf
– Damen Stan Patrol SPA 5009: http://articles.maritimepropulsion.com/article/Stan-Patrol-SPA-500916146.aspx
Perhaps even:
– Gowind Class(Sovereignty Enforcer version): http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/gowind_corvettes/
I’m sure these have been published before, but below are links to some BMT Mothership concepts. Some budget saved from the not going ahead with the 5 T26 GP’s could enable the RN to get a couple of these.
– http://navy-matters.beedall.com/fsc-pre2005.htm/ (2/3rd down the page)
– http://www.shipbucket.com/images.php?dir=Never%20Built%20Designs/Great%20Britain/GB%20AK%20BMT_%20Fast%20Mothership%20Concept%201.gif
PACSCAT and CB-90 would certainly alleviate the duration of shuttle runs as well as Green Water capacity.
ACC,
“(before calling in the USCG, which I would guess would only be done in war)”
USCG have been deployed to the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean for some time. From patrol boats to high endurance cutters.
Simon,
Bay class dock is not (USN) LCAC compatible. Too narrow.
Anixtu,
Lord knows where I read that then. I thought it was about 15m wide and made a lot of sense. Oh well, just another factoid to write off as poor design!
Are you sure the space in the well isn’t just used up by another structure? Gantry? It sure as hell looks much wider than a single LCU from the outside!
Simon,
even with the extra LCUs, 8 hours is a nonsense. Have you ever done a Battle Group attack? You deliver about 60 armoured vehicles and 400 soldiers onto an objective all at the same time. Not over 8 hours in dribs and drabs. Concentration of force, firepower and shock action does not occur with a series of shuttle runs over an extended period. If you scale up your proposal to the sort of force levels employed on D-Day , it would have become D-Month.
I have always argued that a Brigade – as the first sensible and grown up level of force – over an undefended beach is what we should aspire to. Undefended as it would be insane in today’s world to believe that a bayonet in the teeth assault onto a defended beach would be politically acceptable. But undefended does not mean unreacted upon, so speed is still of the essence. Having some experience of these things, I do believe that 2 hours is about the right balance between shock action and not having an unaffordably large amphibious fleet which only does one thing.
So, the F and A1 Echelons of four Battle Groups, and the Brigade C2 and CS elements in 2 hours. Trades between helicopters and landing craft available. Thinking about a fairly standard light infantry Brigade, that is about 3200 men and something between 100-150 vehicles, none heavier than 5 tonnes.
It is about 200 LCU shuttles without helicopters, or less as you increase the Chinook availability (working on 100 men / LCU, 4 vehicles / LCU, and 50 men / Chinook)
There is a reason why a USMC MEU only has a platoon of 4 M1A1. The logistical load is too much to carry even for 4 more.
@ Chris B
I had crap internet access yesterday so I couldn’t reply.
When I say “across the beach” I am talking about the ability to move and rapidly land a formation either literally across a beach or through a port or a mixture. I definitely don’t mean storming up the beach under fire.
As for a battle group isn’t much well no it isn’t. But in qualitative terms a battalion of British infantry supported by a cavalry squadron and a battery of guns using modern command and control systems lead by a command staff with a profound grounding in military affairs is the equal and better of formations many times larger found in the majority of the world. Channelling James rapid movement and fire-power delivered at the enemies centre of gravity.
But a battle group is only a start. One of the reasons why I say build ships that have the capacity (when formed in an ARG) to carry 2/3 of a brigade. If we had 3 such ARGs we would have the ability to group them together to carry a brigade with ease (a brigade being bigger than 3 x battle groups as there would be other support elements). And as it keeps on getting said we will unlikely be doing anything on our own. Imagine a British brigade landing with a USMC brigade. Imagine a British brigade landing with a French brigade perhaps with NL, Italian, and Spanish elements. Imagine a British battlegroup supporting an ANZAC group in the South Pacific. These are big formations which would take similar probably large formations to dislodge. All supported from the sea. 1300 or so disciplined souls working in concert can be employed for other reasons than just war or to practice war.
As for keeping the ARG sitting alongside just in case that isn’t the way to go about it. It needs to be at sea. Exercising with our allies from Norway to the US to the Gulf to the Antipodes. Demonstrating it capabilities to friends and enemies alike. It is a deterrent. An ARG sitting alongside may be a force in being but it is unknown and untested. And could be construed as fat to be cut. If we went this route of having a few per cent of our land forces at sea there would be a group working up or just returned that cover an emergency in extremis. Imagine the at sea ARG exercising in the Med and there is a need to deter Guatamala in the Caribbean. The at sea ARG packs up and heads west. The group in Devonport is put on notice and if needed it can put to sea and join the other ARG.
Armoured brigades are nice to have. But as I said above the logistic train to support such a formation is long. The shipping needs would be considerable. Viking/Broncos or modern 8×8 would be sufficient armour for most conflicts. And though the direct fire of 120mm is considerable (there is a reason why the USMC thinks 4 M1A1 are worth the trouble for an MEU to carry) the armour threat found in the majority of the world could be dealt with by Javelin. As was shown by the Germans in France in 1940 (and by us in SE Asia using UC) it isn’t the size or firepower of a tank more the way it is employed.
When as I was talking about LC and helicopters I was talking about perceptions of value and worth and need. Some here are struggling with my mad idea of keeping 1% or so of our land forces at sea. Note I am trying to avoid saying Marine which for me is difficult! Though we agree on so much here we all attach own value and worth to various defence assets.
Simon,
The door is a bit wider than the dock itself, it narrows immediately inside to be just wide enough for an LCU or Mexeflote.
http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-yTk-0MWNgHQ/TyLngAzcC_I/AAAAAAAAErI/hvJs5OwINsk/s1600/IMG_6732.JPG
@ Anixtu
Yum. Ship porn. Nice. :)
@ All
A gold star to whoever identifies the class of the other vessel in Anixtu’s photo.
“One of the reasons why I say build ships that have the capacity (when formed in an ARG) to carry 2/3 of a brigade”
My desired end-point is to enable the full 3Cdo brigade to roll over a beach, but if we are going to take shortcuts then at least maintain that ability in extremis (overload plus rotated units worked up together), even if the day to day ARG consists of one (of two) CVF, one (of two LPD), one (of three LSD) and one LPH.
I still like the idea of a FR regiment (i know they are called something else these days) using warthogs and BAE’s 17 tonne, CT40 equipped, CVR(t) v2.0. Able to provide light armour support to our light punitive-intervention brigades (3Cdo and 16AAB).
@ Jedibeeftrix
But I am on about having multiple ARGs at least 3 better 4……. :)
If I was to be silly our current situation is rather like us having a company of hundred of plumbers or whatever trade and only one little van.
Within our current orbat we need to put 3Cdo and just the red berret wearing elements of 16AAB into one division. And give that division an FRR. Not espousing RM and Para.
Challenger,
The need for x Type 26 ASW hulls and y GP hulls is a bit of a myth. It’s a product of some uneducated interpretation of the Type 26 requirement by those focussing too closely on the toys installed on said ships.
The T26 requirement is a requirement to replace the Type 23 hull for hull, because with so few escort-sized ships remaining to us we are in the tightest of tight numbers games trying to meet the commitments thrust upon us. Including the Type 45’s, we currently only have 17 such hulls – the last 2 Type 42’s with any life left in them, the two in-service T45’s and the 23’s. 17 hulls at the moment does not fully cover the South Atlantic and Middle East permanent station requirements, the need for two home waters ready units (FRE and Duty TAPS), plus any escort requirement for power projection tasking (e.g. the Cougar deployment latesr this year), the current refit and maintenance cycle and the transit times cycling ships onto and off station. We can’t cover the home requirement (we’ve had one ship doing both jobs for some years now), and ships have absolutely no free time anywhere in the cycle to maintain their own OC, let alone conduct trials and assessments to counter the ever proliferating threats out there. The current duty cycle is punishing, and ships are spending longer and longer in refit and maintenance because of it, to say nothing for crew stress and separation. So despite the much-vaunted lower maintenance requirements of modern ships and the Type 26 (like Type 45 – hah! lower maintenance my arse), it will certainly be called upon to do far more than it was originally designed for, and that maintenance advantage will have become simply a basic standard to maintain. And the hull numbers mean that you do not always need to send an ASW specialist to do a GP ship’s job, but the reverse isn’t true.
The basic Type 23, what some would call a GP hull and which you suggest is neither high-end capable nor cheap, is very effective. High end capable seems to be this universal requirement to be able to dominate a million square miles of ocean whilst raining Tomahawk laden death on Osama’s buddies. The general level of threat is rising in complexity and sophistication, but the general standard of a frigate able to defend itself in a moderate threat environment and pose a serious threat to 85-90% of the LIKELY threats out there is still valid, although it obviously needs to be updated to the latest standard (SeaCeptor, long ranged gun, 997, etc) and as TD pointed out possess room for growth.
Again as TD has made clear (and as I have always supported), the development of Type 26 technologies early, trialled and risk-reduced in the end-stages of the T23’s life cycle and transferred to new hulls is simply good business sense. Many of these systems, 997 and 2087 to make a point, will not need the major hardware components upgrading for decades and instead will need only software upgrades to improve the processing of the raw data. So this stuff will last for the lifetime of the T26.
Finally, if the MOD and designers ignore the ASW specialist/GP debate, the technology and systems across the Type 26 fleet will be 99% common. The only difference should be the fitting of the 2087 sonar system, with the equipment occupying a compartment that would otherwise be empty or used for other purposes, and the choice of helicopter parked in the hanger. Common kit = common capability and reduced costs.
You can always send a frigate to do a corvette’s job, but you can’t do the reverse. We do need hull numbers – but compromising on the hull is not the answer, unless our global role is going to be fundamentally rewritten and, frankly, degraded.
Sorry, should have added to the ‘high-end capable’ requirement the ability to single handedly take on the entire Chinese navy – seems to be another common requirement these days.
@ SI,
interesting on the two home waters requirements. I know how it works for Army units doing a cycle of commitments, so I’m going to accept completely your assessment of the stresses of managing your naval commitments with the 17 hulls.
However, genuine question, if we have covered both home waters commitments with one ship for several years, is it not time to consider whether there really are two separate commitments? Before we get into spending too much none-existent money on lots of new hulls, perhaps we should have a fundamental root and branch review of the commitments.
@ACC
Well the ‘Modified Bay Class’ we were talking about for an ‘Argus replacement’ could conceivably do the MLP job if the design inlcudes a ramp from the flight deck down to the vehicle deck.
When in the Aviation Support or Mothership role you can stash addtional small helos or other equipment downstairs. But when its empty you can drop the stern door of a Point Class onto the flightdeck and drive the trucks across the flight deck, down the ramp to the vehicle deck and into the queue of LCUs or PASCATs lining up to take them to the beach.
“- but building just one would make for a colossal single point of failure
– I would be happy to see two of them as “Ocean replacement””
@ ACC – In your opinion is there a OTS ship which could fill the “street fighter gap”, and is there a need for such a craft in the Royal Navy?
RE: ship to shore connectors. Does anybody think we should bring back the beaching capability we lost with the retirement of the Sir class?
There is this idea from TSSE but it’s designed to run back and forth between a near by sea base and the shore, so its emphasis on speed over endurance:
http://www.nps.edu/academics/gseas/tsse/subpages/2004Project_2.html
@Simon
You are right in saying a beach landing would involve NGS and CAS clearing the beach before putting boots on it, the hard hitting 1st wave is there just in case CAS missed out a squad or 2. Infantry really are like cockroaches, hard to find, and hard to kill in hiding. You really don’t want to unload from a landing craft only to find CAS somehow overlooked a squad or 2 with SAWs. Bad news for clustered infantry.
As for an opposed port landing… I would strongly oppose it. It’s even harder to clean out a port than a pristine beach, too many buildings, too many blind corners, too many places for IEDs and the structures would provide cover against CAS, not to mention planting units into TEUs makes it a hell of a difficult hide and seek game. D-Day +1 is a really nasty time to find that the enemy has mixed light tanks and infantry in with the normal containers in the port.
@Obsvr
“bloke with binos in an a/c is not doing precision targetting”
Hey, I resent this. :P
James,
“…3200 men and something between 100-150 vehicles, none heavier than 5 tonnes.”
Ahh, that’d take about 4-hours! A bit less if both LPDs were available.
I guess you’re after twice the speed and therefore twice the fleet?
Can I ask what is the point in landing so many vehicles so quickly is? Surely the vehicles help push the “front line” forward once the main landing beach is secured? Furthermore it’s easier (for us) to outmaneuver an opponent with aviation assets (make them spread out too thinly) rather than to outweigh them with armour and wheels?
Anixtu,
Cheers for the pic. It must narrow pretty considerably unless my 25m beam figure is also wrong for Bay?
x,
Zodiac? ;-)
X, P2000?
@Simon
The purpose of an amphibious assault/coastal hook is to encircle the enemy and block them off from their main force, or hit them from an unexpected direction. If you delayed, a fast thinking enemy can either
1) Hit you when you’re unloading, causing total chaos for you and potentially total destruction of your force (no way to retreat back).
2) Break back out to their main force if your encirclement is too slow.
Aviation is less useful in case 2 as they can’t “park” in a location long term and physically block the enemy from running away, though they can straf small groups of retreating enemies.
Currently, Western air assets have not yet hit anyone with serious anti-air yet, just imagine how Apaches would have fared against infantry armed with Stingers. And a loss of a helicopter is much more severe than the loss of a single man with a MANPAD.
At the rate things are going, are we going to go back to LSTs? Useful in the scenario, but I really don’t like beaching ships.
Observer, that is only 1 possible use. It may simply be the only way to land troops (Assault) to evacuate troops (withdrawal) to achieve an aim and withdraw (raid) or to fix enemy forces (demonstration).
In the case of an assault it will be about establishing a protected beachhead to allow an administrative offfload. Unless we are invading a Tier 1 country (which we shouldn’t be doing on our won) we will have enough amphib capability to do this.
If speed is of the essence then we either have the assets or the plan is not feasible.
@APATs
If you’re in the middle of an assault, you are definately not doing a withdrawal. Confuses people on if you’re coming or going. One purpose at a time. Yes, there is many other uses for shipping, but once you’re committed to an action, you have to carry it through.
It’s a bit hard to explain. If you asked to get it done, I can do it for you, but ask me to convert an action plan into an aide memoir, and you’d leave me scratching my head for words. Not to mention some aspects are new to me, like “Demonstration”.
In an assault, think you can divide it into 2 types,
“Raid”, where you hit the enemy from an unexpected direction, and skip most of the admin unload save for basic supplies and security (you are running away after all) or
“Blitzkrig/envelopment”, with the whole 9 yards, assault landing, beachhead security, encirclement forces and admin unload. (Yes, dispatch the encirclement BEFORE the unload, no point doing the whole dog and pony only to find your target has already left). The initial entry forces are best used as area security, they would be tired. It’s the next wave that would puch further in to encircle the enemy. Which is also the reason for the mass lift needed, you’re actually pushing in 2 assault waves very closely (area security + blitz forces)
That’s large scale BTW, small scale, you can blitz with platoon sized forces in a semi-covert manner without the admin. We learnt THAT the hard way, from the JJaps.
Gareth J said “RE: ship to shore connectors. Does anybody think we should bring back the beaching capability we lost with the retirement of the Sir class?”
Oh yes. Beaching reduces off load time by a factor of seven. But I see this is a second or third wave RFA capability. I think the idea would work best with simple ships with minimum manning with an economical cruising speed of 18kts. The Greek Jasons or Soviet Alligator class are about the right size.
But I think bigger ships (LPD, LSD) carrying more fast landing craft is a good compromise. As I said further back 2 x modified Karel Doormen and 1 x JC could easily carry 16 fast landing craft. 4 vehicles per FLC x 16 is a battalion moved in one go. Again lets not get get carried away I am not on about an assault just using it as a metric to indicate scale of lift. And I am also think there is some mileage in LASH system.
@ ACC
The major problem I see with comparisons to Normandy is the bit about Germany having total control over all the connecting countries. As seen with things like Iraq and Libya, more common in the modern world is the situation where you find yourself facing down one hostile nation over some very specific gripe.
I concour with your scepticism over what a single Battlegroup achieves in most scenarios.
@ X
Putting a port through a brigade I absolutely understand. Not sure about a battlegroup over a beach.
Now going back to a battlegroup at sea vs in home port thing, why can they not sail out from the home port to go on exercise with other nations? Just seems odd to require them to be at sea 24/7.
And if Guatemala is getting itchy fingers over Belize, surely a much quicker deterrent is to pack an infantry battalion on a couple of flights and get them there in 24 hours with some basic support, as opposed to waiting several weeks for the ARG to sail there from the med?
Hi GJ,
RE an OTS ship: I would take a Visby, extend by half (in tonnage) for sea keeping and endurance, and get another helo plus a hangar on the deal
x, my first thought. too:Zodiac?
http://www.shipbucket.com/images.php?dir=Real%20Designs/Great%20Britain/MHC%20Sandown%20Class.gif
@ Chris B re “through a port”
Berthing ships at a port and unloading them.
As in “through an airport” or “through the garden gate” or “camel through an idea of the needle” or to “to reach London drive through Watford” or “the train goes through a tunnel”……..
As for “over the beach”. USN pilots have two expressions “feet dry” meaning they have crossed the coastline and are now above dry land. And “feet wet” meaning they are over the sea. “over the beach” just landing or moving a force from the sea to the land.
James, it’s a question to ask but there has been at least one incident in the last year when the TAPS ship was committed and there was a need for another to cover an incident. A ship had its leave cancelled and sailed at short notice to cover the gap – that ship had recently been operational and was on down time. Okay, so we covered it but only just. Plus by combining the TAPS and FRE duties, you automatically restrict yourself to a towed array frigate. It can all be ‘managed’ within the working margins of various units, but the impact on maintenance and down time is now severe.
We have seen the numbers of hulls in the last decade slashed and the commitments have not fallen in line with that. There has to be a minimum critical mass for any capability – and we’re there now, so I say that 13 T26’s is the absolute minimum or else give up a fairly hefty degree of influence. The RN is not wasteful, far from it, but there is no fat left and we are now degrading our long term durability to cover the short term duties – keep going like that and it will come badly unstuck fairly soon. The widely held opinion is that we now have absolutely no flex left. We’ve already withdrawn from standing commitments to NATO task forces, contributing only when we can, and if one ship fails a BOST or pre-deployment training then there is massive impact. Given that we now have only 3 standing commitments – Mid East, South Atlantic and Home Waters – it’s hard to see how the load can be further reduced.
Gareth, x,
I’m not with you on the beaching capability. Small LSL/LST types are inefficient. The requirement to beach had a massive impact on the LSLs – Sir Galahad could carry 1500t of cargo to a ramp, but only land 500t over a beach. You must then consider that you not only have to take control of a beach, but one with the particular characteristics suited to beaching a bunch of landing ships, otherwise they end up sat offshore offloading their pitifully small cargoes by Mexe/LCU anyway.
I think this “ship to shore connector” thing you’ve got going on is just a case of “me too” for the American idea. Did you want one before you saw it in the catalogue? ;-) However, I will say in its favour that it is a better idea than a return to beaching!
@ SI,
makes sense. Is there a solution in more use of River-class boats? Someone recently alluded to the need to shadow a Russian boat as a typical FRE-type duty. Surely a River could do that? Or a River and some fly-bys provided by the RAF?
I’m not sure of the differences between Rivers and the Visby-class. I’ve never been on a River, but spent 6 hours on Visby (Swedish Navy hosting defence contractors – my American company asked me to go and take notes despite my expertise being in C3 systems). I was quite impressed. Apart from being somewhat stealthy, it seemed that it could look after itself, had some reasonable organic ISTAR sensors, and a very decent C3 suite. The Swedes say that it had more than enough sea-keeping for the Batlic and North Sea, so in my ignorance I think that’s about OK for UK waters.
In the absence of a direct threat, surely 3 Visby or 3 Rivers for the cost of one T26 is a good enough FRE?
James, again, maybe. But it’s not much of a deterrent to the Kusnetsov battlegroup when it comes sailing past, is it?
I’m struggling to articulate the argument properly, but my perspective is that once you start compromising on the numbers of escort hulls, trying to make up for lack of numbers with even smaller, less capable ships, you compromise across the board. Small ships that might seem great for some of the home waters tasks are limited in what they can do; they can’t sub hunt for starters, so already you need to keep an ASW platform at home to look after the SSBN’s and deter the Russians. Coming up with small ships to do various little tasks means we cannot do some of the high end tasks. Those high-end capabilities and the professionalism with which we employ and develop them counts for a huge amount in international circles, NATO, EU and further, and political clout matters.
I have always accepted that there is not enough money to go around, but some capabilities are fundamental to the core operations of our business. Frigates are one of those fundamentals. Lets get rid of amphibs, carriers, attack subs and the RAF before we start throwing away our basic workhorses. You might as well start slashing infantry battalions* whilst spending money on tanks, to put it in broadly similar terms.
What is T26 going to cost anyway – £250M each? In the grand scheme of things, it’s not that much when compared to the big projects. Probably about the same as a JSF will end up costing.
(* or whatever they’re called – I find Army structures more confusing than RAF ranks).
Recently on this site I have been told that 3 for 1 hull availability and having a ASW ship available to “defend” the deterrent is rhubarb.
And a serving RN bod comes along and basically says both things.
One is now a confused little bear. Is it a question not so much of me not knowing what I am talking about more a question of who reads my comments?
@ Anixtu – well its a trimaran… :p
No, I just thought I’d add something to the “over the beach” debate.
@ ACC – I believe the Visby was originally conceived as a family of vessels including a larger version with hangar and at least one helicopter. However, I thought the original street fighter idea was a 600 ton catamaran with lots of VL missiles?
@x
Your “deterent” is an SSBN right?
It’s main defence is stealth, not a big escort screen in a circle around nothing that makes people wonder what is at the center of that “nothing.
I’d say the best escorts would be a pair of Astutes, not a highly visible frigate.
@ SI,
you may well be correct, but conversely some of what the proper frigates and destroyers are doing – anti-piracy and anti-drugs, for example – could be done by a Visby or similar. I sailed across the Atlantic in a 40 foot catamaran once (I was graded “incompetent crew”, so mostly did the cooking and pulling of ropes under supervision), so I don’t imagine it would be too difficult for those types of boat to get to the patrol area if they choose the right weather.
There is a more systemic problem, for the RN. The case is easily made for all sorts of high end capabilities, but the matching of peacetime tasks to those capabilities is poorly made. It is worse for the RAF. I do think it would be better for the RN to move to something like 15 first class hulls (to guarantee 6 for a FI type deployment), plus another 12 Visbys or similar to work the home waters and non-war standing tasks.
Somewahtinvolved, and others…
Is it not the point, that we have no money for extra hulls at the high end.
What TD is saying is we have to make a choice- better ships or more not as good ships.
If one pursues the gold standard on a decreasing budget, you get less hulls, which means we can’t be in as many places at as many times as before.
Pay your money make your choice.
Happen to be in the more and cheaper less capable camp.
I respect the gold standard camp, but reality is reality.
All the scuttlebut is that we will get 12 or less t26.
Deal with it.
@ Observer
You have jumped to the same conclusion the last person who tried to educate me on this issue.
It isn’t a question of the ASW frigate knowing the location of the SSBN. It can’t as was rightly pointed out not even 1SL or the prime-minister or nearly the entire crew (CO and XO aside) know where it is . But it is a question of RN having an asset looking for and monitoring the submarines (read Russians) of other nations that could be looking for or just moving through the “possible” area of SSBN operation.
I must come across as really dumb.
@ James re UK waters
The trouble is I think nobody believes there is a threat. And I think HMG doesn’t want to increase RN presence in UK waters because the mindset of HMG is that they are European waters. Deploying extra armed forces would look like us asserting our national identity. A bit tin foil hat perhaps but I think reading between the lines of how HMG tends to relations with the EU it is quite plausible. A lot more goes on at sea between states than many shore side would know. It is a different sphere.
Another thing. It is interesting to compare ourselves with the Norwegians. As soon as the oil starts to flow from the North Sea they establish a coast guard and start buying ships to protect their revenue.
X,
I think that the RN’s commitments have become somewhat “totemic” – i.e. “we must do it this way because that is the way it is done”. I recognise the same in the way the Army approached NI commitments, and it is a danger that all institutions encounter. If you start asking difficult questions (i.e. “why is the minimum manning strength of the South Armagh battalion 682, in an era of mission command”?), then the answers are often incoherent and revert to service comfort zones. If there really is a threat from foreign submarines to the UK, then that should be the first commitment made, and sod the anti-drugs patrol with a valuable first class hull. That argument is extensible to buying carriers (otherwise known as “all fur coat and no knickers”, if you haven’t got the frigate for the home patrol.
Actually, I quite like girls who buy the fur coat but can’t afford knickers. They are always fun to be with, so long as both parties know who’s calling the shots.
Visby family options, page 19:
http://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=visby+class+family&source=web&cd=3&ved=0CFcQFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.kockums.se%2FImageVault%2FImages%2Fid_506%2FconversionFormat_0%2Fdownload_1%2FImageVaultHandler.aspx&ei=imnCT9K9A9Kn8QPO–zoCg&usg=AFQjCNFMEZZnSJ3c4_ASD-j_R76rMTRRFw&cad=rja
@ X
I think “port through a Brigade” sounds better. Whoops!
SI, I guess the question is can extra hulls supplement standing tasks to the extent that allows frigates and Destroyers to be better employed? York was not a detterent to the Russian carrier group she was a monitor. multiple platforms could do this and she was definitely FRE only not the CTF 320 ready ship.
Could an extra 10 hulls of lesser capability, any one of which could have replicated York’s role. The point was to let them know they were being shadowed not to threaten them. We could have used an OPV or a sub with a few periscope sightings.
We need to step away from traditional “this is how we have always done it’ mode that pervades FLEET to an effects based system.
“We need to step away from traditional “this is how we have always done it’ mode that pervades FLEET to an effects based system.”
Spooky. Real-world-based thinking from an Andrew proponent. ;) See my thoughts above. It is almost scarily Joint.
Jemes, excuse me I am not an RN proponent; I am a serving Officer in HMG forces and my views are always about how best to achieve the bigger picture aims. Whether you agree with them or not.
@x
You brought up the other problem. The frigate doesn’t know where the SSBN is. I’m not sure who brought up the “decoflication” of battlespace, but the results would be obvious if it wasn’t done.
It would be massively embarrassing to sink your own SSBN by mistake.
So, no. More cooks in this case will spoil the broth. An Astute or 2 would be the best outrider for this job.
As for the use of high end assets for low end jobs, why not just say no? I did recommend splitting the job to the Coast Guard where they can get more equipment suitable for the job, and leave the high end ships to be run ragged by training.
Think I saw a OPV USV tender design by ST Marine somewhere, 4 USVs with a crane. 4 of those for anti-piracy would help a lot, 20 ships (16 USV + 5 OPV) can supply low level control over an area easily. Leave the heavy stuff to the navy. (~130 Euros per estimated, maintainance included ref: Oman Navy)
APATS,
hopefully, your brand of thinking will permeate upwards. The Sea Lords have literally no comprehension of such a concept – there was a shade of such thinking in 2003-5 when investment decisions really could have gone the other way, but those advocating such a view were given severe beatings (i.e. the Appointers told them which side their bread was buttered, and the Appointers themselves were told which side their bread was buttered), and since then normal service has been resumed.
Do you know, every time I see Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope on TV, I nearly choke. Fat, self-satisfied Nelsonic indulgence that he is. He represents everything the Navy should be ashamed of.
@ Observer
There is a lot of ocean between the Koala and Iceland.
And I would agree an Astute or two would be the better answer.
But we are short on resources. There will be roughly 2 frigates for 1 Astute.
@ Chris B
I do that trick all the time. When I read your comment my first thought was what have I typed now….. :)
James my problem with current RN thinking is that the answer is designed to justify a platform and not an outcome.
1. Falklands, a Frigate is not enough to deny an invasion so why not an OPV and a army mech Battalion which does deny invasion?
2. Piracy, what is needed is platform capable of flying a helo, sonars and VLS are not required.
3. Let the US deal with the Gulf everything except the MCMVS are flag wavers anyway.
4, this allows us to priorities escorts and Bg duties and lets have an annual deployment. if there is no conventional threat deploy to the Caribbean and do anti drug ops or Somalia and do anti piracy bringing a real game changing capability.
will never catch on.
APATS,
you should go far. With the current Andrew several stars, you may need to make your case. They’ll be expecting more of the same, not this dangerous new talk.
Observer
“I did recommend splitting the job to the Coast Guard…”
HM Coastguard do not operate ships, nor do they perform law enforcement. What you propose is effectively creating a new agency along the lines of the USCG.
@Anixtu
Exactly. You can either expand the current mandate from SAR to SAR and coastal security or create a new agency and fold the old one in. Either is possible. It also avoids the problem of the navy having 2 ROEs and training types, peace-time and war-time. The requirements of both are so different that cross-training in them might cause hesitation at the wrong times.
@APATs
What you say has a very disturbing line of truth to it. And forget drug ops, find an uninhabited island and practice your assault landings, red vs blue. Practice, practice, practice.
Any drug-lord held Islands/Coasts that we could “practice” on?
APATS said “lets have an annual deployment.”
Fleet summer cruise and pink gins on the quarter deck?
What about black hulls, white deck houses, and buff funnels?
Will we have to increase the on ration strength of the RM Band Service?
Straw hats and cutlass drill for the lower deck?
Wizard!!!!!!!!!!!! :)
@ James re “totemic”
One of the reasons why defence appeals to me is that it helps satisfy my sense of the ridiculous. And I am sorry to say all three services are as bad as each other. We have an Army that forgets it can’t deploy anywhere without considerable help from others. But “Boots on the ground are important don’t you know?” “Yes but how are you going to get there? And where will you ammo and fuel come from?” My beloved RN seems to be a mash up of Navy-Lark-meets-Jeremy-Kyle and seems to have all the fighting spirit of an Italian conscientious objector. And the RAF reminds of the office toad with no personality who always seems to get the expensive toys whose value cannot be questioned but seems only ever just to do enough but no more and yet always appears on the all action plans and is indispensable. All 3 have herds of holy cows. I just hope when push comes to shove, and that day is surely coming, not too many young men and women get killed because of the vanity of flag rank officers and the short termism and political opportunism of politicians.
@Anixtu
You’re quite entitled to that opinion. Are you in favour of the ability to land a medium army brigade over an undefended beach? If you are, can you think of a more cost effective way to do it?
I don’t say we have to use exactly the same kit as the Americans are proposing. As above I think there is the opportunity to create a pair of ‘Argus replacement’ RFAs that would have the capability swing between:
a) filling the role of level 3 PCRS using a containerised facility
b) being an aviation support ship to the LPD & LSD (after Ocean goes)
c) acting as ship to shore connector for the Points
d) being a mothership for various peacetime tasks
“I think this “ship to shore connector” thing you’ve got going on is just a case of “me too” for the American idea”
X,
current planning for the Afghan withdrawal is entirely single service. Train through Asia and Europe. Whether it actually happens or not is yet TBD, but don’t for a moment think that the Army cannot get itself from A to B unless there is a big bit of blue in the way.
The RAF are clearly out of the game, only having the freight capacity of a regional airline. The Navy are reduced to pretending to protect SLOCs against a non-existent threat, and (in the case of the Sea Crusader voyages from Hamburg to Split) protecting the ship with a destroyer, as though the Serbs posed an air threat through STROG. All nonsense peddled by the Sea Lords. If the Serbs had a submarine, what could our destroyer have done? Nothing. It is an example of how the RN constantly bigs itself up against non-existent threats. It’s how they justify their existence.
@James
Last I heard it was train to the Baltic and then *Ships*
I suppose it could yet all come through the channel tunnel
Or even via Lahore if the political situation remains fluid.
Options…
James, we have used up so much diplomatic gold to get the army out it was a actually muted it was no worth while.
We are of course jolly lucky the Russians will let us borrow their railway. They know all about fighting in Afghan of course.
What’s the odds Putin denies us the route at the last minute in order to get some concessions over the missile shield?
Then we might be glad of some ships in the Indian Ocean.
Options…
Have an image of the Army tabbing out of Afghanistan to the tune of “Over the Hills and far away”.
PE,
I think it is tactically unwise to mix PCRS with another simultaneous task. Note that Argus doesn’t. I want to keep my hospital as far from the action as practicable
What you are asking for is an expansion of the amphibious fleet immediately after it has been cut and the current stated requirement is the ability to land a Commando Group, not a brigade. Until policy changes, and I don’t think it is about to, I’m not really up for playing Fantasy Fleets. Roll on SDSR 2015.
@ Peter Elliott,
as you say, “options”, and all sorts of diplomatic games to be played.
What it does do is to put a wrecking ball into the crotch of the idiots who say that the Army cannot get itself anywhere without a Navy. It illustrates that there is a debate, and that by and large, the Navy are a small bit part player in the corner with few chips of dubious value.
“Are you in favour of the ability to land a medium army brigade over an undefended beach? If you are, can you think of a more cost effective way to do it?”
Get the guys to swim there. :P No petrol used.
I think there is a middle ground between an LCU and Bay, which is similar to the Sir class – personally I think a little smaller. It’s got to be “high seas” capable but also shallow draught. I’ve thought about this a lot and have usually figured, if it would work, it must already have been done and/or rejected.
The idea is for the bow of a ship to be fairly standard but the stern to be a smooth wedge. This means podded drives towards the bow or water jets along the side. The ship beaches in reverse! It’s the only way I can think of that can land a lot of kit at high speed. Mad?
On a slightly different note, I do think we need to rejig our force structure. I’ve said it before, I’ll say it again: homeland defence (coastguard, fighter command and Army – working together) and expeditionary force (Navy, bomber command/FAA and RM – working together).
Simon,
Stern Landing Vessel
http://www.catamaranferries.com/Seatransport/SLV.htm
http://www.seatransport.com/products-military.php
@Anixtu
The unanswered questions:
Will Argus be replaced at all?
Will Ocean be replaced at all?
Will we get 13 T26 hulls or a Hi-Lo mix?
I agree the Staff tasks do not require the landing of a brigade. My view is they should and that this is a much better option to put forward than buying Juan Carlos LHDs any time soon. An element of Fantasy Fleets perhaps but also an affordable and realistic one in the context of the questions above.
“What you are asking for is an expansion of the amphibious fleet immediately after it has been cut”
To stay within budget I’d even convert one of the existing 3 Bays rather than build a new one.
Simon,
your expeditionary force. The RM are about 2,400 proper fighting troops. The last couple or three times we got serious we put 20,000-30,000 pairs of boots on the ground. So your proposed expeditionary force is going to work at about 10% capacity of what we can currently do.
The Andrew is a busted flush. It cannot actually do anything positive at medium or large scale. The Air Force only works in an expeditionary sense with 30 days notice (which it can achieve), but all that is is to bomb a third world country. Ask the Air Force to move proper fighting power from A to B and it cannot.
So, until further notice, our forces are:
Andrew: Shimmy up and down a shore line looking slightly sexy, but not really achieving anything.
Air Force: Do shock and awe for a couple of days, then stooge about with nothing much to contribute apart from the ISTAR contribution to a self-licking lollipop.
Army: Very slowly get ferried into theatre by STUFT, then eventually do the business.
I would challenge anyone to say that this is not the normal pattern of ops, since 1945.
James,
Nice overview of the three forces ;-)
I didn’t really mean RM over Army, simply a load of chaps that work the RM way (i.e. lighter, faster). In actual fact I should really have written RM/Paras since it’s in line with the light/fast mentality.
@James
Aren’t we supposed to be suggesting a cost effective new pattern of ops for after 2012?
But it’s ok to stick to this pattern?
Is there no benefit or desire to:
– Move significant land forces quickly by air?
– Move significant land forces quickly by sea?
– Move significant land forces quickly by any combination of land, sea and air?
Strikes me that being able to do this would be a Good Thing™ when needed.
What would be required to do these and under what scenario’s? What would you move in which combination?
Assume reasonable budget, training and the right people are in place for our existing force strength.
(Suspension of Disbelief: Gordon realised he hadn’t actually sold the gold and it was stored under the Olympic Park site all along).
James,
With all due respect if you’re saying we’ve used 20-30,000 pairs of boots the last 2-3 times (and about 10,000 in 1982) I’d probably suggest we cut the expeditionary Army to about that size since it must represent the maximum number we can actually sustain anyway.
We’d then have to determine what “homeland” capacity we needed?
Peter,
“cost-effective” in terms of no f**king carriers or stupid F35s? I’ll sign up to that.
Unfortunately, “we are where we are” as many TD commenters have told me. That means we’re financially f*cked***, and the Andrew have pissed all available funds up the wall for the next 10 years. So in terms of dealing out effects, we need to go with what we’ve got.
*** And as well as being financially f*cked, no aircraft carrier, no aircraft, not enough frigates, and a spastic little ARG that even LIDL would be ashamed to sell. But we WILL have (BAE permitting) something like reindeer dust in maybe ten years from now. Bollocks. Meanwhile, 3 Sea Lords per year retire on full pensions and some form of personal delusion that they made a positive difference in their naval careers.
James,
So given that it’s the “troops” (Army/RN/Paras/etc) that actually do the mucky/bloody stuff how would you suggest the rest of the forces are structured to:
1. Get you there?
2. Get your equipment there?
3. Provide air-cover/support?
4. Fix you when you fall?
If you can outline the above and provide ratios e.g. each platoon needs X trucks, Y strike sorties, Z kg of load on LCU/copter???
@ Anixtu said
“The requirement to beach had a massive impact on the LSLs – Sir Galahad could carry 1500t of cargo to a ramp, but only land 500t over a beach. You must then consider that you not only have to take control of a beach, but one with the particular characteristics suited to beaching a bunch of landing ships, otherwise they end up sat offshore offloading their pitifully small cargoes by Mexe/LCU anyway.”
None of this is news to me. I just like the idea of beaching large large ships! From what I have read one of the main reasons why beaching the LSLs was done rarely in their later was insurance. Each beaching required a hull survey I understand which meant an expensive few days in a dry dock. I am lead to believe back in the 1950s when the RFA still operated WW2 LST then beachings were frequently practised especially in the Gulf; sometimes as many as tide and time allowed during an exercise. The Russians are very fond of landing ships with their distinctive kedge anchors; of course they also like amphibious vehicles too which means the cargo would often swim itself ashore. And of course the USN had those vomit-commets the Newports with their distinctive horns; I am surprise there in no footage on the YouTube of AAVs diving off a Newport’s rear ramp. Of course both super powers would have had considerable firepower with which to secure a beach. We mustn’t forget the US Army’s large class of what landing ship nor the South Korea’s some value in the form factor too. All good clean fun. :)
Simon,
you want me to redesign the entire MoD at 2320 on a Sunday night, and down to platoon / truck level? Not going to happen – we all need some kip before wage-slaving another 5 days.
I’ll give you a clue, however. CNS and CAS told to concentrate on making their services fit for purpose rather than dreaming about new and unaffordable kit.
James said “current planning for the Afghan withdrawal is entirely single service.”
The only thing you don’t recognise, whether deliberately or not, is that it is all dependent on the US having the diplomatic, economic, and military clout to see that the Russians play nicely. Your old service has all the strategic mobility of the AA. The fact that we live on an island sort of limits them for a start off. Your old service is the US Army’s Ghurkas.
A long time back James said:
“There is a more systemic problem, for the RN. The case is easily made for all sorts of high end capabilities, but the matching of peacetime tasks to those capabilities is poorly made”
Problem is the same for all services — there should be no such thing as “peace time tasks” per se. The armed forces are the nations military capability, military forces are supposed to be for militaristic purposes.
For sure, it just so happens the the Royal Engineers can dig people out of earth quake rubble as easily as preparing the battlefield. C17 transports and Bay Class amphibs can deliver disaster relief supplies as easily as war material.
However, those serendipitous ‘secondary’ roles apart, what exactly do “peace time roles” other than training for primary “war time” delivery of death and destruction might James mean ?
Oh no, were back to Maritime Security Operations (MSO) such as anti-drug runner, anti-people smuggling, anti-weapons / tech smuggling etc etc. These are called “constabulary” roles for a reason. They are NOT military tasking. Use a para-military force in the shape of the RFA, with civilian agencies such MCGA, Fisheries, Met Police, MI-frikkin-5 or however you like to provide additional capabilities, including RM and RN as required; but if you want to re-orientate a so-called “military” force for plentiful peace time global maritime policing, stop fucking about and disband the RN as a force, and stand up HM Coast Guard !!
Observer mentioned a OPV which carried 4 USV’s a while back. Thought people might like links…
OPV (carrying 4 RHIB’s but you get the idea…)
http://www.klsreview.com/HTML/2009Jan_Jun/20090519_04.jpg
http://www.klsreview.com/HTML/2009Jan_Jun/20090519_05.jpg
USV
http://www.stee.stengg.com/newsrm/2010/02-02.pdf
There was internet chatter about a USV carrying LW torpedoes as well, not sure if this is the one…
@Jed, you post has got up my nose a little.
Too many people think that the civil tasks are beneath the military and some lesser groups should get their hands dirty in policing, civil aid/disaster type tasks and leave the uniforms to concentrate on the business of legalised mayhem.
Truth is that the military is there to support the civil government, as directed, and that has always included a sisable chunk of non or semi military tasks and it is not going to change.
The UK’s problem at the moment is that the constant financial cutbacks and restructures is putting the services to each other throats and it is neither pretty or productive.
James,
“…CNS and CAS told to concentrate on making their services fit for purpose…”
I’d have thought Sentry, Skynet, Apache and Harrier/F35B are pretty decent… that just leaves the operators in question?
@ Gareth Jones
There is an OPV out there, and I can’t find it for the life of me even though it was wallpaper on one of my PCs for a bit, that has exactly the same length and displacement as HMS Clyde but beneath the flight deck there is one of the RIB hanger arrangements and a decent gun.
@ Jed
“Problem is the same for all services — there should be no such thing as “peace time tasks” per se”
—
That depends what you define as a peace time task. The purpose of the armed forces are to serve the crown, defending it from those that seek to do it harm.
Counter Drug operations in the Caribbean are aimed at preventing the supply of illegal substances to the US, and also Jamaica. Drugs that enter Jamaica get flown to places like Spain and Nigeria and then end up on UK streets; a threat to the laws of the Crown and the stability of the country. That seems like a reasonable task to ask of the forces.
Same with counter piracy. Piracy is a direct threat to shipping that could be bound for the UK or her allies and friends, and in some cases carrying British flags, thus its defence is a legitimate expectation of HM armed forces.
I think on these points PE’s and my thinking are fairly close:
“Will Argus be replaced at all?
Will Ocean be replaced at all?
Will we get 13 T26 hulls or a Hi-Lo mix?”
On 1 & 2 CVF should not count towards “replacement” but is a new capability… the proposed new class becomes sort of funded
– we don’t know, and it is unlikely we will get sight of the 10-year plan before NAO as been all over it… and they are not very quick
Where we differ is the last point as I would tend to consider the “mix” within a 3.25+1.4 (bn) framework
Chris B said “Counter Drug operations”
Yes. We don’t have the resources the US has. We can’t afford a second navy to plug the gap between navy proper and police. And as I keep saying theses second string tasks keep the RN in the public eye and are really good training.
Off on a tangent we have 9,000 bods in the world’s primary region for growing heroin poppies and scarcely a field gets destroyed. That is the big threat from Afghanistan not the phantom Islamic nutcase……….
So the main decision is:
12-13 x T26
or
8 x T26 and £1b spare for 8-12 lesser ships
Could we not build 16 x T26 hulls with half of them fitted for but not with: Sea Ceptor, Harpoon, 2087, WR21 (or whichever one we use), etc… almost not fitted with everything!
This creates a plentiful common hull that could be upgraded in the future (money permitting).
What we are then left with is 8 x T26 and 8 x large general purpose hulls with a Wildcat, a Mk8 gun and some GPMGs which can be used for anti-drug, anti-piracy and flying the flag.
I’m sure we can do this within a £3b budget.
@Simon
That doesn’t sound like a bad idea, if we could get the 8 general purpose ones down to an acceptably cheap price, both in terms of production and running costs.
I’m assuming this would be the case, as the real price of the ship comes from the high tech equipment, Sea Ceptor, Artisan, 2087 etc.
The army doesn’t need ships or aircraft to get anywhere interesting. Has no-one got around to telling RN and RAF about the Channel Tunnel? German railways do an excellant job. Get them on side and getting to the Bosphurus and anywhere North of the Black Sea is a doddle. Of course there’s also the time honoured solution to the over the beach nonsence, unleash the FCO and get friendly with the neighbours.
Hi x, @ 8:41
You mean this one (less fighty than Visby, hence double the range, even though same endurance)?
“The lead ship of this class, L’Adroit has a length of 87 metres, an at-sea endurance of 3 weeks and a range of 8,000 nautical miles. With a top speed of 21 knots, the vessel has a helicopter flight deck accommodating a vertical take-off and landing (Schiebel S-100) supporting unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) operations. It is designed for reduced crewing, with a complement of 30 and space for 30 passengers.”
– 5m longer, same total number onboard, but a better balance of crew and “passengers”
The ship features a number of major innovations for navies, commandos and coastguards: 360° panoramic visibility from the bridge, a single integrated mast for 360° radar coverage, covert deployment of fast commando boats in less than 5 minutes and provision for UAVs and USVs (unmanned surface vehicles). The vessel is also equipped with teleconferencing facilities and long-range acoustic devices.”
Not sure what the wartime role of the 8 frigate shaped patrol boats would be.
Either they would have to hang around a long way from the action acheiving not much, or they would get too close to danger and get sunk.
Also with only capacity for 1 helo and no well dock or stern ramp their utility as motherships would also be questionable.
The advantage of a bay class derrived design (or similar) is that it is (a) more flexible for a wide variety of peacetime tasks and (b) could be really useful in getting @James’ 30,000 boots onto the ground somewhere.
Back on May 23 (11:11 on Page 3) @FBOT suggested the RSS Endurance class of ship for a general purpose vessel and reading through the various discussions since, I agree with FBOT that this class of vessel fits the roles being discussed, especially when considered in numbers.
Assuming that stand-off mine countermeasures can be delivered as effectively from a well deck/davits as by the non-metallic hulled Hunt and Sandown class, then you can arguably include the MHPC budget in any purchasing considerations, or use the MHPC programme as a starting point.
Then it’s up to you how much equipment you install on any single vessel of this category.
– Mine Countermeasures (facilitated by Well Deck, Mission Deck, possibly in opposed waters)
– SAR (Helicopters, Well Deck, Davits)
– Amphibious Assault (Well Deck, Davits, Helicopters, Mission Deck, Passenger Accommodation)
– ASW/AEW supplements (Helicopters, Well Deck)
– UNREP/VERTREP (Helicopters, Mission Deck)
– Flying the Flag / Diplomacy (Passenger Accommodation, Helicopters)
– Hydrographic (Dry dock refitting of hull equipment, Well Deck, Mission Deck)
– Patrols of various intensities (Pirates, Drugs, Fisheries)
– Humanitarian (Well Deck, Helicopters, Mission Deck, Power Generators, Passenger Accommodation)
– Warfighting (Gun, VLS/CAMM, Small Arms, Well Deck, Davits, Helicopters)
ST Marine constructed and exported one for Thailand at a cost of S$200m which is around £100m.
@PE
Try telling the crew of the Eilat that FACs don’t achieve much.
@ ACC
No. But much the same. The ship I am on about is exactly the same length and displacement as Clyde.
Peter Elliott,
I am supremely relaxed about what type of ships we have, or the method of unloading them, just so long as it is quick and efficient.
I saw a marvellous demo of this in 1995. NATO had declared the formation of a military force in Bosnia that wouldn’t be hidebound by UN rules. The Brits re-subordinated an infantry Battle Group outside Sarajevo, the French said they would send in a new Battle Group, based on the 2nd Foreign Cavalry Regiment. My boss (I was his MA) was Gen Bernard Janvier, and he was pretty much Colonel of the Foreign Legion. So naturally he wanted to go to welcome the new French Battle Group.
We went to a small port called Ploce in southern Croatia. The Battle Group was arriving on 2 ships – I think they were the ferries that normally ran from France to Corsica. Anyway, STUFT. On arrival, the port was full because a Croatian ship had broken down and occupied the length of the jetty. There was a harbour master and some UN logistics officers all running about and shouting at each other in front of the media, and it seemed there was going to be a fiasco. No problem for the French ferry captains. They just banged into the end of the jetty and let down the ramps. The Battle Group drove out in about 5 minutes, and impressively managed to do a pretty good eyes left and salute to the General. They drove off the end of the jetty and 3 hours later were in Sarajevo. I asked the General later whether he was impressed, and he said “no, it is what I expect of my legionnaires. Flexibility, and not to let problems intrude”.
Sadly, he’s gone down in history as a poor choice for Comd UNPROFOR, and Srebrenica happened on his watch. He was a fine soldier, but a poor politician.
@James
“So, until further notice, our forces are:
Andrew: Shimmy up and down a shore line looking slightly sexy, but not really achieving anything…”
“…by and large, the Navy are a small bit part player in the corner with few chips of dubious value.”
“It is an example of how the RN constantly bigs itself up against non-existent threats. It’s how they justify their existence.”
“…every time I see Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope on TV, I nearly choke. Fat, self-satisfied Nelsonic indulgence that he is. He represents everything the Navy should be ashamed of.”
– Such dismissive contempt for the Senior Service including a gratuitous ad hominem attack on its head. I don’t know what happened to affect you so deeply but have you tried anger management? In an attempt to restore some semblance of rationality, consider this:
– Long after the 6,000-ish regular soldiers serving in Afghanistan have re-joined their 90,000-ish fellows in sleepy barracks across Britain and Germany with occasional brief forays to outlying barracks or exercise areas, the Naval Service will still have warships, submarines, aircraft and Royal Marines roaming the world and keeping a watchful eye on things for up to 10 months at a time. Fortunately, its personnel don’t adhere to the Army’s one-in-five deployment cycle or it would need to be several times larger.
– Naval units will continue to deploy whenever and wherever required to promote, support and defend UK national interests. Unlike ‘boots on the ground’ which are unlikely to be welcomed by many of the countries that host RN warships, they will continue to provide a physical presence to foster relations, deter foes or boost the confidence of friends, as appropriate, while conducting myriad tasks on the sea, under the sea, in the air and on land across the full spectrum of climates and environments. Their activities will continue to range from protecting trade, gathering intelligence, improving interoperability with allies and conducting defence diplomacy for national purposes to performing maritime constabulary and humanitarian tasks under the auspices of UN, EU, NATO and other international institutions.
– In this manner, Naval Service units will also be able to maintain their capability edge and refresh perishable skills in all warfare disciplines, just as soldiers do on a range. Stop doing it for a few weeks and the skills of operators and maintainers atrophy. Stop doing it for a few months and instructors start to lose their expertise and corporate knowledge begins to disappear. Even during your short time at sea in HMS Bristol, you must have noticed the existence of a training programme that exercised all aspects of the ship’s capability whenever opportunities arose; everything from single-ship fire-fighting, damage control and machinery breakdown exercises (each incident involving possibly different people and requiring a specific response depending on its precise type and location) to multi-unit ASW, AAW, ASuW, EW, Amphib, Comms and RAS exercises, etc., either with accompanying consorts or other allied units encountered along the way. As many have already observed, a high-end frigate can do the work of a corvette and derive useful training value in the meantime but the reverse is not true. I would prefer to keep fewer fully capable maid-of-all-work frigates that can look after themselves than sacrifice some for vessels that will be of little value or even a hindrance when the chips are down.
– Having observed TD for a while, I now believe I can speak about Army tactics, systems and equipment as intelligently as you and some of your fellow commentators do about the Navy, e.g. throwing Sonar 2087 around as though it were some lightweight button-on system. To be specific, I have had some ideas about upgrading snatch Land Rovers to Mastiff/Ridgeback standard in an economical manner. All it needs is raising the chassis a few inches, adding some armour plate, installing a more powerful engine and a couple of other refinements, possibly involving modules. A decent mechanic could probably do it for £1-2k per vehicle, tops. Perhaps we ought to get together to discuss it sometime? On the other hand, I note you crossed the Atlantic in a 40 foot catamaran once and “don’t imagine it would be too difficult for those types of boat to get to the patrol area if they choose the right weather.” I crossed a ploughed field in a Cortina once so does this mean that the Army can relinquish most of its off-road vehicles anyway? ;-)
@Dunservin
You just made my day! I could not agree more.
Armies come and go, but the navy is always there, silently patrolling the world with dignity and the utmost professionalism.
@Challenger
Oh really? Some countries do fine without navies, but try convincing anyone that their country doesn’t need an army for self defence.
@Dunserve
“All it needs is raising the chassis a few inches, adding some armour plate, installing a more powerful engine and a couple of other refinements, possibly involving modules.”
By the time you finished, it’ll be called a new vehicle. Not joking, suspension change, engine change, frame change to support added armour. It’s almost a whole new vehicle.
Observer,
50:50 question. Mongolian Navy or the Golden Horde – which one has influenced western civilisation more over the last nearly 1000 years? ;)
Looking forward to the next 1000 years (that’s quite a board perspective for the SDSR), it is a fact that something like 90% of the world’s population will live within 50 miles of the sea, and resources are going to be contested. I’d like to see the British military reflect this by developing a grown up littoral capability that is much more seamless than we currently have. so yes, that involves the RAF operating from ships, the Marines and Army becoming interchangeable, and the Navy learning to understand about supporting operations considerably inland.
@Observer
“By the time you finished, it’ll be called a new vehicle. Not joking, suspension change, engine change, frame change to support added armour. It’s almost a whole new vehicle.”
– Now you’re getting the idea. Just like a so-called ‘GP’ T26 compared to an ‘ASW’ (or any other) T26.
Peter Elliott,
“Not sure what the wartime role of the 8 frigate shaped patrol boats would be.”
Patrol?
Radar picket?
NGS?
RM platoon insertion (RHIBs and Wildcat)?
Essentially littoral combat.
The Bay class design has a lot of advantages for landing Marines and ASW/AEW copter operations and as you and I have both figured, converting them helps placate the gap caused when HMS Ocean is retired. But it’s simply too big and expensive to run as a police ship.
You also have to remember that 1 x Bay will cost more than 1 x T26 (without any equipment) and you still have to procure the landing/raiding craft before it can really catch a Princess 60 full of drug money!
Dunservin,
“..Just like a so-called ‘GP’ T26 compared to an ‘ASW’ (or any other) T26”
Not really the same is it. A stripped out T26-ASW ship is more like a Land Rover without the seats and radio – cheaper but a little less useful ;-)
Actually James, the key isn’t the “population to coastline” crap ratio excuse that they are giving out, it’s the basic fact that shipping is the most economical and the best way to ship bulk from point A to point B. Has been for thousands of years. You want to kill a country, strangle it’s sea routes. Instant recession. Taking over the ports, blockades, shore batteries, air strikes, just choke them off and watch industry grind to a halt.
You want to put in an armoured fist into another country’s guts? What you need? Shipping. Air mobile units simply can’t drop as much cargo and armour into an AoR as compared to a ship, not to mention the new tactics than you can use with sea transport.
Meet Ghengis’s new idea. The Golden rowboats. :P The Japs are laughing themselves silly about now.
@Observer
And what are these countries commitments and interests?
The problem is with the countries current policy of punching above its weight to look good in front of the our cousins across the pond.
We seriously need to look in depth at what we want to do realistically and then look at what we need for that.
If we want to continue doing COIN styles ops then a larger army will be needed to cope with the stresses this causes (unlikely due to the severe political problems at home this causes and has continuously shown throughout recent history with the larger media coverage of conflict). If we want to maintain our overseas possessions and look after our entire EEZ (5th largest in the world) then a maritime look may be needed. This is partially due to the potential future of drilling around the islands we shall not mention and other overseas possession we currently possess.
Overall I believe we should maintained a balanced armed services that can operate effectively together but hold a big stick when its needed. (I personally like the idea of module based equipment for this type of role)
Ali,
Spot on. 5th largest EEZ. Loads of mineral resources… to be nicked by anyone that we can’t stop.
Perhaps you’ve also noticed that 1/4 of it is “down south”. You know, near our springboard into Antarctica
Does anyone else find the price of fish a little high? Perhaps we should police our seas for fishing a little harder too. That’ll be a little anti-Iceland-ic, but I’ve never liked high-street frozen food anyway :-)
“And what are these countries commitments and interests?”
Speaking hypothetically. And even if I wasn’t, I’m not going to turn this thread into a country vs country flamewar by naming names.
“We seriously need to look in depth at what we want to do realistically and then look at what we need for that.”
Always a good idea. And step 3) Find the tools needed as economically as possible, but not so cheap as to be low quality and cost lives. OTS helps a lot in this, goods preview before buying. Research and design is like playing rolette with your equipment. Sometimes you strike it rich, most of the time the banker laughs behind your back at you.
@Observer
Yeah let’s not get into a country bash and I was definitely not saying we do not need an army because we do before anyone say’s otherwise! I was just putting a question out there for a discussion which is always good to have for all proponents to have a better understanding.
@Simon
Yeah protecting these in the future when the scramble of Africa 2 properly gets under way we may need to look elsewhere when the big players start dividing the continent between themselves and our overseas territories seem to be our best hope for this!
On the idea of the Type 26 Frigate I remember once someone have a feeling it was TD saying the enemy of the best is the just as good. So maybe following the Danes on their stanflex idea is the best for the Royal Navy to operate a number of frigates as general purpose vessels but equip them appropriately when needed?
@Anyone who can answer this
Does the EU permit any other EU member countries to fish in the UK EEZ?
Dunservin’ @ 1351.
you should hear me about the RAF, who are right proper Charlies (or Kevins, in their case). I’m actually a supporter of the Andrew (if not the Sea Lords choices of kit). I’m shocked that you don’t get that warm feeling from my posts. ;) I’m desperately critical of things in the Army, so don’t need to worry about also being critical of the Andrew. And I am afraid that personal experience of CNS on 3 occasions – two reasonably important, the 3rd less so – is enough to turn me off him. He’s just not very bright, not at all joint, and self-proud. You picked a wrong one there.
To be serious, and to address only one aspect of your post, I do believe that both the Army and the Navy achieve great things through defence diplomacy, the exchange training, port visits, etc. Honours even on that. I do however believe sincerely that the RAF never really get into that. They are more focussed on Alliance contribution (mostly NATO), which is also important.
If the “stanflex” concept can be retrofitted into the work BAE have already done on T26 then all the better. I guess when we are at war we get to spread the assets around giving better redundancy and coverage.
@Simon
One thing we have to remember is war’s can require different equipment. A full on hot war we could probably see coming so could prepare for it. And the Stanflex idea means we could also build up a bigger stock over time but while remaining flexible and this is important on our budget!
@ James – “50:50 question. Mongolian Navy or the Golden Horde – which one has influenced western civilisation more over the last nearly 1000 years?”
Fair enough James, i will give you the Mongolian example, but here is a question in return:
50:50 question. Royal Navy or the British Army – which one has influenced western civilisation more over the last nearly 1000 years?
Horses (Military’s) for Courses (Strategic environments), eh, wot?
We are an island nation you know, and the golden horde didn’t float so well:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mongol_invasions_of_Japan
JDBTX,
it’ll be the bagpipes. What else?
To be serious, the answer is probably in the Navy’s court, but I would not believe it is a whitewash. The shaping of modern Europe is more to do with land campaigns than sea campaigns, but the shaping of the colonies more to do with navies. However, big world powers such as the US and India are shaped by British influences that were only delivered by land power. But then, it was the Andrew who got the Army to those places, so fair’s fair…
I’m sure that we can agree that the Kevins have shaped nothing, but that is unsurprising given they they are still in historic terms stuck in silent teenager angst and ASBO land.
“I’m sure that we can agree that the Kevins have shaped nothing, but that is unsurprising given they they are still in historic terms stuck in silent teenager angst and ASBO land.”
are you trying to trick me into revealing myself as a closet RAF hater? ;)
seriously – agreed.
but the mongol invasions of japan are instructive.
@James
Interesting thought on the ability of the different branches to be able to do diplomacy. Ships and troops can stay around and do the “handshake, how are you” skit, while Air Forces are at a disadvantage here.
@Ali
But if “good enough” gets the job done, why spend more for incredibly marginal increases in capability? Honestly, most of the stuff out there are so close in function, you can swap one out for another and most of the time, there is no noticable loss of function. Parts, that’s a different story.
As for the EU, no, don’t think it allows shared EEZs, just trade zones.
The flip side to modular construction is you’ll end up with a lot of unused modules for the “just in case” scenarios which will never come, which means you’d need a lot more space/maintainance per ship to store and maintain the modules, even when not in use.
@ Dunservin
BZ!
I think James was also “drafted” to Lusty for a few months. He will pop up and confirm no doubt.
X,
experiment in 1987 to see if 3 Cdo Bde could do with a recce squadron (concept of course trialled by the Blues and Jews in 1982 down south, but it went onto the back burner for a few years). The answer of course is “yes”. It was her first cruise after a nasty engine room fire the year before had nearly killed her off, so some of the time was consumed with boring engine trials. It was however perturbing when a rifle troop decided we were little small tanks, and to ride us to the objective. Recce wagons should not go anywhere near an objective, but I was over-ruled. 36 hairy arsed Royals hanging off 4 CVR(T) was a new experience.
We used to be lifted off the deck mostly by crane, once by Chinook. Now, if Lusty had a big flap in her arse and a LC or several, it would have made a lot more sense. Much like a JC class.
It is odd that 3Cdo has never had even a CVR(T) squadron permanently assigned. The RAF Reg had their armour. And I think 16AAB (and ancestor units) have call on a squadron from the HC. I have seen pictures of CVR(T) in Arctic scheme so some must have got to Norway at some stage.
X,
AMF(L) had a recce squadron (hence the arctic shots you’ve seen). C Squadron from my Regiment in 81-86, we handed over in Tidworth to the 3 and 8s. It was that that gave someone in MB the idea of trialling a recce Sqn with 3 Cdo. It was a good trial, everything worked well, but for some reason it was not taken forward. I was too junior at the time to know why.
Shame was, we all beasted ourselves to get through the all-arms Commando course and actually completed all of the physical trials in rehearsals, but never did the official test. I’d have liked a dagger on my shoulder.
That’s it!!! I have the book off the shelf now.
OK – Trying to avoid the inter service bitch slapping, I think I’m seeing some general concensus regarding the future vessel types; the options are:
12-13 full ASW Type 26’s
OR 6-8 ASW Type 26’s and various vessel options –
5-8 GP Type 26’S,
up to 32 Sloops/Corvettes (going by Black Swan 2 4 to 1 ratio),
4-8 muultirole vessels acting as USV/UUV and helicopter/RUAV “motherships”, possibly including MHPC capabilities as well.
About right?
X,
just tried googling AMF(L) for some piccies, but there’s nothing much up. Anyway, it was all C Squadron, who were all uncouth and from Leek, Stoke and Tipton (oddly, I recall that one Trooper’s claim to fame was that his twin sister was a porn actress who had some short-lived fame in a Brummie film called “Pigs in Knickers”, but she would not visit us). Not like battling B from Brum.
RE: “Does the EU permit any other EU member countries to fish in the UK EEZ?”
– The “no” campaign in Norway (obviously, they won) had the slogan
“We fight to the last fish”
RE: The flip side to modular construction is you’ll end up with a lot of unused modules for the “just in case”
-the practical experience of those deck modules was that exchanging them was just too expensive with all the retesting (may have led to superfluous modules in the store room; that was never spelt out)
– LCS and the likes now focus on “under the deck” modules which you just roll on/ off, to provide a function that is independent, except of course using “ship’s services”
James said “Leek”
Leek the town is quite nice and quite posh. Out there there is small middle class of yeomen farmers and a large group of high foreheaded red hair webbed toed peasants. During winter it can get bleak too. The local rugby club used to do winter training in a large cowshed if the weather got too bad. Sailing club is nice too.
I take it that the so-called “armour” in the RM (Armoured Support Group) does not have any recce function?
– on the other hand, why not?
– get a few Viking2s that are more bullet proof, and add a few sensors
@ ACC
I am with you there. But the thing to have is that large auto-canon. I like US Cavalry formations. A RM FRR could be set up along similar lines with a mix of CVR(T) and CV90….
Why would the RM need a recce squadron with ASaC and Lynx?
It’s not like they can sneak up and say “don’t look at the massive ship I’ve just come from”.
X,
I can believe the large cowshed. From memory, there are lots of large cows in Leek. Not as bad as the barmaid in the mess at RAF Shawbury, where I had the misfortune to spend a few days on a KAPE tour, but not far behind. She bloody chased me, and as I was the only officer in the Mess, it was damned hard to get away. Webbed udders, I would have thought that close to the Peak District.
ACC,
It might be pretty good on a beach, but BV*** / Warthog / Bronco is about as far as it humanly possible to get from an effective recce wagon. I really think I’d rather walk.
This is not the FRES SV thread, but the short answer is Light Strike Vehicle, bristling with de-mountable sensors, a mounting point for Javelin and an AGL. £80,000. Sorted, we’ll have 400. £32M and the rest of the £3.5 billion FRES SV budget on a couple of JCs, please.
606 comments.
Have any decisions been made yet?! Has anyone agreed on anything?!
@ Phil
“Have any decisions been made yet?! Has anyone agreed on anything?!”
Uhm… that would be a no.
X,
what do you need a large auto-cannon for in recce? You either want a large silent f*ck off great precision hit (i.e. Javelin, these days), or a “Bu**er off while I run and hide” area weapon you can spray and pray, which is AGL. Also, you need to get the beers in for the Troop if you have to fire anything at all – clearly lacking in the skills and drills department.
One issue I always find odd is this theory that the Channel forms some kind of inpenetrable barrier, like a force field around the UK (something for BAE to work on in their spare time?).
There is a reason we deployed our armies into France both in 1914 and in 1939, then later on in the second half of the 21st Century. That reason being that once the enemy reaches the channel, things have gotten a little serious. They now have a number of small coastal harbours from which they can launch torpedo boats/missile boats. They have access to airfields that are almost within spitting distance of the English coast.
Technically speaking we may be seperated from Europe by that small stretch of water, but realistically once that opposite coast line is in enemy hands the game is just beginning.
Chris B, exactly but as history has proven it is bloody difficult to get across!
@James
“I’d like to see the British military reflect this by developing a grown up littoral capability that is much more seamless than we currently have. so yes, that involves… the Navy learning to understand about supporting operations considerably inland.”
– How far inland do you want? RN SSNs fired TLAMs into Afghanistan on the first day of operations. If we’d had strike carriers like the USN, we’d have used those too. At least we’ll have CVF sometime in the future so that should make you happy. ;-)
– As of 19 October 2011, Operation VERITAS/HERRICK OSMs (Operational Service Medals) and/or clasps had been issued to 16,714 Naval Service personnel (8,591 Royal Navy and 8,123 Royal Marines – N.B. more RN than RM) for service in Afghanistan since 11 Sep 2001, many of these individuals having completed three or more tours.
@ James
Um right. Did you unbolt your Rarden and fit a microwave in its place? I suppose it complemented the BV splendidly. Having a wet and hammy cheesy eggy in the field must have helped with all those hours on exercise. :)
Ref AussieJohnno:
“Jed,you post has got up my nose a little.
Too many people think that the civil tasks are beneath the military and some lesser groups should get their hands dirty in policing, civil aid/disaster type tasks and leave the uniforms to concentrate on the business of legalised mayhem.”
Johnno and Chris B, I never said civil tasks are “beneath” the armed forces, and yes in the end the Military is there to the bidding of Civilian Government, in UK parlance, Military Assistance to the Civil Power. I did actually point out that a disaster respsonse role makes perfect sense for the armed forces !!
However that has got nothing to do with anything. Military forces are trained and raised to defend against a certain type of threat. Para-military forces (in some countries) deal with others, and Police type forces deal with others…. there can be considerable overlap depending on the country.
But unless you live in Norther Mexico, I fail to see how drug running is a “military” threat to the UK ? Drug use, drug running etc are criminal offences. Neither is piracy a “military” threat to the UK, or UK interests such as UK shipping companies, or any other nations shipping. Unless Somali “pirates” are going to capture another container ship full of T80’s and attempt a good ol’ 17th century raid against Penzance, it is a civil, criminal and thus “police” type threat.
So give the River class to the RFA, put a boarding party of specially trained SO15 / Met Police or even stand up a “SWAT” type division of the Transport Police (!) on board and Bob’s yer Uncle, a non-military force quite capable of shooting pirates (if required); and thus no need to turn T26 or any other of the few remaining “war ships” able to defend against actual military threats into useless police boats.
RE “Chris B, exactly but as history has proven it is bloody difficult to get across!”
– Hitler called it another river crossing, but once his generals had to plan it, turned out to be otherwise
@ Dunservin,
No, I’m more interested in co-ordinating time on target with Sea Kings delivering troops onto the objective, NGS co-ordinated with land fires, and a ship-launched UAV providing a feed to the local tactical commander, and also being tasked by him. Not really interested in the medals, as the qualification criteria is very broad. It does not prove anything.
@ X,
Microwave would have been more useful than a Rarden. I think I only ever fired 2 clips in combat (but thousands on the range at Castlemartin, Lulworth and Hohne). On the other hand, I got good use out of the little issued SMG bayonet in an Iraqi Battalion CP. They thought they were surrendering, as did we, but someone at the back had a different idea and hefted a pistol and started letting loose. Even 9mm works quite well sometimes, but you need to finish the job with the Queen’s bayonet. Pairs F&M doesn’t really work well in a small dugout.
Cheesy Eggy Hammy – there is something the Andrew can be proud of. My children love it.
@ Jed,
Under what mandate would UK police forces patrol waters in the Caribbean or off the coast of Somalia. It is beyond their jurisdiction? Isn’t this precisely one of the mian benefits the Navy enjoys, the freedom of the sea lanes etc?
Just a thought, RE:
” NGS co-ordinated with land fires, and a ship-launched UAV providing a feed to the local tactical commander”
– no one (here) knows what came of the CB90 trials
– they could launch those UAVs very close to the shore line/ the spot where they will be needed, and the “mother ship” for the CB90s could recover them all en-masse, to be put back on the launching boats again
The OTO vulcano 120 km range will not be of any use without some on-call targeting assets
– if we are not “feet dry” yet, the question becomes: where do they come from, in sufficient numbers (factoring in persistence)
ACC, UAV or even real time satellite feed. If we have guided GPS rounds it is a “step change” hate that pharse in capability.
Jed,
I sort of see your point with the drugs but not the shipping. If you reason that the sea-route belongs to the UK ship at the time that it uses it, it very much demands protection in the same way the RAF protect the UK airspace.
Drug running is more difficult to justify until you think about the weapons that drug-money can buy and the potential level of force needed to act against it.
APATS,
Has anyone actually seen these Vulcano/Excalibur shells work and do the 100km+ range that is touted?
I think they’re a great idea but something is niggling about the reality of their operation.
Excalibur has been used in A-stan
– you can also buy them through Bofors, as we should really have some wheeled artillery for the expeditionary part of the army (Archer, that is, if you get my thrift)
Chris B – on jurisdiction – Good question:
The U.S. Coast Guard manages to do it, as does the DEA, and I once saw some very heavily tooled up Italian “Coast Guards” but there are plenty of legal ways to do such things – and don’t forget some Euro navies are basically “throwing back” the Somali pirates after disarming them due to legal “issues”, while at the same time other countries are saying its OK to have armed “private security firms”. However like I said a para-military police is only one suggested way forward, your RFA manned patrol boats could carry RN / RM boarding parties if need be.
Simon ref “Drug running is more difficult to justify until you think about the weapons that drug-money can buy and the potential level of force needed to act against it.”
No not really, there is no need to be over simplistic. Drug money, or organized crime can finance terrorists, in which case we can do the whole UK version of “clear and present danger” and deploy RM, SBS and SAS (not to mention MI6) as required……
Jed,
Except drug lords are out for themselves not for a “cause”.
Ali,
“Does the EU permit any other EU member countries to fish in the UK EEZ?”
All of them. That is the basis of the Common Fisheries Policy.
On fishing, outside the 12NM limit all EU nations can fish.
@Gareth Jones
Yes that’s about right. The debate is broadly speaking divided between 2 choices.
Either we just have a medium sized amount of high-end ships, probably somewhere near a dozen.
Or we accept a cut down to 6-8 high quality vessels, with the trade off being that we reinvest the spare cash in-to a more numerous and cheaper platform to compliment the other ships and provide a 2nd tier of capability.
Benefits of the first choice is that we may have fewer hulls but at least they would all be capable of a full range of tasks, from counter piracy and drug chasing right up-to being part of a task force heading off to war.
Benefits of the second are that it provides more hulls in the water, which naturally provides more flexibility in what goes where and when.
This is all based on the assumption that we are only playing with the Type 26 budget and not factoring in a greater amount of money.
After 600+ posts we have got to this point, but alas no further!
@Observer
That was what I was getting at with having a ship that was just good enough and didn’t try to act like a star destroyer. Sorry if my post was slightly misleading! But yeah that’s the one downside but at least you do not have overly expensive ships and they can be fitted out when you need that equipment but what you said is a consequence of this.
@Anixtu
Thank you! I wonder if the EU will do the same for oil and other resources in a countries EEZ soon, or if that even happens now! Time to open some websites and books!
Earlier about 3 Commando Brigade not having a recce unit they have the Surveillance and Reconnaissance Squadron who do most of the recce stuff and is part of the newly renamed 30 Commando Information Exploitation Group.
http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/The-Fleet/The-Royal-Marines/3-Commando-Brigade/30-Commando-Information-Exploitation-Group
Recently in Afghanistan they have had one assigned to them. I think it’s really depends on if the operation requires one and a matter of asking if one is available.
Hey,
600 posts but at least I’m happy with my result ;-)
Sixteen T26 hulls with half of them fitted for but not with almost everything. What we are then left with is eight T26 ASW and eight large general purpose hulls with a Wildcat, a Mk8 gun and some GPMGs which can be used for anti-drug, anti-piracy and flying the flag.
@ Jed,
Don’t forget as well that the APT(N) has other roles. While they’re in the vicinity they kight as well be doing counter narcotics. Or worse, if they Navy doesn’t handle the task then you might end up with an RAF MPA doing it….
@ Ali re 3Cdo Recce
The discussion was about little tanks not recce really. And microwaves.
@X
Thank you sorry just scanned over.
Well in recent operations in Afghanistan a armoured recce formation has been assigned. So I assume it’s given if requested.
@ Ali
You lot bite so quick here…… :)
Yes there have been FRR elements in Afghanistan. I don’t think they are withdrawn just because RM turn up to play Bash-the-Taliban. However much they plead…….
@X
Yeah I have heard the ones serving with 3 Commando during their first tour in Afghanistan got on quite well. But it would be good if the Armoured Support Group of 3 Commando Brigade could get some CVR(T)’s or an FRR element attached.
Is 1st Rifles still in 3 Commando after Fleet Protection were given 43 Commando designation?
Ali, Yes 43 Cdo or FGRM has the primary responsibility of FP in Coulport and the Green berths in Faslane. They also provide security teams for fleet units as required. 1 rifles provide the 4th mvre battalion for 3 Cdo brigade.
@ Ali
1RIFLES wouldn’t be in 3Cdo if I were in charge…….
@APATS
Thank you I was wondering if it was a cheap way of removing a battalion… I hope it’s not at least. (on a recent document for the future of the Royal Marines it had no mention of 1 RIFLES but mentioned 29 Commando and 23 Commando)
Actually for armoured reconnaissance would an amphibious vehicle say like a LAV be any good?
@Anixtu
I thought the Common Fisheries Policy was for quota control, not cross country resource sharing?
@James
“It might be pretty good on a beach, but BV*** / Warthog / Bronco is about as far as it humanly possible to get from an effective recce wagon. I really think I’d rather walk.
This is not the FRES SV thread, but the short answer is Light Strike Vehicle”
Been there, done that. Problem is that light strike doesn’t have the field endurance to be a good recce vehicle, the ATTCs have an advantage there in that they pack all of what they need by themselves (jerry cans of water/fuel/ammo). We use the ATTCs as refueling points for smaller vehicles.
Observer the CFP decides quotas and access rights.
Inspired by this idea –
http://img8.imageshack.us/img8/8725/copy2ofpicture10ps5.png
from this thread –
http://www.skyscrapercity.com/showthread.php?t=808188
Switching the C1 and C2 ideas around..
What about 8 conventional Type 26’s mainly for the Carrier task group(s), 6 through deck DDH’s with up to six Merlin each (or various combinations of Wildcats and UAV’s) and 12 Cutters/Sloops/sentry frigate types.
The DDH’S and Sloop’s could act independently or form their own mini-taskgroups for the everyday roles such as MSO, sanction enforcement, MCM, etc – the DDH acting as a mothership for the sloops and their USV’S/UUSV’S, as well as their own UAV’s/USV’S.
Any good? Hi-low balance OK?
RE: Light Strike Vehicles for recon. What about the Spider from Singapore?
HMG/AGL, ATGW, even automatic 120mm mortar (second vehicle needed for ammo):
http://www.stengg.com/products-solutions/products/spider-light-strike-vehicle-%28lsv%29
This may come up twice as my previous try got stuck in moderation (Memo to self – STOP PUTTING IN SO MANY LINKS!!!)
Try 2:
Inspired by the suggested escort fleet at the bottom of this thread –
http://www.skyscrapercity.com/showthread.php?t=808188
Switching the C1 and C2 ideas around..
What about 8 conventional Type 26′s mainly for the Carrier task group(s), 6 through deck DDH’s with up to six Merlin each (or various combinations of Wildcats and UAV’s) and 12 Cutters/Sloops/sentry frigate types.
The DDH’S and Sloop’s could act independently or form their own mini-taskgroups for the everyday roles such as MSO, sanction enforcement, MCM, etc – the DDH acting as a mothership for the sloops and their USV’S/UUSV’S, as well as their own UAV’s/USV’S.
Any good? Hi-low balance OK?
Thinking about it… What about going for ruthless comonality and have 12 DDH’s? Carrier escort and/or task group command and support “mothership”?
Observer,
I went into GW1 with 11 jerrycans of fuel strapped onto the wagon, and 4 extra Swingfire missiles for our ATGW troop, one of which we ditched because it got hit by 12.7mm from a T-59 and looked a bit dodgy afterwards (as did our bergens all lashed onto the side – neatly peppered and holey). If the MoD get serious, they can go to Chenowth or however makes LSV these days and ask for a bigger fuel tank. It may also help with centre of gravity issues, which as far as I can work out is LSVs only major sticking point. This is not a show stopper. Don’t forget that Ferret, and Dingo before it only carried internal fuel for 100 miles in desert conditions, and they were probably the best recce wagons going, ever.
Going back to the Type 26 I believe that 8 high end frigates for ASW is the minimum we need we should then turn the 5 GP frigates into an AAW frigate to complement the Type 45’s we could then have 1 Type 45 and 2 type 26’s 1 of each to allow the other Type 45 to escort either the ARG or the follow on forces so we can give the STUFT ships a fighting chance so we avoid another Atlantic Conveyer which cost the ground forces the fast mobility element in the FI 1982 and for the MHPC what about the Austal MRV which can also do ASW work and has a vehicle deck as well as a flight deck and hanger, I like the DDH idea but can you really sea the Treasury paying for them ? me neither and as for an armoured vehicle for the Commando Brigade why not tag along with the USMC AAV replacement programme this would also give us an AAV which could negate the reliance on landing craft and give them a more mobile vehicle with a main armament for fire support which the BVS struggles to do they could then use the vikings as mortor carriers.
The 29 RM commando battery should also be re-equiped with either M777 or a weeled option like Archer or LIMAWS(G) which was a requirement which was unfunded and later cancelled.
The next SDR in 2015 is the most important since WW2 as our armed forces need to be better manned,equiped,payed and stopped being the wipping boy of whitehall. The recent budget balancing done by the tory accountant missed one valueble point regarding the replacement detterant this is a political weapon not a military one we may staff it but it can@t be used without political approval so why should we pay for it at the expense of conventional forces.
@James
Did the 11 jerrycans of pertol and 4 missiles also include a telescopic mast with thermo-imager and night vision optics? Once you chuck in that, space becomes a bit tight. And unenclosed vehicles don’t provide much protection from the elements for electronics, weatherproofing or otherwise as it’s claimed on the package not withstanding. Bang something around a few times, and it’s bound to spring a leak here and there, or have sand blown in through ventilation holes. True, you can load up a LSV till it looks like a clown car, but 1) was it really necessary? 2) Could it have been done better?
Another interesting point I realised is the difference in doctrine. Apparently, you do what is probably best called mobile recon (continually advancing) while our doctrine is more semi-static recon, where we drop 2 ATTCs as a nuclei in a region and deploy bike/foot patrols to areas of interest from them. 18 bikes/30 men per nuclei, dropped by helo, 3 spares in the ATTC.
@GJ
As much as I’m nationalistic, I’m a bit too pragmatic to believe just because something is made there does not mean it’s a cure all for all problems. The Spider is just a standard LSV with a fairly standard payload. It was the motar that was innovative.
Back to floaty objects.
Hi Michael,
I have my doubts about the ratio you propose here “we should then turn the 5 GP frigates into an AAW frigate to complement the Type 45′s we could then have 1 Type 45 and 2 type 26′s 1 of each”
– I guess it is widely accepted that T45 is a true AREA defence solution
– whereas, even with Merlin support, the efficiency of ASW is more dependent on being positioned (at least in the 180 degree sense)in the direction of the threat?
“I guess it is widely accepted that T45 is a true AREA defence solution
– whereas, even with Merlin support, the efficiency of ASW is more dependent on being positioned in the direction of the threat?”
ACC, agreed, you might say that a [pair] of merlin equipped 2087 ASW frigates is a true area defence solution.
Rough rule of thumb – if we need six T45 then we need twelve T26.
Numbers.
@Jedi, in an ideal world I think you are right that 12 ASW T26s would be a great asset though not really a necessity in my view. Our requirements are ASW coverage for a max of two task groups and coverage for the SSBN, therefore 8 is sufficient, allowing the money for the 5 GP versions to be better deployed elsewhere.
Even if the T26 comes in as little as 250mn a pop, that’s 1.25bn. If a Blackswan II costs 65mn and a fast patrol craft 20mn, then theoretically the RN could buy 12 Blackswans and 24 fast patrol boats…
“our requirements are ASW coverage for a max of two task groups and coverage for the SSBN, therefore 8 is sufficient”
two for each taskgroup, one for the deterrent, and something along the likes of two in work-up/work-down and the last in deep-refit?
“Even if the T26 comes in as little as 250mn a pop, that’s 1.25bn.”
If built in the UK, we use Mark and Chris.B.’s economics values and apply that to the £1.25B figure:
– £0.375B direct claw-back in taxes (taking a 30% mid-point)
– Practical cost to the Treasury of £0.875B
– £2.25B GDP boost to the wider economy (using 1.8 capitol multiplier)
No point being made here other than putting costs into perspective now that we supposedly have balanced books, a ten year programme funding requirement and a government who are going to need some capitol injection projects soon.
“Our requirements are ASW coverage for a max of two task groups and coverage for the SSBN”
Wouldn’t an ASW aircraft give wider coverage for the SSBN. A C295 or similar ASW flight, military-operated/contractor-owned (wouldn’t be deployed outside the UK after all) shouldn’t be too costly, particularly if the same contract provided same type aircraft to Coast Guard for domestic maritime patrol & SAR.
It would free up one of the scarce ASW frigates, and require a lot less RN/RAF manpower to provide just the flight crews (all the maintenance and ground crews could be under civilian contract). Or is there a particular need to have a surface vessel for the job?
No. MPA are good for route surveillance or hunting a specific area.
If flying above the sea at a few hundred knots listening to tiny sonobuoys was a viable substitute for a frigate imagine how effective the frigate would be sitting in the sea with larger sensors. We would only need one frigate to cover the entire North Atlantic and North Sea……
Aircraft and copter carriers are no substitute for a frigate with a towed array and Merlin (or an attack sub covered with thousands of hydrophones). The frigate/2087/Merlin is soooo much cheaper to procure and operate because of its ASW endurance.
Hi Jedi @ 7:31
I think that “agreed, you might say that a [pair] of merlin equipped 2087 ASW frigates is a true area defence solution” is pretty close
– but will three Merlins (the one from T45 included) suffice for keeping two up in the air? Our Navy contributors might be able to advise
If we could start again and were to design the defensive screen for our carriers/amphibs what would we do?
You’d want some anti-air missiles either side of the HVU.
You’d want a sonar below the thermocline.
You’d want a sonar above the thermocline.
You’d want to maintain 24-7 Merlin to locate/target any sub threat.
You’d want a big powerful radar on the HVU.
You’d want a big powerful radar “up threat”.
You’d want a couple more ships “up threat” covering the angles.
So without using Astute I make this…
3 x Daring
2 x T26-ASW
2 x T26-GP
In order to guarantee availability of these hulls at all times we’d need to procure double the numbers…
6 x Daring
4 x T26-ASW
4 x T26-GP
Trouble is, with only 4 of each T26 type you’re cutting it a bit fine…
6 x Daring
5 x T26-ASW
5 x T26-GP
I make this about the minimum.
Is there a better/cheaper way?
ACC,
Merlin in “ASW mode” has an endurance of about 3 hours. This means 8 sorties to cover 24 hours. Two sorties per day per airframe would be comfortable (similar engine load to AEW coverage). This means 4 copters.
Add a couple as spares = 6.
See what others say, but I don’t think we put more than 12 hours on an ASaC airframe each day, which is (to me) equivalent to about 8 hours of hovering about dipping.
@ Brian Black
Also consider the number of airframes you need to have one available. Nimrod was good because it was a high end platform and that means expensive. Again if a cheap ASW plane is that effective imagine how much more effective a proper frigate would be. Going back to Nimrod they were going to cost each as much as we hope to pay for a T26. And don’t forget these things aren’t cars. You can’t just park them up at night and hop in to go the next day. There is a whole squadron of maintainers, clerks, etc. to support the squadron. Also there is just one crew so you need to multiply crew strength by airframes. This MPA is a cheap substitute for a frigate meme really annoys.
The cheapest option would be to several low cost vessel to act as a TAS tug manned to commercial standards. Not really warships just tugs. It wouldn’t have to be fast. And it wouldn’t have to be that quiet if it was drifting. Then using a satellite link send the data back to shore for analysis. And even that is flawed.
Hi Repulse @7:59
“Our requirements are ASW coverage for a max of two task groups and coverage for the SSBN, therefore 8 is sufficient”
– T23, in its mature form, has achieved 86% availability
– I take it that is before the refits, say a major one every 7 years
– funnily enough that takes 100% down to 86%
– so .86 x .86 gives you 74%, times 8, gives 6
=> your requirement covered, plus one in the Indian Ocean… that’s it, very bare bones, though
“Merlin in “ASW mode” has an endurance of about 3 hours.”
That sounds like an active search profile using maximum cruise speeds (~150kts): Dash-hover-dip-ping-rinse-repeat.
You can stretch that with more use of the peak-efficiency cruise speed (~85kts) to push the 5 hour endurance (on station + transit) in passive searching: Drop-patrol/listen-rinse-repeat.
I am lacking details on whether the HM1’s in service were fitted with the additional transfer tank. Anyone here a primary source or know of any references they can link up?
The Other Chris,
Yes, that was active ASW.
Didn’t think passive can be sustained for long periods. How long does a sonobuoy’s batteries last? Do they move with the fleet? How many can a ship carry? How much do they cost each?
Battery endurance is a really interesting topic in itself (especially with EV cars rolling out). We need a technology change, specifically around the manufacture of anodes and cathodes, in order to exceed current battery energy densities and recharge/discharge rates.
Watch out for nano-structure materials being used at these pointy ends and production ready lithium-air batteries in the press in coming years as the likely commercial candidates.
As a result, this source [1] from NAVAIR listing current (2008) sonobuoy batteries endurances at 6 hours is likely to be about right for similar sized buoys.
[1] http://www.navysbir.com/n08_2/N082-143.htm
The Other Chris,
6-hours? That’s a bit rubbish!
Err, are our sonobuoys disposable?
Hi, x.
“No. MPA are good for route surveillance or hunting a specific area.”
But isn’t that exactly what is required for an SSBN patrol?
Do we really face a submarine threat in UK waters this long since the Cold War? I can see that ASW patrols are needed while an SSBN is beginning and ending a patrol, if we’re going to have a credible nuke deterrent; but is there any need for 24/7/365 ASW patrols around the UK? If not, surely a Cold War sized sqn of aircraft isn’t needed either. Why wouldn’t a flight of say three civilian owned and maintained aircraft be sufficient? The military manpower for that scale of operation would not be that great.
Brian Black,
Do you need 24-7 cover for MPA to patrol the SSBN area of operation?
At what range do you need this cover?
It’ll be a lot more than 3 aircraft.
Quick tangent, the BBC are debating whether an aircraft carrier is needed:
– http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-18237029
@TOC
Quick answer? No. More considered answer? What are your goals that require a carrier?
With all the talk on frigates and MPAs escorting SSBNs, you’d have to rename the silent service to the noisy service. Subs are meant to operate solo or as CLOSE sub groups, not mixed into other units that defeats the purpose of stealth. You won’t form a Typhoon screen around a stealth bomber would you?
This does not even include the problem of target identification underwater! So you see 2 subs. Which one does your MPA/frigate/Merlin torpedo? No IFF underwater, and if your torpedo homes in on the wrong target, you’d be in the rather sad comedy act of sinking your own deterent.
@ Simon re disposable sonobouys
No when they finished they fly around and pick them all up with a big hook.
@ Brian B
Deterrent patrols last 3 months. So you want a minimal ASW fit out for a small plane that you will be using for other things during that three months? It wouldn’t be worth the cost of second-rate ASW fit out. Um. Well we might as well fly a Merlin up from Culdrose. If we had enough hulls we could send up the FRE/TAPS to cover the deploying or returning SSBN but we are short of hulls. The Russians plan to build 7 SSN over the next decade. They only have to have one SSN in the area. Of course we are not on about anything silly like the Ruskies trying to sink a V-boat. We are on about the Ruskies listening for the SSBN just in case they need to sink it.
A few more thoughts. If we had a proper full cream MPA we could send it to other places. And as for Merlin covering SSBN deploying if the Rivers had a flight deck it would make that evolution a bit more realistic. Even a fast (OK 20kts-ish) 125ft to 150ft towing a noise maker would help and cheaper than an MPA.
x,
Cheers. Any idea what the loss rate might be in rough-ish seas?
Also, is there a difference in operating sea-states with active/passive ASW? i.e. is hovering and dipping better in rough seas than dropping and collecting sonobuoys?
ACC, TOC,
I guess that means the batteries outlast the Merlin that’s operating them – makes sense. I suppose therefore that in passive (sonobuoy) ASW mode we can get 4-5 hours (5-6 sorties/day) out of ’em at a similar operating range.
You’re pushing it with just three airframes, but I guess it’s a minimum.
Hi, Simon.
“Do you need 24-7 cover for MPA to patrol the SSBN area of operation?”
I assume not, Simon. As Observer says, subs are meant to operate solo. And for the SSBNs, no one outside the boat is meant to know where the area of operation is.
As far as I’m aware it’s just to cover the approaches to the home location, which is impossible to keep secret. It’s like any foot or vehicle patrol entering or leaving a base, it’s the one part of the route which is entirely predictable.
Video of a P3 deploying a sonobouy and the device unfurling below the waves:
– http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eidMDdMK38s
Brian Black,
That’s what I thought. I guess therefore that a flight of Merlin or an available Astute would be sufficient to cover the approaches.
I think I may have got the wrong gist of your comment about MPA.
Other Chris
You call that a tangent!
Try Afghanistan The great Game, last night BBC Really sticking it to current intervention by the simple expedient of looking into the whole history of our interventions in Afghan….
@ Simon re big hook
I was joking. They are disposable………..
x,
And there’s me trying to find them on Google and trying to figure out where the hoop is to hook ’em ;-)
Got to “SonoR” which is what the British Antarctic Survey use!
Hi, x. “So you want a minimal ASW fit out…” I gave the C295 as an example. In March, Airbus provided written evidence to The Defence Select Committee, an extract:
“The Airbus Military C295 MPA has surface and underwater sensors comparable to Nimrod with a fully integrated tactical mission system and weapons carriage capability.”
Of course they’ll love their own product, but ‘minimal’ and ‘second-rate’ is hardly fair description either. A very capable and cost-effective system, wouldn’t be suprised to see them purchased within the next few years.
When would we ever bother with passive (sonobuoy) ASW from a frigate? Surely a 2087 is good enough with active dipping to localise the target?
X
Was there not a program in the 90’s to create a recoverable low frequency Sonarbouy in the US?.
@ Simon
We are all here to learn. It was a bit naughty of me really. But I couldn’t help myself.
You will like this,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fulton_surface-to-air_recovery_system
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7dU9JntKuh0
A sonobuoy isn’t as long as a man is tall and nowhere near as wide.
@ Brian Black
How much a copy?
On the topic of C295 suitability, Lockheed Martin put forward a turboprop design for the P-8 competition that Boeing won with a 737 conversion, citing the efficiency and engine responsiveness (the latter being important at low level) of a turboprop over a turbofan.
Might be a bit off-beam, but would a permanent network of SOSUS type hydrophones all around the Southern Hebrides / Northern Ireland and a bit further not prove more cost-effective over the years?
I really have no idea of what I am talking about here. It may be such a system is already in place and well-known about by everyone (except by me), or it may be in place but super-secret squirrel and I am about to get lifted and have my fingernails removed, or it might be a barking mad idea and therefore not in place at all. How much range detection of a submarine trying to be quiet do these SOSUS things have? And can you put the magnetic anomaly detectors on the sea floor as well?
@James
DK Brown covers that. Although SOSUS is considered effective, its fixed locations are thought vulnerable.
He also asks whether spending the money on a more flexible, re-positionable system is more value for money from a UK perspective.
@ James
I would be very surprised if it wasn’t wired for sound. But I have never seen or heard of any “proof”. But I am sure I have seen the Sal-class up there. Not sure what the MoD would be lifting up (or lowering down) to the sea bottom up there. As I said I think a 125footer towing a noise maker would make good cover.
EDIT: Yes Salmoor is based up there so…….
@ Simon
I have replied to your post. But it is being modded because it contains two links. Yes 2.
i would be amazed if there weren’t at least two short lines running from:
Northern –
1. Balleycastle (NI) to Port Ellen (Sc)
2. Bangor (NI) to Stranraer (Sc)
https://maps.google.com/maps?ll=56.066,-4.817&spn=0.01,0.01&t=m&q=56.066,-4.817
You are only talking about 40 miles of sensors, hardly the G-I-UK gap!
I doubt it would be terribly expensive to run another 40 miles across St Georges Channel and 100 more from Culdaff to Bara as an outer picket.
Blimey boys, so it’s a good idea, and one that people assume the Andrew already have in place?
I have to say, the sonobuoy video TOC linked to was actually quite impressive. A triumph of engineering over form factor. I shall add a mortar-based Sonobuoy launcher to my cunning design for the Mexe-Based Andrew Area Defence System***, which as you know already includes a data radio, batteries, a torpedo underslung, and following some suggestions, an autonomous HVM missile launcher. And a big lump of concrete and 1000 feet of chain. All deployable and recoverable by a pretty cheap boat, and I have to say, making the Septic’s CAPTOR system look pretty ordinary.
The Andrew, and indeed the protection of our great nation are safe in my hands.
*** At the current rate of development, it will be in service considerably before the Weaponised Phil, which was last heard of having biscuit-related problems. The build contract will not be awarded to BAE Systems, in order to keep it affordable, but to a small boatyard I have found in China.
@ TOC – nice vid.
@ Jedi – 2 links? careful or you’ll end up like me…
RE: Towed array tug – …and we’re back to Brown’s baseline corvette:
http://t1.gstatic.com/images?q=tbn:ANd9GcR-Byk2fkQwGiIOSVt473H47SuyZkI_CGe7Mrz_T4tys446aJQ5ZF8k8Ziq4w
OK, catching up
– 5 hrs for Merlin (they will be close to whatever is being protected)
– 2 missions per day => 3 (T45 +2 X T26) can do it even with minor repairs/ maintenance
– and the devices expire anyway when the endurance for the mission runs out! (?)
US T-AGOS vessel:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:USNS_Loyal_T-AGOS-22.jpg
RE “a program in the 90′s to create a recoverable low frequency Sonarbouy in the US”
– there is a good chain across the strategic gaps in the N. Atlantic
– I guess they are anchored to the seabed and do passive listening, so the batteries last for long… they will still have to be changed (more likely: a new device in the approximate location, to complete the cahin)
@ Gareth J
Yes. I was thinking something a tad simpler than that….
http://worldmaritimenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/St.-Johns-Ship-Building-Delivers-OSV-Sea-Strength-to-Trinidad.jpg
And then this popped up…….
http://www.vsdonline.com/news/contracts
Which is too complicated as well. But it is grey and has a gun which makes it exciting.
Awaiting moderation. :(
What’s with the moderation? I had a post a few days ago disappear into the moderation pile, am not sure it ever came out. Given that is was well-mannered and containing no links to anything inappropriate, I assume it was some form of random selection.
2 web links………
were you about to say something derogatory about the raf again? now, james!
@Simon 10.29.
Yeah I think we can talk about specifics in terms of capability but in terms of numbers the minimum needed is around 16. That is to cover all of the escort duties in peacetime and have a surge contingency covered.
Of course with this I think you would also need some cheaper ships for the rest of the standing commitments, but the money saved from the 3 cancelled frigates would probably fund most of this.
Hi, x. According to the Airbus Military site, the C295 is “the most efficient ‘workhorse’ with the lowest fuel burn, as well as the best operating and maintenance costs in its category.”
And in the evidence provided to the Defence Committee on Future Maritime Surveillance that I quoted earlier, qualified and rough comparative figures are given at para 28 with C295’s cost at circa 50m.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmdfence/writev/1918/fms12.htm
@ Brian B
Cheap at half the price! :)
I am off to see how many we could have bought for one Nimrod.
x,
All that waiting for moderation and that’s all I get – a clip from Thunderball ;-)
I’d really got my hopes up for an internal doc detailing ASW standard operating tactics or something – hee hee boo hoo :-(
Is it me or does that C295 just look like a C2 ripoff?
How much is a C2? £25m?
Simon
Brian Black quotes from Airbus Military’s submission above as a C295 at £50m
But also see section 2.4 from: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmdfence/writev/1918/fms10.htm
Sue Robertson tables comparative costs of various MPAs, listing CN235 at £15-£25m per platform.
Not clear of course how much support and what kit is included.
Given the talk of ASW, worth taking a look at the Undersea Defence Technology exhibition that’s going on at the moment.
Shephard have some summaries if Spanish or Google Translate aren’t your bag:
France focussing on ASW [1], interesting angles on the SDSR [2] and the MoD talking about the value of submarines [3].
[1] http://www.shephardmedia.com/news/defence-notes/udt-europe-asw-back-naval-agenda/
[2] http://www.shephardmedia.com/news/defence-notes/udt-europe-sdsr-supports-uk-underwater-capabilitie/
[3] http://www.shephardmedia.com/news/defence-notes/udt-europe-submarines-remain-crucial-modern-naval-/
Bah, moderation.
Ant,
Not happy about the Merlin column in table 2.2. I think Merlin can do a lot more than is made out there – in fact there’s a couple of pics above of Merlin doing anti-piracy work. And how exactly does an MPA do SAR? Search yes, rescue no.
Search, drop life-raft/supplies/beacon and guide in surface vessels.
The Other Chris,
Ah-ha. If I were bobbing around in the Atlantic I would be very happy for that… still wouldn’t consider myself rescued though!
Chucking some chocolate to a chap caught on the side of a cliff isn’t a rescue. Dropping a line and winching him back up is. Unless my grasp of the English language has waned.
Heh heh. Well, there is always the Fulton Recovery System that @x posted I suppose…
Looks just the ratio of prices for Merlin troop lifting vs Merlin ASW
“Brian Black quotes from Airbus Military’s submission above as a C295 at £50m
…
Sue Robertson tables comparative costs of various MPAs, listing CN235 at £15-£25m per platform.
Not clear of course how much support and what kit is included.”
BUT: The manufacturer has bought the rights to Viper Strike; pushing them out through tubes on both sides could take all of Iran’s swarm fleet out in one go (as long as some one lased the targets)
Simon
Re: Not happy about the Merlin column in table 2.2
Agreed. And the LTA capabilities seem underrepresented too: I think that has been remarked before. One has to respect Dr Robertson because of her position, but some things in her statements to parliament do seem peculiar, which leaves me wondering how much weight to give her opinion.
A recent mention of the Dutch Navy’s Holland class ocean-going patrol vessels. Often overlooked on this site – probably not radical enough for some, but it’s a nice little ship that could cheaply boost fleet numbers.
5000nm range at 15kts. 76 Super Rapid and 30mm plus remote MGs. Wildcat (NH90 in Dutch hands) and RHIBs Complement of only 50 (+40 mission crew, including helicopter).
http://miami.the-netherlands.org/news/2012/05/new-navy-vessel-copy.html
Nice little ship that Brian. Now someone explain this to me; how come the head of the Dutch Navy is only a Vice Admiral? He’s missing a trick there.
@Chris
Approximate size of navy. If they’re missing a trick, it’s one that’s commonly missed by most of the world. Or the UK’s armed forces are over-inflated compared to the rest of us. Guess which one is more likely.
Hi BB,
I’ve posted about them a few times. It has even a well-hidden container deck (near the helo facilities, takes 2 ISOs or more pallets), so ticks TD’s boxes!
– and the 40 extra mission staff translates to 100 evacuees, when that is needed
Continuing with TD’s blue sky thinking maybe the best option is as follows:
SLEP the current Type 23 frigates extending their life by at least 10 years. General view is that the ‘kit’ they have is pretty darn good, indeed the comments I have read in this post don’t indicate ditching the kit but mostly porting them to a new hull. As costs are hovering around the 250m mark per unit I am going to work with a annual budget of this for ten years.
The design and development of the new type 26 has a separate budget and as such this would enable the development of a replacement class.
Here comes the radical thinking…
(1) We appear to have lots of platforms that have ‘built for but not kitted out with’ capabilities
(2) Our Astute class and Daring class kit seems to be pretty top notch and broadly what was required. There maybe some lack of capabilities which need filling though. Both production lines will end without more orders. The Astute team will by then be focusing on a Trident replacement and the Daring team on the type 26. Once lines have closed they rarely reopen.
(3) There is a need for anti-submarine capabilities (ASW frigates and MPA). The four pronged capability includes the Merlin (plus Crowsnest needed to add this in as vital too); Astute based sonars; Frigate based kit which could be SLEPed or ported; and a missing capability in the MPA (Poseiden P8?)
(4) Arguably there is a need for land attack too, although for those who believe the sub’s tomahawks are fine this means we lack missile stocks.
(5) The Sampson throws a protective air defence but currently does not allow full CMS fire control of neighbouring ships even though they may have the defensive means to knock out the threat.
(6) The QE class doesn’t have Sampson to save money, despite being the capital ship to protect at all costs.
(7) There is various kit suggested that could be acquired and would need to be integrated. See DT article.
(8) Bae has a habit of appearing to rob the taxpayer, this is clearly an unfair broadbrush tarnish, as there are projects that come in at cost and/or still represent good value. MOD and Bae management and clarity however is poor. It is therefore time to persue a low risk evolutionary approach.
(9) Finally CIWS and anti-ship capabilities are woeful and even the carrier’s capabilities might deserve the same description.
So why not order a new Type45 built to spec with the Type 23’s ASW and air defence combat systems ….. all integrated and tested. Also add the other kit as proposed for the future Type 26.
The ship yards would get to build a new boat and a 13 ship SLEP program. Design risk on a new hull would be largely eliminated, obviously there would need to be some design consideration in fitting out the Type45 but the capability gaps would be largely closed. Thinking about the missing kit this seems to represent a far greater risk than not having a shiny new Type 26 in the next decade.
Delivered:
Extra T45
Sampson & CIWS on QE & PoW
MPA
T45 VLS, CIWS and CMS upgrades
T23 CMS upgrade
T26 systems integration developed and tested
In addition the surface fleet has not suffered a reduction.
What I don’t know is how dated and worn out the T23s are, I am imagining round pin plugs and azal medicated toilet paper ;-) …. they’ll cope!
@Op3
I’m not too worried about the Sampson, carriers are not meant as AEGIS cruisers and don’t really need a balls to the wall full up fleet air defence system, it’s supposed to have escorts and planes for this sort of thing. Some self defence (ASTOR 15/SEACEPTOR and the like) is fine, groupwise, putting such a system in is triple redundancy.
CIWS/GOALKEEPER/PHALANX is… very old, and methods and equipment to defeat it is already very common. Part of the reason being that their stats are on public domain, too easy to work up a counter from that. Go straight to CMS might be better for future utility.
@Observer. Thanks for comments, happy to be advised one way or the other.
I suppose my perceived benefit of having Sampson on the carriers is that potentially there is no need for the destroyers to be close to the carrier. Essentially the frigates could carry out this role using the CMS shared data and it’s own weapons.
Agreed CIWS/Goalkeeper/Phalanx is old and not always to be trusted but I have two thoughts on this. Firstly so is a mounted gun with a rating behind it and Secondly I was trying to use CIWS in its generic term and development is planned for the Phalanx so essentially it might be a back to the drawing board for best options. One thing for sure firing a missile is not always going to be the best answer just like one land or in the air.
Generally happy to hear views on the priorities, just think that integration and filling some of the ‘gaps’ in our capabilities might be a better use of resources for the next ten years or so. Certainly MPA and MASC worry me more than having new frigates.
Ah I see, so you’re hoping the carrier can “add capability” and give those escorts that don’t have an AEGIS system a fleet defence capability. Interesting idea and workable I would say, but it would have to involve a doctrine change on how you use the escorts, the ships will have to stick close to the “key unit” or lose the ability, which means that your Navy will end up moving in battle groups much more often, and you can’t push escorts upthreat for increased detection as they are not really the ones doing the detecting. But then, that’s what AEWS are for.
It all depends on how you want to use your navy I guess.
@Observer
Do you know how the originally designed Sampson fit for the QE class was intended to be used? If I drew circles of protection around the various ships with a shared datalink CMS would the defensive shield not expand accordingly (at a lower potential cost than say for Daring)? I am not wedded to this idea, more the concept of really trying to sweat all the platforms capabilities within the Navy.
I am of the view that the MPA should be a Navy program so obviously might come out of the Navy’s sub-pot. I am not convinced that the RAF has not been more interested in the politics of systems procurement. Would a MPA fleet plus 13 SLEPed frigates be a better proposition than 10 new hulled frigates? I think so.
@Op3
Absolutely no idea about the QE fit. But there was a link in the “Litoral” thread saying the UK has just deep sixed the CEC model.
SLEP is a good idea provided
1) That the hulls can take it.
2) That there are no new innovations that give greater cost savings (e.g automation for less crew = less pension etc)
I wonder what’s HMG’s view of 2nd hand MPA? Might get a few nice bargains in the market now. Speaking from Singapore, I have a sneaky suspicion that our government was intending to get MBTs much later, but Germany was getting rid of Leopard A4s at bargain prices and it was too good to miss. Netherlands was getting rid of MBTs too, Indonesia had a quoted price of ~100M USD per, but there was political objection and the deal fell through I think. Pity there wasn’t more in the coffers, it really is warehouse sale season. Long story short, maybe the 2nd hand market might be a good place to have a look? Israel is replacing their AWACs with AESA arrays, their old stuff might be worth getting temporarily?
I have a couple of surface fleet questions that I thought I would try to get answered here.
The first is Harpoon. I have heard from a few different people recently that it is rapidly becoming obsolete, is this true? If the Type 45 or Type 26 or both eventually have Harpoon installed would their then be a requirement for a replacement soon after?
The second is does the Type 45 have the space to take Harpoon (or something similar) AND additional VLS or is it a case of 1 or the other?
Thanks!
Challenger, I dont think its necessarily obsolete just that the opportunities to use it are less and less likely. I think they are more and more viewed as an anti access or defensive weapon now, again, something are less likely to need.
X often makes the point that ships still need to sink other ships and I tend to agree with him so a replacement would seem to me at least, something worth serious consideration.
On the Type 45, I think there is room between the forward silo and superstructure for either but am sure I read there is space for anther VLS somewhere near the stern as well. In short, not sure, perhaps one of the others know the answer.
@TD
Thanks for having a go at answering my questions.
I agree with the point that a ‘flighty’ surface ship should still carry an anti ship system, the fact that they aren’t often needed doesn’t mean it isn’t sensible to have something there just in case. They wouldn’t take up much room or be particularly expensive to stick on either if you wanted simple Harpoon type launchers.
How about this for the Type 45….
Forget the A70 (I don’t much like the prospect of a Naval Storm Shadow) and simply add some more A50 silo’s in the available space to bring the number up from 48 to around 64.
I’m guessing the available stern space is on the hanger roof, so how about some NSM launchers there? This would provide anti ship and hopefully land attack capabilities in 1 package.
In addition get the main gun up-to the 127mm (if their is room?) and replace the CIWS with Seahawk Sigma (loved that idea!).
Those alterations would make Type 45 a truly formidable ship, and also most of this stuff could go on-to the Type 26 as well to provide commonality and standardisation to the entire escort fleet.
Wonder what people would think of that!
Dutch being ambitious?
http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_GEtV6gA23xk/S2b797y4RyI/AAAAAAAABHo/7ToOMvrirZw/s1600/opv.jpg
The Holland class looks interesting. Speed could be better but then again the Black Swan 2 concept can only do 18kts. It could do with some CAMM for AA self-defence and the two ISO containers would be useful.
Refering to ISO containers for mission capabilites, most designs only have a handful of ISO containers. However, the “mission packages” for the LCS number 9 or more containers; IIRC the Black Swan 2 concept has space for that as ofcourse does TD’s SIMMS idea.
Does anyone know whether the Type 45 can take an anti ship missile (Harpoon) AND a larger SYLVER launcher (more A50 or an A70) at the same time?
Is this possible, or is it a straight choice of one or the other?
I have searched all over the web for this and can’t get a clear answer.
Hi GJ,
Is this “the “mission packages” for the LCS number 9 or more containers”
– the total existing, in variety
– or is it the number to be loaded onboard, all at the same time?
ASW went back on to the drawing board, 2-3 years from service. Did you count them in?
@ ACC – Sorry I don’t have the details at hand – I remember reading (on the Information Dissemination blog I think) that the MCM package was nine containers and it hinted the others were similar in number – but like you said the ASW package has gone back to the drawing board. Some of the number might be accommodation?
@ Challenger,
“Does anyone know whether the Type 45 can take an anti ship missile (Harpoon) AND a larger SYLVER launcher (more A50 or an A70) at the same time?”
— The fitting for the Harpoons is in front of the main superstructure, between that and the missile silo. The room for MK.41’s, which I presume could be used for A70, is between the silo and the main gun. So yes, it should be able to carry additional missiles and harpoon, though I imagine that harpoon fitting wont do a lot for the ships low radar signature.
@Chris B
Thanks for clearing that up for me.
I was thinking yesterday of what id add to the Type 45 to make it a more useful platform. They may have already cost the earth but like Typhoon I think it’s imperative to spend a bit more in the hope of making them general-purpose.
I decided on switching to the Seahawk CIWS, upping the main gun to the 127mm, increasing the A50 VLS from 48 to 64 and installing some kind of anti ship missile, id prefer NSM since it can also do land attack when called for.
I would be concerned about the radar signature but I could accept a slight reduction in exchange for this increased capability, they were after all designed with Harpoon in mind.
I just needed to delve deeper in-to whether these sorts of alterations could happen in conjunction with each other instead of happening in isolation.
@ ACC – I haven’t found the original article yet but these two articles are interesting:
“If the LCS is so ‘perfect’ for fighting pirates, where is the pirate fighting LCS module? That module would, presumably, include a holding facility for example since the ship doesn’t really have any spare bunks for sailors, much less prisoners.”
http://www.informationdissemination.net/2009/07/what-to-watch-for-lcs.html
“Specifically:
32 LCS hills
16 SUW modules
11 MIW modules
6 ASW modules
In other words, small boat warfare is the focus of the LCS program. The ASW module purchase for the first 32 LCS ships is only 6 modules, less than 20% of the total number of modules purchased.”
http://www.informationdissemination.net/2007/06/senate-bill-slams-navy-and-lcs.html
If anyone is interested in reading up on maritime strategy, this is an excellent read.
http://www.amazon.co.uk/gp/product/0486437434/ref=oh_details_o02_s00_i00
Corbett’s Principles of Maritime Strategy has elements of Clausewitz’s concepts but looks deeper on the effects on economic dimensions on war.
Also a quote to provoke discussion,
“since men live upon the land and not upon the sea, great issues between nations at war have
always been decided…either by what your army can do against your enemy’s territory and
national life, or else by the fear of what the fleet makes it possible for your army to do.”
Just to start this up again!
http://blogs.defensenews.com/farnborough/2012/07/11/mbda-offers-brimstone-missile-as-the-answer-to-swarm-boats/
This looks like we could (if the money ever appears) use this to counter the swarm tactics that will become ever present in naval warfare.
Strange how swarm tactics keep occurring such as the days when the merchant vessels were fitted with guns and used in the flotilla during the Napoleonic wars, swarms of torpedo boats that was fears in the early twentieth century and now missile armed fast attack craft!
Hi Ali,
It just so happens that the choke points for SLOCs are likely to be next arenas for major naval action, RE
” to counter the swarm tactics that will become ever present in naval warfare.”
– not that there would have been a permanent change of naval doctrine or capabilities somehow in relative terms turned upside-down
– on the contrary, when the torpedo by fast craft, and then the missile by fast craft appeared, those were moments when the power balance between big and small (in both vessel and navy terms)was temporarily shaken
@ All
On the subject of the Holland class OPV heres a nice little scanned article I stumbled across.
http://www.dutchembassyuk.org/images/document/354.pdf
Good find MM, cheers
Does anyone know – what would be the cost of a 14th Type-26?
Yes, I know that the T-26 is pulling its systems through from the Type-23 upgrades, and that there are only 13 of them.
So yes, a 14th Type-26 would be eqippped with… an empty hanger and a pair of remote 30mm? Perhaps an old 5-inch kept from the current T-23s/22s/42s/45s?
I’m thinking: perhaps omit the gas turbine as well, to save more money – “CODE”propulsion.
But that doesn’t seem much worse than the proposals for the MHPC requirements, and such a 3rd-rate ship would obviously be able to take every piece of hardware that is going on the 1st-rate initial 13 T-26s, as a “modular” upgrade.
What would be the crewing requirements for a massively de-fitted (3rd-rate) T-26?
@Mike Wheatley
No idea on what the cost of a 14th T26 would be, mainly because it’s not clear yet just how much the planned 13 will cost, both as a whole programme and per unit. The estimated unit cost is 250-350m, but then again the original cost of the T45 was 500m and quickly doubled! The T26 will probably do better because of the amount of kit being crossed decked from the T23, having plenty of hulls in the water will help as well. I think it’s fair to say that the more units are ordered the cheaper each becomes.
On the point of a 14th ship being poorly armed, well just because the previous 13 would inherit stuff from their predecessors doesn’t mean hypothetical additional ships couldn’t get equipment off the shelf, it would just cost a bit more.
I have been thinking for quite a while actually that my ideal (well realistic best case scenario really) would be for 14 T26. Id like the last 2 to be AAW ships with Sea Viper and Sampson to bolster the T45 fleet. With the other 12, id take 8 ASW and 4 GP, but I would ideally like to see the 2 variants blended into a common type, essentially just by procuring an additional 4 sonar sets.
One can dream!
@Challenger – ” Id like the last 2 to be AAW ships with Sea Viper and Sampson” – I suggested exactly this a while back but the consensus was that a 5400t hull just isn’t big enough for Sampson and Sea Viper; the best you could hope for would be Artisan and a shed load of Sea Ceptor, which would be no bad thing in my view, a sort of AAW slanted GP version.
Isn’t their a lightweight Sampson mast or system in development?
@Simon257 – Not that I’m aware. Who is going to develop a mast/system for something that might never get built and if it did, only in very small numbers? Artisan will be trialed on T23 then transferred onto T26 – so that’s 13 systems taken care of. Let’s be honest, we’ve all got our fingers crossed that we’ll actually see 13 T26s.
@ Simon257
There was spectar which was a proposal from BAE for the T26 program but it got binned along the way when the T26 became a budget option. I have not heard of anything else.
@Wiseape
I agree that sadly we are all hoping for 13 and that it will be an achievement to get that many, not to mention more!
In hypothetical land though id like to see 14 ships, even though as you say it’s pretty clear that a Sampson + Sea Viper AAW variant couldn’t happen even if the cash existed.
A couple of T26 jam packed with Sea Ceptor wouldn’t be a bad thing, however it wouldn’t be a separate variant, merely an ASW or GP ship that has swapped them for whatever it has in it’s strike length silo’s. Hence why this is something that will surely always be theoretically possible.