I know we are still some way off ceasing operations in Afghanistan and the future is still unclear but what lessons can we take from this conflict?
My off the cuff starter for ten;
- Politicians should think once, twice and seventy-five times before committing the armed forces. We have drifted into an extended conflict with little practical gain that has been extremely costly in blood, treasure, international reputation and influence. Our principal objective now seems to withdraw with as much of our tattered military and political reputation intact as possible, every soldier killed, limb lost and pound spent between now and the cessation of operations will be because we failed to think enough about the consequences.
- Show me the strategy, confusion about selection and maintenance of the aim of operations in Afghanistan means that every strategy in fact becomes a tactic. All talk of COIN this or containment operations that, is conflating the day-to-day means of realising a non-existent strategy because we did not and still do not have a realistic objective. One day, it was the defeat of Al-Qaeda, then it was education for girls, human rights, drugs interdiction, preventing the Taliban provide a safe harbour for terrorists and so on. A clear objective for future operations is as vital as item 1
- Listen to the armed forces but don’t be afraid to ignore them, military advice is not always correct. Politicians need to strengthen their knowledge of strategic and operational matters so they can make informed decisions and have the conviction to drive them through. Political leadership is every bit as important as military.
- If committing the armed forces then do not place shaped handcuffs on them, yes we know very few UOR’s get declined put political limits on force composition, force protection issues, manning and other operational matters makes the job of achieving what little clarity in aim that much more difficult. These are restrictions are generally tied to the cost of operations or how things might look in the press so in short, politicians need to accept that military operations are costly and dangerous but meddling will make things worse. This might seem contradictory to item 4 but it is about different things
- Unity of command is important, yes of course it is important to have a multi agency approach but the FCO doing one thing, DFiD doing another and the military stuck somewhere in the middle is a recipe for chaos
- You can never have enough helicopters, spare parts or soft toilet tissue. Availability of equipment and more than enough logistics back up is something that should never be subject to debate, we need to get better at supporting what we have even if this means fewer new toys
- Relying on Urgent Operational Needs to supply the vast majority of equipment is not big or clever and will cause untold problems post conflict. Whilst many hail the UOR system as a success, and in some respects it is, it is not guaranteed to deliver adequate equipment and is fundamentally an admission of a failure to plan for and resource lots of what might be called ‘basic equipment’ like uniform, body armour, protected diggers and night vision equipment
- Each conflict is different, using one as a template for another is rarely a recipe for success, and we need to have the institutional agility to learn from past conflicts but recognise when those lessons are not applicable. Rapid adaptation is the hallmark of many successful organisations, and we need to put in place a structure that in effect, gets rids of a lot of structure!
- Information operations should be core to military ones and vice versa. The internet and its Twitter/Facebook/Blogging/YouTube offspring is rapidly changing how people at home, in theatre and around the world perceive what we do. We have to recognise this and maximise these tools to our advantage.
- The final one is up to the commenters to fill in
10) Finish one war before starting one or two more.
The favourite quote of the day seems to be ““The need for heavy armor and firepower to survive, close with, and destroy the enemy will always be there, as veterans of Sadr City and Fallujah can no doubt attest.”
– I am sure leesea is right about the speech with “More about strategy than hardware methinks?”
– However, the take-away has been on the US military blogs for a long time (they, too, have the friendly competition between services): ” Marines had to be escorted to battle by Army M1s…”
– I look forward to finding out what our MWCap will look like (currently there seems to be no definitive source?) e.g. at the brigade level, which supposedly is for independent deployment
Jed/Jackstaff
I’m not argueing that fighting battles like Fallujah doesnt require heavy kit. I am argueing that no ones asking, “why the **** did we fight Fallujah”.
It is a political matter, but Gates is a politician.
Refighting Fallujah only comes into play if we refight Iraq.
That no one seems to haver taken on board what a disaster that was is deeply disturbing.
Leesea, I am sure people will be picking over SECDEF’s speech for ages, each taking their own lessons, each seeing their own viewpoints
might I suggest reading the whole speech? My take away was SECDEF was questioing the whole utility of land warfare on the Asian continent.
“By no means am I suggesting that the U.S. Army will – or should – turn into a Victorian nation-building constabulary – designed to chase guerrillas, build schools, or sip tea. But as the prospects for another head-on clash of large mechanized land armies seem less likely, the Army will be increasingly challenged to justify the number, size, and cost of its heavy formations to those in the leadership of the Pentagon, and on both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue, who ultimately make policy and set budgets.
What we can expect in the future is that potential adversaries – be they terrorists, insurgents, militia groups, rogue states, or emerging powers – will seek to frustrate America’s traditional advantages, in particular our ability to shoot, move and communicate with speed and precision. From the look of things, the Army will not repeat the mistakes of the past, where irregular warfare was shunted to the side after Vietnam. The odds of repeating another Afghanistan or Iraq – invading, pacifying, and administering a large third world country – may be low. But in what General Casey has called “an era of persistent conflict,” those unconventional capabilities will still be needed at various levels and in various locations. Most critically to prevent festering problems from growing into full-blown crises which require costly – and controversial – large-scale American military intervention.”
More about strategy than hardware methinks?
Ref: ““The need for heavy armor and firepower to survive, close with, and destroy the enemy will always be there, as veterans of Sadr City and Fallujah can no doubt attest.”
Guys, he is just talking about the utility of heavy armour in urban ops, the combined arms team.
DomJ I do not understand how you take that and turn it into a “bland acceptance that knocking off Sadam was the right course of action” – Gates was not addressing the politics of GW2, he was addressing the future structure of the US Army. He is basically saying between the lines that the US army can be smaller, and it can be made smaller by cutting back the heavy armoured divisions of M1’s and M2/M3’s (in favour of bloody Stryker no doubt !) BUT that there must still be some heavy armour and not just for historical re-enactment of the battle of Kursk……..
Wrong about having to justify heavy formations, that is. But they shouldn’t dominate your regular Army, and the US has the advantage of a decently-equipped and ordered National Guard, rather than a TA that saved British bacon in both World Wars eviscerated because Field Marshal Lord Carver and some of his successors turned up their nose at reservists.
Dominic @ 8:34
I think Gates reference was to combined-arms use of armour together with the constabulary Poor Bloody Infantry/Marines in those two cities 2005-ish. I think he’s wrong, that as it turns out (again) that long-term COIN where you haven’t run a colonial infrstructure for a long time doesn’t fecking work, so you end up with a hi-lo reality for the military: ops involving MOOTW (Military Operations Other Than War) or in-and-outs with airborne or marine elements structured more sustainably than they are now (sustainable for short periods of independent combat), or occasional scares/conflicts that involve people who can throw hardware around. Will more of those be air and naval, and potentially involve deterrence questions? He’s probably closer to the mark there.
Totally, totally with your last statement. Don;t expect any donations to the Primrose League, though ;)
Iraq 2003 was controversial, but that was Blair/Bush that ordered that.
The military just followed the orders of the elected governments.
It is wrong to punish the military through hasty, spiteful cuts for the failings of the politicians.
““The need for heavy armor and firepower to survive, close with, and destroy the enemy will always be there, as veterans of Sadr City and Fallujah can no doubt attest.”
See, this, I dont get.
Its just a bland acceptance that knocking off Sadam was the right course of action.
If we (well, they, I ask it constantly) have not yet asked the question “was toppling Sadam worthwhile?”. They’re a lot further behind than I thought.
I mean seriously.
We’ve spent a trillion dolars toppling Sadam, Mubarak went before we could get TV crews over to film it, let alone invade.
This excerpt from US SECDEF Gates speech may be applicable to this discussion:
“The need for heavy armor and firepower to survive, close with, and destroy the enemy will always be there, as veterans of Sadr City and Fallujah can no doubt attest. And one of the benefits of the drawdown in Iraq is the opportunity to conduct the kind of full-spectrum training – including mechanized combined arms exercises – that was neglected to meet the demands of the current wars. Looking ahead, though, in the competition for tight defense dollars within and between the services, the Army also must confront the reality that the most plausible, high-end scenarios for the U.S. military are primarily naval and air engagements – whether in Asia, the Persian Gulf, or elsewhere. The strategic rationale for swift-moving expeditionary forces, be they Army or Marines, airborne infantry or special operations, is self-evident given the likelihood of counterterrorism, rapid reaction, disaster response, or stability or security force assistance missions. But in my opinion, any future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should “have his head examined,” as General MacArthur so delicately put it.
By no means am I suggesting that the U.S. Army will – or should – turn into a Victorian nation-building constabulary – designed to chase guerrillas, build schools, or sip tea. But as the prospects for another head-on clash of large mechanized land armies seem less likely, the Army will be increasingly challenged to justify the number, size, and cost of its heavy formations to those in the leadership of the Pentagon, and on both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue, who ultimately make policy and set budgets.”
source:
http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1539
@Monty, I don’t think we can take good military leadership for granted, do you think making that assumption betrays a bot of institutional arrogance, believing our own bullshit.
@all, there is an assumption that we tried to deploy Northern Ireland tactics to Basrah and not appreciating the differences between the two came unstuck, especially when we were deluding ourselves, being condescending to our allies and unable to change with the speed that the cousins did.
However, I content that what we did was a watered down, politically correct version of Ulster. Look at the force/area covered ratios, helicopter support, tactics and other things we did in Basrah. Wearing berets is a superficial affectation of our so called Ulster heritage but fundamentally we did exactly the opposite of apply the hard won lessons of 30 years operations in NI.
we did this because of penny pinching and the military leadership, that Monty thinks can always be relied upon, were too cowardly to stand firm on, far easier to complain after it went tits up
The Army failed in Iraq and to blame those ‘meddlin politicians’ is just too easy.
Expect our military to be run by incompetent old duffers, who couldn’t get any other jobs when they left public school.
TD,
Brilliant piece by you. The most useful additional comment comes from Tony William’s quote from TE Lawrence. We should learn the lessons of history.
I think the most important point you make is the need for good political leadership, to complement good military leadership. We can generally take good military leadership for granted, although it is not infallible. What we can’t take for granted is good political leadership. Indeed, I would argue that our politicians are so weak in this area, with such a fundamental lack of integrity, that ‘doing the right thing’ as Tony Blair and David Cameron is invariably deflected by personal ambition or the need for the party to get re-elected for the sake of power alone.
DominicJ, I am arguing for defence and only defence. No offence. No violent military operations for any other purpose than true defence.
No general military “power”, but military “protection”.
1) Decide on your strategic aims
2) Resource your strategy
3) Get your national command and control (C2) systems right
4) Get your coalition C2 systems right
5) Adapt your Armed Forces to the fight they are in commensurate with where that fight sits within your national security strategy (Afghanistan is a limited war fought for limited policy objectives and it is appropriate that it should be with limited means.
6) Remember when it comes to adaption that Generals and senior civil servants will often prefer the status quo.
7) Don’t get involved in a Counter-Insurgency (COIN) campaign if you cannot control the Governance lines of operation – the Afghan government is as much part of the problem as it is part of the solution, yet it is sovereign and we have limited means to exert the required uinfluence there.
8) Revisit the strategic imperative!
Sven
Do you realise that at this point your arguement has become, dont do anything that cant retrospectivly be a viewed in a bad light?
Your argueing the “no true scotsman” for foreign policy
“Sven
And if we sign a treaty of collective defence with the Dari?
What then?
Does Afghanistan suddenly become a just war of necessity?”
I don’t see how they could add to your country’s security, thus it would not be a collective defence (but on paper).
Germany learned some hard lessons about careful choice of allies in 1914, the lesson that a nation should choose its allies carefully and with its own security in mind is self-evident for me. I blogged about it at least twice.
Tony;
An epically good lesson from history there, kinda sums up my own feelings about it.
Sven
And if we sign a treaty of collective defence with the Dari?
What then?
Does Afghanistan suddenly become a just war of necessity?
Jes
One of the greater problems of EU membership is the UK doesnt have a foreign policy.
Or it has only a slither of the tools used to define one.
Trade, Immigration, Aid, all EU competancies.
The UK could be at war with russia and still sending them aid through the EU…
Make politicians do some background reading. Like:
“The people of England have been led in Mesopotamia into a trap from which it will be hard to escape with dignity and honour. They have been tricked into it by a steady withholding of information. The Baghdad communiques are belated, insincere, incomplete. Things have been far worse than we have been told, our administration more bloody and inefficient that the public knows… We are today not far from a disaster.”
TE Lawrence, 1920.
TD said: “Jedi, does that mean more carriers please that will be used for cocktail parties, yum yum :)”
I get the feeling that statement was dripping with sarcasm – so I must ask, have you ever been to a Defence Diplomacy event on an RN warship (aka Captain’s cocktail party) ?
You can take the piss out of them as much as you like, but they are a lot more useful for making friends and influencing people than invading countries !
However back to lessons learned:
1. We (the nation) are capable of independent thought, we do NOT need to follow US foreign policy like the “special relationship” is the only relationship.
2. We need to learn when to say no. Eradicating the Taliban was a response to an attack on NATO (there were a lot of non American NATO nationalities killed in the Twin Towers) therefore I have no problem with the phase of the op. Thereafter pour money, old FV432’s and maybe even the gift of all our old Puma’s to the “Northern Alliance” and let them get on with it. As many have said, its very odd the the FCO of all people could not point out to the State Department the absolute futility of trying to push western ideals of democratic government on a set of peoples who could not give a monkey’s uncle about such things – Learn to say NO !
gotcha, thank you Sven.
There are only two anti-war of choice MilBlogs because the other bloggers are merely following the fashion and don#t rise above the insight that this and that particular conflict was wrong. They still keep the fiction that somehow next time only a few rules need to be observed to make it work.
It’s like the Powell-Weinberger doctrine; not going to prevent the next disaster.
The line needs to be drawn between wars of choice and wars of necessity (the latter including all collective defence). Only genocides might qualify as exemptions, not great power games for influence, economic effects, some kind of crusade (such as for democracy) or prestige.
Fearmongers and Warmongers should as a rule of thumb be ignored and marginalised.
@ TD – “Jedi, does that mean more carriers please that will be used for cocktail parties, yum yum :)”
It means that the continental/maritime choice, that you don’t believe necessary, should swing in the maritime-raiding direction which would indeed involve carriers (in the plural).
As has been noted by RUSI, even if the army did shrink to 80,000 post afghan we would still have the most army distorted Armed Forces of all our western peer nations.
The first statement; that anti-war sentiment has become common:
“That rule should be different: “No wars of choice.” Isn’t it interesting how after a failed war suddenly my long-held dovish positions become almost mainstream?”
Appears to contradict the second; that there are still only two anti-war english language mil-blogs:
“Just four years ago almost nobody seemed to be inclined to agree with me. I know only about two anti-war of choice milblogs in the whole English-written internet!”
Or is it a peculiarity of the British temperament that we have not moved with the times?
Jedi, does that mean more carriers please that will be used for cocktail parties, yum yum :)
@DominicJ:
It’s futile to attempt to re-define established words.
10. If you are determined that Britain is to remain in ‘playa’ in international affairs, and to do so by military intervention where this will achieve the greatest advantage, then make sure you choose interventions that are as compatible as is possible with the expectations of the British public.
Unless the war is an existential threat to Britain don’t let it dominate the entire expeditionary capability of the Armed Forces.
Unless the war is an existential threat to Britain don’t let it suck you into a commitment longer than a typical British parliament.
It will be a long time before a British politician is ‘brave’ enough to join another protracted and nasty counter-insurgency war, precisely because in having breached the two dictums above they know that the British public will not tolerate another.
We need an end to unrealistic idealism – some countries are a mess, and we should be thankful that we don’t have to live in them, but it’s not our responsibility nor within our power to fix every problem in every messed up country in the world.
Afghanistan was a hole before we turned up; we didn’t break it, we didn’t need to fix it.
SO
All wars are wars of choice.
Regardless of the provocation, if the invader is raping your children in front of you, you still have a choice, to fight back or not.
You had a choice when you crossed the border, you had a choic then, and when you drive them back, it remains a choice to follow them and do likewise.
I have to echo TD’s comments – it wasn’t so much different culture, etc which screwed us over – being a bleeding heart liberal type, I believe Human beings are essentially the same and want the same – but we simply had no idea what we were doing after the fall of the Taliban regime. We used Ulster tactics, didn’t coordinate with other agencies, underestimated the enemy, and experienced mission creep – were we there for nation-building? Anti-drugs? Anti-terrorist? I always favour looking at the bigger picture, the holistic solution, but you must always know what you can achieve with the resources you have.
The biggest failure I believe is not realising that A-stan is NOT a nation-state, let alone a modern one. Saddam in Iraq had at least created the civil infrastructure we could build upon (what we didn’t destroy/disband). A-stan is pre feudal, let alone a pre-modern state. I believe we could have produced enough security/stability by creating a (Neo-)feudal state(s); tribal area becomes “cantons”, all send reps to Grand congress (forget what they call them)to choose Gov for International affairs, etc. Try and introduce democracy, etc,slowly via NGO’s/UN…
Sorry, IR rant over.
Here’s some more:
Adding Western troops (particularly Brits and Americans) into a traditional Muslin location will create a conflict even if there wasn’t one already. When the troops first went to Helmund it wasn’t an area of conflict and there was every intention of building a few schools ‘without a shot being fired’. But the sheer presence of troops in Helmund attracted Taliban, terrorists and nationalists looking for a chance to battle infidels.
Don’t start a conflict and then go and ask other people to help. T Bair committed forces to Afghanistan, made a speech in Kabul “we will not desert you” and then went to ask our European allies to lend a hand. We’ve been berating them ever since for not pulling their weight and bearing the burden Blair seemingly thought he could share with them. On their part their attitude is entirely understandable – they didn’t start the war, they don’t buy that it is worth the cost, so why should anyone expect them to be there fighting it? They are there to some extent, but only the minimum required so as not to lose favour with the US.
The Malaya scenario – Controlling an insurgency is far easier if you control the national politics and you can deliver a political solution along with a military solution. It’s potentially impossible if you are in someone else’s country whose politics is not in sync with the military effort.
That rule should be different: “No wars of choice.”
Isn’t it interesting how after a failed war suddenly my long-held dovish positions become almost mainstream?
Just four years ago almost nobody seemed to be inclined to agree with me. I know only about two anti-war of choice milblogs in the whole English-written internet!
We just need one simple rule.
No silly wars in silly places.
Hi JS,
RE ” “winning the hearts and minds” of a radically different culture, it can’t be achieved”
– a great opportunity in Libya now, trying out slightly different means?
Thanks Jed, for
“Yes I am talking about the “we have been doing this in Ulster for years, and we don’t need to listen to the stupid Yanks” attitude”
– I remember vividly how eagerly our press was repeating those statements
Without Demos, there is merely Kratos.
Foreigners cant police natives.
A corrupt institution is corrupt, its quicker, but more expensive to build anew.
Some of my own #10s are already here, and they group together well to riff on others comments:
Sven (twice above) and by extension Gabriele and Gareth: well, yes. That’s the root of it (and here I was mentioning “schwerpunkten” just the other day, Sven :) The shocking thing is that big, complex, messy things like nations and the states that manage them actually work better with strong degrees of honesty and transparency. Parliament was invented, more or less, to audit and approve the dosh the Plantagenets wanted with which to wallop the French. But that puts in danger the whole modern political class, who are really just a subset of the weasely-corporate-VP-management class, who have thrived on the lack of working “inspectorates” in complex organizations, which means that cheaters and the relentlessly, short-sightedly selfish (functionally sociopaths, not “psychopaths” but that 5-10 percent of a given population who have no working emotional connection to others, whether in-group or out-group, and manipulate circumstances to narrow selfish ends) are automatically favored because they’ll do whatever it takes for advantage even if it damages the larger structure. Have to rein that in on all fronts, but it creates obvious strategic problems like hasty, ill-considered wars that become matters of greed, fear, and pride pretty quickly.
Jed: bang on. That’s another one of the sins, the type of “bounded rationality” we call groupthink and that old-school religious types called the Sin of Pride. You may be sinning as the angels but it that just means it gets you in the worst trouble. And they don’t seem to be learning: underwater COIN knife fighters parachuting off the nose of a Super Tucano wouldn’t be much good on the current shores of Tripoli, or in a collapsing Pakistan, or a Greco-Turkish Cyprus flareup, or against a Russia that wants the Arctic as its new Siberia, etc.
Mark,
Yes. Honest policing ties right in at all levels. It’s one of the rarest and most essential things which is why it has the name of the community — “polis” — buried in its root (just like politician, talk about debased terms ….) Policing the government, policing strategic and economic relations with furriners (lots of the lighter-complected folks, and a few of the non-European ones, scarpering from Libya right now did an awful lot to prolong the problem), policing the nations goals and debating its best interests, policing the operational art of each service so they don’t get smug, etc. Ultimately (and this is me a wierd but very distinct sort of lefty seeing this) communities of people have to be able to sort themselves out in order for the greater web of global communities to work. And that takes several different varieties of literal and figurative policing and can’t be done by outlanders, especially in camo with big metal pointy-killy things.
x,
Yes. Numbers do matter. And long-term COIN in an alien environment is a contradiction in terms. Just simply doesn’t work, at all, ever. Not the way most Western “experts” suggest these days. Best bet is what I’d call “hit and sanitize,” go in with good effect from your shock troops up front, and immediately flood the zone with patrol/surveillance forces, engineers, civil affairs, etc. Clean things up nice and say you only did what you had to do and respect the effort of locals to get back on their own feet, then *go home*. Best way to keep insurgencies from *starting*, which is the only way to defeat them from outside.
x,
Malaya (and its corollary vs. Indonesia in Sarawak) was won because after about four bloody and unsuccessful years (a longer-than-average time to last without ultimate defeat, made possible only because Britain owned Malaya and had colonial infrastructure there) Templer and co. decided to take sides and create a simple, two-sided civil war, and backed the right side (bigger, stronger, better economy, more grit, etc.) Did the same thing several other places (Oman comes instantly to mind), and in a few others lost in the long term but concluded a settlement before being worn out or kicked out (Cyprus, Aden, Egypt in ’54.) Ulster was mutual exhaustion and was in no way foreign turf, whatever English folk in particular may think of the Province — it’s a cornerstone of the old English empire that predates the Act of Union by a couple of generations. Rhodesia had quite a lot of covert and overt outside help. (Until ’74 they partnered actively with the Portuguese who did well in Angola but had to give up b/c of other failures, exhaustion, and a nasty govt. at home that deserved its overthrow. After that the Boers waded in.) And please, oh please, put the select committee out at FOBs at least. If you’re going into elected office you should have at least two kinds of internship, one with the military, one with some kind of civic service (NHS, trauma room, social work, etc.)
JS,
This. Or rather, it requires understanding each other and then *going home*, rather than “making them see why we’re right.”
10) If victory requires “winning the hearts and minds” of a radically different culture, it can’t be achieved.
10) Numbers matter. Don’t send a platoon to do a company’s work; don’t send a battalion (well battlegroup!) to do a brigade’s work.
11) Get the history books out! Why did we “win” in Malaya? How did the Rhodesians manage a successful campaign with a third as many men and not nearly a tenth of the equipment?
12) Everybody on the defence select committee to spend a week in patrol base. No requirement to go out on patrol, just “live” in the patrol base.
Well I think there are more than 10 politic lessons, and more than 10 military ones but I am having trouble splitting the two and picking my favorites.
I’ll stick to military for now, and start with Iraq:
10. Do not let your general officer corps get too comfortable with the idea that they always know best, and are unable to learn either from their own experience or the experience of others. Yes I am talking about the “we have been doing this in Ulster for years, and we don’t need to listen to the stupid Yanks” attitude. The armies senior management failed badly in Iraq, and they also caused problems in Afghanistan (we don’t need MRAPS or more helicopters……)
Never get into a long war & then forget about it.
Understand your true strategic aim.
In this case to stop the taliban retaking control. You do not need young squaddies risking IEDs on mud tracks to do that. Keep them on a secure base. If the taliban break cover to take control, hit them with everything (tanks, jets, artillery).
Trawl the moderate modern parts of the muslim world. Spread their articles & broadcasts to counter the extremists.
Do not cut the defence budget in the middle of a war.
C4ISTAR has to be the biggest unlearned lesson.
When I was listening to some of the evidence from the iraq enquiry it was interesting to note that some of the witness mentioned that when we go to these countries the one thing that is always missing is not an army but a non existent police force. Maybe point 10 should be a create a deployable police brigade made up of RMP/Para-military force.
(Military) history knowledge and understanding is important for politicians in general. Without it, they’re either dependent on advisers (all too often = lobbyists) or prone to repeat old mistakes.
I found it especially strange that BRITISH politicians were eager to send an occupying force into Afghanistan.
10) NEVER fight a land war in Asia? Or more seriously give Politicians/top brass a compulsory History lecture about the region in question?
I might add that next wars need to be funded from the Treasury “contingency” yearly reserve when a government starts an operation. The MOD can’t be asked to fight wars on peacetime budget without being forced to lose pieces all over the place.
Especially if it is also dealing with Force’s modernization and procurement efforts, both always needed to keep the Armed Forces ready and capable to take on the missions the country gives them.
This has not been the case for Iraq and Afghanistan… And it has been the cause of the constant cutting back and delaying (and thus, indirectly caused also most of the cost overruns in procurement). The money that should have paid the Modernization programme, from FRES to CVF, has had to be used to fund the two wars… and in light of this, the MOD probably did the very best that was possible, much as things look like disasterous.
They could have easily been far, far worse, seen the premise.
10. – Beware of mission creep, but stay flexible and adapt to changing requirements.
11. – Be honest to your citizens. Social media will immediately expose “half truths” and have a devastating effect on (military) ops.
Two cents, up in the air. :)
(10) Be careful about whom you elect into power.