Rather than filling up other posts comments with discussions on artillery, loitering munitions etc can we just use this one for now?
This will be part of the ‘Future of’ series but everyone seems keen to crack on with the discussion.
So a few talking points to start the ball rolling…
- Is 105/155 the right mix, what about a single intermediate calibre
- Do we need traditional armoured self propelled system like AS90 anymore
- Where do mortars fit in, is there a case, for example, for a 120mm and if so Infantry or Artillery
- The bunfight between RA/AAC and RAF for extended range attack
- The role of sythetic training systems
- Counter battery fires, or more likely counter rocket and mortar fire, do we have the right equipment mix
- Where does naval Gunfire and land attack fit into the matrix
- Are we going precision crazy and ignoring the utility of flattening grid squares
- How can indirect fires support a larger area of operation, is longer range or greater mobility the answer
- How can we organise direction and management of indirect fires, is it a recce or RA task
- What about UAV’s and CAS
- What about the impact of greater urbanisation
- What about rockets, is there a case for a smaller round
- Loitering munitions, a decade too late or armed UAV replacement
In your own time…
Think Defence 
There has been an effort at a self propelled 120mm before, mounted on a Warrior IIRC.
Loitering munitions, especially non recoverable ones are absurd.
If the budget had allowed the UK would have moved to 155mm only.
Watchkeeper really should have LMM- use the cash from cancelling the silly Fireshadow.
If the UK is to stick with a heavy armoured force it needs AS90 or an equivalent.
Counter-battery, UK has proven outstanding, hopefully centurion will be retained and the new counter-battery radar will be procured. The combination of sensor, defensive system and retaliatory fire proved very effective in Iraq.
Urbanisation; if we are going to care about civilians it needs precision.
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with a difference of 1300kgs (1317kg to be exact) is it not time to bin light gun in favour of the m777, it shares ammo with AS90 therefore easing supply lines,more choice of shells (ie excaliber) ammo orders etc.
not much bigger in size either, 3ft when in travel mode. barrels built in UK, supporting our industry blah blah!
(edited to add, bugger bob got in first about 155mm which nulls my post)
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ah what the hell i’ll do another, AS90 is being reduced quite dramatically. Now somewhere this week i read that chile need to upgrade their old and bold M109 SPH’s could we ride out the poltical storm (if there was one) and flog some AS90’s using the money to fund purchase of M777’s I hate to say the forbidden sentence but they are airportable, to the battlefield and around it, couple it with a decent tractor (RG35 6×6 for me, would hold all the gun crew comfortably,or something that goes under chinook) feasible?
ps my mad idea on deturreting the AS90 for a RA fire support vehicle (see cvrt 2.0 thread) came from looking at the paladin support vehicle and man you could have a serious party in there! do they really need a manned 30mm turret? nah!)
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If a loitering device is a munition, then I don’t want it back.
I think it a silly idea. Once launched you have to crash it, you can only put your eyes into the air if you have somewhere safe to ditch the munition and you can only go over the horizon if you expend two or have a relay in place.
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Just remember that although M777 may be less than a ton and a half heavier than a light gun, the ammunition will weigh considerably more.
I wonder if the time has now come for rocket based artillery to take over. The launchers are much lighter than guns and can be made mobile on a relatively cheap wheeled platform and it’s a heck of a lot easier to build a guidance system for a non-rotating round that doesn’t pull several thousand G’s at launch.
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I think there is a lot of hype on 155m lightweight and the 105mm light gun is a magnificent system
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A LW 155 is only 1.3t heavier than a 105.
That’s heavier than my car. Another way of putting it is that the 155mm is 70% heavier than the 105. Something like 80 shells, or quarter of an hour of rapid fire, is the difference between the two guns.
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I think I am with you on the light gun V M777.
The 105 could be replaced by 120 mm morters the vehicles / weapons rounds exist to do this in conjunction with the M777 Commonality here we come
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105mm gets the job done, it has also received a bunch of upgrades (and there is more that could be done) which is why it is still there, but 155mm will fire a bigger shell further. Ammunition is heavy whatever and will need to be transported by vehicle- might as well have it a bit heavier. However, lightweight 155mm is just not a priority, its not a capability gap and the performance improvement would not be mind blowing. That said, it is kind of depressing that Vickers first unveiled the Ultralight Field Howitzer (as it was known then) back in the late 1980s and the UK has never bought it. On the subject of history, the AS90 turret was derived from a Vickers design called GBT, that was itself derived from the UK work on the failed SP70 project, alongside GBT Vickers also offered a GBN which was basically the GBT 155mm for warships, obviously it never went anywhere but basically what I am saying is that in the late 1980s Vickers offered a complete family of 155mm weapons- naval, light and self-propelled.
Light gun can NOT be replaced by mortars, one of the upgrades it has had is to provide direct fire capability- you just can not do that with mortars. Mortars have their place, but replacing the light field gun is not it.
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The light gun a magnificent system. But for shorter ranges would a long barreled 120mm recoiling breach loading morter do?
Not necessarily wedded to any answer and can confess family connections to light gun on my part.
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IXION,
See above, can’t do direct fire, 105mm can.
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The term “fires” grates. It’s a horrible Americanism. Artillery does not light fires.
Now that is off my chest.
Why would you need a 120mm mortar when Light Gun is very effective? Closer in 81mm mortars are accurate and powerful.
The thing with systems like MLRS is deconfliction with airspace. And indeed a lot of other artillery systems. In a busy airspace that can be a big problem.
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sorry Phil, I am usually with you on those horrible americanisms but it seems to be the in vogue word, like warfighter 🙂
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RE: Intermediate round. The Russians have (had?) 122mm howitzers and 130mm guns; would a dual purpose 120-127mm gun for both tank and artillery be possible?
Going even further, could you combine the two, the old artank concept? This article really goes too far with AAA but is interesting;
http://www.g2mil.com/artank.htm
The turret needed for full 80+ elevation, 360 degree may be too big but if the engine were forward mounted, could the gun elevate further than the usual 20 degrees if pointing forward? 45 degrees would allow maximum range at least.
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RE: NGFS – just finished reading Future British surface fleet by DK Brown; he is dubious about the effectiveness of guns in this role and suggests add-on MBRL instead.
He does suggest the idea of a ROF 105mm tank gun for patrol craft, with its accuracy and ability to destroy a terrorist launch with one shot. Modern version with 120mm tank gun?
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RE: bunfight – reorganise in to new role divisions? ISR/cavalry, deep strike,close combat, logistics? Joint commands?
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HI GJ,
I’ll have to wait for tomorrow to jump into this one, but from the first glimpse through, re
“RE: Intermediate round. The Russians have (had?) 122mm howitzers and 130mm guns; would a dual purpose 120-127mm gun for both tank and artillery be possible?”
– the 122 is light enough for the SPG to be fully amphibious
– the 130 had such a long range (30km) that Americans in Vietnam had to have 155s to do counter-battery
Don’t have the answer to your question. Italians have worked on the interim caliber based on the Volcano rounds initially developed for the navy. Lately I read that army, however, wants them in 155 (I guess to be able to use cheaper, volume products when a niche one is not required to do the job).
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Bob Morters can do direct fire. Gun morter systens have existed with since the 60s?
Although not many have made it into service which perhaps says something…
The problem with the ARTank idea is that fire control ammo choice etc make it direct fire weapon system.
Tank and artillery sharing the same ammo would be useful but are we ready to reduce the size of our main artillery or increase the size of our tank guns? The 127 mm navel gun has been kicked arround on paper for both roles but would I suggest be a bit ‘light on shell ‘ for true heavy artillery.
Although the south african LEO system at 105mm claims its shell has as big a bang as WW2 155mm.
Not bene shot at by both for comparative testing myself though..
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Doesn’t the issue of the light gun’s direct-fire sight mod come down to the fact that you can only elevate the gun so far, so without direct fire you have a considerable minimum range – something that is not a problem with a mortar that can fire at much steeper angles to close the range. A characteristic of a gun, but not really an effective argument for keeping the guns.
There are also vehicle mounted breech loading 120mm mortars that can provide direct fire, and fire with suppressed barrels.
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I think I’ll echo Pete A’s call; what about some kind of light rocket system?
Something that could be driven to a firing point and literally set up in seconds, firing off a big arse barrage of light rockets.
I’m not a rocket scientist though (ba dom tish) so I’m not sure.
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The ADF was based on towed M198’s and UK light 105’s but the last white paper decided to drop 105mm completely. The regular towed light 105 unit’s are moving to M777’s and the current stocks of M198 are due to be replaced by 155mm Self Propelled Guns with Pzh2000’s and K9 Thunderers being shortlisted before the Defence Materiel Organisation out here stuffed up the tender process. The Army plainly want the Pzh2000!
To meet the higher costs of all 155mm Regulars, the reserve artillery regiments have re-rolled on 81mm morters.
The thinking out here was that an 81mm morter can reach half as far as a 105mm, is much cheaper and far more mobile. To reach further, anything a 105 can hit a 155 can harder. To top things off various smart 155 rounds are becoming available (copperheads and course corrected fuzes)whereas the 105 seems doomed to remain a dumb round.
The ADF had a look at 120mm morters a couple of years ago but the extra capability didn’t justify the cost of having another calibre in service.
With cost always pressing the idea of replacing 105 with something intermedite between 105 and 155 would simply add cost.
The reserve 105 units were somewhat pissed but they were given plenty of morters and rounds to use.
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Hi, Chris. They did develop the LIMAWS(rocket) system some years ago, essentially a 6 round MLRS pack mounted on a 6×4 Supacat. Ran out of money before they could buy it though.
Meant to support light forces, it weighed in at about 9t with rockets so could be lifted by Chinook.
Would a short range system with mini rockets be worthwhile? We have mortars or even GMG that probably fill that spot effectively already.
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Just to add to the debate:-
– ATACMS has had it’s guidance system modified to permit vertical impact terminal mode for urban targets. Also somewhat useful for mountains, and I’m sure GMLRS will shortly have the same
– re guns vs rockets, I suspect that the latter is gaining, since it can do both the precision mode and the grid square removal job better and cheaper than tubes. That being said, it’s more expensive in logistic tonnage for a specific weight of shell, but if we are usually firing far fewer of them, this will matter less
– regarding all the requirements for NGS, I suspect the Falklands expedient of assigning a frigate to each battalion attack is sadly not practicable unless we want a lot of Glamorgan incidents. Obviously the 4.5 has other naval jobs as well, so given we need more range and don’t want to dominate the VLS loadouts, some MLRS on amphibs seems like the logical solution
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is there still a possibility of moving heavy artillery into the TA’s, seems pretty sensible to me.
perhaps as additional squadrons to regular battalions in the same way FR is roled………..
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RE “Something that could be driven to a firing point and literally set up in seconds, firing off a big arse barrage of light rockets.”
When the Sheridan had already been binned, M1 the only game in town and the US Army realised that their airportable formations would be light infantry (at a disadvantage with most opponents, that is) once they had arrived, there was a thought of combining direct and indirect fires:
– “down”gun the tank (Israeli multi-purpose rounds for 105 mm were already available, to compensate) to achieve airportable weight
– add laser-guided rockets to both sides of the turret (accuracy will compensate for big barrage)
– the latter can have the targets self-lased, but don’t need to
– with an infantry team (or a helo) doing the lasing… you have direct and indirect fire on the same platform, ready in seconds or less, never fails to keep up (but can have other parts of the formation scouting ahead, to neutralise OpFor ATGW teams in hiding)
… sadly, was never realised (the said rocket also entered mass production many many years late)
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I’m thinking with light(er) rockets, they would have to find a range home between MLRS and mortars. So basically replace the 105.
I guess it’s all relative in the end, each weapon to its own merits and all that.
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RE some of TD’s “teaser” points:
Is 105/155 the right mix, what about a single intermediate calibre
– agree with the scepticism expressed about “single”
Do we need traditional armoured self propelled system like AS90 anymore
– yes, but in a more balanced mix
– cross-train crews, TA included, in 105 and 155 SPG
– have a small number of both permanently attached to each MRB (see the next point about rounding off numbers to be sufficient for “effect”)
Where do mortars fit in, is there a case, for example, for a 120mm and if so Infantry or Artillery
– yes, we need to address the requirement for fire support “never to fail to keep up”
– 81 mm is organic to bn’s; 120 mm should be organic to AI bn’s (and obviously on a similar, well protected and mobile chassis as the rest of the unit)… this would be the 3rd battery of the bde, even if not within RA
The bunfight between RA/AAC and RAF for extended range attack
– I am not sure there is a bunfight between RA/AAC (sure, RAF would want to control everything that takes off from a runway)
– base-bleed and Excalibur for RA, with loitering munitions (I don’t share the enthusiasm of e.g. rusi), GMLRS – even ATACMS loaded (ie. one instead of six) to the other launcher unit on the carrier) … reach and effect is not the problem, but real-time targeting and as someone pointed out, real-time airspace picture not to do damage on the way to the target
– identifying and targeting for extended range effect should not rely solely on e.g. Watchkeeper; as we know from the Georgia conflict, the Russians easily downed 4 of similar Israeli-supplied thingies right at the start
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RE “Something that could be driven to a firing point and literally set up in seconds, firing off a big arse barrage of light rockets.”
When the Sheridan had already been binned, M1 the only game in town and the US Army realised that their airportable formations would be light infantry (at a disadvantage with most opponents, that is) once they had arrived, there was a thought of combining direct and indirect fires:
– “down”gun the tank (Israeli multi-purpose rounds for 105 mm were already available) to achieve airportable weight
– add laser-guided rockets to both sides of the turret (accuracy will compensate for big barrage)
– the latter can have the targets self-lased, but don’t need to
– with an infantry team (or a helo) doing the lasing… you have direct and indirect fire on the same platform, ready in seconds or less, never fails to keep up (but can have other parts of the formation scouting ahead, to neutralise OpFor ATGW teams in hiding)
… sadly, was never realised (the said rocket also entered mass production many many years late)
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A couple of folks question whether 120 mortars could replace the light gun.
One thing to consider is that a vehicle mounted 120mm advanced mortar requires less crew than a single light gun and, if you believe the product brochures, can provide a heavier bombardment – very important in our incredible shrinking army. And can do shoot and scoot faster than the guns.
———
I remember seeing a CGI video quite some time ago of a much more automated 155 gun, proposed for the army. With cash tight, new heavy artillery might not be a priority right now, but there is further scope to shave off some manpower without cutting into capability.
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Quite a few people seem to be doing artilery at then moment.
I’m swinging towards “peacekeepers” need a smattering of light guns, stick a 105 in a FOB, and suddenly shoot and scotts are rather more dangerous for the other side.
But I’m struggling to see what an MRB would do with any artilery at all. Armour componant is looking like 20-40 MBTs and 40 Scout Tanks.
What exactly does that force need artilery for?
Artilery might be dead….
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There will soon be laser seeker heads for FFAR’s (APKWS) and I wonder if such seekers could be applied to something like the old german LARS.
Also,what sort of range would a CVR-7 would have if deployed as light artillery rather than from under the wing of a Harrier?
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Pete
Click to access CRV7-PG.pdf
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Does the LMM have any significant advantages over the CRV7-PG, and will we be getting the latter?
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“What exactly does that force need artilery for?”
For the same reason artillery has always been used. For the same reason it is being fired in Afghanistan now and was fired in the Falklands and Iraq. And the Gulf. It is raw fire power. It is devastatingly effective and it doesn’t care how well trained or professional its targets are.
The words Medium Role Brigade have not changed the essence of hundreds of years of conflict. And I don’t see the link between armour numbers and the need for artillery.
It’s all about the application of fire power and nothing beats artillery / mortars for doing that on a swift and grand scale.
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Andy, I think the LMM is far more versatile, shorter minimum distance, greater potential range of seekers and an all round better improvement but here is the rub, its way more expensive. We have just placed a production order for LMM so the likelihood of getting CRV7PG into service is the square root of zero
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Phil
Well, I specificaly mention that its worth its weight in gold in places like Afghanistan, so, we can cross that one off.
The falklands, yep, if we took away the 30 guns, that would have been a disaster, but if we replaced them with 30 MBTs, would the war have been easier or harder?
My vote would be easier.
Hands up, I could be wrong, but in my understanding, 30 Challies could have easily overran the Argentine lines.
It could just be my limited knowledge, but I’m unaware of any major artilery victories in either gulf war, or the persian war before it
“The words Medium Role Brigade have not changed the essence of hundreds of years of conflict. And I don’t see the link between armour numbers and the need for artillery.”
Blitzkreig.
A Tank is, in effect, little more than a very expensive, very mobile(in its way), very survivable artilery piece.
I dont see the need for its cheaper, fixed, glass jawed little brother, especialy considering the sort of war we are liable to fight in the future.
Which are, in effect, lightening wars.
Whichy, although grand in effect, are unlikely to be grand in scale, the BEF sent to France in the first world war is bigger than the entire british army. In future, a british force, even including air and naval complements, is unlikely to number 40,000
Or, COIN, which I agree, needs guns, far more than we have deployed in Afghanistan.
I asked, would I rather send a tank, or a gun, and apart from afghanistanesque situations, the asnwer was always tank.
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DominicJ
The clue is in the name, “indirect fire”. Tanks provide direct fire. Artillery and mortars, indirect fire. They do that over a far greater space than a tank can provide direct fire. An artillery piece if essentially able to be in lots of different places at lots of different times across a very wide battle space in as long as it takes to lay on. A tank, cannot do this.
With your Falklands example, tanks or artillery? The answer is simple, ideally, both. You play to win and so you bring all your strengths to bear, so you need both. That would have made it easiest of all.
Artillery victories in the Gulf War? It was artillery that helped ensure that when forces descended on the objectives the enemy were already a shattered force. More than many other wars the Persian and Iraq wars were one of artillery (whether through guns or via planes) because of the wide open spaces.
Blitzkrieg never changed the essence of war either.
It was simply the exploitation of the new found operational manoeuvrability afforded to conflict with motor vehicles and improved communication systems. And to gain that operational manoeuvrability it must, in all except the least dense battlefields, be earned through attrition. And this is where artillery plays a massive role. All battles boil down to attrition, all wars boil down to attrition. Artillery does a lot of donkey work to that end.
There’s no Blitzkrieg on a dense battlefield with depth.
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Yankee artillery officer here, with a few thoughts if you don’t mind.
1)I’m a big believer in mixed calibers. The USMC moved to a single caliber (155mm) in the 80’s and 90’s and it was found to be insufficient. The US Army uses both 105mm and 155mm. 105’s for lighter units and 155mm for heavy units. I think this is appropriate if you have a mix of heavy and light maneuver units. Not so much for the USMC that claims to utilize only light units. Even if you only have light units, artillery support needs to be able to go lighter or heavier depending on situation.
2)The only utility I see in SP vs. Towed is for armor units. In a large, conventional armored fight a towed system would have trouble keeping up with tanks. Otherwise, towed works just fine.
3) A 120mm is a good but possibly unnecessary system. They definitely belong with the artillery. Grunts are not going to hump a 120mm or the ammo and still be able to maneuver like a grunt unit should. An artillery unit is better equipped logistically to handle a 120mm.
4)Dispersion is necessary to handle a larger area of operations. Artillery units have to be capable of splitting up into sections and operating independently. Good communications is necessary to do this, and each sub-unit needs its own fire direction capability. Manual fire direction probably can’t support the dispersion, need to be able to rely solely on automated fire direction.
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“Is 105/155 the right mix, what about a single intermediate calibre”
This is a technological lock-in. 105 mm is calibre of choice for lightness (and the South Africans have a G7 LEO howitzer for ~ 30 km range with base bleed) and 155 mm for range (and when weight doesn’t matter much).
155 mm will survive as NATO standard, and the UK army is too small to justify a major deviation from NATO standard.
“Do we need traditional armoured self propelled system like AS90 anymore”
Such designs are valuable in conventional warfare, but new procurements could be dumpster truck-based, see the Swedish design.
“Where do mortars fit in, is there a case, for example, for a 120mm and if so Infantry or Artillery”
Normal 120 mm mortars (not the expensive turrets, not the long barrel-long range designs) are a very good choice (and NATO standard) as organic battlegroup / battalion indirect fires system.
“The bunfight between RA/AAC and RAF for extended range attack””
Surface-surface missiles with up to 500 km range should be under army control in order to give aground leadership some bargaining chips in their cooperation with their air force.
“The role of sythetic training systems”
This is a done deal, computer-based training is essential for cost reasons and can be more realistic than live-fire exercises (especially for the artillery).
“Counter battery fires, or more likely counter rocket and mortar fire, do we have the right equipment mix”
I personally would place a greater emphasis on 360° counter-battery radar surveillance AND its availability within seconds of stopping the vehicle. This is a necessity for mobile forces.
“Where does naval Gunfire and land attack fit into the matrix”
It’s a mere niche.
“Are we going precision crazy and ignoring the utility of flattening grid squares”
Suppressive fires with HE (proximity fused) and smoke shell lines (smoke screens) are of great tactical importance. Destruction by direct or close hits is only part of the artillery’s job.
“How can indirect fires support a larger area of operation, is longer range or greater mobility the answer”
Mix it. The artillery and mortars that are organic to manoeuvre formations need to be supplied, of course. This should be relatively easy in mobile warfare if the unit carry enough ammo (mobile warfare = high fuel consumption, low ammunition consumption).
“How can we organise direction and management of indirect fires, is it a recce or RA task”
Joint fire support teams (mortar, artillery, air attack, naval fire support) with high-end hardware and training for Schwerpunkt actions and very good positions (dominating heights).
Leaders, snipers and recce: Qualified for calling for support fires. Bn Cmd and up are able to command instead of ask for a fire mission, of course.
“What about UAV’s and CAS”
Forget UAVs for attack for a while. CAS – expensive, only for theatre Schwerpunkt or very low intensity warfare.
“What about the impact of greater urbanisation”
Shit happens. Ability to hit individual buildings and to create smoke screens is required, but other than that there’s little arty can do.
“What about rockets, is there a case for a smaller round”
227 mm MLRS is de facto NATO standard and unlikely to go away, even though I thin that the Israeli 160 mm LAR is a superior approach. It can use 155 mm cargo shell submunitions. The UK army is too small to deviate on its own, though.
“Loitering munitions, a decade too late or armed UAV replacement”
The only loitering munitions that make sense are anti-radar munitions with SEAD purpose (emphasis on the “S” for “suppression”.
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S O makes the very good point that the 105/155 is a NATO standard and thus unlikely to be deviated from for some time. If we had an intermediate shell then we’d be the only ones using it and our interoperability and flexibility would be severely curtailed (not least when we go begging to Belgium for 155mm shells).
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what is the actual real world interoperability between NATO nations for artillery shells anyway, I mean really
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Afaik the shells are interchangeable, but you need to inform the artillerymen about their actual external ballistics.
Guided shells require extra equipment for handling, of course.
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Regarding urbanisation.
People seem to forget that it is the responsibility of the soldiers *Occupying* the city to ensure the protection of the civillian populace and infrastructure, not those shelling it.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Goose_Green
“”MILITARY OPTIONS
We have sent a PW to you under a white flag of truce to convey the following military options:
1. That you unconditionally surrender your force to us by leaving the township, forming up in a military manner, removing your helmets and laying down your weapons. You will give prior notice of this intention by returning the PW under a white flag with him briefed as to the formalities by no later than 0830 hrs local time.
2. You refuse in the first case to surrender and take the inevitable consequences. You will give prior notice of this intention by returning the PW without his flag (although his neutrality will be respected) no later than 0830 hrs local time.
3. In the event and in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Geneva Convention and Laws of War you will be held responsible for the fate of any civilians in Darwin and Goose Green and we in accordance with these terms do give notice of our intention to bombard Darwin and Goose Green.
C KEEBLE
Commander of British Forces””
The Guardianistas might not like it, mostly because they prefer the terrorists shooting from schools to the Israelis soldiers they are shooting at, but it is perfectly legal to use a 1000lb bomb on a mortar, even if its fireing from the top of a childrens hospital, and any ensueing loss of life is the fault of the mortar team and the officer who placed it there, not the pilot who bombed it.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Laws_of_war#Applicability_to_states_and_individuals
“By the same token, combatants that intentionally use protected people or property as shields or camouflage are guilty of violations of laws of war and are responsible for damage to those that should be protected.”
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“People seem to forget that it is the responsibility of the soldiers *Occupying* the city to ensure the protection of the civillian populace and infrastructure, not those shelling it.”
Negative.
All military actions should be bound by the principles of military necessity, humanity, proportionality and distinction. Shelling the shit out of a town can violate all those principles.
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This “use” means ‘force them to the position they want to protect against attack’.
It’s perfectly legal to set up camp in an inhabited village, for example. That’s not prohibited behaviour and no special responsibilities for the lives of the civilians are attached.
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If we could afford it, I would love to see the M777 155mm howitzer, with its much heavier hitting power, in British Army service (to serve alongside the 105mm Light Gun – 155s for heavy units and 105s for lighter units).
However, I have one lingering doubt in my mind about the M777. I think I remember reading years ago that although it could be carried underslung by a Chinook, it could not be transported thus by a Merlin. If the Merlins are all to go to the Royal Navy, the M777s would not be much use in support of the Royal Marines, would they, or have I got that entirely wrong?
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Hi BB,
“can provide a heavier bombardment – very important in our incredible shrinking army.”
– hence two barrels:16 rounds in the first 2 minutes out to 10-12 km, depending on type of round
– And can do shoot and scoot faster than the guns; yes ready to shoot almost as soon as stops as all targeting is on GPS (manual override, of course)
I think the latest is the Canadian decision
– http://www.army-guide.com/eng/article/article.php?forumID=1912
– only one barrel, on wheels to give better range (and speed) to reach the next firing position
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“A BAe representative confirmed one assumption that I have had and expressed since a long time.
It takes two to three minutes to turn around a M777 lightweight 155mm howitzer beyond its small traverse. This prevents a good responsiveness all-round. Assertions of airborne guys about their ability to secure an airfield for air-deployable reinforcements are not credible for this reason. The M777 is a 39 calibre barrel length gun (already out-ranged by 52 cal guns) and it needs eight guns minimum for a 360° coverage at response times of less than two minutes.
Sure, such equipment proves itself against Taleban and its users seem to like it. But did these users encounter any counter-artillery-capable opponents in the past 63 years? No.”
http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2008/06/eurosatory-2008.html
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Phil
No, not negative, a soldier fighting from a hospital or other such structure is responsible for any damage done to it.
“Shelling the shit out of a town can violate all those principles.”
It *can* but *can* does not mean *does*.
Use a Grid Square Removal Service on central Paris to get a sniper would probably fail.
Using it to destroy a tank regiment would not.
Many people seem to have the mistaken opinion that a soldier fighting from a hospital has donned some sort of legal armour, he has not, he has jumped into a legal noose.
Thats not to say the UK would bomb hospitals, even if the other side made them legal targets, but thats for political/press reasons, rather than cast iron legal ones.
For example, had we used area munitions against argentine airfields, despite massive losses to civillians, that would clearly be a military necessity, whereas the same against the fleet in port, would probably fail, because they’d been knocked out of the war already.
SO
Using my above example, I’m fairly sure if the argies hadnt surrendered, and goose green had been shelled, with heavy civillian losses, some of them would be in jail / gallows over it.
We’d be less interested in holding the other side to account for losses to their civillian populace.
I’m surprised that got such a reaction, personaly I;m still not a fan of artilery, but ironicaly, its because we hit better civillian targets with guided stuff…..
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Hi DJ, your bottom line answer is to the wrong question, as it is not “either-or”.
Further:
“the persian war before it”
– was, if anything lately, an artillery war on the lines of WW1. The lines soon froze and then 8(?) years of that followed (including death-defying infantry charges across mine fields, barbed wire – on occasions even gas)
“the link between armour numbers and the need for artillery…
Blitzkreig.”
– lesson learnt(?): Don’t ever let the artillery support fall behind (SPG was the answer then, and part of the answer still today)
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12km really isnt that far….
The 105 does 17km, the german 155 throws out to 40km, and some experimental work went out to 80km.
Personaly I like the 120mm mortar, but range is hardly a selling point.
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“No, not negative, a soldier fighting from a hospital or other such structure is responsible for any damage done to it.”
Fighting from a hospital would violate some or all four of the principles mentioned. And just because they have been violated by the enemy does not mean the other parties obligations under the law of armed conflict are negated.
The army attacking that occupied hospital still have to adhere to the four principles mentioned above. You cannot shift the responsibility to the enemy.
Both sides have responsibilities.
So it’s a negative ghostrider. The occupying power is not responsible for the hospital and the damage done to it.
“It *can* but *can* does not mean *does*.”
I know. I used the word “can” on purpose.
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105 mm HE-RAP fired by G7 LEO does 32 km under optimal conditions, while comparable 155 mm HE-RAP fired by best 155 mm L/52 guns does 42 km under same conditions. The real-world values for a much more economical HE-BB are about 23 and about 30 km.
Glide shells for howitzers are idiotic. You should use a MRL if you intend to use a fin-stabilised glide round.
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DominicJ
Never mind the law!
There are certain practicalities. About indiscriminant firewpower.
As the US found in Iraq, it’s not a good opening line when you drive in: –
“High we are the people Who:-
Destroyed your local economy/job.
Blew up your house.
killed your children
We are here to save you”
It gains nor looses nothing in translation.
Goose green and Darwin hardly ‘Built up’ Areas!
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ACC
The Iran Iraq war used a lot of artillery, but I cant imagine how artilery is viewed as a wonderful success in it.
The war was an absolute disaster for and by both sides, with folly not seen since the first world war.
I think we just fundamentaly disagree on what war is likely to look like in the future.
Me, I see a swift breakthrough and a collapse of the enemy, but I have little wish for a sustained break through, with a view to “seizing territory” or some such.
The purpose is to smash the enemy military to oput pressure on the enemy government to give in to our demands.
We dont have the stomach to lay seige, even if we buy the equipment, so why buy it?
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Hi S O,
Good points all through, on this one
” loitering munitions that make sense are anti-radar munitions with SEAD purpose (emphasis on the “S” for “suppression””
– a pity that the only one in which the idea has been implemented is too short ranged for safely (for the launching aircraft) to reach a position (for starting the loitering) in Area Air Defence situations (of modern standards)
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… or are there such, now, that are artillery launched (on the second thought)?
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DominicJ
Artillery is not a siege weapon. And as I said, your quick breakthrough has to be earned.
Tell me how you envisage your swift breakthrough occurring.
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“with folly not seen since the first world war”
WWI was many things, above all a true tragedy for Europe, but there was not as much folly in it as many think.
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@Armchaircivvy; google for the harpy drone.
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Hi DJ,
It is not the range, but the overlapping of ranges and firing modes, taking your
“The 105 does 17km, the german 155 throws out to 40km, and some experimental work” …, now in service, a pity that 127 and 155 both have to be made in very small production runs, to 120 km… add 70 for GMLRS and 300 for ATACMS
-one battery 120 automated mortars with direct fire from under 100 m (with indirect) out to 12 km; then the other out to 17 from positions where the other arty assets might be difficult to insert (oh boy, the Americans were pissed off with the Chinook lifted 105’s lacking the range of the 155’s that were difficult to get to where they were needed; and we are going back to Vietnam here, not the Iraq/Iran wars of later)
– yes , and the 155 as the third. It is no secret that I favour putting these on wheels as opposed to only having heavy SPG’s. The same wheels indeed as already quoted early in this thread that could take half a load of GMLRS to where they are needed, plenty quick, including by air to another continent – the much derided capability in itself!
There is no need to have these last mentioned assets organically within an MRB, but to assign them/ twin packs on tracks, or even enhanced to ATACMS’s as needed, from specialist RA Rgmnts as and when needed (the heavier held in TA perhaps)
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“with folly not seen since the first world war”
“WWI was many things, above all a true tragedy for Europe”,
While I agree with both DJ & Phil on these, the rare success of anything that DJ was looking for was:
the BVR capability of F-14 Tomcats… flying against a western-supported Mig air force (the Mirages later did not make any difference; the embargoed supply of spares and AA weaponry did)
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Hi S O, starting from the shared point (best value from loitering is taking out radar emitters)
– the European advanced Harpy derivatives only target 200 km range (you as as land forces, or your ships have to be on the edge of an AAD system to attack it then)
– whereas this one looks like a real substitute for TacStrike in SEAD (as we don’t have any deep strike):
” Initially displayed in the Paris Air Show in 1999, the system combined the airframe of the Harpy UAV, made by Israel Aircraft Industries, with advanced sensors made by Raytheon Systems, which also manufactures the HARM (High Speed Anti-Radiation) missile. Cutlass was adapted for ship-based operations to support US Navy operations over land. It is designed for six hours missions, flying at speed of 100 knots and maximum range of 1,000 km.
Unlike the autonomous Harpy, Cutlass also has a direct line-of-sight datalink capability at range up to 150 km. This range can be extended via relays built into each weapon. Like Harpy, Cutlass primarily is a SEAD weapon, relying on a blast-fragmentation warhead, but Cutlass is different from Harpy in its semi-autonomous mode of operation. When a potential target is located, the information is data-linked to an operator in the ground station to confirm target identification and to provide positive man-in-the-loop attack permission. With different seekers, the killer drone can also be used for hunting of ballistic missile launchers, urban warfare, and attacking vehicles. Other potential missions for an unarmed version of the Cutlass could be reconnaissance, target acquisition and battle-damage assessment, he said. It operates at an altitude of 6,000 feet, to avoid ground fire.”
A bit of an aside from artillery discussions, but then again 300 km ranged ATACMS is artillery!
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Head over to Sheppard publishing and register for your free electronic copy of Land Warfare magazine – this months issue has a big article on SP Artillery, just not had time to read it yet !
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Gabby, you know that RUSI link that you thought we should all read, did you notice the author?
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@ Phil said “WWI was many things, above all a true tragedy for Europe, but there was not as much folly in it as many think.”
Do you mean militarily? If so I agree.
Or do you mean more in a broad sweep of history sort of way?
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http://www.g2mil.com/JUS.htm
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Gareth, those comments at the end seem to be very telling
The utility of helicopters and the AC130 for example but don’t forget, if the enemy has decent AA then they might not be available
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TD, agreed, the mindset seems to be setting in a “mould”.
What caught my eye, though, was the very beginning:
“A six-month basic spotters course for E-2s will produce experts in map reading, GPS systems, radio systems, naval gunfire, artillery spotting, mortar spotting, and close air support. The school will also offer a three-month advanced “Chiefs” course for career JUS servicemen at the grade of E-6. This course will also teach the neglected aspect of munitions costs and inventory management. For example, there is no need to waste a million-dollar Tomahawk missile on a bunker when a Navy 5-inch gun can destroy it. And if you only have 200 MLRS loads in theater, you don’t waste them on non-critical targets.”
This kind of “jointness” has been implemented in the SRR, and the Sphynx Battery within the RA. I am no expert, but I believe there are stove pipes in normal formations? Like: no heavy mortars at all, because it would be difficult to say whether that is integral infantry (close) support or artillery, being 120 mm and long-ranged.
– and even when the RA wants to move with the times, and put all the relevant kit into the same team (that then takes two Warriors, because it is a lot of kit, taking a lot of power and antennae… guess what: no budget)
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Welcome to TD Brett, as well
How did you find us by the way?
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An earlier point by paul g set me thinking. As AS90 is scheduled to remain in service until 2030, might not some hulls be retained for other purposes? The original intention was to manufacture several variants: e.g. a recovery vehicle, an ammunition re-supply vehicle and a carrier for the anti-tank mines that Shielder now carries. If and when the British Army has the money, surely a recovery version of the AS90 for the RA would be useful? I ask because the Army itself developed a recovery and repair version of the MLRS carrier and 4 of these vehicles are now in service.
Such a conversion of the AS90 would save on the use of Warrior repair and recovery vehicles. Spares would be there in considerable numbers. I am probably just being fanciful again.
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DomJ,
While breakthroughs and rapid movement are all well and good, I think the point Phil might be making is that you need to punch a whole through in the first place before you can start free wheeling through the enemies rear.
That means using artillery and airstrikes to wear down the enemy and then eventually suppress them while the advance goes in.
Once on the move, you’ll find that artillery very handy. Even a fluid advance sometimes has to slow down and engage certain enemy forces, at which point mobile artillery comes in very handy.
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Hi Mike W,
Not a bad idea; BTW, can a 30 t Warrior recover a 45 t AS90, to begin with?
Also, Command Post would be useful, space would come to good use. FSTs are desperately short of space, but then again they will be well forward a lot of time, so a Warrior (2 of them, to hop on my hobby horse) is perhaps more appropriate?
– also, a command post vehicle does not need to be armed, whereas being well forward needs self-defence weapons (not necessarily a 30mm)
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Yes that is what I mean. Clean breakthroughs just do not happen in dense battle spaces. You have to claw your way through.
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They did. Sedan 1940 for example was a breakthrough through an 8 km deep divisional defence -including river crossing – all done in one day and with artillery munition supply largely depleted and on a loooong supply line which included a gigantic traffic jam.
The breakthrough was a result of good infantry small unit actions, a demoralizing Schwerpunkt aerial bombardment and a French tank panic (especially among the French artillery). Tanks didn’t even play a major role in it, nor did artillery. The attack was done by an infantry-weak Panzerdivision, though.
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I think a lot of it, as with most things in war, is relative.
— The nature of the artillery has an impact (rate of fire, size of HE shells)
— As does the enemy defense,
— And their depth,
— And their morale,
— And the quality of the attackers and their equipment,
Etc, the list goes on. I think artillery has a very good record though!
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The Battle of France was a lesson in concentrating strategic strength against strategic weakness. Had there been a greater density of French troops and reserves the attack would likely have not gone so well. For an example of what happens when a powerful army strikes a front line which is not dense in itself but the operational area possesses depth you can look at Operation Watch on the Rhine. A clean breakthrough is very much the exception in warfare when the battles-space possesses density and depth.
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Furthermore more with Sedan in 1940, you’ll note that the Luftwaffe effectively provided artillery from the air and that two of the three assaults across the river failed completely. Had the French had depth and gumption in that area it would have proved no great difficulty to pinch off 1st Pz Division.
In addition, war is a human endeavour and so you will never find a complete theoretical model to explain every event. There was no small amount of good luck on the side of the Germans over the course of that battle. They won it by the skin of their teeth. The point being is that depth and density would have compensated for a lot of French structural weaknesses, probably all of them. As it was, there was little density in the line around Sedan but even that was enough to stop dead 2/3 of the attack.
I can think of 7-8 allied thrusts in Normandy which were powerful, massed armoured thrusts that broke against a dense German battle line. You need fire power to breakdown the enemy, you need to grind through their lines and win the battle of attrition before you can break out.
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No you don’t.
You don’t seem to take the concepts of morale, turning movement, infiltration attack or surprise into account.
A well-executed breakthrough engagement (if there’s anything to break through at all – front lines are unlikely) can be quick and succeed with relatively few KIA and WIA on both sides.
Certain armies weren’t capable of more than brute force employment for breakthroughs, but their incompetence does not set the limit of what was or is possible.
Competent forces – even only competent in one regard – define the limit of the possible.
The Chinese in Korea, Germans in France and Soviet Union and at Kasserine, the British against Italians in Libya, the Japanese in Malaya – they all proved that there’s the possibility of quick breakthroughs based on competence instead of slow and costly breakthroughs based on brute force.
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“No you don’t.”
When the enemy is remotely competent and in sufficient density then you do.
I have never said that in all breakthroughs the density requirement was met. The entire Eastern Front in both wars is an example of what happens when insufficient force density allows manoeuvre warfare to take place. Same with regards to the North Africa campaign in most of its phases.
But in a dense battlefield like the Western Front in WWI, at Alamein, in Normandy, in Italy, in the Ardennes you have to fight your way through. You have to earn your manoeuvre battle – you do not have a choice which one you employ. And to earn that manoeuvre battle one needs fire-power and mass and the enemy must be attrited.
None of those quick breakthrough’s you mention would likely have occurred had the force density been high enough.
The genius of the German plan (although it was essentially accidental genius) in 1940 was to concentrate its strategic strength against the allied strategic weakness, once it was through Sedan, which was not the clean breakthrough you make out, then there was nothing to counter the thrust once it developed. The battlefield in that sector became much less dense and the rest is history.
In Normandy a powerful allied army had to beat the German divisions down to battlegroup size, it had to literally grind them down to nothing more than a string of outposts with no reserves before they could break out. The only thing that stopped Normandy being WWI redux was the lack of strategic German depth. There was no way around the German lines except to go through.
In a less dense battlefield you can manoeuvre, but in a dense one you have no choice in the matter. Furthermore, in a less dense battlefield, key points will see dense localities of troops that you again will need fire power to smash.
So I never said breakthrough’s were not possible in a clean quick manner. I said they were almost impossible in dense battlespaces.
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As I wrote; the incompetent armies don’t define the limit of the possible. Same is true with lacking morale.
The breakout of Normandy beach was utterly incompetent, evidenced by the fact that the defensive line was very thin – a single regiment held a sector that was even too wide for a division and succeeded for more than a day.
A German invasion at Normandy would have reached Paris before the Allies even saw Caen.
Speed is essential. Slow attackers provoked timely arrival of defender reserves. They did not prove that no quick breakthrough was possible. Their incompetence lead to the result, not the state of the art and tools of war.
Besides; isn’t it rather stupid to lie about what one has written if the evidence for what was actually written is just a half second’s worth of scrolling away and already too old for an edit?
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Hi Phil,
I agree with everything you say, but your specific example is not the best one:
“In Normandy a powerful allied army had to beat the German divisions down to battlegroup size,[the most capable divisions could not be deployed, in time, in division sized packets as the Allied air superiority disrupted other communications and impeded their normal manoeuvre speeds over roads, so not so much grinding down but deploying?] it had to literally grind them down to nothing [yes, from there on] more than a string of outposts with no reserves before they could break out. The only thing that stopped Normandy being WWI redux was the lack of strategic German depth
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“Besides; isn’t it rather stupid to lie about what one has written if the evidence for what was actually written is just a half second’s worth of scrolling away and already too old for an edit?”
Point out where I lied then mate. Off you go.
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“[the most capable divisions could not be deployed, in time, in division sized packets as the Allied air superiority disrupted other communications and impeded their normal manoeuvre speeds over roads, so not so much grinding down but deploying?]”
Had the divisions around Calais been released early on in the campaign the breakout would have taken much longer.
Lots of people like to blame perceived military failures on incompetence when in actual fact the failures are down to far more objective reasons like supply, difficulty in communications, subjective readings of the enemies intentions, exhaustion, difficulty in assessing enemy positions and above all, more than any other, the intentions and actions of the enemy. They do not put themselves in the same position as those making the decisions with the same information they had at the time. Nine times out of ten there is logic behind each decision.
Breakout from the Normandy beach incompetent? That’s right S O, if only you had been in command, you’d have known just what to do with your perfect information flow and robot army that doesn’t get tired or make mistakes and a supine enemy that just did exactly what you hoped they would do.
You have served from what you say, you should know better.
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Had the Anzio breakout been attempted against token opposition (before HG LW Divison got deployed, because the delay made that possible)…
I think our own history channel deserves these topics! (TD has reserved the opening shot for San Carlos for himself…)
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Straw man attack? How lame.
Fact is that the Allies had already paid their fee in regard to the importance of moving ahead on a bridgehead/beachhead in Italy (Anzio). They planned for a quick breakout and failed to execute it against the opposition of 4th rate German troops and ill-positioned, totally overextended 1st rate German troops. That was tactical incompetence at levels platoon to division.
The failure to break out of Normandy beachhead quickly is thus not indicative at all in regard to breakthroughs in general. It’s simply not the benchmark – or close to it.
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“Had the Anzio breakout been attempted against token opposition”
It is much more useful to look at WHY the breakout did not happen when we, with hindsight, think it should have happened. By looking at WHY we’ll get a much better idea of the friction and constraints and thinking on the battlefield.
A lot of the time sound decisions are made based on what the commander at the time understands, sometimes those decisions loose out to luck, or perhaps subordinates down the line mess up, or perhaps the enemy pins down one platoon long enough to bring up a reinforcing company or perhaps the weather closed in, or planes dropped bombs on their own lines, or orders got muddled, or the enemy launched a spoiling attack or were feared to be about to launch a spoiling attack, perhaps intelligence underestimated enemy strength in one sector and over estimated in another.
Clausewitz summed it all up by calling it the “friction” of war. Everything in war is simple, but doing the simplest things are difficult.
So perhaps by studying why things happened in Anzio we can understand the friction and constraints and understand the decision making.
Two very good books are by Van Creveld, Supplying War and On Command.
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@ACC
Thanks very much for your reply to my post about an AS90 Recovery Vehicle. I rather like the suggestion of a Command Post too. I suppose it all comes down to how much cash there is. Doesn’t it always? Still, it’s a good idea to use the chassis you have already.
In reply to your question “BTW, can a 30 t Warrior recover a 45 t AS90, to begin with?”, the answer is I don’t know how they recover AS90s. I think the old Chieftain ARRVs and M578s went some time ago. Perhaps they bring in CRARRVs or the heavy wheeled MAN wrecker.
Incidentally, ACC, you mentioned on another thread (CVR(T) 2.0?) that the Stormer flatbed (Shielder) was now in storage. Do you know that for certain? It’s not a case of yet another vehicle withdrawn from active duty, is it? Is there a source for that?
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“The failure to break out of Normandy beachhead quickly is thus not indicative at all in regard to breakthroughs in general”
Normandy was just one example. Anzio another. Gallipoli another. Monte Cassino another. Alamein another. Hurtgen forest another. Shall we go to the Pacific theatre too? There’s plenty of examples of having to grind through the enemy there. No great “turning” movements there, or was that just down to incompetence too? Equally, North Africa, and the Eastern Front show what happens when the front is less dense and strength can be bought to bear on weakness.
A dense battlefield with depth removes any choice you have between manoeuvre and attrition.
You do NOT get to choose which you’d prefer.
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General dePuy makes my point for me.
“People talk a lot about attrition versus maneuver. This is not an intellectual choice. The same generals who so brilliantly dashed across France were suddenly forced back into conducting attrition warfare. Nobody doubts that General George Patton preferred maneuver, but maneuver warfare is not a doctrinal choice; it is an earned benefit.
The efforts to break through and obtain operational maneuver in the Fall of 1944 at Arnhem, with the great air-ground operation called Market Garden, failed; the attacks through Huertgen and Aachen were bloody and indecisive, and the attack by the Third Army across the Saar bogged down.
In a last operational effort in the middle of December — three months later — the German Army once more sought freedom of maneuver through the Ardennes.”
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Hi Mike,
I don’t know either (about recovery, it is the sort of engineers’ department of moments and all that… but the chassis are plentiful, so should not be a money question? And commonality guaranteed within the unit fielded).
I believe the weapon system is about as modern as they come and they created a special Stormer version for it, as Wiki tells us:
“Flat bed Stormer [ the next bit is wrong because it is also launched from the carrier]
A transport version of the Stormer with a flat load bed is used to carry the Shielder minelaying system.”
– Gabby quoted an army (capability) study where this became across as all new (when I think it was just about putting it on a shared & common chassis)
– I believe the number of HMV Stormer carriers is merely a token (3 dozen or so??? I don’y know)… so
— I have been suggesting (because overall WR numbers are tight), that
— we take them (the residual Stormer number) out of storage and provide AI with a mobile & protected HEAVY mortar platform
— the flatbeds would serve as ammo carriers (putting the “instant anti-tank mine field dispenser” system from the US back onto them, if that was perceived to be ‘the’ response to a likely threat would be easy and quick)
Just the fact that we have a capable & fairly new, ie. not worn out platform, with enough volume in it for various uses and enough parts commonality to make it work in the field… while there is all this whining about money – that makes me hurt on the inside
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BTW, I think, hope and trust that
– there has been a trick, using the Spartan’s increased height, to mine-proof it in the new build of Scimitar 2
– otherwise it makes no sense, as the Stormer hulls would have been new enough (but the design didn’t focus on mines nor IEDs at the time)
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Don’t you see that your examples of failure to achieve a quick breakthrough are all Western Allies examples?
The only German failure that’s comparable was Kursk, and the forces and field fortification density there was beyond comprehension.
I already gave you examples of competent, quick breakthroughs and I already hinted at what important levers you’re ignoring. I understand you’re what many people call an “attritionist”, but that doesn’t change the fact that quick breakthroughs happen regularly for competent forces.
You do NOT need to reduce the defenders very much (not even locally – and especially not WIA/KIA). You do NOT subject them to an intense artillery bombardment (nor an aerial substitute).
Infiltration attacks can penetrate even strong defences. Entire battalions can disassemble, infiltrate and reassemble kilometres behind enemy lines.
Turning movements on micro level can dissolve even deep defences by de-valuing them. You do not need to grind them away – all you need is to make clear that they better withdraw in the next night.
Morale is most important. Low defender morale (including poor cohesion) enables even minor attack successes to dissolve large defensive sectors. Again – no need to grind away many of those defenders in this case.
Surprise – no front line is everywhere strong enough to withstand an assault. It’s merely everywhere strong enough to withstand a moderate concentration of attackers and to slow them down till defensive reserves arrive.
Surprise can – both on micro and on macro levels – overwhelm a weak portion of the line quickly. I’m talking about a few hours here.
Doctrine, attitude and leadership character. Some forces capture a position, then prepare against counterattack. Reserves then advance to make the next push.
Other forces capture a position, then exploit the temporary disorder and push farther. Reserves mop up the beaten defenders.
Other forces again don’t even mop up the beaten defenders, but use the reserves to push even harder or wider.
It’s also possible to be in the process of winning a local fight and let some of your forces break contact in order to assemble them for pursuit/further advance – even before the initial fight was over.
Some armies know how to do mobile warfare and be quick, others don’t. There’s a DePuy quote for that as well:
“The German Army is convinced that the American Army does not understand Panzergrenadier
tactics and techniques. In this they are to a large extent correct, at least as it is now practiced.” (1975!)
Click to access swain3_pt3.pdf
Feel free to postulate that a quick breakthrough requires massive amounts of firepower and a long time, including the chewing away of many defenders.
Be aware that this is not an universal truth, though. It’s the limit of what British, Americans and Soviets were capable of in face of competent and half-way properly equipped defenders.
Most of this is now quite moot, of course. There won’t be classic World War front lines again any time soon.
The one relevant aspect is about he destruction of a mobile formation. It can be shattered with quite few KIA or WIA on both sides. That’s important to know. It’s for field officers also important to know how to do it.
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Phil
Another example of Manouvre v Atrrition is the American Civil war Gen Mclellan treid every manouvre in the then book but was fired in the end becuse he refused to committ to the innevitable and bloody attrition that was required.
Manouvre is not a substitute for firepower.
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Hi Phil, a great point again (100% agreed):
“Equally, North Africa, and the Eastern Front show what happens when the front is less dense and strength can be bought to bear on weakness.
A dense battlefield with depth removes any choice you have between manoeuvre and attrition.”
But then you go on to spoil your own point, again through the chosen example:
” Nobody doubts that General George Patton preferred maneuver, but maneuver warfare is not a doctrinal choice; it is an earned benefit.”
Both Patton and Monty earned “whatever”, but there are political constraints, in this example Ike (already with an eye on the US Presidency – can’t spoil the chance! – and at the time charged with maintaining the balance (ie. the full effort of) between the partners, at no time unsure who was the junior partner, but ever so “politician” – and yes or no: a great soldier? Probably not, as his balancing act between the broad brief given to him (executed) and his personal agenda (executed), cost hundreds of thousands of lives (‘linear front’ – does that sound like manoeuvre to anyone – was favoured). Up to a year more of the war – and Berlin (who would want that, anyway, such a dour city even though ‘hip’ to some)
Why do I detail to that degree, for something so far in the past? Were the field commanders in Basra also under political constraints to execute? And we are mainly talking here about a chain of command within one nation (ok, 3, but nothing like the Grand Coalition in the example); That! was so much worse than bad that only my aversion to swear words on the internet closes the post here
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“Don’t you see that your examples of failure to achieve a quick breakthrough are all Western Allies examples?”
I’m not blind to that fact. It is because the western theatres were far denser than the eastern ones. The enormity of a continuous eastern front meant that depth and density could not be achieved and so it was far easier for either side to gain space to manoeuvre.
There was no such luxury anywhere in Europe in Italy or France and the low countries. It was therefore necessary to fight strong German forces who used their tactical and operational skill to deny the allies a breakthrough until they physically could not hold the line anymore.
The Germans were attrited to almost nothing and that enabled the allies to breakthrough. The Germans had all the advantages of the defender, the allies every disadvantage of the inexperienced attacker.
The Germans were very often able to have the allies in a position where their overall inferior numbers could be deployed in a space small enough to bring about the required density to preclude an easy allied breakthrough.
Call me what you want, I am a realist.
I do not deny that small unit tactics of some imagination can succeed on the local level but the picture is bigger than that.
Delving into the minutiae of a lot of battles in Normandy or elsewhere shows a fluid series of events but in almost all cases the Germans would deploy reserves and recover their equilibrium. Only when there was nothing left in the barrel did the allies make real progress.
You also completely ignored my comments on the Pacific Theatre where battlefield density was very high and there was no scope for operational manoeuvre or barely tactical manoeuvre.
I guess the Marines “shock and awed” the Japanese to death then? Persuaded them they better pull back the next night or else?
And it’s all very well telling me how an attack develops, tell me what happens when it stalls? When the enemy do something you don’t expect? Or a unit stops dead because it misunderstood an order? Or when the enemy recovers and strikes back? Or your lead company is pinned down and want go forward? Or the enemy are infiltrating your lines as you try and do the same to them?
You take the friction of war and you label it incompetence.
You take a best case scenario of a quick breakthrough and then announce this is the only model and deny plenty of evidence to show that attritional warfare is unavoidable when the battle space becomes dense.
“It’s the limit of what British, Americans and Soviets were capable of in face of competent and half-way properly equipped defenders.”
It’s the limit of what any army is capable of in the face of a competent half way properly equipped force. German operational and strategic counter-attacks (as opposed to local ones) in NW Europe failed every time they came up against a dense allied battle-space. Their panache in the defence and their panache in the local attack did not translate itself into victory against a strong dense enemy and they lacked the ultimate numbers to attrit the allies to the point of victory. The same was not true of the allies vis a vis Germany.
“Most of this is now quite moot, of course.”
Hardly. Had the Iraqi’s had some gumption about them then Baghdad would have been a classic attritional battle in 2003. Fallujah was nothing more than attrition of the insurgent in the local area and his wearing down. The Faklands saw a relatively dense battle-space as well.
The forces might be smaller now, but if the spaces in which they fight are not also very large then you hit the same problem.
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Phil
‘The Germans had all the advantages of the defender, the allies every disadvantage of the inexperienced attacker’.
Exactly it is where some of the myth of the German super soldier comes from. Also the germans were fighting for as they saw it there survival as a people.
(Lots of nazi propaganda abou the allies Deporting it’s people and / flattening Germany turning it into a agriculteral plain,(not as soutlandish as it sounds now it was discussed openly).
And after all they knew their treatment of conquered peoples would not go unpunished.
Likewise sooner or later you have to destroy the enemies decent units for him to be defeated.
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Soooo, just to move back to TD’s questions rather than turn this into the history thread (not that history is not important!) – I finally got round to reading the Sheppard Land Warfare International for his quarter, which has interesting articles on SPG’s.
Donar with its AGM gets a mention (and two photos) in the context of new move to lighter tracked SPG. It does note that the AGM turret carries 30 projectiles (and charges) compared to 60 carried by a “full size” PZH2000.
On the wheeled front there seems to be a definate hierarchy of expense / capability and complexity:
1. Top Tier
South Africa’s G6 and Rheinmettal’s new and very similar RWG52, which is a bespoke 6 x 6 chasis with a new 155/52 gun and turret (with 40 rounds carried).
2. Second tier
BAe Archer based on the FH77 52 calibre gun, the small “turret” carries a fully auto gun with ready to fire rounds (20 in turret, 20 more in stowage)
3. Third tier
Nexter CAESAR 155/52 which is manually loaded (?) gun on the back of a lightly armoured truck.
I guess the old LIMAWS(G) idea of an “Portee” M777 155/39 on the back of a Supacat 8 x 8 (with up to 70 rounds) is somewhat equivalent to CEASAR ? Or was it just a transport mechanism – did the gun have to be “dismounted” from the truck to be fired?
The New Denel T7 105/58 gets a mention, apparently the turrets has been trialed on a GD-Canada LAV III chassis.
Anyway – as SDSR (realistically funded or not) continues to place the emphasis on expeditionary warfare, IF we had the money to supplement the big and heavy AS90 what would be best ?
Supcat LIMAWS(G) and CEASAR seem to be the lightest weight and most “deployable” systems, but the Archer seems to be in the suite spot to me: In context I would get rid of the good old 105mm LG, because 120mm mortars are even more mobile and have precision guided munitions available, with a 155(39, 45, or 52 calibre – I dont care) for heavier medium range fires, and GMLRS for the longer range.
So it would be good if an LIMAWS(M) single rocket pack could go on the same chassis as the 155mm – could we build something on my beloved RG35 or the protected cab variant of our ‘standard’ MAN 6 x 6 ???????
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Another reference to Land Warfare International – there is a story about Sweden’s competition to replace BV206 with either BVS210 MKII or STK Bronco/Warthog.
In the article it states: “Many of the Royal Marines Mk1’s have seen punishing service in Afghanistan and the Royal Marines plans to upgrade them to a comparable standard to the Mk II. The RM is also seeking to field two new variants in small numbers, an 81mm mortar variant and a direct fire support variant.”
Direct fire support variant of BVS10 Mk II – what would that carry I wonder – just a 40mm GMG ??
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To get back to one of TM’s initial questions (he said ‘to start the ball rolling’)
“Is 105/155 the right mix, what about a single intermediate calibre?”
Well, I think that it is the right mix. There is a rumour that the Artillery component in the new MRB will now be a regiment consisting of two AS90 batteries and two 105mm Light Gun batteries. That would seem to me a better solution than equipping the whole regiment with AS90s and keeping the 105s outside the brigade to be called on if needed. As AS90 batteries now train with the Light Gun prior to deployment in Afghanistan, it would seem to me a sensible and flexible arrangement. Both guns are now scheduled to serve until 2030, I believe. I don’t know how true the above rumour is, by the way.
In answer to TM’s second question: “Do we need a traditional armoured self-propelled system like AS90 anymore?”, the answer is an unqualified, yes, we do. If we had to fight a more conventional high-intensity campaign again, heavy armour would be indispensable. Not only would its armour be important but its range of 24.7 kms significantly outdoes that of the Light Gun (17.2 kms. (HE).
By the way, some contributors have said that the M777 uses the same 155mm ammunition as the AS90. Can someone confirm that that is true?
One last point. Wouldn’t Wolfhound, with its heavy protection, make a very appropriate towing vehicle for the 105mm Light Gun? I know that it carries out such duties in Afghanistan but I meant in general service eventually, to replace vehicles like the Leyland DAF and the Pinz?
@ACC
Thanks for the info concerning Stormer. Agree with every word.
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Historically some formations broke after experiencing 5% losses, while others kept resisting after experiencing 40% losses.
Now if you allow the enemy to become prepared for your assault (or even only its late stage) AND choose to attack at a place where there’s one of the stubborn formations, then you’re most likely incompetent as operational commander.
Another point is that even though breakthrough battles often caused great losses (example Amiens 1940) to the defender, these losses did mostly not occur before breakthrough was ensured. Pursuit and mopping up actions usually account for a great share of the casualties (especially POWs).
It’s been true for millennias that pursuit of a defeated army causes usually more casualties than the battle does while both armies are still intact.
The Amiens example shows that breakthrough can actually be achieved by simply pushing forward through a strongpoint defence.
The German army didn’t do major breakthroughs in late WW2 against Western Allies for very different reasons than asserted here:
* immobility in daylight due to air power
* catastrophic drop of fuel production (down to 10% by autumn ’44)
* lack of young, aggressive and optimistic infantrymen after five years of warfare
* inferior motorisation
* lack of air power support
They wouldn’t have attacked through easily defensible wooded areas in late ’44 if density was the key problem, for you only need high density on few points to defend such terrain.
Today’s tooth:tail ratio and dependency on major weapon systems (as opposed to masses of infantrymen) makes it even easier to achieve breakthrough/to shatter a formation than in WW2.
A modern brigade that lost a mere hundred men and a couple dozen tanks would be forced to retreat and could be dissolved in a skilled pursuit because its few fully combat capable elements could not hope to provide adequate security to the many soft components any more.
There’s no need to grind away a major portion of such a formation with firepower – not at all.
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Mortars – OK final comment for this morning I think.
In response to comments above I think mortars have their nice as the “infantry’s artillery” and nominally should not be an RA tool – but there might be exceptions.
I have pontificated on 120mm smooth bore breach loading mortars before, and seeking TD’s nirvana of commonality I would thus seek to make 120mm the standard calibre BUT as we have shed loads of very good 81mm mortars already, we should take the golf bag approach.
I would like Armoured Infantry to benefit from a turreted 120mm mortar on Warrior. I would like my Mechanised Infantry on Warthog with STK’s own 120mm Super Rapid Advanced Mortar System (SRAMS), and I am sure my Motorised Infantry on RG35 could have a vehicle mounting the same system. Light units (RM and Para-Commando/Para-Rangers), TA infantry and AI or MI used “out of role” for whatever reason could drop down to the 81mm (or Soltam K6 / M120).
Extending this principle, why couldn’t the teams of the Mortar Coy, all leave their heavyweights at home and deploy with the 60mm Mortar if required ? Giving some “right tool for the right job” flexibility. By the way it appears that standard protocol at the moment is 6 mortars per infantry battalion with 3 more added by TA in “time of war” (?) – perhaps FF2020 will bring this upto the full 9 as ‘standard’ peace time establishment ? – Well lets go further and make it 12 !!
So when might the RA get involved with mortars? Well for 7RHA and 29 Cdo Rgt.
I have said before I see 16 AAB as a cold war anachronism and would get rid of it. I would also disband the “Special Forces Support Group” as it exists now, and have the 3 Parachute Regiment Battalions as the “Army Special Operations Forces” – Para Commandos / Para Rangers, whatever you want to call them – but taking on the SFSG role, and the limited special ops airborne intervention role (i.e. battalion battle group sized, not Brigade sized) – in which case 7 RHA might provide additional 120mm mortars (M120’s Supacat / Rouche “prime movers”??) and air defence (Starstreak / LMM) teams and forward observer teams.
29 Cdo Regt. might be similarly equipped, or even better have BVS MKII with STK SRAMS – although much shorter ranged than gun artillery, in a protected amphibious vehicle this might provide better manouvre support capabilities for “commando” gunners – if the beach head is big enough surely any old bog standard RA regiment could be heli-lifted in with M777 towed, a wheeled 155mm as discussed in comments above, etc. – they would not need to be ‘Commando’ qualified for such a role.
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Hi Jed, thanks for a great summary!
Before I start, I need to ask why you put Archer in Cat2, below the top? Just because of its protection levels?
– 2-man crew, on wheels (as I think we would like, as for the direction of travel, gun that hasn’t been bettered (?), etc
“The New Denel T7 105/58 gets a mention, apparently the turrets has been trialed on a GD-Canada LAV III chassis.”
– a firm order has been placed for NEMO mortar turrets on the same, does that kill the 105?
“Anyway – as SDSR (realistically funded or not) continues to place the emphasis on expeditionary warfare, IF we had the money to supplement the big and heavy AS90 what would be best ?” … c’ed
“Sup[a]cat LIMAWS(G) and CEASAR seem to be the lightest weight and most “deployable” systems, but the Archer seems to be in the suite spot to me: In context I would get rid of the good old 105mm LG, because 120mm mortars are even more mobile”
– Spot on!
“with a 155(39, 45, or 52 calibre – I dont care) for heavier medium range fires, and GMLRS for the longer range.”
– I agree
So it would be good if an LIMAWS(M) single rocket pack could go on the same chassis as the 155mm [YES, it can]
– it is not “single” but a six pack[OK, now I notice you said “pack”], one of the two that go on the heavier carrier (that can take one ATACMS in the other “place holder”)
– yes, indeed it can, the (m) and the (g) were denoting that, the same (crew cab protected) chassis was proposed
… here I become confused (this is by design , as BAE is conflicted, just like in naval guns: they make all the USN and therefore an ever increasing number of other navies’ guns, now that we have lost the 155 alternative)
1. Archer vs. Portee 777
2. Portee GMLRS(light) and the gun on the same chassis (that part not from BAE)
=> what’s the difference between the 777 and the Bofors (leaving the carrier aside)?
BAE is the dominant bidder for all alternatives (in guns), land or sea; where can we get the objective information from??
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“Now if you allow the enemy to become prepared for your assault (or even only its late stage) AND choose to attack at a place where there’s one of the stubborn formations, then you’re most likely incompetent as operational commander.”
Sometimes there are only so many ways to skin a cat.
The enemy can anticipate objectives, routes of advance, forming up points and jump off points. It is not incompetence, it is a fact of war when you fight other human beings led by other human beings. They can anticipate your likely movements and plan for it. In most scenario’s in Italy or NW Europe there were only so many rational and likely objectives, only so many possible routes of advance and only so many possible objectives. Throw in a broadly competent and pro-active Army and you have a recipe for a very tough fight indeed.
“Another point is that even though breakthrough battles often caused great losses (example Amiens 1940) to the defender, these losses did mostly not occur before breakthrough was ensured. Pursuit and mopping up actions usually account for a great share of the casualties (especially POWs).”
German divisions suffered grievous losses before Cobra. I’ll grant that overall the casualties were far higher in the Falaise “pocket” but that does not make the horrendous losses of the months before vanish. The German Army in Normandy was worn right down. You only have to look at divisional strength returns to see that some divisions were not even at battle-group strength by the end of the campaign in NW France. They were utterly destroyed and this destruction was the necessary toll to be paid to gain passage into the German rear.
Again you ignore my Pacific Theatre points.
“The Amiens example shows that breakthrough can actually be achieved by simply pushing forward through a strongpoint defence.”
The Germans did the same in 1944. But then they hit depth. And in isolated areas could not reduce American forces. They lacked the power to do so.
“They wouldn’t have attacked through easily defensible wooded areas in late ’44 if density was the key problem, for you only need high density on few points to defend such terrain.”
American forces were at their weakest at this point and the wooded areas offered concealment of the build up – it was also far less likely to see an American spoiling attack. Attacking through there was a logical step.
Once again the Germans attempted to bring strategic strength against strategic weakness, except this time the lack of strategic strength was only an illusion as the allies possessed reserves to re-build the defensive line in their once rear and stop the Germans.
“A modern brigade that lost a mere hundred men and a couple dozen tanks would be forced to retreat and could be dissolved in a skilled pursuit because its few fully combat capable elements could not hope to provide adequate security to the many soft components any more. ”
Maybe at NTC mate.
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ACC
ref: ““The New Denel T7 105/58 gets a mention, apparently the turrets has been trialed on a GD-Canada LAV III chassis.”
– a firm order has been placed for NEMO mortar turrets on the same, does that kill the 105?”
The SA gun turret was being “tested” on a General Dynamics-Canada LAV III – GD-Canada is the name of the company, it was NOT being tested on a Canadian Army LAV, and I am pretty sure it was not offered to the Canadian Army in the competition that has resulted in a NEMO purchase – so I don’t think the two things are related or the NEMO purchase will impact on further testing.
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Phil
“Tell me how you envisage your swift breakthrough occurring.”
100ish MBTs and IFVs attacking a weakpoint in the enemy line over a narrow frontage, say, 250m, hell, attack a strong point, *IF* the enemy even has weapons capable of stopping our MBTs, they wont have them in quantity enough to stop such an attack.
Break through, annihilate rear area supplies, and if the enemy lines still havent crumled, break through at another point and regroup.
I’m unsure of the utility of “softening up” the point with an artillery bombardment, but am happy to admit a “pulsed” air raid would precede it by a short window.
ChrisB
Do we need to “soften up” the enemy?
Which enemy?
Phil Again
“Yes that is what I mean. Clean breakthroughs just do not happen in dense battle spaces. You have to claw your way through.”
But when will be facing a dense enemy force?
He who defends everything defends nothing.
Yes, The enemy probably could mass in its capital and turn our penetrating attack against them into a blood bath.
But to do that, they have to abandon the rest of the country to us.
If the purpose of military action is to create political pressure….
Phil
Operation watch was a counter attack, by a clearly insane german high command, against a vastly superior enemy.
I dont see the applicability.
SO
I just use “front line” as a convenient term.
Equaly applicable against a detachment in a none city scape.
Lack o9f front line of course opens up the fun of surrounding and attacking agressivly and noisely with armour on three sides.
Maybe I am wrong.
But I cant imagine an infantry Battlegroup, entrenched on a shallow hill, surving a thrust launched from three sides by 100+ MBTs, IFVs and CVR(T)s, even if they were armed to the teeth with world class ATGMs, but isnt likely that the enemy we fight will actualy have Carl Gustavs and 66mm rockets?
Phil
Oh absolutly, if you can go 10 miles deep with dug in trenches, artilery posts, anti tank weapons, ramming tanks down the enemy throat is insanity, although Kursk almost broke through. but in what war is that realistic for the future?
I’ll catch up with rest later
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Phil, your “Pacific Theatre” examples are only one – New Guinea. All else was no breakthrough or had several clean breakthroughs.
To advance along that highlands trail in New Guinea was stupid, and even if it wasn’t, it wouldn’t prove your point at all.
The other significant Pacific Theatre example was Malaya, and that was a great example about how forces can be thoroughly devastated and defeated without inflicting many KIA/WIA.
Moreover, you made shifting point that either no or almost no examples of good breakthroughs exist – so the evidence you need is to deconstruct my examples, not providing more examples of inept offensive actions.
You’re obviously oblivious to several tactics and are willfully ignoring the effect of the strategic environment on the late WW2 battles.
I doubt that discussing with you makes much sense. You should read a bit more on military history that does not involve Western Allies.
About NTC; the combat power of an entire brigade rests almost exclusively in a bit over 100 weapon systems. This quantity is given normal readiness (~90%) barely enough to provide security and focus power for offensive action at once. A few dozen major combat system losses later the same brigade is too depleted to combine both and has thus lost its ability to contribute much on the battlefield at acceptable risk. It has to be withdrawn and refreshed (or joined with another depleted formation).
Exercise stuff looks very different than this.
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Hi S O,
Thanks for the first one:
“The German army didn’t do major breakthroughs in late WW2 against Western Allies for very different reasons than asserted here:
* immobility in daylight due to air power
* catastrophic drop of fuel production (down to 10% by autumn ’44)”
… and your excellent piece on Fall Blau is missing the second one, as one of the far reaching consequencies of that failure
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“All else was no breakthrough or had several clean breakthroughs.”
You tell me that clean breakthroughs can be had. Yet I give you examples such as the islands and atolls in the Pacific War where no breakthrough was possible and you seem to think my examples are irrelevant? There is every possibility in the future of encountering a small dense battle-space on an island and once again there will be no prospect of a breakthrough. So I don’t see how you are proposing to win such engagements?
“You’re obviously oblivious to several tactics and are willfully ignoring the effect of the strategic environment on the late WW2 battles.”
On the contrary, I am most aware of the strategic environment of late WW2 battles. The reality was thus, the allies had mass and density and the Germans could only match that locally. They did not possess the power to smash through and defeat the allies because they did not have the force to attrit the allies. Manoeuvre failed when it came up against density. Yes there were other factors at play but plenty of other German attacks failed throughout WWII when they met allied forces who were in continuous dense concentrations with strong reserves even when the Germans operated with local air superiority and none of the constraints imposed on them by the allies in 1944.
“You should read a bit more on military history that does not involve Western Allies.”
Wonderfully patronising I’m honoured, coming from someone that for several posts ignored my attempts to move the argument on to examples in the Pacific.
I am simply using the example of NW Europe because it is central to my argument that an attacker must earn his breakthrough when the battle-space is dense enough and when it is a continuous front. I do not deny that as war is a human endeavour there are not exceptions, but overall, time and time again in a dense battlefield the allies had to fight for every inch. Whenever that was reversed, even in 1940, the Germans met the same difficulties.
In the East, with the far greater force to space ratio’s nothing like that density could be achieved along the whole front so manoeuvre warfare was the inescapable modus operandi. Where on the Eastern Front force densities rose, attritional warfare to breakthrough then occurred, just as allied manoeuvre warfare broke on the concentrations of German forces in the autumn of 1944.
Of course there are a great many other factors at play in warfare, I do not argue that force density is the sole arbiter, but it is a very large factor.
You look at theatres that had large densities (NE Europe, Pacific islands) and compare them to theatres with low densities (Eastern Front, North Africa) and you can see the overall pattern of attritional warfare vs much more manoeuvre based warfare correlates strongly.
“About NTC”
NTC exists to exercise troops. I’m not interested in how exercises there pan out.
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“100ish MBTs and IFVs attacking a weakpoint in the enemy line over a narrow frontage, say, 250m, hell, attack a strong point, *IF* the enemy even has weapons capable of stopping our MBTs, they wont have them in quantity enough to stop such an attack.
Break through, annihilate rear area supplies, and if the enemy lines still havent crumled, break through at another point and regroup.
I’m unsure of the utility of “softening up” the point with an artillery bombardment, but am happy to admit a “pulsed” air raid would precede it by a short window.”
All is well and good in theory, but a competent enemy will inflict massive losses on you as you advance through their defensive positions and have a reserve ready to counter attack your now weakened forces. It is not quite as simple as you make out. Fire-power is central to breaking through the enemy lines, weak or not and artillery is incredibly potent and able at applying massive amounts of fire-power concentrated in time and space over large areas. I don’t see how you think there is no utility in that capability?
“But when will be facing a dense enemy force?”
In a restricted battle-space. An example would be Goose Green. A future scenario might be having to seize an objective on an island, or peninsular or a pass in the mountains like in Kosovo. The overall enemy force does not need to be large, there are occasion when he can concentrate his forces into obvious and key spaces that then must be contested. If mountain pass A is a couple of hundred metres wide and a battalion is holding it, you have a localised dense battle-space and you will need to defeat that enemy in detail (you cannot assume that they are of poor calibre and will break). To do that you need to apply large amounts of fire-power and indeed artillery, as said, does that in spades.
“If the purpose of military action is to create political pressure”
That works in reverse too. Hold a choke-point or key piece of terrain (an airfield to fly in humanitarian supplies, a crossroads town), inflict massive casualties and hope the enemy thinks sod this for a game of soldiers.
“Operation watch was a counter attack, by a clearly insane german high command, against a vastly superior enemy.
I dont see the applicability.”
See below, I use it as a tool to show that you cannot consider parts of a theatre or battle in isolation, although the Germans concentrated initial strength against weakness that initial success could not be isolated from the context of the theatre as a whole which was a context of depth and density – which the Germans eventually ran into and which helped defeat them along with the other factors that SO points out.
“For an example of what happens when a powerful army strikes a front line which is not dense in itself but the operational area possesses depth you can look at Operation Watch on the Rhine.”
“But I cant imagine an infantry Battlegroup, entrenched on a shallow hill, surving a thrust launched from three sides by 100+ MBTs, IFVs and CVR(T)s, even if they were armed to the teeth with world class ATGMs, but isnt likely that the enemy we fight will actualy have Carl Gustavs and 66mm rockets?”
They probably wouldn’t, but that battle-group is not going to be an isolated force, it is going to be fighting in the context of the operational area which although that battalion does not survive, the operational area possesses sufficient depth and density to grind that advance down.
So, to go back to your original point – artillery applies massive and monstrous amounts of firepower concentrated in time and space over wide areas and thus adds considerably to an armies offensive and defensive power – it has every utility on the battlefield from suppressing the enemy, to disrupting his rear, to smoke screening to just dumping tons of HE onto his positions to help destroy coherence, damage defensive positions and give some morale to the attacker. I don’t see your wisdom in loosing all that capability or why you think loosing that capability would be a desirable thing.
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Dude, Island fights are no breakthrough battles. They’re self-fulfilling arguments for you because their whole purpose was not to break through, but to annihilate. Utterly irrelevant for breakthrough discussions.
On strategic environment: Your inability to grasp the morale-related things in warfare is astonishing.
The Germans of ’44-’45 failed in offensive actions of grand scales because they had not the right manpower for it. They had spent it in five years of warfare. Depth or not – the German army of 44-45 was about to be mopped up because it was spent and the ineptitude of its opponents stretched that process to a year.
You cannot execute a competent attack without the right men.
Besides; you still don’t grasp that it’s up to you to disprove my arguments, not to add examples of your own. You claimed there are no or almost no requite clean breakthroughs possible. The existence of repeated clean and quick breakthroughs in the relevant time frame of military history disproves your point. You gotta disqualify said examples, not pile on more irrelevant anecdotes.
Great firepower is not a necessity for breakthrough. It’s the brute force approach for forces that lack a more versatile repertoire.
Competent forces have several approaches for every problem on hand.
Besides; the Red Army had about 2,000-3,000 men for defensive purposes per front kilometre during WW2. That is NOT low density. This equals more than Western-style division for what was considered appropriate defensive width for a Western-style division. You don’t seem to understand the size of the Red Army of 1941-1945.
About NTC: Major text understanding flaw and fixation on your part. I DO NOT TALK ABOUT NTC. I do so only in your fantasy.
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manouvere is not quite so simple to block.
What would german trenches have achieved if fishers assault had been implemented.
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“Utterly irrelevant for breakthrough discussions.”
Not at all, a breakthrough into the rear of some of those operations would have done a lot to disrupt and help defeat the enemy in detail. When your defences are pointing one way, it’s not so great when you’re getting attacked from the other. A continuing frustration of the island campaigns was that there was nowhere to go but forwards. The enemy held a dense battle-space that denied all attempts at turning it and the result was simple slugging it out. Plenty of other battles of annihilation in other theatres too.
“Your inability to grasp the morale-related things in warfare is astonishing.”
Tell me why?
“Depth or not – the German army of 44-45 was about to be mopped up because it was spent and the ineptitude of its opponents stretched that process to a year.”
This is the same army that fought violently to the death on the Eastern Front. If you think the Battle of Berlin was a mopping up operation I’d love to think what you think a proper battle looks like. You’ll note that as the Soviets got closer and closer to Germany, as their attack options became more predictable, as the front shortened their speeds of advance slowed considerably despite the German army getting nothing but weaker.
“Besides; you still don’t grasp that it’s up to you to disprove my arguments, not to add examples of your own.”
Oh I see. Is that the etiquette.
You gave me Sedan I pointed out that 2/3rds of the attacking force was stopped dead by weak French defences and then the spearhead was subjected to continuous assault. Some “clean” breakthrough. Certainly there was a breakthrough, into a wide open French rear. Seeing as I have addressed that point perhaps you could regale me of the great breakthrough’s the Germans gained against the French 7th and 1st Armies and the BEF in and around Belgium during the initial stages of the invasion?
“Great firepower is not a necessity for breakthrough. It’s the brute force approach for forces that lack a more versatile repertoire.”
Firepower not necessity? Do you read your own Army’s manuals? So armies should instead mince through enemy lines in a refined manner? Dude, like, whatever. Battles are won by the application of force and mass. Infiltration etc is merely another means of applying that force and mass from other directions against the grain of the enemies dispositions. It does not delete the necessity to continue fighting if the enemy is in depth.
“the Red Army had about 2,000-3,000 men for defensive purposes per front kilometre during WW2. That is NOT low density.”
In a straight line, all lined up then I am sure you are right. But lets play your game. Normandy, around 25 July, an allied strength of approx 1.4 million soldiers, across a front approx 110Km long = 12,727 soldiers per km. That’s dense.
“I do so only in your fantasy.”
Disturbing.
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eh up! i was just having a nosey at the denel site as it was mentioned above (i think the denel NTW20 20mm sniper rifle is in fact sexual chocolate). When i stumbled across this little snippet of info, did anyone know of it’s existance, and with the hulls that will be going spare soon should it be resurrected?
It’s a 105mm turret on a warrior by the way!!
http://www.army-guide.com/eng/product925.html
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actually have a look at all the stuff on that page (calibres and turrets list down the left)
http://www.army-guide.com/eng/product925.html
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“You gave me Sedan I pointed out that 2/3rds of the attacking force was stopped dead by weak French defences and then the spearhead was subjected to continuous assault. Some “clean” breakthrough.”
Well, I can’t help it if you insist on inventing your own version of history.
a) The defending forces were not “weak”.
b) All three attacking divisions (actually merely elements of the same) crossed the river on the first day and the penetration was 10 km deep, though the 2nd of 3 defensive lines by dawn.
c) Very little artillery fire support was available, and the spectacular air support had primarily a morale (not an attrition – not a single bunker was destroyed) effect.
d) Direct fire was the main driver of busting defensive positions, not indirect fire. Ammunition consumption was thus moderate.
“In a straight line, all lined up then I am sure you are right. But lets play your game. Normandy, around 25 July, an allied strength of approx 1.4 million soldiers, across a front approx 110Km long = 12,727 soldiers per km. That’s dense.”
Thanks for the evidence that you don’t think clearly.
Remember? We were talking about defender’s density of forces, not attacker’s density of forces.
A single German 4th rate division’s equivalent faced the invasion on day one – on a 80 km wide sector. The attackers were still too incompetent to gain much ground, in part because they lacked the unit level ambition and attitude for a quick push forward.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Normandy_landings
“Battles are won by the application of force and mass.”
At times, yes. Though an empirical study on military history did not find a correlation between numerical superiority and winning battles.
The key here is a different one: You do not need to destroy mass or the enemy’s ability to apply force to win a battle or achieve a breakthrough or to shatter an opposing formation.
All you need to do is to make the enemy yield or simply move through him. Massive firepower is but one way to do this (the one that requires the least skill or imagination). There are others.
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@Phil & SO.
Can we please leave WW2 alone. its 60 years out of date.
@ everyone else: ”enemy” for the western world is Russia and China, Russia because of nuclear weapons. China because of military build-up.
Arty is very nice so keep, but reduce RA numbers. in my uneducated opinion mobile and small/light is best with a few 155 as RAF does have ground attack abilities, even if they are near useless and hate it.
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PS: UK main enemy at the moment is none other then Argentina as they still claim Falklands and are having an arms build up last i looked.
Hopefully now with the armed forces reduced to such a sorry state we can miss all stupid wars like ”The Stan” and Libya etc, and concentrate on holding falklands.
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The problem with going just 155mm is the logistics, not an insignificant problem to solve and the argument about needing fewer shells only goes so far.
The 105mm Light Gun by the way has engaged in a spot of artillery duelling in Iraq with both D30’s and even larger calibres, two men entered, one man left kind of an outcome. It’s not just the kit though don’t forget, it’s as much to do with the surrounding systems and training as anything else.
I know you lot might think this is my obsessing but they were also deployed to the Balkans in ISO containers for lowering the profile reasons. In Sierra Leone it was a firepower demonstration using Light Guns that persuaded the RUF and associated tearaways that if they really wanted a fight they would definitely come off worse.
They used smoke and illum but the inference was clearly, the next ones could easily be HE, job done.
Like the idea of using AS90 hulls, has a common sense feel about it, much better than putting them in a shed just in case or flogging them off to collectors
The loitering munition idea seems a bit daft to me as well, its like the best way of driving expensive sensors into the ground. Personally, I think the whole idea has been overtaken by armed UAV’s and other weapons.
On 155mm systems, must admit I quite like the CEASAR, and although I think the mode of transport and general design of Archer is very smart but I am still a bit uncertain about autoloaders though, the reduction in crew might overcome the disadvantages though
@Paul
Enjoy
I think I looked at the Warrior LMT105 a while ago, not sure if actually progressed beyond the artwork stage though. It used the same turret as the ASCOD LMT105 that the Thai Marines use. Looks like a direct fire version of FRES SV to me, oops!
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“@Phil & SO.
Can we please leave WW2 alone. its 60 years out of date.”
Just ignore the posts.
My own version of history? Pot, kettle black.
“The defending forces were not “weak”.”
“and the spectacular air support had primarily a morale (not an attrition – not a single bunker was destroyed) effect.”
So the defences were not weak, yet the formations broke without a good fight. Which one is it? Were they strong or weak?
“All three attacking divisions (actually merely elements of the same) crossed the river on the first day”.
Two divisions failed to secure a bridgehead, French forces prevented them from doing so. It’s a fact. It’s in even the simplest histories of the battle.
“You do not need to destroy mass or the enemy’s ability to apply force to win a battle or achieve a breakthrough or to shatter an opposing formation.”
Don’t know many commanders that would agree with that. And you say, all you simply need to do is “move through him” as if that is the easiest thing in the world to do. The point about a dense battlefield is that the enemy will not let you do that.
Sedan was not a dense battlefield, it was operational strength against operational weakness, it still employed massed fire power, although it was from the air, and still 2/3 of the attacking force was repelled by a second class reserve division which did not have the strength or will to resist much at all.
I’ll re-iterate it, a dense battlefield with depth means you have to fight through the enemy. And that means attrition to earn your breakthrough.
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rlc
arty is never going to reduce the red armies, theres just too many.
Shock will break their morale.
The argies remain doomed in the falklands until they can force a seabridge.
An airbridge couldnt supply fuel for mobile armour, a or multiple corps infantry force.
No density, no mass to reduce.
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“main enemy at the moment is none other then Argentina as they still claim Falklands and are having an arms build up last i looked.”
So we’re dropping bombs on Libya and Apache’s are engaging ground forces whilst soldiers fight and die in Afghanistan and you think Argentina is our main enemy at the moment? I can’t see the logic behind that.
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Phil said:
“I’ll re-iterate it, a dense battlefield with depth means you have to fight through the enemy. And that means attrition to earn your breakthrough.”
I have mentioned in this thread that I am reading about the Stalingrad campaign at the moment – when the Soviet army broke into the pocket around Stalingrad salient, their master of artillery brought together 7,000 medium and heavy pieces which he concentrated into a single area and in the ensuing bombardment several whole German divisions just ceased to exist (and they were well dug in, with defensive depth too). I think that was a quite risk averse (from the Russian perspective) way to attrite the enemy !
So while I doubt that we could have pulled together that many guns in WWII, and the whole of NATO might have trouble doing it now, it does speak to the efficacy of shit loads of HE dropping on the bad guys.
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Jed said “I think that was a quite risk averse (from the Russian perspective) way to attrite the enemy !”
No. It was the Russians who christened the artillery piece the king of the battle field. It was a very Russian thing to do.
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I posted this in the open thread but its vaguely relevant to this thread;
http://www.informationdissemination.net/2011/08/libya-lessons-supremacy-of-sof-airpower.html
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X – yes, I know, that’s what I was getting at – instead of relying on massive waves of T34’s to break into the salient, which along with infantry was easier to get into position, they waited until they amassed 7000 pieces of artillery and all the ammunition, and I dont think that figure including “Stalin’s Organ” units either !!
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I thought the Russians called Artillery “The God of War”?
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Gareth – the ID article is frankly nothing that hasn’t been said before – keep the risk down by sending in your SOF to assist the locals by designating targets for your superior air power. No need for massive amounts of boots on the ground because the locals provide the grunts.
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What about a modern version of the Abbot SPG? 105mm light gun on a Warrior chassis? Would be more strategically mobile?
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@ Jed – I have suggested something similar with my Light Dragoons concept but that was intended as a rapid reaction/delaying force and a scout/skirmishing force supporting heavier units.
Talking about lessons from Libya, should we be investing in Toyota trucks and AAA/MBRL’s?
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@ DomJ
The need for artillery is proven I believe. It has shown itself useful in every theatre deployed and goes beyond just HE shells, what with smoke and illumination as well.
As for pounding an enemy force with it, I think this sits into the broader argument being made between SO and Phil so I’ll address that all in one.
The simple fact that has presented itself in all my studies is that manoeuvre and attrition both have their place and they’re subject to the conditions in the field.
If we look at the 1991 invasion of Iraq and the later 2003 war, these are often hailed as perfect examples of the manoeuvre school. But people often fail to acknowledge the attritional effect of airpower in these campaigns. If it was not for airpower (especially “tank plinking”) there is a strong likely hood that the land battle would not have been quite as smooth as it indeed proved in the end.
Looking at the German invasion of France in 1940, this was manoeuvre in the sense of where the attack was laid. The invasion of Holland and Belgian to the North drew off the British and then the armoured thrust was laid between the two forces, in a less dense operational area.
But there are plenty of examples of the opposite happening. Rommel’s campaigns in North Africa struggled because of logistic problems and air support, which precluded him from assembling sufficient mass and momentum against the enemy.
Had the option been available of a wide sweep to the South then maybe he would have taken it, but is simply wasn’t there. As Phil has noted, sometimes war just takes one look at your beautifully laid plans and decides have a sneaky dump on them, leaving you to deal with the concequences.
I can also think the fact that the German army was stopped at Moscow and Stalingrad should not go unnoticed. Terrain and conditions simply didn’t allow the German army, which was unquestionably superior in the quality of men and equipment (except maybe warm clothing), to manoeuvre as it pleased.
At the Ardenne forest Phil has pointed out that this WAS (sorry, can’t do italics) the weak point in the allied line. It was chosen because it was believed a punch through here would be easier, that the terrain would mask the forces somewhat from the air, and that the poor weather would limit allied air power.
But manoeuvre failed when met with strong defensive positions.
The moral of the story should be, hopefully, that manoeuvre is preferable when the option exists, but sometimes that is simply not the case. Conditions on the ground, training, morale, supplies, communications, the weather, the terrain all play a factor. The “Friction of War” as was pointed out earlier.
And in it artillery has its place. You don’t necessarily have to blast the enemy positions into oblivion, but a short barrage timed prior to a land attack can help inflict casualties, sap morale and disorientate the enemy.
Or it can be used defensively, which is a point I notice people seem to be overlooking. A mobile enemy must, by design, be on the move. They cannot dig in and be making a rapid advance at the same time. Thus artillery has the ability to break up attacks, not just lead them.
For that reason I’d like us to keep the full gamut of artillery, from the big 155mm to something in the “light” 105mm type range, down to the 81 and 60 mm mortars needed by the infantry.
And just quickly to round off regarding future enemies, hopefully we’ve all learnt by now that there is absolutely no way, none, to predict who we will be fighting next year.
– We might have to intervene on the ground in Libya,
– We might be fighting in and around the South China Sea (not neccessarily against the Chinese),
– We might be in the heart of Africa,
– We might be fighting over ‘them islands down south there next to Argentina’,
– We might be stopping a war between Greece and Turkey,
– We might be supporting a Turkish invasion of Syria,
You just don’t know. Other than a very few select instances, we have no idea. Nothing should be taken off the table, because as soon as you do it means you’ve stopped watching everyone and everything and that’s precisely when someone is likely to walk up behind you and stab you in the back.
I simply cannot entertain arguments of “we won’t fight another COIN war” or “we wont fight another ‘normal’ war”. We’ve done both in the last decade.
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I remember reading a looooong time ago that the NATO standardisation on 155mm was it was deemed the smallest calibre that could disrupt/stop a soviet armoured force. Does this requirement still hold true or should we be looking at different calibres?
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Gareth jones
How about palletted systems desinged to be bolted on to world wide readily available pickups?
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“Don’t know many commanders that would agree with that. And you say, all you simply need to do is “move through him” as if that is the easiest thing in the world to do. The point about a dense battlefield is that the enemy will not let you do that.”
Oh well, the enemy could always allow you to move through and past the lines, then close the breach behind you, too.
And you are screwed.
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“The loitering munition idea seems a bit daft to me as well, its like the best way of driving expensive sensors into the ground. Personally, I think the whole idea has been overtaken by armed UAV’s and other weapons.”
It depends on the cost of the loitering ammunition. Fire Shadow is to cost less than a GMLRS rocket.
Armed UAVs are awesome, but even if ATUAS gets funding and Watchkeeper gains weapons, i don’t see RAF and Army having, together, enough armed drones to cover the battlefield, everywhere, all the time.
How many minutes do soldiers in Afghanistan wait, on average, before they get the air support/artillery support they required when a fire contact is established?
The gap-filler is the Loitering Ammunition, which has many uses. Israel most recently used them over Lebanon/Gaza to try and detect and timely destroy rocket batteries.
The US wanted loitering ammunitions for NLOS originally, and they still have requirements for LMs. They have just ordered man-portable loitering ammunitions http://defense-update.com/20110902_switchblade.html, and there are other plans in this regard as well, included loitering jammer and in future perhaps bomb developments of MALD.
Armed UAVs are the correct answer only if Loitering Ammunitions are used in the wrong way, launched AFTER a contact is established.
Fire Shadow LMs must accompany patrols from overhead, provide the Tac Party in the patrol with imagery via Desert Hawk downlink, acting as a drone, and then strike the targets as soon as they reveal themselves.
Despite the points of contact, armed UAVs and Loitering Ammunitions are not the same thing, and do not substitute each other, other than in particular cases.
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Modular “Technicals”? Hmmmm… Could do a whole range – automatic cannon, MBRL, Recoilless rifles, mortars, and support versions – ammo carrying, Command and control, even recovery.
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Talking about pallets and weapons reminded me of this piece:
http://www.angelfire.com/art/enchanter/wespe.html
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Yep a few adjustable feet/clamps etc to take care of size and shape variation; and you could ship a very nice little recon/light infantry special forces/force out in few containers and bolt them to local to local trucks ofcheap as chips.
Even get local mechanics on it so can leave most of the support at home.
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Hi Paul G,
Did you notice this part about the “Warrior” turret:
“The LMT 105 turret system is also fitted to the ASCOD 105 light tank covered earlier in this section.”
– so the direct fire version may be less mystical than we are made to believe (this is of course not ASCOD2, but feasibility can be/ has been established)
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Hi TD,
Re the Thai ASCODS, the gun itself was proven on Thai Cadillac Stingray tanks ealier. The Warrior version is quite impractical as it carries 9 (!) rounds for the gun. Mo one has bought the similar CV90 version (120mm on it) yet.
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@TD have watched that vid before, the bit about 14.5mm being good for 2600m and still lethal at 5000 is awesome. Could be a bad day for someone thinking they were safe hiding behind a reinforced concrete pillar!!
@ACC yes i did notice that last sentence, v intersting, how come though if you’re ditching 8 men and their kit can it only carry 9 rounds? is the turret blocked off from the back?
seems denel has come on a lot, should see if they would consider having a factory over here, especially as BAe keep closing theirs (woodford,chatterton etc etc)
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RE “seems denel has come on a lot, should see if they would consider having a factory over here”
– I agree
– on the arty side of things, it goes back to the (apartheid) arms embargo, and all that excellence was initially built on expertise gleaned off Israel/ Canada/ Finland models, packaged in RSA for production… funnily enough in GW1 Saddam’s best arty outranged the OpFor by far (bought some pieces from S. Africa)
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“I can also think the fact that the German army was stopped at Moscow and Stalingrad should not go unnoticed. Terrain and conditions simply didn’t allow the German army, which was unquestionably superior in the quality of men and equipment (except maybe warm clothing), to manoeuvre as it pleased.”
Personaly, in my limited view, had I been in command at that point, I’d have gone home, rescorched the earth on the way back to Berlin, and let the Red Army overextend its march back into striking range, for another go at manouvere warfare.
Say, somewhere along a Romania/Poland line.
Beef up your transport links to a few places on that line, and stockpile for another blitzkrieg to smash anything west of Moscow.
Even with artilery, in massive quantities, urban warfare is a bloody mess we cant afford to fight.
As I said, we view warfare through radicaly different prisms.
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@ Chris B:”We might be stopping a war between Greece and Turkey”
why exactly would we want to stop it? Turkey largely in middle east and interested in joining EU but they hold opposite views to nearly everyone in the EU. Hate to say it but large population of Muslims with no history of religious freedom, remember the genocide of Armenian christians in 19th-20th century.
@Phil. Afgan & libya are not important to defence of the realm, they are in effect some flag waving and PR stunts.
the People of falklands have said they want to be british therefore their defence is more important then the liberation of fuzzy wuzzy
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@RLC
If you say so mucker.
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Q(1.How can indirect fires support a larger area of operation, is longer range or greater mobility the answer
2.How can we organise direction and management of indirect fires, is it a recce or RA task)
A1: Mix of both as we will have to do more with less, this leads to greater strategic mobility( and tactical) but at the same time demand development in longer(range) and more powerful rounds (HE, Smoke, Illumination…etc)
A2: It is the responsibility of every and anyone. Our soldiers are better educated now then at any other time in history eg their minds can cope with the relevant knowledge. ie platoon/section/recce squad under fire they call straight to fire bass commander and viola they have their support.
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I fail to see why TD and Bob (I think it was) are so strongly opposed to a weapon such as Fire Shadow.
For years the Royal Artillery has needed a weapon that can provide much greater precision at long range, one which can operate in a cluttered environment and cause minimum collateral damage in complex environments such as urban areas. The guns at present in service cannot achieve this and it is only recently that GMLRS has been made into more of a precision system.
I think Gabriele is right about Fire Shadow. I am not claiming quite the flight endurance and operating range that he does for the weapon (I have read figures such as 6 hours flight endurance, as opposed to his 10 hour loiter time, and 100 km range, as opposed to his 150 km). However, I do think that his point about failing to see that the “RAF and Army will have, together, enough armed drones to cover the battlefield, everywhere, all the time” (even if Watchkeeper is equipped with weapons), is a very valid one indeed. As he says, the gap-filler must be the loitering munition.
Drones are more expensive that this loitering munitions. I think a Fire Shadow munition actually cost less than an MLRS rocket. Gabriele’s statement:
““Hate me for it, but Loitering Ammunitions in simulated warfare scenarios prepared by NATO in the last decade have ALWAYS been battle-winning assets.” is pretty convincing evidence.
The system can be used in several roles (counter-indirect fire, the protection of patrols, etc, although in the latter case it should launched before the patrol sets out).
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ven with artilery, in massive quantities, urban warfare is a bloody mess we cant afford to fight.
Over half the worlds population is now urbanised. Most combat in the future will revolve around the population centres whether we like it or not. Iraq was centred around urban combat and even Afghan is turning around the towns there. Operations in Urban Areas is very firmly here to stay.
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@RLC.
You seem to be suggesting that every infantryman should be able to call in artillery. There are procedures for a layman to bring in fire but it is much better to leave it to those trained to do. Much better by a very, very long way.
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yes, then train the infantry in that or do you think it is to much to ask someone to multi-task?
afaik in every plt their is a radio man can’t he do it or even corp’s in the squads. it just means a more multi-role type foot soldier as we need in these modern times of austerity & cut back. shortens response times and could lead to reduction of manpower inefficiencies. ie infantry expand RA contract
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There is nothing wrong with FireShadow as long as we have a pixie at the end of the rainbow with a bottomless pit of cash and if all we care about is how sexy a piece of kit or its top trumps specification but the problem is we don’t have any pixies on the payroll so everything has to be seen as taking the investment of something else.
Remember, there is a very long queue of things to spend the dwindling defence vote on.
So we must look critically at how they might be used, what impact it will have on other systems, can it displace others for example.
The problem with some of the manufacturer’s claims is you just can’t get away from the cost. It is coming out of the Team Complex Weapons group for a reason, it’s complex, complex equals cost.
Gabby makes the claim that they cost about the same as a GMLRS which might be true, but given they have yet to reach Main Gate allow me to hold judgement on that one. But even if they were the same and we think about how they might be used in the scenario where they launch with every patrol. Every patrol has its guardian angel, Fire Shadow, whilst it is aloft, the air space must be controlled so a helicopter doesn’t drive into one and if at the end of that patrol (or 6 to 10 hours, whichever comes sooner) a target rather inconveniently does not present itself then FireShadow has to be driven into the ground, seeding the local countryside with the best western sensor technology, lets also hope we can find a safe area to dump it as well. So whilst using a GMLRS every patrol for x pounds is most unlikely, the same x pounds on FireShadow is a certainty if used this way. It would not be buddied with a single patrol of course but in this context, what does FireShadow provide that an armed UAV doesn’t?
Lets just say a GMLRS/FireShadow is £100k, tot the numbers up for patrols across an MRB, scary.
There are other uses for it, no denying but personally, I think they have been overtaken by armed UAV’s and there are other things we should spend our money on first.
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RLC, yes, I think maybe one day, when infantry plus extra training can replace forward air controllers by using synthetic systems and advanced datalinks but it will not be for some time, its a very safety intensive activity where mistakes aren’t worth contemplating
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I still mourn the loss of the 175mm guns. MLRS was the replacement, but I wonder if 175mm shells were more cost effective.
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Some infantry already are trained, they’re called MFCs and they are specialists. It is definitely too much to expect your average infantryman to call in artillery and mortars. For a start they need instinctive reactions and knowledge of the procedures and of the pre registered firing points. They also need links back to the appropriate stations. There is a very good reason why it’s a specialism in every army in the world. A good MFC will constantly be updating the mortars on their location, laying barrels on to x-rays and anticipating adjustments that might be needed and the type of ammo and fire needed. It’s a full time specialist job. Controlling artillery is even harder since there are a number of weapon systems to master and procedures and deconflictions and skillsets. FSTs are trained in stages it’s such a complex job.
Like I said there are procedures to bring in fast air and artillery by someone not trained but they are emergency procedures for a reason. Dropping short is a very bad day. So yes it is too difficult to multi task that task too. The infantry are already multi tasking without adding that to their burden.
As for radioman etc. Platoon org is much more fluid now that the radios are so portable and easy to use. The platoon commander doesn’t need a radioman and very often neither does a company commander out on the ground.
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@Chris.B.
“You just don’t know. Other than a very few select instances, we have no idea. Nothing should be taken off the table, because as soon as you do it means you’ve stopped watching everyone and everything and that’s precisely when someone is likely to walk up behind you and stab you in the back.
I simply cannot entertain arguments of “we won’t fight another COIN war” or “we wont fight another ‘normal’ war”. We’ve done both in the last decade.”
You never said a truer word. I was going to make the same point myself but could not have made it so succinctly and incisively.
@TD
Thanks for your very detailed reply re: Fire Shadow. I’ll go away and have a ponder.
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@ Mike W
Cheers!
@ RLC
“Why exactly would we want to stop it? Turkey largely in middle east and interested in joining EU but they hold opposite views to nearly everyone in the EU. Hate to say it but large population of Muslims with no history of religious freedom….”
Erm, are you sure we’re talking about the same Turkey here? Only the Turkey I’m talking about is well known (or at least I thought it was) for being a secular state with no official state religion and a provision in its constitutional document guaranteeing the right to religious freedom.
It is predominantly Muslim, but it is very much a moderate muslim country. It also sits in quite an important strategic area.
Oh, and then there is the small matter of our involvement in Cyprus…
The world also changes rapidly. Government bonds in Indonesia are starting to become a little less risky while still paying very good interest, which is a sign of that countries economic growth. Many people believe that Chinas manufacturing boom may be on the verge of coming to a shuddering halt, at which point that business will shift to places like Indonesia.
What the means is that in the next ten years the face of the global economy could change rapidly, and with it peoples priorities. Take the US for example.
It’s widely accepted now that poor financial standards and oversight in the US were a huge factor in the global recession. Ten years from now, especially if there is another shock, American financial markets could take a serious hit through distrust that they are able to reign in their greed.
This could shift the centre of world banking to London, Singapore, Shanghai, Tokyo? The loss to the American economy would be pretty huge.
This is the world we live in. One big change in one place can help to massively change the entire world as a knock on.
Today’s enemies could potentially be tomorrows friends. Imagine telling Wellington right after Waterloo that in less than 40 years time, Britain would be fighting alongside France against the Russians.
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@ IXION – Hmmmm – if we’re using this system we could even include MANPDS and ATGW mounts.
@ Paul g – “..14.5mm being good for 2600m and still lethal at 5000..” = :0. Bring back the Rifles with Lynx Gepard AMR?
@ John Hartley – the 175mm had excellent range; I vaguely remember reading that the towed version was outstanding in Vietnam as they could be moved from firebase to firebase as needed to outrange the Soviet supplied artillery.
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Phile
“Over half the worlds population is now urbanised. Most combat in the future will revolve around the population centres whether we like it or not. Iraq was centred around urban combat and even Afghan is turning around the towns there. Operations in Urban Areas is very firmly here to stay.”
I disagree.
Or certainly, wars I believe should be thought do not require urban operations, nor mass artilery.
Lets say Iraq the last time really was about WMD, and not getting rid of Sadam at any cost.
Seize Um Qasr and Al Faw Peninsula.
Plant an MRBs heavy kit to the North waiting to smash Sadams Forces if he’s mental enough to move on us.
And cut off oil exports, or keep exporting, but dont transfer the cash to Sadams Government, hold it in trust.
How long till he does whatever we want?
He cant dislodge us, because that involves moving across the open ground from Basra to our positions, and we ride out to meet him, and slaughter his force. Sooner rather than later, his money runs out out his unpaid soldiers shoot him for us.
So, he accepts our suggestions, and we go home.
Much the same applies to Libya.
We couldnt storm Tripoli, with 1 MRB or 5, but one could easily block the 4 main highways, and shut off or restrict the water and power running into the city.
Unconditional Surrender requires a bloody storm and us to go in and dig them out.
But Unconditional Surrenders are the purview of Boneheaded Americans, if military force is a way to apply pressure for political ends, it requires threats and annoyance as much as action.
Upriver of Buenos Aries theres a huge hydro electric dam, behaind which is a vast lake.
Were that dam to fail, BA would quite literaly be washed into the ocean.
Couple of SeaShadows either side of it ought to concentrate the minds of Argentinas Leadership on the virtues of vacating the Falkland islands and ceasing to claim them.
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Hi GJ,
Paul g was wanting a Denel factory over here, and no wonder: the best range for the PzH2000 has been achieved using their rounds (40-42)km. Their own best pieces by far exceed this and they also have quite a selection, to optimise across different terrains/ uses while standardizing gun/ round as far as possible. I’ll quote an example from the long-running Indian procurement:
“The MOD asked for 1000+ Towed Howitzer, 814 Mounted Howitzer, 200 Wheeled self-propelled [and some tracked, with chassis commonality with someting already in Indian use]…. Denel Stable G5-2000, T5-2000, G6-52 and T6-52 on Arjun [tank]Chassis ([called]Bhim)”
– these are their “own”, the G4 was a copy
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@ DomJ
Are you mental?
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ChrisB
You’ll have to be more specific, washing away BA is probably a bit excessive even for my tastes, although then again, I’m not sure I’d want to look several hundred British mothers in the eyes and say “better your sons died than argentine sons”, but switching off the water, power or money, not sure why thats viewed as mental.
Follow that to its logical conclusion and we should have been shipping Hitler petrol not bombing his refineries.
As I said, you’d have to be more specific.
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DomJ
First thing. You said seize a town. But there’s no need to according to you?
As for the rest. Sorry mate but that’s not a very good argument at all that has some very fundamental errors. It’s more Tom Clancy than real life. Whether we do COIN, evacuations or general war – armies will be drawn into the urban areas. Barring some global act of God urbanisation will be a fact of life well after we’re all dust.
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You propose denying resources which is a sound policy but you twist it into a grotesque and extreme form which is based on some serious misconceptions about the use of force.
Your ideas paint you as desiring this country to engage in war crimes.
Distasteful ideas to say the least.
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Phil
A small port town isnt the last stand at the capital. If you want to go into the capital and dig out the moustache sporting despot, you have no choice but to deal with the bitter enders surrounding him.
The town was just a name, it can replaced with any other if the enemy garrison may cause trouble. The enemy cant garrison everywhere.
“armies will be drawn into the urban areas.”
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Cast_Lead#Ground_invasion.
Not if they’re smart.
I think its a bit rich for you to accuse me of “Tom Clancyism” and then to come up with the Iran Hostage Crisis as a need for urban combat.
“Barring some global act of God urbanisation will be a fact of life well after we’re all dust.”
Cities predate writing, but fighting in them is a relativly new concept. Its never been considered ideal.
“but you twist it into a grotesque and extreme form which is based on some serious misconceptions about the use of force.”
Not really, I just go back further 50 years for examples of acceptability.
“Your ideas paint you as desiring this country to engage in war crimes.”
Ink on a page and lines on a map.
The UN can pass all the laws on solving conflict through football not violence, shooting the other side tends to end arguements.
“Distasteful ideas to say the least.”
Depends upon your viewpoint, we’ve *done* far worse in living memory and celebrate the fact.
Go back into the recent past and we were blockading German food imports AFTER they surrendered.
Is that really worse than cutting off Sadams oil money until he steps down in favour of his least insane son, who promises to behave himself?
Certainly cant see how its worse than what happened in The Lancets view.
Ask Sven to walk you through what would be left of Germany after WW3.
As I’ve said.
War, in my view, is a political tool, and its one thats perfectly functional in the space between dense urban areas, and yes, frequently with threats that go well beyond mass murder, “dont invade me and I wont flood your capital, when your situation is hopeless, kneel before me, and I’ll help you up.”
Other nations might conceivably want to seize enemy nations cities, or liberate their own, but no one can conceivably occupy York, and I have no wish to Occupy Berlin.
Germany/Poland may of course, have need to liberate Riga, and through NATO, we would too, but equaly, let them liberate the city, we can provide the outer siege line.
******
I’m happy to be corrected if I am militarily wrong, but argueing we do/dont do it today so we should/shouldnt do it tomorrow is rarely correct, and thats illegal is just laughable.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Chastise
Several towns were flooded, and its the final verse of a childrens song.
Never mind the joys of “disarmed enemy forces”
******
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@Chris.B you did not answer they why i thought you would as i was looking more at a regional level, but thanks for your points very helpful to me.
and on the BA side i think the threat itself backed up by will to carry through(examples) might win the day
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FIBUA is FIBUA is FIBUA. To a company a small town may as well be Tokyo. You say that stupid armies get drawn into FIBUA and yet for very first example shows how irresistible urban concentrations can be. I agree there is no point getting into urban fighting if there is no pressing need to, my point is there very often is a pressing need to.
I don’t know where you got the Iranian Hostage thing from. I’m talking about large evacuations which happen with frequency. Most people by definition these days live in built up areas.
As for 50 years ago. Come back to me when you’ve read some of the literature surrounding the moral and technological aspects of the bombing campaign and the a bombs. You’ll find a far more diverse opinion than you think and far greater horror even in official circles. There is also a very big difference to engaging in strategic bombing which had a gestation long before the war in a fight for survival with limited technological means and deliberately seeking to kill civilians as a means of forcing will in a colonial war.
And besides all that. The actions of the past are judged in the context of the past. There is no appetite in liberal democracies for such wantonly cruel and criminal policies. We used to take civilians as slaves too and put the men to sword. We dont now.
You have some extremely distasteful and out of touch ideas.
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It is illegal if it defies the four principles of the law of armed conflict: distinction, proportionality, military necessity and Humanity.
Do you need anyone to explain how killing thousands of civilians and destroying a capital city to defend a small island that can already be defended ten times over with the in place forces grossly violates every one of those principles in spades?
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so is the answer to the questions to
1: keep both 105mm and 155mm
2: SPG are very useful but we need one that is lighter and cheaper then AS90
3,4,5,7,12: have yet to be resolved
6: Maybe (probably need expansion on this subject as well)
8: slightly phil has shown that grid squaring sometimes is useful
9: both are good and need to be improved
10: Seems RA get to keep their assets, pity.
11: both are needed with more light uav’s controlled by on spot peoples
13:no, unless fired by the RAF
14:we cant seem to decide;)
ANSWER PLEASE
3:Where do mortars fit in, is there a case, for example, for a 120mm and if so Infantry or Artillery.
4:The bunfight between RA/AAC and RAF for extended range attack
5:The role of sythetic training systems
7:Where does naval Gunfire and land attack fit into the matrix
12:What about the impact of greater urbanisation
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Phil
“And besides all that. The actions of the past are judged in the context of the past. There is no appetite in liberal democracies for such wantonly cruel and criminal policies”
Liberal Democracy started when exactly?
“You have some extremely distasteful and out of touch ideas.”
I am always and everywhere a realist.
No plan survives contact with the enemy, no rulebook survives the planning stage.
“It is illegal if it defies the four principles of the law of armed conflict: distinction, proportionality, military necessity and Humanity. ”
And who enforces this law?
Which police force is going to kick down the doors of ten downing street and drag out David Cameron?
The same one that dragged out Teflon Tony?
Which prison will he rot in?
Teflons in the worlds most open prison….
At the end of the day Phil, I’m providing continual examples of times our leaders chose mass murder of the enemy civil populace over defeat, and several where they carried on kicking long after the other side was down.
Have you *one* example where a nation chose to surrender rather than slaughter the other side?
I’m sorry but I dont see how your arguement is realistic, tasteful perhaps.
And we seem to have come well away from the need for artilery.
RLC
I’d quite fancy a few warriors with 120mm mortars, maybe 1 in 10?
Maybe even a couple of big beasts for counter battery, but that can probably be done better from the air.
I just dont see the need for masses of guns in any war the UK is geared up to fight.
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RLC – I did a big comment on where I see mortars fitting in a day or so ago, scroll back up and see what you think
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Hi RLC,
Did this on 2 & 3 (Sept 2),and have got back to the mortar question in further detail three times thereafter:
“Is 105/155 the right mix, what about a single intermediate calibre
– agree with the scepticism expressed about “single”
Do we need traditional armoured self propelled system like AS90 anymore
– yes, but in a more balanced mix
– cross-train crews, TA included, in 105 and 155 SPG
– have a small number of both permanently attached to each MRB (see the next point about rounding off numbers to be sufficient for “effect”)
Where do mortars fit in, is there a case, for example, for a 120mm and if so Infantry or Artillery
– yes, we need to address the requirement for fire support “never to fail to keep up”
– 81 mm is organic to bn’s; 120 mm should be organic to AI bn’s (and obviously on a similar, well protected and mobile chassis as the rest of the unit)… this would be the 3rd battery of the bde, even if not within RA
The bunfight between RA/AAC and RAF for extended range attack
– I am not sure there is a bunfight between RA/AAC (sure, RAF would want to control everything that takes off from a runway)
– base-bleed and Excalibur for RA, with loitering munitions (I don’t share the enthusiasm of e.g. rusi), GMLRS – even ATACMS loaded (ie. one instead of six) to the other launcher unit on the carrier) … reach and effect is not the problem, but real-time targeting and as someone pointed out, real-time airspace picture not to do damage on the way to the target
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“And we seem to have come well away from the need for artilery.”
In your world maybe.
“At the end of the day Phil, I’m providing continual examples of times our leaders chose mass murder of the enemy civil populace over defeat”
And I told you to look at the debates and you’ll see it was not as clear cut as that, not even over the A-Bombs.
You’re over-simplifying a very complex issue.
You’re also seemingly stating we’re entering some sort of era where we can elect our battles and how we would like to fight them, which implicitly removes any notion of national survival, you are still willing to deliberately kill thousands of civilians – that is the only and sole point of your attack – you kill civilians. It has no other feature – you simply wish to kill civilians because you think it will bring about your political will.
You just want dead civilians.
“And who enforces this law?”
It’s the Law of Armed Conflict mate. Adhered to as an act of policy by every liberal democracy in the world – including the United States, the most powerful country in the world. Go destroying capital cities and murdering civilians on their continent to save a tiny island from an invasion a battle-group could defeat and you’d see PRECISELY who enforces that law.
Human societies have instinctively limited warfare, the Laws of Armed Conflict are the latest manifestation of that. And they are central values of every liberal democracy in the world today, and yet you think there is justification in completely ignoring them.
The majority of nations hold a set of laws dear that you want to break – you want to see war crimes committed under the guise of the ends justifies the means.
No mate, they do not.
And the history of strategic bombing in WWII is a lot more complicated than you think. And I’ll say it again, those actions should also be judged in the context of the past.
No mate, you’re not a realist.
You’re a fantasist promulgating publicly a desire to see war crimes committed.
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Oh come on, comment lost to spam filter!
Phil
All issues are complex.
Its how we end up with the ends justifying the means.
Its everyones arguement.
From the most brutal dictator, to the most gentle nudge theorist, all of them cry “You only disagree because you do not understand”.
I dont wish to kill civillians, three of the three examples I gave would be far less bloody than the actual outcomes.
Strikes around the dam would bring to Argentinas attention just how hopeless its position was. They would surrender, and we would not have to kill 600 conscripted boys.
Cutting off Sadams oil would oust him peacefully, and no one need die, certainly not the million plus who’ve died in the sectarian violence that followed.
Cutting off Tripolies water would have seen off Gadafi even quicker, he was effectivly a king, supported the barons, they’d have shot him hours after the taps went dry if he tried to hold on.
Russia surrounded Grozney with Artilery and had a good go at leveling it, the US and UK complained the actions were making them look bad and would Russia please stop it.
Russia still occupies parts of Georgia, and you cant possibly argue the bombing campaign was militarily necessary.
The US has gone to great lengths to argue there is technicaly no genocide in Darfur, 300,000 dead, 3million in camps, and I doubt theres a woman in the area that hasnt been raped, but technicaly, theres no genocide, so they dont have to get involved.
Mugabe was slaughtering 30,000 members of rival tribes and political groups whilst at the same time the US was praising him for his stance against apartheid.
Supporter of Israel or not, only the stupid argue they have never trampled the spirit or letter of every rule.
Human societies have limited warfare, in peacetime.
Once the bloodletting starts, it quickly devolves into anything goes.
Turn the other cheek – unless its a muslim, then launch a holy crusade.
Hell, the reason Mohamed was so successful was because he threw the rule book out of the window and chopped down fruit trees. And too the Romans, who poisoned the wells and salted the earth.
I dont *want* anything.
I merely acknowledge the truth, no plan survives first contact with the enemy, no rule book survives the planning stages.
I dont argue that strategic bombing in the second world war was simple, simply that it was done, night after night after night, until the yanks turned up and added day after day after day.
Someone made that choice, theres a compelling arguement that Churchill insisted Berling bombed to force a German counterstrike on London, which duly came, and cemented his hold on power.
For 5 years he was a dictator beyond which the UK had ever seen before.
I doubt an MP in 1938 thought himself uncivillised, nor one in 1912, but two years later, when pushed, by god they did some unseemly things.
Napolean was a servent of civillisation, his empire even held a church service to the goddess of reason (i shit you not), but his armies raped their way through spain all the same.
“No mate, you’re not a realist.
You’re a fantasist”
So should we address you as Field Marshall Phil?
Or is it The Right Honourable Phil?
I am a realist, even when the real world is a dirty and unpleasant.
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“Its how we end up with the ends justifying the means.
Its everyones arguement.”
It really isn’t mate. It really, really isn’t.
“I dont wish to kill civillians, three of the three examples I gave would be far less bloody than the actual outcomes.”
You said you wanted to burst a damn and flood the capital city of Argentina. An idea was mooted in the Gulf War about blowing the dams on the Euphrates but it is acknowledged that it would never have happened even if NBC weapons had been launched against the coalition. That is the context of today.
“I doubt an MP in 1938 thought himself uncivillised, nor one in 1912, but two years later, when pushed, by god they did some unseemly things.”
I’ll say again that you should read the literature and primary sources regarding the strategic bombing campaign. And once again those actions must be judged in the context of the times.
“I am a realist, even when the real world is a dirty and unpleasant.”
Judged from behind a keyboard I’m sure your call to deliberately murder civilians is very rational. Alas, the real world works a lot differently. You propose to blow out of the water a central tenet of every liberal democracy in the world, even that of the United States and commit murder.
“So should we address you as Field Marshall Phil?”
Says the man who has all the answers to a “dirty” and “unpleasant” world. I tell you that you’re calling for murder and war crimes and you call me the Field Marshall? Just call me a compassionate human being mate. You can wear your Field Marshall rank in front of your laptop.
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TD
Yes, have now had a bit of time to think about your reply to my contribution on Fire Shadow. Actually, your main argument concerning the non-recoverable nature of the weapon seems very convincing, even watertight at first view. However, when you say:
“and if at the end of that patrol (or 6 to 10 hours, whichever comes sooner) a target rather inconveniently does not present itself then Fire Shadow has to be driven into the ground, seeding the local countryside with the best western sensor technology, lets also hope we can find a safe area to dump it as well.”
the thought did occur to me that we ran that same risk every time we fired off a Phoenix UAV, which was, as you know, the real-time surveillance and acquisition system before the Watchkeeper-type drones. From what I have read it was more or less crash-landed, with an inflatable bag to protect it! Presumably the British Army operators planned to land it in a “safe” area but the risk of sensors falling into enemy hands was not non-existent! The same could be said of the Hermes 450 or Watchkeeper. Incidentally, doesn’t the latter require a runway, if it is to be brought back? A safe return is not guaranteed.
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RE: Mortars – is there a place for a automatic mortar like the Vasilek?
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field marshall phil
‘not it isnt’ is not an arguement.
I did not say i ‘wanted’ to burst the dam.
I merely said it was an option, the very threat of which would force an
argentine capitulation.
But, pushed to it, its no worse than anything else thats been done.
Speaking of the gulf, did you know the first time we destroyed more 90pc of iraqs generating capacity?
Did liberal democracy come into force in 92?
Or was that a military necessity, proportional to the threat?
You obviously missed the point with your field promotion.
You accuse me of fantasy, but unless your on the privy council, or hold a high rank, its what youre doing too.
With of course the obvious, i’m posting based on facts, not high hopes.
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Western militaries are agencies of mostly “liberal” centrist governments who dictate ROE.
Therefore civilians casualties are an anathema. As there is no direct military threat to the Western homelands the peoples of the West can afford the luxury of putting “them” before “us.”
Unfortunately many the enemies faced by Western militaries don’t have these qualms.
It will be interesting to see when or if a point is reached in the near future where “us” trumps “them” in the mindset of the West’s political elites. Perhaps in a future war over some resources?
Do Western governments truly represent the wishes of their peoples? Who knows?
Of course whether putting civilians first, whether “them” or “us”, is always right strays in the territory of moral absolutes which is difficult.
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“But, pushed to it, its no worse than anything else thats been done.”
The more you type the more I think you are morally bankrupt.
“Speaking of the gulf, did you know the first time we destroyed more 90pc of iraqs generating capacity?”
There is a big difference between taking out power stations and attacking a target with the SOLE and EXCLUSIVE intention of DELIBERATELY killing civilians. Which you say is acceptable because “it’s no worse than what’s gone on before”.
“You accuse me of fantasy, but unless your on the privy council, or hold a high rank, its what youre doing too.”
No mate. You’re talking about courses of action. You’re imparting solutions. I am telling you that
(a) One of your solutions would be a war crime as it blows away the four principles of the Law of Armed Conflict which is a central tenet of every liberal democracy in the world today.
(b) That you are simplifying the issues over the strategic bombing campaign in WWII.
and
(c) You’re a fantasist because you think we will no longer have to be drawn into operations in urban terrain (when we are doing it right this second) and you’re advocating the mass murder of civilians because the “ends justify the means” and “it’s no worse that anything else thats happened in the past”.
I will now add that you are morally bankrupt as well as the promulgator of repugnant solutions masquerading as reasonable military strategies.
Nowhere have I in our discussion put on my Field Marshall Hat. I have just told you that I think you are wrong about OBUA and that your explosion of a dam would be a war crime, a war crime you still seek to justify. But mate, it’s a war crime. It’s murder. It’s not on.
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“It will be interesting to see when or if a point is reached in the near future where “us” trumps “them” in the mindset of the West’s political elites. Perhaps in a future war over some resources?”
Well x these are all very deep questions. Perhaps when national survival is truly at stake then we might put us before them, but really, there is no military utility in the mass murder of civilians that I can see either in the past, the present or the future.
No our enemies do not have these qualms. But they do seek to limit warfare which is a natural and instinctive human thing to do. They just seek to do it to conform to their own subjective outlooks.
But as it stands right now, the Law of Armed Conflict and its 4 main principles are at the centre of every operation undertaken by a liberal democracy at this moment in time.
And DomJ seeks to violate all of them in spades.
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phil
if you can say how destroying 90% of electricity generation meets your four points.
Fair enough.
If you cant, how can you argue they are enforced laws?
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An interesting sideline fellas
How would the denial of big chunks Belgrade’s electricity distribution system by dropping those BLU114/B’s fit into the discussion. The US even did it again when they were trying to repair the damage.
Wonder what the legal advice was, after all, NATO seemed to be indulging in a spot of collective indiscriminate denial of a vital infrastructure, albeit by non explosive means, in order to effect a political change with subsequent military change. Would the fact that the damage actually killed no civilians directly have counted in the deliberation, even though its very possible people died as a result of a city having now power for an extended duration?
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“if you can say how destroying 90% of electricity generation meets your four points.”
Military Necessity
Degrading Iraq’s power network degraded their defensive capabilities and degraded their C4I capabilities. Electricity was a key supporting industry to the Iraqi war effort. Targetting it would achieve several military objectives.
Humanity
Civilians were not deliberately targeted.
Distinction
Targeting was as precise as possible and those targets were not prohibited under the law.
Proportionality
It was recognised that while the electricity generation system was a natural and key enabler of the war effort it was also recognised that it had a civilian role. Whilst no effort was made to avoid inconveniencing the Iraqi population targeting took into account proportionality by such measures as targeting transformers instead of generating plant as generating plant took much longer to repair.
So, the electricity system was a legitimate target as it was a key industry in the Iraqi war effort.
Civilians were NEVER deliberately target in the destruction of electricity targets.
The targets were not prohibited and targeting was as precise as possible.
And efforts were made to reduce the long term effect of the strategy.
Perfectly legal. And all thought about beforehand with legal advice.
Unlike blowing a dam and deliberately killing thousands of civilians.
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RE ” Would the fact that the damage actually killed no civilians directly have counted in the deliberation”
– how about the cost of rebuilding it?
– unlike some other administrations (do I dare say: some other[ capitals or italics for other] Gvmnts as well), the end game was factored into the decisions at the time – the military outcome was a certainty, only timing was uncertain
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International law is a very elastic term. In the anarchic nation state system there is no authority greater than the sovereign state which means all equal. Adherence to treaties and convention etc. is an expedient to help make a very complicated world work. Reputation and horizontal responsibility is important. But to regard international law as an entity similar to a nation’s criminal or civil law is to be mistaken.
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Undoubtedly that fact would have had a bearing on targeting electricity targets. Legal advice was taken and it was decided that the coalition strategy did not break the law. Now I am sure if you asked ten lawyers their opinion on it you’d get 11 opinions back but my main point is that the coalition paid much more than lip service to the law in planning it’s air campaign. The law recognises that collateral damage can occur and will occur but it distinguishes between that and breaking one or all four principles.
These principles are fact and you will find them in US and UK military manuals and they are taught to soldiers at regular intervals. They are not some wishy washy concepts, they are bona fide institutions and recognised by nation states.
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Yes x this is true. But as I have said they are recognised principles in all liberal democracies including the most powerful nation state in the world. They are taught mainstream to troops and governments and militaries take advice on them and consult legal opinions on their planned actions. The principles were also agreed between nation states.
Also let us not forget that these principles are also implicitly required to be adhered to by a liberal democracy’s populace and voters. There is little serious appetite for war crimes and thus a nation states government also has to answer for it’s war crimes domestically. Could you see this government or a US government surviving a deliberate and sanctioned war crime on any large scale?
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There are many in the Third World who think the US commits war crimes all the time. There is a good sized minority in the US and UK who believe that too. One state’s or coalition’s police action is another state’s or coalition’s act of aggression.
Further one appreciates that ethics may be on the syllabi of the West’s war colleges. And indeed the office class of the West on the whole are very decent people in many, many way our best. But I also know that classroom ethics are severely tested in the field. Take civilian casualties. If a suburb which still had some civilians in residence was targeted by the artillery of one faction is right for peace keepers to evacuate the civilians to protect them? Or is evacuation actually ethnic cleansing which means that the peace keepers sit in their MICVs while all hell breaks out outside?
States do agree things. There are many bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements. But not all states are in contact with all other states. And it would be a mistake to see the UN as a totally universal and totally effective conduit between states.
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Yes and that’s getting into relativism which is an enormous subject as I’m sure you know. The reason I say the laws are fact is because they are accepted by liberal states as if they are. There is a proven record of liberal democracies limiting their actions voluntarily to comply with the law of armed conflict as explained by legal experts. And these laws are mainstream and central in training and planning considerations. Liberal states essentially act as if these laws are enforceable by a trans-state body and that has the effect of making them legitimate and binding in practice.
As for your scenario. Well Officers are paid to think. There will always be detractors. And almost every field of human endeavour has similar conundrums.
As it is the proposal made here to blow a damn to deliberately kill civilians is repugnant on many grounds, not just legally speaking.
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I could always ignore the comments, but hasn’t the connection to the headlined matter been lost?
– except that artillery has always been an indiscriminate weapon (but is rapidly becoming less so)?
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Gareth, I think the automatic mortar may well have a place in the overall scheme of things but the problem with automating mortars is you take away one of the key advantages of mortars, simplicity and low cost
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“As it is the proposal made here to blow a damn to deliberately kill civilians is repugnant on many grounds, not just legally speaking.”
Never said it wasn’t.
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I’m sure it does violate the letter of thread but I think it brings another dimension to the discussion. Weapon systems do not exist in a vacuum they exist in the context of the organisational culture of the user. I think discussing this adds fullness to the debate. A weapon system was named and it was suggested it be used against a damn. A capability probably well within it’s specifications but extremely illegal. So I think context is being given.
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My God man you will be saying people kill people not guns next…….
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What about Dragon Fire Hmmmmm
120mm Auto Mortar, 3,450 pounds, able to do count-a-battery fire.
probably simple engineering to tern it into 81mm
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TD – “I think the automatic mortar may well have a place in the overall scheme of things but the problem with automating mortars is you take away one of the key advantages of mortars, simplicity and low cost”
Good point – BUT with the STK SRAMS, for example, unless the automatic loading device / arm breaks down and jams solid in the way of the muzzle, then it can be hand loaded, but with a slower rate of fire I am sure !
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everything is legal in total war
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in small wars or restricted combat, collateral damage is to be avoided were possible leave the superposition that the ”Dam” could be blown up IF it will save your troops lives in the taking of said city/area. This example was give were this action was to be part of an ultimatum for either partial or full(unconditional) surrender this will legally put all the blame in the seat of who ever holds said city as they will have firstly refused the ultimatum and secondly the chance to negotiate on the aspects of the said ultimatum.
This type of action should only be used as a last resort after a period of strategic bombing removing the enemies ability to fight.
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the first casualty of war is truth
THEN JUSTICE/LEGALITY as all wars are inhumane.
Even WW2
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”Weapon systems do not exist in a vacuum they exist in the context of the organisational culture of the user.”
Too True. However the Geneva conventions which led to the Law of Armed Conflict are based on soft hearted Western ideals and some parts of them are ignored by western Powers during war. Who’s to say what the completely culturally different ”people” perceive’s as allowed via the laws of their culture in times of war. just look at Afghanistan, Pakistan, Palestine, Somalia, China, Russia-Chechnya. parts of South America.
They all have different culture and different laws , yet we try to constrain them with our perceptions of how war and prisoners are to be treated.
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sorry about bad sentence structure and grammar.
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I am late to this bash so pardon me if I repeat what others have said.
The NATO standard is now 105/155/MLRS. All of these have a role but in what form is the question.
Personally I would like to see both the 105 and 155 developed into a portee configuration with the former on a Warthog/Viking platform and the latter similar to the French Caesar. The 105 option should be a fairly simple programme but the 155 offer a few options. Should we utilise the M777 and develope a bespoke vehicle or simply buy the French platform. AS towed versions of both systems would also be used the M777 probably comes out on top as although the French gun is an L52 it is much heavier in its towed form. The above platforms would negate the need for heavy armoured SP platforms, with both providing some protection to their crews via an armoured cab. 2 would probably fit in a A400 and double that in a C17 but don’t quote me on that it being a guestimate.
Regarding the MLRS, we should restart the lightweight MLRS/Supercat programme ASAP. There would probably be a fair amount of export potential for this with countries like the Netherlands, Germany and France. The guided rockets are an ideal precision attack system with both its unitary and submunition payloads. In fact I would replace all the current heavyweight launch platforms with the lighter version.
Turning to the 120mm vs 81mm Mortar. AS has been pointed out the 120mm is far from a manportable piece of kit. IF vehicle mounted a 105 Portee as discussed above would also fill the role and negate the need to add another calibre in to the British Army. What I would like to see is smart rounds introduced. In the 80s the UK was developing a round called Merlin for the 81mm, as an AT weapon sing a MMW seeker. Could we not add a laser and or GPS to the range of 81mm Mortar rounds. Surely this would be a cheaper alternative to using Javelins. Again there could be some export potential.
In sumary I think we have what we need as far as systems go but I believe the platforms need to be adapted or replaced to make them more suitable for future operations.
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@ DomJ
I think you rplans were just a little misguided, with a dash of insanity.
Your plan to avoid Urban Warfare in Iraq started with the capture of a port city with a population estimated in the mid 40,000’s.
Now as for cutting off Saddam’s oil, there are some significant problems with this. Not least among these is the assumption that all of Iraq’s oil flows into Western tankers, which it doesn’t. I think the Chinese would have something to say about your ban on oil exports, probably seeing it as a Western plot to destabilise their economy.
Next, you seem to be overlooking that sanctions against both Iraq and Libya have not worked in the past (Osama Bin Laden creditied the US sanctions against Iraq that effected the ordinary people the most as one the prominent reasons why he ordered the September 11th attacks). They have only made the situation worse, not better. As many enemies as Iraq had, the Americans and us had more. Money would have flowed in from other places.
Not to mention that assuming your strategy was to be tested, would it not have been better to use the coalition fleet, supplemented by on call land based aircraft to impose your blockade?
Now onto Argentina. The threat posed by the Storm Shadows would be non-existant. Any diplomat with half a brain will know you’re just bullshitting it and that you have no intention of flooding Buenos Aires. At the risk of sounding like a soppy leftist, EVEN I WOULD march on London in protest against such a move. And I wouldn’t stop until Cameron was on trial.
You cannot justify swamping a city and killing hundreds of people while ruining the lives of about three million more, just because they captured some shitty scrap of pete bog in the south atlantic.
No government would do it. Thus the warning strike would just make us a laughing stock.
Now as for WW2 and the bombing campaigns, you have to see the context. Our home nation was being bombed and we were under “threat” of invasion (argue that one among yourselves).
It also must be understood that in the historical time frame, bombing was many things, but accurate was not one of them. This is one of the many considerations, along with the huge amount of casualties being inflicted by the enemy on Russia, that brought about the decision to start using thousand bomber raids on Germany. Even then it was not a widely accepted strategy.
Context is everything Dom.
The world is not perfect and sometimes I think people have glimmering eyed views of the world that they shouldn’t, but most normal people would strongly be opposed to blowing up dams just to try and bring someone to heel.
I would also point you to the opinions of the “terror bombing” strategists who believed that such an action would make the enemy cower in fear and bring down their own leaders. It however has always proved to do the opposite; it unites your enemies against you on a common platform.
Just quickly also with regards to your comments about Urban warfare. You do understand just how prevelant sieges and street battles have been since the invention of the sword, don’t you?
You can only seal off a pocket of resistance for so long, especially in a general war. At some point you have to address the areas of mass, depending on how full they are. Typically you can’t leave a battlegroup behind to try and contain an armoured division while you race off to the capital, not if you value your supply lines at least.
And back to the subject of artillery!
— Is 105/155 the right mix, what about a single intermediate calibre?
I think it’s a good mix. I think introducing a new calibre will cause more headaches than it’s worth.
— Do we need traditional armoured self propelled system like AS90 anymore?
Yes. Unless someone invents a better way to tow a 155mm around and then keep its crew protected in the event of counter battery fire.
— Where do mortars fit in, is there a case, for example, for a 120mm and if so Infantry or Artillery?
I think the advantage of mortars is largely in their portability, such that infantry can carry them around and deploy them for local support without having to try and prise the upper echelons away from their tea and biscuits long enough to authorise the expenditure of larger rounds!
If anything the shift should be to provide Infantry and armour with as much light and portable fire support as possible.
— The bunfight between RA/AAC and RAF for extended range attack?
Until the army air corps figures out a way to drop a 2000lb bomb from a helicopter I think this ones a given. Personally I think at the minute that attack helicopters should be kept by AAC. As for drones, close scouting/patrol covering goes to the army, long range and long duration goes to the air force.
— The role of sythetic training systems?
I guess it depends how good they are.
— Counter battery fires, or more likely counter rocket and mortar fire, do we have the right equipment mix?
No idea. What we need is an artilleryman!
— Where does naval Gunfire and land attack fit into the matrix?
Aren’t these a bit specialist for the artillery discussion. I’d have thought Naval Gunfire is a landing support/suppression role, with uses limited to when we need fire support close to land, while land attack missiles fit more in the wider spectrum of strikes on high level targets, unless we’re talking helicopters and planes off ships providing CAS.
— Are we going precision crazy and ignoring the utility of flattening grid squares?
It depends which grid squares you want flattened and what happens to be in them at the time.
— How can indirect fires support a larger area of operation, is longer range or greater mobility the answer?
I’d have thought mobility would be the key issue. Mortars and light guns for the boys and all that. I think the trouble with longer ranged weapons is that you encourage commanders to go a little too far in the concept of dispersion, as well as becoming reliant on a small number of long ranged assets to cover everyones needs, on the hope that not everyone will need support at once….
— How can we organise direction and management of indirect fires, is it a recce or RA task?
Direction on the front line should come from trained personnel. Control is always going to be an issue. If you can teach reece elements to call it in, then why not, providing it’s dealt with correctly (is this a covert, information gathering recce, or is it an overt, we’re just checking the path type reece?)
— What about UAV’s and CAS?
UAV’s fine in permissive environment. CAS stays as is, called in only under land based direction by controller who can see/knows where target is and where friendlies are.
— What about the impact of greater urbanisation?
Which is why you need a mix of weapons. Not sure if artillery in general is the best tool for urban warfare, unless you’re sure about the occupation state of surrounding buildings.
— What about rockets, is there a case for a smaller round?
If it makes artillery more mobile and quicker to respond with effective volleys, then yes.
— Loitering munitions, a decade too late or armed UAV replacement?
Neither. A lawsuit waiting to happen. Either from the people accidentally killed/blown up because you had to keep binning rounds into the countryside, or from your creditors who are seeking to liquidate your assets because you haven’t paid your enormous ammo bill.
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“everything is legal in total war”
Ah you mean that hypothetical extreme?
Read up on the history of warfare mate. You’ll find total warfare to be a mid twentieth century development and only practised by two main warring parties, one of which got what was coming to them and the other, well the world isn’t perfect.
Human societies have always sough to limit warfare. Tribes do it instinctively. As have almost every other society, the exceptions prove the rule and are just that, exception. The Knights Chivalry code, a construct to limit warfare; the etiquette of siege warfare, a construct to limit warfare; the concept of surrender, a construct to limit warfare. And so on.
You like to think you are being a realist but you are not.
It has shown that throughout the history of this species, warfare has been self-limiting for most of it. Human societies are repulsed by total violence and total war exists only as a theory for all of human history except from 1941 to 1945 and even then, no populations were wholesale exterminated.
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OK then (you are asking for this):
“A weapon system was named and it was suggested it be used against a damn. A capability probably well within it’s specifications but extremely illegal. ”
– what about the Damn Busters? Not using a general purpose weapon, within its capabilities,but specifically researching and building one (and of course using it, rather than adding to “deterrence”)
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Tell me the reasons why the dams were blown ACC. Look them up and you will see the distinction that must be made.
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Hi LJ,
I agree in broad terms, but (to have a discussion forum) there is some detail I would point out:
“Personally I would like to see both the 105 and 155 developed into a portee configuration with the former on a Warthog/Viking platform and the latter similar to the French Caesar. The 105 option should be a fairly simple programme but the 155 offer a few options. Should we utilise the M777 and develope a bespoke vehicle”
– that exists and is shared with the GMLRS-Light
– Warthog idea is great, maybe Viking2’s are hefty enough, too. Army/ RM divide may play into this (commonality of platform across other uses)
” or simply buy the French platform. AS towed versions of both systems would also be used the M777 probably comes out on top”
– agreed for the reason you give (plus commonality with US & Oz, thinking of supplies within any theater)
– “as although the French gun is an L52 it is much heavier in its towed form.”
” The above platforms would negate the need for heavy armoured SP platforms, with both providing some protection to their crews via an armoured cab.”
– lessen, but not negate as the crew while in firing position are unprotected. Also, you need to have a balance between fire support being able to keep up with tactical formation, in any terrain and at all times (=tracked) vs. being able to quickly deploy to where needed (wheeled, especially suited to less “dense” battle fields)
Regarding the MLRS, we should restart the lightweight MLRS/Supercat programme ASAP. There would probably be a fair amount of export potential for this with countries like the Netherlands…
– I definitely agree, as the Supacat would also be part of putting more of artillery on wheels
– the Netherlands first did away with a good numbers of their GMLRS, then Leopards, then AH’s…BUT I think you are still right as they are emphasizing deployability of formations (3 Marine and 3 Army Commando bns all now training together) and long-range, precision munitions (PzH2000 only does 40-42 km and is very heavy to deploy)
“Turning to the 120mm vs 81mm Mortar. AS has been pointed out the 120mm is far from a manportable”
– some of the smart stuff you are calling for already exists for the 120mm; is the size difference too challenging as it has not been copied over to 81? Or is it simply, not minituarization but, that you want some HE to travel along with all the expensive stuff?
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If there is a concentration of industrial plants, there are normally quite a few people around, too?
– I did not want to dive into the argument, but to point to the non-productive nature of it
When the density of battle field as a determining factor was discussed, I (unlike some others)thought it was wholly appropriate to use WW2 for examples – for the want of not enough of later ones to properly address the point
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I’m not using WW2 examples. DomJ predictably is. I’m saying that his idea is murder. All weapon systems must be wielded within the laws and conventions of the time.
And again there is a very big difference between deliberately seeking to kill civilians as the SOLE and COMPLETE objective and their being collateral damage. Blowing those damns would be unacceptable today because we could achieve the same effect without doing so. In the techno-social context of the dam busters it was acceptable.
I don’t see how a discussion about the legal use of weapon systems is irrelevant when a big driving force in artillery in the last decade has been greater precision and a deliberate move away from area weapons like MLRS precisely for reasons of legality and collateral damage. It’s a central part of the subject area. There’s no point talking about weapon systems without discussing how they would / should be used.
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@ Phil re going off topic
The comments on this blog often go off on detours before getting back on course. Stop panicking if this happens. This isn’t uni’.
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I think it’s people moaning that Phil is. Which, like Phil points out, is silly.
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Very true “a big driving force in artillery in the last decade has been greater precision and a deliberate move away from area weapons like MLRS precisely for reasons of legality and collateral damage. It’s a central part of the subject area. There’s no point talking about weapon systems without discussing how they would / should be used.”
– how many meters from target at 70 km’s range was it again for the unitary GMLRS?
– when will the vertical attack mode be available in service, so that will hold true also in urban environments
– Excalibur performance has also been phenomenal; how do we set the guidelines as regards relative costs vs. conventional rounds (not all that are fired can be special versions)
– etc… good topic, I agree
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Thank you x for your barbed comment. See Chris Bs comment.
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Oh yes. Does anyone here know what EXACTOR is?
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It wasn’t a barbed comment actually I was being nice. Several times since you have been posting here you have mentioned going off topic. But seeing as you also seem to like to dictate tone and boundaries to others it isn’t surprising you interpret statements of others as offensive. Tell you what you don’t comment on what I say and won’t comment on anything I say?
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I have not moaned about people going off topic. It really doesn’t bother me at all. I have said to others to just ignore posts they have no interest in. It’s not like I’m posting monologues, people respond to the posts and when they stop then that’s the natural passing of that line of discussion. Besides I don’t think we have gone off topic in this thread.
And if I did misread your non barbed comment then I do apologise. But you have as much form as me in that regard.
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@ACC, ref lightweight missile systems have a look at this, comes in at 10,000kgs. I’m not saying buy it but the photos give a good idea of what’s feasible, wikki have a page on it as well. Also if you wikki thunderbolt II it shows the chinese MRLS mounted on a MAN chassis.
http://www.bing.com/images/search?q=astros+missile&view=detail&id=DA7A61E70DB38C7DDBE8F2ACA55F5A6AB0A61C69&first=0&FORM=IDFRIR
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thunderbolt-2000, my bad!!
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Hi paul g,
The Brazilian one is a saturation rocket system. The types of units that form the battery/ bn working together are on the right track (all are the “same”).
Having said that, the Supacat design should be fine and you can mix & match 155mm & longer reach (with accuracy) at will.
– not forgetting that the fire support up to 10-12 km reach should move with the units, and under armour (when the unit itself is under armour, as a minimum, and with other units we can then look at non-Warrior solutions like Stormer/ Warthog/ Viking… and also 81 in place of 120 so that the mortars share the logistics tail better)
Such a design would leave AS90’s for very special scenarios and moving them to TA (and enjoying all the wonderful part-time benefits of WFM to the full, within a part-time part of the army).
– I am just labouring the point, not being sarcastic
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Talking about putting effective systems on the back of (MAN) trucks:
– Israeli Jumper
– our peaceful SIMMS could turn very evil with it; just put in on a deck that is “out of sight”… but as said, shore bombardment is hardly part of the mission set (?)
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@ACC
“Should we utilise the M777 and develop a bespoke vehicle”
– that exists and is shared with the GMLRS-Light”
I am all for having lighter platforms to carry either a 155mm gun or a lightweight multiple rocket launcher. However, I think you are slightly mistaken when you say that it is exactly the same platform. I believe, unless I am mistaken, that Supacat developed a 6 x 6 platform for the rocket launcher and an 8 x 8 for the M777. The story is that the platforms were rejected eventually because they were insufficiently robust, although there might have been more than a degree of rationalization there. It is more likely we simply ran out of funds!
I agree with you absolutely about the need for a balance between tracked and wheeled platforms, e.g. when you talk about:
“a balance between fire support being able to keep up with tactical formation, in any terrain and at all times (=tracked) vs. being able to quickly deploy to where needed (wheeled, especially suited to less “dense” battle fields)”
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Hi Mike W,
Your end statement is certainly true (=A-stan scuppered a lot of good ideas & developments, but some might be worth resurrecting, whilst keeping all the lessons learnt in mind)
” Supacat developed a 6 x 6 platform for the rocket launcher and an 8 x 8 for the M777. The story is that the platforms were rejected eventually because they were insufficiently robust, although there might have been more than a degree of rationalization there. It is more likely we simply ran out of funds!”
– I was totally unaware that it was two platforms, but what would be the commonality, after adding two wheels (80-90%?)
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Phil, I think Exactor is an RA trade, no idea what they do exactly though
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This is probably an extremely stupid question, but why are we not sticking vls systems on vehicles?
There have been attempts to put mlrs rockets in vls tubes but didn’t work (I think the project was called polar), so why not do the reverse? This would fit in with TD’s mantra for ruthless commonality. Instead of ATACS we could use a SCALP-N, for MLRS we could use a Brimstone variant. Isn’t this the concept behind CAMM? ALso, Lockheed have already done similar with the P44 missile which has a Hellfire warhead, 70km range, and can fit 10 into a mlrs pod. Raytheon and Boeing are also using the Brimstone body for the proposed Hellfire replacement, using the tri-mode seeker from ther SDB2. The reasoning behind this would be to have a common missile architecture, allowing easier upgrades and reduced costs through bulk buying.
With air, sea and land missiles based around ASRAAM, Brimstone,and Stormshadow (and Perseus in the future), wouldn’t this cover the whole spectrum required?
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http://defense-update.com/products/p/portee.htm
http://www.military-today.com/artillery/limaws_r.htm
first one is the 8×6 supacat 155mm portee and the second is the 6×4 MRLS supacat known respectfully as LIMAWS(G) and LIMAWS(R) Lightweight Mobile Artillery Weapon System (gun,rocket). Much as i like the MRLS i feel it would be better served placed on a similiar sized OFS chassis rather than something bespoke, easier for spares in the future or if in some far away land.
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Hi paul g,
Love to read different sources, as they all have a different take, if only ever so slightly
– LIMAWS(G) joins the league of Viking & Warthog, where the helo transportability is assisted by a split into two loads on a “normal” battlefield
– the (R) travels as one load under a Chinook, and can take an ATACSM if something heftier is required, instead of the six pack, just like the bigger brother/ carrier that takes two pods
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shame there’s only photos of the 155mm system i would like to see the demount of the gun, seems strange that BAe dropped it after the brits did.
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@ACC
“I was totally unaware that it was two platforms, but what would be the commonality, after adding two wheels (80-90%?”
Yes, I am not denying that there would be considerable commonality, probably in excess of 80%. It is just that the M777 gun and the rocket pod are not interchageable on the same chassis.
I agree wholeheartedly, though, that the two projects should be revived.
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The LIMAWS(G)
Is (or was) an 8×6 platform, based on SUPACAT.
SOME (but not all references) in the published data implies it was wider than existing jackal design.
There was cricism at the time of Quart into a pint pot, and of the limited off road ability. Not having all axles ,and wheel size/ ground clearence sacrificed to the god of air transportability.
I for one thought it looked a bit overloaded, there was some discussion of the feasability of 10 x 10 design using same axles etc that would have rectified most of that. But I am not sure through the mists of time whether that was any official or just internet wishfull thinking.
The orig idea was that you could either use the gunon or off the vehicle like the original portee.
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I liked the LMAWS(r) a lot (although I thought the penny pinching lack of a third driven axle was ridiculous) and I wonder if we actually need 155mm guns. MRL’s do grid square removal AND precision guidance better than conventional guns, need fewer crew and lighter vehicles to move around. On the debit side they can’t change ammunition types quickly (from HE to smoke, for example), have huge firing signatures and, in the case of MLRS launchers need a crane to reload.
Anyone care to speculate how a battery of LIMAWS(r) would compare with a battery of AS90 with regard to personel and logistic requirements? Would it be acceptable to have one vehicle per battery permenantly loaded with smoke in case it’s needed?
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http://content.yudu.com/Library/A1q3xm/RoyalArtilleryBriefi/resources/37.htm
Don’t know if you guys have read this. It will give everyone food for thought if they haven’t.
Still interested to know what EXACTOR is. I thought it was a weapon system. They or it are out in Afghan now as that link tells you. But nobody is saying what it is. Or does. Or who they might be.
Also, check me out, being on topic!
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Phil, Exactor is an RA Trade, a pinch point one in fact but I have to admit to not knowing exactly what they do
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@Pete Arundel
“I liked the LMAWS(r) a lot (although I thought the penny pinching lack of a third driven axle was ridiculous”
Couldn’t agree more. The very height of fatuousness or fatuity , or whatever the noun is. I couldn’t believe it when I heard it. It turned a vehicle with good cross-country mobility into one that would probably have had to remain virtually static after being dropped by helicopter!
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RE: Mortars – how man portable are 81mm’s? How many rounds can a team carry? Personally I think all crew served weapons (and the crew) need a vehicle; this would not only improve their mobility but the amount of ammo they could carry.
The Soviets and Israelis swear by 160mm mortars for Urban warfare – large payload and near vertical terminal flight profile. I have read an idea of creating 155mm mortars, using same rounds as artillery pieces.
I understand the South Africans are moving from 81mm to 60mm mortars, claiming modern 60mm rounds are as good as the old 81mm ones.
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We have 60mm mortars and 81mm mortars. The 81mm is certainly man portable.
But the ammunition represents a big problem.
Manpacking it can be done at a stretch, ie Falklands but its a last resort.
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What is pinch point?
The fact that there seems to be NOTHING at all about it on the net except that it exists and it goes to Afghan makes me think perhaps we should not know!
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Mike W said “It turned a vehicle with good cross-country mobility into one that would probably have had to remain virtually static after being dropped by helicopter!”
Playing devils advocate here but perhaps the extra weight of a third driven axle would mean that it couldn’t be dropped off by helicopter at all?
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@Pete Arundel,
Perhaps, Pete, but are you being tongue-in cheek as well as playing devil’s advocate? Surely a third (albeit driven) axle could not weigh that much, or could it?
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That’s the problem, Mike, I really have no idea. I can’t think of a vehicle that is available in 6×4 and 6×6 versions that are otherwise identical so that I can make a valid comparison of their weights. I suppose I could e-mail supacat and ask them. Sometimes the direct approach works.
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@Pete Arundel
I can’t help either, Pete. I am not even an engineer, let alone a mechanical engineer!
You could e-mail Supacat, I suppose. I remember contacting them some time ago and they seem quite a helpful company.
I think we certainly need something lighter than (or rather as well as) the present GMLRS. Some capability that will enable us, as ACC says, “to quickly deploy to where needed (wheeled, especially suited to less “dense” battle fields)”
Incidentally, thinking about Supacat, whatever happened to all those 6 x 6 vehicles high mobility vehicles developed to carry the Soothsayer EW kit, until that programme was abruptly terminated at the last moment. I read one report that said that about 25-30 of them were manufactured by Babcock down at Devonport but can’t vouch for the accuracy of that report.
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Hi Mike W, here are half-brothers and cousins for you:
“4×4 Jackal in three variants (1, 2 and 2A), the 6×6 Coyote and the 6×6 MEP (Military Enhancement Programme) vehicle.
The MEP was procured as the base vehicle for the Soothsayer programme, which was cancelled in 2009 – 35 vehicles were produced.”
… so for once, not wasted altogether
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In answer to TD’s question “Where do mortars fit in, is there a case, for example, for a 120mm and if so Infantry or Artillery”, I think there is a case for 120mm mortars in British service (much greater hitting power, etc.). However, I certainly feel that they should be an Artillery weapon, not an Infantry one. In that, I would go along absolutely with Gareth Jones when he says: “Personally I think all crew served weapons (and the crew) need a vehicle; this would not only improve their mobility but the amount of ammo they could carry.” A self-propelled, breech-loading system on something like Warrior or FRES would be ideal.
On the subject of weight , I always remember getting in to conversation with a retired Lieutenant-Colonel and asking him why the British did not use a 120mm mortar. He snorted and bellowed: “Have you tried lifting one of those bloody things?” (by which I suppose he meant the 120mm rounds or bombs). Rather meekly confessing that I had not, I did not pursue the questioning any further! The point he was making, though, was that they are extremely heavy to handle and that rather rules out the Infantry.
Having said that, I believe that the recce component of the joint UK-Netherlands Amphibious Force does use the 120mm mortar. It is used by the Dutch and I think that it is towed, although I am not sure.
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@ACC’
Thanks very much for the info. So is the the 6×6 MEP (Military Enhancement Programme) vehicle actually in British service then? I know the Jackal and Coyotes are.
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Sorry for the delay getting back, works been hectic.
“Allied bombing raids destroyed Iraqi civilian infrastructure. 11 of Iraq’s 20 major power stations and 119 substations were totally destroyed, while a further six major power stations were damaged.[20][21] At the end of the war, electricity production was at four percent of its pre-war levels. Bombs destroyed the utility of all major dams, most major pumping stations, and many sewage treatment plants, turning Iraq from one of the most advanced Arab countries into one of the most primitive. Telecommunications equipment, port facilities, oil refineries and distribution, railroads and bridges were also destroyed.”
From Wiki
Phil
“Military Necessity
Degrading Iraq’s power network degraded their defensive capabilities and degraded their C4I capabilities. Electricity was a key supporting industry to the Iraqi war effort. Targetting it would achieve several military objectives.”
Your title doesnt match your explanation.
Destroying the electricity grid was military useful, but I dont see how it was a necessary.
It was easier than destroying the Military C4I hubs, but the US had a choice. It could have done either.
It chose the easy option that risked fewest American lives, no one cared how much trouble it caused iraqi civillians, then or after, we were on a crusade against people who through premature babies out of incubators…
Civillians were not directly targetted, but they were indirectly targetted, the electricity grid was destroyed and this inflicted quite substantial collective punishment.
“Whilst no effort was made to avoid inconveniencing the Iraqi population targeting took into account proportionality by such measures as targeting transformers instead of generating plant as generating plant took much longer to repair.”
55% of generating capacity was destroyed, a further 30% damaged.
Targets also included damns, water pumping stations, sewage plants, roads, bridges, railways.
Even I struggle to see any military utility in destroying a sewage works, beyond putting presure on the enemy to give quit before their country falls apart.
“There is a proven record of liberal democracies limiting their actions voluntarily to comply with the law of armed conflict as explained by legal experts.”
Where is this proven record?
No state, with its back against the wall, has EVER chosen to lose rather than break these guidelines.
They arent routinely flouted, but thats not the same thing.
When it comes down to it, no American General, President, Congressman or Senetator is going to choose to lose 500 pilots in attacks on command bunkers when he could lose 5 pilots and destroy the neighbouring civillian support infrastructure.
“And these laws are mainstream and central in training and planning considerations.”
Perhaps, but they are set aside whenever it is expedient to do so.
“As it is the proposal made here to blow a damn to deliberately kill civilians is repugnant on many grounds, not just legally speaking.”
Lets stick with Argentina for a moment.
Lets say they reinvade the Falklands.
Instead of sending Dowling home in disgrace for pointing loaded guns at children, they gave him medals for pulling the trigger. Followed by death camps for male islanders and rape camps and forced marriages for the female islanders.
The news is greeted with street parties in Argentina
Would the UK government give a gnats piss about what the ‘law’ said?
Or would it strike back with extreme violence?
RLC
There was a weapon, the puckle gun I think, that had a round bullet for use on chrsitians, and a square for use on muslims.
There were also calls for the fragmenting round restriction not to apply to “natives”, the reason being a European knows that once shot, its best for all sides if he goes to the medical station at the rear, whereas a native may continue to try and fight, to the harm of all…
Chris B
Let them whine…
Freedom of Navigation is guarenteed under law, but is routinely denied, one of the Israeli-Egyopt wars kicked off over it.
I actualy agree RE sanctions.
Long Term Limited Sanctions dont work.
Cubas been under US sanctions for half a decade.
The West has been replaced in Africa by China because China doesnt ask about human rights in the countries it invests in.
” Any diplomat with half a brain will know you’re just bullshitting it and that you have no intention of flooding Buenos Aires”
And yet the fleet went south with nuclear weapons and the aircraft the deploy them….
“It also must be understood that in the historical time frame, bombing was many things, but accurate was not one of them. This is one of the many considerations, along with the huge amount of casualties being inflicted by the enemy on Russia, that brought about the decision to start using thousand bomber raids on Germany. Even then it was not a widely accepted strategy.”
But laws arent contextual.
Thats my point.
Pushed far enough, we would do some *very* unpleasant things.
Sometimes we dont even have to be pushed that far.
“I would also point you to the opinions of the “terror bombing” strategists who believed that such an action would make the enemy cower in fear and bring down their own leaders. It however has always proved to do the opposite; it unites your enemies against you on a common platform.”
Again, I actualy agree here, blowing up houses night after night doesnt work.
The Dam being destroyed would simply collapse Argentina as a state, otherwise, I usualy suggest much as we did in Iraq, the power grid, easily repairable bits at first, with fair peace terms, ie, “get the **** off our islands”, targets and demands slowly escalating in severity, until yeah, we’re demanding unconditional surrender and preparing to kill 3million.
You also then get the more off the wall ideas, like bombing the houses of MP equivilants who voted for war, which quite clearly says, “my war isnt with the people of Argentina”.
Phil
“Human societies have always sough to limit warfare. Tribes do it instinctively. As have almost every other society, the exceptions prove the rule and are just that, exception. The Knights Chivalry code, a construct to limit warfare; the etiquette of siege warfare, a construct to limit warfare; the concept of surrender, a construct to limit warfare. And so on.”
I’ve already answered that….
Codes of War spring up, and last a while, and then someone changes the rules and conquers half the planet.
The Arabs boiled out of Arabia and didnt stop till they reached the atlantic in the west and the pacific in the east, they did so by ripping up the rule book, much of which they then put back in force when the wars became muslim v muslim.
There are also many such codes, they arent universal, sometimes there are even different codes depending on who youre killing.
Gareth
81mm mortar shells weigh 4kg according to wiki.
Thats a lot of weight.
120mm shells weigh 18kg and 40mm grenades a mere 250grams
Thats actualy quite surprising, I forget how heavy things like that are, kinda explains they are so frequently vehicle mounted.
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“Civillians were not directly targetted, but they were indirectly targetted”
Don’t you see mate. That sentence sums up the difference between murder and the fortune of war. You propose murder.
“But laws arent contextual.”
Of course they are! How can they possibly not be? They are social constructs!
“Followed by death camps for male islanders and rape camps and forced marriages for the female islanders.”
Your cheese has slipped off your cracker mate.
“Destroying the electricity grid was military useful, but I dont see how it was a necessary.”
I just told you how it was. I told you what the objectives were.
“no one cared how much trouble it caused iraqi civillians”
You seem to have two personalities. Won’t somebody think of the poor babies in incubators and then, kill thousands of horrible Argentine civilians because their military has somehow dug a secret tunnel to the Falklands, emerged from it and overpowered the garrison and now they are rounding up the males and executing them and raping the women.
I told you that civilian concerns were one of the most important considerations in the bombing of Iraqi infrastructure. Legal concerns were paramount. The coalition made every attempt to stick within the agreed laws of armed conflict, unlike you who thinks you are justified in killing innocents to save a peat bog which the Argentines are about as likely to successfully invade as me getting to have a threesome with Megan Fox and Kirsten Dunst.
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Mike W at 3.24pm
“However, I certainly feel that they should be an Artillery weapon, not an Infantry one”
But what about armoured infantry and mechanised infantry ? If its a turreted breach loading mortar on a Warrior, or a STK “automatic” 120mm on the back of a Warthog ? why should they belong to the RA – but then if they were to be RA crews attached to the armoured / mechanised infantry would it matter ? For example if Royal Armoured Corps provide the drivers for Warthog’s, then would mixing cap badges within a unit really be a problem?
I mentioned the golf bag approach to equipping infantry mortar units back on the 3rd at:
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2011/09/indirect-fires/#comment-28536
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Mechanized and Armoured Infantry could and should certainly use 120 mm mortars, since for vehicle-mounted applications the weight is not a real issue. The french 2R2M weights 1,5 ton in semi-automatic vehicle variant, and 627 in the towed, wheeled manual mortar variant, for example.
A use in the Infantry is also not so unthinkable: the towed wheeled, manual variant is used by some Infantry units of the italian army, Alpini (mountain troops) included, who use it in replacement of the 105 mm dismountable mountain howitzer. The crew is of 4 men + 1 normally. The mortar is towed behind jeeps and moved under slung from NH90 helicopters. In France, however, i believe that the 120 mm mortar went into the Artillery regiments (8 in each regiment).
In Japan the weapon is also in service, both APC-carried and towed, but i don’t know well how it is distributed to units.
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@Jed
Yes, apologies. It really was woolly thinking on my part. When I said, “I certainly feel that they should be an Artillery weapon, not an Infantry one.”, I was in part responding to TD’s original question, which specifically mentions the terms “Infantry” and “Artillery”. However, more than that, I was thinking that they should certainly not be muzzle-loading weapons, to be loaded by the infantry fighting on foot. 120 mm weapons, I think, would be much too heavy for that, so in that sense not an infantry weapon.
I’ve had a look at your earlier post and, yes, you’re right. I don’t suppose it matters whether the operators are Armoured/Mechanised Infantry or RA. The mixing of cap badges should not matter.
However, if ever enough funding were made available to the British Army to enable them to field a heavy mortar, can you imagine the cap-badge in-fighting that would take place for control of those weapons, or is that being too cynical?
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have a look at this photo on the TD Tumblr
155 and 120 on the same firing point, interesting
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Each French regiment of (towed, but maybe the Self Propelled too) 155 mm guns has a 8-pieces Brandt MO120RT 120 mm mortar battery as well. They are towed by VAB 4×4 armoured vehicles which carry 70 rounds as well.
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wheels on the mortar? big girls blouses!!
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Base plates are heavy dude. 🙂
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Especially in a weapon with a 114 kg barrel…
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Once we get some artillery on wheels (meaning other than towed)e.g. for the mechanised parts of MRBs, then we can marry some heavy mortars on wheels with them
“a joint development between IGG, ST Kinetics of Singapore, which manufactures the 120mm Super Rapid Advanced Mortar (SRAM) system; South Africa’s Denel Land Systems, which supplies the Arachnida fire control system; Rheinmetall Denel Munitions, which makes the ammunition, and BAE Systems, makers of the RG31 mine-resistant armour protected utility vehicle. Reports credited the Agrab with a range of 8200 meters.
The Denel Arachnida computerised fire control system enables the crew, consisting of a commander, a driver and a loader, to bring the mortar into action within less than a minute after the vehicle stops, reports suggest.”
– The Arachnida is already mounted in the UAE’s Denel 155mm G6, should we want a package deal
– I would prefer Archer (still a “package deal” through BAE) as the crew can stay under armour & NBC cover all the time
… 3 men per mortar and 2 per Archer; ten men driving around at 60 mph would have massive fire power and reach behind just any terrain feature that the target might try to utilise for cover
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114kg, that’s why in the REME we’d have one under each arm, y’know cover all the arcs and that!! (have you spotted the squaddie piss take yet?)
anyhoo said it before say it again love to denel on board, maybe we could actually start making ammo in the UK again, oh wishful thinking!!
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I wanted to verify this bit, and it wasn’t easy so excuse the google translation from Arabic, re the Agrab mortar solution:
” When SRAMS is installed on a lighter chassis, a spade is normally lowered to the ground but as the RG31 Mk 5 chassis is so stable this is not required for this application. It has a Recoil force of less than 26 Tonnes.For this application the one hundred and twenty mm SRAMS fires to the rear and a total of 46 120 mm [rounds are carried; google translate still has to learn shells/ charge/ round/ ammo terms, it seems, as it did not quite manage to the end]
– so now the one minute from stopping to firing is credible
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Is that a mortar tube under your arm or are just pleased to see me?
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Paul, if you did have one under each arm, the right hand would be ‘awaiting spares’ and the left hand would be fitted with a pot noodle heater and compact hammock
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So we don’t need no stinkin’ armoured mortars, be they infantry or RA – we just need to clone Paul G. !!! 🙂
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More interesting stuff from S. Africa;
“The M6 is currently replacing the 81mm mortar in South African service. The specially developed 2.2kg Long range bomb is claimed to have similar destructive effects to a 81mm and a somewhat greater range (6,000m). The total weapon system is also lighter and logistics are simplified since the same rounds can be used at platoon, company and battalion level.”
http://www.angelfire.com/art/enchanter/mortars.html
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another interesting article;
Click to access 200711272205571.pdf
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slight flaw in the plan, i was normally so far back i sent my washing forward, therefore a danger of drop shorts. (BTW had a hammock, and a microwave in my truck, old and bold QM didn’t like the microwave)!!
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“I have said before I see 16 AAB as a cold war anachronism and would get rid of it.”
Why is it a Cold War anachronism? It has very clear and defined specialist roles that are all very relevant to the possible actions of the future (and indeed the present).
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“I have said before I see 16 AAB as a cold war anachronism and would get rid of it.
Why is it a Cold War anachronism? It has very clear and defined specialist roles that are all very relevant to the possible actions of the future (and indeed the present).”
A Brigade without a realistic share of armour; with parachutists without enough planes to realistically deploy, with the usefulness of mass parachute assaults in very, very serious doubt, without an organic air lift, and depending on a fleet of helicopters, coming in from the RAF, insufficient to move the brigade around.
If it must be an Air Assault (air mobile is more realistic) brigade, it needs helicopters.
A single battalion of infantry takes 20 Chinook-lifts equivalents to move.
I believe that there only are 10 deployed at any one time in Afghanistan, and a fleet of 60, yes, will be able to support a slightly bigger deployment, but it ends there.
Actually, 16AA has many flaws. Hate me for it, but it is true. It would have made at least 3 times as much sense to cut more 16AA but retain amphibious capability.
That, at least, existed, and in the real world, not on paper.
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RE “A Brigade without a realistic share of armour”
– a recce element, backed up by flying tanks
RE ” with parachutists without enough planes to realistically deploy”
– would you ever want to (at the same time, to the same drop zone) do more than a bn at a time; we sure can do that – and take it from there, to the whole bde, or even more to follow
RE “without an organic air lift, and depending on a fleet of helicopters, coming in from the RAF, insufficient to move the brigade around”
– that is jointness (coming from RAF, who in more normal times mix the fixed wing and rotary (heavy) in an optimal way?)
– when would you ever move the whole bde “around” in one go? CFR. below
– having enough of strategic mobility (without going “begging”) is a more serious issue than mobility once deployed
RE: “If it must be an Air Assault (air mobile is more realistic) brigade”
– you are of course right on nomenclature (only a small part of the relevant US divisions are actually “air assault”)
RE ” it needs helicopters.
A single battalion of infantry takes 20 Chinook-lifts equivalents to move”
– yes, a third of the Chinook force, and throw in all the Pumas, when the problem at hand is that urgent and warrants the simultaneous assignment… where is the problem?
I really don’t think we should try to define “cut” priorities within the easiest&fastest to deploy force elements (yes, I would have kept all of the amphibiosity, too… the great tragedy is that the 4th Commando was cut on the pretext of “never any more of that East of Suez stuff”)
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“A Brigade without a realistic share of armour”
It would be almost impossible to support armour through its spectrum of operations and it is free to make use of a FR Sqn if it needs it.
“with parachutists without enough planes to realistically deploy,”
Parachuting is just one role out of many. There are sufficient assets to parachute in the Airborne Task Force.
“with the usefulness of mass parachute assaults in very, very serious doubt”
There is no role for mass parachute assaults in 16X. It’s not one of their capabilities.
“without an organic air lift”
It has organic air lift through being part of the Joint Helicopter Command. The Bde and the helicopters come under the same commander – that’s pretty organic.
“insufficient to move the brigade around”
A massed brigade air assault is not part of its requirements either, anymore than a massed parachute assault is.
“If it must be an Air Assault (air mobile is more realistic) brigade, it needs helicopters.”
It’s got them.
You think the brigade exists to operate as a massed formation. It does in some circumstances but it is actually better described as an institutional knowledge and experience base to generate units that can launch the full spectrum of air manoeuvre operations and provide a high readiness response force.
It has its own organic helicopter assets and it works closely with those assets under JHC. It has sufficient air assets to fulfil its operational requirements, which have never been to launch a brigade sized air assault force which is something that only the US Army can do.
Although I suspect if it really really had to it could do it.
If 16X didn’t exist it would be necessary to invent it. The only thing I would change is the name from Air Assault to Air Manoeuvre which more accurately describes its range of roles.
I still don’t see whats Cold War about it either.
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Ahh… I can see that I missed some good words:
” generate units that can launch the *full spectrum of air manoeuvre operations* [there might be other manoeuvre units doing the rest of that “manoeuvre”] AND provide a high readiness response force”
– my only complaint is the balance between strategic and tactical mobility, but the the former has not been set as a brigade-level requirement (whether THAT is right or not – needs another thread)
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Phil and ACC
Gabrielle summed it up quite nicely but this is my take. ACC “a third of Chinooks and the Pumas – where is the problem” – how do we rapidly get all these assets to the theatre of operations exactly ? More on that below.
16 AAB is the post-cold love child of 5th Airborne and 11th Airmobile (? might be the wrong number, cant be arsed to look it up).
5th Airborne was of course the full air assault formation based on the paras, but rounded out with an additional battalion(s) for tactical air landing. We no longer have enough transport aircraft to fulfill this role, and cannot drop / tactical land a full brigade including artillery, engineer, medical and signal support.
The air mobile brigade was a late cold war experiment to group together all the anti-armour helicopters to gain some operational mass.
Add the two together and you apparently get all the benefits !
However as per above, we no longer have the RAF transport aircraft numbers, and apparently can’t even afford the parachute training for the majority of the Parachute Regiment. As for grouping the majority of the Army’s armed helictopers (AH64 Longbow Apache) and RAF transport helo’s (Chinook and Puma) together with the “airborne” infantry function – well great, except they are no longer facing a threat to the inner German border and aren’t based within flying range of their possible battle ground. IF we used a QE class carrier, HMS Ocean, and a couple of big container ships, then we MIGHT be able to move these helicopters to where they are needed in a rush. We simply don’t have the strategic mobility, via air or sea to make the current 16 AAB a useful rapid reaction / contingency brigade (which is supposed to be its “Future Force” role alongside 3 CDO Bgde).
SO – I would split the helo’s into units that belong to the 4 or 5 MRB’s – if these are to be our primary units of combat power.
As I have said before, in this world of “asymmetric” threats I would turn all three battalions of the Parachute Regiment, the Pathfinders, 7 RHA and Para-Engineers into the “Army Special Operations Forces” – call them Para-Commandos (Belgian model), Para-Rangers (US model) or whatever you like, BUT acknowledge that they will not all be para-trained, and we have enough aircraft to do a limited drop, in a limited threat scenario etc to perhaps single battalion plus small support units level, perhaps for scenarios such as securing airports or sea ports for extraction / evacuation of British Nationals etc – you get it I am sure.
I am not anti-Para, nor Anti-AAC, just dont think 16 AAB is a useful formation as it stands.
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@ Gabby
True. The US Army, the world’s second biggest airforce and the world’s largest operators of helicopters, has a budget of $7.5billion. Given they get so much more bang for their buck you could easily see that is £7.5billion.
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Phil said:
“You think the brigade exists to operate as a massed formation. It does in some circumstances but it is actually better described as an institutional knowledge and experience base to generate units that can launch the full spectrum of air manoeuvre operations and provide a high readiness response force.”
Wow, did you come up with that yourself 🙂 Sounds a little like Public Relations Officer speak to me….. only joking. I understand this, I just think the “generate units that launch the full spectrum of air manoeuvrings operations” is actually bollocks; as in that might be the aim, but it does not really have the resources to “generate” such force. My model would keep the institutional knowledge element, but spread the helo assets into smaller units that would be able to work closely with, and deploy on the same rotational schedule as the MRB’s.
“It has its own organic helicopter assets and it works closely with those assets under JHC. It has sufficient air assets to fulfil its operational requirements, which have never been to launch a brigade sized air assault force which is something that only the US Army can do.”
Agreed / completely understood – but it’s not just about the name, I don’t think its wrong because it can’t actually carryout a brigade size air assault operation by helo. I just think as a formation it suffers from a complete lack of strategic mobility and that there is no longer a compelling operational reason to group together the armies premier / elite “light infantry” formation with the majority of the vertical lift air transport assets.
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“5th Airborne was of course the full air assault formation based on the paras, but rounded out with an additional battalion(s) for tactical air landing. We no longer have enough transport aircraft to fulfill this role, and cannot drop / tactical land a full brigade including artillery, engineer, medical and signal support.”
We never could then either unless we were part of a coalition involving the US. But it didn’t stop us pretending we could.
16X has a far more realistic and eminently do-able parachute requirement.
“The air mobile brigade was a late cold war experiment to group together all the anti-armour helicopters to gain some operational mass.”
No it wasn’t. 24 Airmobile Bde was an anti-tank formation. It comprised three battalions of infantry whose structure was orientated entirely around providing 50 Milan FPs each.
The attack helicopters were not attached to it, they remained devolved as it were to the Divisions. Arguably after 1992 the whole formation became very pointless. Which is why it isn’t around now.
16X and 24X have nothing in common except the word “air” in their titles.
“together with the “airborne” infantry function – well great, except they are no longer facing a threat to the inner German border and aren’t based within flying range of their possible battle ground.”
They are grouped together to provide the institutional knowledge and experience to operate effectively. It is also an administrative convenience.
There are no intentions to deploy a mass of AHs. They are just grouped together for the reasons I stated above.
“We simply don’t have the strategic mobility, via air or sea to make the current 16 AAB a useful rapid reaction / contingency brigade (which is supposed to be its “Future Force” role alongside 3 CDO Bgde).”
Yes we do. ABTF is properly resourced. As is SLE. And the brigade can generate a force structure for enduring operations. It is a unit which provides rapid reaction units, it is not a rapid reaction unit in itself.
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Hi Jed,
” was a late cold war experiment to group together all the anti-armour helicopters”
– gave the impetus to spend the money on any real ones – have turned out really useful! Smaller enemy – deployed in smaller packets
“We simply don’t have the strategic mobility, via air or sea to make the current 16 AAB a useful rapid reaction / contingency brigade (which is supposed to be its “Future Force” role alongside 3 CDO Bgde).”
– point awarded; I thought I made that point, too?
– would we want to intervene with a bde force; to me implies that 2-3 would perhaps follow (what’s left, other than TA – if it ever gets to be formed units again?)CFR. below
–“we have enough aircraft to do a limited drop, in a limited threat scenario etc to perhaps single battalion plus small support units level, perhaps for scenarios such as securing airports or sea ports for extraction / evacuation of British Nationals etc”… so we can do two of those at the same time, without mobilising the reserves: 1. with the RAF Rgmnt specialists trained to secure an airfield, and 2. with the RMs, to take over once a port has been secured
… again, where is the problem?
” split the helo’s into units that belong to the 4 or 5 MRB’s – if these are to be our primary units of combat power”
– rather, attach any number of the 4 bn’s to the Battle Group’s of these 4-5, depending on which would need airmobility to support their manoeuvre (the helos can be switched more easily than the bn’s – just think of the LCV’s from Burma, halt ops! – to the Med – to the English Channel)
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“Wow, did you come up with that yourself :-)”
I did, what can I say. It doesn’t come from any spin based document, it comes from practical experience of what they are trying to accomplish by putting the AHs together.
“is actually bollocks; as in that might be the aim, but it does not really have the resources to “generate” such force.”
But it does. There is sufficient lift for ABTF and there are sufficient SHs.
ABTF is operational right now. As is SLE. And they are resourced appropriately.
And their missions are appropriate. Massed parachute assault is not one of them. Not least because it is doctrinally extremely dodgy.
“My model would keep the institutional knowledge element, but spread the helo assets into smaller units that would be able to work closely with, and deploy on the same rotational schedule as the MRB’s.”
That is exactly what does happen and what will happen. You know as well as I do that peacetime organisations reflect administrative ease. A battalion never deploys as a battalion, a brigade never in its peacetime ORBAT. Although those AHs are under JHC they are available to the Army as a whole. 16X and JHC does exactly what you want it to do in the quote above.
The AHs are not slaved to the brigade.
“and that there is no longer a compelling operational reason to group together the armies premier / elite “light infantry” formation with the majority of the vertical lift air transport assets.”
2 and 3 PARA are there to provide the ability to generate the ABTF. They always have been there for that role. And that role is part of 16X because 16X holds the assets to enable that role.
If you moved 2 and 3 PARA you’d need to get those assets from somewhere else and as ABTF is a specialist function you’d need a centre of institutional knowledge, experience and excellence, which is otherwise known as 16X. It doesn’t exist by accident.
I think it has very real roles and is resourced for them.
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“perhaps single battalion plus small support units level, perhaps for scenarios such as securing airports or sea ports for extraction / evacuation of British Nationals etc – you get it I am sure.”
I give you four letters, and you already know what they are going to be! ABTF!
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I understand and agree the last sentence in “ABTF is properly resourced. As is SLE. And the brigade can generate a force structure for enduring operations. It is a unit which provides rapid reaction units, it is not a rapid reaction unit in itself.”
– what does the rest of it mean?
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“- what does the rest of it mean?”
Which bit? ABTF and SLE?
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Yes, with those two it might be readable (to a layman, say, a civvy).
Cheers
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ABTF is the Airborne Task Force. A battlegroup for parachute operations held at I think extremely high readiness.
SLE is the Spearhead Land Element. A light role infantry battalion held at very high readiness for contingency operations.
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…something form 1998 Defence Review ( a good one, btw, except the appendices about alternative task force make ups – academic BS, clearly McKinsey that was in the vogue then)
Or, something that really exists?
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Sorry, Phil, I missed your 8:44 post (ref. my question on the acronyms)
– even though I agree that it should work like that (as you say), I don’t actually believe it
– if it did work like you say, why was it that Black Watch was put on alert in the early Libya days (a mere 540 strength – who would call that battalion)… until one of the RM Cdo’s sailed into the Med (long planned, just like Southern Mistral exercise with the French… we all believe this).
If you read the Libya thread from those days (and I am no war monger) you can see that I advocated taking Gaddafi’s compound from the inside, with an air assault – diversion by the RM would have been like eating your daily slice of toast, right.Putting a quick end to it.Well, better this way: one casualty on the Italian roads, that’s all.
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A bit off topic but I don’t think 16AAB and 3CDO should be immune from scrutiny about structures but I also tend to think they bring something useful by the very nature of their being different!
Perhaps they both face a challenge from the so called line infantry, is there really that much difference between them now to justify the significant extra cost, especially RM?
Its an open question and I think they can but its definately something for them to think about. If they are perceived as just another collection of cap badges that slot into an enduring deployment the same as the 1st blankshires then question will be asked are they worth it
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AAC
Where was 16X in March 2011 😉
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Phil:though I agree that it should work like that (as you say), I don’t actually believe it
– so when is the theory going turn into practice?
TD: I saw a statistic where the RM bn-equivalent came below an army bn in annual cost
– can’t be because of the kit (they have many ‘specials’) so must be about lower overheads (both have the same ultimate HQ as Dr. Fox calls it. One of my ex-CEO’s was asking for a neutron bomb to put under (our) HQ: with the people gone but building intact the market valuation for the company (ability to produce results) would have gone up immediately
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16X was taken out of the rapid reaction role because of the need to do two medium enduring operations. As was 3 Commando. Because of SFSG there were no units to generated the ABTF from 2008 which is the time of 16X first deployment to Afghan. After this deployment just been 16X has been taken out of the roulement for Afghan ands previous role resumed. ABTF has been stood back up and SLE will be sourced from the brigade too. The Commandos have a third unit lying around and so despite also being on the sane boat (pun intended) as 16X there was still the ability to generate a landing force.
So it works from now. That is the plan as it stands now. 3 Commando will do the same when it finishes coming home in November.
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TD. It’s not the units that are expensive. Their roles are expensive. The units themselves are not expensive. The training isn’t that specialised or particularly expensive. Para’s do a modified infantry course and the RM course is only a couple of weeks longer than normal. A line unit tasked to parachute would cost as much. Ditto amphibious assault.
The real question is whether you want to keep the roles not the units. I think we need those roles. Remove the parachute role and The Parachute Regiment costs the same as another infantry Bn.
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ACC, was that a comparison of a light role infantry battalion?
Can’t see it myself
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I see the point but have to say I remain sceptical on a cost for cost basis.
The problem I was getting at is that for the last half decade in Afghanistan Para and Commando have been more or less treated the same as the blankshires so those bean counters will look at the comparisons and ask a few searching questions. This is a big future challenge for both RM and PARA, in a shrinking overall force size with the county regimental associations and old boy network on the warpath, they are going to have to find a role that is sufficiently different from the rest and find a way of bouncing those searching questions back
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Parachuting and amphibious landing is very distinct. Getting the Blankshires parachute trained would cost precisely the same as the Parachute Reg. I’m not sure the Commandos cost anymore as units but certainly the brigade is specialised but again if you want to do amphibious operations you need those units.
Remove their roles and neither unit costs much different from line units.
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I don’t disagree Phil, just saying that in the last 5 years the majority of RM and Para have been acting as a standard infantry role, perceptions !!
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That was thanks to Telic and Herrick running concurrently from
2006 to 2009. I think it shows their flexibility! But then on mans poison is another mans …
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TD: Yes it was, and just shows that cost accounting is bollocks (or the RM runs a lean and mean shop compared to the army; not a fair comparison when a lot of their support is sourced from ‘indivisible’ capabilities, supported through army’s overheads)
So Phil, let me try to translate, without acronyms what you are saying (which is, I believe, I have been trying to say to Jedi on other threads):
– in 16X you can, from the 2+2 bns have 1+1 (rotating) in high readiness, as not all units can be at high readiness all the time
– should the SLE need to follow an amphibious entry, then one of the three RM bn’s could be the first one (does not exclude para entry) and the SLE will then follow one or both of them, as and when needed as they can all be in high readiness,
– but in the RM they have their wayward ways and sometimes go on ships for prolonged periods (perhaps to the wrong ocean/sea). As the NATO fun is now mainly ski trips at sunny Easter time in Norway, the three units have been brought together, so that at least one of them can be kept ready to go (ie. 50% of the force in the UK, if one happens to be away, which would be several months each year?)
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“A bit off topic but I don’t think 16AAB and 3CDO should be immune from scrutiny about structures but I also tend to think they bring something useful by the very nature of their being different!”
Very much agreed admin.
I am 100% convinced that 3Cdo needs a Limited/Punitive Intervention partner brigade, and i don’t care if that is not the 16AAb that we know and love today, but it will inevitably end up involving the para brigades so someone, please, come up up with a sensible structure for a light-weight and rapidly deployable brigade formation formed from the the ‘corpse’ of 16AAB!
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That’s broadly right. Spearhead Bn (SLE) would usually be flown into the theatre since they are at 24 hrs notice. The Black Watch you mention were the SLE when Libya kicked off and their potential mission was just what SLE is meant for.
In the future the reaction forces will be an extreme readiness SLE, a very high readiness ABTF, a high readiness MRB and the UKs amphibious force based around a Commando battle group whose readiness will vary depending on if it’s at sea.
SLE is such high readiness the units rotate very often.
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Phil,
Hats off when that will be/ has been achieved. Where does the jointness with the French (intervention forces) sit here? Only at some HQ level,under which the assigned units exercise (ie. copying the NATO concept and the HQ’ing experience that we already have?)
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It all comes together next month when 16X has regenerated from Herrick 13. With the obvious fact that the high readiness brigade is in Afghan until 2014.
I have no idea about the French.
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Phil
I have been unable to access the site for hours and am typing this on a touch screen while watching a cracking opening game of the NFL season – so apologies for spelling etc…..
I understand all your points and obviusly agree especially ref peace time orbats etc in some respects i am being pedantic about semantics but I am very sceptical about the ability of 16 AAB to generate force beyond the ABTF, and I completely disagree with respect to JHC and the actual availability of helo assets, and while I comletley understand the flexibility the JHC force structure provides, I think it has to change if we transition to the 5 MRB’s force structure.
Meanwhile lets just call it something else 🙂
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JJHC – with the Commando helo force as part of it?
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“It would not be buddied with a single patrol of course but in this context, what does FireShadow provide that an armed UAV doesn’t?”
Can you provide so many armed UAVs to cover the requirement and give the coverage that Fire Shadow is (hopefully) going to provide, for the same cost?
No. Not even the US Army judges itself capable to do it.
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On the subject of Para’s, I think there are some surprising misunderstandings taking place.
For example, the assumption that just because they’re parachute trained means they would always deploy by this method. There’s helicopters and there is the possibility of air landings made in an enemy air base, perhaps a civilian air port, designed to secure an air head for follow on forces.
On the the subject of helicopters, it’s not just Chinook or Puma or Merlin, but Lynk as well that can be used, albeit not the most ideal in terms of it’s carrying capacity.
And lastly, I’m not sure where the fury of sorts over not being able to deploy the entire brigade comes from? Look at Operation Barras in Sierra Leone. That was a much smaller operation that didn’t require a whole brigade, but did require troops familiar with the nature of such heliborne assaults.
And lastly, with regards to not being able to airlift an entire brigade by helicopter or C-130, I’d make the point that the Royal Marines don’t have sufficient capacity to land their entire brigade on a beach in one shot either.
Like the helicopters with 16 AAB, the landing craft would need to shuttle back and forth to land the entire force of Marines. So it’s even stevens really.
@ JED
That was a great game! Allow me to plug my blog at this juncture, as the NFL is one of my great passions;
http://www.keepingthechainsmoving.blogspot.com
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Gab, was that a serious question
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Hi Chris B,
I don’t think it is a race between these specialists “Like the helicopters with 16 AAB, the landing craft would need to shuttle back and forth to land the entire force of Marines. So it’s even stevens really.”
– but addressing the (to me unexplicable) feeling on this website that they don’t have “a place” going forward; comes across stronger for the paras/ 16AAB than the RM, but regardless…
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There is no requirement to deploy the brigade as a brigade in a rapid manner. The only high readiness brigade in the British Army is the one that is in Afghan at present. 16X provides units at very and extremely high readiness, the Brigade itself is not at this level of readiness. Certainly it can be bought forward to this level if needed and given time but it is not its standard setting.
The days of the entire Army being at around the same readiness state has been over since the Cold War.
Working with helicopters is not a matter of just stepping on and then running off when they land. Planning and organising an air assault operation takes a lot of institutional knowledge and experience and it makes sense to concentrate that institutional knowledge so it can be built on and be farmed out if needs be.
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Yep…” it makes sense to concentrate that institutional knowledge so it can be built on and be farmed out if needs be”
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“Gab, was that a serious question”
Very serious.
Fire Shadow might be lost at the end of each mission, but in the end it is all about balance in cost and capability.
It is meant to be cheap enough to be sacrificeable, while delivering Tactical UAV recce and attack capability.
How many Fire Shadows you’ve got to lose before you have expended the same money necessary for a Reaper (124 million pounds for 5 Reapers gives a cost of 24.8 million each), its crew, its fuel, its support, and the Brimstone / Paveway IV it would drop to do the same attack done by a Fire Shadow, when the Paveway IV alone is likely to cost like 5 Fire Shadow or more?
How many armed drones can be financed with a budget of nK pounds? None. They cost millions, and nK more pounds afterwards to fly, arm, support.
The Army will manage to field some Fire Shadows in Afghanistan next year.
But the Fire Shadow budget would have not financed any additional Reaper, it would not be enough.
It is a very cost-effective expansion in capability, even if it is not recoverable.
Making it recoverable would have meant making it bigger, more complex.
More expensive.
Thus harder to procure.
Thus potentially even more hesitatingly used.
Germany acquired the Harop to cover a similar requirement.
Harop that is more expensive, by a good bit, than Fire Shadow. Still, it was considered cost-effective.
Arguably, in this specific case, giving the munition the capacity to be recovered was “gold plating”. It is a matter of balance.
Can armed drones do the work? Yeah, that and more, probably.
Can they do it for the same cost? No.
Can the Army / Armed Forces realize the same coverage with armed drones, and have enough drones for “higher echelon” work at strategical level? No.
Could the Fire Shadow budget fund a number of armed drones that could deliver at least the same effect? No.
Money well spent.
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@ ACC
I wasn’t implying that a race for the beaches was on! 😉
Just saying, the Para’s are being heavily criticised for not being able to deploy as an entire brigade, but then nor can the Marines, as reaffirmed by one of the recent parliamentary answers.
I think both have their little niche into which they currently fit snugly.
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I enjoyed the parliamentary answer, too, as with CS & CSS elements (but not the ones that specifically deal with that nuisance, water) the Battle Group strength is set at 1800.
– I wonder if Phil can enlighten us how this would rate in comparison with the strength of the two 16X rapid elements, put together, but again not counting in transport planes related personnel?
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“Just saying, the Para’s are being heavily criticised for not being able to deploy as an entire brigade, but then nor can the Marines, as reaffirmed by one of the recent parliamentary answers.”
Before retiring a Bay and putting a LPD in mothball and deciding to downsize the readiness requirement, it was possible to deploy at near brigade level. While 16X couldn’t even before the SDSR (indeed, helicopters are the only thing we’ll have more than before if things do not change again. There’s gonna be more helos than even SDR98 promised… still not enough though).
Now none of the two can.
That’s what really, really sucks. I would have preferred losing 16AA and think of a long-term plan for moving an Air Mobile battalion (perhaps with a supremely-deployable battery of 120 mm mortars) inside each MRB instead.
PARA regiment safe, capability of parachuting a battalion, plus 1 PARA in support of Special Forces also safe, but closure of the 7 RHA and other 16X brigade units and downsizing of the para requirement, with consistent savings.
Amphibiosity maintained.
Each MRB would then had a specialized air mobile battalion to use as Spearhead element, all phased in the rotation of the Readiness period between the brigades themselves.
For me, it would have been a lot better.
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Regarding 16 AA I think 5 scots and 1 RIrish should be absorbed into the multi-role brigade system. Whilst the two para battalions should be put into a Brigade Combat Team; with enough Para trained support units for two battalions, such as the 173 Airborne Brigade Combat Team. The Marines should also follow the BCT route, I think we have just enough ships for two commandos.
Onto the matter of indirect fires, I think 120mm mortars should be introduced and should be given to the infantry. Whether this be creating a Fires company in each battalion, which has three platoons: One of FACs, one 81mm and one 120mm. Or alternatively we can return to having a heavy mortar company in each brigade, this would mean giving the pieces to the RA. Either way I believe 120mm mortars are needed to support infantry operations, as they are a rapid and deadly piece of artillery which mobility and massive firepower.
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The SDSR mentions that the Army of the future will have “deployable surveillance to protect forward operating bases and a force protection system to protect against indirect fire such as artillery and mortars.”
Rightly or wrongly, I took that latter part of that to refer to C-RAM weapons. It is an area about which I know very little but I would appreciate any knowledge that people have. After all, one of TD’s questions is “Counter battery fires, or more likely counter rocket and mortar fire, do we have the right equipment mix?”
Now, I wasn’t aware that we had much of an “equipment mix” at all in that area. In fact, I read somewhere the other day that the “Centurion” (Phalanx on a low loader) weapons had been withdrawn, that the Phalanxes had been returned to the Navy, etc. etc.). How accurate that report is I do not know but we might be in something of a predicament if we had to intervene in a region and set up Forward Operating Bases that were subject to artillery and mortar fire.
So does anyone know what the plans are for the future? It has been suggested that the British Army is interested in eventually acquiring some Skyshield systems from Germany. The Germans have apparently already bought some for their own forces but I am not sure whether they are for AA purposes or C-RAM. Apparently, and correct me if I am wrong, those weapons can be dual-purpose. My guess is that we shall have to wait a long time for such a capability.
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I like the term ‘will’ as if it is something to be gifted to the Army by this government when in fact it has had it for ages
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2010/07/another-look-at-towers-and-blimps/
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2010/08/towers-and-blimps-follow-up/
These posts are quite old and a lot has seeped out since then
A good place to read all about it is here (a few people have posted this link before)
http://content.yudu.com/Library/A1q3xm/RoyalArtilleryBriefi/resources/4.htm
and in terms of the SDSR impact on the RA, have a read of the Gunner Magazine
Click to access 11_Gnr_Nov_10_email.pdf
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I believe the German Skyshield buy was for a battery in Airfield defence role (very cold-war style if you ask me!) and a deployable battery for missions abroad.
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Hi Mike,
They bought two systems ” The Germans have apparently already bought some for their own forces but I am not sure whether they are for AA purposes or C-RAM. Apparently, and correct me if I am wrong, those weapons can be dual-purpose”
– yes, they are dual-purpose and at least one has been deployed to A-stan (no AA there)
– to me it would seem a much more practical solution then the Iron Dome (that is also operational, but only with the help of a huge subsidy from the US – none such for us, I’ afraid)
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Here i’ve condensed all the info i could dig up about the RA of FF2020, for who’s interested.
http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.com/2011/08/future-force-2020-royal-artillery.html
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Am I right in thinking refurbed/reengined Puma can be transported by A400M?
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Believe so John, would have to check though
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Thanks TD.
Thought it wise to buy the biggest helicopter that fits in an A400m. So Puma family or NH90.
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Many thanks to you all for the information. It will need a lot of assimilating. The Royal Artillery Briefing is very revealing and Gabby’s article is packed with information and a highly enjoyable read. Thanks once again.
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