Complex Weapons Industry

For the UK defence industry, complex weapons are delivered by a number of manufacturers but the specific Complex Weapons Portfolio means MBDA (owned by BAE, EADS and Finmeccanica (Leonardo)) and Thales.

Following the 2005 Defence Industrial Strategy, in 2006, a new approach to managing the design, development, manufacture and through-life support was announced that would adopt a collaborative partnership, with MBDA and the MoD as the lead. Other partners in the team were Thales, Roxel and Qinetiq.

This arrangement was intended to maintain sovereign industrial capabilities by providing a predictable requirements roadmap. It was a smart move by the MoD and manufacturers and one which I don’t think they get enough credit for. In moving outside of the old-fashioned adversarial supplier-customer arrangement and towards a portfolio partnership it has provided an environment where innovation can be accommodated and the adverse effects of feast and famine reduced dramatically. In return for this assured workstream, industry would commit to a large block of efficiency savings over the initial ten-year timespan.

In 2010, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) signed a long-term partnering agreement with MBDA called the Initial Portfolio Management Agreement (PMA-I).

Key objectives of the portfolio partnership were a desire to maximise commonality, promote reuse of subcomponents, reduce development times improve collaboration with European partners. The agreement covered a spend of approximately £600m per annum.

Non-MBDA/Thales weapons were not included in the portfolio agreements, the Raytheon Paveway IV, Boeing Tomahawk cruise or Hellfire missiles for example. It also excluded infantry weapons such as Javelin and NLAW. This approach was perhaps due to industrial and sovereignty concerns but by putting Raytheon and Boeing ‘outside the tent’ the desired end to end capability management and cost advantages may not have been fully realised.

The portfolio approach was also intended to reduce single service focussed programmes that produce anomalies like RAF Harrier GR.3 rockets and RN Sea Harrier rockets not being interchangeable in 1982. These lessons were not learned by the time Brimstone was introduced but hopefully, SPEAR CAP 3 will have driven out this, frankly, nonsensical situation.

The Complex Weapons portfolio has seen increasing industrial consolidation and integration, indeed, this was one of the fundamental objectives of the portfolio approach. With increasing UK-French defence cooperation, complex weapons have also taken on a more UK/France focus.

The creation of MBDA came from a need to reduce the numerous missile vendors;

MBDA was created in December 2001 following the merger of the main missile systems companies in France, Italy and the United Kingdom. Each of these companies contributed the experience gained from fifty years of technological and operational success. The restructuring of the sector in Europe took its next step in March 2006 with the acquisition of LFK-Lenkflugkörpersysteme GmbH, the German missile subsidiary of EADS (now AIRBUS Group). This further enriched MBDA’s range of technologies and products, consolidating the Group’s world-leading position in the industry

The diagram below shows the timeline.

It is jointly owned by BAE (37.5%), Airbus Group (37.5%) and Leonardo (25%)

In December 2015, as follow up from the 2010 Lancaster House agreements, France and the UK jointly signed contracts for the development of the Sea Venom missile that will replace Sea Skua in both nation’s armouries. Of more interest was confirmation that work would continue with the creation of a number of ‘Centres of Excellence’.

• France; weapon controllers and test equipment
• UK; datalinks and actuators

These four will be followed by locations for complex warheads, guidance and navigation systems, algorithms and software.