The area around Umm Qasr and the Al Faw peninsula in Iraq featured a range of amphibious and mine clearance activities in 2003.
The port of Umm Qasr, before the conflict, was responsible for two-thirds of the United Nations Food for Oil programme imports into Iraq but as a port, it had seen better days. Much of the infrastructure was neglected, many of the approach channels had silted due to lack of dredging and wrecks littered the general area.
It was functional though, and so formed part of the operation, it was considered to be vital in maintaining the flow of basic commodities like food and medicine following the initial combat phases. The port itself was divided into North, Middle and South with 22 berths and a range of cargo handling and storage facilities, some berths are dedicated to bulk materials like grain. The deepest draft was 12.5m, but most of the port required constant dredging due to its location and most of the berths were between 2 and 7 metres depth at low water.
In to order to dock at Umm Qasr a ship would need to navigate 41 miles of the Khor Abdullah waterway which in the approach channels had a depth of between 7 and 10 metres at Celestial Low Water (CLW).
The port and approaches would need to be made safe and open for traffic but before that could happen there was the small matter of clearing it of enemy forces.
Build Up in Kuwait
As the forces were being built up in Kuwait in January port space was at a premium at the main port of Shuaiba. There were a large number of vehicles to offload from chartered RORO vessels and the berths available for 24×7 operation (No 11 and 12) had no slipways or RORO linkspans available. The port also had a wide tidal range and so it was determined some kind of floating linkspan would be needed.
527 Specialist Team Royal Engineers (STRE) were tasked with sourcing one and consulted with the Engineer and Logistic Staff Corps (E&LSC), a network of senior civilian engineers. E&LSC is a fascinating and little-known organisation comprising senior executives of sixty British logistics and engineering organisations that retain military rank but have no military duties or pay. They exist purely to provide expert advice.
After consulting with E&LC, the Royal Engineers turned to Transmarine in Newcastle, the same company responsible for FIPASS in the Falkland Islands. They faced a tough challenge, the linkspan had to be in place by the planned arrival date of 24th February.
After examining the potential options Transmarine decided to buy the pontoon in Bahrain and design and fabricate the superstructure and bridge deck in Dubai.
The linkspan consisted of a 28m by 14m steel pontoon with two additional 4m x 7m flotation sponsons permanently fixed to the pontoon.
The superstructure and hinged 17m bridge deck could be set at an angle to accommodate ships with stern ramps and different tidal ranges. The assembled construction was secured to the quayside by a series of tensioned rope moorings.
It could accept the heaviest and largest military vehicle loads including Heavy Equipment Transporters (HET) towing a trailer with Challenger 2 Main Battle Tanks and variants. Difficult and awkward cargoes such as Chinook helicopters could also be accommodated.
The whole thing from start to finish cost £1.2 million.
A Mexeflote was also used to transfer ammunition from RFA Fort Rosalie over a nearby beach at the Port of Shuwaikh in Kuwait in order to meet the Net Explosive Quantity (NEQ) regulations in place at the time.
Assault Al Faw
On the night of the 19th of May US SEALS and Polish GROM, forces secured the offshore oil terminals and the onshore manifolds on the Al Faw peninsula.
The MoD publication, ‘Operating in Iraq – Lessons for the Future’ records the assault on Al Faw as;
The high mine and anti-ship missile threats around the Iraqi coast meant that the initial assault onto the Al Faw peninsula was reliant on helicopter support. The plan was to insert 40 Commando (Cdo) first using RN and RAF helicopters to seize the oil infrastructure at the base of the Al Faw peninsula. In order to protect 40 Cdo’s northern flank, 42 Cdo was to be inserted a short time later using US Marine Corps helicopters. Build-up of combat power, in particular light armour and logistics, was to be achieved by US heavy lift hovercraft because the very shallow beach gradients did not allow the use of conventional landing craft. The assault by 40 Cdo in conjunction with US forces, went according to plan, but the early crash of the US CH-46 Sea Knight helicopter carrying the headquarters of the Brigade Reconnaissance Force caused the second helicopter insertion to be aborted in the appalling and deteriorating visibility. It was hastily re-planned and executed six hours later using RAF Chinook and Puma helicopters. In view of extensive mining of the beach area it was decided not to risk the hovercraft. Consequently the light armour supporting 3 Cdo Brigade had to be inserted by a landing craft ferry north of Umm Qasr, some 24 hours later than planned.
Supporting the assault forces was 148 Battery Royal Artillery who were involved with three distinct activities, the initial assault, countering an Iraqi counter-attack against 40 CDO and Op JAMES, an attack on Basra.
From 148 Battery RA commanders notes;
As the Battery Commander I was responsible for the coordination, integration and delivery of offensive support, or combined fires, from air, aviation (helicopters), artillery, naval gunfire and mortars. There was an awful lot of it, especially for the initial operation on the Al Faw Peninsula, which one particularly articulate Royal Marine company commander described as a battery commander’s wet dream. As well as a variety of platforms providing fire, including my own eight 105 mm Light Guns, I also had the Battery’s Tac Group throughout the operation: my own three OP parties, a fire support team from 148 Bty, four fire control teams from the USMC 1 Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) and two Tactical Air Control Parties (Forward Air Control) (TACP(FAC)). We coordinated these with the mortar fire controllers (mfcs) from 40 Cdo to optimise the combined effect of all available weapons systems.
The first phase was to secure the oil facilities against sabotage.
Defending the area was a Naval Coastal Defence battalion reinforced with artillery and anti-aircraft guns.
The plan for Offensive Support was as follows. Any aircraft from Op Southern Watch – the air overflights of south-east Iraq sanctioned after the 1991 Gulf War – that was illuminated by enemy radar would result these high priority air defence and C2 targets on the Peninsula being hit in return. At H-24 hours 105 mm Light Guns and 155 mm AS90 from 3 RHA would occupy firing positions on Bubiyan Island which is just within the Kuwait border where they would prepare for a 90-minute fireplan to support landings by 42 Cdo to our flank after we had landed. Surveillance of the Peninsula and objective would increase at H-5 hours using US and UK assets. At H-20 minutes Iraqi communications frequencies would be jammed. Between H-17 and H-7 specific targets would be engaged by Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) or GPS guide bombs. A10s and C130 Spectre gunships from the Special Operations Flight would then be on station from H-7 to cover the HLSs and remain on station to provide close support to the contact battle once the SEALs and ourselves had landed. Finally, once the first assault elements from 40 Cdo had landed the guns on Bubiyan Island would commence their 90-minute fire plan to prepare the 42 Cdo Area of Operations for their landings to our flanks.
Tactical Assembly Viking was the kick off point with most of the Royal Marines launching from here, A, B and C Company.
D Company would also launch from HMS Ocean. The Brigade Reconnaissance Force (BRF) suffered a loss of several personnel in a USMC CH46 Sea Knight crash
Throughout the night and into the morning the assault continued and by morning USMC and RM artillery, naval gunfire support from RN and RAN vessels and helicopter launched TOW missiles from the CHF’s Lynx’s enabled the main force to achieve their objective.
As we consolidated on our objective, the Scorpions (light armoured vehicles) of C Sqn Queens Dragoon Guards pushed north to set up a recce screen just south of Basra. The Commando then began to clear north up the west bank of the Shatt-al-Arab waterway between Iraq and Iran. As we approached Basra the enemy launched an armoured counter attack against us, relying on heavy armour to throw our lightly equipped Commandos off the Peninsula. A, B and D Coys and 8 Bty were spread across a wide frontage in company positions. At last light on 26 Mar intelligence began to detect increased signals traffic from the enemy, then the recce screen from the QDG picked up the lead armoured vehicles moving towards them. We began to call for all available air support and US and UK aircraft heading north started to be diverted to assist us. As aircraft began stacking over our battle area, the FACs with the QDG began calling in strike after strike against the tanks. At the same time we began hitting them with heavy artillery from the AS90 guns with 7 Armd Bde to our west and both 7 and 8 Btys on the Peninsula itself. The situation along the forward line own troops got quite tense as some of the tanks got to within 800 metres of the lightly armed recce vehicles and there was a spectacular hit by an F18 with two 500-pound bombs on a pipeline behind which two T55s were hull down. As we slowed the enemy armoured column down, inflicting heavy casualties in the process, we were allocated a squadron of Challenger 2 tanks from the Royal Scots Dragoon Guards with 7 Armd Bde. They conducted a night assault river crossing by an M3 pontoon bridge into our area and worked their way up the west side to a line of departure on the flank of the remaining enemy. With our air and artillery supporting them, coordinated by HQ 40 Cdo, they launched their attack which destroyed fourteen T55s, sixteen other AFVs and five enemy positions in what was described later as the biggest British tank battle since the Second World War, which, it must be added, was coordinated by a Commando brigade and a Commando group HQ.
Naval Gunfire Support consisted of 17 fire missions and expended 155 4.5″ and 5″ rounds.
The assault on Al Faw is often characterised as an amphibious RM only affair but this was very far from the truth, combined arms and combined nations forces achieved the objective of securing the oil installations at Al Faw and allowed the port and its approaching waterways to be used without fear of being attacked from the peninsula.
Caught Red Handed
Providing maritime security in the area during this initial phase were two US Navy Cyclone Class patrol boats (USS Firebolt and USS Chinook) and two US Coast Guard cutters (USGC Aquidneck and USCG Adak)[tabs] [tab title=”USS Firebolt”]
During the night of 20th March 2003, all four patrol vessels spotted a number suspicious vessels coming down the Khor Abdullah and decided to intercept them. It was not possible to conduct a detailed search during the night and so the vessels and crews were held until morning. In the morning, a number of UK and US forces boarded to investigate, what they found was nothing short of incredible.
The tug Jumariya had a barge with carefully concealed mine storage and launching facilities and the Al Raya had disguised mines and a specially constructed stern flap for covert launching.[tabs] [tab title=”Jumariya 1″]
[/tab] [tab title=”Al Raya 1″]
The Jumariya barge was carrying 20 Manta and 48 LUGM mines ready to launch and on the deck of the Al Raya, 18 LUGM mines with cut oil drums as covers. The LUGM is a conventional buoyant contact mine with the familiar Hertz horns and 200kg explosive filler. The Italian made (Now Rheinmetall) Manta mines were much more dangerous as they are both acoustic and magnetic triggered with a 140kg warhead.
Luck as ever played its part, it was not lucky that the US Navy and US Coast Guard intercepted the two tugs, that being testament to their professionalism, but luck in so much that the Iraqi forces decided to indulge in a spot of mining on the same night as the initial assault.
Timing was all, a day or two earlier and the next phase may have been very different.
The combined force eventually made them all safe and removed their crews for detention.
Soon after, the task of clearing the port and approach lanes commenced.
Clearing the Port
The composite force for port clearance consisted 3 teams from Australia, the UK and USA. They drove into the port on the 24th of March with security provided by USMC and Polish forces.
Australian Clearance Diving Team 3 (AUSCDT 3) was the only coalition unit with established harbour clearance SOP’s so they were tasked with clearing the berths and associated facilities at Umm Qasr to enable berthing of vessels. The Australian force also noted that US Navy MCM forces arrived without ammunition or explosives so had to be sustained by the Australian force. The US Navy team did not have any NBC equipment either.
The port was a difficult environment, strong tidal current and extremely poor visibility being the two main problems and because of the extremely cluttered sea bottom environment, conventional detection using sonar was almost impossible.
It often came down to touch!
To provide some sense of the problem of demining a busy port as opposed to a pristine beach this quote from an Australian Army spokesman, Lt Col Pup Elliot;
If they find a can of soft drink on the bottom, they have to deal with that, look at it and make an inspection and at times they’ll find stuff that they may not be able to identify
One of the first finds was a sunken PB40 minelayer with four LUGM mines still aboard. The US dive team set to work removing as much of the vessel as possible to allow the mines to pulled clear and disposed of on land. Because of the time pressure and potential for booby traps any suspicious contact was usually just exploded in situ, just in case.
The team were also involved in clearing the port buildings and disposing of all manner of munitions and on one occasion destroyed a cache of 25 mines found outside the town.[tabs] [tab title=”Clearance Divers 1″]
They used REMUS 100 to conduct 10 missions that surveyed 2.5 million square metres and identified 97 contacts using on-board sensors, thus enabling the clearance divers to concentrate on other more difficult contacts.
Port clearance at Umm Qasr also saw the operational debut of the REMUS 100 autonomous underwater system, bought with them by the US Navy team.
The Remote Environmental Monitoring UnitS (REMUS) was developed by the US Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute in the early nineties and subsequently manufactured and further developed by Hydroid Inc., now Kongsberg. REMUS 100 is a compact device, weighing on 39kg and 1.6m long but it can operate for 14 hours before needing to be recovered to be ‘re-charged’[tabs] [tab title=”REMUS 100 Image 1″]
Clearing the Port Approaches
As port clearance activities were underway the Royal Navy led the approach channel mine clearance operation in conjunction with US Navy and US Coast Guard assets, it was a considerable volume of difficult water to clear.
Safe lanes were cleared by a multi vessel group as per the diagram below.
Leading the column were a pair of SWIMS unmanned clearance boats being controlled by operators on HMS Brocklesby. USS Dextrous acted in the role of Command MCMV, gathering data from the others and plotting likely seabed contacts for interrogation by the other MCM vessels.
The cleared channel would be widened and eventually
HMS Roebuck also provided invaluable survey capabilities and was in fact the first Royal Navy vessel to dock at Umm Qasr.
Commenting on the task, HMS Roebucks commander said;
The last charts to be made in the area were over 40 years ago, so our biggest problem was to find out how accurate they were. The first few weeks work were very slow indeed because we tow our sonar behind us, so we don’t want to be the first to find a wrecked ship
Clearing the waterways involved a range of UN and USN forces, everything from the rapidly introduced SWIMS system and One Shot Mine Disposal System to the hugely impressive CH-53 Sea Dragons, even the US Navy dolphins played a part.
The Shallow Water Influence Minesweeping System (SWIMS) was designed to operate in the shallow waters in the south of Iraq and was obtained as an Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR)
SWIMS consists of a towed magnetic and acoustic source, a tow/power delivery cable, a power conditioning and control subsystem, and an external or palletised power supply. Its small size and reduced weight require minimum handling equipment, and it is deployable from a helicopter or surface craft by two personnel. 12 QinetiQ modified remote controlled Combat Support Boats (CSB) were also used to tow Australian Defence Industries (ADI) Mini Dyad System (MDS) and Pipe Noise Makers (PNMs) ahead of the RN mine hunters as part of the SWIMS payload. It is worth noting that the system demonstrator was available within 3 weeks of order placement, a truly remarkable feat.
Australian Defence Industries are now Thales Australia and this system have evolved into a comprehensive package called the Australian Minesweeping System (AMS).
SWIMS comprised two main components, the towing boat and payload.
The towing boat was a rapidly modified Combat Support Boat, in service with the Royal Engineers and Royal Logistic Corps. Modifications included telemetry and remote control equipment and additional power generation and power distribution equipment.
The SWIMS payload consisted of multiple towed bodies in an array that was designed to simulate the acoustic and magnetic signature of a ship, and would thus, fool the mine into detonating, possibly destroying the unmanned system rather than a real ship. In addition to floats and connecting equipment, the payload array consisted of two towed bodies, a Pipe Noise Maker and Mini Dyad. Pipe Noise Makers are simple and robust systems that do pretty much as the name suggests, make noise. Mini Dyads sound small, at 7.7m long and weighing in at 1.6 tonnes, they are not. They are simply a steel tube containing multiple steel and ferrite disc magnets with multiple Mini Dyads arranged to simulate different magnetic signatures[tabs] [tab title=”SWIMS 1″]
The MoD selected the ADI system because it was the only one available that did not need additional power and could operate in shallow waters. The system was ordered in late December 2002 and delivered in late January, they were hired for 12 months and the acoustic generators purchased outright. One complete array comprised 2 Mini Dyads and 2 Pipe Noise Makers.
The US Navy Mk 105 minesweeping sled is towed by a Sea Dragon MH53 helicopter and these were used, although with mixed results.[tabs] [tab title=”Mk 105 Image 1″]
The Royal Navy also used the Seafox one shot disposal system and over this initial period 450 contacts were detected and investigated, 15 of which were mines.
Although 12 tonnes of supplies reached Umm Qasr by truck, overland from Kuwait, the bulk of humanitarian supplies would be through the port and the delay in clearing the port and its approaches was contributing to rising tensions in the city. The Polish logistic support vessel Kontradmirał Xawery Czernicki escorted RFA Sir Galahad for much of the initial journey and then as she approached the Khor Abdullah formed up into a convoy with a number of other vessels for the final journey to Umm Qasr on the 27th of March 2003.
RFA Sandown led the convoy, arriving on the 28th March 2003, Berth 5, with 232.3 tonnes of humanitarian supplies, gifted by Kuwait.[tabs] [tab title=”Sir Galahad Arrives 1″]
RFA Sir Galahad was followed by RFA Sir Percivale a few days later.
However, ten days after the first port visit Lloyds were still refusing to insure civilian vessels, or at least at a rate that was affordable. This lack of insurance meant larger vessels carrying the thousands of tonnes humanitarian supplies needed by the people of Basra remained on ships in the Gulf.
The Spanish vessel The Galicia berthed after Sir Percivale and the channels were widened until larger ships could dock.
17 Port and Maritime Regiment RLC under the command of Lt Col Paul Ash were responsible for bringing Umm Qasr back into service. Most of the damage had been caused by neglect and under investment rather than military action by the Coalition, spare parts for machinery were unavailable and most of the Iraqi civilian workers had been dispersed. The waterways had little or no safe passage markers and the surrounding utility infrastructure was in poor condition.
By early May much of the immediately repairable damage had been repaired and in conjunction with a number of civilian contractors shipping traffic increased.
The 2,000 ton displacement US Coast Guard Juniper Class Buoy Tender Walnut had installed 34 navigation buoys, the existing ones being either damaged or dangerously out of position. 25 of the existing buoys were also removed. Interestingly, the USCGC Walnut history page indicates that they knew of the deployment on 14th November 2002 which contrasts with the notice available to UK forces. USS Grapple carried out a great deal of wreck salvage and on Friday 2nd of May a United Nations World Food Programme ship docked at Umm Qasr and offloaded 14,000 tonnes of bagged rice, contrasting starkly with the couple of hundred tonnes landed by the RFA vessels and the Galicia.[tabs] [tab title=”USCG Walnut”]
Longer term rehabilitation would include all wreck removal, a more permanent dredging capability, crane repairs, installation or repairs of aids to navigation, storage, parking and utility services. Equipment ranging from large heavy lift barges and salvage vessels to self-propelled dredging pontoons (Versi Dredge 5012L) were deployed. The port of Umm Qasr was handed back to the Iraqis in May 2003 after which the slow process of full rehabilitation continued.
Even the trains were bought back into service.
The final dredged depth of 12.5m was achieved in 2010.
Opening and rehabilitating Umm Qasr was a significant feat that involved collaboration between US Navy, British Army, Royal Navy and Royal Australian Navy, Polish Navy and US Coast Guard. The follow on operation to expand the port and complete all salvage tasks would also have been impossible.
This all occurred against a backdrop of operations ‘elsewhere’ and so the whole effort was relatively un-newsworthy, but it was a perfect example of joint working that combined, survey, mine clearance, the deployment of a linkspan and broad range of salvage and electrical and mechanical engineering capabilities, even rail.
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