Over the next week or so I am going to attempt an in-depth analysis of the SDSR No doubt RUSI and Chatham House will be going into overtime and the other blogs as well but with the help of the Think Defence readers, I am sure this will be better!
As with the Think Defence FDR, it will be split over a number of posts
Table of contents
- SDSR – Analysis #01 (The Road to SDSR)
- SDSR – Analysis #02 (Where’s the Strategy)
- SDSR – Analysis #03 (The Elephants in the Room)
- SDSR – Analysis #04 (The National Security Tasks)
- SDSR – Analysis #05 (Royal Navy)
- SDSR – Analysis #06 (Army)
- SDSR – Analysis #07 (Royal Air Force)
- SDSR – Analysis #08 (Trident)
- SDSR – Analysis #09 (Wider Security)
- SDSR – Analysis #10 (Alliances)
- SDSR – Analysis #11 (Structural Reform)
- SDSR – Analysis #12 (Jam Tomorrow)
As usual, we have an open door, so the same rules apply if anyone wants to chip in feel free to let me know.
We all knew it was going to be damaging, we all knew there was going to be very little by the way of strategy and we all knew the boast about it not being a series of salami slices was complete and utter shite.
We ended up with 10 things
1. Political and industrial self-interest dictated the outcome
2. No real tough decisions were actually made, see point 1
3. There was a light dusting of good news to sweeten the pill
4. A complete lack of articulation about what is in the interests of the nation
5. A management-speak guru’s wet dream
6. Important decisions. Trident, for example, were fudged
7. Service politics was, as usual, shocking and shameful
8. A vague promise of jam tomorrow
9. Illogical capability cuts in the wrong areas
10. A document that ultimately created much confusion and unanswered questions with problems for the future
It’s not like we are at war or anything, is it?