The official history of the General Purpose Frigate (GPFF) starts with the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) 2015.

Since then there has been very little by way of official detailed information but the back story to the GPFF, or Type 31, goes back much further than SDSR 2015.

History

Prior to SDSR 2015

Although there may not be a direct line between the late nineties early two thousands Future Surface Combatant (FSC) programme, there are certainly echoes of a dotted line.

In 2001, the MoD awarded a contract to Vosper Thorneycroft (VT) for three River Class offshore patrol vessels to replace the existing five Island Class vessels. The vessels were originally chartered for five years at a cost of £60 million.

All were commissioned in 2004.

The Future Surface Combatant (FSC) programme sought to define a replacement for the Royal Navy Type 22 and Type 23 Frigates.

By the end of 2004, the Royal Navy was seemingly no closer to finding a steady state design or even an agreed concept for FSC. Industry had been encouraged to create radical proposals and significant funds (for the time) had been spent exploring alternative hull-forms.

The Maritime Coherence Study was initiated to try and make sense of the confused and confusing situation.

Err, crystal.

At the end of 2005, the Government published the Defence Industrial Strategy

It expected the industry to restructure itself around an analysis of skills and workload created within 6 months of publication. The key industrial partners were BAE, VT, DML, Babcock and Thales.

The requirement was stated thus;

On FSC, it made clear that the current approach was based on a two platform solution.

Whilst the Coherence Study was running, the working assumption was that those two platform solutions mentioned above would be called;

• Versatile Surface Combatant (VSC), entering service in 2023
• Medium Sized Vessel Derivative (MSVD), entering service in 2016.

The Coherence Study concluded that there was a need for another study, proposing the Sustained Surface Combatant Capability, or S2C2.

S2C2 was established in late 2006 and lasted for 18 months, with representatives from the MoD and industry.

It concluded that FSC should not be delivered by the two class (VSC and MSVD) solution at all, but a new two-class solution, with an additional vessel that would replace the hydrographic, mine countermeasures and patrol ships.

Two became three;

• C1; Force Anti-Submarine Warfare Combatant, a large multi-mission combat vessel for ASW and land attack missions.
• C2; Stabilisation Combatant,  a less well-equipped vessel for choke point escort and protection of sea lines of communication (SLOC).
• C3; ocean capable patrol vessel

This change in emphasis from a high end to a high-low mix was reportedly prompted by the then 1SL, Sir Jonathon Band.

Cue another round of speculation, design studies and proposals from industry, with much criticism from everyone else. Much like the British Army with FRES, it seemed the Royal Navy was having trouble deciding what it wanted, and calling each successive round of ideas something new only added to the mirth.

The Sustained Surface Combatant Capability project highlighted a need for up to ten C1’s and eight C2’s.

C1 and C2 would use the same hull form but have different equipment levels. C1 would be built at one per year, followed by the C2’s.

The C1 and C2 concept of having the same hull but different equipment fits was eventually taken into the Type 26 Global Combat Ship.

Remember, the original concept for Type 26 was 13 vessels;

• 8x Type 26 with Sonar 2087 for ASW and,
• 5 x Type 26 without Sonar 2087 for General Purpose.

The proposed C3 variant was seen by many as a way of replacing the existing, and relatively numerous mines countermeasures vessel, with a less specialised and more general purpose fighting vessel, hoping that this approach would both retain MCM capability whilst bolstering surface fleet numbers.

At the time, there was a great deal of speculation and discussion about what the C3 should look like, arguably more so than for C1/C2.

In 2003, BMT started to examine the requirements for an Auxiliary Surface Combatant, comparable to the C3, but one that sat astride the C3 and C2 boundaries. The MoD even funded a small-scale feasibility study that examined the potential to combine the smaller vessel with heavy lift ships for global deployments.

The naval design company BMT, self-funded the 2007 Project Venator in response to the Royal Navy’s Sustained Surface Combatant Capability (S2C2) ‘Pathfinder’ initiative. The study programme was intended to inform the design of the C3 Ocean Capable Patrol Vessel (OCPV) which was to be part of the S2C2’s projected three-tier Future Surface Combatant solution.

One of the principal design objectives of Project Venator was to demonstrate that role reconfiguration was possible. A balance between roles could be made, determined by current requirements. The resultant design was a globally deployable minor warship would be able to execute mine countermeasures (MCM) using the rapidly maturing off-board unmanned autonomous systems, MCM support, hydrographic survey, maritime security operations (MSO) and offshore patrol.

Venator had the following characteristics (from BMT);

• Maximum speed of 25knots (to track and stop vessels)
• Cruise speed of 18knots (task group operations)
• Range of 5000nm at 18knots (task group operations) or 7000nm at 12knots (as a dispersed unit)
• Sustain a transit in Sea State 6, and remain operational in Sea State 4/5
• Accommodate a complement of at least 60 (stretch to 80)
• A mission payload of up to 700tonnes including (as fixed systems) a medium calibre gun, an air/surface search radar, and a flight deck/shelter sized for a Lynx helicopter

Mission modules would be tailored to the specific tasking and included (again, directly from BMT);

• MCM (Crew 59): largely based on off-board systems including minesweeping unmanned surface vehicles (USVs), reconnaissance unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), one-shot mine disposal vehicles, self-defence fit (air/surface search radar, guns, and obstacle avoidance sonar)
• MCM Support (Crew 79): MCM Tasking Authority and (limited) Forward Support Capability with logistics office, planning space, spares, workshops, diver support, and recompression
• MSO (Crew 78): two (manned) 11m Rigid Inflatable Boats (RIBs), USV, helicopter, EW/surveillance, unmanned aerial vehicle, self-defence fit (air/surface search radar, guns and obstacle avoidance sonar)
• Survey (Crew 48 plus temporary personnel): survey UUVs, survey launches, laboratories/offices

The project concluded that standard ISO containers could be used for many of the mission modules but a much improved and flexible solution would use task specific sub ISO sized containers (Bicon’s, Tricon’s and Quadcon’s for example)

The design study was submitted to the MoD, where it was promptly filed in the round filing cabinet.

Thales proposed a C3 vessel called the Modular General Purpose Frigate and VT, another concept based on their earlier Global Corvette for the C3 requirement, called the Ocean Capable Patrol Vessel (OCPV)

The VT vessel was based on its design for the Royal Navy of Oman but with more equipment space, taking its displacement up to 3,000 tonnes. It could travel at a top speed of 25 knots, accommodate a crew of 76 and carry a number of ISO containers underneath the Merlin capable flight deck.

HMS Clyde, a modified River Class OPV was commissioned in January 2007.

HMS Clyde was the first evolution of the River Class design, specifically for use as the Falkland Islands patrol vessel and able to accommodate a Merlin helicopter. Lengthened to 81.5m, HMS Clyde has a displacement of approximately 2,000 tonnes.

In mid-2007, after completion of their study, the S2C2 IPT was stood down. The BMT Venator 90, Thales Modular General Purpose Frigate and Vosper Thorneycroft Global Corvette were all consigned to the dustbin although some reported that the working assumption had moved on from a single base vessel for C1 and C2.

In a 2008 submission to the Select Committee of Scottish Affairs, BAE were clear on the implications for workload and build location for FSC.

In May 2008, QinetiQ announced an 11-month contract;

Later in 2008, BAE and VT merged to form BVT Surface Fleet.

In 2009, BAE were awarded a design contract for the C1 and C2 element of FSC

The Terms of Business Agreement (TOBA) were finalised in 2009 which were to form the basis of a new industrial capability that was to be underpinned by commitments from both the MoD and industry. A new commercial entity was to be formed called BVT comprising BAE (65%) and VTG (55%).

Early in 2010, the C3 variant was dropped in favour of a new programme, the Mine Countermeasures Hydrographic and Patrol Capability (MHPC).

The Government of Trinidad and Tobago cancelled their order for three for three Port of Spain class vessels, launched a year earlier. These were modified River Class OPV’s.

In March 2010, the C1 progressed to Initial Gate, five or six years later than envisaged. Recognising the impending SDSR, no commitment was made to quantities, given that policy may be changed by the review, although the expectation was still for ten vessels.

BAE Surface Ships were awarded a four-year, £127m, contract in 2010 to design the Type 26 Global Combat Ship.

Commenting on the award, 1SL, Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope said;

The C1 and C2 variants of FSC had variously flip flopped between completely different designs and identical base hulls with different equipment fits over the course of the elongated FSC programme but SDSR 2010 confirmed it would be met by a single acoustically quiet class of vessel, the Type 26 Global Combat Ship.

SDSR 2010 also described how Frigate numbers were to be reduced to 13, the Type 22’s being withdrawn.

Eight Type 26 would be designated Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) variants and five, General Purpose (GP).

This was a change from the C1 and C2 concept being envisaged as different vessels, they would now be the same, but with different equipment fits, i.e. the ASW variant would have the Thales 2087 towed sonar array and the GP variant, would not.

The BAE/VT Khareef Class were launched between 2009 and 2011 for the Royal Navy of Oman. The three vessels share many systems with the River Class although officially, they are described as a ’99 metre Corvette’

HTMS Krabi of the Royal Thai Navy was launched in 2011, a locally produced variant of the River Class.

December 2012 saw the Brazilian government confirm the sale of the three River class vessels previously ordered by Trinidad and Tobago. The £183 million contract resulted in the vessels being renamed the Amazonas Class; BNS Amazonas, BNS Apa and BNS Araguari (shown below)

Joint Concept Note 1/12 ‘Black Swan’ was published in 2012.

It must be said that the Black Swan Concept drew much criticism from many.

Nothing came of Black Swan, apart from ridicule, but looking at Type 31 today, it might have been somewhat prescient.

After much speculation, BAE released the results of their shipbuilding study in November 2013, click here to read;

Three Offshore Patrol Vessels OPV’s were to be built to cover the gap between the end of QE Class construction and commencement of Type 26 work.

There was a great deal of commentary at the time that the Royal Navy did not really want these ‘make work’ ships, directly because of delays in Type 26 but this is immaterial, the TOBA was designed to retain shipbuilding skills and if the Royal Navy and MoD had decided what it wanted from a Type 22/23 replacement sooner, construction would have immediately followed QE work.

A month later, in August 2014, the contract for the River Batch III Offshore Patrol Vessels was announced.

A few months later, BAE released the first imagery for the River Batch II Offshore Patrol Vessels.

The design was the lowest risk and quickest into production, the entire point of the order.

They were to be named HMS Forth, HMS Medway and HMS Trent (in build order). Details on whether these would replace or supplement the existing Batch I vessels was unclear at the time and questions tabled in the House of Commons declared that this question would be considered in the 2015 SDSR. The Royal Navy, BAE and Ministry of Defence embarked upon a public relations effort to try and convince everyone the ships were both needed and wanted by the Royal Navy, and not simply a means to satisfy the obligations of the Terms of Business Agreement (TOBA) to prevent skills fade.

In various public appearances 1SL and other Royal Navy Very Senior Officers would insist that only a one-for-one replacement of Type 23 with Type 26 would deliver the credibility and capability the UK needed. They were uniformly emphatic and anecdotally, any suggestion of a two tier fleet or more OPV’s/Corvettes would be extremely unwelcome.

A 2015 Freedom of Information (FOI) release confirmed a change in the MHPC programme

The delays in FSC and Type 26 which had resulted in the Batch II River OPV’s had de-facto covered the P in MHPC.

At the end of September 2015, Defense news reported a comment by Rear Admiral Alex Burton, Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Ships);

This, of course, set the hares and hounds running with extrapolations made to get unit cost. A financial consultancy services contract was advertised to provide additional support to the decision-making process.

Clearly, all was not well in the Type 26 GCS Programme.

After SDSR 2015

The 2015 SDSR, published in November 2015 described a change of plan for Type 26.

No longer were there to be 13 Type 26 split between 8 ASW and 5 GP, the Type 26 programme would be truncated at the eight ASW variants. It also confirmed a further two River Class Batch II vessels would be purchased to fill in the widening gap between the end of the QE carriers and the start of the Type 31/26 Frigates. The SDSR also stated that there would be ‘up to six’ OPV’s in service and subsequent speculation was that this would consist of the 5 new builds and the existing modified batch 1, HMS Clyde, with the original Batch 1 vessels withdrawn.

On July 2016, in a speech at Mansion House, 1SL, Admiral Sir Philip Jones referred to the GPFF as Type 31.

So there you go, Type 31 it is!

The same evidence session also saw 1SL confirm that the SDSR 2015 description of ‘up to six’ OPV’s actually meant five, with HMS Clyde replaced by one of the five new builds.

HMS Forth, the first of the five River Class Batch 2 vessels was floated out in August 2016.

The River Class has been somewhat of an unlikely success with 13 built (or about to be built) and a further 3 derivatives.

In the first half of 2016, a number of manufacturers reportedly revealed their GPFF type 31 concepts, will cover these in the next part of the series.

Perhaps the most significant event in the history of the Type 31 was the publication of the National Shipbuilding Strategy  (Independent Report) by Sir John Parker.

This was originally described as the national shipbuilding strategy but was later downgraded to an independent report that would inform the actual strategy.

Sir John made a number of observations and judgement statements about the woes and on the Type 31, or General Purpose Frigate made four recommendations;

An evidence session on the National Shipbuilding Strategy at the House of Commons on the 28th February 2017 revealed the working assumption that Type 31 is being referred to as Type 31e, e for export, as in the report.

It also became clear that the desire for Type 31 is that it is built in parallel with Type 26 in order to prevent a reduction in frigate numbers between 2023 and 2035.

Table of Contents

	Introduction
	Type 31 History
	Type 31 Capabilities