A guest post from Jed
There have been a lot of interesting comments made in the various post-SDSR army articles written by TD (and guests), some by serving soldiers, some by us arm chair generals, but I am focusing here on the ones about the Warrior upgrade, and the Protected Mobility variants of FRES SV.
Those comments have prompted me to ask my contentious question which provides the headline for this article, is the concept of the Mechanised Infantry Combat Vehicle (MICV) or Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) passed it’s use by date ?
You can choose to interpret the question in its most broad sense, but I will attempt to constrain my meandering thoughts and arguments to the confines of a post SDSR British Army.
History
But first, the potted history of the MICV / AIFV, starting with it’s predecessor, the Armoured Personnel Carrier:
As is often the case these days, a succinct and reasonably accurate history is available from Wikipedia:
- APC : http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armoured_personnel_carrier
- MICV / IFV : http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MICV
Apparently as early as WW1 the British Army built a “tank” variant with no main armament but designed to carry up to 30 troops, who were provided by armoured loop holes from which to fire their rifles, as the vehicle wadded through the mud, ran over German trenches, and protected said Tommies from machine gun fire. This was news to me, but hey it appears we invented the MICV before the APC !
Move onto WW2 and we have iconographic images of both German “Hanomag” and American M2/M3 “half tracks” providing “protected mobility” to infantry accompanying tanks formations. Already we are to the crux of the matter, the development of what we call the “combined arms” formations, tanks and infantry working together; each has its strengths and weaknesses, vulnerabilities and advantages.
For example the Hanomag (Sd. Kfz251) provided protection for Panzergrenadiers (mechanized infantry) from small arms fire and some artillery shrapnel, while also providing tactical mobility close to that of the Panzers. The infantry could use their personal weapons from within the vehicle, or de-buss to deal with anti-tank guns, infantry with Bazookers, PIAT’s or Molotov Cocktails etc, thus basically protecting the tanks by making up for some of their weaknesses (lack of situational awareness and all round vision, etc).
Post WW2 and into the Cold War era and the APC got a roof – not only to better protect against shrapnel (and the weather ?) but also as part of the efforts to provide some NBC protection. This era produced the iconic American M113 tracked APC and its wheeled Soviet counterpart in the BTR series. In the UK we got the home grown M113 look-a-like in the shape of the FV432.
Vietnam brought the re-learning of old lessons when the M113 went into action – gun shields for pintle mounted MG’s, and a disturbing realization of how vulnerable these vehicles were to Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG’s) spawning the first use of bar armour. Of course we have even more recently re-learnt these lessons again !
Evolution – APC to MICV
And then…… along came the BMP !
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BMP-1
The Soviet Army thought that allowing the infantry squad in the back of the APC to bring their weapons to bear might be a good idea. At the same time they added a turret mounting a low pressure 73mm gun, which fired HEAT rounds which apparently were supposed to be able of defeating the front armour of M60A1, Leopard 1 and Chieftain MBT’s and, well just to make sure in case it didn’t, an AT3 “Sagger” wire-guided missile sat on a launch rail just above the main gun barrel.
https://www.flickr.com/photos/73614187@N03/6998248294/
Although the modern German Army had a small APC fitted with long barreled 20mm cannon during the 50’s, it had no firing ports for its small 5 man infantry team, so I will go with the conventional wisdom that says the BMP-1 was the first (modern?) MICV.
Western responses included the U.S. Army Bradley, with firing ports, a 25mm cannon and two TOW wire-guided ATGW, and the German Marder, with a 20mm cannon and later on a Milan ATGW launcher. As well firing ports for the onboard infantry, the early versions included a rear MG, with direct optics allowing it to be aimed and fired by the troops, but this was not an Remote Weapons Station (RWS) as we now know them.
In this era Britain got the Warrior. The main design differences from our allies (and enemies) was that instead of the fast firing auto-cannon, or large caliber low pressure gun (like the 76mm of the Saladin and Scorpion) we went with a bigger auto-cannon, clip fed rather than belt fed, with a much lower rate of fire. The idea being that well aimed high velocity Armour Piercing Discarding Sabot (APDS) would penetrate the armour of BMP-1’s and other Soviet light armour, without recourse to a big and expensive ATGW. Meanwhile the co-axial 7.62mm and the embarked infantry weapons would take care of enemy infantry, and HEI shells were available to take on buildings, sangers, soft skinned vehicles etc.
As can be seen, perhaps the biggest difference between the British Army MICV and those of both our allies and potential opposition is the lack of a anti-tank missile on the standard squad vehicle.
Why not ATGW ? It’s just not British old chap………
I have never been able to find a book or scholarly journal that clearly states why British Army doctrine led to this difference. We can of course make our own inferences – in the combined arms battle group, the Warrior would be fighting alongside the MBT’s (Cheiftain, Challenger 1 and Challenger 2) which are considered the main weapon system for dealing with enemy tanks and other threats. In a mixed battle group setting with Armoured Recce assets the British preferred the “anti-tank” over watch methodology, with the Striker vehicle and it’s Swingfire missiles.
We can then add on the other elements of the “combined arms” teams – artillery and aviation. So if the tank-MICV combo come under ambush from enemy tanks or infantry anti-tank teams, we could call in fast air with cluster bombs, or a full battery of 155mm “HE dispensers”. Although not available in huge numbers, there might have been TOW equipped Lynx helicopters available too. Finally the infantry carried in the Warrior can always de-buss and take up their own ambush positions with Milan launchers or their unguided anti-tank rockets.
Non-the-less many other countries saw, and still see the benefit of equipping the standard squad MICV with an ATGW (including Kuwait’s version of the Warrior).
Continued evolution – back from Infantry Fighting Vehicle to Protected Mobility
Updated variants of all the main MICV / IFV vehicles featured improved armour protection, and all of them lost their firing ports because of this. So in some way’s we have moved full circle – the original aim of the IFV, be it the WW1 Mk X tank or the BMP-1 was to allow the carried infantry squad to contribute to the carnage with their personal weapons, while remaining behind armour.
As the weapon versus countermeasure battle moves inexorable onwards, we are now back to a scenario where protection levels mean the squad are back to being somewhat passive passengers, as they are in a simpler APC. So now the main difference between IFV and APC is the main and secondary weapons, the weight of protection and maybe the tactical (“keep up with the MBT”) mobility.
The most interesting element of this to me, and the of the various comments made on various TD articles, is the evolution of the main armament, the turret versus RWS and the “fire support” vehicle debates.
So while this applies to any modern armoured vehicle, lets confine this right now to the Warrior update and FRES SV Protected Mobility variants. Based on the good old British doctrine of accurate, heavy punching, low rate of fire auto-cannon development we have the introduction of the CTA 40mm Case Telescoped Ammunition gun, with its very high velocity APDS “kinetic energy” rounds designed to take on light and even “medium” armour (and who’s to say it is not going to penetrate the more thinly armoured rear or side portions of some MBT’s ?).
However now it also has an air bursting HE round, suitable for dealing with infantry in defilade cover, or in buildings. As you all know we are looking to standardize on this weapon for both the Warrior upgrade (or IFV) and our armoured Recce vehicle (FRES Scout).
Fine – but now we have the manned turret versus unmanned turret debate.
How much situational awareness do you need ?
I fully understand the arguments for a Recce vehicle retaining a manned turret. I am not so sure the same arguments are applicable to the IFV. If an unmanned turret allows all the crew to be lower down, protected by the thicker armour of the hull, we can probably all agree this is a good thing. However critics suggest that even with modern sights, periscope and TV sensor technology there is a potential loss of “situational awareness” in this arrangement. However as the most recent example of why “fighting heads out” is a bad idea, the U.S. experiences of Iraq once again seem to suggest that in a fire fight, sticking your head up out of the hatch is a bit suicidal !
But, do we even need the unmanned turret ? Do we need a medium caliber auto-cannon with co-axial MG (and maybe ATGW ?). Perhaps we could make do with a big RWS, able (as some on the market right now are) of taking say a 40mm auto-grenade launcher and a 7.62mm MG.
As someone noted in a comment, 40mm HEAT grenades are not really up to much, even against light armour. However with the right fire control system, 40mm grenades are also available as an air bursting HE weapon, providing a cheaper alternative to the cannon HE round when you want to fill the air around enemy infantry with shrapnel. So if the primary role is to provide cover for the MBT against close in infantry anti-tank teams and to provide cover for the embarked infantry team as they de-buss to get “up close and personal” – then is this not heavy enough weaponry?
If we look at ASCOD 2 FRES SV Protected Mobility variant, CV90 Armadillo and Israeli Namer vehicles, they all have prominent “cupolas” with direct view armoured vision blocks, as well as the main sensors on the RWS and “situational awareness” enhancing CCD cameras covering the rear, front corners (or the driver) and even providing a panoramic 360 degree view.
ASCOD 2 based FRES SV Protected Mobility variant – note quite low profile commanders cupola between drivers hatch and RWS
CV90 Armadillo – note the much more prominent commanders cupola and vision blocks.
The APC variant of the French VCBI actually puts its RWS on top of a large cupola with 360 degree direct view “vision blocks”.
Many of the RWS are fully capable of adding a pair of Spike, Javelin or other ATGW to the mix, so does that cover the lack of ability of the 40mm GMG ?
Detractors of the RWS approach may point out the reduced ammo capacity, and the inability to reload under armour – which is a feature of some of the unmanned turrets. Good points, I guess it just comes down to the cost benefit analysis.
Adding “fire support” vehicles into the mix
At the same time as the so called “strategic” review and defence cuts see us reducing our fleet of Challenger 2 MBT’s – the plan for FRES SV includes an element for “fire support” vehicles, and we have had many a discussion in the comment threads about 120mm, 105mm or even 90mm medium / high pressure guns, and of course my personal favourite the turret mounted breach loading 120mm smooth bore mortar.
So, if we are going to have the following potential mix of vehicles in a armoured / mechanized battle group, do we still need the cannon armed IFV ?
- MBT – 120mm rifled gun, possibly to be replaced by 120mm smooth bore at some point ?
- FRES SV Scout variant – 40mm CTA
- FRES SV ‘Fire Support’ – who knows ? Medium caliber gun of some type ?
- FRES SV ‘Anti-Armour Over Watch’ – specialist anti-tank vehicle
Perhaps we could save considerable money on the Warrior upgrade by dispensing with the turret all-together and fitting a dual weapon RWS ?
Is the logical extension of this thought to simply put effort into keeping the Warrior in service just long enough to replace it completely with FRES SV Protected Mobility variants ?
Questions
So let me leave you with 3 questions to get the discussion thread heated up:
- If we have less MBT’s available to the combined arms battle group, are we really able to dispense with the turret mounted 40mm cannon
- If we are to have less MBT’s should we fit every standard squad IFV with an ATGW ?
- Should we dispense with the idea of dropping MBT numbers, and just use them instead of developing new fire support / anti-tank vehicles on the “medium” weight chassis ?
- Should we think outside the box, and examine a turreted 120mm mortar with extended range, guided and tube launched ATGW as a truly multi-purpose fire support platform (direct, indirect fire support plus direct and indirect anti-tank fires).
- Has the time of the IFV gone, and considering both current threats and budgets, is the RWS armed APC or “protected mobility” variant the way to go
If you go chaps, lets see how big we can build this comment thread J
my cents
http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2009/06/challenging-ifv-concept-part-1.html
http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2009/06/challenging-ifv-concept-part-2.html
Similar calculations as in here
http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2010/02/panzergrenadiere-in-2010s.html
should be relevant for UK Army, too.
Btw “M113 in Vietnam – not the gun shields”; you misses an “e”.
this is probably a very stupid question, but why does the ammo box for RWS have to be external? If they are belt fed, can’t the belt be dropped into the interior with some sort of auto-loading mechanism? Alternatively, why not a very small turret allowing under armour access to the ammo box?
A very interesting article, and a lot to discuss.
It really depends on what you want your forces to do. Heavily armed IFVs were meant to fight outnumbered in the the Fulda Gap scenario against hordes of Soviet tanks and BMPs. Every vehicle needed significant anti-armour armament.
One could envision south east Asian scenarios that mimic this problem. Really in any mechanized vs mechanized combat it is probably better to have significant IFV armament.
ATGMs on RWSs might get you part of the way back, but they don’t typically support firing on the move, have limited stowed kills, and don’t usually support separate commander and gunner “hunter-killer” sight arrangements.
RE: 120MM Gun-Mortar for fire support.
Does it have to be turret mounted? Would a return of the German “Stug” assault gun be a good idea? Reduced profile, more weight for armour, easier to transport (particulary in aircraft)?
http://www.angelfire.com/art/enchanter/agm.html
andyw, I think it’s more of an issue of having to deal with gun stoppages outside, with a RWS, rather than where the weapon’s ammo is stored.
RE: Armament for IFV/APC’s. Perhaps the problem is the type of primary weapon used; The 73mm of the BMP-1 was replaced by the 30mm of the BMP-2, better range and use against IFV’s of the west. However, the BMP-3 has a 100mm (low pressure?) gun and co-axial 30mm and 7.62mm MG. This enables the BMP-3 to deal with more threats to its infantry? Perhaps if we are to keep the IFV it needs a new set of weapons to support the infantry, a merger of the IFV and fire support requirement?
http://www.angelfire.com/art/enchanter/IFVarm.html
I would be wary of giving up IFVs with cannon. There are plenty of places around the world, and realistic scenarios, in which British forces could expect to come up against enemy armoured vehicles.
On the other hand, I don’t think every IFV needs an ATGW as standard. The new CTA is claimed to be up to the job of defeating most everything short of a modern MBT. Without a clearly identified heavily armoured adversary, like the USSR, it’s a lot of money for limited utility.
Transport capacity is the cheapest if you don’t add much equipment (electronics, armament) to it.
Infantry transport capacity requires much volume, much volume leads to large surfaces and large surfaces + high weight/surface of protection leads to either inadequate transport capacity, inadequate protection or unacceptable weight and effort. The protection is thus typically inadequate in comparison to MBTs (and AT defences are meant to be effective against MBTs!).
There’s really no reason why an armoured vehicle should stick around fighting infantry if it’s not well-armed AND well-protected.
In the end the IFV story is a story of people who forgot the original (obsolete idea) and stick to a jack of all trades, master of none concept that is 360° unsatisfactory.
I think that British army will not change its organisation in terms of Formation Reconnaissance Regiment.
It was envisaged in the initial plans that FRES Scout are supported by FRES ATGW Overwatch, APC, command vehicles, repair, recovery, ambulance, radar, bridgelayer for manoeuvre support.
The big question is what use for 192 direct fire, it has no place in the usual recce organisation.
In the initial plan of FRES UV, it was envisaged a vehicle with a turret AMOS for artillery and un vehicle for CBRN recce.
Also, in the FRES SV block 2, it is supposed to have a FOV vehicle for artillery.
I can imagine that the direct fire will be used for something else than recce, perhaps to protect mechanised infantry, which will be equipped with FRES UV APC.
“RE: 120MM Gun-Mortar for fire support.
Does it have to be turret mounted? Would a return of the German “Stug” assault gun be a good idea?”
Not for a wealthy force.
Most firing will be done indirectly, and a rapid reaction requires a rapid traverse. The casemate tank has a lousy traverse and needs to pivot with the full hull (which is a problem in regard to calibration of bearing and effectiveness of cover such as a loose netting).
A poor force facing poor adversaries might make good use of a cheap direct/indirect fire AFV, though.
I think variety is the spice of life.
An RWS can go from 7.62 to 20mm Cannon to 40mm GMG quite easily.
Throw in 40mm CTA and you have every target short of an MBTs front armour dealt with.
Some sort of Javelin armoured box launcher on a CTA turret?
A Javlin Box, a 40CTA and 3 dual 40mm gmg?
Or instead of the javelin, the 120mm mortar, can that knock out a tank head on? Even if by that you mean an idirect fire top attack?
How expensive are 40mm grenades?
I just realised I was happy to fire them in their thousands….
Be bloody unfortunate for the blokes defending buildings though…
I’m just wandering here, no real plan, but sometimes my random thoughts are good.
Surely the key question with all this is who stays with the vehicles? Does the platoon commander stay with the vehicle or the SNCO? The more firepower the vehicle has the more weight this question has. Perhaps we should also ask should the infantry be driving armoured vehicles at all?
@Jed
Fine article, yet again. Thanks.
Like Brian Black I would be very wary of giving up IFVs with cannon. It it is not just the fact (as Brian mentions) that there are plenty of places around the world in which British forces could expect to come up against enemy armoured vehicles. They would also be confronted by enemy infantry (and not just the close-in infantry anti-tank teams that you mention in the article).
To counter that infantry, would the air bursting HE 40mm grenades which you say are also available as an air bursting HE weapons (the ones which are going to fill the air around enemy infantry with shrapnel) really prove adequate? Surely a cannon is a precise weapon, able to be trained with extreme accuracyon enemy personnel, whereas 40mm grenades (albeit air-bursting) and shrapnel are a far more haphazard and hit and miss kind of capability. Correct me if I’m wrong.
“However critics suggest that even with modern sights, periscope and TV sensor technology there is a potential loss of “situational awareness” in this arrangement.”
Yes, haven’t there been reports of armoured vehicle crew relying only on modern sensors etc., feeling detached from the reality outside the vehicle, even disorientated? Another argument for retaining manned turrets?
Jed, a great piece, I will get back to some of the statements in a minute.
@ Mike W, RE
“To counter that infantry, would the air bursting HE 40mm grenades which you say are also available as an air bursting HE weapons (the ones which are going to fill the air around enemy infantry with shrapnel) really prove adequate? Surely a cannon is a precise weapon, able to be trained with extreme accuracyon enemy personnel, whereas 40mm grenades (albeit air-bursting) and shrapnel are a far more haphazard and hit and miss kind of capability. Correct me if I’m wrong.”
Cannon: yes, accurate, even incredibly so, and needs to be. Think of the scenario: ATGW teams can be upto 5.5 km away (yes, there are missiles with a longer range but that is for deserts and coastal defence). You spot, laser measure the distance, choose the round(s) and then they are fused as fired… look at the muzzle velocities and if you get the laser measurement at all wrong the whole exercise is wasted. ie. the rounds have travelled so much past (or v.v.) that there is no effect.
Think of the automated GMGs as slow firing machine guns, with less range, too
– the way you aim them is still the same, and you rely on the saturation effect
@Jed
I’ve only just seen DominicJ’s point:
“How expensive are 40mm grenades?”
And it’s a very relevant one. Yes, how does the cost of 40mm grenades compare with that of cannon rounds?
Aother point. As you say, “the CTA 40mm Case Telescoped Ammunition gun, with its very high velocity APDS “kinetic energy” rounds is designed to take on light and even “medium” armour.” Can 40mm grenades do that as successfully?
On the more general point of Infantry Fighting Vehicle versus armed APC or “protected mobility” vehicle, surely the Infantry originally wanted an MICV because they needed a fire support vehicle UNDER THEIR OWN CONTROL. Then they would not have to call in ‘fast air with cluster bombs, or a full battery of 155mm “HE dispensers”’ or attack helicopters or anything else nearly so often.
Hi Jed, RE
” However with the right fire control system, 40mm grenades are also available as an air bursting HE weapon, providing a cheaper alternative to the cannon HE round when you want to fill the air around enemy infantry with shrapnel. So if the primary role is to provide cover for the MBT against close in infantry anti-tank teams and to provide cover for the embarked infantry team as they de-buss to get “up close and personal” – then is this not heavy enough weaponry?”
I buy into the philosophy, but
– right fire control system does not come cheap (whereas a GMG is a basic infantry weapon)
– to make full use of that fire control system, there is a need to computer-fuse a lot of rounds (ie. expensive fuses times a big number)
I would rather have a few SPGs or FRES SVs of AMOS-edition, keeping up and delivering organic fires, as directed
… takes us to the philosophical question: are fire control teams always RA, or should there be others, embedded in units that are within hundreds of meters of the OpFor and exchanging fire
Question Time:
“If we have less MBT’s available to the combined arms battle group, are we really able to dispense with the turret mounted 40mm cannon”
– The “if” is an “as” and the answer is a “No”
– Quite the contrary, two European armies that chose the CV90 with a specific gun are looking to up-barrell/ upgun them by using super-shot (the Netherlands which I have from a reliable source; they did away with all of their MBTs; the other one that I have put together from bits and pieces released reduced their MBT numbers by a half)
“Should we dispense with the idea of dropping MBT numbers, and just use them instead of developing new fire support / anti-tank vehicles on the “medium” weight chassis ?”
– I am for that, and that does not exclude the idea of doing a limited number of Infantry-support tank conversions
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lazar_BVT
In Afghanistan the Taliban likes to ambush NATO forces with Soviet HMGs. Personally I think having a 20mm cannon onboard is therefore still relevant.
This perhaps has nothing to do but the new turret work alone, there is thermal imager to identify targets capability that automatically detects and tracks potential targets from their thermal signature, alerting the crew to their presence.
Then in an urban combat, it’s important to defend the strategic points of a city. The tanks generally having less mobility, it must use lighter vehicles.
The use of heavy artillery using unguided munitions is almost impossible for the close support of troops, at the risk of fire on its own units.
If they don’t have cannon which allows them to directly support the infantry in combat, what is their utility ?
Hi x,
RE ” with Soviet HMGs. Personally I think having a 20mm ”
– those HMGs are incredibly capable, but more importantly, they are about the heaviest man-luggable pieces that you can take over the mountains (3 men) apart from mortars (where you won’t have that many rounds carried)
– so I fully agree, a fast firing 20 mm gives you the edge (and bigger can be better still, as 20mm does not have programmable fuses)
@ ACC
I saw a documentary about a Parachute Regiment patrol mounted in Jackals. They were exposed and came under fire from a compound by HMG. They weren’t enough of them to engage the compound or defend themselves. An accurate 20mmm would have silenced the opposition. As I often said here I wonder by what margin an organic (to the infantry) direct fire weapon would help lessen the work load of CAS aircraft. The West’s advantage is technological yet it seems NATO only wants its forces on the ground to be equipped to similar standards as the Taliban……
Hi x,
I have not seen any footage (who would be close enough anyway) but have read that those compound walls eat 20mm rounds like we eat popcorn, so nothing under 40mm (there are CV90s there with those) makes much of an impact
– in the open 20mm is perfectly fine
Many of those walls require a 105mm HESH.
The proper procedure if you cannot destroy it is to blind it. A RP rifle grenade might already suffice.
“Many of those walls require a 105mm HESH.”
Or a TOW. ;)
(ideally TOW 2 BB)
Nice article Jed, good for a 200 comment thread at least!
Some thoughts for all to digest;
– Do we need that many more Warriors than we have Challengers? I’m thinking here that Warriors in an armoured brigade would come in the form of maybe 1 or 2 battlions worth, trotting along behind an equal number of Challenger battalions?
– What do we want Warrior to do? If we’re facing enemy armour and personnel carriers, are Warriors going to be the primary method of engagement? What about CAS/helicopters and the tanks? On the defensive, wouldn’t the infantry dismount and set up anti-armour position? I’m just worried by the scenarios popping up where our Warriors (not warfighters) are becoming the primary anti-material weapon.
– Is the focus on more armour the right way to go? Ships haven’t carried heavy armour into battle for years, so maybe there are alternatives we should be investing in?
– Isn’t a key tenet of the Warrior in British use to be a “battle taxi”, moving the men under protection to a drop off point from which they dismount and engage the enemy, with the vehicles then providing fire support? Should the weapons favour this role more (lighter chain gun with high elevation) over any sort of anti-armour role, with some new(er) version of the ATGW carrier as the main anti-armour weapon?
cb
i think armour should be our striking arm, the warrior dismounts are there to provide close protection of that armour and to hold ground after its been taken.
1:1, 5:1, 10:1
i can see arguements for any, but the more warriors to each tank, the more capable the warriors have to be.
10 warriors and one chally, the warriors better be able to pull their weight.
1:1, a hmg would no doubt be fine.
@ ACC
Of course the mud walls eat 20mm shells. But as you say timed fuzed shots above cover or through openings in walls or against “light” cover it is a good option. Scimitar is used all the time in overwatch. (Before somebody says RARDEN is 30mm I know……………)
As Sven says I am thinking of 105mm HESH. What I am advocating is a return to direct fire artillery. The 105mm light gun can only be used in direct fire up to 800m. But if you take a look through the catalogue of WW2 anti-tank guns there are several options with ranges up to 2km. And if you look at the engagement ranges in Afghanistan it seems that is adequate. I don’t believe firing Javelin (as good as it is) at £60k a go is the optimum solution. Even if using a gun means firing more than one round.
Another thought. I always interpret “light role” in British terminology to mean “we can’t afford to put everybody in a real vehicle.”
I don’t understand that, in french army the soldiers move always with at least a VAB, except in the jungle, you are traveling with land rover, it’s a bit dangerous as concept.
“I saw a documentary about a Parachute Regiment patrol mounted in Jackals. They were exposed and came under fire from a compound by HMG. They weren’t enough of them to engage the compound or defend themselves.”
How does that work a Jackal packet of 2 vehicles would have 4 crew served weapons including GPMG, HMG and GMG plus personal weapons. I can’t see that packet not having enough firepower to defend themselves.
Frenchie said “I don’t understand that, in french army the soldiers move always with at least a VAB, except in the jungle, you are traveling with land rover, it’s a bit dangerous as concept.”
Yep, this has baffled me for ages. With the Foxhound now coming in to service this should help. I hope the MRBs (Multi-Role Brigades will take it further and give us a rounded and well equipped “Battle Group” as we like to call units these days.
I must confess to not buying in to the reasons for not equipping our AFVs with ATGWs. It is supposed to make them more of a target, and threat to an MBT with a crew of 10/11 rather than 4 is likley to yield a higher number of casualties. This I understand, but, if your enemies AFV have ATGW and you don’t the result is going to be the same isn’t it? You have just made your vehicles more vulnerable not less. There were many examples in the Gulf war where US M2 (and certainly M3s) ran in to T72s and the like, did not have Tank support and if it hadn’t been for being with TOW woukld have been destroyed. Also I think more tanks were destroyed by Bradley’s than Abrams!!
I think there is a case for a least a percentage of our AFVs and certainly the new agrressive FRES SC Recce being so equipped.
Great post Jed…
PS I think the Navy are wonderful ;-)
@ Frenchie
“If they don’t have cannon which allows them to directly support the infantry in combat, what is their utility?”
Exactly. Well said, Frenchie.
@x
‘Another thought. I always interpret “light role” in British terminology to mean “we can’t afford to put everybody in a real vehicle.”’
Couldn’t agree more. But what do you do you do when only 200 new Foxhounds (Is that figure right?)have been ordered? Revert to Land Rover WMIKs?
@Phil Darley
“I think there is a case for a least a percentage of our AFVs and certainly the new aggressive FRES SC Recce being so equipped.” (with ATGWs, that is)
I agree on that point too, Phil, but is that prevailing doctrine or again a matter of cost? You also make the point very nicely about the need to develop “rounded and well equipped “Battle Groups”.
Nice to be able to agree with everybody for a change.
Hello all
TD thanks for posting – I have a deliberate “off line” family day, and come back to all these comments ! Also thanks for adding the YouTube vids.
Sven et al – I really apologize for the spelling errors !!
Everyone – I have no particular position on this, hence my questions at the end of the article ? I really wanted to promote some conversation on the subject, and we seem to have that going :-)
So as Chris B. said, lets make it a “200 comment thread” ……..
Here is another contentious question for everyone, although on a slight tangent:
If the NL is getting rid of all it’s Leo 2’s, and Germany has just announced another cut in it’s numbers (and it already has a bunch in storage) AND it was decided it would be too complicated / expensive to fit a “NATO standard” smoothbore to the Chally 2 – then should we consider:
Replacing our Challenger 2 fleet with second hand Leo 2’s ?
Bought on the cheap from our allies, bringing standardized logistics with the remaining European NATO allies (Germany, Denmark, Poland, Greece, Turkey, Portugal, Spain……) and upgraded to 2A6M or later standard, this might be cheaper in the long run than upgrading the Chally 2. We are reducing tank numbers anyway, so 200 to 250 Leo 2’s ????
Hi Jed,
Great so far “have no particular position on this, hence my questions at the end of the article ?”
Not many commentators have so far pegged the value /uses of IFV to other than MBT numbers/uses.
– I would like to see a broader (perhaps another thread?) discussion of what else under armour, in what sort of numbers/ combinations.
If you take just the turreted Warriors and all the SV versions, and the MBTs…
– it is not a very big slice of the army (even though very important… the hard fist, as I like to call it)
Is combining the tank regiment, armoured and mechanised battalions practical? By which I mean two ‘combined arms battalions’ per MRB. Each formed around a Warrior IFV company (with additional platoon from the left-over third company), a Bulldog/ASCOD APC coy, and a Challenger sqn (four or three troops, or two squadrons, depending on how many C2 make the cut).
It’s not likely that a Warrior battalion, for example, would act as a single homogeneous lump within the MRBs. This alternative gives each MRB two battalion sized armoured manoeuvre units – a mini armoured brigade in themselves.
Hi BB,
I think you lose rather than gain when you start to go permanently ‘combined’at lower than the battalion level.
However, I has a similar thought on the army future ’04’ thread, but my Battle Group” was much bigger than what they tend to be in the British Army (and very self-contained, over a 2-3 day engagement span, at least).
If you combine two of mine, add some logistics and ISTAR, then there is a very hard hitting brigade to hand (but mainly for offensive action – hence not permanently combining them)
BTW, at the time Lord Jim said he had sent to TD a draft on a similar, perhaps not as armour-heavy structure
– we will get to see that one in due course
@ Philq
Sometimes a good number of heavy weapons aren’t enough! They broke contact pretty quick. I know sometimes recces are performed to see what’s out there (can’t think of the proper term) but in A-stan with everybody armed to the teeth I can’t think that would achieve much. Further I was talking about the fact they were engaged with a Soviet HMG so they were matched. I suppose we could speculate what would have happend if they had closed the enemy and found themselves under enfalide fire from another HMG or RPGs the situation could have become sticky.
@ Mike W
The Army has been short of proper vehicles since vehicles were invented!!
Hi ACC. The US army have introduced combined arms battalions to their armoured brigades. Each of two battalions formed around two infantry companies with Bradley, and two Abrams squadrons.
In peace-keeping or COIN type operations the Challengers, the Warriors will be used in packets much smaller than battalions – in support of other forces or as QRFs for example. In more traditional armoured manoeuvre warfare, the single battalion size lumps of tank, IFV, APC in our one expeditionary MRB won’t provide the same options as two CABattalions.
@ Brian B
Back in the mists of time it was envisioned that it would be the RTR driving the infantry around. Of course we all know that idea came to naught. I suppose the “all in one” outfit to look at are American cavalry regiments.
Hi BB,
The US army is structured to heavy and otherwise.
Within the heavy, when they come into play, they will probably always deploy with more than one brigade, and then we are close to Corps-type of operation; then these pre-packaged bn’s make sense
The standard practice is to pair tank and IFV units 1-to-1 (depending on the task), but in my view this is better reflected at the higher formation level (proportions); in our case at the Bde level and then the Battle Groups (as in the UK nomenclature) are drawn from that pool, and you can realistically expect to have the ingredients at hand
Further to the US practices:
They have a big initiative on the way to have “joint” fire control teams trained and readily available to standard formations – as opposed to today’s make-do and amend on the go
In my view this is a “necessary condition” to being able to divide up manoeuvre units to much smaller packets than brigades, and also recognising the fact that the next step “up” from the organic fires is more likely to be tacair and helos (if that is different) than Brigade-level artillery
Taking that comment to European armies:
– artillery seen as a bde asset needs the c. 40 km range and precision munitions
– that is all very well, but should not be at the expense of some artillery a) under armour, b) with similar mobility to the units they belong to, and then c) even a 20 km range is great (and targeting assets and coordination make all the difference)
.. not forgetting the force multipliers (tacair, AH, airmobility…); these are things that will always be scarce, and added when crucial
I think the MRB will be organized as a mechanised brigade with a regiment of recce in its usual form, with Scout, ATGW, tracked APC, etc …, an armored regiment with 60 Challenger, an armored infantry battalion with 50 warrior, two infantry mechanised battalions with approximately 100 “light” APC, protected by squadrons of 120mm direct fire vehicles, and an artillery regiment with 30 AS90 and possibly carries mortars 120mm vehicles.
With the possibility of adding squadrons or battalions from other MRB according to the mission.
Whilst the US army thinks in division and corps deployments, ACC, I’ve drawn from their brigade combat teams – small, independently deployable, self contained structures. We won’t readily have more than one brigade deployed, these combined arms battalions are exactly what is needed for this scale of operations, mostly.
If you do want to form a battlegroup around an IFV or APC mounted infantry battalion, then it’s still doable though not with a standing formation. CABattalions would have advantages and disadvantages, though I think the weight’s -probably- in their favour.
Hi, Frenchie. I feel that the three planned light and mechanised infantry battalions in the MRBs will, over time and due to cost, become a mixture of light and medium protected wheeled vehicles – Foxhound, a light armoured tactical Landrover replacement out of OUVS, and a few variants of a LAV/Stryker/Boxer type APC wrung from FRESS.
We’ll end up with essentially a straight forward infantry brigade with a little attached armour, rather than a true multirole brigade.
@Jed
“If the NL is getting rid of all it’s Leo 2′s, and Germany has just announced another cut in it’s numbers (and it already has a bunch in storage) AND it was decided it would be too complicated / expensive to fit a “NATO standard” smoothbore to the Chally 2 – then should we consider: Replacing our Challenger 2 fleet with second hand Leo 2′s ?”
If the NL is phasing out her heavy armour, and we traditionally share the same strategic goals, why bother having heavy armour at all?
Hi BB, You’re right, we will have probably, as you think, most of the brigade equipped with light wheeled APC, it’s cheaper than a tracked APC, it’s easier to repair, and there is vehicles such as the Patria, which are resistant to mines and IED, multifunctional, and have proved their worth in Afghanistan.
Phil D
Bradleys in iraq were guided onto targets by air platforms, and could happuily hit them from behind.
Acc
“I think you lose rather than gain when you start to go permanently ‘combined’at lower than the battalion level.”
Not sure I agree with that, not saying your wrong either.
X
Thats not quite true, the UK had the worlds first all motorised army, it just only ever used them to leg it from the Germans and never had the resources ever again :)
About APC wheeled, the soldiers are angry.
http://www.defencemanagement.com/news_story.asp?id=17822
Thanks Frenchie, I had read a shorter version before
“”Even the Americans, who have dollars to spare, went out and bought new vehicles because their Stryker vehicle – which was perhaps one of the vehicles we were looking to procure for our core programme – was overmatched by the threat. Even a well-equipped AFV (Armoured Fighting Vehicle) fleet is challenged by heavy IEDs and externally forged fragments.”
MoD chief Ursula Brennan said that the need to spend billions on the vehicles as Urgent Operational Requirements would have been the same if Britain’s planned armoured fighting vehicle programmes, such as FRES, had been successfully procured.”
Well, she is not quite the Chief of MoD ( I speak at my peril; in many companies the chief accountant is the chief!), but
– she is right
– as per the piece I put on the Open Thread; the next US Stryker Bde to deploy to A-stan is leaving their $4m Strykers behind and using $1m MRAPs instead
Let’s not bin them all; horses for courses
McZ
Ref the Cloggies getting rid of MBT’s – well it has absolutely N O T H I N G to do with strategy, and everything to do with budgets and cost cutting. So in this case I would say the Dutch are wrong, and we dont want to copy them!
Read an interesting piece the other day, I will look for the link, on the way Israeli doctrine is being modified in the context of the proliferation of sophisticated MANPADS and how this may deny them the traditional high level of CAS from both Apaches and fast air. This, in conjunction with the threat from modern Russian ATGW’s and RPG’s is pushing them towards heavier vehicles such as the Namer, and to start examing more organic fire support at lower levels, and it was thought that this will most likely mean more armoured 120mm mortars in the short term.
I’ve been trying to do some research on the cloggie issue purely to see if were possible to whack the turret onto the chally chassis, no need to buy in a huge stock of spares and retrain the VM’s. (and no outrage in the daily wail, or disgusted retired **** of tunbridge wells writing to the telegraph)
I note that they are now upgrading older MBT’s for urban warfare, so if we are going to bin/store a percentage would it not be an idea to also convert some, to be used if our “raiding” concept turned into a stan like prolonged occupancy?
leopard PSO is the urban version
Hi Jed,
Say what you like (I don’t mean you) about the Israelis, they are not stupid:
“, in conjunction with the threat from modern Russian ATGW’s and RPG’s is pushing them towards heavier vehicles such as the Namer, and to start examing more organic fire support at lower levels, and it was thought that this will most likely mean more armoured 120mm mortars in the short term”
– all of that right, even though some of it specific to their context
Next, about the Cloggies:
” absolutely N O T H I N G to do with strategy, and everything to do with budgets and cost cutting. So in this case I would say the Dutch are wrong, and we dont want to copy them!”
– everything to do with their chosen strategy
– read it: 3 Marine bn’s and 3 army Cdo bn’s to be made into a coherent and agile force.. in the context of NOT having to defend the country at its borders
– we have a different strategy, and as you say, we should not copy them… having said that: 3 Marine bn’s and 3 other cdo bn’s with almost half of our Apache numbers and better Pumas than we have got, to move them around… what is there to sniff at?
the idf might have the luxury of reverting to imprecise barrages if pinpoint fire is off the table, do we?
I remember the last time i pointed out how far we could go even within UN rules the reaction on here wasnt supportive.
DomJ
Ref the IDF – who mentioned imprecise barrages ? Not I, don’t leap to the wrong conclusion.
ACC –
NL policy is budget led, so called strategy being only one available to fit in with the budget cuts – which does not make it bad per se of course, especially as their politicians are less “adventerous” than hours. So lets see how they do with CV90 as their heaviest armour.
Sven
Just read the three articles you linked – ta very much, interesting discussion ! If only I had read them first…… :-)
I note B.Smitty was involved in the comments threads, and in response to my questions, he states at the head of this comment thread, that the answers to my questions very much depend on what it is we want our army to do.
If we don’t argue with the premise and outcomes of the SDSR, British doctrine is basically to fight our battles as far away from UK / Europe as possible – i.e. an expeditionary strategy. This gets us back into arguements about weight and how much we can deploy by air. Personally I am with Sven / the Israeli’s and favour heavier armour, so I will just say to me it boils down to how many amphibs / merchants we have to move heavy MBT and supporting vehicles.
So back to the questions at hand, IFV versus APC etc. Sven in his article seems to come down on a heavily protected Namer type HAPC, able to keep up with the MBT’s, but not heavily encumbered with turret and auto-cannon. He suggests an auto-cannon equipped vehicle on the same chassis the MBT / HAPC for direct fire support. Frankly I am maybe being swayed over to this side of the fence BUT lets face British Army is not getting Namer, or a family of front engined Chally 3 and Namer-type HAPC’s any time soon !!
So, out of what we might get, which way should we go ? Might it be better to upgrade more Warriors, in order that each Armoured Infantry Battalion get more vehicles, with more capabilities, rather than relying on what Sven describes as a “jack of all trades” IFV ?
Perhaps Warrior APC’s (or protected mobility) with no turret (or basket) and just a heavy RWS, and a full 8 man disembarking infantry squad. These could be joined by perhaps as many as 16 (8 in the “Recce” platoon, and 8 in the “Anti-Tank” platoon) turreted versions with not only the 40mm CTA, but also a turret mounted ATGW. By not carrying any infantry in the back, but using the space to carry additional ammo, these would perhaps make up for some of Sven’s issues with the paltry amount of reloads carried by the IFV.
Add to these 8 to 12 x turreted 120mm in the indirect / direct fire support role. Overall size of the Armoured Infantry Battalion goes up, but as the number of battalions is being reduced, this in someway ensures the ensuing battlegroups retain a certain critical mass of firepower capabilities ?
Of course if we could just hand all these to the TA and equip the MRB’s with brand new versions built on FRES (or even better in my opinion, on CV90) then there would be greater fleet commonality with the Formation Recce regiments !! Can’t see the budget for that arriving any time soon…….
I do wonder if advent of reliable, multi-shot active defense systems mean the APC does not have to be quite so heavy as the German Puma ?
Sven notes that all western armies are getting a bit thin on armoured transport of all varieties, and suggests less expensive IFV’s means more, cheaper, APC’s. If we only need them to be bullet proof and 155mm air-bursting shrapnel proof because RPG’s and ATGW’s are dealt with by a triad of: Mobility, active-defense and masking systems (IR smoke etc), then is something like the RG35 or RG41 (both less well protected and thus cheaper than the Boxer) good enough for the majority of the “mechanized” infantry.
I think to some it up, we end up with (build either on Warrior or FRES ASCOD 2 platforms for this fantasy)an armoured battlegroup triad of:
Chally 2 MBT
“Heavy” APC – up armoured Warrior with RWS (MG / GMG)
“Recce Tanks” – Warrior or FRES Scout with both 40mm CTA and ATGW but no dismounts
Additional “Recce Tanks” might mount MANPADS instead of ATGW’s (and the flashy Starstreak type laser guided 40mm CTA round).
Might this triad be capable of taking on the threat spectrum envisaged by SDSR for “expeditionary” operations – I think so, of course we will have to buy back that Bay class, and build a couple more :-)
Jed
“Ref the IDF – who mentioned imprecise barrages ? Not I, don’t leap to the wrong conclusion.”
I think if you give infantry companies a 120mm mortar, they will use it, a lot, quite possibly against targets a Fast Air or Artilery platform would refuse.
Its really impossible to comment on the the RG vehicle without a clearer idea of the function.
If they (mechanised infantry) are Panzergrenadiers, fighting an identified enemy in a war, mine resistance is of limited value, and the RG’s resistance to .50 AP not much use against 20mm and up cannons.
If your going to operate as a quasi police force, well the RG series is great, the enemy has nothing bigger than a .50AP and you will face serious mine threats.
I believe the recent Royal Marine grabbing of a uncooperative tribal chief should be the way forward, even if we need to land 30 tanks 100 IFVs and 3,000 men to grab Christina…..
Personaly, I think gun ports are a bit of a waste in any vehicle. If you need any sort of close range fire power like that, I think some sort of “hedgehog” all around grenade weapon would be far better at dealing with close in enemy before the infantry debark.
Hi Jed,
I am with you on this one:
“perhaps Warrior APC’s (or protected mobility) with no turret (or basket) and just a heavy RWS, and a full 8 man disembarking infantry squad. These could be joined by perhaps as many as 16 (8 in the “Recce” platoon, and 8 in the “Anti-Tank” platoon) turreted versions with not only the 40mm CTA, but also a turret mounted ATGW. By not carrying any infantry in the back, but using the space to carry additional ammo, these would perhaps make up for some of Sven’s issues with the paltry amount of reloads carried by the IFV.
Add to these 8 to 12 x turreted 120mm in the indirect / direct fire support role.”
-but you omitted the word mortar or AMOS from the last sentence? (joke-joke!)
– the Canadians chose NEMO for their wheeled LAVs, i.e single barrel only and thereby much lesser first burst rate of fire (6-7 rounds land on the target simultaneously with two barrels)
Also this one is good (except for 16AAB and 3 CDO):
“Chally 2 MBT
“Heavy” APC – up armoured Warrior with RWS (MG / GMG)
“Recce Tanks” – Warrior or FRES Scout with both 40mm CTA and ATGW but no dismounts”
As there is no ATGW-version, I’ll offer my two pennies worth
– we all agree(?) that Brimstone is brilliant,and will be better still with the three-mode seeker head that the Americans are working on
-The MMW radar system can see though any kind of smoke, fog, heavy rain, and allows (as evidenced by the Russian Krisanthema system) to target metal vehicles at 6.5km at night, in heavy snow, fog, or even the special smoke screens that IR sights can’t see through. The radar is fully retracible and uses very low emission levels (the frequency as such does not lend itself too much for ARM-missiles to home in).
– as there is a lot of parts commonality between Brimstone and Hellfire already, we put a ‘Brimfire’ on the over-watch SV Scouts
– I forget the range of a ground-launched Hellfire, but the Russian one does 5.5 km
– guidance method can be different from target detection, eg. laser beam riding
Further, for recce the trials done in N. European type of vegetation have produced results for up to 20 km detection that are good enough for preliminary classification. Putting an MMW radar on a retractable arm (think of a miniature of the Giraffe AA-radar arm) on some SV Scouts and on others the same thing loaded with optical & TI sensors a la Fennec and Jackal would enhance unit-level ground surveillance greatly, while the gunned units (MBTs,Scouts/ WRs, AHs or the above proposed ATGW carriers) would then do the jobs themselves
– following the trend for off-board sensors here (holy cow, forgot to mention UAVs… have to keep up with the times)
Mine resistance is not a waste of time. Anything that gets a vehicle back into action quickly is not a waste. On the MoDs website right now there’s a pic of a REME fitter repairing a mine strike vehicle in the field as part of a CLP with their own assets. You think that would be valueless in a general war?
Israel can “afford” really heavy APCs because its forces fight at home. And Israeli doctrine puts crew survival first. It really isn’t a Western style heavy vs medium argument. Completely different context.
Is the MICV concept past it’s use by date?
Maybe.
It’s armament is not good for supporting infantry in the assault, it’s armour can’t keep the infantry it carries safe from ATGWs and incoming tank rounds like an MBT’s armour can and it carries fewer infnatry than a dedicated APC does.
A 25-40mm autocannon is great for killing light armour but poor for anything else. Even a 40mm cannon fires an HE round about as heavy as a hand grenade which, unless it’s backed by ludicrously expensive sighting and fusing technology, is incapable of hitting infantry behind dense cover or on the reverse side of slopes. A good mortar or even a GMG is a better weapon for such tasks. The old Scorpion’s 76mm HESH was better for taking out buildings and with the increasing amounts of armour that MICVs now carry, how long will it be before an ATGW is the only reliable way of killing one (short of a 120mm APFSDS round, of course)?
If your MICV is designed to support infantry on foot then does it need a stabilised gun? If it has a large-ish calibre weapon does it need expensive, electronically programmed airbursting ammunition?
Phil
“You think that would be valueless in a general war?”
Yes.
If we accept limited engineers time and resources, its likely that the highest availability rate will be maintained by writing off damaged vehicles and concentrating on keeping functional ones in the field.
Although it does of course depend on the exact circumstances and a vehicle by vehicle basis,
An Abrams was hit by such a blast that it was flipped over, the turret seperated and the vehicle pretty much shredded, probably BER.
The same tank that drove over an anti personel mine and lost a track segment, probably worth repair.
My point was more that vehicles to be used in Counter Insurgency should be built to be mine protected above all else, both keep the crew alive, and facilitate either easy repair and canibalisation.
Vehicles used in war, should be built to be protected against enemy fire first and foremost.
It rather depends on what sort of war you intend to fight.
If you favour long peace keeping operations, you need to keep vehicles going for long periods of time, and have a lot of time to effect repairs on damaged vehicles in the field.
If you favour quick “in/out” raids or dashing advances, a three hour delay to fix a vehicle is likely to be impossible.
Somewhere in between, its likely to somewhere in betweem.
Personaly, in the sort of wars I think we should be fighting, the resources spent repairing damaged vehicles would be far better spent bringing more vehicles in the first place.
I remember reading about somewhere in Afghanistan, fairly early on, 4 CVRTs were sent to an area, two fire support, one command and an engineering vehicle and thinking that was positivly insane.
X
A bay class can in theory carry 36 MBTs, thats an under strength battalion, more or bigger bays, its not a massive problem moving them, admitadly, keeping them supplied mught be harder.
But its not beyond possible.
Pete
I considered mentioning that for our light tanks, we went with a little cannon, a big cannon and a missile platform.
20mm cannon, 120mm mortar, javelins?
If you look at the information from WWII in Allied armies they returned huge numbers of vehicles to battle after repairs, it’s likely things would not have run as they did if vehicles had been abandoned. The more resistance to fire you have, the more your combat power. Mines are a legitimate and very widespread weapon in general war and designing vehicles that can largely take a hit and be repaired rapidly afterwards is a valuable concern in all scenarios. Vehicles hit by mines can still then dismount their infantry and the vehicle dragged back for quick repairs. There is much utility in mine resistance. I’m not talking about catastrophic kills, nobody is expecting an MBT with its turret popped off to be repaired in the field but every little helps.
Phil
But WWII lasted years, in that sort of situation, then yes, repair matters.
The Gulf war, less than 30 days, Khafji to Ceasefire.
Repairability either comes with a dollar cost or a performance cost, how much we can afford either of those to be varies depending on how long the war is likely to last.
Look at the campaigns. They were far more condensed in time and space. And surely the shorter the war the more valuable repaired vehicles are?!
@Jed
I know the Dutch ditched their MBT-capability due to budget cuts. But when you cut something, you take the capabilities first, where you think that the strategic need is lowest.
As I heard from a friend-of-mine living in Noord-Holland, the Dutch will in the foreseeable future never again fight another war on foreign soil. If forced to fight, there are hundreds of second hand tanks readily available on the market.
This is a strategic decision, one I would support absolutely if implemented in the UK.
Hence my counter-question.
Apart from this, I shit on political conventions and would want to have Merkava IV including Trophy.
Phil
Depends on the time required.
Sure, if the vehicle is modular, and it takes 20 minutes to bolt on a new piece of armour.
But if takes 10 engineers a day and a workshop, I have to wonder would it not have been easier to ship over spare vehicles than that level of maintenance kit.
Its impossible to say in isolation.
It’s not in isolation. It’s in the context of a general war. Not even the Soviets considered their AFVs disposable in the sense that they would not be worth repairing in battle. The tougher the kit the harder it is to completely break it. Look up the historical evidence that shows in a general war repaired AFVs comprised significant portions of AFV fleets even in condensed phases of different campaigns.
“It’s in the context of a general war”
And that was agreed when?
Yes, if the UK intends to shoe the seventh soviet shock army (I need an S for army?) at Fulda, repairability is probably going to be very important.
If we intend to land at Rio Gallegos, beat the shit out of the 11th Mechanized Infantry Brigade and leg it back to sea before reinforcements can mobile and crush our land forces, anything immobilised is likely to be destroyed rather than repaired in any event, simply for lack of time to effect retrieval before the ships leave.
You said identified enemy in a war. You then use GW1 as an example. So I am assuming we’re talking about a good old fashioned battle or two, conditions that represent a general war on the sharp end. Lots of firepower, attrition, etc etc
Phil
Perhaps I read “general war” and thought “total war”.
I freely accept, I have no detailed knowledge here, and am operating mostly on guess work, but were there many (any?) theatre repairs in the first (or second) gulf wars?
McZ – I understand the point and the arguments, I may counter that if the Neaderlands is suddenly looking for second hand tanks, because it’s next government has different strategic priorities, then others maybe too, and therefore they may not be readily available.
However, strategically we are going down the same route at a lower speed, we will have far less Chally 2 MBT available so what impact does this have the operational doctrine of the combined arms battle group ? Does it mean more heavily armed IFV, or less (but more APC’s) ???
Jed
My biggest concern must be that an APC/IFV group stumbles upon a concealed enemy MBT, and it kills half of them before anyone can debus and engage with ATGMs, if we’re lucky, and simply wipes them out if we arent.
Something must be able to engage and destroy an enemy tank with a few seconds notice.
Dont care what, but something, if theres nothing there, we are inviting disaster.
Happy to entertain everything from escorting MBTs, heavily armed IFVs, or even heavily armed “tankettes”.
Pete Arundel,
From what I’ve read from ODS & OIF, the 25mm on the Bradley and Marine LAV-25 has been very effective and versatile against a wide variety of targets.
While the Bradley won’t survive an ATGM, tank gun round, or large IED, it did prove reasonably survivable against just about everything else.
IIRC, it was praised by commanders as one of the most useful combat vehicles in theater due to its combination of mobility, firepower, protection and ability to carry troops. Swiss Army knives aren’t the best at anything, but they still are handy to have around.
Assumptions about threats goes hand-in-hand with the question about requirements. If we anticipate the future “norm” will be fighting Hezbollah-like forces in Lebanon (i.e. dug in, with large numbers of ATGMs), then HAPCs/HIFVs or even unmanned vehicles may be the only way to go. On the other hand, if we think threats will look more like the regular and irregular forces in ODS, OIF and OEF, then maybe the IFVs “Swiss Army knife” approach still has considerable value.
Just MHO.
@dom j, yes 7 armd wksp deployed with 2 MRG’s (main repair groups) and 2 FRG’s (forward repair groups) known as MRG/FRG 7 and MRG/FRG 22 in respect to the brigades they supported. In the actual 100 hour “war” they used the leapfrog method to support assets, ie 1 set up, takes a bit of time to get up and running to accept kit, while the other went past and started to set up. TBH it was all a wee bit hetic!! I was in optronics and we took in radios and stuff dunno about the black hand gang (who are mechanics not engineers)!!! TD knows the difference, handsome debonair, sophisticated and then there are engineers!!
@ DomJ
The USMC deploy a “platoon” of 4 M1A1 in a MEU and that small formation is a considerable drain on resources and takes up a lot of space too (as part of an all arms formation) within the ARG’s ships.
Israel is tiny. Though the IDF has transporters if needs be their armoured vehicles can self deploy. In the 73 war IDF reservists left their kibbutz, jumped in their tanks, and were in contact with enemy within the hour.
DomJ ref: “My biggest concern must be that an APC/IFV group stumbles upon a concealed enemy MBT”
Yes, understood. As mentioned, they should not be alone, should have tanks in company, or 40mm CTA/ATGW armed ‘tankettes’ though. BUT if they do, possibly more likely in urban scenarios, perhaps two of whatever the standard infantry disposable anti-armour rockets should be mounted on the RWS – cheaper, shorter ranged than say Javelin, meaning these vehicles are equipped for the emergency why the round a corner and a T90 is bouncing over the rubble….. ?
See YouTube for Greatest Tank Battles episode on GW1 – two detached Bradleys pop up over a rise into a large group of Iraqi T72’s and BMP’s, instead of poppping smoke and running (in the middle of sand storm, Iraqi’s may never of got a clean shot) they stand and start plinking the bad guys with TOW’s – one of the two vehicles is shot by a BMP resulting in one of the only U.S. KIA of the particular battle – should they have legged it ?
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MlgPkOw9xO4
TB.Smitty – I think the Israeli stance could soon morph into ours. What if the OPFOR in OIF, OEF, etc get their hands on more sophisticated ATGW’s – if Iran get their hands on the latest stuff from Russia and forward it on etc. Would the Bradley’s 25mm been of such use because it out-ranged RPG’s / PKM’s etc ? Could a 40mm MK19 GMG have done just as good a job against light infantry type insurgents in rural or urban scenarios ??
Hi DJ,
This is a good line (sets out the requirement, and has been uttered by some tank commanders I know):
“Something must be able to engage and destroy an enemy tank with a few seconds notice.
Dont care what, but something, if theres nothing there, we are inviting disaster.”
About value of repairing in the field, do read some of the better records of the battle of Kursk, as they utilise the war diaries of the entities on both sides (the Germans being more methodical in noting down, as you would expect), Despite the numbers involved, permanent write-offs were in dozens as long as the Germans were gaining ground and as soon as they could not retrieve the damaged tanks anymore, suddenly hundreds were lost, even though battle intensity diminished.
There you go Dom straight from the horses mouth. The thing with GW1 is that it didn’t happen anything like anyone was expecting it to. The US MEF and Arab forces pushing into Kuwait were expected to take 20-40% casualties in the opening days and move at best a few kilometres forward before being stopped by overwhelming fire-power and chemical weapons. The British forces in the Gulf actually had the equivalent to a battlegroup of kit manned and organised into companies and squadrons ready to rapidly replace the lead elements as they were destroyed in the advance. So we were expecting a lot of repair work, as was everyone else. As it happened, the ground war went rather better, probably a bit too well.
Paul, a legend in their own (extended) NAAFI break :)
Can I ask a simple question?
What is an MICV for? How is it supposed to be used?
Pete – have you actually read the article ? Did I do a really crap job of that part ?
To recap the original concept was (is) for a vehicle which can carry infantry to keep up with tanks, it was to be better armed than an APC (something heavier than MG’s) and was to have firing ports, so that the infantry could get into the battle without disembarking. It was therefore to be used as part of the ‘combined arms’ armoured combat ‘team’ for lack of a better term.
Jed
“and was to have firing ports”
Arse, my first thought was “and get rid of those silly bloody fireing ports!”
If I can add one more problem.
Its easy to say that the MICV will be protected by the “big Brother” MBT/MCV on a Powerpoint presentation, but those assets can be stripped away very quickly, either not deployed in the first place, or called away on “more important” matters
In its pure form an MICV wants to be far more than it can ever be because it represents a conflict between forms and any one product as ever will be a compromise – the key is getting the balance as right as you can.
An MICV wants to fight other AFVs and provide fire support yet it cannot yet be armoured sufficiently to give it the same level of protection as an MBT and fulfil other roles, yet it is expected to expose itself to the same level of danger.
It wants to have weapon systems that can engage and kill tanks but these weapon systems are substantially less effective and vulnerable to counter measures than the 120mm main gun of a tank that is smashing out APFSDS rounds.
It wants to carry infantry into the battle and utilise the infantry’s organic fire power through firing ports yet without the armour necessary to withstand most of the enemies counter measures who would clean the clock of any mounted attack.
MICV cannot do what they are wanted to do against a determined enemy.
Which is why Warrior is a good example of a well balanced MICV. It carries infantry under reasonable armour which balances well with the fact that it is not expected to engage weapon systems it cannot defend against and so it is not armed to tackle them; and it cannot attack mounted when it doesn’t have the armour to do so, therefore it has no firing points.
It therefore carries a useful infantry section under armour suited to its role which enables it to be mobile and it doesn’t carry weapon systems that would get it killed quickly against a competent enemy, but it does carry a weapon which can provide fire support to the infantry at opportune times and also engage other AFVs at opportune times.
The design and make up of the Warrior reflects a realistic appraisal of how it would be most useful. Let’s not kid ourselves that BFV and BMP mounted attacks against a competent and reasonably equipped enemy would be suicide and that in close country a BFV or BMP would stand a chance against a modern, well crewed MBT. So let’s stop encouraging it to do so – it can only end one way, a dead infantry section. Better to split the tank destroyers from the infantry like we did with Milan CT and Striker.
Phil – thanks for the summation :-)
DomJ – I did cover it in the article – the firing ports where part of the whole reason d’etre of the MICV concept and soon became obsolete as the vehicles, be they Warrior, Bradley or BMP got up-armoured with additional protection that simply got in the way (of the firing ports).
Back to Phil – I don’t agree ref the tank destroyers, I have always thought that was very much a British solution to the Soviets in the Fulda Gap WWIII type scenario, much less applicable in other scenarios, and as I note in the article many other nations seem to agree, with both MICV (IFV) and less well armed APC’s having ATGW on their turret / RWS as “standard”.
I think IFVs serves for fire support and protection to a group of infantry during an assault, and secondarily they can to support the tanks, being as mobile as the tanks.
The tanks attack, the infantry protect tanks against infantry opponents (ambushes, antitank missiles …) and IFV support the soldiers and they serves to based mobile fallback in case of need for protect them against light fire (machine guns , assault rifles, RPG …).
That’s how I see it, but you are safe from anything.
FRES direct fire can be used to protect the APCs, here I understand.
Wasnt the point of Striker to provide an AT cover/owerwatch for CVR(T) i.e. a big brother with a very long arm, exactly because CVR(T) was meant to go places where it would bump into enemy MBT. Small, nimble, highly manouverable vehicle that go go and look but without the necessary means of having a stand up fight with an MBT, thats why we dont have ATGW on Warrior because the point is, Warrior is never meant to be anywhere (supposedly) where it will be without having it’s own big brother in the form of CR2.
This kind of falls apart though when Warrior deploys to or is used in scenarios where it operates alone because this reality can turn it into a light tank, unfortunately it doesn’t have the firepower to operate in this role so maybe it would be useful to have an ATGW mounted, personally, I would see far more use in the kind of scenarios we actually find ourselves in for a Warrior with a 90mm cannon or 120mm mortar than one fitted with a 40mm cannon/ATGW combo
I don’t think we should confuse how Warrior has been used and how it was envisaged it would be used. Obviously the context of its employment has changed quite a lot and as TD has pointed out it can be seen mission creeping into light tank areas but again, this is at the margins in that it only happens against less capable enemies. You would not see Warrior for example in an over-watch position in Lebanon firing with impunity and then scurrying about the battlefield.
I personally think other nations are wrong. Adding ATGW to an MICV detracts from its mission, adds weight, complexity and temptation all for a marginal capability frankly. MICVs should not be in the business of looking for trouble – they are there to deploy the infantry onto objectives and if they can, provide additional fire support. Now, they may run into a tank, but they may also run into a helicopter and we don’t advocate arming MICVs with HVM – it’s just the fate of war. Warriors were envisaged as one element in a combined arms battlegroup with other units taking on the tanks.
The Tank Destroyer concept is hardly a British peculiarity and represents a cost effective means of conducting a defence against MBTs without distracting your infantry tasks. A cheap vehicle that can fire from defilade or hull down position and which can concentrate entirely on stalking or ambushing tanks is far more effective than an expensive MICV which also has to operate and deploy its infantry section.
Yes, Jed, I have read the article and yet I still think the question needs answering! You did give the classic answer (a vehicle which can carry infantry to keep up with tanks, it was to be better armed than an APC and was to have firing ports, so that the infantry could get into the battle without disembarking.) which I always thought was crap! So did the british army, I think, since Warrior never had firing ports. Anyway, my question still stands but perhaps I should modify it to “What is an MICV for now”. If it’s to carry infantry forward with the tanks then, really, it should have tank level armour and sacrifice the turret and big gun for infantry. The tanks are there to support the infantry and vice versa.
Didnt West Germany field a HOT armed tank destroyer?
Yes Germany fielded a Jagdpanzer I and II I believe it was called, one with a canon (or Kanon!) and the other upgraded to HOT.
Pete A – Sorry, I take your point. Actually the whole article is basically framed in order to ask that very question !
TD, I think agree with the Warrior / FRES, whatever, fitted with a 120mm mortar, because it can hide behind hill (or other obstacle) and chuck guided top attack AT mortar rounds, or it could fire 8km ranged top-attack, laser guided missiles through the same barrel – so the “AT top cover” now has commonality with the indirect fire support role (note I am not saying you should mix the roles within say the same section of 4 vehicles).
Phil;
Jagdpanzer Kanone – 90mm gun
Raketenjagdpanzer 1 – unreliable HS 30 IFV with SS 11 ATGM
Jaguar 1 – Jagdpanzer Kanone design with (initially) SS 11 ATGM, soon refitted with an automatic high-performance HOT ATGM system
Jaguar 2 – used Jagdpanzer Kanone refitted with cheap manually-loaded TOW system
That’s them. And the Yanks had their ITVs too.
Are they still in service Sven?
What was their operational concept?
No all long gone. They were tank destroyers in the German tradition as implied by their names. Like the S Tank, probably the best tank destroyer made.
Jed,
IFVs should have tanks accompanying them too. However sometimes tanks are out of position for targets of opportunity (as you illustrated) or are otherwise occupied (e.g. lots of targets).
In your Greatest Tank Battles example, the Bradleys did kill numerous tanks and BMPs before one was knocked out. Should they have pulled back and let someone else deal with it? Maybe. But they gave a lot better than they got.
Can you improve the ability of an RWS-equipped APC to handle targets of opportunity? Of course. Would they be as good as the sensors (IBAS plus commanders thermal) and firepower (25mm, TOW, 7.62mm) on a Bradley? Not even close.
Of course there is plenty of room for improvement on the IFV front too.
A lot of these questions can be addressed with modeling, gaming and simulation using various configurations. But this depends entirely on our assessments of current and future threats.
Shall we reverse roles. Imagine it’s 1989. The Cold War has just got hot. You’re in the Blackhorse Cavalry in an M1A1 as part of the covering force and you’re hull down with excellent fields of fire. And then the Soviet vanguard drives into view, the infantry riding in their BMP2s hoping to over run you through speed. And you and your Platoon open up. Hands up those that think the BMPs won’t stand a chance? So why should it be any different of they were PUMAs or WARRIORS? A competent enemy will annihilate that force and it’s infantry will burn before they get a chance to fight.
Phil
Are you suggesting that relying on the “fighting spirit” of the frenchman might not be the best strategy? :)
Well said, put like that, we re-he-ally cannot count on warriors surving tank confrontations
From an anti tanking killing perceptive in any ww3 Type fight I assume we would Employ apache the weapon the army bought for that role or indeed any Uav, fast air you care to mention. As soon as armour moves it’s killed from the air.
As the Apache’s, UAVs etc fly about serenely and completely unmolested?
Not just ours we lose air domance it doesn’t matter how gd are tank is it’s dead.
I think the enemy might have some say in how many of their tanks we destroy from the sky.
Mark
As soon as armour moves, it dies, I agree.
So what if it doesnt move?
A T-90 hiding in a barn or a woodland or garage is invisble until it turns its engine on, drives out, and wipes out your Warrior company.
5 minutes later, fast air arrives, and its back under cover, or its running for home, or its crew have blown the valuable systems and are walking home.
Either way, 100+ families are about to get a sad visit from the rear party, and ministers heads are rolling.
Couple of incidents like that, and we;ve lost the war.
Which is why you the west generally in every coalition war we’ve fought only moves when we have total air dominance.
Doesn’t quite work like that I assume a tank needs it’s engine on to work when it turns them on it exposes its self and also now the advance is usually cover constantly with some sort of air asset look at the way convoys move in afghan. Attrition in such a war would be expected
Mark
True, with its engine on, its a big target for airplatforms, but without, its invisible, if I was fighting NATO, I would scatter individual tanks all over the place, who would wait patiently for any targets they can maul to appear, they might have to sit patiently as tanks idle past, they might be captured without a shot fired 90% of the time, but every now and again, unless every unit of your army travels with tank support, a company is going to stumble across my hidden tank, and get annihilated.
Phil said about the first gulf war
“The British forces in the Gulf actually had the equivalent to a battlegroup of kit manned and organised into companies and squadrons ready to rapidly replace the lead elements as they were destroyed in the advance.”
And I have no reason to doubt him, but ANY minister who announces losses like that is going to be out of a job by the end of the month, even if we “won” the war, excluding of course a war of national survival.
Dismounted infantry carry anti tank weapons no! One tank may kill one or 2 warriors but that’s war if you assume your op above. Remember the largest tank battle fought by uk forces since ww2 was a 14 tank engagement in telic. It’s hardly a major issue I think a 2 company tank 2 company warrior battle group gives you all the on ground tank capability we will ever need
Different times mate. We fully expected such casualties. The only political concession was to move British forces away from the Kuwait operation since British forces would have suffered a disproportionate number of casualties in an expected blood bath. GW1 was expected to be WW3 scale. It wasn’t just Saddam who was expecting the Mother of All Battles. It’s the price of fighting a competent enemy, heavy casualties. Luckily in the end the Iraqi Army never stood a chance.
i’ve got a map of all the battle groups, shame it’s 1)A1 sized so won’t fit printer 2) behind glass in a frame
mark
tanks can fire roughly every 10 seconds. One warrior explodes, how soon can someone debus, set up their atgm and score a kill?
‘one or two’ warriors is twenty dead men, couple of incidents like that….
won’t let me edit, bugger but i remember all the BCR’s (battlefield casualty replacements) all based in blackadder lines, it’s all coming back!!
By the way my laptop is playing up so an answer i put earlier but lost was why not bin mucking about with ASCOD bridgelayers and ambulances, any non upgraded warriors convert some to ambulances, BAe already done the bridgelayer and let’s do an ASCOD replacement for striker (awesome when watching that fire using dismounted remote control system).
I would use spike in either ER version (8km) or the NLOS version (25km) video on youtube shows NLOS going through a small window 25 clicks away and now there is mini spike so the infantry could have 1 system for all foot/mobile etc etc.
The Soviets, who originally came up with the IFV concept (well it’s disputed but for arguments sake…) saw a battlefield dominated by NBC fallout and artillery. Hence the BMP=1 was enclosed but allowed the infantry to fight without leaving the vehicle (rifle ports). However, they got carried away and thought the vehicle could speed in to the battle area and then dismount the troops. When the soviet trained and equipped Arab armies tried this against a well-entrenched opposition they were slaughtered before they could dismount. The Soviets (and the West) learnt the lesson and dismounted the troops before advancing on the objective; the 73mm gun was replaced by a 30mm, I assume to tackle helicopters and lightly armoured AT vehicles. The West followed a similar path and the Bradley was originally designed almost as a tank killer rather than a troop carrier. However, after experience of fighting in Grozny and other places the Russians produced the BMP-3 and the BMPT. If they are the result of lessons learnt by the Russians, what particular reasons/limitations are stopping us from similar conclusions?
http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/grozny.htm
RE: Bradley development…
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pyakI9GeYRs
It’s noticeable that in the context of general war, it’s clear that anything operating with tanks logically has to have the same level of armoured protection. Since the vehicles are then effectively the same weight class, why not make them the same, equipping some with 120mm cannon, and some with 30mm cannon suitable for infantry suppression. For dismounts, instead of trying to fit a full section into a single MICV, we could move to one fire team per vehicle
Re any fighting vehicle without an installed weapon under armour capable of dealing with the majority of threats it is likely to meet can best be described as a liability
“The Soviets (and the West) learnt the lesson and dismounted the troops before advancing on the objective…”
The correct tactic depends on multiple variables. There’s no one-size fits it all and all too often leaders can only know enough to make the correct choice after the action.
An infantry screen ahead of AFVs is typically meant to defeat manportable AT weapons – it was the approach that partially countered the Panzerfaust and Panzerschreck in 1945.
The typical countermeasure are flanking (frontally concealed) defensive positions and mortar HE fires (mortar HE because it’s usually too close for arty or ICM).
Men riding on AFVs and shooting at AT teams while mounted works only with concepts such as open-topped AFVs and ACAV, not with ball mounts. It’s furthermore outdated because mounted infantry has nowadays less effective range than manportable AT weapons do.
It shouldn’t surprise that dilemmas still exist even for heavy combined arms teams. It’s the defenders job to keep any single tactic from becoming an “I win” button.
Then again, it’s also the defender’s job to keep his position secret until he initiates his ambush…
Garth Jones,
“The Russian Army had no money and little support. The army had not conducted a regiment or division-scale field training exercise in over two years and most battalions were lucky to conduct field training once a year. Most battalions were manned at 55% or less. Approximately 85% of Russian youth were exempt or deferred from the draft, forcing the army to accept conscripts with criminal records, health problems or mental incapacity. The Russian Army lacked housing for its officers and had trouble adequately feeding its soldiers and paying them. The Russian Army invaded Chechnya with a rag-tag collection of various units, without an adequate support base. When the Chechens stood their ground, the state to which the Russian Army had sunk became apparent to the world.”
The Russian Army in Grozny was a first order cluster f*ck. I have a hard time drawing equipment conclusions from their experience. Besides, the BMP-3 is not even up to the survivability standards of early western IFVs.
Good discussion guys !
DomJ and the rest of the “if it drives it dies” crowd – utter bollocks – watch the episode of Greatest Tank Battles via the YouTube link – you will see it mentions that the Battle of 73 Easting turned into an armoured ground battle because of the appalling weather conditions that kept fast air out of things (“mother of all sand storms”…).
The wikipedia page is here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_73_Easting
A quote from the page: “The 2nd ACR, which advanced between the Iraqi 12th Armored Division and the Tawakalna Division, was the only American ground unit to find itself significantly outnumbered and out-gunned. Nonetheless, the 2nd ACR’s three squadrons, along with the 1st Infantry Division’s two leading brigades, destroyed two Iraqi brigades (18th Mechanized Brigade and 37th Armored Brigade) of the Tawakalna Division. In moving to and through the Battle of 73 Easting, 2nd ACR destroyed 160 tanks, 180 personnel carriers, 12 artillery pieces and more than 80 wheeled vehicles, along with several anti-aircraft artillery systems during the battle ”
Tanks, AIFV’s and artillery did that, not Apaches and A10’s which could not take part. As I already mentioned, the Israeli’s are considering that even due to the proliferation of sophisticated Russian MANPADS, they will never again have total air dominance over potential adversaries, and those will not be able to rely as much on CAS.
So what makes you think the RAF can do any better ?
For sure in the ideal situation Brimstone is a great piece of kit, but not every situation is ideal.
Aw dammit, before DomJ or someone else flames me, apparently the sand storm did NOT last for the full duration of the Battle of 73 Easting:
“Combat became so intense at times that only massed artillery and mortar fires, attack helicopters and Air Force close air support prevented the enemy from closing with G Troop.”
Yes, it does say attack helicopters and close support….. DOH !
jed
an enemy unit that can only move during severe weather is functionaly immobile in my book.
I’m not saying they cant swap fireing pit, or anything, but a unit trying to sprint 20 miles getting picked up by an anti tank platform is screwed.
We can (or better be able to)smash the enemy line at a chosen point, the enemy should in theory then encricle and destroy us, but anything trying to waves a big kill me kill me sign around.
There is also a capability issure, in 91, f16s, thermal sights and 1klb laser guided bombs were all we could manage, now, aircraft have a dozen missiles, not 4 bombs.
Dom you have a very Tom Clancy technologically deterministic outlook on combat. Just because it can be killed doesn’t mean it will be.
Domj
I don’t know why you keep bringing up the casualties of 2 warriors killed. That is the cost of such a war 25-60% unit losses would be the order your talking this is not afghan. Politicians should remember that before ever engaging in such a war. Look at Falklands 255 killed 10 warships lost in just over 2 months.
While airpower will not remove ever single tank on every battle field it changes things more than anything else. I would say airpower has moved on significantly in the last 10 years wide area/ local area SAR sig advances in targeting pods total persistence thru tactical uavs and weapons that can be launched in any conditions day or night and all pin point accurate with ftacs on the ground and far better cross cue and integration. This was all in it’s infancy in gw1 and even gw2.
But in the context of a uk operation the requirements will be much less
Hi Mark,
The reason for my initial applause at the rumoured Gen Richards proposals, one of them being the emphasis (= investment in kit, doctrine , tactics and training) on tactical networks
RE “advances in targeting pods total persistence thru tactical uavs and weapons that can be launched in any conditions day or night and all pin point accurate with ftacs on the ground and far better cross cue and integration.”
– luckily TD had a thread on this coming up (termed more broadly “Communications”)
Mark
Because its not 1982!
And, unless UK territory is threatened, UK Territory isnt threatened.
The Falklands losses were acceptable because we were clearly attacked and we won.
And even then, the government was in a panic, Goose Green was mounted not because the Army believed “momentum” was being lost, but because the government was starting to look weak in the headlines.
47 dead in the Gulf War is unfortunate and men die in war, the army might have been prepared to suffer 470 dead, or 4700 dead, but they’d have been dragged from office over it.
5 warriors without armour support that ran into an enemy tank would be destroyed, with (relative) massive losses, the next day, the papers would be demanding to know who’s head was going to role, making suggestions, and the British contingent to a coalition would be relegated to the rear lines, an army in itself, any sort of aggressive actions would likely be off the table.
Or maybe not.
The point about the Falklands is not it was 1982 it’s the only time a western army in modern time has engaged a compatible enemy in equal terms. The point being a clear objective was established and a clear end game was there and uk believed in the cause. Like wise in 91 a very clear objective was in place. We know how many personnel we need to fight such wars and how to get out of them without long term garrisons of countries that don’t want us there. Why would 5 warriors come across a tank without any other assistance in such a war we talking about. Even if it did I’m sure there’s ways it can be dealt with. By your logic every vehicle ever put on a battle field will require an anti tank capability as it could at some point come across a tank thats hidden it self so no one ever sees it when the all the heavy stuff passed by.
Dom Warriors move in over watch, all units move in over watch when contact is likely. Now the fate of war may mean that a unit stumbles on a tank in a tight bit of terrain but such is war. The public etc is far more resilient to casualties than you think. Show me one officer or politician hauled over the coals since 1945 for commanding a force that’s sustained casualties? Rather than the political unpopularity of a certain campaign. I can’t think of a single one.
Unfortunate typo in my applause to Gen Richards
(instant, not initial, I meant as I don’t doubt for a second that he has arrived at the right conclusion)
Let’s get systematic.
What do you guys expect of a MICV/IFV?
defeat occupied structures
defeat occupied structures without rare ammunition
defeat MBTs
defeat IFVs, medium armoured recce vehicles
defeat APCs, light armoured recce vehicles
defeat helicopters within 2 km radius
defeat infantry in the open
defeat snipers (sensor!)
defeat infantry in defilade / behind cover
carry ? dismounts
be capable of close combat (in streets, forest roads)
survive MBT fire (frontal)
survive ATGM fire (800 mm RHAeq CE or top attack HEAT)
survive IFV fire (autocannon 30 mm APFSDS)
survive HMG fire (14.5 mm API)
survive major IEDs (below belly)
survive major IEDs (roadside)
survive conventional AT mines
survive DPICM direct hit (110 mm RHAeq CE top hit)
match MBT mobility off-road
full networking
ECM components
magnetic mine countermeasures
full night combat capability
amphibiousness
deep wading capability
price per unit below 1.5 million GBP
price per unit below 3.0 million GBP
price per unit below 4.5 million GBP
Copy & paste what you’d NOT require (+ the qty of dismounts). It’s the compromise that you’re willing to really expresses your opinion.
@ AAC – “Unfortunate typo in my applause to Gen Richards”
What has Richards been saying (couldn’t find a reference above)?
Cheers
Rumour an arrse:
– bin MRBs and plan for/ with more usable combinations
– maybe have 4 standing bde’s in place of the 5 MRBs, but concentrate on stuff that makes the difference (e.g. put money in upgraded tactical networking)
… I have not seen any original document (but that’s what arrse is for)
price per unit below 4.5 million GBP
deep wading capability
full night combat capability
match MBT mobility off-road
full networking
survive HMG fire (14.5 mm API)
survive IFV fire (autocannon 30 mm APFSDS) (frontal)
be capable of close combat (in streets, forest roads)
defeat IFVs, medium armoured recce vehicles
defeat APCs, light armoured recce vehicles
defeat infantry in the open
carry 4-8 dismounts
I’d alter the cover/buildings infantry to “suppress” rather than defeat.
ACC
The problem with that is it doesnt work.
Its great to think, right, what do I need, and order exactly what you need from a catalogue, but half an hour later, you get a string of emails back saying x/y/z is out of stock, a has a lead time of 3 months ect.
@ AAC – “maybe have 4 standing bde’s in place of the 5 MRBs, but concentrate on stuff that makes the difference”
That is the second time that rumour has popped up here, i’m starting to give it real credence.
I wonder when it will be formally unveiled?
DominicJ; do the math.
3 million GBP costs for 8 dismounts (the good end, the worst of what you wrote would be 4 dismounts for 4.5 in a million GBP vehicle!).
That’s 375k GBP merely for moving an infantryman on a battlefield – and its not even protected against ubiquitous AT weapons. With four dismounts in a 4 million vehicle that’s a million per man.
The concept is not survivable on a modern conventional battlefield AND not affordable.
See? This is why I argue for really cheap APCs (could even be a medium trucks with hard shell) and crude HAPC as in-battle taxis. Add in a dedicated firepower vehicle and you’ve got what it takes.
Sven,
Most armies already have the “cheap” APC too. The Germans have the Boxer. The Americans have the Stryker. And these aren’t exactly cheap. The US also now has a vast selection of mobility-compromised MRAPs.
IFVs aren’t just for moving infantry around, they also provide significant amounts of firepower.
How much extra do your dedicated firepower vehicles cost (full life-cycle including development, procurement, manpower, deployment, sustainment)? How many per company/battalion/brigade? How much of a firepower loss are you willing to accept?
Numbers matter. An M2A3 battalion has 44 25mms, 44 TOW vehicles, 88 long-ranged thermals (better than RWS) and that’s not counting dismounted Javelins. How many will your APC/HAPC plus “tankette” battalion have?
I agree, the Bradley battalion is relatively infantry poor, but it can be plussed up at higher levels. For example add a Stryker battalion to the TOE of a mechanized division and assign companies to brigades as needed.
The Boxer is NOT cheap (4M+ EUR). Even the Fuchs was NOT cheap. The Stryker is NOT cheap (3.8M+ $).
In fact, Stryker and Boxer are more expensive than many of the world’s MBTs!
A truly cheap APC would either resemble a simplistic vehicle such as M113 or be based on one of the army’s standard trucks.
I did NEVER propose a “tankette”. I proposed rapid fire combat vehicles with a 60-90 mm automatic gun with good max elevation as main weapon, CKEM as dedicated frontal anti-MBT munition and a coax machinegun – on a heavy chassis common with MBT and HAPC.
IFVs do provide firepower and move infantrymen, and do both poorly. The total dismount strength of a mixed battalion battlegroup cannot dislodge an infantry company from a blocking position along a forest road.
IFVs cannot stand up to anti-tank forces or main battle tanks under equal conditions. ATGMs are superior to 1970’s tank guns only at ranges greater than 2 km (the Iraq scenario), thus IFVs are limited in their AT potential largely to ambush over long distances.
The firepower of an autocannon is largely superfluous in presence of a 76-120mm tank cannon, as evidenced by coaxial autocannons falling into disuse.
BSmitty, we had this discussion already in 2009. You could know my numbers.
A heavy brigade needs more dismounts than you can transport with all-round whiz-bang IFVs affordably.
Sven
I’m not averse to cutting the cost or adding more features, but I merely highlighted the bits that were drasticaly important, in my view.
If it can be “tank armoured” like a Namer, all the better, if it can cost under a million, great.
Cost is relative, expensive, for a “boutique” iron fist, $5mn for an APC isnt much, for a multi army group force, its madness.
900 vehicles(IFVs/Tankettes) at £3mn a vehicle is £2.7bn.
Assume a 25 year lifespan, thats £108mn per year.
Assume the Tanks cost twice as much, thats another £1bn, or over 25 years, £43mn.
Are you really saying we cant afford £150mn a year? Course we can.
Its pocket change.
B Smitty
“How many will your APC/HAPC plus “tankette” battalion have?”
My “Pocket Division” would as it stands have 30x 120mm rifles mounted on MBTs, and 100x 40mm cannons mounted on IFVs, with perhaps a recon regiment using upgunned/armoured versions of the IFV, giving another 50x 40mm cannons, and they seem like a very good place to mount some missiles. Or perhaps simply a bigger gun.
How about the 76mm off the Scorpion? Or something similar?
Across the entire (none MBT) fleet? that way you can lob high explosives at vehicles and canister (or funky stuff like smoke/illumination) at dug in infantry
Along with 1400 dismountable infantry, and 2000 more following behind in land rovers or possibly PPVs.
Sven,
There is value in what Boxer and Stryker bring to the table vs a “simple” APC. Stryker at least has significant C4 capabilities (not sure about Boxer). Both are significantly better armored than the M113. I have a feeling any “simple” APC well end up looking like one of these in the end.
Truck mounted infantry is a different story. But even there, if you go beyond basic upgrades to an existing truck line, you’ll end up paying for it. For example, the Australian Bushmaster costs over a million euros each.
I re-read the discussions we had back then. You said a heavy brigade might be composed of two battalion combat teams with a mix of MBTs/HAPCs/RFCVs but how many of each? If you mentioned this back then, I’m sorry, I missed it.
Each RFCV might be better than a single Bradley in firepower and protection, but I bet once you do the numbers, the aggregate of Bradleys in a battalion will possess greater overall firepower. Numbers do matter.
ATGMs may be inferior to tank guns under 2km but ATGMs can still contribute, and LOTS of ATGMs can contribute a lot.
Replace TOW on the IFV with, say Spike LR or Spike ER (or equivalent) and you open up new capabilities. IFVs could use them in fire and forget mode, or fire-observe-update, or even network-centric Spike C4I, which allows the vehicle to remain completely hidden and receive targeting from other sources.
Lots of upgrade costs incur over a long lifespan, and spare parts tend to cost more/year for more expensive vehicles as well.
That “Pocked Division” is a brigade-sized force (~4 combat battalions; divisions have 6-12).
150 IFVs will NOT yield 1,400 dismounts, especially not if they use ATGMs in internal storage or a bigger gun than 40mm. Less than 1k is more likely.
Your “Pocket Division” would furthermore depend on a mere 30 guns for AT if OPFOR can defeat shaped charges with modern defensive measures. There’s a reason why even small brigades have about 44 MBTs at least.
About being able to afford something: Look at what the government does. It does not afford sufficient quantity because of a lack of revenues because of lack of sufficient manufacturing output (and too much financial “rip off” economic activity) in the UK.
RE “There is value in what Boxer and Stryker bring to the table vs a “simple” APC.
– Stryker at least has significant C4 capabilities (not sure about Boxer)”
– Doesn’t Boxer (German config) have an active defence system?
Anyway, both can be costed & fitted separately; why do Boxer and Stryker cost twice what a Patria AMV does… what do you get for that 100% uplift
RE “Australian Bushmaster costs over a million euros each”
– that’s what MRAPs cost; isn’t it one of them (or is it better)?
Sven
Throw in a midlife upgrade of 50% of the cost, and its still not overly expensive.
“That “Pocked Division” is a brigade-sized force (~4 combat battalions; divisions have 6-12).”
I counted a tank battalion, a “recon” battalion, 2 IFV battalions and 4 light battalions, however they are all manpower capped at 500. Even so, thats 3000 fighting soldiers.
“Your “Pocket Division” would furthermore depend on a mere 30 guns for AT if OPFOR can defeat shaped charges with modern defensive measures. There’s a reason why even small brigades have about 44 MBTs at least.”
I believe current UK Tank Regiments are 57 strong, although thats being reduced, not sure to how many, could never find information on how many men you need beyond the 4 tankies to keep a tank going.
I’d be thrilled if you wanted to do a proper write up of my “pocket division”.
BSmitty, I did the numbers a long time ago. The result was more firepower, more infantry and potentially less costs (assuming ~MBT costs for RFCV (rapid fire combat vehicle, main gun = automatic 60-90 mm with high rate of fire).
It’s simply inefficient to use fully equipped IFVs. They end up with 7 dismounts if fully equipped, while APCs can easily exceed 10 at a fraction of the costs. IFV firepower is still small.
HAPCs need very few electronics while the armour and dynamic components are relatively cheap. In the end they can cost less than a full-blown IFV or wheeled IFV (if you use components from a heavy vehicle family).
The RFCV rivals MBTs and replaces SPAAGs if you add an AAW kit. Its firepower is not compromised by the need to take dismounts into consideration and is way beyond anything any IFV ever had, including BMP-3.
You’d need as many HAPC dismounts as the MBT/RFCV force would need accompanying infantry. HAPCs with 10 dismounts could thus be quite few, for they would be immensely survivable (unlike IFVs).
I think 30 per brigade would already be too much.
RFCVs would rather replace MBTs and SPAAGs in numbers, but also serve as a replacement for IFV firepower.
APCs – same dismounts as HAPCs, depending on concept 1 or 2 per Bde. A dismountable ATGM (such as EuroSpike) would be organic to some APCs. Reason: Provision of security for the support forces (APCs would stick to them), but the ATGM would be intended for dismounted use (by the infantry squad).
So in the end you could get instead of 50 IFVs about
20 HAPCs (RWS machinegun)
80 APCs (shielded 20 mm gun, about 20-40 ATGM launchers)
and instead of 44 MBTs and 6 SPAAGs you would get about
30 MBTs
20 RFCVs (5 with AAW kit, but all 20 available for AAW fires with 3 km radius and all 20 capable of penetrating MBTs frontally with CKEM).
The RFCVs could furthermore serve as auxiliary SPGs (range 15+ km, airburst HE)during emergencies!
Result:
Same costs. More artillery firepower. Tripled AAA firepower. Same AT firepower. Same fuel consumption. Doubled infantry strength.
All “tip of the spear” AFVs with top notch survivability (360° resistant to handheld AT firepower and most ATGMs, 360° resistant to 30 mm APFSDS).
I got to admit that for peacetime forces I prefer a 15 ton tracked or 6wd APC in a heavy brigade (same vehicle family as cavalry/heavy skirmishers) – think Fuchs and M113.
The crisis/wartime production APC (6wd truck with hard shell) could in peacetime be used by infantry units that are not organic to heavy brigades.
(The numbers are just examples; the exact composition takes more deliberation than one person can do.)
Regarding cost
The British Army bought
408 Chally 2s
789 Warriors
3000+ CVR(T)s
3000 of the FV series
7,000 armoured vehicles.
My pocket division army would want 1000 at the most.
You can spend a lot more per vehicle and still have a cheaper equipment budget.
@DominicJ: 30 MBTs is a fig’s leaf for a 8 maneuver battalion force. They’d need more if they are in any kind of IFV-suitable terrain (if there’s such a thing at all).
You’d at least need to add ~CKEM missiles and some 75-105 mm HE weapons for direct fire support (could be low-powered guns).
A division with 30x 120mm APFSDS, 150x 40 mm APFSDS and other than that only indirect fire or shaped charge munitions for AT work is fragile. An active protection system-equipepd brigade could roll over it.
http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2009/02/active-protection-suites-for-afv-state.html
Sven
I am being swayed by your arguments, but did I miss the definition of your RFCV vehicle on your site ? Did you say its armed with a 76mm auto-cannon ? Like the turreted version of the OTO Super-Rapid ?
You asked us to cut and paste what we could do without, well in that case I do without the following from the standard infantry carrying vehicle:
defeat occupied structures without rare ammunition (depending on the structure – 40mm GMG)
defeat MBTs
defeat IFVs, medium armoured recce vehicles
defeat helicopters within 2 km radius
survive MBT fire (frontal)
survive ATGM fire (800 mm RHAeq CE or top attack HEAT) – yes but only with active defense system
survive major IEDs (below belly)- depends on your definition of major
survive major IEDs (roadside)- as above
survive DPICM direct hit (110 mm RHAeq CE top hit)- with active defense system ?
ECM components
magnetic mine countermeasures
amphibiousness
Dismounts – back up to the 10 of the FV432 era if possible !
You’re asking for an APC.
About RFCV; think this http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2010/04/medium-calibre-allround-option.html on the hull of a 40-50 ton MBT. the inspiration is rather the RDF LT armament than the bulky OTO Melara naval gun turret. The Italians did have a 2nd attempt with the DRACO turret.
I will perhaps say something stupid, but how you carry your 60-ton vehicles “Namer like”, it enters just in a C-17 ? I would understand in the case of an attack on the USSR, with vehicles based in Germany, but this is not the case, the British army should be able to move around the world.
frenchie
landing ships are penies.
All
i want to suggest equal numbers c2 tanks and c2 apcs with .50 or gmg,
Frenchie; air deployment of substantial number of AFVs heavier than 15 tons is a mere theory.
The practice is that few AFVs of that kind get air-lifted, and An-124s and C-17s do most of that.
The whole air-deployability of AFVs as criterion is a result of a craze in the U.S.Army after the Kosovo War when they weren’t able to deploy quickly and got all crazy about their future “relevance” (read: budget).
Their fantasy about brigades being deployable within 96 hrs led to the poorly-designed Stryker brigade and was generally in ignorance of the actual intent of the air force (which wants to deploy other units).
In short: There’s not really a substantial deployabiltiy gap between 35 ton and 45 ton or 65 ton AFVs in practice.
With 20 A400M you are transporting 20 Warrior and with seven C-17, seven Challenger 2 in a few hours.
With landing ships should be not be pressed.
RE “air deployment of substantial number of AFVs heavier than 15 tons is a mere theory”
Interesting to look a different way for a change: Russia
The Namer-like BMP-T got cancelled (T as for heavy, built on a T-72 chassis)
Looks like the BMP-4 family (was at first reported cancelled as well) may make it for the airportable divisions
– more like 20 than 15 t
– comes as IFV, SPG and tank-killer, all on the same chassis
Their BMDs are below 13 tons while their BMPs are not really meant for air-deployability despite the many available and good transport aircraft (BMPs are paired with MBTs and the heavy brigades are not meant for airlifting; the parachute formations are meant for that).
Yes, got the third letter wrong. This is the base model http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/bmd-4.htm
in production since 2004 even though unveiled only in 2008.
The tank destroyer/ SPG derivatives have been in production since 2007 and weigh 18 t.
Not only air-transportable, but air-droppable (and they swim, too. Hence naval infantry has some, in addition to the parachute formations).
For the UK I would take our lead from the US and have 2 formations similar to their Heavy Brigade combat team with warrior and challenger.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Heavy_Brigade_Combat_Team_Organization.svg
Then I would have up to 10 IFV battle group formations based on the French VBCI vehicle which can either attach to the heavy brigade or the rapid reaction/light brigades (of which I would have 3 in the army) as required with up 4 battle groups total being commanded by a brigade HQ.
Dom you and your pocket divisions!
There is no role for an MICV that is meant to go out of its way to fight enemies it cannot match while being distracted from its main job of infantry dismount transport and support. But neither is there a role for the ultra cheap lightweight APC. Both represent extreme’s that have serious problems.
The British Army has been down the ultra cheap APC route with SAXON, basically a 4 Tonner covered in a tin can. It had a very specific role however which was to move British reinforcement rapidly into Germany via the most dense and elaborate road networks in human history. It came up seriously short on every other front.
Like I said, I think Warrior really strikes a good balance between its job as an infantry transporter-supporter, and by sheer luck, having the fire-power to make it more versatile in this day and age without truly deflecting from its true purpose.
Cheap tin can APCs are less versatile and have less utility. They’re a HMG away from being u/s.
Interesting concept of RFCV; similar idea here:
http://www.oocities.org/dominantlogistics/bradley.html
I’m beginning to think that FRES-SV isn’t heavy enough. Perhaps we need a new, 50+ ton, heavily armoured, front engined chassis to be the base of a new family of vehicles. A protected mobility (anyone else loathe those two words? It’s an APC, for pities sake . . .) vehicle, tank, SP artillery (gun or multiple rocket). Modern armour allows for excellent protection from HEAT rounds without needing Challenger levels of weight so an effective tank armed with a 120mm smooth-bore with autoloader would get the BA back to NATO standard.
Of course there would still be a need for a simpler APC like the RG35 and probably a lighter family of recce vehicles similar to, but heavier than, the CVR(t) series.
I think we can split ourselves between fantasy based on completely new vehicles – e.g. a Merkava/Namer type family for UK service, or the slightly more grounded fantasy (if that makes sense) of basing our forces on existing, real world vehicle families, even if we could never afford them.
As such I think the closest thing we could ever get to the Namer would be a CV90 Armadilo with turret weight made up in additional passive armour, plus active defences, and armament reduced to a heavy multi-barrel RWS – as Sven says, an APC, whether or not it’s truly a HAPC is debatable.
To be qualified as an HAPC, it should at the very least stop the RPG-29 on frontal 90° and minimise its effect (at most 10° spall cone, no secondary explosions or fires or hydraulic leaks) on left and right 45° each. I don’t trust cages and nets, but they might be used nevertheless.
Top should withstand PKM fire at 20 m with common AP cartridges (~10 mm RHAeq) and have roof spall liner.
Bottom needs to keep dismounts and crew alive on AT mine hit under the tracks (blast type). It would also be nice to have the rubber hedgehog armour on top in the event of DPICM threat.
An HAPC doesn’t need to stop APFSDS, but it needs to survive weapons that were not spotted by the MBTs.
ACC mentioned hearing the rumour about binning MRBs and possibly having 4 standing brigades in place of the 5 MRBs. jedibeeftrix commented that that was the second time that rumour has popped up and that he was starting to give it real credence. The rumour is, I believe, that there are plans for 2 Heavy and 2 Light Brigades.
I am rather confused about this. Do people think that this means that the four brigades, if they came about, would still be multi-role? Or would they be more akin to our present Armoured Brigades (each with one Armoured Regiment and two Armoured Infantry Battalions) for Heavy and to our present Mechanised Brigades (each with one Armoured Regiment, one Armoured Infantry Battalion and two Mechanised Battalions) for Light?
The Mechanised Brigade would certainly seem closer to the concept of a Multi-Role Brigade. It has armoured, armoured infantry and mechanised infantry components. It also has own Armoured Recce Sqn, SP Artillery Regiment, Engineer Sqn, RLC Sqn, REME Worksops, AD Detachment, Medical Sqn and, when needed, Army Air Corps assets. However, it would still not, I feel, be truly multi-role, lacking Light Infantry.
If the powers that be within the Army/MOD do change their plans once again, what a hell of a waste of time and energy the planning for the concept of multi-role brigades will have been. How many years have they been planning for them now?
I happen to think they could very well be the future. The change to 4 Brigades does not seem very different to what we have now, only less of it!
Rather than going into any fantasy land, RE “Perhaps we need a new, 50+ ton, heavily armoured, front engined chassis to be the base of a new family of vehicles”
– why new; and we are getting a family anyway
– so take the Ch2’s (over and above the 200+ retained as active)
– do what the Israelis and Russians did to T-55; they had 7 dismounts (with MG RWS only) or 5 dismounts (with cannon or GMG turret), respectively
– or what the Serbs did, a combat engineering vehicle not just having the kit, but also 6 combat engineers under armour, well protected
– or do all three versions?
@Jed
Apologies for what seems like going off thread rather in my last post but I think that the future structure of the British Army might very well be relevant to the type and number of vehicles (e.g. Warrior) we should have.
I have a strong inkling that the 4 Bde model is one of several options put forward and details of this has leaked out. There has been no official word on it, not even a whisper. It’s all rumour.
Most organisations will present its senior managers with reports detailing various options available.
@Phil
Thanks. If you are right, then at least there’s some hope. I know others will disagree.
@Jed – I don’t disagree about the fantasy vehicles – we’re going to get ASCOD-SV – or nothing! That said, I don’t really see any difference between an ASCOD based family and a CV90 based family. Both are equally unexceptional in basic design.
@ArmChairCivvy
Why new? Because ASCOD based FRES-SV is unimpressive in it’s concept and too lightly armoured to be in the front line with the MBT’s.
Challenger II’s chassis is not a good starting point for an APC. The engine is right where you want your troops and there’s nowhere to put a door!
Blimey, this one is going well! Nearly at the 200 comment mark Jed!
I can’t remember if it was in this thread or another, but the talk about armour in the open being slaughtered needs putting into context. The subject of WW2 has been brought up, but as always with historical examples we have to look at the finer points of the equipment situation back then, notably that AA guns on tanks consisted of a small calibre machine gun. Even the purpose built mobile flak weapons weren’t all that.
Modern AA against low flying aircraft consists of something all together more sophisticated. Mobile SAM batteries are making this situation all the more so. The cat is also somewhat out of the bag now regarding modern airpower. This is why Iran and China are so eager to get their hands on the very latest technology in the SAM field.
But back to IFV’s for a minute;
I don’t see a situation where – against an enemy armed with tanks and anti-armour weapons – Warrior, or any replacement of said vehicle, would be charging into enemy territory without Challenger 2, or later developments/replacements of Chally, out in front.
My understanding of the use of Warrior (and perhaps this is where we need Phil to fill in (pun not intended) some blanks for us) is just to keep the men inside safe from enemy fire as the formation advances into enemy territory behind the armoured spearhead, before they are required to assault some objective at which point the armour and other supporting elements go into overwatch and/or suppress the known enemy, while the Warriors transport the men (protected from small arms and artillery fragments) to the position from which they plan to begin their attack, and from there support them.
So for me what we end up looking for is a vehicle that must;
– Keep pace, both speed, terrain crossing and logistics (range, reliability) wise with the tanks,
– Can carry an infantry section in one vehicle or a likely little understrengthed platoon over no more than four vehicles,
– Can protect the passengers from shell fragments and machine gun fire up to heavy calibre armour piercing rounds (12.5mm NATO AP or 14.5mm AP, whichever is more effective),
– Can provide fire support to the dismounts in the form of plenty of machine gun fire for suppression and possibly some form of 20-30mm weapon designed primarily to fire high explosive rounds for suppression of enemy positions (possibly requiring a high elevation gun),
– Can be modified into a number of common variants designed to support the infantry in the attack; ambulance, mortar carrier (either sinlge heavy mortar or a medium mortar dismount team), command post, recovery vehicle, forward observer post (for artillery and/or CAS), ATGW carrier, possibly an engineering vehicle, AA vehicle.
I don’t see the IFV as needing to be resistant to, or even able to take on in open battle, enemy armour or AIFV. Such targets would be engaged by tanks on the offensive or by dismounted teams and tanks and helicopters on the defensive.
I think building the IFV with a mind to fight against bigger targets is capability creep.
Thanks Pete, I just wanted to be provocative (ie, what we need)rather than pay attention to such insignificant detail as the engine occupying the troop compartment!
This is true “Both are equally unexceptional in basic design” but for the first time I saw a text that said anything meaningful about the sensor suite http://www.generaldynamics.uk.com/scoutsv/index.html
– all specifics missing, but then again, the request for bids for a ground surveillance solution filling those parameters was only just released
I’m not of the “air power will destroy whole army divisions” crowd, but I disagree on the survivability of armor on open fields.
The longer the field of view, the more likely is detection by the enemy and thus the more likely is that you get hammered by whatever long-range firepower the enemy has.
Armor is more suited than infantry for open fields because it can cross these killing fields quicker (quick enough?), not because it’s somehow strong there.
It’s true that armor has problems in close combat against infantry, but the perceived suitability of armor for open areas has led to the development of many anti-armor capabilities for open areas. In the end, armor may be better off fighting closely together (mass, assisting each other!) in terrain with short fields of view and keep moving there.
@Chris: IFV autocannons had also the job of providing effective (not necessarily lethal) suppressive counterfire to ATGM teams (2nd generation ATGMs; SACLOS, LBR). This was relevant when 2nd generation ATGMs had 2 km range (autocannons are not really good beyond 2km). The utility against 1st generation ATGMs (controller usually with ~50 m spacing to point of launch) and 3rd generation ATGMs (fire and forget) as well as heavy 2nd generation ATGMs (range well in excess of 2 km) was and is marginal afaik/imo.
Would mounting the new generation of light missiles currently designed for UAV’s (like the Griffin) on a IFV prove a better weapon to use against dismounts with third generation ATGM’s, as they would be cheapish and have similar range to the ATGM’s fired at them?
The best defence against ATGMs is the same it’s always been: combined arms operations and prudent fire and manoeuvre. MICVs should exist totally to support infantry. Having an eleven man tank destroyer is a retarded idea.
Plus in most terrain an ATGMS is seldom able to exploit its full range. Most engagements will be well within the range of cannon and tank main gun.
MikeW on structures:
I have been previously of the opinion that “Armoured Infantry” would be in MICV / AIFV be that upgraded Warrior, or something on the common (FRES)chassis. Below them in terms of capability would be “Mechanised Infantry” and I had thought a much bigger buy of Warthog would be ideal to replace all FV43x series vehicles, both for these battalions and all other users.
Now I am being swayed towards Sven’s way of looking at things, with all battalions (8 ?) being “Mech” with the standard 3 Inf Coy’s (12 x ‘MAPC’ and 2 C2 variants) giving 36 x MAPC with 10 dismounts each = 360 “boots on the ground”, supported by the Manoeuvre Support Coy, which would be well beefed up:
12 x Recce Vehicle – the MAPC with a turret mounted 40mm CTA and 2 x ATGW or 2 x MANPADS (i.e. FRES Scout with extra weapons)
12 x Fire Support Vehicle – MAPC with turreted 120mm mortar, available for indirect fire support (traditional mortar), indirect anti-armour fire (IR guided top attack rounds), direct fire support (HE) and direct anti-armour (LAHAT).
The Medium APC would be a stretched FRES (or CV90) with an extra road wheel (?) to carry a full squad of 10 dismounts (up from the current 8, more on that later perhaps). It would be armed with heavy RWS with a 40mm GMG and a 7.62mm co-ax. The RWS would also mount 2 x whatever the standard infantry unguided short-medium range AT rocket, for short range, self protection “snap shots” (just in case) – the weapons are meant to suppress other infantry, they are not to be used as tank hunters.
Mix these in with at what ever level you like to create your MBT / Infantry battle groups.
Ideally all built on FRES chassis, giving us a single family of medium armoured tracked armoured vehicles, while retaining the flexibility to take the 100 + Warthogs into core fleet to equip a special battalion. Of course we would then need a standard wheeled battle taxi to move the rest of the infantry battalions around.
This is fantasy realm I realize, but I think it’s less fantastic than introducing Sven’s 75/76mm autocannon vehicle (not that it’s not a good idea).
I’m usualy a “tankie”, but the more we’ve discussed this, the less sure I become.
Just how bad was Iraq?
Could we have a single chasis, say, 40t, to cover Recon/APC/Tank/SPG
Dont get me wrong, FRES promised far too much, but, did Bradleys survive those “encounters” becuase the Iraqis were unbelievably crap?
Could a 40t tank with a 120mm gun and funky sensors reliably stumble onto a T-90, identify it, and destroy it, before the T-90 could do likewise?
Phil said, “Having an eleven man tank destroyer is a retarded idea.”
Seems to work pretty well in the US.
Hi Phil,
I was not advocating using IFV’s to kill tanks, rather that if ATGM can engage an IFV outside the range of its 40mm cannon was it worth adding a light missile like Griffin for the sole purpose of killing the dismounted ATGM team?
ACC,
With Stryker you get the $200+k Protector RWS, FBCB2 (C4 system) and MEXAS/cage armor.
I don’t know about Boxer and I’m not sure what’s included in the Patria AMV buy you mentioned.
Tubby,
Attaching 120mm mortars to mech infantry companies is a better plan, IMHO.
@ArmChairCivvy – If we’ve got surplus Challengers I’d give them dozer blades, 165mm demolition guns and pass them to the engineers for the next time it’s necessary to do some urban renewal – after all, they share a common chassis with Titan and Trojan!
Does it work so well? The Iraq BMPs didn’t cover themselves in glory. Imagine Bradleys fighting German crewed Leopard 2’s. Do you think they’d be so effective at tank killing against such a peer enemy operating modern kit with well trained crews in an integrated combined arms defence in depth? They’d get smashed trying to kill tanks when they should be in defilade if it’s too hot to expose as the infantry work their way forward, supporting them with cannon fire where they can and concentrating on being in the best places to remount and move to keep momentum. Cheaper tank destroyers can engage from over watch hull down positions and concentrate on their job.
As for long range ATGMs as said they can rarely exploit their long range unless they are in a high terrain feature and to defeat them you’d use combined arms tactics and shell the shit out of it, screen it and pour fire into it from over watching tanks.
I take it Phil that you think that the cut back in the number of Challenger’s is the real danger to the Warrior’s not the emergence of 3rd generation ATGM’s in the hands of non-peer forces.
As Sven and others have pointed out, once you get past the issue of ‘what we want our forces to do’ argument the main issue is one of tradeoffs
Having a 40mm cannon, a higher up viewing point and a lot of gucci sensors brings things of benefit, of course it does. Especially if you find that MICV is used in small numbers in environments that are not of the Fulda gap type, for example the Balkans or Afghanistan. These are good examples of where its combination of mobility, firepower, sensors, protection and pink payload was and is pretty damned useful, if your view is that these are more likely than less then why change things.
However, this comes at a cost.
The obvious financial ones of course but also associated issues like maintenance, training and support issues plus those of doctrinal complexity. If we de-turreted a number of Warriors and took that weight opportunity to improve overhead protection (important in an urban environment, remember the future character of conflict stuff about increasing urbanisation) then the vehicle itself would arguably be less multi role and therefore useful in a range of scenarios but the cost savings in personnel and cash ‘might’ be used elsewhere such as a dedicated light tank i.e. a role that has always been performed by CVR(T) that was sub 25 tonnes, armed with either a 90-105mm main gun or 120mm mortar
“MICVs should exist totally to support infantry.”
20-40 mm autocannons were available in WW2, but infantry support was either done with machine guns only (Matilda series), with weak single-shot guns (French 37 mm) or with 75-152 mm guns. The dedicated infantry fire support halftracks (SdKfz 251/9) used 75mm or AT guns.
The preference for infantry tanks and assault guns moved from ~75 mm towards ~150 mm during the war and from a wide range of armour strengths to exclusively very strong (practically immune) frontal armour.
150 mm HE from WW2 translates approx to 105 mm HESH of today.
An IFV appears to be very unsuited for infantry fire support with the typical 20-40 mm autocannon, even after taking account misuse of ATGMs and the odd Russian low-power 73 or 100mm gun.
Keep in mind that there are furthermore issues with improvised use of APDSFS; the discarding sabots are lethal, thus no infantry must be close to the line of fire near the IFV. This eliminates one of the IFV’s advantage over the MBT (MBT muzzle blast creates a large danger zone as well).
More on Medium armour;
http://www.angelfire.com/art/enchanter/panz.html
I’m tempted by the 40 ton common chassis idea, with a fire support/medium tank, but what effect would the extra weight over Warrior have on strategic, Theatre and Tactical mobility?
Edit: another “medium” tank:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TAM_%28tank%29
“I take it Phil that you think that the cut back in the number of Challenger’s is the real danger to the Warrior’s not the emergence of 3rd generation ATGM’s in the hands of non-peer forces”
The cutbacks shouldn’t matter overall as long as whatever is out there fighting is part of a correctly balanced battle group.
3rd Generation ATGMs: nobody can pretend these are not a grave threat, the only real way to defeat them is overwhelming fire-power as part of a combined arms attack and prudent movement and over-watch.
If they are in the hands of a non-peer enemy say in an Afghan or Lebanon scenario and they plink at us, again, you move forward in over-watch, have over head UAV cover and AH support and dismount your infantry.
If there was a device that could immediately detect an ATGM launch, slew a LLM launcher onto that launch signature and fire when commanded then there might be some use in that in such a scenario; but then again, these missiles are fire and forget, soft launch, they are real bastards to counter.
So you do it the old fashioned way by good support and good TTPs in combined arms operations.
Phil,
Yes, I’ll take an M1/Bradley team over a Leo2/Marder team, all else being equal. The Bradleys WILL contribute kills with TOWs and 25mm.
I’ve seen M1A2 pictures with MMW radar on them (camouflage and hiding in foliage countered effectively by that)
– not sure if any formations have it as standard issue
– give it time, Abrams will be around to 2040 (at least); Bradley won’t, though… where’s Bob when you need him (re:FCS)?
Sven,
Most AARs I’ve seen coming out of Iraq (both ODS and OIF) praise the Bradley’s 25mm as a very effective, accurate and versatile weapon. I’m not sure why you think it’s so poor.
It’s not just the cannon, it’s also the fire control, sensors and two man crew that contribute to its effectiveness.
Can it do everything? No. Nothing can. That’s why we fight with a combined arms team.
“Yes, I’ll take an M1/Bradley team over a Leo2/Marder team, all else being equal.”
But things aren’t equal. A competent peer enemy is striving to do everything in its power to ensure the advantage lies with them, there must not be equality. So two crews firing at each other on a two way range isn’t the whole story. There are obstacles, mines, smokes screens, reserves, security and covering forces, channelling obstacles, pre registered artillery at key points and in known likely FUP and in likely firing points.
“The Bradleys WILL contribute kills with TOWs and 25mm.”
I have no doubt they might, it’s war and chaos after all, but the point is, at what cost to its real mission?! If you lose 2 BFVs as they track an enemy MBT with its TOW was it worth it now you’re infantry is now less mobile, less cohesive, less powerful than it might have been if the BFVs had kept their heads down a bit more and just bit off what they could chew?
ITV could have done just as good a job and they employment would only have had to take into consideration their main role, tank killers.
I’m not advocating APCs armed with GPMGs, GMGs or even HMGs. The vehicles should carry a useful punch to support infantry, but I fail to see why an IFV or MICV should be armed with weapons that detract from its main role when that anti-tank capability can be done more cheaply by far less complex vehicles like Spartan MCT, M113 ITV, Jaguar 2 and the various other tank destroyers that used to be fielded.
Well, and I’ve seen reports about its ineffectiveness.
Reinforced concrete isn’t exactly its strength, nor are the Afghan walls.
Also keep in mind the low intensity. The Russians rotated their T-72s in Grozny because the 125 mm consumption was so high. U.S. M48s rotated in and out of Vietnamese villages because their 90mm consumption was so high (now remember Vietnamese architecture of that time!).
You may be able to chew away with 25 mm what needs to be destroyed if you have small opposition and plenty time, but you want it quicker if any moment a red artillery strike could hit your position or your opponents could slip away because no drone survives on station.
The recipe is then 75-165 mm HE(SH).
“The recipe is then 75-165 mm HE(SH).”
On an IFV? Why not another platform like AVRE?
There is talk of making a division.
http://www.parliamentarybrief.com/2011/10/having-brigades-will-never-deliver-the-same-punch-as-a#page_1
Phil,
METT-T (Mission Enemy Terrain Troops Time) drives usage. If you’re fighting well trained Leo2/Marders , you do things differently than if you’re fighting incompetents in T-72s and BMPs.
The reason I don’t like separate tank destroyers is numbers. In an APC battalion, if you attach a company of tank destroyers, it grows your overall battalion size, manning, consumption rates, and so on. And you get, what, maybe 14 vehicles?
In an IFV battalion, you have 44+ tank killers. Numbers do matter.
Also, we’re discussing Bradley using the 70’s-era TOW missile here.
Put Spike-LR on there instead. Now it can fire from behind complete cover, or ripple off 2-4 rounds in fire-and-forget mode, perhaps even on the move.
@Phil; I was writing about direct fire support for infantry, not about IFVs only.
Thanks Frenchie, a nicely written article, and I do agree with the overall thrust. A couple of points, though
” admit that the US Marine Corps, despite being of approximately equivalent size to Britain’s armed forces, exceeds the capacities of the UK military by a significant factor, in a climate of economic contraction and radical re-structuring, the US Marine Corps may be an ideal model for imitation.”
– RM are 7.5 k men in all; USMC takes 7.5 % of the US defence budget
UK Divisional HQ in A-stan makes a division (when it was a multinational division; non-UK and non-US things consistently written out of all commentary)
I’ve never argued that you shouldn’t adapt TTPs depending on the enemy.
I really don’t think its an equal numbers game. You get 44 ATGM platforms, but they are not ATGM platforms, they are infantry carriers with another very important primary role to carry out. 12 ITVs on the other hand, are 12 ITVs so concentrate solely on stalking and killing enemy tanks. You always have those ITVs for that job, your BFVs might be doing something different like forming up etc
Bradleys have TOW missiles so they’re relevant. SPIKE L-R fine, but again you’re massively detracting from the main mission which is infantry support.
Hi ACC,
I am happy if I can be useful in the discussion.
Sven,
I’d be interesting in seeing those reports.
Yes, reinforce concrete is not an autocannon’s strength, but a Brad could carry TOW-2 Bunker Busters too. They have a 147mm semi-HESH warhead designed specifically to breach concrete and destroy bunkers.
In any case, no one system can handle every target or situation. 25-40mm autocannons hit a sweet spot, IMHO. They are good enough for many targets.
Frenchie, thanks for that link by the professor of sociology!
Have to say I have read more factually correct and sensible stuff in the Beano!
Phil,
Certainly ITVs are specialists and IFVs are generalists. In theory ITVs are better at their job. But there aren’t that many of them. They may be out of position, or there in insufficient numbers due to attrition, or simply because there aren’t enough to go around.
Quantity has a quality of its own.
“Quantity has a quality of its own”
I don’t agree it’s as simple as just quantity. Your quantity comes at a cost, the cost of conflicting roles and lack of specialisation and proper employment. IFVs are not generalists – they should have a very specific role, transporting and supporting infantry in relatively tasty scenario’s. They are not tank destroyers and adding an opportunistic weapon tempts them to be employed as such.
Why should they have a very specific role? What evidence is there that narrow roles improve overall unit performance across the full spectrum of combat scenarios (especially high intensity armored warfare).
I think I have to agree with Phil. If you start piling anti-tank weapons onto infantry carriers, you start tempting them to engage targets they should really be avoiding. Their primary purpose is to keep the infantry in relative safety and then deliver them to their objectives, not to be tied down hunting for tanks.
BSmitty, those reports are years old and not so easy to find again with moderate motivation.
The special TOW is not going to be a solution. IS-3s were criticised for having a poor ammo storage at 28x 122mm shells and a RoF comparable to TOW. How many dismounts do you want to delete to come even close to that in terms of various TOW versions? Again, fighting in Iraq can be terribly misleading.
Phil is correct; the many roles of the typical IFv (let’s say Bradley) are in conflict and a cause for great trouble.
You don’t want to carry your dismounts during an AT mission. What do they do? Will you pick them up later? Are they effective as infantry in the meantime?
You need to carry dismounts to a drop point, but a fire support AFV’s TC would probably prefer very much to stay back for optimal field of fire.
A Bradley lost on a transport mission means equipment for AT mission and fire support mission are being lost, too.
What if fire support, transport or AT mission -just one of them- turns out to have a high rate of attrition? You’d be knocked out in all three areas real quick.
AT specialists are often employed as convoy escorts until needed. Would you want IFVs to play this role, thus depriving yourself of infantry strength in actual engagements?
Experience suggests that this doesn’t happen. (Actually, experience suggests that dedicated AT AFVs exist next to IFVs because IFVs are not really tank destroyers when facing peer forces).
How do you explain that AFVs have not evolved into generic vehicles able to take on any role without modification? Or even come close to that model? Specialisation has enormous advantages in efficiency and effectiveness. Diluting roles sees none of them performed adequately. Adding weapon systems to a vehicle otherwise unsuited to fight the intended targets simply invites mission creep at the expense of the real job.
I would agree with this “Actually, experience suggests that dedicated AT AFVs exist next to IFVs”
– but what’s still in service in the West?
Sven,
In its basic load, a Mech. Infantry Battalion with 44 Bradleys carries 308 TOWs and 39,600 rnds of 25mm. That’s in addition to its infantry.
The US Army has worked out how and when Bradleys should perform each role. Are there conflicts sometimes? Sure.
There are no dedicated anti-tank AFVs other than tanks themselves in a US heavy brigade. Apparently the US Army thinks Bradleys and tanks are enough.
The U.S.Army used the M901 as long as it took red armour seriously.
Nowadays they think air power, Abrams and Bradley are enough because they have proven track record of only voluntarily going to war with third world countries anyway.
Armchaircivvy;
Stryker AT version, Jaguar in Austria, Centauro, M901 in Greece, Rooikat, SK105, (Wiesel 1 TOW), Swiss Piranha 6×6 with TOW,
Phil,
Obviously there are limits to how far generalization can go. But if you’re willing to put a two-man turret on an IFV, adding ATGMs to it isn’t much of a stretch.
In any case, their “real job” is whatever we define it to be.
Sven,
The Bradley came out of studies and simulations about how best to stop the Soviet hordes in Europe. It wasn’t designed to fight 3rd world incompetents.
Well we’re at a doctrinal impasse. I happen to agree with the Warrior model and think an ATGM is a distraction and changes crew and unit perceptions of risk that would lead it to engage vehicles that can destroy it with ease. There’s plenty of evidence that’s what happened in the Gulf. A peer enemy wouldn’t have let them get away with it so easily. And I like to think that for every BFV killed fighting a tank there’d still be a Warrior able to do its proper mission because it never would or could have got itself into that tank fighting scenario.
Are you joking? Studies and simulations?
Do you have a clue about the “simulation” quality of the 70’s or about how studies are done if leadership already made up its mind?
The history of the Bradley may not have been as bad as depicted at times, but it was certainly not a result of studies and simulations that deserve to be taken seriously.
Besides I already reminded you that the M901 was the primary non-MBT anti-tank vehicle of the U.S.Army back in the 80’s. The Bradley was merely meant to use the TOW in emergencies, not to be sent on real AT missions.
Reminder: TOW is inferior to 120 mm APFSDS out to 3 km. 25mm is so much inferior to 120 mm that experiments with coaxial autocannons in MBTs were aborted because crews preferred to use either the cannon or the machinegun and found no real use for the autocannon.
Bradley’s armour couldn’t even stop a hit by a medium tank of 1939.
Finally a quick wikipedia quote:
“There was an added political advantage in that the TOW missiles made it an easier sell to Congress as it was a whole new capability not possessed by the M113.
“We in TRADOC…decided to put the TOW on the MICV because we realized that if we did not put the TOW on the MICV, we would probably never have a MICV.”
—General Don Starry, Army magazine, 1987.”
RE: Bradley. I refer the honourable gentlemen to the youtube link I posted above…
Hi Gareth, that link was great (will have to watch the rest of the Pentagon Wars now!)
Sven, thanks for the list. Jaguar was retired in 2006 and of course countless things have TOWs on top of them. The Finns put new sleek automated launchers on AMVs and the old TOW-launchers onto our Viking-equivalent. However your medium fire support (less so AT) gun has found its way onto the S. African version of AMV, makes an appearance here:
http://www.tanknutdave.com/component/content/article/105
– they do have the Rooikat for AT work
From: Article Originator
To: All participating Units
Bravo Zulu – desig – great conversation
//
In other words we broke the 200 mark already, so thanks to all for the input!
Earlier this evening Phil said “we have reached a doctrinal impasse” – while it looks like it on the surface, I am not so sure we have, as I have no access to U.S. ARMY doctrinal publications, so it is difficult to tell how they teach the use of the M2 Bradley IFV versus the M3 CFV, and how that has changed since the M113 based ITV went out of use.
But let me play devils advocate for a moment, lets move away from the platform specifics, and just consider that whether our infantry carrying vehicle is an M2, a Desert Warrior, a Puma or a wheeled AMV, it DOES carry 2 “ready to fire” ATGW of some variety.
So can our Doctrine, CONOPS, and TTP’s ensure that we don’t use said vehicle in the “tank hunter” role, and that our vehicle commanders, platoon, company and battalion commanders are taught that the organic ATGW is a “self defence” weapon of last resort? Is this not good enough??
If someone misuses said vehicles on real world ops, resulting in destruction of a pair of them by OPFOR MBT’s, and the death of say 16 crew men, while there might be political fallou, unless this results in western Europe becoming a caliphate, or the world being over run by aliens, it is hardly on the scale of the “charge of the light brigade” is it?
On the other hand, in a situation where a young Major de-busses the infantry, loads up extra ATGW’s, and uses 4 of them to defend the bridge / mountain pass / city intersection, because it’s the only mobile, protected anti-armour asset he has available at short notice, do we not value this tactical flexibility???
So could it be that we could accept the flexibility of the platform, and rely on training, tactics and procedures to overcome potential weaknesses in its use cases?
It has some utility, but you’re adding cost and complexity initially and then the question becomes one of reloads using up interior space. With Warriors being a part of a larger formation, would it not serve better/cheaper to just have dedicated assets available? If you’re defending a fixed position, aren’t infantry dug in with those anti-armour weapons better than restricting them to the four vehicles?
Ah but you do have access to US doctrinal publications, they be on t’interweb. Or rather they used to be. I have loads on my HD.
The problem is not so much doctrinal. Give a cyclist a helmet and various studies have shown they cycle faster and are at more risk. Ditto ABS brakes. Give a MICV an ATGM…
ChrisB – don’t fixate on my crappy example, it’s more about the concept.
Phil – ooooh really, I will get my Google head on later !
Lets switch tacks
If we are carting infantry around in these tracked armoured vehicles, as part of a combined arms team, then what is sufficient fire power for the vehicle to support its dismounts against other infantry ?
Personally I think a modern GMG is sufficient – modern air bursting grenades are much improved, and fire control is not as expensive as some seem to think, lets face it, it can all be built into a sight unit which fits on top of the OICW 25mm man portal grenade launcher ! A co-ax 7.62mm for closer range engagements seems OK too.
We might mix it up a bit and add some 12.7mm instead of the 40mm, and maybe even a GECAL .50, 3 barrel Gatling type.
What say we all ???
the 12.7mm they use on the leopard PSO is on the ball designed so it can operate in urban areas it can elevate to almost near vertical for spoiling the days of nasties looking down, if we are going to stick stuff on there this should be part of the criteria for when/if the ICV has to go into town.
GMG is an awesome weapon but it’s more of an area weapon. It would supplement a more accurate longer range cannon very well I think, especially with a mixture of ammo types.
“…access to U.S. ARMY doctrinal publication…”
Publications are by definition available to the public…
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/index.html
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-21-71/index.html
htt p://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/71-1/index.html
htt p://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/7-7/index.html
htt p://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/71-2/index.html
What about de-linking the vehicle and the troops? You have your multi-role infantry with their crew served support weapons able to be mounted/dismounted on vehicles (ATMP, Neo-Universal carrier, Toyota pick-up, whatever) and a RTR manned unit of essentially light tanks/scouts/cavalry, with heavier vehicle mounted fire power (120mm nortars etc). Put the two together and the infantry become mechanised infantry/Dragoons and the tankers have a duty to support and protect them rather than charging off crying “Tally Ho!”. What do people think?
http://www.army.gov.au/lwsc/docs/Owen_Universal_Infantry.pdf
You need to have trained the armour/infantry cooperation though. WW2 experience with assault guns showed the necessity of such training.
Having trained for mechanised, airborne, mountain and other light roles, you invariably end up having either a “jack of all trades – master of none” or having a very expensively trained and thus rather small infantry force.
@ S O – Hmmm, good point. Would having specialised infantry for supporting the Heavy armoured formations like the airborne and marine units (Panzer Grenadiers, Dragoons, dismounts?) but supported by multi-role infantry and light/medium cavalry units work better? The infantry would be more like cargo to be protected and delivered to the battlefield, then the RTR actually cries Tally Ho and runs off to perform the cavalry role?
Edit: Forgot to say thank you for the link! In reply, this is the link for the original multi-role infantry idea:
http://www.angelfire.com/art/enchanter/patch.html
That doctrine is essentially a throwback to the Infantry and Cruiser tanks. Tank design since 1945, apart from a few heavy tanks of limited runs, has concentrated on the MBT which can do both roles and adds versatility. Before anyone points out that shooting things other than tanks distracts from its main mission I’d point out that the MBTs mission is to simply apply firepower with its main gun wherever it’s prudent to put it. So whereas shooting tanks distracts MICVs, shooting everything does not detract from the tanks mission since its mission is to blow all bad shit up hence the mixed ammo load outs.
Phil,
The roles are what we define them to be.
If enemy tanks and IFVs are preventing the infantry from doing their job, then isn’t killing them part of the “infantry support” role?
@Jed
This is a reply to some comments you posted much, much earlier in reply to some of mine (so much earlier, in fact, that I doubt whether you can find them!) The debate has moved on and this might interrupt the line of the present argument(s) but don’t worry, I don’t require an answer if you’re busy with other topics.
“I have been previously of the opinion that “Armoured Infantry” would be in MICV / AIFV be that upgraded Warrior, or something on the common (FRES)chassis …..Now I am being swayed towards Sven’s way of looking at things, with all battalions (8 ?) being ‘Mech’”
Intriguing ideas but could you tell me where you get the idea of eight battalions from? I was under the impression that at the moment the total of our Armoured Infantry and Mechanised Infantry battalions was 12 or 13 (I might have got this horribly wrong). Therefore quite a reduction! SDSR-based?
I like the idea of the 120mm mortar Fire Support Vehicle, which would provide two types of indirect fire and two of direct fire. However, has an IR guided top attack round been developed for the 120mm mortar? (I know nothing about mortar rounds).
“The Medium APC would be a stretched FRES (or CV90) with an extra road wheel (?) to carry a full squad of 10 dismounts (up from the current 8, more on that later perhaps). It would be armed with heavy RWS with a 40mm GMG and a 7.62mm co-ax.”
Surely a GMG is a much less precise weapon than a cannon? Isn’t it more of a blanket effect weapon and therefore one with more indiscriminate effects than an accurately aimed weapon like a cannon? Admittedly the machine guns are a different case.
I very much like your ideas of having all your vehicles ideally built on FRES chassis, giving a single family of medium armoured tracked armoured vehicles.
However, I am very dubious about losing the cannon-equipped MICV. Here I am with Phil: “IFVs are not generalists – they should have a very specific role, transporting and supporting infantry.” And for that role I think a cannon is the weapon.
Incidentally, what a sensible suggestion by Pete Arundel: “If we’ve got surplus Challengers I’d give them dozer blades, 165mm demolition guns and pass them to the engineers for the next time it’s necessary to do some urban renewal.” I think cost will almost certainly militate against that,though.
Finally, Jed, do you have any view about the emphasis being placed back on divisions rather than MRBs? See Frenchie’s reference (Nov 2, 7:13pm)
“The roles are what we define them to be.
If enemy tanks and IFVs are preventing the infantry from doing their job, then isn’t killing them part of the “infantry support” role?”
Only if you take the assertion too far. If planes are bombing infantry isn’t shooting down planes supporting infantry?
We should cut our cloth correctly: tanks are excellent all round fighting vehicles, heavily armoured, mobile and possessing a versatile and extremely powerful weapon system. They fight whatever they come across on the ground.
MICVs are not for fighting per se, they are primarily for transporting and then supporting the infantry if they can. This distinction in roles has been true since the end of the war and is based on empirical evidence and practise. The waters have been muddied by IFVs that think they can do the tank bit when they should be concentrating on deploying and supporting their main weapon system, 1x infantry squad / section sized dismount group.
I have to say that I find this thread fascinating – there are a plethora of very interesting points being made. If i can add to this quality, it would be good, though I fear that you are about to get a stream-of-consciousness.
I would say that the idea that an MICV is not a fighting vehicle is an odd concept. An APC is not a fighting vehicle, even though it mounts a machinegun (a formidable weapon against infantry). A MICV is designed to fight, albeit on different terms to tanks. I would look upon a MICV as an extension of the infantry squad, being an effective combatant when fighting mounted or dismounted, whereas APCs are protected mobility, with little to no offensive capacity.
A MICV, in the past (for western designs), has been designed to provide mobility across open ground and deal with opposing infantry, including those mounted in APCs and MICVs. Thus Soviet vehicles (BTR) had 14.5mm HMGs that would defeat western APCs, then western MICVs (Marder) had cannon that would defeat Soviet APCs. Then came the BMP1, with a cannon that could defeat some tanks and armour that would protect against HMG at range. That seems to have been the excursion, although it spurred the development of the Warrior and Bradley. The Warrior that was produced seems to be an up-scaled CVR(T), with the same protection and firepower balance (armour against HMG and a cannon (RARDEN) suitable for killing Soviet armoured cars at range). Bradley is similar but with ATGM to help mechanised units avoid being swamped by Soviet tanks (all autocannon are ineffective against heavy armour)
The Soviets then moved to a 30mm cannon for the BMP2, also backed-up with ATGM.
Subsequent IFVs have favoured a similar mix of armour and firepower.
Part of the reason for the soviet switch from 73mm to 30mm was partly to make shooting easier (flatter-shooting gun and faster subsequent shots) Much the same reasoning was behind the British RARDEN. As fire control has improved, the need to facilitate follow-up shots and insensitivity to ranging errors has reduced. Modern IFVs have fire control on a par with many MBTs, so a larger gun could be possible. The other advantage of automatic cannon, however, was that they permitted many more shots to be carried. With modern munitions, this greatly increases the suppressive power of IFVs, allowing speculative fire on potential or suspected hostile locations, permitting increased mobility in the face of the enemy.
Going back to S Ortmann’s list, I think that I would omit, on the basis of operating a mixed armour group:
defeat occupied structures – If I know it is occupied, I would hand it off to the tanks
defeat occupied structures without rare ammunition – as above
defeat MBTs – I would settle for blinding them or disrupting them for long enough for my tanks to kill them while on the offensive. The ability to present a mobile ATGW asset on the defence would be nice, so I think that I might make that an MoD favourite – Fitted for but not with.
defeat infantry in defilade / behind cover – not so much omit but look at in a different way. If I can suppress them because I do not know exactly where they are, then that is good enough. If I know where they are, I can direct tank fire onto them.
carry ? dismounts – not an ommission, but it needs to be clarified. 8 dismounts.
survive MBT fire (frontal) – This is not going to happen unless we are at current MBT weight class. – i.e. 60t plus
survive conventional AT mines – depends on what is meant by survive. I’d accept a track break or lose a roadwheel – residual mobility against AT mines on a tracked vehicle is going to be tricky. It would be good to have though.
full networking – If I could work out what that meant, I might be able to decide if I wanted it or not.
ECM components – optional fit.
magnetic mine countermeasures – Do you intend to de gauss tanks? What are these magnetic mines?
amphibiousness – do not want. No way, no how. Requires too many compromises for limited operational functionality
deep wading capability – optional fit again. If I need it,
price per unit below 1.5 million GBP – If I have fire on the move and decent sensors, this is not attainable
price per unit below 3.0 million GBP – as a recurring production cost, this should be possible.
price per unit below 4.5 million GBP – if it goes up this high, it may be necessary to put off some of the equipment/armour fits until operational necessity demands it.
“Modern IFVs have fire control on a par with many MBTs, so a larger gun could be possible.”
This is not going to happen. If opposition politicians see a tank-like gun (say, 90 mm) on an IFV they will likely oppose the funding for a new MBT. Ground forces bureaucracies won’t drop the hope for a new MBT that easily.
“full networking – If I could work out what that meant, I might be able to decide if I wanted it or not.”
Digital radios, flat screens that show the tank commander where friendlies are and where reds are known to be, automatic radio relay functions, target distribution/targeting coordination in ambush situation, super-quick digital call for support fires, possibly datalink that warns about air threats or even about incoming indirect fire munitions.
This kind of stuff. Basically it’s a hardened laptop with a cable to a modern radio, but in practice it adds several hundred thousand bucks per vehicle.
I said not for fighting per se. They obviously fight, but in the context of supporting their infantry. Tanks blow shit up, MICVs blow shit up in the context of supporting infantry. Well, that was the idea back in the day. Missions have creeped.
Repeating myself:
http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2009/06/challenging-ifv-concept-part-1.html
“The conclusions of German officers for WW2 were clear:
The Panzergrenadiere (~mechanized infantry) should get a vehicle that
– was as mobile as the tanks (full track, speed, power/weight)
– had a shell-proof frontal armour plating
– carried about eight Panzergrenadiere for primarily mounted combat
– had a serious weapon (12.7 mm MG or 20 mm autocannon) for ground combat and air defence
The intent was that the combat would happen mounted if possible – this enabled very quick actions at tank speed instead of infantry speed. The Panzergrenadiere had to defeat the enemy infantry (which had only short-ranged light anti-tank weapons). The mounted fight required good vision when mounted – this meant that the vehicle should be open.”
as mobile as MBTs = not always achieved
mounted combat = obsolete (and thus the whole original idea = obsolete)
frontal proofing against major AT systems = never realised
eight dismounts = about normal for IFVs
ground/ground firepower: check
ground/air firepower: marginal
That’s not so much mission creep; that’s a failure to live up to the original concept. IFV evolution has been on autopilot and manipulated more by procurement politics than tactical needs.
I meant much more recent creep like using MICVs as tankettes in places like Afghan because we can get away with it. It’s only natural to push ones luck.
I would say this about the Germans, I don’t think they had any particular insight into armoured warfare at the end certainly and probably waaaay before then. People get hung up on some blitzkrieg myth and a model of tank design that was an ultimate failure, if rather cool. So I don’t think German specs should be considered the be all and end all. Obviously mounted attack was no better an option as it is today.
It was, for the anti-tank weapons of that time had an effective range of 30 m up to 150 m (typical Panzerfaust: 60 m), while machineguns had up to 300 effective range (when moving) and rifles up to 300 m (stationary).
Nowadays the small arms have the same range, but AT weapons range from 200-600 m for man-portable weapons.
Likewise, a 20 mm autocannon of 1945 was capable of defeating shielded AT guns at 2 km distance, while the IFV concept called for frontal immunity to (normal) AT guns (~up to Soviet 85 mm).
Modern autocannons are still not very effective beyond 2 km (at most 3 km), while ATGMs have effective ranges from 0.6 to 4 km and many ATGM systems cannot be suppressed/destroyed by autocannons at all.
What the German officer corps knew about armoured warfare came from many theatres of war over the course of many years, with and against air superiority and against very diverse enemies. They knew infantry tank, assault gun, light tank, medium tank, heavy tank and SPG tactics. The only kinds of tank they missed were airborne and amphibious tanks and some specialist engineer tank types (AVRE, for example).
No-one ever knew armoured warfare better than the surviving Panzer troops Oberst to General of 1945.
MikeW at 6.12pm Nov 3
“Intriguing ideas but could you tell me where you get the idea of eight battalions from? I was under the impression that at the moment the total of our Armoured Infantry and Mechanised Infantry battalions was 12 or 13 (I might have got this horribly wrong). Therefore quite a reduction! SDSR-based?”
Yep sorry, the 8 was from in my head and not well explained ! SDSR FF2020 was supposed to be 5 MBR’s with 1 Armoured Infantry (Warrior) and 1 Mechanised Infantry (Bulldog, Warthog, FRES UV, whatever….) each, plus of course the infamous “Infantry, General Purpose, Light Role”. So that would be 5 each Armoured and Mechanised. In my fantasy world (I did mention “in my head”) we would have a core of 4 Brigades for the enduring operations fallacy, sorry I mean requirement, each with 2 tracked (FRES SV “Protected Mobility”) and 2 wheeled (FRES UV) battalions. So that makes 8.
“I like the idea of the 120mm mortar Fire Support Vehicle, which would provide two types of indirect fire and two of direct fire. However, has an IR guided top attack round been developed for the 120mm mortar? (I know nothing about mortar rounds).”
Oh yes, Swedens Bofors has had the STRIX round available for years, like everything these days it even has marketing video on YouTube ! http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RTvXhfJxxz8
“Surely a GMG is a much less precise weapon than a cannon? Isn’t it more of a blanket effect weapon and therefore one with more indiscriminate effects than an accurately aimed weapon like a cannon? Admittedly the machine guns are a different case.”
Yes, and ? 40mm air bursting to suppress enemy infantry, sure its less precise, I am not sure “blanket” is the right word though !
“However, I am very dubious about losing the cannon-equipped MICV. Here I am with Phil: “IFVs are not generalists – they should have a very specific role, transporting and supporting infantry.” And for that role I think a cannon is the weapon.”
I was dubious, but during this conversation my position has changed – I like Sven’s way of looking at it, although rather than developing a new 75/76mm autocannon I would just stick with 40mm CTA
“Incidentally, what a sensible suggestion by Pete Arundel: “If we’ve got surplus Challengers I’d give them dozer blades, 165mm demolition guns and pass them to the engineers for the next time it’s necessary to do some urban renewal.” I think cost will almost certainly militate against that,though.”
Sure, except there are non of those guns left, so just fit the ubiquitous 120mm mortar :-)
“Finally, Jed, do you have any view about the emphasis being placed back on divisions rather than MRBs?”
Not sure what you mean – an MRB, or a dedicated “Mechanised Infantry” brigade can be part of a UK only division (not likely to happen though really) or part of an “allied” formation of division strength or higher. Depends on what were doing, where we are doing it and how long for. Lets face it, Afghanistan warranted Corps strength or higher, but we didn’t have one to send :-)
Found this Master’s thesis paper while I was Googling for old papers on IFV doctrine.
THE ROLE OF THE FIGHTING VEHICLE ON THE AIRLAND BATTLEFIELD, WILLIAM G. GESSNER, JR, CPT, US (1990)
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a227430.pdf
Has some interesting history and views.
Why should the Germans know more about armoured warfare than the US or Britain who also had been fighting for years? The German Panzer superiority is a myth. Their only innovation, if you can call it that, was concentrating larger armoured formations together at the start of the war. Their divisions were organised exactly the same essentially as Br and US albeit differences in scale. The BEF was entirely mechanised in 1940 as the Germans still trundled around with bloody horses. The Panzers were cool, they won some victories and people forget the solid work allied armoured formations put in.
Phil, seriously. The whole history of WW2 in Europe answers your question.
The Germans fought in much more diverse tactical situations on more diverse terrain with a more diverse set of tactics and more diverse equipment at worse quantitative odds.
The fact that a 90% non-motorised and 10% fuel-deprived German slowed down the Allied advance to a small fraction of the German advance speed of 1940-1942 (then also only 10% motorised, but with more fuel) kinda says it all.
German troops with U.S. equipment, supplies and air support would have raced from Normandy to Berlin till August 1944 at the latest.
That expertise was largely lost by the late 50’s, of course.
Hi Jed,
RE “Oh yes, Swedens Bofors has had the STRIX round available for years, like everything these days it even has marketing video on YouTube ! http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RTvXhfJxxz8”
– it was designed to give dug-in infantry better odds against massed armour formations
– the manooeuvreability on the way down is so limited that in today’s more dispersed battles/ tactics I doubt it would be very useful
ACC
we were developing an 81mm guided mortar at one point (think it may have been called Merlin). I’m not sure of the guidance or whatever happened to it though
It was millimetric radar
http://www.secretprojects.co.uk/forum/index.php?topic=5166.0
What? Funnily enough the Allies fought in every theatre Germany did. The Germans slowed us down because they were on the defensive and were a peer enemy. And they lost. Utterly, totally, completely destroyed. Every drop of fight pounded out of them for seventy years.
German armoured operations gained no great successes in the ETO. They were stopped in Normandy and they were stopped in the Ardennes. There was nothing special about their armoured experience or insight.
I don’t buy into the German fetish. They had cool tanks, but nowhere near enough of them. They used them in no special way.
Phil, the “Allies” were not one, while the German officer corps was one. They accumulated the experience that the allies did not accumulate.
We were discussing competence, not supply, air support, availability of enough young men and the other stuff that defeated the Wehrmacht.
And guess what; every advance faces defence, and European WW2 was on all major fronts a peer war.
The Germans used tanks in special ways, and were copied in these ways (to some degree). By 1945 it wasn’t any speciality what made the German medium and high ranking armour officers most competent on average, it was the fact that they knew almost everything about armour – way more than any other officer corps.
They had seen it all, and done almost everything themselves. Plus their successes are even today acknowledged by scholars to have been greater than can be explained with material factors alone.
You don’t seem to be able to focus on competence, so I guess further discussing with you is pointless. The opinions are entrenched anyway.
Right. So we should concentrate on one aspect of the German war effort and ignore the inconvenient other facts about allied strategy being far superior and the allied war effort being better attuned to fighting a vast land campaign?
I don’t agree the Gernans were particularly competent. Neither do I think they were bad at all. They were in the whole capable and aggressive, but so were many allied formations. I don’t buy into this special ability argument. The Germans were a capable and imaginative enemy on the defence. That doesn’t make them special or gifted. They used no great incisive tactics or strategies. They were not a cut above the best allied formations. It’s absurd that a huge swathe of people feel the need to explain allied set backs and slow progress on meteoric German ability. The Germans were stopped dead on the attack in Eastern and Western Fronts after 1943. They gained dramatic victories in low density battlefields at the start of the war, as the Allies did in 1944. And they gained local successes later in the war but you’d expect nothing less from a peer enemy. Just because they fought hard and generally well doesn’t make them anything outstanding. As I said, we smashed them to smithereens through a far superior war effort that could absorb the attrition needed to defeat them.
Your straw man arguments don’t work on me, nor does moving goalposts.
“Why should the Germans know more about armoured warfare than the US or Britain who also had been fighting for years?”
That’s what you asked and that’s what I answered plentily. Period.
@Jed
Thanks for the long and detailed reply. Several points are now clearer, including the one about the number of infantry battalions.
You say that you are not sure what I mean by “the emphasis being placed back on divisions rather than MRBs?” Well, I got the idea from an article to which Frenchie provided the link: http://www.parliamentarybrief.com/2011/10/having-brigades-will-never-deliver-the-same-punch-as-a#page_1
I don’t know that I can precis it very succinctly but the article, by one Anthony King, essentially put forward the idea that the division, rather than brigades, is likely to be the optimal formation for Britain’s armed forces’ operations in a range of contingencies.
He says that senior commanders in the British Army, even as the SDSR was being created, seemed to begin to question whether the having numerous brigades, each with relatively small combat power, was the correct way forward.
He further develops the argument by stating that it was during Major General Nick Carter’s command of ISAF Regional Command South in Kandahar in 2009-10 that such a realization began to dawn. During this deployment, General Carter and his staff realised that the divisional level (consisting of approximately 15,000 troops or about three brigades) provided the commander with not only enough military resources to fight properly but also “the political, informational and economic levers to prosecute a coherent campaign across all its lines of operation, security, development and governance.”
King puts forward the idea that the US Marine Corps may be an ideal model to follow. That is because the US Marines have a genuine integrated cross-service formation – a Marine Air Ground Task Force. The Marine doctrine, procurement and training are designed to unite air, maritime and land forces into a single manoeuvre force with exceptional combat power.
He further develops the argument by saying that if we were to attempt to create such a force (a Marine Air Ground Task Force) in the UK, it would be difficult. The Army possesses some air assets in the form of support and attack helicopters but a genuine UK Marine Air Ground Task Force would require the participation of the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force. The Royal Marines and 3 Commando Brigade with their amphibious shipping are also likely to be vitally important in the formation of any British deployable division.
However, he seems sold on the idea that the division, not the brigade, is likely to be the optimal formation for Britain’s armed forces as they prepare to meet a range of contingencies.
However, as you say, Jed, “It depends on what we’re doing, where we are doing it and how long for.”
regardless of the past, todays germans have no more experience than anyone else, considerably less in fact considering the uk, us and israel have all operated armoured divisions in recent history, the egyptians, syrians, iraqis and iranians have all fought major armour actions in living memory, badly, but they have experience.
Germany has a small armour force, with no practical experience.
my dad is bigger than your dad :)
You may have given an answer but there’s not a single shred of evidence to back it up. The Germans just knew more about it you say. So where’s your evidence? I’m not asking for a thesis. But a particle or two of evidence might do. I have pointed out that the German reputation was built on quick gains in low density battlefields and they had as much success as allied attacks in dense battlefields I should add. Point out my straw man? If you think not ignoring the reasons why we won is a straw man set up then you have a very narrow view of events. Like trying to explain why team a won a football match playing 11 players against five and ignoring the number of players in the post match report. It’s a flawed analysis.
The Germans were not special. They had no special insights. They operated in no unique manner at the start of the war. They were able, aggressive and imaginative but their officers had no unique understanding. No monopoly on armoured warfare wisdom.
“no practical experience” is incorrect due to recent stupid adventures, but I think that’s not on topic anyway, and I already mentioned that most first-hand experience was already lost by the late 50’s.
erm, 2000 light infantry is not an armoured division….
You’re moving goalposts as well. Is coherence so difficult nowadays?
“Germany has a small armour force, with no practical experience.”
Marder AFVs have been in Afghanistan and fired shots in anger for years now and several Panzerhaubitze 2000 have joined them last year.
Your statement was factually incorrect and I pointed that out.
Besides, Germany has 4,590 troops in Afghanistan and that’s actually been many thousands more because of rotation. 2k was another factual error.
sven
my point was entirely that germany has no experience of massed armour.
A few tanks dont count.
“Is coherence so difficult nowadays?”
Please, spare us the passive aggression. Its the internet.
Maybe rustle up some facts to put between the goalposts.
DominicJ, your post was partially wrong and partially in agreement with me. I pointed out the wrong line, for no reader can read your thoughts – only your text.
@Phil; I don’t discuss with you any more. You’re not discussing armour, but your hurt feelings.
I accept discussions about hurt feelings only in private affairs and even that is usually pointless.
Don’t worry Sven – I will get over the hurt feelings. Tomorrow is another day.
Hi DJ,
RE “the egyptians…fought major armour actions in living memory, badly”
The exception to the rule was the early part of Yom Kippur war – with innovative tactics, fully capitalising ATGW potential etc [ended the normal way, as we know]
– these same tactics were honed further by Hezbollah (also Syrian army has been transformed accordingly)and the US manuals on how to counter them group the current versions under “semi-irregular”)
ACC – why do you think STRIX has bad down range, cross range maneuverability ?
MikeW – of course Divisions are better, for many many reasons, but we can’t afford an army that has 4 identical divisions to rotate through enduring operations.
Sven and Phil – have to say, based on the history books I have read, you seem to be out on a limb Phil. Early German tanks were quite crappy, late 30’s British and French models being considered better, and yet Blitzkrieg managed to lever these poor quality assets, with the addition of tactical air in the form of Stukas, to achieve a great deal. Later on they had much better tanks, but could never, ever match the numerical advantage of the Western Allies or the Soviets. Obviously the whole war effort has to be taken into account (i.e. lack of sheer numbers and fuel for the Germans) but most of the academic histories I have read do acknowledge that the German army had a real “flair” for armoured warfare. So on a doctrinal, strategic and development of tactics level, they probably were better, and of course we (the allies) learned lessons, copied some elements and discarded others.
Hi Jed,
RE your question , it is basically a normal ballistic round (by Bofors) to the top of the flight trajectory, and then the clever bits from Saab take over. As it is an indirect fire weapon/ method, aiming is approximate and even though the seeker head is very clever, it is down to the additional 12 correction rockets to achieve the adjustment in the “down” part of the trajectory, so very much a function of
1. how accurate was the initial aim
2. are there several targets so choose the “easiest one”
3. are target(s) moving or not, the latter more likely when massing into the initial jump positions for an attack – this is the ideal use scenario (a bn having 2 x 4 120mm tubes, and the round being fire and forget, so you just fire as many as you can as there is no need to adjust in-between).
Anyway, you will enjoy the pages 4-8 on this one,
http://www.fmv.se/upload/Bilder%20och%20dokument/Publikationer/Informationsmaterial/PROTEC/Protec03_05.pdf
I will translate the concluding para on p.8 to a separate post (not to lose this piece in toggling between the screens)
Translation:
The base round has been optimised for the 9,1 km range and is not stable enough in direct fire mode.
Development needs for Strix regard both range and precision ,but the Swedish Army (Försvarsmakten)will only proceed when a foreign partner is found to share the necessary funding.
RE “Later on they had much better tanks, but could never, ever match the numerical advantage of the Western Allies or the Soviets. ”
American post-war assessments support this, stating that a Tiger needed 5 Shermans or 10 T-34s to match it.
– sounds strange at first as the T-34 was much better than the Sherman
– but the assessment was not about the tanks as such, but their effectiveness (tactics,training, air superiority & tank killing from the air)overall, in real context, but averaging over several
I go away, I come back, I try to get the discussion back on topic.
The weaponry of the MICV is a really interesting area. The really interesting historical bit, to me, is where the BMP1 moves to BMP2 or where the Scorpion moves to Scimitar. In each case, the single-shot, low velocity, high calibre cannon is replaced by an automatic, high-velocity, small calibre cannon. The logic, as far as I can ascertain, is to provide fewer errors due to a shorter flight time, more aerodynamic rounds and a flatter trajectory, coupled with a faster follow-up shot.
These advantages, while they still exist, are not nearly as compelling now, with each MICV having a sophisticated fire control, on a par with MBTs, that provides very high first-round hit probability almost independent of the velocity of the round.
So why stick with small-calibre autocannon? The HE content is small and the AP effect is minor. The option is there to move to a larger calibre, but, as S Ortmann points out, this limits the political dimension by making MBTs obsolescent, at least in the eyes of the average politician. In addition, the ability to add a large cannon to a MICV is restricted to space. A dedicated gun tank will always be able to mount a larger cannon, carry more ammunition and pay more attention to a single objective. A large cannon is really versatile and can perform most battlefield tasks. Compared to a dedicated gun tank, a MICV doesn’t have the space or clarity of purpose – it can’t scoot off semi-independently to kill tanks, for example – to effectively mount and use a large calibre gun.. IMHO, of course.
This leaves the MICV with the option of filling in what the dedicated gun tanks either cannot do, or cannot do efficiently. In the past, this has included
* taking out opposing infantry carriers, which cannon can do and automatic grenade launchers cannot
* Suppressive fire at extended range (outside machine gun range), which cannon and AGLs can manage well, with an advantage to AGLs because the ammunition is smaller but delivers a bigger payload.
As MICVs trend towards getting bigger and better protected, the ability to successfully engage the opposing sides MICV requires a bigger gun, which affects the ability to carry lots of ammunition and consequently reduces the ability to engage in speculative fire, recce by fire etc.
A future aspect of warfare that may affect armoured formations is the proliferation of remotely piloted vehicles (I prefer that term to UAV, for some reason). One job a large cannon cannot do particularly well is to engage small, airborne targets – it lacks the elevation (due to recoil space) and rate of fire needed, plus the rounds it fires are massive overkill on anything that it isn’t worth using a SAM on. This, to me, is a supporting niche that a MICV with a rapid firing cannon in small calibre would be useful in, especially if it can be equipped with airbursting proximity or timed fuses. AGLs lack the velocity to engage something moving quickly like a RPV and also restrict you to using bursting munitions rather than the comparatively range-insensitive shrapnel-type shells.
Thus, there is a potential niche in a mixed armoured formation for a light-cannon armed MICV for suppressive fire and small anti-air. Killing shots against AFVs or fortified positions would be the province of the dedicated gun tank.
An interesting concept then emerges of a standard chassis and permanently mixed formations. One (modular) armour solution, one powertrain, one running gear arrangement, different turrets and interior fits, but possibly common electrical gear such as sensor fits, radios, networking etc.
With this kind of integrated team, the ability to hand-off targets between platforms is going to be vital, to ensure that the right vehicle is available to deal with the right threat. This is no substitute for protection though – you have to assume that the enemy will be able to land hits on you before the message gets through to the right platform. The ability to suppress targets is important in this context. Plastering the front (and particularly the sensors) of a hostile MBT with HE or, better, ABM/KETF shots may buy you enough time for a gun tank to take the kill shot. Or it may not.
This concept could be described as the Main Armoured Fighting Vehicle (MAFV) – the successor to the MBT concept.
There is also room in this mixed unit for 120mm mortar, but only as indirect fire support – which is what they are intended for. There is no point in them in the direct fire mode, although there would be no sense in removing the capability. Quite simply, direct fire is what the dedicated gun tank is there for and it would be better at it. 120mm smoothbore isn’t a whole lot different from 120mm mortar in terms of terminal effect.
As a side note. 165mm demo guns are a nice thought, but there is just no point. A 120mm tank gun can do the same job (but from further away), which is why the Centurion AVRE was the last AVRE to feature one.
What a piece, Mr. fred
-would have taken me at least 20 pages to say all of that
I would just add two notes, which are just, perhaps, changes in emphasis:
1. “leaves the MICV with the option of filling in what the dedicated gun tanks either cannot do, or cannot do efficiently. In the past, this has included
* taking out opposing infantry carriers, which cannon can do and automatic grenade launchers cannot”
– when all of these things (now in use, rather than on the drawing board) were designed, NBC fighting environment was always factored in, ie. both you and OpFor fighting enclosed (mainly, and obviously not for ever)
– so a *must have* and not too many AGLs around then
2. UAVs and the lot came into the picture earlier in your text, so for the target hand-off/ assignment you probably had this in mind: not just between the vehicles that have LOS to the target(s), but off-board (not a naval term!)sensors brought to bear to the full
ACC,
Good point on the NBC conditions. This, combined with the mechanised nature of the expected conditions, meant that thin-skinned AFVs would be an absolute necessity for both armies. The numbers involved meant that armoured carriers had to be relatively lightweight
AGLs didn’t exist, but rapid-firing cannon with a high proportion of HE were available. An AFV equipped with an ADEN cannon would have been quite something. These would, if anything, have been less effective against light AFVs than modern AGLs, although the M789 did come in with the Hughes Chain gun in the 70’s, so it is a contender for cold-war AFV armament.
Yes, target hand-off would need to include sources outside the immediate formation. Attack Helicopter feeds, micro UAVs (using the term deliberately as the smaller stuff tends to have more autonomy) and even different sensor sets, issued on a modular basis. So, for example, I would expect that a weapon detecting radar (like MSTAR, but more modern) would be able to generate contacts on the battle web, just like an individual vehicle with its thermal sights, a section commander with his binoculars or a sniper detector on any vehicle. These contacts would appear on the battle network which would then be accessible to each vehicle, with command vehicles able to assign priority targets for subordinate units. You might need contacts to fade over time to avoid information overload, and certainly some kind of intelligence to ensure that contacts are not double counted – i.e. multiple reports in the same space and time location are collated into a single contact ID with all the information gathered on it accessible via that report.
Might be tricky and bandwidth intensive.
Mr. fred,
The trend is for MICVs to get heavier, but to date, OPFOR IFVs are only now approaching the level of protection offered by older generation western designs. Even 25mm APFSDS remains a credible threat to late model BMP3s.
Autocannons occupy a handy niche, IMHO. They have good range and accuracy, useful HE content, reasonably high ROF, acceptable penetration against most battlefield targets, and the gun and ammo don’t occupy as much space as a larger HE tosser.
Not to beat a dead horse, but ATGMs have also proved themselves as useful support weapons. The US Army fired over 4,000 TOWs in Afganistan and Iraq through Jan 2005. Most were fired at targets other than AFVs.
Hezbollah used ATGMs effectively against Israeli infantry.
They aren’t just for killing tanks.
Mr fred,
Yeah, not cheap. Here’s a count from the US, done in 2007 (of course might include contracts that take a long time to deliver)
“The Army committed more than $230 billion to a network-centric makeover, on top of the billions the military had already spent on surveillance, drone aircraft, spy satellites, and thousands of GPS transceivers.”
– but with sensible prioritisation all that you describe can be done
The use of ATGMs is contentious. The US has used them, both from Bradleys and from other platforms, but this is usually because there is no dedicated gun tank accompanying them and therefore no direct-fire HE of any decent calibre. ATGMs are very costly and frequently optimised for anti-tank work.
There are, perhaps, better ways to provide direct fire support. One is to deploy heavy HE chuckers with the light cannon-armed IFV. Another would be to deliberately make and provide ATGM for use against soft targets, in quantity that lowers the price.
ACC,
I wasn’t thinking about the cost. Internet-enabled devices shows that it could be done, but the trick is the detail of the realisation of it.
You would be generating a massive amount of data, but you have to share it without:
* Overwhelming the user
* Giving individual units away by their transmissions
* Using up too much bandwidth and blocking other signals
* Being blocked or jammed yourself.
“As a side note. 165mm demo guns are a nice thought, but there is just no point. A 120mm tank gun can do the same job (but from further away”
Disagree. Firstly the 165mm HESH round weighs, if I remember correctly, about three times what the 120mm HESH round does – and when you’re talking about plastic explosive that is not insignificant. The 120mm gun is not something you want to try using in a city. It’s muzzle blast is huge and it’s length is excessive (the Chieftain’s L11 is about 22′ long) – try traversing that to engage a target down a side street!
I believe there is a role for a dedicated, large calibre infantry support / engineering tank as street combat is more likely as the world becomes more urbanised.
I wanted to go back to the why and how of all versions of the FRES project, you must take my word about it. It’s anticipated on paper:
FRES SV (tracked) variants include : Scout, recovery, repair, troop carrier, engineering support, joint fire control, command and control, minelayer, ATGW Overwatch, regiment level command and control, ambulance, medical aid post unit, ground based surveillance, direct fire and bridgelayer.
FRES UV (wheeled) variants include : troop carrier, repair, recovery, medical aid post unit, ambulance, command and control, command and control regiment level, mortar carrier, logistic support, CBRN recce, electronic warfare.
I did not understand the usefulness of these variants, particularly the mixing of ATGW Overwatch and direct fire, it made no sense, and I thought that ATGW served to protect reconnaissance regiment against tanks, and direct Fire used to protect convoys of light wheeled vehicles.
But only time will tell if all variants are provided and how they will be useful, it’s about money and political will.
It is perhaps not very interesting, but it is my humble contribution to this topic.
Frenchie, would you mind translating the 1914 section of this link
http://lespontsurlaisne.free.fr/soissonsanglais.htm
Its for my bridging series
Thanks in advance
I’m sorry if I say stupid things :(
@Pete Arundel
Agree absolutely about the 165mm demolition gun.
“The 120mm gun is not something you want to try using in a city. It’s muzzle blast is huge and its length is excessive (the Chieftain’s L11 is about 22′ long) – try traversing that to engage a target down a side street!”
Precisely, and that is one one the reasons why a more compact weapon is needed. You are also right about its explosive power. The 165mm AVRE demolition gun proved very highly effective in WW2 and I believe that the French have a demolition projector on board their modern engineer tank (or they did the last time I read about the vehicle). I believe theirs might be compressed air based, unless I am confuising it with a British one which was being developed (low level research) a few years ago but which has now almost certainly been cancelled because of cuts.
Pete Arundal,
Slightly less than twice – 29kg for the 165mm against 17kg for the 120mm. The 120mm has an effective bang (and probably effective enough against most battlefield targets), a longer range and flatter trajectory. Plus it can fire tank-killing APFSDS rounds. But the key point is that it the 120mm is sufficiently effective against the targets that the 165mm is used for that we do not need a one-trick pony cluttering up the armoured formations as well.
A similar thing happened with the Centurion and Conqueror. The Conqueror’s 120mm was more powerful than the Centurion’s 20pr., but not so much more powerful than the later Centurion-mounted 105mm that it was worth keeping.
Being able to manoeuvre the gun in close terrain may be an issue, but such specialism would be an expense that most countries could ill afford. This may be a justification for future gun tank designs that they should try and use shorter barrels, obtaining velocity for KE rounds with higher pressures
Mike W,
The 165mm gun was not used in WW2. Perhaps you are thinking about the 290mm outside diameter petard mortar mounted on the Churchill AVRE (aka “The Flying Dustbin”)
@Mr.Fred
Yes, of course it was the “Flying Dustbin”. Apologies. I don’t think the 165mm appeared until fitted to the Centurion, did it?
I’ve just checked the French gun fitted to their EPG. It is 142mm. Wonder why they think they need it.
Bring back this I say
http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205206477
http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205201750
http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205201751
Thanks for the correction on the HESH weights, Mr. Fred, maybe I was thinking about the 105mm HESH . . . or maybe senility is setting in . . .
If it’s choice between 165mm and 120mm then, obviously, the more versatile 120mm gun wins but I still think there is a place for a heavy gun AVRE. I also think that if Challengers are mothballed then a few should be converted to AVREs and issued to the Engineers – use the standardisation argument if anyone objects and point out that they’re already operating the chassis as Titan and Trojan!
LOL – you know what I am going to say don’t you? Repeat after me: 120mm breach loading mortar……….
Cheque please! (Oops, that should have been the inside voice)
Now this may be completely idiotic, but I’ll try it anyway:
– why not vary the proportions of the propellant and the charge, and make a new round that can be used from existing guns (for clarity, I am not suggesting sawing off some of the barrel, so that problem remains in tight urban terrains)
– to reach compressed air -type of performance would need hardly any propellant, so how much more HE could one pack in?
A new shell would certainly be cheaper than a new gun and a new shell for a grand total of about a dozen vehicles.
However, a new shell, in order to be bigger, would have to be longer. This might run into aspect ratio problems in order to be stabilised from a rifled gun. In addition, a slower shell means a slower rate of spin, compounding stabilisation issues.
A turreted breech loading mortar might be a workable solution for a direct/indirect fire platform for use in complex terrain. If operating in such scenarios, it would need substantial protection – far above and beyond what such turrets currently mount – because there would be no way of avoiding getting hit at such close quarters.
Mr. Fred said, “The use of ATGMs is contentious. The US has used them, both from Bradleys and from other platforms, but this is usually because there is no dedicated gun tank accompanying them and therefore no direct-fire HE of any decent calibre. ATGMs are very costly and frequently optimised for anti-tank work.
There are, perhaps, better ways to provide direct fire support. One is to deploy heavy HE chuckers with the light cannon-armed IFV. Another would be to deliberately make and provide ATGM for use against soft targets, in quantity that lowers the price.”
That’s not entirely true. I’ve seen reports from Iraq of units using TOWs even with tank support. The tanks draw fire from buildings and the TOWs take it out.
Some problems with using a dedicated HE tosser is a) cost to develop and buy them, b) having enough of them in the TOE to be “there” when you need them, and c) accepting the logistics and O&M burden of another vehicle/gun type.
Putting ATGMs on vehicles you already plan to buy anyway solves those problems.
Plus, the shelf life for a TOW is only around 10 years, so many may expire soon and have to be replaced anyway.
There is a dedicated TOW variant for use against buildings and fighting positions. It’s the TOW II Bunker Buster.
http://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/products/stellent/groups/public/documents/content/cms04_011980.pdf
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VE7XhiQZD9o
I’d like to know more about the direct-fire accuracy and range of 120mm turreted mortars. One primary use for an HE tosser like this is to create breach holes in walls. This can require two or three shots placed close together to breach reinforced concrete. Can a 120mm smoothbore, direct-fire mortar do that at useful combat ranges? I don’t know.
In the British Army, the infantry in the MICVs and the Tankers in MBTs are separate units and often deployed independently. In large scale conflicts they are grouped together but most of the time they are not. Even with spangly networking this will impact cohesiveness and communications.
The future of the MICV, as far as I can see it, is as an organic asset within a heavy armour unit, rather than an independent unit.
Hi B. Smitty,
RE mortar accuracy, CEP used to be over 100m so the useful statistic was how much of a given type of target (in %)could be expected to be destroyed in a 100 x 100m grid by a salvo from a fire unit (4 is a typical number for firing together).
Currently the de luxe version is the Israeli Fireball which requires no ranging, as the weapon uses an innovative guidance method that provides course adjustment by gliding, extending range capability. The bomb detects a target as it glides by GPS navigation to a laser detection basket, where it acquires the target and descends for the kill. The target’s GPS location is fed to the bomb before launch, which improves accuracy over standard mortar bombs. With laser designation, the bomb is accurate to 1 meter CEP or less against stationary and moving targets.
Fireball uses various warhead fuzing options—fragmentation for soft targets, percussion for armor, and penetration for bunkers and targets in buildings. The weapon is designed for a single-shot kill in an urban environment, and flies a steep trajectory to minimize collateral damage. Fireball’s aerodynamic design gives it twice the range of conventional mortar bombs—up to 15 km.
Too expensive for most concrete cracking jobs – and therefore a “semi-smart” mortar munition is under development at Soltam for 120-mm tubes. Designated M150/M151 HE-TAG, the design uses laser homing to improve the accuracy of fire against time-urgent area targets, rather than hitting point targets with pinpoint precision. The idea is to fire a single round on target to neutralize it, thus saving the costly ammunition fired for traditional ranging. A homing device on the tip of the bomb scans the ground during the terminal trajectory phase, searching for the designated target area. Once the laser spot is acquired, tail fins deploy to correct the trajectory and impact on the spot. The M150 has a range of 7.2 km—the M151 fired from a long barrel reaches 9.5 km.
Patria is working on a 12 km ranged precision round but whether it is ready and what sort of CEP statistics; no idea.
As I was commenting earlier, in response to Jed, Swedish experiments have narrowed down the main improvement needs over previous generation rounds to
– stability in direct fire mode
– range for homing or precision pointed varieties
Would seem that all of this is in the works, but rifled vs smooth bore (i.e. will there be a need to swap the old tubes)does not get very much attention as the developments are very recent and to the needs of particular countries
ACC,
I’m fine with the 120mm mortar’s indirect-fire accuracy, I’m more concerned about it in direct-fire mode.
B.Smitty
Ref direct fire accuracy – it,s a good point I don’t think I have ever seen figures ref direct fire accuracy for BAe’s AMS or for Patria,s offering’s nor for that matter their predecessors from Thompson-Brandt.
Given that direct fire ranges for the 120’s are normally given as 1.2 to 1.5km, with a lower muzzle velocity and less “flat” trajectory, but with a modern fire control system I would surmise they are “accurate enough”.
Certainly the old French Thompson-Brandt gun-mortars in both 60mm and 81mm had both “high velocity” AP rounds and HEAT rounds, turret mounted in various French armoured vehicles, again we can only think they must have been considered “fit for purpose” !
Following up on this I was just reading about the South African M10 breach loading 60mm intended for use in AFV’s – this could be quite a neat weapon for an MICV / APC if the main role is anti-personnel / materiel, with a couple of turret mounted ATGW; but especially if your Platoon (or SF) light weight commando mortar is a 60mm (e.g. SA M4) and your battalion level 81mm is replaced by a long range 60mm (e.g. SA M6). That’s a lot of basic ammo commonality, and we know TD loves commonality :-)
At ranges that Jed mentions the American 120mm mortar precision round that has been production funded since 2007 for Light/ Stryker/ Heavy Bdes; scores 1st round hits 4 times out of five and 100% with 2 rounds
– bunker busting
– wall holing
– sniper team take-out
Collateral damage danger zone under a 100m when e.g. a JDAM would require 225m in an urban type of “terrain” (not considering cost or reaction time).
Does not add any hardware to frontline units; does not compete with HE artillery/ mortar roles
– I wonder about the range and accuracy of the anti-material weapons procured for the UK forces from Sweden (man-portable, I presume purely for kicking down doors/ holing walls and not much else?)
ACC,
PGMM is an indirect fire only round, AFAIK, and requires laser designation. It’s certainly useful for taking out sniper teams and bunkers, but doubt the lofted trajectory would be much use for breaching walls.
In any case, if you have to resort to an expensive guided round for this, you negate one of the primary benefits of having a large caliber HE tosser: cheap munitions.
Here’s a presentation on the effectiveness of the 105mm HEP (HESH) tank gun round in wall breaching.
http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2002gun/farrand.pdf
Hi B.Smitty,
Those slides don’t have numbers but this one
M393A2 HEP Velocity Profile
as Function of Range
can be tied back to American research which shows that mortar rounds fired at higher than 600 m/s velocity have disproportionate dispersion, so for holing purposes become useless.
Your tank gun round still has that velocity at 598 meters; the question is how much can the bigger charge compensate for effect, lacking velocity and therefore penetrating effect, to make the best of the “bang”.
-the route suggested by that research was better fin designs, to help to make use of higher velocities. A much newer development is a Swedish two-part round where the propellant is waiting for the charge to drop onto it (so you can get any velocity you like, but the stability will have to be achieved by other means).
– and that is not a breech-loading solution, which is easier to put under armour, drive to the front door and blow it in
In practice, though, when we are not talking about bunkers, will the rebar’red concrete to bust through be the exception, rather than the rule?
– the Canadians, having to fall back to the older Leopards at first in A-stan, found that just one shot made a 5m x 5m hole in a compound wall
ACC,
Depends on the theater. In Afghanistan, no. In urban areas of Iraq, yes. In Fallujah, US Marines found many buildings with 20+ inch thick concrete walls.