I know we are still some way off ceasing operations in Afghanistan and the future is still unclear but what lessons can we take from this conflict?
My off the cuff starter for ten;
- Politicians should think once, twice and seventy-five times before committing the armed forces. We have drifted into an extended conflict with little practical gain that has been extremely costly in blood, treasure, international reputation and influence. Our principal objective now seems to withdraw with as much of our tattered military and political reputation intact as possible, every soldier killed, limb lost and pound spent between now and the cessation of operations will be because we failed to think enough about the consequences.
- Show me the strategy, confusion about selection and maintenance of the aim of operations in Afghanistan means that every strategy in fact becomes a tactic. All talk of COIN this or containment operations that, is conflating the day-to-day means of realising a non-existent strategy because we did not and still do not have a realistic objective. One day, it was the defeat of Al-Qaeda, then it was education for girls, human rights, drugs interdiction, preventing the Taliban provide a safe harbour for terrorists and so on. A clear objective for future operations is as vital as item 1
- Listen to the armed forces but don’t be afraid to ignore them, military advice is not always correct. Politicians need to strengthen their knowledge of strategic and operational matters so they can make informed decisions and have the conviction to drive them through. Political leadership is every bit as important as military.
- If committing the armed forces then do not place shaped handcuffs on them, yes we know very few UOR’s get declined put political limits on force composition, force protection issues, manning and other operational matters makes the job of achieving what little clarity in aim that much more difficult. These are restrictions are generally tied to the cost of operations or how things might look in the press so in short, politicians need to accept that military operations are costly and dangerous but meddling will make things worse. This might seem contradictory to item 4 but it is about different things
- Unity of command is important, yes of course it is important to have a multi agency approach but the FCO doing one thing, DFiD doing another and the military stuck somewhere in the middle is a recipe for chaos
- You can never have enough helicopters, spare parts or soft toilet tissue. Availability of equipment and more than enough logistics back up is something that should never be subject to debate, we need to get better at supporting what we have even if this means fewer new toys
- Relying on Urgent Operational Needs to supply the vast majority of equipment is not big or clever and will cause untold problems post conflict. Whilst many hail the UOR system as a success, and in some respects it is, it is not guaranteed to deliver adequate equipment and is fundamentally an admission of a failure to plan for and resource lots of what might be called ‘basic equipment’ like uniform, body armour, protected diggers and night vision equipment
- Each conflict is different, using one as a template for another is rarely a recipe for success, and we need to have the institutional agility to learn from past conflicts but recognise when those lessons are not applicable. Rapid adaptation is the hallmark of many successful organisations, and we need to put in place a structure that in effect, gets rids of a lot of structure!
- Information operations should be core to military ones and vice versa. The internet and its Twitter/Facebook/Blogging/YouTube offspring is rapidly changing how people at home, in theatre and around the world perceive what we do. We have to recognise this and maximise these tools to our advantage.
- The final one is up to the commenters to fill in
Hi CL,
RE “the US had tried to go toe to toe with Moqtada al-Sadr in 2004 and it had ended badly for them”
-only because they had to call a halt to it, to keep the Shia gvmnt on their side, for reasons that you so well describe
Hi CL,
RE”not allow operations to take place against the Shia Militias until Op Charge Of The Knights in 2008″
– suddenly, when THEIR PM realised that he was about to be overthrown, there was an urgency to crush the Shia militia, and lots of manpower became available
– who came up with the name; so close to “Crusade” even though the initiative was Iraqi (and US just followed, not to let the fresh forces to be defeated)
You coined a good term “strategic action” – that captures the meaning well!
Hi Lj,
RE ” There was insufficiant manpower to retain control and chaos resulted. The war was played out under the “Rumsfelt Principal” and it didn’t work”
– quite right
– does anyone remember anymore that Rumsfelt had to fire Shinseki to get his dubious principles into play ? (And the President let it happen, shame on both)
can’t remember the specifics now, but thank you callum.
In Baghdad the US were predominantly fighting the Sunnis which was fine as the Iraqi govt was keen for them to do so. They had much less success fighting the Shia Special Groups as the Iraqi Govt allowed them much less leeway in this matter. Also the US did not want to fight a two front war in Iraq against both Sunni and Shia, of whom the Shia were by far the most dangerous enemy.
By contrast the UK was up against the Shia in Basra, and when we tried to take them on we saw intransigence from both UK and Iraqi govts. The policy (such as it was) was to very much contain the problem until the Iraqi Govt and Coalition were in a position to deal with them. The two pre-conditions for this were:
– Neutralisation of the sunni insurgency threat
– Consolidation of Maliki’s political power base such that he no longer needed Moqtada al-Sadr’s party to maintain a government and could move against them. This latter point also relied on neutralisation of the Sunni insurgency as a pre-cursor.
To be honest I am not sure what Mark Urban’s point was with regards to Basra, but as soon as a sovereign (Shia) Iraqi government was in place our hands were tied, even if there was the UK political will and military might (which there was not) to confront the Shia in Basra. Remember the US had tried to go toe to toe with Moqtada al-Sadr in 2004 and it had ended badly for them.
Callum
Thats what I thought, and exactly what I feared.
Pretty much the charge I levelled at Basra.
Quick we need a win, grab us one.
Despite the fact that we were not ready to fight and damned near lost.
i was referring specifically to the contrast between what was going on in baghdad and what mark urban describes as happening (or not happening) in basra. :)
I have read Task Force Black… What struck me about TF Black was the targeting cycle, the resources used to implement the targeting cycle. I need to read it again as I am still unclear as to how the JSOTF plan fitted into the campaign plan as a whole – an aspect on which much of the discord at senior level within the UK SF community appears (according to the book) to have been based. As a side line McChrystal is writing his memoirs at the moment and has started to publish some interesting articles on his approach in Iraq and AFghanistan. I can recollect nothing in the book that struck me (and it is a year since I read the book) of political meddling from a UK perspective. From a US perspective things are very different as Rumsfield did provide an inappropriate level of micromanagement in some areas and not enough in others. From a UK perspective I am not aware of political guidance explicit or implicit on patrol schedules. Political direction was given on operational timing and that is entirely appropriate – military staff do not know the domestic political context in which operations are being fed in to – remember our strategic centre of gravity was assessed by political and military figures as being the appetite for the UK to stay in the fight.
Looking at the Iraq Inquiry evidence again there is little or no evidence of political meddling at the tactical level. Political decisions seemed to be confined to troop levels and concern over casualties which drove the appetite for risk. There is however an insinuation that the UK Permanent Joint HQ (PJHQ) and senior UK military officers were possibly oversensitive to this and tried to second-guess politicians in this area of risk taking.
The problem with Iraq is we did not know what we were supposed to do there and did not have the resources to even maintain the staus quo. However, resources is a moot point as the Iraqi government did not allow operations to take place against the Shia Militias until Op Charge Of The Knights in 2008 – so even if we had had the resources it is unlikely that we would have been able to apply them effectively (we were fighting the Shia and not Sunni).
In terms of the Falklands my understanding is that the UK PM ordered the attack on Goose Green in order to deliver to the British public a military success at a time in which the Royal Navy had been bloodied (HMSs Ardent, Antelope & Coventry and Atlantic Conveyor all sunk 21-25 May) and success was not certain. Goose Green was seen as an unneccesary and unwelcome distraction by both the TF Commander and the Land Forces commander but the strategic imperative was clearly perceived in the UK – deliver success or see domestic and international support erode and possibly collapse. The Battle of Goose Green was therefore not a strategy, but a ‘strategic action’, an action conducted at the tactical level to specifically achieve strategic effect.
“I have seen little evidence for tactical meddling in Iraq.”
you might not say that if you had read Task Force Black………
Callum
Oversight doesnt mean “do the job”.
My boss and I have a quarterly meeting.
We agree a set of goals for the next quarter.
I accomplish those goals.
He doesnt sit on my shoulder controlling my work pattern. If he were doing that, whats the point in me being there?
Equaly, if he doesnt set my goals, I’d just wander around aimlessly for a decade.
The government should set strategic aims, not patrol schedules.
Simply because only the government can set the first one, and it might mistake the second for a grand strategy.
“I have seen little evidence for tactical meddling in Iraq.”
Perhaps, but the lack of Strategic Goals is the killer.
And of course, manpower.
What we are doing is very different from how we are doing it.
One is best sorted out by boots on ground, one can only be dictated from on high.
“The attack on Gose Green in the Falklands Conflict is another example of a tactical action being directed by the strategic authority for strategic reasons and against the wishes of the military as tacticall and operationally the attack was a sideshow.”
Really?
Never heard that before.
I did always wonder what the point was, it was rather out of the way and the forces deployed their were in no fit state to counter attack.
What exactly makes you think the destruction of goose green was a strategy? I’m not sure I agree.
Lord Jim
I think rumsfeld gets a bit of a bum rap.
Remember pre war everyone was talking up the mighty Republican Guard and the Iraqi Army. They were knocked senseless.
In the war, Technology did replace manpower.
It was in the Peace that it didnt.
And primarily, that was due to the debaathification. Following the German and Japanese Surrender, massive portions of the army were mainted under allied control, throughout much of the Japanese Empire, the Japanese Occupation forces were never really disarmed.
Disbanding the Iraqi army was an utter disaster.
If politicians cannot cope with pictures of casualties returning home then they shouldn’t ge the country involved in a conflict in the first place. You cannot have one without the other and to try to do so is futile and ties the hands of the troops on the ground. Just look at Afghanistan where standing orders mean that British troops do not close with the enemy as often as the US. The local ssee the US troops chasing off the Taliban and “Winning” where as the see the Opposite with UK Forces.
Of course there should be Political oversite but just thet. Goose Green was almost a disaster but was instigated by Whitehall against the wishes of the Military. Imagine what would have happened if the Paras had lost.
The US and UK fought GW2 on a false premise that technology could replace manpower through “Shock and Awe” and allowing Iraqi soldoers to simply go home taking the AKs and RPGs with them bit both nations in the A£$e latter on. There was insufficiant manpower to retain control and chaos resulted. The war was played out under the “Rumsfelt Principal” and it didn’t work.
I shall say it again it is the politicians roel to say when, where and why we are going to war and to set down the objectives and endgame. It is inevitable that they will also impose both tactical and strategic limitations on operations but these must be based on a sound understanding of what is going on in theatre as well as political ramifications at home.
Taking political interference to the max, with even current technology it would be possible for a Minister to see what a individual soldier can see live, and have a say as to when and what he can shoot together with the lawyer sititng next to him. It this the way we wnat to go!
Fighting wars is too important to be left to the generals, it has to have political oversight and that does and should involve direction down to the tactical level. The concept of the ‘strategic corporal’ is clearly understood. The exact same arguments that stand for the ‘stategic corporal’ also stand for the ‘tactical statesman’.
In GW 1 there were clear strategic aims – get the Iraqis out of Kuwait and preserve our oil supplies. In GW 2 there were no clear strategic aims for the continuing occupation of Iraq. In GW2 it was the lack of clear and effective political involvement that hampered us. Political direction was limited to ‘keep the US on side, don’t take unnecessary casualties, don’t ask for more troops’ – not a recipe for success. I have seen little evidence for tactical meddling in Iraq.
Where the constant drip drip drip of casualties and images from operational theatres does have a strategic impact on the home and international fronts then I fail to see how politicians cannot be involved at the tactical level. The attack on Gose Green in the Falklands Conflict is another example of a tactical action being directed by the strategic authority for strategic reasons and against the wishes of the military as tacticall and operationally the attack was a sideshow.
1. Think of problems as an integrated whole. Are we short of helis, or is it that the infantry don’t have a weapon that reaches out far enough, so engagements go on inconclusively and they have to use enormous amounts of ammunition? Or is it that our intelligence can’t find the enemy? Or that we can’t get counter-insurgency right? Or we don’t have the numbers, and therefore have to constantly manoeuvre? Or that our strategic goals are simply wrong? Are our apparent problems symptoms or causes?
Given the Tony-Blairish fashion in which Dave Cameron is calling battle stations over Libya, maybe we haven’t learnt any lessons from our recent conflicts.
Concentrating on aid for refugees, or doing something to help the repatriation of Egyptian and Tunisian nationals stranded in Libya would be a much more constructive use of the governments time and money -and present a much better image of the UK to people in the region- than ramping up the pressure for any kind of military intervention.
Creating a no-fly zone could cause all sorts of problems but do very little to protect the people of Libya. Not every Arab problem has to have a military solution.
I have to stand by my opinion that there should be minimum interference from Politicains once the shooting starts. Compare GW1 and GW2. In the former the Military were allowed to conduct operations as they needed to with the Politicians stepping in only to call a halt. In GW2 their was alsmost micro management of operations to ensure the politically correct execution. If fact GW2 went against every facet of teh Weingerger principals and look how it ended up and the same goes for Afghanistan.
Politicians still say when and where to fight but and when to end it but not how to fight it. Managing director don’t give intruction to a airline pilot on how and when to turn the aircraft in flight etc do they.
@ Callum
There is political interference and there is political interference.
What about the instance in Iraq where that RMP was running around in the middle of contact reminding the people only to use semi-auto and be “defensive?” Or the battalion that was told not to take sniper rifles because there were weapons meant for offensive warfare?
ROEs that are too liberal/socialist cause problems.
With reference to the US, this open article (hopefully you all can see it fine, it’s one of their free “nibbles”) from Stratfor, the Yanks’ very good commercial open-source outfit, on America and land wars in Asia over time. (One sentence midway through might give some the vapours: I think Friedman’s well aware the British Empire had more divisions in the field than the US until D-Day, he’s good at those kinds of details, but he’s writing to a largely domestic American audience.)
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110228-never-fight-land-war-asia?utm_source=GWeekly&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=110301&utm_content=readmore&elq=b60739deda5a4955b09cd044f08f8574
Jed
Oh come now
Surely it was clear I meant “Fighting “insert city here” only comes into play if we fight “insert nation here””
I actualy agree with Gates, if you want to take an enemy city, you need heavy armour to do it.
Where we differ is, why the hell are we taking enemy cities.
No one seems to have asked, although this is the best way to do it, is it the best thing to be doing?
Thats the real thinking I think is missing.
I admit much of my knowledge of the actual Basra Op came from a book called Target Basra.
I read it a while ago, but its certainly the impression I was left with.
Maybe it was that most of the forces who took it moved on afterwards then.
I shall have to dig out the book.
Leesea @6.48 – Strategy choices should drive equipment choices. Hence if you take the SecDef’s comments to the logical conclusions more ‘NexGen Bomber’ and more Arleigh Burke Flight III and less M1A1 and M2 upgrades……
DomJ @ 8.27 “Refighting Fallujah only comes into play if we refight Iraq.” – No it doesn’t stop being so pedantic. For Fallujah insert “urban terrain” his point was that US strategy should be less land centric, that things can be done to reduce the size of the US Army, and within that to reduce the heavy component BUT as shown in Fallujah and other urban battles in Iraq, the tank is NOT dead and heavy armour DOES have a place in MOUT.
Also Ref: “The UK ended up in control of Basra because the push for Baghdad was going too slowly. There was little military reason to sieze Basra when we did, with an under strength battalion, the original plan was capital first, regions second, but the papaers were getting antsy and the politicians wanted a quick win” – I think you will find that is completely wrong and that Basrah was an agreed upon objective, given to the UK in the overall ops plan before the ops started. Also we did not “take it” with an “understrength battalion”. Don’t get confused between the war phase and the ‘liberation’ of Basra and the post ‘war’ phase when UK political disinterest may have been a factor, but Army command “we have done Northern Ireland, you can’t tell us anything” attitude was also a big problem. I certainly know we had great problems convincing senior officers interested in kinetic (or old fashioned) options that it was time to go balls out on the Psyops…….
Lessons to be learned? How about:
Selection and Maintenance of Aim
Concentration of Force
Security
Cooperation
Sustainability
and, of course (not one of the Big 10, but one of the five COIN principles)
Unity of Command
DJ.
The UK ended up in Basrah because the Turks dropped off the option for the advance from the North. Intial planning saw the UK finishing in the Kirkuk region.
The tactical plan for Basra was to isolate in order to prevent interference with VII Corps and 1 MEF supply lines running to Baghdad. The occupation of Basra came earlier then anticipated because resistance crumbled and 7Bde exploited to fill the vacuum. The timing was very much bottom up driven – ‘recce pull’ as opposed to ‘command driven’. That said the occupation of Basra was seen as a boost and signs of tangible progress while the US element were paused before moving on to Baghdad.
The problem was that once we were in Basra it took until 2009 for the Govt to articulate clearly what they wanted us to achieve there. As you have said – it all links to having a clear strategy and then resourcing it.
Strategy is however an art, not a science and while you may start a war with a strategy and clear aims you are more often then not going to finish with a different strategy and different objectives; enemy as well as friendly forces all get a say in how things transpire.
In terms of UK political disinterest the Iraq Inquiry testimony makes clear that poloticians were not interested in Iraq beyond trying to ensure that it created no inconvenient headlines in the press for them; also that Prime Minister and Cabinet Office direction was rarely implemented on by other departments of state. There was no Iraq strategy and the campaign lacked a campaign plan.
CL
3 becomes more of a problem when you dont have 4.
And both are part of 1.
Know what you want
Have the resources available to do it
Dont back off from a bad headline or two
Know when to cut and run.
Iraq failed on every count.
Objectives were never clear cut things abnd there was very little contingency planning. We also need a clearly agreed upon break point.
These are all political decisions, to be made in advance of war, by politicians with military assistance.
A bad headline in the Tabloids cannot be allowed to derail the strategy.
The UK ended up in control of Basra because the push for Baghdad was going too slowly. There was little military reason to sieze Basra when we did, with an under strength battalion, the original plan was capital first, regions second, but the papaers were getting antsy and the politicians wanted a quick win.
Once it all comes apart, then your back to square one, politicians setting clear achievable goals and resourcing them adequatly.
Its then that politicial disinterest becomes poison.
1. Clear Objectives. Yes
2. Overwhelming force. Yes
3. Minimum political interference once the shooting starts – No. Warfare is an extension of politics, politicians must remain hands on. Part of the problems in Iraq was the fact that the govt maintained a lack of interest.
4. Clear exit strategy. No. A clear strategy for involvement leads ipso facto for a clear strategy for disengagement. But warfare, being an extension of politics is rooted in ‘the human condition’ and once you let the genie out of the bottle it can tirn round and bite you, hence warfare like politics tends to be an iterative process.
I would actually give the Select Committees more bite, especially the Defence Select Committee. If you read their reports and the cross examinations, you will see that they are more often than not on the right track but are constantoy frustrated by the inability to be polite, of the MoD to provide evidence and documents in a timely manner.
Resourses/supplies are never going to be available in the number required. The first area cuts are made when required in in the maintenance, spares and ammunition budgets. The last Government tried to ge the RAF to reduce its depot spares to only one months worth but backed off when availabiity issues became public.
For me, conflicts should be run on the Weinbeger principals where;
1. Clear objectives.
2. Overwelming force.
3. Minimum political interference one the shooting starts.
4. Clear exist strategy.
If you cannot meet the above you don’t get involved in the firat place by choice.