Is this a new low for the senior officers and civil servants at the MoD?
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/9217918/Fighter-jets-about-turn-will-harm-capability.html
If the report that Thomas Harding has supposedly seen and reported on was actually marked ‘Secret’ then releasing such protectively marked information is a serious breach of the Official Secrets Act and should be investigated as such.
If we cast our minds back to the famous leaked letter from Liam Fox to David Cameron, not a single person has been bought to account for that.
Is this now normal behaviour, is this the standard of conduct that should be expected of senior officers and civil servants because that document would not have been released to Joe Bloggs in the pub, then it really is a sad day.
As soon as the potential for a change in model from F35C to F35B the well oiled campaign has been in full flow, blog posts, tweets, letters to the editor and think tank musings from all the usual suspects have been involved in a concerted and coordinated campaign to persuade those in the decision making circle to ‘do the right thing’
We all know the F35C represents in isolation a set of improved performance figures and lower initial aircraft sticker price but those in the campaign simply do not comprehend that the decision is about overall cost and impact to the rest of defence.
Regardless of the decision, which for me is exactly and precisely nothing more than balance and cost, yet again, the grown ups in the MoD have cheapened themselves by talking out of school.
In my last post on this subject I suggested that Mr Hammond should go on the warpath against the leakers and spinners but I think this latest episode has shown that certain individuals on that document distribution list need to have a little attention from the MoD Police.
The rioters have felt the full force of the law and lenience for them, no matter how trivial their actual crimes, was in short supply.
Perhaps we should take the same approach with those responsible for this.
EDIT
Another take on this from Sir Humphrey, click here
Just saw the head of airpower at RUSI on BBC 24; sensibly pointing out C has more range because of more fuel, B has more landing options because its STOVL. Both excellent aircraft. You makes your choice and you pay your money. Only we don’t have a lot of money to go around.
If the MOD keeps getting bullied.. sorry, lobbied into ignoring their budget and buying “the best” then all we’re going to end up with is another black hole (assuming the original one is now filled in).
Indeed it is about costs, and the reduced capability of the “b” version will apparently require £2.4b in extra jets.
That should go some way towards the cost of cats-n traps on two carriers don’t you think?
;)
This is bad leaking and poor reporting. B might be “less capable” than C but that is not the point which is choosing an aircraft that provides the right balance between meeting our needs and our budget. C on CVF is less capable than in fact binning CVF, ordering 2 ford class carriers with squadrons of F/A Xs but we can’t afford that and don’t need it
That is not what the report is saying……….
If we want to save money it means CVF as an LHA… which means a couple of F35B squadrons. Not 130+, not ~90, 24-30 aircraft only.
What happens in the future is then dependent on funds and capability requirements.
That is kind of against the notion of an effective military planning for the kind of engagements it sees itself as partaking in……. And then seeking the capability necessary to succeed in those engagements.
Surely?
:D
There must be some serious infighting going on to warrant this standard of leakage, media coverage and general info ops. Wonder if it involves bailing out of any aspects of the contract, impacting on BAE’s profit figures or risking losing jobs in shipyards/aircraft factories? What a circus.
This leaking is beyond a joke and quite frankly those involved should be ashamed of themselves and the appropriate jail time served. A jsf document with a secret uk eyes tag should not have a huge distribution list.
Jedi you don’t know what the reports saying because we have a journos interpretation. Indeed how exactly we end worry about time over target if aar assets are present would suggest to me this may have gamed a very specific a/c only exercise. There is another telegraph artical which has more detail from the same author. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/9217344/New-warplanes-less-capable-secret-paper-shows.html
@Gareth
Which RAF airbases can the F35B land at where the F35C can’t?
Wouldn’t it be cheapest of all to have F35A’s and have a Global Bombing Force at 24hrs standby that Chris B mentioned on a guest post I read in the archives.
While outclassed by F35C, the capability of a navalized GripenNG would compare better against the Bees; would have the possibility of buddy refueling too.
If they want a large carrier air-fleet, then it might work out cheaper to fit cats for the cheaper aircraft.
@ mark – for sure.
I am being a little glib as I am thoroughly amused at how carriers seem to be at the Centre of all these capability documents. Strange when they are apparently unnecessary gin palaces strangling core funding for ‘genuinely’ useful capabilities elsewhere in the military!
A viewpoint best summed up by James with his vitriolic epithet: “those spastic carriers”
We have two carriers with sufficient jets to meet the capability requirements demanded by hmg. What flies off them in support of that requirement matters not and I care even less.
:)
We [will] have two carriers – that should read.
If that document was indeed SUKEO then heads have got to roll for that – that is an outrageous breach of security. However, as always I expect media hype to have overinflated the report – we will see.
Idealy we would have both types like the Yanks – C’s flying of our strike carriers for serious power projection and fleet defence/air superiority and the B’s flying of 4(?) CVS’s attack duties and sea control. But we can’t afford that… unless we REALLY cut capabilities elsewhere…
The point of this post is not about the decision but the agenda fueled leaking with scant regard for propriety and the appropriate treatment of protectively marked information.
If true, a criminal offence has clearly been committed, so while rioters caught up in a moment of madness and nicked a Mars bar are seeing the inside of a cell for 6 months, the people responsible for this should be treated equally harshly.
I have no sympathy whatsoever for them, they are a disgrace.
The same goes for Thomas Harding as well, he should know better, there is no public interest defence here at all
Reduced capability? Don’t both c and b outperform GR9? Yes. Well the it is an increase in capability.
Does C outperform F4 and the Buccaneer? I don’t know…….
Somewhatinvolved I would agree if it’s origion is indeed dstl then it’s highly likely it would be a min of secret when discussing jsf. I bet there will be a few phone calls from washington along the lines of and you want what source codes..,,(they are very paranoid about this kinda stuff) If people aren’t careful someone in the PMs office will say enough your getting neither.
Jedi I agree 2 carriers are required even if they’re rotated like the LPDs which means paying for cat and traps for both not 1.
I agree Mark, this sort of leakage has huge potential to cause international outcry; even if the contents are relatively tame the question is ‘why can’t you control your own classified information’.
2 x cats and traps please and get the US to install then, thus seeing off BAE in the process.
Hmm – when people were leaking in favour of the B, TD was all “this is just vindicating what I’ve been saying about B”. When people leak in favour of C, his attitude is “lock em up and throw away the key”.
The “political” leaks and counterleaks have been going on for weeks, even if some people haven’t worked out that’s what they were. Realistically, it’s hard to avoid at least some of that kind of stuff when you’re talking about a democracy spending £bn’s – and arguably this is another facet of the fact that UK procurement isn’t transparent enough.
Compare the way the US Senate/House committees oversee spending of other people’s taxes versus our system. Obviously a downside of that accountability is the amount of porkbarreling that goes on, but that never happens here. Oh no, not having a combined Scottish/Defence Secretary building carriers in Scotland and not closing down a £100m/year base with 9 aircraft for fear of what the SNP might say.
Far be it for me to suggest that the UN has better security than the MoD, but even the UN knows how to deal with this.
I drafted the “note” that the UN Force Commander sent to the Security Council in May 1995 about his negotiations with NATO for the dual-key approach to no fly zones in Bosnia, following the 2-week hostage crisis. It was an incredibly contentious issue. It had to be staffed around both UN and NATO HQs, as well as cleared politically by the 5 governments that made up the P5 on the UNSC and the 4 nations who were both part of the additional 10 nations on the UNSC and also contributing troops to UNPROFOR. Leaking would have been highly problematic.
Solution? 16 separate copies, all on .PDF and not editable, and all with very small differences in wording, use of italics or font, or oddities like a space between the end of a word and a comma, or changing the order of addressees.
We knew instantly which nation leaked the final draft document, and adjustments were made to the final text to reflect UN displeasure with that nation.
i like it james. :D
This is obviously trying to influence the aircraft decision, but regardless of whether this supports your own favourite flavour of jet or not, the leak is a serious issue.
And while there are undoubtfully a great deal of documents passing back and forth, reports do suggest that this one was indeed a secret report.
It is wrong that this was leaked, but was there any need for such a report to be marked ‘secret’? Would it not be better for there to be more transparency around this issue – that has been subject to so much meddling already?
El Sid, can I suggest you go and read my last post on leaking
It’s a matter of huge national interest and public funds so perhaps the real issue is transparency rather than leaking. Moreover, if the C version won’t be ready now until 2025 rather than 2020 is it not highly likely that the Superbug production line is going to keep going for a few years longer, albeit as an interim solution for the US Navy as well as our own and other nations?
Seems to be growing pressure to do this http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-03-29/boeing-lobbies-for-2-dot-5-billion-in-jets .
I’ve long thought the best indirect argument for the C version or the Superbug are the other longer-range, higher altitude aircraft that become deployable like Hawkeye and Greyhound using EMALS that wouldn’t happen with Dave B. What’s the point of a short-range air group on an aircraft carrier?
Dan, 1982
TD, I think you misunderstood me. The argument here is not what’s the point of having an aircraft carrier with any air group short or long range – but whether a timely interim solution with the plus of a bigger radius of operation is becoming more available with each f-35 delay in a few years time rather than wait and extend the carrier strike gap longer still for b (not convinced this is now all running to plan) or c?
Brian, Dan, the Government has every right to protect sensitive information irrespective of what that information might be. The release of said information could prejudice numerous international relations and have potentially severe political, financial and military consequences. Just because we’d like to have something to talk about doesn’t mean that we should be able to demand whatever information we want – if fact it positively encourages further meddling.
Just give the services their budgets and let them spend it as they see fit … if we need carrier airpower let the Navy decide what works for them. Why should the RAF/BAE meddle?
The Army didn’t give advice on the AirTanker selection I presume?
If it’s all so contentious / fraught, why don’t they buy the F35B for the RAF and F35C for the Navy then everyone’s happy?
Of thr top of my head the definition of secret is info that if divulged may harm the national interestm
TS is info that if divulged will harm the national interest, whoever leaked this should have the book flung at them and more.
I Can’t believe a reporter from the telegraph is shown a document marked secret UK eyes only. Either they are not telling the tuth or some one at the ministry is breaking the law. Either way it warrents a police investigation and should result in a prosecution. I am sick to death of this constant press leaking from the current government. Perhaps a little jail time would finally fix the problem.
Given the knowledge and military experiance of many of the commentators on TD, if we as individuals were in a position of significant influence with regards to the F-35 acquisition, would we leak information to get the aircraft we thought was right for the job?
Damned bl@@dy right we would, or are creatures of such virtue that we only see the fault in others?
Dan, with aircraft like the MV-22 Osprey available, C-2 and E-2 are not the only game in town, so B is as viable as C (as long as range is discounted from the debate).
@Ace
Hell no, I won’t. You do it, someone else does it to counter your opinion, another leaks something else to counter the other guy, and soon you’ll have 1) An organization of leaks
2) Decision making by propaganda. (Abolish RAF!! Sounds familiar?)
Hi, SI. The PM and gov’t should be fully accountable to MPs, not sidelining parliament in the Blair style. These are spending decisions that stretch well beyond this government’s term in office. While the report mentions ‘sensitive planning exercises’, much of the cost and capability assessment info could be decoupled from the report and be published to the commons library for access and debate. If the report is concerned with two variants of the same aircraft, there is no competition issue; and broadly speaking, the flight performance and payload of each aircraft will be publicly available when they’re in service. What is being leaked now suggests that the gov’t likely intends to incur greater long-term costs for short-term expediency by buying a less capable aircraft – this is the ‘bow wave’, which has been widely blamed for the defence budget black hole, being continued.
Oh yeah.. wikileaks anyone? How much accountability did that generate? Not much, only lots of red faces in the US.
Ichabod – why don’t they buy F35B for the RAF and F35C for the Navy? STOVL may be a handy niche capability, but with a relatively small RAF/FAA fast jet fleet, any lightly armed and short-legged STOVL jets at all create further limitations for the overall jet fleet that are not outweighed by anything that STOVL brings to the table – except for the ability to operate from small cheap carriers maybe.
The RAF would probably prefer Alphas over Bravos. As for the consideration of F35B for the Navy, the leaks are now pointing towards that being the more expensive option.
Observer, “there is hope, the force is strong in this one” ;)
@Ace
Nah, he had beans for lunch. That’s just gas you’re sensing.
@Ace- The Osprey is an expensive aircraft to run for the job it does, it also requires on average nearly 20 maintenance hours per flight hour and is far more complicated than the CH-46.
It makes sense simply to provide ample NH90 or Merlin helicopters but they take up deck space and I’m not sure if they could satisfactorily be stowed below.
Alternatively a rummage around the bargain bins at AMARC might be in order. Refurbished and slightly modified aircraft could massively cut down our total bill s long as money is spent wisely (e.g no frivolous glass cockpits, trained pilots can cope with real life instruments).
On the leak front, if this is all that was released then it does seem like a bit of a misuse of the top secret stamp. I have a few books that you could get the same information out of. TD you are right in that they have the right to make things secret but you are wrong in that it is fundamentally a topic of national interest.
I do have to say I understand why certain parties in the MOD feel the need to orchestrate these leaks. The government has seemingly eliminated them from the discussion all together and they will be the ones stuck with the planes and ultimately carry the can if there is a massive screw up.
If it were up to me I would get C’s for the navy and have the catapult installed abroad to attempt to save some money and have the RAF equipped with A’s and simply buy one or two Boeing KC-46/KC-767 or refurbed KC-135’s.
I just have to put in:
1. I spent enough time around goverment to know that most leaks come out of minister’s offices.
2. Leaks of the scale suggested indicate a department which is utterly at war with itself. Such departments are always disfunctional and the only solution is a general house cleaning. General house cleaning’s are however rare as pollies lack the balls for the ensuing ruckus. Administrative tinkering is much more likely which simply papers over the cracks.
3. In the absence of real house cleaning, pollies treat everything coming out of the deparment with long tongs and in the absence of an immediate political impact the department stagnates.
Will that happen in the UK? With the end in sight in Stan, without an equal operation in the immediate intray, with a slow economic recovery, looks like a good prospect.
“As soon as the potential for a change in model from F35C to F35B the well oiled campaign has been in full flow, blog posts, tweets, letters to the editor and think tank musings from all the usual suspects have been involved in a concerted and coordinated campaign to persuade those in the decision making circle to ‘do the right thing’”
Because the pure and awesome lovers of the greater good did not have their own campaign in support of the B when the decision to change to C was put forward, right?
A very big case of “i’m right, you are wrong”.
“We all know the F35C represents in isolation a set of improved performance figures and lower initial aircraft sticker price but those in the campaign simply do not comprehend that the decision is about overall cost and impact to the rest of defence.”
Absolutely true.
You believe that the F35B has the lower impact and overall cost, others believe, not without reason, that it is the C that delivers the best deal.
You are no different in your arguing for B than who argues for the C, you know.
You BELIEVE that the B is the best choice. There is still no way to prove it for sure.
Especially until the 1.8 / 2 billion conversion cost figure isn’t explained, because there is really no way to justify such a cost unless it is related to the conversion of both hulls.
Ace said “The Army didn’t give advice on the AirTanker selection I presume?”
Actually I bet they did. James the Red Trouser is the man who will know……
I have one probably stupid question.
Is the airframe of the B strong enough to take a catapult launch?
And if so what would be the cost of modifying our B’s so as to be fully interoperable.
@DavidNiven: no, it won’t be strong enough. But it’s not necessary, a B could operate from a CATOBAR carrier just fine. The ski jump allows it to take off with more weight.
DavidNiven,
You’d then have the worst of both worlds. A heavy jet that doesn’t have the range AND all the expense of the conversion.
STOVL already are completely interoperable – Harriers have landed on the back of Intrepid/Fearless for example, and they’re not even carriers.
Trouble is STOVL jets are heavier (carry less fuel) than their conventional counterparts.
Almost certainly not. Given that the B is utterly dependent on having a low empty weight, all structural members will have been designed against the lowest required load. In the B, that will be compressive as the gear reaches a ski-jump (UK requirement), whereas a nose-tow cat launch would have a completely different (and higher) set of loads.
Thanks for the reply’s.
I thought there was an obvious reason.
I said “Ace said “The Army didn’t give advice on the AirTanker selection I presume?””
It was Ichabod.
Hi Jedi,
More interesting than what the numbers uplift might have to be, to compensate for capability “the reduced capability of the “b” version will apparently require £2.4b in extra jets”
is the very exact 97 of “C”s
– tallies with the speculation of 48 to fill the need for carrier aviation (of course, a lot of it land based)
– and the two-humped procurement profile(which opens up the avenue for a different variant for the RAF dep strike, should the one chosen for carriers struggle)
Basic question on this discussion – apologies if I am the 5th guy to ask it.
Sea Harrier / GR 9 – Off a CVS using a ski jump.
AV8B – Off a rolling take off from Wasp @ normal distance.
Harrier – Off a 260m FOB runway.
How do the weights compare in these 3 scenarios?
What can take off with the highest weights?
FBOT,
GR9/AV8B will take off fully laden in about 310m with 25 knots WOD (wind over deck). No ski-jump.
The ski-jump reduces this to 2/3 (ish), so ~200m… the entire length of Vince.
Without the WOD you’re talking 450m+ for fully laden. This would be the case for a FOB. In addition, you’d normally have to clear the trees ahead and double this!
Simon @ 5.19
What did we normally get off the ground with the Harrier / Ski jump / CVS?
What do the USMC normally get off the ground with the AV8B / Rolling T/O / Wasp?
FBOT,
Depends on what you’re carrying and the ambient temperature.
You’ll have to wait for others to reply for standard sortie ordnance and takeoff distances. Sorry.
Gab, I havent seen anyone campaigning for the B, no letters to the editor, no mainstream media articles, no blog posts, no submissions to the select committee etc.
So no, its not as obvious.
Its not at all a case of I’m right and your wrong although I have to say some of the lame arguments, dubious statistics, outright lies and fabrications that have spewed forth in support of C or the F18 are incredible.
Nothing wrong with different opinions and there is no right or wrong answer as such but whilst most of the pro C / F18 crowd seem to focus on carrier fast air they kind of miss the point about unbalancing the budget, which is my point and my position.
Fair enough if you think that lack of balance and sacrifice of other capabilities is worth, I do not.
Does anyone think we would have had all this nonsense if in the sdsr the government had said “we are reviewing the a/c type due to fly off the cvf to ensure the B varient represents best value for money and operational capability” in stead of what it did say. not forgetting that srvl contract with LM was still signed after sdsr was announced.
This should help with the harrier questions and dont expect a f35 one anytime soon.
http://www.history.navy.mil/planes/av-8b.pdf
Great point Mark, couldnt agree more but then see the previous post about covering leaves for the cuts by slagging the previous government off
Hey Mark,
Stop giving away my secrets ;-)
I’d love a version for the GR7/9 from Vince though?
Mark,
Why are we always going for “best value”, surely sometimes we need the “best we can afford”.
If we always went for best value we’d all be driving Fiat Pandas.
The point I’m making is that you should be getting the best possible solution for a set price – trouble is the price isn’t set – a fundamental flaw in any procurement process.
If the Navy wants F35C and scrapped the Ark Royal to pay for it, and will scrap further vessels to pay for any additional unplanned costs for catapult, why is this a topic for discussion?
If they are to fight the maritime war shouldn’t they be allowed to get on with deciding how to do this, or do other services know better?
The RAF got into a £10bn air tanker program, which sounds like a lot of money, but that was their choice surely?
Simon
Its and interesting question and dont necessarily think that the 2 statement are saying different things. I think there are areas were we need the absolute best on the market and others were we dont if you search around TD did a piece on this very thing.
Ichabod
The F35 is not solely for a maritime war and im not really sure why we consider f35b to be the wrong a/c for the UK. Considering statements that have been made that the running cost of the entire fleet is less than 1B pounds per years if we scrapped a 1/4 of the surface fleet for the next 4 years we could afford to convert a single carrier for the F35C.
I do wonder how much of this b v c debate revolves round making sure the carriers always have jets onboard and what happened with the JFH doesnt happen in the future. And despite popular belief I believe if we go for the C version they will be as common a sight on the deck of a ship as the dodo.
Ichabod, because the RN wont be paying for them, its a joint decision and joint ownership type deal
OK, SI has a fiver on the F35B being cancelled, I have a fiver on Rafales for the FAA, who wants to put a fiver on a buy back of GR9’s whilst we make our minds up.
Pick your charideee
So perhaps we are looking at this the wrong way – for sure if someone really leaked a classified document prosecute them to the full extent of the law.
However, what if some journo just threw that in there to “spice up” the headline ? Seriously, a bit of internet based research throws up the basic figures for the C versus B, be it internal fuel volume, external weapons carriage options, bring back weight etc etc…
So maybe the hack just made it all up, and there is no secret report at all… ???
Jed,
I’m with you. The report is a sham.
Either that or the nations secrets are about as well protected as 3Cdo.
136 F35Bs or 97 F35Cs suggests that it is a sham.
@ TD
“OK, SI has a fiver on the F35B being cancelled, I have a fiver on Rafales for the FAA, who wants to put a fiver on a buy back of GR9′s whilst we make our minds up”
— Go on then, I’ll have a punt. A fiver on Sea Gripen for the FAA, with Gripen NG for the RAF.
re; Ski jumps
I remember reading somewhere that on average the ski jump on Russian Carriers cuts the required take off speed for a Mig-29 almost in half, though that might just be without any weapons.
For a fully loaded Harrier with a decent head wind you’re looking at damn near a halving in the required take off distance.
Waddi @ 9.05
The magic number in the whole paper was the £2.4bill extra cost that picking B would generate.
That is the counterpoint to the cost of the CATOBAR option.
It is a case of yes CATOBAR will cost a lot of money but buying B will be even more expensive.
You might have to question what number came first.
Sweepstakes eh? Marvellous. Anyone want to lay odds on when a decision will be published (vice actually taken)? Another fiver of my hard earned sea pay for next Thursday.
I am beyond angry over this. The idea that someone wanted to leak SUKEO to fuel their own service view is an utter disgrace of the highest order. I dont care how senior, I dont care how important, I just want them found, courts martialled/tried in court, and then sent to prison for a very long time indeed. This is nothing short of scandalous.
My own take is here – http://thinpinstripedline.blogspot.co.uk/2012/04/oh-for-sound-of-silence.html
Chris B,
It depends very much on the power of the aircraft.
A fully loaded GR9 will leave the end of Vince (~200m) at about 100 knots, and be given an extra 2 seconds of “throw” by the ski-jump. In this 2 seconds the jet will have moved about another 100m, the same distance it would have needed if the jump wasn’t there. It’s now airbourne.
The numbers are rough I admit.
I agree Jim, will add your link to the main body of the post, will you do the same?
Someone has to go to jail
Maybe I’m missing something about this article, but the difference between 136 and 97 is 39.
39 x F35 are going to cost a LOT more than the £2.4b the article eludes to. £61m a unit? – let’s ‘av ’em.
TD – link to this thread added in to my own.
Simon actual that would be in the ball park for a f35b unit recurring flyaway( eg no support costs)at full production quoted in the latest SAR at 106m dollars. But this is not the thread for that debate.
Hi Simon, that point “the difference between 136 and 97 is 39”
– was not about equating cost but capability
– capability cannot be universally defined, so it must be the average calculated through the four played-out scenarios (this calculation does not assume that 100% of the planes are deployed, just produces the ratio for the relative quantities needed)
…now one of the two figures must be factual (ie. planned) and the other calculated; I would vote for the 97 being the plan (as I have speculated earlier, in two batches, widely separated time wise)
Mark,
Okay, let’s not discuss that here. Suffice to say, even the unit cost looks 50% higher than that using some of the numbers that are flung around at the mo (probably totally inaccurate).
@ Waddi – “136 F35Bs or 97 F35Cs suggests that it is a sham.”
Why?
As the report alludes to these calculations start from what is the necessary effect on target, which is a product of sortie-rates, payload and range among other factors.
It has always been understood that their different roles will lead to different characteristics, and that of course will result in different per-plane effect on target.
Thus do we arrive at different fleet numbers.
I am not sure that this is contentious…………..?
Hi Jedi,
Exactly. I further suggested that one of the two figures came, not from the scenarios, but the scenarios were used to calculate the difference (the ratio would probably come out slightly differently under different scenarios, so if there is any truth in the report/ leak, then we are probably looking at the average)
I think this report is a reporters maths based on the relative range of the two aircraft and an expected procurement quantity.
I must admit, I’d believe this even more if the wiki entry for F35 hadn’t had it’s range for B reduced to 383nm (used to be 450nm).
Range of the b version is still 450nm and has NOT been reduced. From reports in the telegraph it appears range is the only issue and numbers probably relate to persistence at range though it would be interest if this had any acces to aar assets or was just a/c only comparisons.
@jedi
Not the difference in the numbers but the sheer scale. We would end up with more F35Bs than Typhoons. Ok may argue that this is a modelled number based on the various scenarios and not what we are likely to buy. My guess would be half these numbers of either model if the order actually ever goes ahead.
@Mark
Surely any available AAR would be equally effective in extending the persistance of both “B” and “C”? So the ratio between the numbers requried would remain fairly contstant regardless of whether AAR was available or not?
I agree however that it would be interesting to know that planning assumptions are currently being made about this critical capability: land based? buddy pods? carrier mini tanker? or none at all?
@ Waddi – well, there is editorial sensationalism. i have no doubt they chose the scenario with the largest discrepency, but how much divergence there is in the scenarios is a matter of speculation.
Peter what would be the consideration with aar is the frequency of utilising that assets both would be in the air for the same time. But again the c spends more time on the tanker than the b. I believe it dancing on the head of a pin at the edges of capability. Again it really depends on what’s been simulated and in what context that’s been done. I would ask people look at b fuel load and weapons load against current a/c and what we’ve actually been carrying weapons wise and you’ll soon find the capablility it offers is actually quite gd and more than adequate for the uk.
All leakers should have the book thrown at them, it is just getting silly now. Sadly no one has faith in the leadership anymore so there are any number of p****d off people in the MOD who just want to throw a spanner in the works.
Journos are being extra careful with how they use leaked info these days as they don’t want to end up in the dock, especially with Levenson on the go. I reckon the journo herry picked the interesting bits that they could understand, used the executive summaries to present the conclusions and then phoned MOD police to ‘hand back’ the document. It is an offence for them to hold onto it after all… I have no knowledge of this document, but I would speculate it was S UK EO because it had loads of data in it, that is what DSTL are meant to produce. The journo did not go into those parts because a) they could not understand it b) they have to tread a fine line of what is in the public interest and actually breaking the law.
When the plan was to buy 150 F35B, a ridiculously high number of airframes was to be used for attrition pooling.
Mainteinance worries and unavailability seem to be an issue with the F35B, pushing up the numbers of airplanes required.
It is far from being simply a matter of range and payload.
Hi Waddi,
” We would end up with more F35Bs than Typhoons.”
– funny that; after the “final” refurb we’ll have 96 Tornados (a figure fairly close to 97, and only C will work as Tornado replacement in the long run, B not so well)
” … not what we are likely to buy. My guess would be half these numbers of either model”
– agree on both parts
– buy the first half for a carrier wing
– fly the Tornado to mid-20s and bring in the other half then. Or, improve Typhoons (conformals etc) and perhaps never execute the second order – who knows where the economy is ten years from now, and the threat picture may also have changed
Hi Gabby,
Absolutely right; the truth is somewhere between the original “easier to maintain than F-16” and Osprey’s 20 maintenance hours for one up in the air, RE
“Mainteinance worries and unavailability seem to be an issue with the F35B, pushing up the numbers of airplanes required.
It is far from being simply a matter of range and payload.”
Except the us marines expect a higher sortie generation rate than the us navy do with the c. And as we will have to follow the us navy procedures if we go with the c there will be a requirement for buddy buddy refuel a/c to be kept on deck to recover a/c with would compensate for any difference in maintainance/availability. Not to mention a number of other issues that could affect deployed numbers on a carrier.
I will add I did read your piece gabby on the c v b debate and found it not only quite bias and in some cases inaccurate.
Hi Mark,
I agree (more CAS-like missions) but is this because of what they “do” or because of what the plane (combined with the facilities that the ship offers)can do
– I’m not sure I understand
Mark,
You seem pretty confident that the range of B has not reduced. Can you support this? Are you in the business?
Harrier II was great for CAS… and that’s about it. It’s a sad loss, but why replace it with another aircraft with specs designed to be great for CAS. The UK are missing a whole lump of capability.
I don’t want the B/C debate again, I just want to get a handle on why you think that “what we had” is “all we need”.
B is going to have shorter range, less capability to carry stores steathily, and higher maintenance requirements than the C: that much is true. All manageable issues, at a cost.
What worries me is that the B also has a small thrust and weight margin. Hot conditions plus needed airframe upgrades could rapidly make the B effectively useless in operations. The risks are very high, and after the V22 program, I have no faith in the USMC’s former ability to avoid gold plating in favour of practical solutions
Simon
My confidence is based on the very latest f35 SAR document released to congress by the pentagon jroc stating just that. Indeed they tweaked those kpps of which this is one by increase the stovl take off run by adding 24ft said the a was missing its range target by 5 nm and increased the c approach speed to 144 knts. If the b had fell over in its range I guarentee you it would be plastered all over the aviation press.
I’m not just talking about Harrier look at the f18c/d f16 even the load typhoon and tornado carried in Libya Iraq or afghan and the b version pretty much meets or exceeds that with the exception of tornados range with external tanks on a stormshadow mission or typhoon dynamic manoeuvre capability. For which on a land base typhoon with conformal tanks mitigates that area.
Stupid Question Time!
Is it at all possible to fit either conformal fuel tanks to the B either on the side or on the belly. Or fit internal fuel tanks in the weapon bays?
I have to disagree here.
Okay, letting out that a government official somewhere in Whitehall is plotting hypothetical wars involving other countries who would otherwise have had a higher opinion of the UK had they not known, is not on. But for the rest of it the Telegraph articles were not really secret; anyone who wanted to know would be able to work it out for themselves.
We are never told the real reasons for any government decision; decisions are proclaimed as government knows best and don’t worry about the detail. I’d suggest save for genuine secret issues it should be compulsory for the pro’s and con’s of any major decision should be laid out for the public to see and judge.
Of course, a lot is in the eye of the beholder – its obvious that there is no perfect answer between B or C and it is inevitable that the decision will be a subjective weighing of the alternatives according to whoever makes the decision. Some people will like the outcome some will not, there will not be 100 percent agreement. At least this time with the public primed by the Telegraph articles Dave will not be able to just say ‘they made the wrong choice’ and then avoid saying what the merit of the choice really was.
I’m of the opinion that the B/C saga goes much deeper than the selection of the F35.
Without ruffling to many feathers I think there’s two mindsets: 1) RAF as bomber command, and 2) FAA as expeditionary strike.
Those who seem to support B (with perfectly decent reasons) also seem to assume that the tankered/modified RAF Typhoons will pick up the other strike needs.
Those who seem to support C (with perfectly decent reasons) see long-range/heavy-weapons delivered from a carrier.
I have a few problems with the first option:
1. The Typhoon was designed for air-superiority, not strike. If we needed strike we should have joined the French with Rafale a long time ago. If this WAS the way we should have gone then heads should roll.
2. The USA still advocate carrier strike, even when they have Strike Eagle, B52, B2s, etc, because it’s more efficient for long-ranged projection of power.
3. We had “proper” carriers until someone persuaded a particular government that we didn’t need them or couldn’t afford them.
4. The Black Buck raids were a failure, or at the very least, very inefficient (sorry to any who were involved, but it’s the way I see it).
5. The Tornado strikes in Libya were expensive and inefficient.
6. The Indians purchased Rafale after the nice Typhoon/Rafale demonstration in Libya.
I guess this makes me FAA!
Grab your guns and start shooting :-)
Ye ha cowboy
A quick and dirty riposte Simon
1.
One of the greatest myths is that Typhoon is designed solely for air superiority, simply not the case.
2.
What has what the US do got to do with how we spend our defence budget, capabilities have to be optimised for the UK, not just because someone else does it one way or another.
3.
We couldn’t afford proper carriers then, no one needed persuading, it was cold hard facts, which trumps cock waiving sentimentalism every time
4.
I would not characterise them as a failure at all, not decisive, not the saviour of the operation but not useless either
5.
How so, the Tornado has consistently been the most cost effective aircraft we have had for a very long time
6.
Do you really think their decision had anything at all to do with capabilities, really?
But most of all, it has nothing to do with being in camps but delivering effects at the best value for money within a defined budget within an overall strategic/doctrinal framework
that is ABOVE ALL ELSE
Appropriate for the UK
Maybe a stupid question but if we had a carrier with 25 F35B’s, 4 of these aircraft are assigned as tankers with external fuel tanks that would solely be responsible for topping up the other F35B’s shortly after takeoff, isn’t that extending the range a little?
TD,
Thanks, but:
1. You know full well that we should have gone Francais at the time if we wanted a well rounded jet, but we wanted air-defence optimised – short sighted in my mind. Typhoon is not a great strike platform, certainly not as good as F35C.
2. Because the US manage to provide more expeditionary capability with less money.
3. I agree, we lost “proper” carriers not because they weren’t needed, but because we couldn’t afford them. The converse to this is that if we can afford them we should have them. It’s not sentimentalism – I couldn’t personally give a feted dingo’s kidney what we had yesteryear. It’s the fact that things haven’t really changed that much, save the reduced need for jet air-defence.
4. Hmmm.
5. Because the sortie rate is useless in large scale conflicts. Meaning you need LOADS of airframes, which is expensive and inefficient.
6. Yes. But to be honest, I really don’t have a clue. It was just another nail in the coffin.
Again, it’s entirely possible you or someone else can persuade me otherwise. All you need to do it explain how 120 jets at 4000nm range can deliver more that 12 jets at 400nm. Especially when they’re not stealth capable.
Rather late to the party…
If the report refers to planes on an individual basis then, by god, the MoD have discovered Wikipedia. Onwards into sunlit uplands of knowledge!
If we’re on about capability as a whole then I’d take two bastardised LHAs with an airgroup of 12 Bs and a smattering of helos over one CVF and 6 Cs.
As a quick question to anyone who knows, would a switch back to B allow the government to return to previous build times? I.e. 2014 QE 2016 PoW? Even the 2016/18 Delayed Labour times would be better than 2019/21. Save a fair bit of wedge as well; those currency bailouts aren’t free you know…
TD @ 12.47
You mention the fact that the RN could not afford carriers or more specifically they could not afford to renew / replace their carriers in the mid 60s.
This is down to the technological limits and design abilities available at the time.
The RN wanted ships that were Audacious Class hulls burned with some white hot heat. It was part of the prevailing mind-set that was into salami slicing rather that root cause analysis.
Consequently the crews were too large, the running costs too high and the build costs / standards too rooted in the past.
So what did we do?
Sort out the issues or did we just jump ship literally and run up some nice aviation cruisers that we could handle without thinking.
Looking at the Invincibles – how much better would they have been if they had been made that much bigger?
How about an extra 50ft dumb section of hull?
We eventually gave away a whole generation of carrier capable aircraft.
And still we spent huge amounts of money trying to work a numbers game rather that biting the bullet and trying to do some real thinking.
I don’t think there will be a return to the original timetable. A hull in the water needs a crew,bunkers, etc. and any expensive faults remaining unknown. No I think the date will be somewhere post 2015 post the next election because I think the current government barring some miracle are already lame ducks. The public are very good at forgetting who put us in this mess. And are ignorant of the true extent of that mess and confuse attempts to tidy up especially if they fail as incompetence. Better to ooh and aah over a wasted £400million now than think back to the waste in the programme that has caused costs greater than that. Or better still moan about anything now and forget the years of spend, spend, and spend that got us here.
TD said “What has what the US do got to do with how we spend our defence budget, capabilities have to be optimised for the UK, not just because someone else does it one way or another.”
Aren’t you the bod who keeps on going about working in coalition and sharing assets and bringing unique capabilities to the table? So surely that means how the Americans spend their money does affect us? Or how the French spend their Euromark?
Sometimes you play arguments both ways.
got me there X !!!
@ TD re Tornado
Considering the numbers of them bought and the small size of Harrier and Jaguar fleets economies of scale would have come into play? It isn’t like we are the US who in the same time frame could have compared F14 v F15 or F16 v F18 is it?
@ TD
Well you never catch me doing that now would you?
I have sent you some of my spare common sense and unbiasing kit in the post. I have too much of the former and no need of the latter….. :)
Good list there, x:
“It isn’t like we are the US who in the same time frame could have compared F14 v F15 or F16 v F18 is it?”
– F14 was superb for its time (an F22?), but all those other three have managed the Typhoon trick (evolving into other roles; I would keep Tornado out of this – a v good aircraft – as the “F” was a very specific spec, for very specific circumstances)
And before you get back to “it was a navy vs. AF comparison”, this one from Simon ” two mindsets: 1) RAF as bomber command, and 2) FAA as expeditionary strike.” is the same kind of comparison
– we can only afford one, not have two separately
But I think that is what you were saying anyway!
We are going to look like a total bunch of D@$k Heads with the CVF. The hypothetical comparison wouldd be for the USN to commission the Gerald Ford with an airwing comprised of a single squadron of F-35Cs, one of Ospreys and a few each of the SH-60 and AH-1Z. A carrier’s reason for being is the area effect of its Airwing. If you want ship to shore troop movements buy an LHA. The whole flexibility arguement is to use spin to cover a bad situation.
With the way things are we would be bettter to forget any ideas of ordering any version of the F-35 for the CVFs and use the money saved to pay any contractual dues from cancelling the white elephants. We won’t be able to afford the operating costs anyhow. Its like but a fleets of MBTs but not buying the guns to go with them. Sure we can find other uses for the chassis but that is not what they were bought for. IF the budget is continually put under pressure the whole FF2020 needs to be renamed FF2030?
It seems UK Politicians seem to think Defence can be done on the cheep and have know idea of its true costs, the time and planning projects require, and wish to micromanage everything with more attention paid to the resulting media articles than the actual effect on our Armed Forces.
Like the Banks there needs to be a split between policy and funding. The Government should retain the decision making on what our Armed Forces are for and when, where and how they are used. A separate independant should be responsible for procureing the tools to meet the Government’s requirements. IF the latter is too expensive, the former needs to downsize its aspirations or find extra funds. No more smoke and mirrors. More importantly the Armed Forces need to be put on a all for one and one for all footing, presenting a united front to both the Government and the new independant body. Defence funding needs greater priority. If Billy’s school isn’t funded to expected levels he might not get the best job. If the MoD isn’t properly funded Cpl Smith gets shot in the head!
Guys, guys, guys! Relax will you.
No one in the MoD has let slip a secret FUKEO document. What has happened is that the Government has given the Telegraph an ‘exclusive’ based on a putative secret memo from one high ranking politician to another. All the Government is doing with this story is trying to spin their U-turn.
Here’s Cameron’s expected storyline when he announces it: ‘We chose the F-35C because we believe that it represents the best possible solution for the UK. Unfortunately, however, there have been unforeseeable and unexpected additional costs for converting the new carriers to CATOBAR which have made the total price tag much greater than we anticipated. We expect that extra cost to be in the region of 1.8 billion. In order to pay that price, we would need to forego other equally important new equipment procurement projects, e.g. FRES UV. These other projects have assumed a heightened level of importance due to the following reasons (insert blather about new and emerging threats).These are also tough times. The reality of our situation is that we cannot afford the ‘gold plated’ F-35C. What we can afford is the ‘silver plated’ F-35B. At the time we came to power, there were serious doubts about the F-35B’s viability. It had been ‘put on probation’. We needed to consider an alternative. Now that the F-35B is more-or-less back on track and the F-35C is going to cost more than anticipated, we can get 80-90% of the capability of the F-35C at a cost of $2 billion less. We have to accept that.’
Within that framework, you can bet that a lot of blame will be attached to the previous Government.
The truth is that the F-35C is ultimately a more capable aircraft in terms of payload and range on internal fuel tanks. While the F-35B carries less weapons and fuel, it is a more flexible platform because of the interoperability it provides for both the RN and RAF. The F-35B is also SIGNIFICANTLY more capable than the Harrier, as you would expect it to be. In that sense it is a step forward.
The bottom line is that the original carrier decision, i.e. opting for 60,000 tonne vessels, when we should have stuck with something under 40,000 tonnes was misguided. You’d think that if we were going for such a large carrier the ability to fly aircraft like the F-35C would have been built into them. Instead we’ve got the worst of both worlds. The F-35B is best suited to smaller carriers.
I wonder if the choice of the F-35B will be further justified by the need to buy the V-22 too? Expect a surprise to fall into the mix.
Monty,
“the original carrier decision, i.e. opting for 60,000 tonne vessels, when we should have stuck with something under 40,000 tonnes was misguided”.
That’s all very well with the benefit of hindsight, but without knowing that the STOVL version was going to be a “goer” you’d have to design the smallest sensible CATOBAR, and this is CVF.
@ ACC
It wasn’t an AF vs navy thing more comparison of type. F14 vs F15 both high end air superiority fighters. F16 vs F18 low(er) end fighter. The USN unlike the rest of the West had two fleets to compare.
What annoys me about all of this is that HMG have buggered both long range air capabilities by underfunding or slicing capability or poor decisions or a combination of all three.
If we aren’t going to sail about the world and just join in Europe’s collective defence we need tankers. What do we get? Voyager. Outstandingly poor value for money. How much is it? 9billion over 20years. I think I said that is like buying a every year for 20 years a fleet tanker plus covering its operating costs for its lifetime. What are the Yanks getting 179 aeroplanes for £23billion? Imagine if that £9billion had that level of buying power. We could have funded both tankers, a third carrier, and extra oilers to support CVF.
And then we have CVF…………. :(
Anyone think Cameron may switch back to the C again to avoid the growing shit storm?
“The Public Administration Committee said an absence of national strategy was leading to ‘mistakes’ such as those following the recent Budget.”
“In a critical report, the committee said ‘the government’s inability to express coherent and relevant strategic aims’ was leading to mistakes in a number of areas.
“These included the rethink on Royal Navy aircraft carriers, the lower-than-anticipated economic growth and the likelihood that child poverty reduction targets will be missed.”
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-17817741
“Anyone think Cameron may switch back to the C again to avoid the growing shit storm?”
There has been no switch away from the “c” yet.
@jed
Not officially, although the mood music coming out of Government have suggested so. When the Defence Secretary openly says we can’t afford the cats and traps it’s pretty clear which way the wind is blowing.
Question from Jim Murphy to the Cameron:
“* Can you guarantee Britain will have year-round, continuous carrier strike capability?”
This above all else must be answered!
I’ve been looking at this for all it’s worth and I can’t figure out the hidden agenda behind saying the F-35C is better but still reverting to the F-35B.
political imperative for the coalition to say they have forced the MoD to balance its books (f35b) versus the desires to see carrier strike with lower operational costs long into the future (f35c)…..?
Monty – try this. Post 572 says it all and yet the general public are not privy to this part of the debate.
http://www.pprune.org/military-aircrew/478767-no-cats-flaps-back-f35b-29.html
@ NAB
To stir the pot a little, I thought comment #583 was quite interesting, that being the quandry that the RN might find itself in having sung the praises of jointness in Libya with Army Apaches flying off the carriers, while claiming fast jets should be a Navy only enterprise.
It ends up looking like a RN vs RAF issue.
@Chris B
I don’t think the RN is in any quandary about a few AAC Apaches flying from its platforms. Having taken several years of preparation, achieving the necessary clearances and much practice, the system now seems to work, at least with few numbers for relatively short periods and this is mainly down to airframe marinisation issues. From what I have heard, the Army personnel have integrated very well, perhaps because they share the same ‘all of one company’ ethos as the RN.
However, there is a world of difference between operating three or four visiting helos for the occasional sortie and operating an air group of more complex FJ (VSTOL or Cat & Trap) with a demanding flypro where heavy airframes are landing on, taking off and being moved around a busy rolling deck and in confined spaces day or night, all with frightening speed. Constant training is not a luxury; it is a necessity if people are to avoid becoming stale and unsafe. I used to get exasperated when members of my ship’s company forgot the most basic drills and procedures after being on leave for a couple of weeks. Every on board emergency is different but this is why exercises covering damage control, firefighting, machinery breakdowns and man overboard are conducted daily at sea and in harbour.
I trust that most readers are able to appreciate the complexity of ‘proper’ carrier operations which require lengthy work-ups and continuous training to establish, build and maintain currency among everyone on board, not just aircrews. Even the chefs and stewards have secondary roles as medics in the event of injuries. If you have any doubts about the scale of the problem, take a look at the demanding American standards for keeping qualified for carrier ops. The choreography, skill and commitment of the many different specialists involved in executing carrier flying, let alone moving, bombing up, fuelling and maintaining the a/c, is amazing. It’s not nearly such a case of ‘fire & forget’ as you have with land bases. The ship’s position, heading, speed, C4I, ATC, FC, SAR, etc., are all integral parts of launch, execution of the mission and recovery. A carrier doesn’t get called ‘Mamma’ for nothing and its air group is its primary weapons system.
For what it’s worth, I think a leavening of RAF aircrew on board the carriers would be a good thing. It certainly seemed to work in the old days of CTOL carriers and I’m sure they would have much to contribute, just as they would have much to learn from their FAA counterparts. I just wonder how many would be prepared to spend up to 10 months on board at a time, including shake down, work-up and a normal 6-8 month deployment.
@ Dunservin
I appreciate the complexities. The problem you have is that all those complexities were imposed on the AAC pilots and they came through with flying colours and much praise.
When push comes to shove a defence select committee is going to ask the Admirals why they are so insistent that it is impossible for the same to happen by replacing the words “AAC crew” with “RAF crew” and there’s going to be no satisfactory answer.
Hi Dunservin,
Totally aside the main points that you make RE” mainly down to airframe marinisation issues.”
– lots of good work has been done on the Apache
– its stability on the deck will not be easily changed (at one point the plan was for the USMC to be flying them, too)
Chris B makes a good point. For example on JFH there were quite a few RAF personnal that had more sea time than some of the navy. I think the boat trips came around, for some, 2 or 3 times a year when their sqn would deploy for an exercise. And although there were undoubtable new skill sets to learn I don’t know many that didn’t pick it up. As far as I know they still had the same tests and checks that the navy had before going away.
Like Dunservin said a blend of skills and learning from both would be a good thing and the RAF have been onboard since at least the 70s no reason for it not to continue and all the benefits it would bring to both.
Dunservin et al,
Assuming we get two carriers of the same type, why couldn’t the RAF operate from the in-active carrier? I know you really need wind-over-deck, but surely not for light training loads?
This means that the chaps that don’t really like being at sea and/or away from their families, etc, can still hone their skills for emergency deployment.
Alternatively just use a dummy-deck (with real edges that you can fall off).
Those deployed on the active carrier are true/old FAA (expeditionary), those based on the inactive carrier or dummy deck would be “homeland” F35 strike pilots (sort of blend between RAF and FAA on a squadron by squadron basis).
Topman & Chris B
There is a later post in the Pprune thread that actually details what happened with the AAC/Apache det and how much work was required to get two (yes two) cabs on task.
The answer to the question why RN rather than RAF is highlighted by assertion that some RAF spent more time at sea than RN – “embarking for exercises”. That’s not delivering what is required – they may have flown some missions, but were they bought into the everything required? Air defence? No – GR( couldn’t do that. Lrage packages (as opposed to 4-6 cabs embarking for a week or two)?
JFH getting a slack handful RAF Harriers aboard a CVS for a couple of weeks at a time is not and never was Carrier Strike.
Then they will just have to do better in future
All this bellyaching about the RAF not liking sea time or the AAC taking ages to do this or that on board a ship just strikes me as old fashioned union style closed shops
JFH was an entirely sensible concept because it recognised the realities of financial constraint, if it didn’t work as well as might have been then that is a problem of execution not strategy.
C- Must Try Harder, See Me After School :)
@Simon
With the occasional exception of launching and recovering a helo, no ship alongside for any worthwhile period is conducive to flying operations or even having aircraft embarked. As I explained in my previous post, smaller scale helo ops, as performed by OCEAN during ELLAMY, are relatively simple (unlike the old Commando carrier operations during the Suez crisis for example). Destroyers and frigates conduct them day and night as a matter of routine and they compare to high-intensity FW ops like your local go-cart circuit compares to Le Mans.
Apart from the absence of adequate wind over the deck, ships alongside have too many conflicting activities such as planned and unplanned maintenance, storing, fuelling and ammunitioning or even changing fittings and disembarking materiel if re-roling for a specific operation or exercise. I well remember the disruptive work required to equip a CVS as a functional floating JFHQ (Joint Force Headquarters). Also, vital systems and services will be offline for routine work and critical personnel will be otherwise occupied with on board tasks, undertaking shoreside courses and meetings, filling otherwise gapped billets elsewhere or getting some rare leave. Today’s warships spend much more time at sea than their forebears (even during WW II) and they need their time alongside for various good reasons. You don’t just turn everything off and lock the doors.
Finally, the QEs will be based at Portsmouth in the middle of a built-up area so you can imagine the safety issues coming into play if they started messing around with aircraft and ordnance. Far better to use a dummy deck in the countryside with dedicated training staff. Failing that, they will just have to perform all their carrier ops training and assessment at sea before deploying, like they used to.
Dunservin,
I understand. The trouble is with QE at sea there’s no opportunity to properly train the other would-be naval aviators (other than a dummy deck). I guess, as you say, they’ll just have to wait for an opportunity to try their hand on the real (active) carrier.
I think this is, however, a classic example of how we’ll never manage to maintain anyone other than FAA as carrier capable. There’s too much of a gap between, for exmaple, RAF opportunities to land to maintain “the edge”.
Harrier was a little different; yes it’s different on a carrier, but not as different as CATOBAR ops slamming into a pitching, rolling and heaving deck, putting the throttle to full and having your head ripped off when the arrestor cables catch.
Regardless of what they’re called (RAF, FAA or expeditionary strike wing) there will only be a handful of carrier capable pilots.
It’s interesting to suddenly realise why there was, is and probably always will be a difference between RAF and FAA. They are simply a product of their situation and availability of training resources.
@TD
“Then they will just have to do better in future…
C- Must Try Harder, See Me After School :)”
-You remind me of the FAA CO of a warship who shouted at his XO during a particularly complex and hazardous seamanship evolution, “Why are things taking so long?”
– His XO replied, “Because I’m not in a hurry to get anyone killed, Sir.”
:-)
@TD: JFH merely demonstrated why the RAF is the ultimate “closed shop”. It wants to destroy competition, and given the opportunity, promptly did, demonstrating that it is not in the business of delivering capabilities, but protecting it’s own rice bowl. Case closed methinks :-)
Of course its always them bigger boys isnt it
Nonsense
If (and it is a big if, because I seem to recall JFH doing rather well in Afghanistan for several years) JFH failed it is because the two components failed
I see the conspiracy theories are as strong as ever…
Well, if in a civilian environment two departments were merged, with one of the managers appointed leader, who then shut down the majority of the other dept ASAP, we would be calling it a takeover, right?
JSF was a fail because the core competency of carrier air, air defence, was disposed of. We can use TLAM, NGS whatever to do land attack, but air defence over the horizon needs planes. Now, if the RAF had disposed of F/A 2 but upgraded the GR7 with radar, I would have been the first to applaud. But they didn’t, and were never going to do so: the Harrier was to wither on the vine until it could be cut.
@Topman: conspiracies exist everywhere. The difference between reality and fantasy is that they are usually about the most mundane items.
For example, I have seen a data centre built in Ireland after connectivity costs were ordered removed from the cost matrix. The two regional managers were Irish :-) It’s a bit of a white elephant, but I did get a lot of time in Dublin drinking out of it, so…
Ultimate conspiracy theories :-)
http://youtu.be/P6MOnehCOUw
@ wf ‘The difference between reality and fantasy is that they are usually about the most mundane items.’
You would think so, yet they still come out about this particular issue. Again and again.
@Topman: because we would have been utterly humiliated if Hermes and Invincible had been sold in 1981? That sort of lesson sticks
wf,
I was under the impression that FA2 was retired so that Daring could take over the role of air-defence. It’s only because Daring was pushed back three years that there was a gap in capability.
If you accept that Daring replaced FA2 and GR7 was for strike then there’s no reason to put radar in them.
@wf
I’m not sure how that’s related to my point.
@Simon: no, the FA2 was retired because the costs for upgrading it’s engines for hot and high conditions was considered to be prohibitive. The same upgrade along with others was then applied to three times as many RAF Harriers shortly afterwards. Any excuse will do….
wf,
Okay, that’s just the other way round. Whichever way you look at it Daring was supposed to be there to provide air-defence for the fleet meaning there was no need for FA2.
There’s no point in upgrading engines on an obsolete asset. Better to upgrade them on the GR7/9 so that they can work in Iraq/Afganistan/etc.
I love FA2 (look at my icon/avatar) but we migrated to Aster because it’s more effective… and, this is debatable, more cost effective.
@Topman: could we have retaken the Falklands without carrier air? Given that every SAM system we possessed with the exception of Stinger were failures to a lesser or greater degree, that would be very, err, brave. Seems a very relevant point to me, and no need to dismiss it just because it’s effective.
Simon
Your impression is incorrect. When the SHAR was withdrawn it was accepted reluctantly by 1SL as a temporary measure, the actual phrase was “taking risk” against the air defence capability – a risk mitigated only to some degree by the planned service entry of T45. It was also referred to as a “capability holiday” which illustrates the level of logical thinking involved. That T45 was late only compounded that risk.
T45 was never an attempt to replace the SHAR or manned fixed wing air defence. There are those who conveniently forgot the argument and attempted to pretend T45 replaced SHAR, but that was never the case. The analogy is to suggest that we can bin Typhoon because we have Rapier/Starstreak or bin the SAMs because we have Typhoon.
@TD – JFH did not fail in Afghanistan – of course not. One would have been very surprised to see it do so, given that HERRICK was a land-based CAS mission, which the RAF had trained to do using the Harrier GR series for about thirty years (albeit in a different climate). However you will hopefully notice that 800NAS / NSW did at least their fair share of the op and in a role that formed only a part of their previous skillset which included AD and maritime ASuW among others. No single role f/w squadrons in the FAA.
However, as JFH was also supposed to simultaneously deliver the carrier-capable embarked role, perhaps you can explain why the “capability owner” (in this case CAP-Theatre Airspace) reduced the required FE@R in the Harrier force to a level that could really only sustain the Herrick dets (6 or 8 cabs), while retaining a much larger Tornado FE@R that was required only to sustain an equivalent det on TELIC. Had Tornado FE@R been reduced back then and GR7/9 FE@R maintained or increased to allow both carrier-embarkation and HERRICK dets to be maintained, the SDSR result would have looked very different. Not a plea for the return of GR7/9 or SHAR, it’s done, we must get over it.
The whole point of JFH should have been to demonstrate that sea-based airpower can operate from land seamlessly and vice versa. In fact what it has done is to demonstrate that those who operate from land (and particularly their head-shed) don’t understand sea-based ops and don’t want to do them for any sustained length of time.
You can sarcastically suggest that “it’s always those big boys” causing trouble, but when the evidence is put forward, I’m afraid it usually is.
Hi wf,
I think your statement is too broad, a pity that Seawolf was on only two ships.
Wiki says “Sea Wolf accounted for two confirmed “kills” and three further possible successes from eight launches.”
@Simon: we have had this discussion before. The last FA2 was delivered in 1998, 4 years before the retirement decision, and was the only UK aircraft which could operate AMRAAM at the time, which hardly makes it obsolete. A T45 cannot engage low flying aircraft or missiles beyond 50Km: the earth is in the way. An aircraft can.
The most cost efficient way of defending a fleet is not to wait until the missiles are within seconds of impact, it is to shoot down the aircraft that is firing said missiles, which is both easier and prevents said aircraft from returning with more missiles a few hours later.
@ Simon – re cost effectiveness. No, really, it’s not. A SAM is not and can never be a substitute for a manned intercept and/or visual ID. Nor can it be retasked once launched, return refuel and do something else. If you want to shoot down a demanding target that has got through your outer defences, that’s when you use a SAM.
NAB, that was exactly my point. People complain that JFH was a failure but forget the sterling service it delivered in Afghanistan, equally between the light and dark blue. I make no distinction when I say Joint, I mean exactly that.
If it failed in its intention to also deliver carrier strike then that is a shame but surely the defence main effort should come first, second and tenth. If carrier strike was needed for a UK sovereign operation then I am equally sure JFH would have delivered as well.
So it might not have been perfect, there might have been some residual inter service bollocks, there might have been friction between the two cultures, differences in opinion and operating procedures, manning and lots of other things but it patently delivered the goods and that in my book makes it a bloody success.
I suspect the SDSR decisions were tinged with the usual inter service nonsense but that is a clear failure of political leadership and rather shameful of the service chiefs.
The point about operating sea based air power on a sustained basis is quite simply, it doesn’t need to.
So JFH and what will become of CEPP surely was based on land basing being the norm with a residual nugget of sea based capability that could be surged and augmented when needed.
Not sure what is so wrong with this.
As for evidence, I have read it from both sides to be honest but apologies for being sarcastic
wf, I would say that the most effective way of defending a fleet is not to shoot anything down but make sure that that anything doesnt get off the ground, hence Tomahawk and Storm Shadow
It is a valid point that 16 of the airframes were practically new “The last FA2 was delivered in 1998, 4 years before the retirement decision, and was the only UK aircraft which could operate AMRAAM at the time”
– these numbers alone, as part of a larger GR force, would have enabled maintaining CAP
– cueing the BVR missile with radar info from dispersed ships, to make the best of it; anyone know what level of linking there was at the time (I mean in 1998…voice, directing the pilots?)
@ACC: that’s why I said to a lesser or greater degree. Sea Wolf was unable to fire on multiple occasions because of either software problems or crossing targets, which is one reason why it looks so much better than Sea Cat. But the fact that Sea Harrier shot down the majority of the aircraft says a lot about relative effectiveness: and this is a aircraft with a non-coherent radar with no look-down capabilities and with a pair of short range heat seekers onboard. By world standards, FRS1 was grossly obsolete, but it was a lot more effective than SAM’s
wf,
Sorry, you’re right, we’ve been here before.
I didn’t want to imply the FA2 WAS obsolete – it was MADE obsolete by T45… which you don’t agree with either. And neither does NaB.
Fair enough.
Have you not noticed that nearly all “interceptors” are becoming “strike” aircraft? F15, F16, F18, Typhoon, Rafale. The only one that isn’t is F22 because it has an edge that missiles don’t.
I hope you’re right, but will be surprised if we ever operate CAP over the carrier with F35 – they’ll be used to project CAP/CAS over the assault leaving T45 to do fleet air defence.
Simon, I think FA2 was made obsolete by the lusting for CVF/JCA at all costs, hence it was sacked off on the basis of jam tomorrow
If you read all the early transcripts and material from the early days of JCA/CVF and even today, outer layer air defence never seems to get a mention
TD,
That’s because you can’t provide outer later air defence with jets without a high AEW capability.
The time to target is too slow.
e.g.
Detect at 200nm, scramble FA2 at 400 knots average against a slow (400 knot) threat – intercept at 100nm in 15 minutes.
Compare with:
AEW detected incoming threat at 200nm.
Wait.
Wait.
Fire Mach 4.5 Aster 30
Intercept at 100nm (sneaky) in 90 seconds.
@ACC: AMRAAM needs midcourse guidance to be effective at anything other than short range. These signals are usually transmitted via the sidelobes of the fighter radar controlling the engagement. Given that ship radar would be ineffective past the horizon, you would have to assume the only way of gaining that data would be via ASAC7, if we could retrofit a datalink to it
@TD Outer layer defence does not get a mention in the same manner that a MBTs ability to engage another MBT may not be mentioned. It is a given that this will be one of the primary roles of any carrier based aircraft.
TLAM and Storm Shadow are all well and good but the enemy get a vot as well and the only way you have to kill the aircraft that want to launch their version at you once airborne is a fighter aircraft.
If I remember rightly (which to be fair, I usually don’t) wasn’t the issue with the SHAR that the engine upgrade required was very different from the GRs? And as TD has pointed out, there is a significant lack of documents where the FAA screamed blue murder about the loss of SHAR.
And just to stir the shite a little in the opposition direction, only a couple of weeks I saw a comment from a US Navy pilot, I’ll see if I can find it again, who basically said that the difficulty of Carrier landing vs base landing was somewhat over stated, at least in the case of reasonably skilled aviators.
Chris B,
The FA2 was the old Harrier I airframe so the refit of a new engine may well have been more difficult than shoving it into the Harrier II.
Interesting about the carrier landing.
Hi wf,
I would assume you are right for the UK with ” would have to assume the only way of gaining that data would be via ASAC7, if we could retrofit a datalink to it”
– in the US they can do fighter-to-fighter hand-offs after launch (F-35 becomes a force multiplier?)
@TD: the FA2 decision was made immediately after the RAF took over administrative control of JFH, more than half a decade before *any* spending would have been required for JCA or CVF assuming an in service date of 2012. Not a valid excuse IMHO
@Simon: the entire point of having a fighter available is that it can fly a CAP up threat. It would be sitting 100NM off the fleet, with a radar that can detect threats another 100NM away (even if they are at low level) and with missiles that can reach out 50NM. Threats 200NM away would be engaged within minutes. Meanwhile, the Aster and T45 would see targets pop up momentarily, then would see nothing until the missiles appear on radar at 20NM, whereupon they would 30 secs to engage before they hit. Feeling relaxed?
@Simon: “interceptors” are not becoming “strike aircraft”, strike aircraft and interceptors are becoming multirole :-)
@TD: given we can only launch TLAM from subs at the moment, we might be a bit optimistic to assume we would both compromise the stealth of our “ace in the hole” SSN and be able to sustain the multiple attacks required to keep a runway out of action over a period of days or weeks. Given the density of runways even in third world countries, without real time recce of such locations, I think that’s a problem that would be very hard to solve. These Storm Shadows we are going to use: do we have a spare Vulcan to launch them from? :-)
@TD – I’m afraid not. Carrier Strike has never been about hopping onto a ship occasionally and I have access to the “earliest” documents you like, dating from 1996 onwards. Outer layer AD is not mentioned now because the current “owner” of the capability and budget finds it easier to pretend taht T45 can do it and there is no need for a f/w maritime AD capability.
No other carrier operator in the world pretends that you can live on land most of the time and then embark occasionally, so why should the UK? Conversely, ship-based air can and does disembark and provide the equivalent to land-based capability on a regular basis.
You still have not explained why if embarked carrier capability was a core requirement of JFH (which it was), that capability was arbitrarily cut, while retaining a much larger Tornado force that was required to deliver only a small TELIC det – certainly not the Defence main effort.
As for lusting after CVF/JCA, remember who owned the SHAR aircraft and budget at the time of retirement and owns the JCA budget.
@ Simon – I think you’ll find that the air-to-air role is still a major part (and performance driver) of their role. It’s not that the need for AD has gone away, it’s that multi-role capability (something the FAA has usually done) is more useful than a single role capability – something the RAF is only just grasping. If you want to understand that better, try this – Sea Hawk, Sea Venom, Scimitar, Sea Vixen, Phantom, NOT Buccaneer, Sea Harrier. All capable of multi-role and trained as such. Then compare and contrast – Javelin, Harrier GR1-9, Jaguar, Lightning, TSR2, Tornado GR, Tornado F2-3 and Buccaneer. All operated and trained as single-role capability. Typhoon has only had the GA capability funded in extremis.
Obviously, Hunter does not fall into this category as it was a superb aircraft, but like Sea Hawk could only do day A2A as no air intercept radar.
wf,
1. That’s great if you get the threat axis correct.
2. You’re burning aviation fuel at 100t a day for every CAP (150t for F35).
3. I’d be using ASaC to give me 200nm visibility.
Still relaxed.
@ wf
There’s nothing “temporary” about the need for attacking aircraft such as the Entedard (or however you spell it) to pop up to 5,000 ft, twice, in order to first scan for targets and then to get them locked in.
As for the missile engagement time, without completely accurate data about the height of the radar above the waterline then it’s difficult to be certain, but against an Exocet you’re looking at somewhere between 90-140 seconds, depending on which numbers you use for the radar height.
@ Simon,
Not entirely sure about the SHAR to be honest. One torygraph article that I though had the needed info in fact was full of shit, including two golden nuggets that “Harriers shot down 80% of Argentine aircraft over the Falklands” (try about 30%, the majority of them Daggers) and this from Mr.S.Ward;
“All Harrier versions are very slow compared with other fast jet attack/fighters. The GR9 will therefore be unable to get close to an attacking aircraft in order to engage it and will be unable to escape from any fast jet fighter seeking to attack them,”
Which would beg the question that if the Harrier were such a slow and useless piece of tripe, how indeed were he and his comrades able to score so many kills in it?
Still trying to find that quote about carriers.
Simon, You are both half right, dependent on the threat you tend to use both.
APATS,
Ever the politician ;-)
Chris B, Harriers scored kills in the FIs as they had a state of the art 360 degree engagement heat seeking missile and the Argentinians did not.
Ugh, can’t find it now.
In a nutshell what the chap was saying is that all that business about a moving deck etc and the ship moving forwards but with an angled deck is basically just comparable to making a crosswind landing in a normal aircraft, that the shortness of the runway is something fairly common to even civilian pilots who routinely “touch down” in only an actual short portion of their runways, and that all this is supplemented by the “meatball” and being talked in.
I think he said the hardest part is remembering on the glide approach that the throttle now controls your altitude and the pitch of the nose controls your speed.
NAB, I should have said JFH and ultimately carrier strike was predicated on baseline plus surge, early entry via the deck and transition to land bases for the long haul, hence why STOVL was always the preferred choice because it supported this model.
I am sure I read in evidence that 1SL was specifically asked about JCA and air defence and his reply was very very firmly on the strike element, hence being able to slide FA2 out. Will have to dig it out.
No arguments from me about sea based personnel transitioning to land based easily but the problem with that is it doesn’t come free, hence the baseline plus surge model.
This is what JFH and therefore CVF and therefore Carrier Strike and therefore CEPP is based on, the ability to maintain a kernel of permanent sea based capability with the ability to surge should you need to using personnel and aircraft that are usually land based and therefore cheaper all round.
The Tornado v Harrier capability has been done to death but are you sure Tornado stayed at exactly the same level post SDSR and as we know support to Afghanistan trumps any existing requirement except the deterrent. I always thought it would be better to save both and reduce them to make savings but you only save the big bucks by deleting entire types, not a slice off the top of both.
So therefore it was actually a very easy decision to make, Tornado could support Herrick to the planned end date PLUS provide other capabilities and capacity for ‘elsewhere’ and crudely put, JFH could not.
The need for big savings and Afghanistan therefore was a higher priority that keeping a capability that has been used very rarely in the last 30 years where it was decisive precisely once.
Not ideal, I wish it hadn’t happened, a real loss.
But
Understandable and logical
You know as well as I do, project CVF has been numero uno for the RN and a whole range of other capabilities and quantities sacrificed on the altar to pay for it
TD I think the reason FA/2 was despatched in 2006 was that it was decreed that it coudn’t land back on with full weopon load (up to 4 x amraam) in hot and high climes. Lots of money dropped to a watery grave to save the A/C. Unfortunate as I and others have said before the FA/2 radar/missile combo was second to none. Last FA/2 sortie before retirement was FA/2 V F15 (Lakenheath 48 FW) over Wales. Guess who won.
@Simon: –
– aviation fuel is cheap.
– Threat axes have be covered by ships if aircraft are not available: this is why Sheffield was all on her lonesome 20NM away from the carriers, acting as a radar picquet in the absence of AEW.
– Aster has a maximum range of 70NM if it’s target obligingly sits at medium to high level only. If it dives when engaged, Sampson will lose it before the seeker on the missile acquires
– What do T45’s run off? Fresh air?
@ APATS
You have to admit that Sharkey’s quote, although intended for a modern context, is still a little sensationalist. By his quote the SHAR should not have been able to get close to the Daggers, which per his quote should have slaughtered the hapless Harriers.
@ Simon
While searching for the original quote I came across this one instead, which will have to do for now;
“It was the same with carrier landings. Long before actually landing on a carrier we practiced at an auxiliary landing field. We went over the routine again and again and again, getting comfortable with the procedure. As with dive bombing, the first attempts were tense, scary, and flashed by much too quickly. Again, the immediate concern was doing it safely more than doing it well. But, as usual, there comes a time when things slow down and you “get ahead of the plane,” so you can make it do what you want, rather than just reacting to whatever is happening. Then out to the ship to do it for real. Make six OK landings and you’re qualified”.
wf,
– AVCAT is cheap. Shifting it 4000nm is not!
– And the ships that cover the threat axis that cannot be covered by CAP would use what to take out the threat?
– Sampson may lose the target but ASaC won’t.
– For every T45 I’m running you’re running a carrier and a squadron of jets.
The third point I’m not sure can actually happen at the mo. i.e. Aster targeting hand-off to ASaC.
Perhaps we should stop this. I will yield that for long range engagement you need jets, simples. However, in exchange, will you yield that a fleet can be (and currently is) defended by Daring?
Simon, What I meant is that there is rarely a hard and fast answer. Let us take a generic CVF task group poised off the coast of country Y. Before entry into the area of operations and a posture decide upon considerations will include.
Enemy Capabilities. (most likely or most dangerous COA)Will they simply launch an attack without further warning? Will there be gradual escalation.
1. Number of air bases and ability to suppress them is the threat axis readily identifiable?
2. Are the enemy night capable and what is their combat readiness.
3. What type and number of aircraft and missiles do they possess. If they have the ability to reload then then tragetting the aircraft is a priority if they have very few ASHM then the missiles can be engaged.
4. Is there a valid sub surface threat which may prevent 45 being outside of the screening ASW units to act as a picket?
5. What capabilty does the enemy air defence network possess is a strike possible utilising organic fast air from the CVF or should TLAM be used?
Own capabilities. (what is my mission)
1. How many aircraft do we have a vailable, flying hours available, AVCAT, AEW assets. can we maintain 24hr CAP, do we need to?
2. Do we have logistics support to sustain the effort, AVCAT, Ammo etc or are we time limited?
3. Do we have a stand off strike capability against enemy air bases and defence network, is that from a TLAM SSN or air launched weapon.
4. If we use the SSN for a TLAM launch does it adversely affect our ASW ability.
5. What sort of missiles do the enemy have, what sort of seker do they use, how is our soft kill capability against this missile, how far out would we expect to detect it.
6. what is the ROE for closing radar contacts would and hostile intent will I need a visual ID vefore shots are fired.
7. what is the current PPI.
Once you have looked at these factors and many more you decide upon the screen layout, use of any attached submarines, possible use of a radar picket. posture of fixed wing air, alert status or CAP, day only or 24 7.
So you see there are no hard and fast answers.
@Simon: I would agree a fleet can be defended to a degree by ship SAM’s only. But I would aver that against a serious threat, you require armed aircraft to threaten and/or take down the launching aircraft.
I would assume that if Aster goes below the horizon, we would lose datalink to the missile as that would be coming from the T45. It would certainly be nice to have a datalink in ASAC7….
@Chris.B: both the USN and USMC “fly the ball” to landing on their land bases most of the time, although they don’t use arrestors, in order to maintain currency
APATS,
When I play these things out in my mind I tend to consider an enemy that has almost exactly the same assets as we do. This means we almost always need to engage at arms reach – the limit of our reach and hopefully out of theirs (this is what we did in the Falklands with our carriers).
At the 300nm (for 24-7 cover) or 600nm for SEAD this means we’d need to police up to 600nm of enemy coastline (assuming a straight coast).
This means 2 x CAP (at least), which is the entirety of the aircraft we’ll deploy on CVF leaving precious little to actually do the SEAD operations that precede an invasion.
This is where T45 comes in. Allowing us to screen attacks whilst fully utilising our strike capability.
This is the first step in an invasion/assault/retake. I haven’t even got to steps 2 and 3.
Perhaps I’m assuming too much from the enemy?
Just as a spot of reality…
Given Defence Planning Assumptions state that UK ONLY operations will be at SMALL SCALE
What UK ONLY scrap do we envisage getting into that requires the following layers
Offensive counter air from at the very least TLAM, plus maybe Stormshadow
Air defence from carrier borne fast jets supported by airborne early warning, again, sea based
Area air defence from T45 (the same ones that can shoot golf balls down from a gazillion miles)
Air defence from Sea Wolf/Sea Ceptor
Close in defence from Phalanx
Soft kill, ECM etc
6 layers of the onion
Answer that and they answer this one
Defending what, at what scale, again, UK ONLY
Just wondering
@ wf
Then that’s hardly a difficult thing to introduce for squadrons that are ear marked for Carrier Landings, along with deliberately using runway approaches that will incur cross winds in order to keep skills up to a high order.
TD,
Full scale naval engagement with the blockade that Brazil cook up when they side with Argentina following escalation of the Falklands issue?
Think Defence,
Well the obvious answer is the Falklands.
The second answer is any country(given our inability to see strategic shocks coming) I will not use an example that can afford a squadron or 2 of Sukhois or Migs on teh open market. purchase a few ASMs and know how to disperse aircraft!
Also where does it say small scale UK only?
Defending an ARG putting a couple of Royal Marine Commandoes ashore is hardly large scale.
Also answer me this?
Why should we not be providing this capability as part of a NATO or EU force?
Damn fine counter APATS :)
However,
The Falklands assumes that the other layers of the onion have failed, namely diplomacy, defence and deterrence.
If I had to spend a pound it would be across those rather than to reinforce failure by planning for a glorious retaking of an occupied islands so although I can see some validity in the Falkland Islands for that argument it is rather thin.
The point I am making is that the scale at which we need all that where we will stand alone is very limited but your point about offering that at a greater scale as part of a coalition is equally valid
@ TD / APATS,
leaving your points aside, and taking TD’s statements about UK only at small scale (i.e. Bn size intervention – a Brigade is medium scale), there is an implicit logic that states that if Carlos Fandango gets ashore in Bn or greater strength, then we have no counter.
In the real world, it would not work like that. He’d need to put a Division or more ashore before we acknowledge that we cannot kick him off, and we’d be going balls out and throwing every unit we can find onto STUFT and sailing them south.
But, the budgets follow DPAs, and that is where we have a problem.
@ NAB ‘while retaining a much larger Tornado FE@R that was required only to sustain an equivalent det on TELIC.’
Not really, planning assumptions had it tasked at a greater rate to do both Telic and Herrick with 8 surge to 10 at the same time. The phrase at the time was ‘duel ops’ various issues got in the way and it didn’t happen but it wasn’t done, as suggested, to somehow knock the JFH and by default the FAA.
‘All operated and trained as single-role capability. Typhoon has only had the GA capability funded in extremis.’
Some of those a/c you’ve listed are multi-role and trained for such. And I’m not sure the first list is so multi role as you suggest. The lists are in a/c terms generations apart. It makes comparison a little weak.
James, I am on your side on the FI being easily taken. My thoughts were more laong the lines of an unprovoked attack on a CBG possibly dispatched South as a show of force. It was in this sort of scenario I would advocate the layers of defence.
TD,
While sidestepping the ongoing (dark) blue-on- (light) blue argument I just want to take on the specifics of your argument
1) The current defence posture statement is wishful twaddle, ginned up by two specific High Tory/financial sector/Right Sort of Chaps Dontcherkow named Cameron and Osborne, regardless of what other members of their own government, party, and species at large may think, because wars are another one of those grotty things — even against the likes of Hitler or Nappy or Kaiser Bill (just go read one of Niall Ferguson’s apologias) — that crimp the style of finance by imposing public debt.
2) Doesn’t even take UK only scenarios (although I could list a non-Brazilian scenario in Those Islands and a sudden collapse of Nigeria round about 2020 when the French say “hey, this ostcolonial mess is on you” and the only flat deck the Americans have in the Atlantic has loads of marines but only six fast jets and none of the neighbours, watching the big kid on the block have a psychotic break are keen on basing rights. Add to that it will take time as lives are lost to gt two or thrr squadrons of Tiffs set up on Ascension and enough refueling capacity in place even with American or French help if they’re not busy elsewhere.) All you have to do is alter one factor: subtract the Americans. At that point, as you have to introduce British ground forces by logistics over the shore and the only other meaningful carrier navies are France and –solely in the Mediterranean basin where the “unsinkable carrier” of the Italian mainland can back them up — Italy, it’s an issue. Algeria implodes? Well, God help us, but even if you commit the crabs and Armee de l’Air in the US’s absence they will be busy clearing the skies of enemy jets and “shaping the strategic environment” by bombing sexy stuff inland rather than clearing the sea approaches and securing the beachead in three dimensions. (I’m not assuming an Iraq-style occupation here, just an effort to rescue expats from potential massacre and tilt the fighting in favour of a faction HMG and allies approve.) Likewise if Cyprus goes south in Greco-Turkish conflict after another debt crisis or two (all those SSKs on both sides? Again landward air forces trying to interpose between will be busy and the Russians are refitting Kuznetzov because they’re aware you need air cover for your sub/ASW assets.) Or if Morocco goes south after Mohammed VI and gets into it with Melilla and Ceuta with Gib in the firing line. Or the Russians in the 2020s decide they want to own the gates to Europe’s Arctic passage — Finnmark and Svalbard — and the Yanks no longer wish to risk Armageddon over two bits of tundra. Or Libya explodes again and your Opfor is smart enough to keep Euro expats “for their own safety” but things get fluid and their mercenaries run amok and you have to act fast. Or Angola implodes with similar provisos to the Nigerian scenario. I haven’t even gotten to the Horn of Africa yet. Or a post-chavez government friendlier to the US that still decides they want the Antilles’ oil. And so on.
The thing about introducing a kitted-out carrier task force into that mix, for the UK, is a bit like physical rehab, relearning skills and possibilities lost for some time. When you actually have a flat top with more than half a dozen SHAR, plus amphibs attached, that’s actually at sea, your capacity to react quickly (in days to a week) with a range of capability is much greater than before. Flying in Spearhead is bold and maybe necessary. But in terms of what you can airlift behind them *quickly* with UK assets (or UK plus a little bit of French or US aid) to a hostile environment pales to owning a sea lane, taking a beachead, and rolling out an Army brigade, a big ‘un, with proper kit that in an attack of sanity and recognition your carrier group gives you “door kickers,” you have prepositioned on Points for such an occasion. And for lesser included cases its good old fashioned escalation dominance in one convenient package. (You don’t use a sledgehammer to crack a walnut, but you can bloody well bludgeon a snake to death with it whether it’s a Burmese python or a garter, and some of these may be smart enough to slither off.) When you have to maximise effect from straitened resources, that’s a lot of use from one formation.
APATS,
I’m not entirely sure your scenario is that likely – what would it achieve or gain for Carlos Fandango? We’d be seriously pissed off, and he still would not have the islands. Also, if he were for some reason to try it on against a CBG, I think he’d have more success (= damage done) with a submarine attack, with the added bonus of a chance at least that his submarine will escape and he can deny all knowledge.
@TD
1SL at the time was Alan West and the phrase he used was along the lines that he was “content to take risk at this time”, but this was not meant to imply he was content to lose the capability forever. In fact it assumed a T45 ISD in around 2008 and a CVF/JCA ISD in 2014.
At the time, the Navy were very sensitive to the accusation (guess where from) that Fleet AD meant defending the carrier, which was usually followed by the phrase “self-licking lollipop”, when in fact it also means defending the wider fleet (amphibs, MCMV, strat lift, troops ashore)and with varying demand over time. However, they were right to emphasise strike as that is the primary role of a carrier (or at least one with more than a handful of aircraft). It’s just that the Fleet defence one is there too for at least some of a campaign. One of the reasons the ships are big is so that they can do both, comfortably.
Tornado vs Harrier has been done to death post-SDSR and as I suggested this is not to re-open that debate. However, we’re not talking about the SDSR decision, rather the decision made in around 2007/2008 (a full two years before SDSR) to reduce the JFH FE@R, when at the time the large Tornado force was only committed to TELIC, whereas the relatively smaller JFH was committed to both HERRICK and carrier.
I am well aware that post-SDSR the Tornado force has also been reduced, but that is not the point – the reason JFH could not sustain embarked or “elsewhere” capability post 2007 is that it’s FE@R was cut then. Funnily enough, a decision which much later contributed to the “Tornado rather than Harrier” decision in SDSR.
Finally, I fail to see how a land-based component is somehow cheaper all round. You still pay the personnel and you still pay for the aircraft, or is this based on the other myth that they’ll be so busy training to do CV-embarked ops that they can’t do anything else?
@Simon – carrier positioning on Corporate was dictated by a relatively weak position regarding aircraft numbers coupled with a lack of AEW. Had we had a half-decent AEW capability, the carriers would have been able to close and either use a longer CAP, or a CAP plus alert, or even a pure alert posture.
You are also falling for the myth that QEC will only ever embark 12 aircraft. That is a planning assumption driven by the current owner of the JCA budget (guess who) and not how you would actually conduct that sort of campaign. If you are going up against an enemy with capable jets and aircrew, let’s be quite clear – you’ll be taking as many jets as you can squeeze aboard! An analogy is to suggest that when facing an enemy with a capable air force, you would deploy only strike aircraft and leave AD to SAMs around the airfield. Does that sound like good tactics to you?
This is the reason QEC/JCA is viewed as a debacle – you have people whose entire interest lies in demonstrating that you don’t need to go to sea in great numbers, doing the planning. Is there not a slight conflict of interest there?
However, much easier to bash the navy who bought a ship that’s too big and too expensive (must be as it’s so much larger than the CVS), rather than examine who keeps b8ggering about with the CONOPS for the aircraft.
People talk about the “capabilities” that the RN has “sacrificed to pay for QEC”. The reason they have been fought so hard for, is that they are an intrinsic part of maritime capability, without which the other elements, particularly anything to do with operating away from the UK and projecting power are much diminished to the point that their utility in anything other than constabulary operations is limited. And remember – QEC will consume about 6.5% of the total procurement budget (£54Bn) of programmes post Main Gate according to the last NAO Major projects report. The T45, Astutes and QEC comprise about 24% of that total (£13Bn). Typhoon, A400M and FSTA account for 61% of that total (£33Bn). Perhaps people ought to talk about the “capabiliities sacrificed to pay for the RAF”.
Just a thought……
@Topman – IIRC Tornado wasn’t ready to operate from Khandahar much before 2009 when it finally went out. In any case, 16-20 from a total of 140-ish GR4 (I know that’s not the same as FE@R) is a bit easier to accept FE@R reductions in than 16-20 from a for of 67-ish, surely?
As for teh aircraft list, I appreciate the generational gap. However, my point was to try and demonstrate that the FAA have always had a multi-role ethos, whereas the RAF have not necessarily had the same, in fact going so far as to single-type stations. I’m afraid I struggle to think of any of the RAF aircraft listed that had a true multi-role capability or trained for as such. Happy to be corrected – this is not intended to be an RAF are evil rant – but maritime air is I’m afraid something that the RAF just don’t get and have little interest in doing so.
@ NAB,
those programmes added together consume 85% of the procurement budget, which in my simple soldier maths means there is 15% left to pay for “everything else”, not all of which goes to the Army. And it is the Army + RM who achieve the decisive effect in most operations, or at least that is the plan. Not all operations since WW2 certainly, but most.
@ NBOT
‘IIRC Tornado wasn’t ready to operate from Khandahar much before 2009 when it finally went out. In any case, 16-20 from a total of 140-ish GR4 (I know that’s not the same as FE@R) is a bit easier to accept FE@R reductions in than 16-20 from a for of 67-ish, surely?’
It was ready yes there were other issues. With it covering (or at least planned to cover) both it needed an uplift in FE@F (who made that up I don’t know!) the kit was waiting around for quite a long time to go into theatre. The diamond fleet stood up, logs ready, extra engines through ROCET sat waiting. Not to get back into the afore mentioned debate but if Harrier was in neither theatre and GR4 in both, it would be logical to increase the latter’s and decrease the former’s. Possibly but it’s set to work load if it drops off so does FE@R.
Yes in larger numbers than the FAA in a historic sense we were able to go single type in more things for example in the 1950’s. From a logistical effort (and other reasons) it made sense to go single platform where possible it was done quite on purpose. The GR did strike, recce, SEAD, nuc role and anti shipping. The F3 did SEAD and AD. Buccs did anti shipping, nuc role and strike. I’m not going through the rest, just to say I feel it a little unfair and unbecoming of yourself to say ‘something we’re just grasping’ it’s not new.
This isn’t a ‘we’re whiter than white’ I just feel that things are looked at (speaking generally) with an already predetermined view. This then gives huge weight to certain evidence and other point ignored and the pudding is then over egged. To be controversial but genuine, I don’t think the RN’s interest in air is as great as it is stated online either.
Hi James, the 85%(those programmes added together consume 85% of the procurement budget, which in my simple soldier maths means there is 15% left to pay for “everything else”, not all of which goes to the Army. And it is the Army + RM who achieve the decisive effect in most operations) is past main gate only & major projects, not of the proc budget
– other than Typhoon, they are all about expeditionary/ power projection that make up the 85
– I agree that army/RM are nowhere to be seen: recce wagons will come in with low profile because of very low numbers from 2015, PASCAT has pretty much disappeared from the radar screen. Other than UAVs and tactical networks, what is there actually in the works?
@ James. Correct. I’ve said earlier that the army/RM have perhaps not got their fair share (other than through UOR and that’s a separate debate). However, you will hopefully now agree that QEC is not the cause of the squeeze, rather some other large programmes…..
@Topman. I didn’t mean to decry the range of air to surface roles – of course there are many shades. However, in general I hope you’d agree there have been “air defenders” and “strike (inc SEAD) role specialisation.
My point re the Harrier / GR4 was that in 2007 when GR4 was in only one, then surely it was easier to absorb e FE@R reduction in taht force rather than in JFH.
I am absolutely certain that some senior RN don’t understand what the potential of QEC/JCA is and are nowhere near as “air-minded” as they should be. That is not however an argument for effectively disbanding the FAA, rather one for re-educating their Lordships.
The Public Accounts Committee has been probing the carriers today.
No decisions yet on whether to switch back to the F35B. No explanation as to delays announcing a decision or in answering a number of questions. No costs for all the reports and examination of the available options. No estimates of costs for any aircraft.
Investigation of the various recent leaks has apparently been instigated though.
@ NaB
‘However, in general I hope you’d agree there have been “air defenders” and “strike (inc SEAD) role specialisation.’
Yes I agree to certain extent it’s more complex than my brush stroke earlier, different skill sets even under just ‘strike’ can be quite challenging regardless of service. On the flip side a more ‘basic’ dual role needn’t be the be all and end all either.
Not to be awkard for the sake, no I’m afraid I don’t. In terms of FE@R although other areas come into it,one of the main areas, if not the, is a/c availability. A/c available for carriers ops (in pure availability sense) is no different than an exercise in the US to FE@R numbers. I said these points are rarely spoken of it’s all looked at through one view point all ready set in stone.
Absolutely I agree, I just wonder how often that is ignored conveniently or otherwise and that lack of interest spun into some sort of vague but never ending RAF plot to wipe out the FAA. I never really see balance, how often do you see the times there has been support given to the FAA (and the AAC for that matter) frontline or otherwise, brought up to balance the debate? Very rare indeed.
In fairness to James there are a few things that ought to go on the shopping list for the khaki: a sensible 8×8 family to supplement any remaining Warriors and Fire-Belching Chobhamized Castles of Death (TM), a rationalisation of mortars and ammo, and for their friends with the Fairbairn-Sykeses, PACSCAT back on the agenda (since that’s of a piece with a combined-arms power projection “package”.) All of which is to say, in a rebuilding period after grindng the Forces down to a nub in two sandboxes, the procurement budget is too low. If this were any other country — like for example the US or Canada — I would’ve said Hammond’s public plea that CATOBAR was unaffordable was not self-flagellation but rather a play to *get* the money out of the government by going round the sofa to various, old-school french cuffed patriots in the 1922 Club and their attendant newspapermen. Of course this is Britain we’re talking about, where bewailing institutional poverty and decline is a kind of inverse snobbery about how great things once were to fall so far. But elsewhere that (saying there’s not enough dosh in order to acquire said dosh) is how things are often done.
The glacial testing pace with B and C alike (maybe more so with B since, despite flaws, it’s landing on ships already) borders on the criminal. Allowing the carrier business to become (by the mid-noughties, long since) the “floaty things to land F35 on” business likewise. The complete lack of testicles on the part of the government to say, “look, you lot in DC, if you want us to cover the Atlantic for you jointly with France while you retrench into the global East, you’re going to need to get a fucking move on and give us more early production slots at a price we can pay” still more so. Don’t get me started on the dragging this out rather than building a marinised Typhoon or Son-of-Harrier (both of which, especially the latter, could’ve seen exports) which means, on top of the Sandbox Wars, there’s now no money assigned for a new LPH which means the carriers need to double up as a light fleet carrier (ca. 20-24 fast jets) and an LPH (with at least RM plus bayonets and bergens, kit stowed on on auxiliary JSS) in the same hull despite the fact that hull’s hangar space shrank in planning from the 50 that would’ve accomodated such comfortably to a smidge over 40 if you pack tight. Ye gods.
And back on the specific topic of aircraft purchase rather than the politics of leaks I’d rate, again, three reasonable possibilities now:
– C all ’round, promising loadsa-loadsajam tomorrow, well, erm, 2025, ish, sort of. Makes everyone happy with bright promises but just to get sweary again it is meaningfully fucking useless for both flavours of blue because a lot of middens are going to hit the windmill between now and then with an American hyperpower vastly less inclined to shovel them up unless there’s meaningfully large amounts of oil (even there DC would rather have passed on Libya) or Skeery Mooslims or Chinese ambition involved.
– Divorce Italian style: B enough for a carrier wing (ca. 50, I suspect when Rafale M ends its build life that’s all the French will have for CdeG), plus A enough (ca. 90, on paper at least, so around the original 138 figure with some other government to foot the bill) for RAF post-Tornado.
– A dangerous outbreak of sanity involving **putting CATOBAR on effing HMS Queen Elizabeth and not sodding about like you’re going to sell the thing as per SDSR** and then her sister as well, with Rafale to get a wing aboard at least one of them, and some whole new saga ref: FOAS for the light blue. This is just going to end up pouring on lighter fluid, but I do find it interesting the degree to which RAF plans to skate on past Tiffy to new-and-shiny despite destroying their own budget lines a couple of times over with the former, as though nothing had happened. That more than any other detail of the light-and-dark back and forth irks me with regard to the RAF position.
This is all rather sad its back to we want the c version because the airforce did us over in 2008 rather than what we want the capability for and this is why said a/c delivers it. Well it wasn’t 2010 or 2008 or 1998 that doomed the harrier force the date was 1988 yes that long ago.
Back then the raf took the decision for harrier gr5 and the navy wanted the falklands wonder updated to fa2. From then on they were never compatible and never ever effective on their own for anything like what we really wanted. What we should have done is in 1991 is gone for 100 av8b plus to replace all harrier variants and jaguar and then had tornado as a strike fighter a/c in gr1 and f3 essentially two fleet of a/c. Typhoon could then off been tornados replacement. However the germans did for that with their wobbliness of increasing it range so we got essentially a f18 hornet with a f15 supersonic performance in a European fighter and a great big mess to sort out.
This takes us to my current thinking and the LAST change to sort this out or we end up in the crap again for 2 decades. I see it either two ways JFH was done for due to FE@R never good enough to really do whats required and near really a gd enough a/c either. So if the f35c is the choice deemed the one then quite simple the entire fast jet needs to be f35C and we need to do that between now and 2030 only way it works.
Would require about 160 a/c 8-10 sqns allowing sufficient pilot numbers and fleet size to allow sufficient FE@R to be q land strike and carrier ready with sufficient surge capacity who operates it I care not but ideal say 6 raf 3 rn sqn. This would be done by starting the f35c buy now tranche 1 typhoon go as planned tornado held to 2020 in DPOC role with typhoon tranche 3 order diverted to both Saudi and oman allowing us to integrate paveway 4/brimstone only on typhoon and running tranche 2 jet through to OSD of 2030 and a full f35 buy achieved. This doesn’t mean e2 hawkeye and ucavs on ships thats essentially pointless. If your doing large strike packages the only a/c to support that is E3D nothing else is event in the same ball park and with the stragetic ISTAR triad we have information centric air operations by 2030 carriers get seaking stuff transferred to merlin for task group pop up defense.
Option 2 is we go with the B version and have the carriers operate as a us marines style evolved expeditionary strike group (see bold alligator for direction) as door kickers in the go anywhere first responders in the shape of about 4/5 sqns, 90 a/c and the RN and RAF learn to play nice and operate similar to JFH nature. Tornado goes quickly about 2016 typhoon gets to 5 sqns asap gets conformal, and all tornado cleared weapons asap with a aesa radar upgrade late this decade numbers stabilise around 100 this force compliments the b for larger operations and provides Q. Possible future replacement of typhoon pushed past 2030 to early to think about now. ISTAR is as with option 1 but perhaps an osprey or two for long range assault.
Dont know if anyone has the balls to do either option but someone needs to make a decision apparently we cant at present due to election on may 1.
BB,
No surprises on all fronts then :) I wouldn’t have thought it earlier, given the semblance of methodical work (five separate work lines for investigation, etc.) on the subject, but it is now starting to look like CamerBorne are drowning in their own flopsweat and hoping, like optimistic third-formers, that the exam they didn’t study for will go away if dadders calls the school. Nick Price’s report on the Army has gone missing as well. I would expect some degree of conflict between the two (structuring air power around the carriers or not vs. the Army looking to maintain fighting weight and personnel size at the end of a saecular era of Cold War occupation and post-imperial brushfire wars.) Even in better economic times. But this really is starting to look and sound like a train wreck, where a plan to look “reasonable” by slicing Defence to bits for savings while going softly-softly on other hits at public funding (the assault on NHS in England to free up opportunities for American health-management outfits with British shareholders to step in and make pots of money) is coming unraveled. And, more generally, an approach to austerity that hasn’t been (per Chris B.’s sensible comment in the five-percent thread) about bringing the economy back to life but rather about rehabilitating the borrowing power of the b(w)ankers who helped set all this off under Gordon the Toad. If Defence gets (don’t say the word aloud, it’s so foul) a stimulus, lots of other departments and private industries that aren’t about “blowing things up” will want the same and then the wolves are well and truly at their heels. But they can’t not do something, not in front of the party elders, because that will reek of yet more incompetence and unfitness to lead. Bad day to be an old Etonian in politics, then, I expect.
I wonder if we’re being set up for a dual purchase of F-35Cs for the Navy and F-35Bs for the RAF? Or Perhaps F-35Cs for the Navy and F-35As for the RAF?
One thing is now clear. If we buy the F-35C, the role of the Tornado is ceded to the Navy. I am sure this is unpalatable for the RAF.
It seems that the F-35 in either A or C guise can effectively substitute the Tornado. While the F-35B may not be as capable as either the A or C in terms of range, if it fulfils the requirement it will be significantly better than the Harrier.
When the UK cancelled the TSR2, we opted for the F-111 instead, which was the first swing wing fighter/ bomber to see service. It was revolutionary at the time. It went through similar teething troubles and budget escalations, but when it finally came into service it proved its worth for several decades in both USAF and Australian Air Force service. It has been a formidable strike aircraft.
We binned our F-111 order and went for the Phantom at a time when the Phantom was halfway through its lifecycle. As good as our Phantoms were, they needed to be retired long before the USAFs F-111s. I believe the Aussies kept their F-111s in service until 2010.
So, I think we should stick with the F-35 whatever happens – any talk of buying Rafaels or Super Hornets is ridiculous – these aircraft are well past their prime and will have only a limited shelf life. I don’t think we should worry about which version we buy, because all will achieve their goals.
In choosing one version over another, we need to think about cost. A lot of the criticism is based on unfounded waffle. The B actually weighs less than the C. It uses only marginally more file when making STOVL landings as opposed to CATOBAR ones.
@ jackstaff ‘ sailing past typhoon onto new and shiney ‘ how did you come to that conclusion?
Sorry about the site going tits up this evening
Am going to have to get my arse into gear this weekend and get it upgraded
Might have to drop it back to a vanilla format for a short time just to give us some breathing space
re; some of the stick for the RAF for not being interested in certain missions. Wasn’t the whole purpose of the Jag’s to be dedicated to ground attack and recon?
@ chris b yes those and the nuc role earlier on.
Cracking post Mark, very difficult to disagree with any of that
In general, I am with James in broad terms, in the last 20 or 30 years we have spent far too much on fast jet aviation, either land or sea based.
Whatever the arguments, and I guess those will never be resolved so I am thinking its time to agree to disagree, we need to actually PAY ATTENTION to every single lessons learned report from the same last 30 years, none of which said we are short of fast pointy jets but always in short supply of decent vehicles, personal equipment, spares, maintenance kit, ISTAR, combat engineering, support helicopters, training, IT, mined countermeasures, down time, pay, welfare and logistics ad bloody infinitum.
i.e. THINGS WE ACTUALLY USE MOST BUT HAVE BUGGER ALL OF
Did any of you see my post on lessons learned from Libya, what struck me was SI/APATS comments about running out of targets for fast jets, i.e. too many fast jets.
But, we had to go begging the US for ISTAR, AAR etc etc
We are dangerously unbalanced and this is what we should remember when discussing this subject.
I agree that Typhoon has cost way too much and badly distorted all three services but lets not make the same mistake with CVF/JCA because the RN has some sort of sense of entitlement that it is its turn now
I agree that air has distorted the priorities, but the reason the Army has had such issues is more to do with it’s insane ability to endlessly demand gold plated nonsense while failing to keep up spending on production items. Failing to have significant programs “in production” doesn’t just screw up fleet life cycles, it ensures that the MOD assigns the monies to other priorities. It doesn’t mean every line has to be hot, just that one should be: build tanks for 5 years, IFV’s for 5, recce for 5 etc
TD. I will play a bit of devils advocate here. We have operated with complete impunity for the last 30 years thanks to (and I will use capitals as well)the complete AIR SUPREMACY given to us by the USN and the USAF. Both Gulf wars fought under a blanket of US jets which ensured the Iraqi air force was a non entity. The first night of Libya, with SSGN strikes and SEAD. The provision of ISTAR and AAR. The rotary wing assets we do have able to operate where they want with CAS on tap. In Libya only the US,Italians and French had a CSAR capability, thx to Maritime fixed wing assets.
Without the ability to achieve this ourselves or within a European NATO complex and a theatre entry capability you can have all the helos, vehicles you want (I disagree with personal kit these days) but they will be looking pretty parked somewhere as if the US do not get involved we cannot shape the battlefield for their deployment.
So yes to deep strike, AAR, ISTAR, SEAD and air superiority because without it we will not have bought enough A400m for the increase in body bags!
Fair points APATS but its a circle isnt it
The problem is we either cant afford or politically have no will to do it all.
This arguments always come back to scale and capabilities underpinned by a consistent and realistic strategy
We all get involved in these arguments because there is not enough resource
Is there an answer to that conundrum?
Not sure there is to be honest, very depressing isn’t?
Think I might start blogging about containers, the real big issues are just too depressing :)
Anyone fancy a pint
The indexing problem only seems to be on this thread
… testing with this comment
Mark,
Sorry, I struggled to understand your last post (re the two options). Are you saying:
1. F35C only (you say entire fast jet fleet).
2. F35B and Typhoon.
???
APATS,
I was going to say the same thing.
For anyone that can answer: is 72 Tyhpoon enough to defend the UK mainland against the entire Russian air force operating at range (I’ve just picked a silly example, but you get what I mean)? Is 72 enough to cover the British Isle?
@ Chris B re Jag
Yes. The super little attack plane we got rid off just as we got into the thick of two land campaigns where the opposition had no air defence. The plane we scrapped after a well thought out, pragmatic, but innovative, and budget efficient upgrade to keep Eurofighter. What service scraps a good chunk of its more mundane but useful capabilities to keep a vanity project alive? :)
Somebody who knows about ‘planes should write about that Jag upgrade programme as it is a model of how such projects should be done.
…I suppose that was a bit of a leading question.
Here’s my fast jet inventory:
72 Typhoon: no tranch 3, no conformals, stop spending money on making it a strike aircraft. Speed is the key to interception. F35 is slow.
72 F35: 24 F35B + 48 F35C (or 72 F35C if we can afford the covert the carriers). Stealth is the key to strike. Typhoon is not.
X @ 8.36
I have put this point forward before.
If we needed a Tornado capability out into the medium term why did we not treat it in the manner that Jaguar was managed in its last decade.
Low investment / high output mode – large amounts of flexibility including an efficient maintenance regime and a focused but productive upgrade path.
How many squadrons are we running at the moment – my guess is 4 so we are looking at a front line of 48 or 64 aircraft from a much larger pool of working airframes.
This should not be a high cost operation.
1280 civil contractors would cost £70-80mill pa.
The one question would revolve around the current upgrade path and it’s associated costs?
Are we planning to spend big and then retire?
The big issue is the fact that the RAF can’t walk and chew gum at the same time.
We should have been able to support both the Harrier and the Tonado in VFM run out mode.
That we can’t or don’t want to is a damming indictment of the MOD / RAF / stupid politicians overseeing the whole shambles.
Finally – is the RAF credible if it runs itself down to 6 squadrons of fast jets?
For me I think we need a New Model Airforce.
Less nice chaps looking for an education subsidy and more people wanting to fly.
We need to re-introduce a light fighter dimension to the mix.
FBOT,
We need to re-introduce a light fighter dimension to the mix.
Most of the people on the “education subsidy” when I studied were in fact people that wanted to fly, and indeed did.
Do you mean CHEAP and light?
OUCH
http://www.parliamentlive.tv/Main/Player.aspx?meetingId=10685
@ FBOT
I will respond when the site lets me see your comment. I can only read up to Chris’ comment last night at 10:52pm.
Simon @ 9.18
Are you telling me their is a light but expensive sector?
Light has to be cheap, if it was dear then it would be better for commonality to do more Heavy / Expensive.
As for the nice chaps wanting an private school education subsidy it would be for their sprogs not themselves. I think it became an issue in the late 70s possibly due to the abolishment of the direct grant schools.
You only have to look at journalism to see what the sprogs turned into.
X et al,
You need to use the [Newer Comments] button 1/4 way down the page.
FBOT,
I was thinking that there are 72 light jets going for about £100m, true they don’t have radar but hey, they’re still excellent value!
PS: I’ve heard they can also work from small ships ;-)
TD,
The “older” and “newer” page buttons are between the actual post and the comments – flippin annoying to scroll to all the time.
PS: For some reason the “Leakage and the F35 Saga” sends you to page 10, when there are 11 (probably 12 by now) pages.
i linked a site to TD which had a side by side table for gripen and typhoon showing what weapon systems they were already cleared for. I would like to see gripen in the CAS role with EJ200 fitted, and if it works (it can use all the same weapons as tiffy) Then get a deal for some sea griffs, already cleared for anti ship missile firing, good chance of UK assembly, and if the FAA want an all F-35 force then transfer sea gripen over to the RAF CAS role to have tiffy and gripen using the same engines and hopefully AESA radar (gripen already has it) would fit nicely into the TD “common chassis” theory. Plus the 2 seater can be a tanker so could keep that for AAR on the CVF, we are skint these are cheap, plus first CVF could have the arrestors fitted for gripen and therefore cheaper now and when in for refit half the job already done.
@ Simon
Thank you.
@ FBOT
I agree. One of my many quirks is the older the platform the more I like it and the more value I see that can be squeezed from it.
My comment re Jaguar was a gentle swipe at those who point at the RN for sacrificing everything for CVF. :)
Not wishing to go into Tornadao vs Harrier terrain but bearing in mind West’s stance on a lack of depth in the surface fleet I think lots of Tornado outweigh a few Harrier however much value the platform has in itself. Saying that Harrier in GR7/9 form isn’t that much of a loss. If the RAF had been serious about JFH (I am not sure of the timeline here) GR9 would have been AV8B so we would have not just the attack platform but a fleet air defence capability as well. Now losing those would have been a tragic mistake.
If we revert to the B, if we need to increase the range, for say a Long Range Storm Shadow First Strike? Would it not be beyond the realms of possibility to fit Fuel Tanks into the Internal Weapons Bays of the B, thus getting the range of the C?
If we do revert to the B, then we are going to either have to have some F-35b’s permanently fitted out as tankers.
Or look to the V-22 and palletise the AAR/AEW/ISTAR and COD mission. Pushing the boat out even further, if we were to purchase USAF Speacial Forces version with all the bells and whistles on it. The SAS/SBS
Bloody iPad. As I was saying, SAS/SBS finally get a dedicated aircraft.
Isn’t the V-22 the aircraft that repeatedly falls out of the sky? I was always wary of getting into a Chinook – the only aircraft in the RAF that can have a crash with itself, and normally flown by a Kevin with an inferiority complex because he flunked being a fast jet pilot. V-22 doesn’t even know whether it is a helicopter or a plane.
@James: it’s accident rate is actually fine now. But it’s serviceability rate is shit and it costs a fortune. YMMV
“that can have a crash with itself”
How does it do that? Or are you refering to the test where they thetered a Chinook down and let the resonance shake it to pieces?
@Observer: about 25 years ago we had a couple of Chinook blade sync issues with North Sea rig flights: I suspect that’s what James is thinking of. It wasn’t pleasant, but not aware of recent issues
paul g,
As a little project I designed a single EJ200 engined jet. I called it Storm.
I then found the Gripen and thought “what a waste of time that was”.
Trouble is that Gripen is getting bigger and bigger and heavier and heavier. It WAS excellent, I’m not so sure now.
Would it be more expensive to have 3/4 different aircraft and aircrew all doing different roles, or one aircraft which could be reroled in hours, where you only change the kit on the side of the aircraft and in the back and the system operators to suit your mission requirements.
Unfortunatly, Military aviation is never cheap.
@Simon: I’m probably very “un-Sprey”, but when it comes to manned combat aircraft I suspect the smart way it towards a large, long range craft with room for a two person crew, who’s function is to coordinate groups of UAV’s within line of sight.
The future lightweight fighter is a stealthy UAV, stealthy so we can avoid the highly complex air combat software and can concentrate on firing missiles on targets that humans elsewhere pick for it. Such a UAV can probably be designed for reduced airframe life and lower g limits, not quite a throwaway item but something not designed for more than 500 hours flight time. However, I suspect we have a decade to wait before it’s truly practicable, given the requirements
@ Observer / wf,
yes, the blade sync’ing issue. I also had a spectacularly poor experience once in a Chinook with my Scimitar underslung beneath it. Biggles up front did something wrong and the whole shebang started oscillating like a double-ended pendulum and had to be put down on the ground rather quickly. It was not even poor weather or windy. A track was thrown by the sideways landing and then Biggles and his mates buggered off declaring that they could not complete the lift. Bl**dy RAF.
wf,
I agree. My comment about light jets was quoting FBOT (trouble is I forgot to put quotes round it).
I think, as you say, there is a bit of time to go before we’re mass manufactuing semi-re-usable stealth UAVs.
James,
I’ve always dislike the Chinook – but it gives sterling service.
At least the V22 is symetrical which is useful for the aerodynamics bit. The blades don’t overlap, they’re just extrodinarily complex in the hub.
V22 “should” be a great solution.
I hate this wireless keyboard!
This recent debate highlights the issues with the B. All this “stuff” that people want to fit only works if it is within the bringback envelope which is incredibly weight-sensitive funnily enough.
Going for a STOVL carrier also brings the lunacy of proposing all sorts of V-22 mods which the primary operators (USMC & USAF) don’t seem to want, at least not to my knowledge. Which would mean UK picking up the entire development bill for what is already a very expensive aircraft. As a minor thought, anyone thought what flying in the wash of those two props might be like for AAR? You’re also right down towards the bottom edge of the envelope in terms of controllability, not good for a/c in close proximity.
Or, you could use MOTS solutions (E2, C2 at a stretch KS3B)when we can afford them and if we’re really smart get into a pooled servicing arrangement with the major operator, which ought to reduce the overall cost of capability.
But only if we opt for cats……
Where is the requirement for C2, people keep talking about it but have never seen how it would fit within our overall concept of operating CVF, as E2 to be honest.
Just because cats would open up the possibility of these extras does that automatically follow that cash will be found down the back of the sofa to fund them?
Not sure, but don’t think so.
NaB,
Are you talking about V22 for AEW? Surely that is a “bolt on” type fit rather than full development?
Besides, if we concentrate on UAV AEW we’ll only need V22 (if we’re not happy with 200nm range of Merlin) for assault – unmodified.
Let’s face it. We’re going to get F35B on an LHA with Merlin assault/ASW and AEW. It’s the cheapest solution and, at the mo, that’s all that matters… not to me, I might add.
But that is exactly all that matters because the MoD has to live within its means and provide a range of capabilities across all three services that do not unbalance and distort the rest
Very simple
Anyway, have a look at the Boxer bridge in Port Stanley
http://www.flickr.com/photos/hectorpatrick/4782093693/in/photostream/
TD,
Isn’t a C2 on board a bit like having a load of spares… that actually fly?
@TD: we buy fewer aircraft as the C has longer legs than B, the money becomes available. As with all MOD projects, it’s the cashflow that’s the issue.
Ideal option 1: lease AV8BPlus now to get us back into the game, continue with POW conversion. Buy F35C post 2020 after dust has settled and convert QE as well
Less ideal option 2: buy F18E/F now, speed up POW and QE conversion to reduce time without carrier cover. Perhaps look into reactivating F/A2 as an emergency measure
option 3: go for F35B and pray that it’s delivered and works OK
C2 would be OK for COD and AAR
I have a solution for AEW/ASaC platform but will not post it for fear of ridicule.
Well it is more a starting point for a possible solution……..
How heavy do we reckon an an AEW/ASaC module and dish would be?
Guesstimate = 1.6 tonnes.
Yes. I was thinking nothing more than 3 tonnes. Simply based on the Sea King Baggers.
I haven’t thought about electric………..
@TD – Which concept of operating the ship? The one currently driven by the JCA budget holder, that is more predicated on what can be achieved by the minimum number of a/c embarked than what might be required? Or the concept that may be required in about ten years once the world has changed again? It is easy and relatively cheap to change concepts and plans, far less so to change the hardware.
The nearest thing to a requirement for COD (which I guess you were refering to wrt the C2) is MITL. That might be better delivered by a heavy helo or it might be better with a long-range intra theatre asset (eg C2) and then distributed within force by helo. Makes no odds, the point I was getting at was that there is a C2 line, it is a simple aircraft. The E2 is also an active line, with a good number of allied users. The E2 requirement is under MASC, which was specifically re-titled from FOAEW circa 2000 to reflect the air co-ordination requirement rather than “pure” AEW. However, AEW is still a basic requirement unless the lessons learned from Corporate are to be given a stiff ignoring.
UAV solutions while very persistent don’t tend to have all the capabilities required. Not sure what has been looked at recently, but the old X5 study was the definitive work last time I looked. You still have the problem of comms, although that may have lessened in recent years.
AEW is by no means a “bolt-on” fit to V22. What does the antenna look like, where does it go, how does that affect the aerodynamics of the aircraft, does it conflict with the folding mechanism, are the aircraft avionics EMI/EMC with a powerful radar in close proximity, comms channels? We were lucky with the old SKW – the airframe (and it’s folding systems) were straightforward and low speed tends to limit aerodynamic effects.
All of this recognises that Defence is cash-strapped at this time and I am not for one moment suggesting that we rush out and buy all this kit now. However, I have yet to see a single authoritative source state that the PoW “conversion” cost has been properly costed by the ACA.
All we have is a large number of unknown origin, which given the “knowns” in the equation (hardware costs) looks very large from a project and engineering perspective. If the ACA have provided the cost, they ought to be challenged in a constructive manner to explain where the 12M+ manhours are required. If they haven’t produced it then the estimate ought to be examined properly.
The choice here is between permanently hamstringing the potential of what will be a fifty year capability because there is a shortfall in the RAF budget for an aircraft that has less than a decade’s service left.
NaB,
I was thinking an AEW “bolt on” like the one designed for Merlin (utility version, not naval one), whereby the antenna is lowered out of the rear loading ramp. Mkaing this aerodynamic should not be a major issue.
250 knots is not THAT fast.
I don’t think there is a Merlin system designed and tested yet. At least not to the best of my knowledge.
The point about 250kts is that if you’re shifting CG it’s possibly a bit slow.
NaB said “The choice here is between permanently hamstringing the potential of what will be a fifty year capability because there is a shortfall in the RAF budget for an aircraft that has less than a decade’s service left.”
Wow……… :)
Sorry NaB, I think that characterises all that is wrong with this debate
Sounds like one child spitting the dummy out of the pram because matron has taken the sweets away and given them to another of the kids in the nursery
Of course, cost over runs in Merlin, T45, Astute or the eye watering costs of pouring old wine into new Type 26 bottles has nothing to do with it, or the cost of not buying FRES for a decade or, or Typhoon hoovering up all available capital budgets, or cancellation costs of Soothsayer or, well, you get the picture don’t you.
When we can have a debate about maintaining a balanced set of capabilities within a reasonable budget that has some give in it against a balanced set of requirements then fair enough but all the constant whining from the services just illustrates to me they are simply incapable of being trusted with a single fucking penny
And as for Ursula, what a spectacular display of mediocrity that was, seems about par for the course in the MoD though
We’ll have to disagree then. The constant spin from most has been that “the QEC is crippling the defence budget and everyone is suffering because the navy wants it’s vanity project”. As soon as someone presents figures from a reputable source that call that line into question (and those NAO figures include T45 & Astute cost escalation and Merlin CSP) the it is decried as spitting out the dummy.
Don’t disagree wrt Ursula, but then what do you expect in a dysfunctional organisation like MoD senior CS?
I have never spun anything, I have never said the Navy is crippling the defence budget but I have been crystal clear that both CVF and JCA combined with their attendant capabilities and resultant costs will unbalance UK defence capabilities across all three services so that the next set of lessons learned from the next operation will be a depressing carbon copy of the last one.
Just because Typhoon, Astute and T45 did so in the last couple of decades does not mean it is CVF/JCA’s turn to do it in the next couple.
Nothing at all to do with what service is doing the spending but what they are spending it on.
All we hear is complaints about the defence budget not having enough money, one might have thought that the collection of intelligent people in the MoD might have worked out that relying on hope and a pot of cash at the end of the rainbow has been a losing strategy for the last several decades.
The pro-RN chaps always bang on about how important it is to have air cover over the fleet to protect it. At the same time they complain about how much Typhoon costs – which is there to give air cover to the Army and RN over land and in coastal regions. It seems bizarre to argue over having yet another layer of air defence for the fleet, whilst leaving the Army with only a handful of Rapiers.
We had essentially 3 choices in the early 90s: Typhoon, F-15 or F-16. Typhoon and F-15 are very similar on price, but Typhoon benefits from being newer and more capable.
F-16 was roughly half the price, but isn’t as capable as the others meaning that things get a bit dicey against anyone with Su-30+. Similar argument for Gripen. There would also be no British defence aerospace industry left, with the loss of tens of thousands of jobs and complete dependency on foreign governments in the future.
The problem isn’t that Typhoon is expensive – it’s that fast jets are expensive. But that’s the price that needs to be paid to avoid getting blown up by opposing air power.
Hannay,
It’s much the same at sea as it is on land – it’s about air-cover over landed forces, and to provide that we need SEAD beforehand. Mark will explain about tankered Typhoon with conformal tanks providing this, others will suggest the sortie rate that solution delivers is poor and we need a carrier – no differenty to the Americans.
However, I wholeheartedly agree with your last paragraph. Jets are expensive.
Yes simon indeed I mean either only f35C or a combination of f35b and typhoon in about equal numbers. Why quite simply I don’t see how you retain currency in carrier landing with a small group of planes which will be required to do other things as well as practise carrier landing and provide a surge capacity with enough qualified pilot. Never in a million years will FAA transform into the US navy.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uTVj_ZSwxGE&feature=related this needs lot of practise.
We can be quite sure our carrier capability requirements and safety cases for cats and traps will be identical to the US navy with one exception we will be doing long cycles and keeping everything crossed that we can integrate this with helicopter amphib ops. This will mean more reliance on the buddy tanker requirement for take offs and landing serials or put a a330 tanker race track over head this will not be negotiable. Which brings met on to AEW ISTAR or tankers for a carrier the question for the UK why are putting that capability in a fixed wing carrier plane its daft they cost nearly as much a land based jet and deliver a fraction of the capability.
Both E3D and A330 offer in excess of 4000nm unrefueled ranged and sentry with refuels over 18hrs flight time and give any commander a choice between one of them and 2 or 3 hawkeye of any variety and he picks the land based E3D EVERY time. The carriers organic AEW in seaking is to protect the carrier from pop up anti ship and has been very useful in other niche roles, its all we will ever need and is very capable and can be deployed widely throughout the fleet. This should be migrated to merlin or use the Italian merlin aew already in service.
This is no were near as complicated with f35b and while smaller normal airgroups can and should regularly deploy they can very easily by comparison be increased for operations exercises or training and integrate much easier with helicopter operations with the exception of srvl which would be a storm shadow bring back type event.
When cant F35 be a fleet fighter or simons sead plane ( not really sure what than means ).
I said before too look at what tornado actually carries or radius of missions flown not wiki trumps. Standard 2 ship in afghan or Libya was what 1a/c with 2 paveway IV, 3 brimstone a lightning 3 pod and 2 asraam the other with 1 or 2 paveway IV and a raptor pod. Well a single F35B will meet it 450nm kpp and vertical bring back carrying 4 paveway IV and 2 asraam albeit with 2 paveway IV external with a data link, communications and sensor capability far in excess of that carried by the tornado pair and ill bet a few quid the tornados range in said configuration will not be a million miles from that of f35B. Paveway IV has deep penetrating war head in test and a extended range kit in development its a really quite excellent weapon from all reports and with brimstone will be almost in constant use.
So we go to storm shadow mission well we wouldn’t do the marham to Libya one we would do 100m off the cost and hit the same targets no loss of capability there. Second one Kuwait air base to Baghdad well thats about 300nm and f35b with 2 stormshadow launching from the same base would not have an issue hitting the same target and don’t for one minute think tornado hung around over Baghdad for an hour after firing its load. It could potentially do this from a ship in the northern gulf but would require srvl return.
As for it as a fighter ect well its never going to be a typhoon or raptor in the high supersonic fight in a phone box but then it doesn’t need to be thats not how we fight if it was the SHAR would be at the bottom of the South atlantic excellent pilot training and superb situational awareness is what a pilot asks for in air combat couple with high bore missile. If any plane gets into a turning fight now a days there most likely both shot down.
But this all fundamentally fails to understand what the f35 is about. The modern doctrine and future battles areas all about situational awareness and passive active netted sensors allow pilots to see the “awacs” picture of the whole battlespace air and land and identify what he can shoot at and what he can’t f35 does this a networked 4 ship provides a grid for air dominance providing high level ISR in a contested airspace and moving that offboard using directional data links to avoid detection its whats its been designed for from the bottom up it. This cant be recreated in 4 generation a/c they simply don’t have the power or avionics capabilities to do it and its why the day of the light fighter is past. The light jet is great in zero threat but thats the job of cheap and cheerful king airs or uavs. No one is planning them for a high threat environment the mythical ucav will stay that way past 2035.
Stovl f35 offers maximum flexibility for no loss of any real capability and the US plan them to still be in service past 2050 so it will be here a while. Some areas of possible risk can be covered by typhoon with conformals a tremendous capability in its self it would increase internal fuel from about 9500lbs to 16000lbs and thats plenty for any land scenario currently filled by tornado. But in real DPOC a 100m here or there is not really a big deal if you really want dpoc give me a 21st century Vulcan.
Given how very few times since 1945 we have shot down enemy aircraft (almost all examples being in a few weeks in 1982), and given how fantastically many times we have put land forces into action or attacked targets that are based on land from either ship, submarine, aircraft or by missile, surely the DS solution is:
1. Spend the majority of the money we devote to fast air into airframes that can support land forces, either in advance or in a CAS role at the time.
2. Spend the bare minimum on flying air defence capabilities, because the history is we don’t use them very much (i.e. start with the mud mover, only later make it AD. Not the other way around).
3. Spend much more money on surface launched AD capabilities than flying AD capabilities, because fast jet AD is fantastically and unaffordable expensive.
4. Spend much more money on land forces as a proportion of current expenditure, because those are the forces who are mostly delivering the strategic effect.
James,
Interesting, so the DS will ignore the trends of military spending and procurement around the world as well as Geo poliitcal trends and the feeling of the Uk public so we can be ready to fight Afghanistan 5 years after we pull out?
@ James
Given a little leeway with the budget how big should the Army be? Give it to me in terms of infantry battalions. As it Friday I will allow you to play “fantasy force”. :)
APATS,
that is clearly trying to twist what I was saying.
Any conceivable air threat is over-matched by existing capabilities.
Advances in missile capabilities are more cost-effective than buying the latest generation AD airframes. Within a human generation – which is about the design and life window of a modern fast jet, it will be more effective to put highly capable missiles onto a networked swarm of AD UCAVs with integral ISTAR than it will be to maintain a CAP of fast jets.
People and their causes, resources and territory are still the creators of modern conflict, as they have been since forever, and will be forever. Ultimately, land-focussed forces are the only way of effecting a strategic resolution.
There are very few examples of any conflict in the last 70 years being ultimately decided by air or sea power. I would posit that neither the no fly zones in Iraq or Libya were ultimately decisive – in the former case, it took years to come to a conclusion in 2003, in the latter indigenous forces and on the ground SF which actually affected the change.
I don’t think any of that will change in at least the next 50 years.
James, The only reason they have been overmatched is the umbrella provided by the USN and USAF. With the US focus switching to the East we as both UK, EU and European NATO forces have to be able to provide that theatre entry, SEAD and air blanket.
Networked swarm of mini UAVS are a star wars solution and we are in the game of manned aircraft for th forseeable future.
Iraq was once again a war of choice. As for LIbya what broke the deadlock was close air support from sea based AH and fixed wing fighters, backed up by NGS. This was used every time anti Gadaffi forces were held up.
Land forces of course have the pleasure of the knock out blow but whilst air and sea forces can influence blockade and strike land forces can not even deploy without the other two. Let alone operate under a magic air umbrella as they have grown used to.
The future is going to be a bout resources, conflicts we will shy away from long term intervention in and the undoubted unseen startegic shock. This will require flexible, deployable and supportable assets across all 3 services.
X,
not really a case of size – it should be the Goldilocks solution – just the right size. Over years it may go up or down, depending on what the pollies want us to achieve.
For today’s commitments, you can get away with 6 Brigades + 6 battalions to cover the standing commitments and allow everyone to have a normal rotation to avoid staleness and too much turnover. Post-Afghanistan, perhaps 5 Brigades, and if we relax a bit on the requirements for the standing commitments, maybe 3 battalions and enough spare RAC and RA to cover off the other periods. Funnily enough, including the RM as a Brigade, that’s pretty much what we have, but that does not prove me “right”, merely that not everyone in Main Building is insane.
I would like to see one in-role amphibious Brigade – probably 3 Cdo and and 2 Army Brigades on a 3 year cycle for rapid intervention, with supporting assets (both floaty and air/aviation), with 2 further heavier Brigades at reduced notice furnished by the remaining 3 Brigades. You could do it on 7, 30 and 60 day readiness cycles. I’d go further: all assets for the 7 day Brigade to be grey painted, nothing STUFT or air-chartered. Points will do for the follow on forces, plus STUFT for the scraggage.
There! I got in a good word for the RAF to fly some grey painted transport aircraft. It’s about all the human part of the RAF will be useful for in the next 20 years. We can ditch the RAF movers though. I’d rather be marshalled by Ryanair than one of those little Hitlers, and I have suffered hugely at Ryanair’s hands before, so I do not say that lightly.
Can I play?
Circa 1990, a group of raving lefties wanted a “peace dividend” & slash Britains defences. Even they did not want the Army to be smaller than 100,000.
Air defence is a bit like the nuclear deterrent, you should be glad you do not need to use it.
My 92 year old Dad was dive bombed by Stukas in 1940. Missed him, but killed his driver. He has a few words to say to those that think control of the skies is not important.
Would be interesting to weigh up the costs in Libya not between land based or sea based fast air but sea based GMLRS or ATACMS with 70/300km range and high precision combined with sea or land based UAV’s combined with SF for the ISTAR.
X,
as it is a Friday evening, a little relaxation. I was once OIC Troops during a flight for my Squadron from Norway back to Brize – I was only a Tp Ldr but the Sqn Ldr and 2IC weren’t going to do that menial job themselves. The boys were being buggered about, the plane was hours late, so I authorised the official burglary of several pallets of snack meals that were in a corner, ready for someone else but not us to eat. Cue huge outrage from the jumped-up RAF Cpl mover, and his insane decision to try to take me on in front of the whole watching (and eating) Squadron by arriving in my face and shouting at me. He is probably the only RAF mover ever locked up (temporarily, and in a makeshift manner by having several heavies sat in close proximity) during an air move. We managed to load ourselves without incident when the VC10 eventually arrived, which must have been embarrassing for him. I also managed to misplace the manifest, but the world kept turning. A day of shame for the Mover branch, no doubt.
@ James
I don’t think we need more than we have. I prefer every brigade to have 3 infantry battalions, 1 cavalry regiment, 1 artillery regiment, and support elements. Not too big, not too small, and with all elements. And I think I have expounded my 3 year heavy armour brigade model too. So that is 6 brigades in rotation, 1 heavy armour brigade, 5 Guards, 2 Parachute, and 3 Ghurka (and then the Green Death.)
I don’t think you could cope with my radical ideas based on 4 RM Commando, 2 + 1 Para, and just 5 Guards. :) ;)
APATS,
we’d agree I’m sure somewhere in the middle of a solution involving balance across all 3 elements (or typically for most operations, Maritime+Land or Air+Land).
However, as has been indicated several times above by others as well as me, the costs of providing that are disproportionate. Don’t get me wrong, I’m not looking for parity. However, we do get into the ridiculous scenario where force protection – and often of very small groups of men or even singletons – is grossly unweighted. There seems to be a horror of equivalence and refusal of acceptance that Biggles is only worth as much as Tommy. The same thought scales upwards, to where a single mission with a single objective – drop a bridge at grid 123456 – results in an air package of 72 aircraft, or a fighting patrol plus an RE detachment.
NAB mentioned self-licking lollipops up thread. The entire RAF is a self-licking lollipop as far as I have experienced them in more than 20 years, and the Andrew is displaying disturbing signs of following along.
The close air support I had in Gulf 1 was fantastic, and delivered by the USMC and an attached ANGLICO team who lived and fought with us in the sand for 6 months. The CAS we had rehearsed with in BAOR for the previous 6 years were from the RAF, and spectacularly useless, inflexible, and whining and bolshy. I’d rather have the USMC overhead any day of the week than Kevin from the RAF.
…Anyway, it’s the Army / Navy rugby match at Twickers tomorrow, and I’ve got front row seats on the halfway line, a decent curry lunch in a corporate bar, 8 family coming along, and a total expectation of yet another Army victory. Come on the Scarlets!
I am unfortunately not in the correct country. Booh hiss.
APATS,
never mind. Content yourself with this: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qEp92lx5hOk
@Mark
You’re missing the technical advances in JSF CV that make it much easier to carrier land than legacy aircraft. The training burden is greatly reduced so that fewer sorties will be needed for pilot currency. I’m thinking you want to keep ~12-16 pilots current for rapid deployment to the ship, but with the lower training burden you can conduct familiarisation over a week or two if you really need to surge to 36a/c.
Keeping all pilots current on carrier operations will cost a lot of money, wear out the very limited numbers of aircraft very quickly, and massively increase attrition rates. Incorporating this modern technology into JSF allows us to be far more flexible.
@James
CAS aircraft make pretty poor fighters. Sticking Meteor on A-10 won’t really work. Jaguar is a pretty good example actually. Air Defence as the primary requirement, but with sufficient range/endurance and payload to conduct CAS. F-16XL seems a pretty good example of a blend between the two roles.
Surface to Air Missiles are horrendously expensive in themselves. Look at MEADS – billions down the pan. With limited budget, best to go for the aircraft that can provide air defence when needed, and then bomb the crap out of the enemy when they’ve finished shooting the opposition out of the sky.
Point 4: Apart from in Libya – which seems like a template for future operations MoD is keen to pursue.
@TD
GMLRS and ATACMS are not high precision weapons compared to Brimstone or PWIV and aren’t really suitable for UK RoE in recent situations.
If you’ve got to have a UAV or aircraft in the air for ISTAR then you might as well just weaponise the thing – preferrably with cheap gravity weapons rather than expensive long range missiles.
Mark,
I read your comments with interest.
That youtube vid was interesting to say the least, but it’s what I’ve always been lead to believe… naval aviators have to be “the best of the best”.
Your first option (for an all F35C fleet) gives away a great asset (Typhoon) for what you believe are the numbers of F35C airframes needed to provide the required capabilities. Is this (trained) pilot numbers or airframes you’re worried about?
Your second option is then perfectly reasonable on cost grounds, but on capabilty grounds it does not appreciate the effect of distance on Typhoon’s ability to provide the “heavy” stuff (e.g. Black Buck raids).
Two other points:
1. I’d wager a 4000nm radius AEW solution would cost a bomb.
2. I doubt SRVL is ever going to be a goer. I’ll buy a hat ready to eat though, just in case ;-)
The IAI Lavi would have combined fast air with good close air support. Sadly the Yanks bribed/bullied the Israelis to drop it.
@TD – not suggesting you spun it. Merely that there is a difference between what is being spun and the truth.
For those who believe the RAF can provide coastal AD & AEW for naval forces, you need to do the maths. As others have posted, our freedom to do “stuff” on land and in the air, has (with one exception) been bought by the USN and USAF. They’re going elsewhere now, so who is going to do it? The current DPA are about to be exposed for what they are…
@ James
I second what Hannay said. If you design an aircraft for CAS like the A-10 and then try to convert it into a fighter then you’re in all kinds of trouble. It’s much easier to attempt the reverse.
The problem from the pilots perspective is that often he can’t see what you can see on the ground. You can see a hedgerow which the enemy is postioned in and you’re looking right at.
From several thousand feet all he can see is a myriad of fields surrounded by hedges, all of which conceivably could be the one you’re talking about. He’s also too high to be able to pick out human forms, and if he can, too high to identify their uniforms.
This is why your ground controllers become so important.
Personally I think if I were in your shoes on the ground, I wouldn’t be all that happy either about having bombs dropped so close. The key then is getting the army and airforce to work closely together to figure out the most effective system for identification and targetting.
What you could really do with is a light, man portable laser designator I guess.
As for Typhoon, there is no doubting that project has been horrendous. The inital requirement was laid out in 1979 for christs sake. It took damn near 10 years to get all the European “partners” together and then to agree on it, a testament if ever there was one against multi-nation co-op defense projects (*cough* A400M).
At least now though Typhoon is here and actively operating, though I do think that its air to ground functions should be given much higher priority over any further air to air functions such as the new radar and new missiles.
And that’s really the key with this whole debate about CVF hoovering up funds. Typhoon = financial fuck up of the first order, but in service. Astute = FFUOTFO, but in service. Future Tanker = FFUOTFO, but coming into service.
CVF = FFUOTFO, but not even one ship fully built yet. It’s an easy target because at least it can still be shit canned in favour of something else, whilst the rest can’t.
FRES = FFUOTFO, but no vehicles delivered so still time to shit can it for something more appropriate.
Hi JH,
The same happened to Mach3 recce Phantom
– only a superpower should possess something like SR-71
ACC Well if I was paying 60% of the development costs for another countries project which when complete would compete for orders that may put workers in my country out of a job I may say enough as well.
My favourite Carrier video at the minute;
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aw4dZ2bJnGI
No music, no dicking about. Just a cockpit camera and the sound of the engines, as heard by the pilot. Take off, one lap and back down again, let going for a quick run to the shops.
wf,
That FA2/Aster30 chat we were having, well something has been bugging me about it so I got the pen and paper out. Please read, it’s in your favour:
Aster30: 100km range, 1400m/s
AIM-120: 60km range, 1200m/s
MIG: the Mach2 threat = 600m/s
AEW detection range of 400km.
FA2 interception speed 300m/s (Mach 1 at altitude)
Assuming we’re okay with these figures then I’ll proceed…
Aster30 will evidently intercept a Mach2 (600m/s) threat at it’s maximum range of 100km.
FA2 needs to intercept the threat in 340km (because the AIM-120 will do the other 60km).
FA2 x t + MIG x t = 340,000m
300 x t + 600 x t = 340,000m
t = 377 seconds
In this time FA2 will have travelled 113km.
It then launches the AIM-120.
AIM x t + MIG x t = 60,000m
1200 x t + 600 x t = 60,000m
t = 33 seconds
In this time the missile will have travelled 40km.
Total distance = 113 + 40 = 153km.
So, FA2 with AMRAAM is about one and a half times as effective as Aster30.
I must admit that I thought they were about the same. Guess not. We can now draw our conclusions as to if it is/was worth it or not.
Simon, The most relevant question is what range can the Mig launch its ASHM? You really want to shoot it down before it does!
APATS,
Well Exocet has a range of 180km so on a Mirage (for example) both Aster30 and FA2 are a touch useless.
Guess we need to intercept a bit quicker. Mach 1.6 seems about right as it gives a few miles margin for error – hey, isn’t that the max speed of F35 – what a surprise!
Simon, only the MM40 Block3 ship launched variant has a range of 97NM. The air launched variant has a range of 42NM.
APATS,
That’s good news then. I suppose I should have picked the Kayak since I picked MIGs in the first place, or the Chinese equivalent.
Quite a few posts missing from the end of this thread?
ACC
Yes, many rants AWOL.