A Royal Navy FLO-FLO

A few thoughts on the utility of the US Expeditionary Transfer Dock and its potential for the UK, expanding into other roles as part of a wider discussion.

The US sea basing concept envisaged a far offshore collection of logistics and combat vessels that could deliver forces and all their sustainment needs directly to the objective without needing to build up stores at a beach location or operate in vulnerable areas close to shore. The sea base would eliminate the need to organise, redistribute and repack supplies onshore, and palletise what was needed, to order, all whilst afloat. Technical challenges included asset visibility in the deployed logistics management system, ship to ship transfer of stores and vehicles in high sea states and very high fuel usage rates for the high speed connectors (LCAC, CH-53K and V-22). The planning requirement for a fourteen thousand strong Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) is just under a thousand tonnes per day and even with the excess of airlift available to the US forces it was not deemed practical at distances greater than 60 nautical miles offshore.

It is important to recognise that this was not for the assault phase but in order to provide the throughput required to sustain the ashore force at the stand-off distances envisaged, the only sensible option was a high speed surface connector, the LCAC hovercraft. Neither is it used with amphibious assault shipping, instead, the landing platform is used with logistics vessels, the Large Medium Speed Roll On Roll Off (LMSR) for example. If it were to be contextualised in UK terms, it would be one of the Point ‘class’ strategic RORO vessels.

One of the initial concepts was called an Interface Landing Platform which would be carried ‘side loaded’ in a similar fashion to a Mexeflote on a Bay Class vessel, unloaded in-situ and then recovered when not needed. This was a simple, cheap and quick to deploy concept but somewhat size limited.

A mobile landing platform concept was advanced that examined a number of vessel configurations.

The concept of using a semi-submersible vessel to allow the LCAC to ‘drive on’ was proven with the M/V Mighty Servant 3, a commercial heavy lift Float On Float Off (FLOFLO) vessel, as shown in the image below.

There has been much change since these early iterations of the sea-base concept but one of the survivors is the landing platform, now called the Expeditionary Transfer Dock. Instead of a commercial heavy lift FLFO vessel with superstructure forward, the final design is a NASSCO modified Alaska Class Tanker 

Mobile Landing Platform Operations

Expeditionary Transfer Dock (ESD) USNS John Glenn (T-ESD-2) – 【海上兵站基地】遠征ドック型運搬艦USNSジョン・グレン

CNO Talks About the Mobile Landing Platform

The large deck area affords the crew the ability to turn and queue vehicles to maximise flexibility and throughput, certainly an advantage over the smaller ILP. It does add cost though, the vessels were not cheap and it is hard to avoid view that the US is often guilty of recreating what it already has but at great expense. The existing method of offloading RORO ships is for vehicles and containers to be driven down the ships ramp onto a floating platform called a Roll On Roll Off Discharge Facility or RRDF. They are then transferred from the platform to lighters and landing craft. When weather and sea conditions preclude safe operation of the RRDF vehicles and equipment will be loaded onto lighters over the side rather than driven off the RORO ramp. Unsurprisingly, there is a Navy and Army version.

RRDF has also been used with LCAC’s

Because of doctrinal and scale differences, the lack of high speed connectors and cost, it would be difficult to envisage the UK adopting a similar, highly specialised, vessel. More likely would be to develop further the Strategic RORO/Mexeflote combination.

Three of the five contracted ‘MLP’ vessels have been delivered in a different configuration, the Afloat Forward Staging Base, or Expeditionary Mobile Base as it is now known. For this second role (ESB), the large open deck is fitted with a prefabricated module that has space for small craft, unmanned systems and helicopters.

Includes a two-spot flight deck, hangar facility, helicopter fueling capability, ordnance storage, operation planning and work spaces, and berthing for 101 permanent military crew and 149 personnel of an embarked military detachment.Has a mission deck below the flight deck with a crane for storing and deploying the various mine-hunting and clearing equipment used with the MH-53E helicopters; explosive ordnance demolition boats and equipment may also be stored and handled on the mission deck.

Although many seem to focus on the more glamorous aspects of the ESB, the MCM role seems to be well suited to a future that includes and increasing reliance on off-board stand-off systems.

To support Airborne Mine Countermeasure operations including hosting a squadron of four legacy MH-53E helicopters. Provide storage and deploying capabilities of the various mine-detecting and clearing equipment, which are used with the helicopters. To support explosive ordnance demolition boats

The media below show some of the key features..

Lewis Puller ESB (2)

Lewis Puller ESB (6)

Lewis Puller ESB (7)

Lewis Puller ESB (9)

Lewis Puller ESB (11)

Lewis Puller ESB (12)

USNS Lewis B. Puller (ESB 3) Operations

USNS Lewis B. Puller deploys from Naval Station Norfolk

Operations Aboard Navy's New Expeditionary Sea Base USNS Lewis B Puller

There is a very good write up of the the type here

Would something similar be useful for the UK?

Perhaps yes, but it is difficult to see the significant advantages over using a Bay class vessel.

Given the UK has no defined requirement for amphibious ‘sea basing’ logistics and no spare cash either, this post would naturally end here.

That said, where it is arguably worth taking the discussion forward is in the context of a broader future requirement and see where it takes us.



Several years ago BMT looked at the options for replacing RFA Diligence under the Operational Maintenance and Repair (OMAR) study. It concluded that the optimum solution was an unpowered barge carried to the area of operations on Float On Float Off (FLOFLO) heavy lift vessel. The barge was 120m x 30m and displaced approximately 3,500 tonnes.

OMAR BargeThe study suggested using a FLOFLO vessel of opportunity or one on a long term charter. With the withdrawal of RFA Diligence and pending withdrawal of RFA Argus,  it is perhaps worth another look at the general concept.

Putting aside heavy lift barge/tug combinations, there are three basic configurations for a heavy lift ship;

Lift On Lift Off; the ship has a large open deck area onto which outsize and extremely heavy cargos are lifted on and off using dockside or integral cranes.

Roll On Roll Off; the payload is moved on-board using multi wheeled heavy lift platforms called Self Propelled Modular Transporters (SPMT). Ballasting allows a straight path to be established between the ships deck and quayside

Float On Float Off; the deck area flooded after ballasting down to an appropriate depth and the cargo manoeuvred in, usually with tugs, although when transporting smaller vessels, they can self-load. The ship is ‘re-floated’ and secured for the journey.

Different ships can use one or more of these methods, the most flexible being able to use all of them.

Movable Deck

The more one looks at the above the more they start to look like one of these…

A robust, cheap and adaptable vehicle which is used for shifting stuff, or with the addition of ‘modules’ a more integrated device for more complex roles.

Operators include Jumbo MaritimeBigroll, Dockwise, RollDock and Combilift. For transporting leisure craft, Yacht Transport provide a specialised service, the FLO-FLO vessels generally have higher capacity accommodation for the yacht crew.

M/V Combi Dock I loading zeppeliner in Hamburg

DYT Yacht Transport Services

The Combi Dock is longer than the Roll Dock ST class, 170m and 151m respectively, but in other regards, they are very similar. Moveable deck panels are used to create a deck at one of six levels and a temporary bulkhead can also be installed to allow the vessel to be submerged without flooding the cargo hold. The cranes can be used together for a tandem lift of approximately 700 tonnes.The hold has enough space for 1,383 TEU .

With a little shaved off the width, the BMT OMAR barge would fit perfectly on the cargo deck.

The M/V Combi Dock cost €100m to build, these are not expensive.

Interestingly, the later vessels in the Combi Dock series have been purchased and converted for use in the offshore industry

The OIG Giant II, formerly Blue Giant, formerly Combi Dock IV, is just such a conversion. The work included modifications to the cranes (anti heave and lift extension) and adding a helideck, moon pool, accommodation module, additional generators and a Dynamic Positioning system using azipods and thrusters. The 500 tonnes 13mx18m accommodation module is built across seven decks and includes facilities for 86 personnel, including leisure, sleeping, work spaces and water/waste treatment.

A new build contract at the same ‘offshore’ specification for two was reportedly €200m for the pair.

If the UK is going to make use of such a design the mantra must be ‘minimum modification’ but would the heavy lift cranes really be needed, probably not.

If there were no FLOFLO or RORO capacity, there might be an argument for retention, but otherwise, there is no real need for them. The only thing they would be used for is lifting the hatch covers in and out of the cargo hold. Using a fixed crane, 3 in the case of the Combi Dock, allows the entire length of the cargo deck to be covered, but it does mean they have to be hefty enough for the weight at a specific outreach.

An alternative to the very expensive heavy lift cranes might be smaller travelling rail cranes such as those used in the offshore anchor handling industry. The large ones can lift 10-15 tonnes so when acting in tandem, a pair could easily lift the hatch covers.

Rail Crane

A different view is that the cranes could be used for lifting small craft, or even larger patrol craft as part of a ‘mothership’ type approach. They would also be problematical if any of the larger modules used an aviation capability, obviously they would be a hazard. Leaving the centre crane in place but removing the other two would allow it to be stowed in a forward position for aviation operations but this would limit the amount of cargo deck it could cover, there would be gaps to the front and rear.

This assumes the jib length is the same.

By accepting a lower lift weight than 350 tonnes, a longer jib length would allow a single crane, at the cargo deck mid-point to cover the entire deck. A 60m jib length crane, with heave compensation, is available from MacGergor, Liebherr and others. Passive heave compensation could also be used for traversing the splash zone.

A few different crane options to consider, but that would be about it for the changes save for specific communications or other such systems.

The question remains though, what would they be used for?

There are two role categories, straightforward transportation and more complex missions that will likely include some form of ‘module’.

Transport

Over 1,300 TEU’s is a lot, but easily carried by the Combi Lift design described above.

They can be lifted on and off using harbour or the ships own crane. Containers could also be off loaded whilst at sea, the heave compensated crane allows much safer operation without pendulation. The containers could be loaded onto Mexeflotes, landing craft or other lighters. With a single crane, this would not be a particularly fast option though.

Containers could be simple dry types, tank containers or other specialist shelters.

Tank_StackA 20ft Tank Container, for example, could hold 24,000 Litres of water, fuel or other liquids.

At 4m width, there is 528 Lane Metres, with vehicles using a shore based loading ramp or lifted in and out. This would be across two decks using the standard hatch covers only, each deck being just over 4m high. There would also be space on the hatch covers if it were permissible to carry vehicles exposed to the elements.

The USMC used the MV Combi Dock III for just such a deployment

As with containers, the vehicles could be easily lifted onto lighters whilst at sea, in reasonable sea states.

Because the vessels are semi-submersible, they can be used ot transport small craft and patrol boats, and even submarines.Smaller craft such as patrol boats or MCM unmanned boats could simply be lifted from the deck into the sea. Using the two deck approach, the vessel could comfortably transport 110 Pacific 24 RHIB’s, more than we have in service.

Where this gets interesting though is with larger vessels.

A crane lift would be preferred because the lengthy docking down process would not be required.

Lift On BoatsWith one crane, a 350 tonne limit allows a range of fast patrol craft, work boats and hovercraft to be transported to theatre. To be fair, we don’t actually have many of these, but with a credible deployment capability, we would be able to exploit the type of patrol craft we don’t have precisely because we have a need for global deployability but no means of doing it at short notice within our control. Anything up to 20m should be a simple lift, weather and sea conditions dependant.

To provide some sense of scale, a handful of examples.

Landing Craft Vehicle Personnel (LCVP) Mk5; these smaller craft are generally used for personnel only although they can carry small vehicles and light stores up to a weight of 6 tonnes. With a top speed of 24 knots the LCPV Mk5 is carried on davits on the assault ships (HMS Bulwark and Albion) and HMS Ocean. They have also been deployed from other vessels as deck cargo and deployed using cranes. The moveable and removable deck shelter provides essential protection against the elements for personnel aboard, a lesson from extensive operations in cold weather. The UK has 12 LCVP Mk5’s, obtained in two batches and purchased at a cost of £750k each. They are 15.7m long, 4.3m wide and have a range of excess of 200 nautical miles.

One FLOFLFO could carry 21 LCVP Mk5 on a single deck, more than we have.

Army Work Boat; in addition to a number of Combat Support Boats, 51 (Port) Squadron RLC have four Army Work Boats made by Warbreck Engineeringin Liverpool, subcontracted to VT Halmatic (now BAE). The four are named WB41 Storm, WB42 Diablo, WB43 Mistral and WB44 Sirocco, yes, the Army owns a Mistral! They are 14.75m x 4.3m, weigh 48 tonnes, have a top speed of 10 knots and are equipped with firefighting equipment. When deployed they are usually carried as deck cargo on a specially designed cradle and craned to the surface as needed. The Army Workboat can be used as tugs for Mexeflote’s, positioning other pontoon equipment and for handling flexible pipelines, especially those used in the JOFS fuel system described below.

One FLOFLO could carry 21 Army Work Boats, also more than we have.

Offshore Raiding Craft; Designed and built by Holyhead Marine, the Offshore Raiding Craft is in service with the Royal Marines used in insertion, patrol and security operations. The 9m craft are heavily armed and able to travelling at speeds up to 40 knots, available in three versions (mid, rear and front console), able to carry up to 8 personnel in addition to the 2 crew. Beam and draught are 2.9m and 0.6m respectively. The ORC trailer is supplied by Tex Engineering and with the ORC weighs 5.4 tonnes. They are powered by a 250hp Steyr Marine M256 engine driving a Rolls Royce FF270 waterjet’s. 39 are in service.

One could carry 44 ORC’s, more than we have.

Hovercraft; Feedback from operations in Iraq showed that whilst the in service Griffon 2000TD was able to withstand greater small arms damage than imagined, the crew were exposed so its replacement would need improvements in this area. The £1 million Griffon Hoverwork 2400 TD LCAC(L)(R) was a direct replacement for the 4 existing LCAC’s and feature armoured panels and bulletproof glass in addition to greater performance. The primary role of the LCAC (L) (R) is as an air-portable, fully amphibious craft capable of the high speed movement of 16 fully equipped troops and crew of 2 over water, ice, mud, marshland and beach. Able to maintain a speed of 45 knots whilst fully laden the replacement is much faster than the older version and there are a series of additional improvements. In addition to be being able to be deployed from the RN/RFA assault craft they are air portable by C130, A400 and C17. Their side panels can be retracted to reduce the width to enable air portability.

One could carry 16 2400 TD’s, more than, well, I think you get the picture!

Island Class; the CAMARC designed and Holyhead Marine manufactured Island Class Patrol Boats are used by the Royal Marines to protect high value Royal Navy shipping on the Clyde, Gare Loch and Long Loch. The pair (Mull and Rona) are a conversion of the more common 15m MoD Police patrol craft also used for similar duties. Six of the MoD Police variant were purchased in 2013 for £7 million, more since. They are 15m, 4.6m wide and have a draught of 1m. All have a high specification, ballistic panels, rescue equipment, security cameras and recording systems for example.

Archer Class; there are fourteen P2000 Archer Class Fast Inshore Patrol Craft in service, mostly tasked with supporting the University Royal Navy Units (URNU) but they are also tasked with other roles. 20m long and 6m wide, with a draught of 2m.One could carry 12 of the 14 in service on the main deck, with remainder carried on the deck covers. There are plenty of options for 20m patrol vessels and landing craft we don’t own, but I think you get the picture.

Using the Float-On-Float-Off loading method, even larger vessels can be transported and as long as their total height is no less than 8m, the hatch covers could be fitted for protection or even to allow other cargo (including smaller craft) to be carried on the top. Unless we have a burning desire to transport the 90m Offshore Patrol Vessels, which I guess would be kind of pointless, the main option would be the larger landing craft.

Landing Craft Utility (LCU) Mk10; Part of the programme for the Albion and Bulwark LPD’s were new Landing Craft Utility, Mk 10, replacing the Mk9’s carried aboard HMS Fearless and Intrepid. The LCU Mk10’s are large craft designed for transporting personnel, stores, armoured vehicles and large plant. Their roll on roll off design (stern and a bow ramps) is designed for ease of loading and unloading in the well dock of the assault ships. Up to 120 troops (100 in normal operating conditions), a Challenger main battle tank or other heavy or logistics vehicles can be carried. The LCU Mk10 can be used for general movement of equipment and operate independently for up to a couple of weeks with its 9 man crew out to a range of 600 nautical miles. Interestingly, the bow ramp can be used to lift an inflatable raiding craft out of the water when operating as a mother ship for raiding parties and such like. The LCU Mk10 is just under 30m long, with a beam of 7m, a draught of 1.7m when disembarking and a top speed of 9 knots. Click here for details of the engine and propulsion. A total of 8 LCU Mk10’s were brought into service in the £35 million programme, all delivered between December 2001 and February 2003 with a pair of prototypes in addition to the eight. The RORO capability is especially useful but as the wheelhouse impinges onto the load area at the stern it is not wide enough to accommodate a TES Challenger 2 vehicle and derivatives. Although not normally armed they have been seen recently with a range of automatic weapons on manually aimed mounts, mostly from ISTEC

LCU-01-Image-Plain-MilitaryOne FLOFFLO could carry 8 LCU Mk10, the full number in service.

Another opportunity, transporting MCM vessels

When used in the simple transport role a single Combilift type vessel could carry a significant quantity of vehicles, containers and other dry cargo. By utilising the semi-submersible capability this opens up a whole host of opportunities for using them as a means of transporting smaller craft and patrol vessels.

This flexibility alone should warrant giving the design a serious look.

Modules

If we consider the huge open hold to be a space into which we put ‘modules’, the potential adaptability of a CombiDock type FLOFLFO vessel can start to be envisaged.

Mention the word module and people tend to think of the Royal Danish Navy Stanflex or the US Navy’s LCS, and jump straight in with why it is a bad idea. The reason for this is twofold, it may well be a bad idea, but mostly, because the wrong reasons for modular payloads are highlighted. The idea that a seaframe can be an ASW frigate one minute and a MCM vessel the next, purely by virtue of swapping a few modules is clearly suspect. For these highly complex and difficult tasks, ship system crew must be focussed and integrated. But if the idea of changing roles and modules every other week is put to one side, modularity starts to make a lot more sense.

Common physical attributes, electrical, data and other interfaces, compliance with a set of known standards and even common lifting points allow the module to be developed in isolation from whatever is carrying it and fitted to a vessel without each vessel being redesigned to suit. As systems and ships evolve at different speeds the benefits of this become obvious. Add ease of maintenance, damage repair, familiarity and training, and the arguments for modular payloads become compelling.

But we need to be pragmatic, we need to be realistic about what can usefully be modularised and we need to be certain where the limits lie.

The offshore industry is a long standing user of modular systems and approaches. Beyond various stores containers, there are accommodation, power generation, compressors, medical, laboratory, ROV launch and recovery, workshops and even blast resistant refuge modules for use on production platforms. All of these are based on the familiar ISO container format. For use in the offshore industry, these modules have to comply with a significant amount of safety related regulation including maintenance of a positive pressure environment and high levels of fire resistance.

Accommodation and welfare modules, with different densities and build standards, shown below.

Using these would be similar the the offshore industry variant shown above, maybe just for the crews of vessels or vehicles being transported.

For more complex roles, more complex modular fit outs are available.

It is easy to envisage a variety of ISO container sized modules being used to support different roles and requirements. Add in a demountable deck shelter and one or two other systems and this could be expanded to encompass the MCM ‘mothership’ role or as an afloat base for a collection of small vessels and hovercraft in the littoral security role.

Of course, it would not be a warship, so the temptation to think of it as one must be avoided but the flexibility to experiment with different configurations using a cheap but flexible base hull is the embodiment of ‘payloads not platforms’

The options above focus on transportation and the ability to utilise 20ft ISO container modules to expand accommodation or enable more complex roles but if we look at the unique design of the ships and systems used in the offshore industry, another option presents itself; the Maxi Module.

The Combi Dock is designed to accommodate very large constructions, weighing hundreds or even thousands of tonnes. FLO-FLO loading can accommodate a maximum load of 7,000 tonnes and RORO, 4,000 tonnes.

Instead of the twenty tonne module we should lift our horizons and look at the thousand tonne module.

Module 3

The Primary Casualty Receiving role, in reality, is used infrequently, major combat operations or unusual deployments like Operation GRITROCK, the ebola response. And yet despite this low usage rate, the demands of the role require a complex fit out, which means a dedicated vessel and not a collection of ISO modules lashed to a deck. This is the dilemma for some of these roles that are only valued in combat operations, they are infrequently used, and so a vicious circle appears. We might be able to allocate secondary roles to improve utilisation but the odds are always stacked against them in budget discussions.

Facilities required include resuscitation, operating theatre, intensive care wards, advanced diagnostics (X ray, MRI etc), recovery wards, sterilisation, pharmacy, hyperbaric facilities, blood/blood component storage, medical waste disposal, command and control, laboratory, dental, isolation, medical gas handling, power generation, uninterruptible power supplies, storage space, catering, mortuary, laundry, extensive communications for telemedicine and a computing environment that supports the secure generation, storage and processing of large volumes of data.

Building the PCRS capability into a large module allows it be stored onshore and used as a training facility but when needed for a planned deployment, wheeled on to the FLOFLO ship and deployed to the operational area.

An MCM command module could include UUV/USV storage, aviation, command and workshop spaces all within a single structure.

For repair, maintenance and salvage, the Maxi Modules would be arranged to include heavy, electrical and composite workshops, electronic workshops, stores, personnel accommodation, helicopter landing facilities, stores lifts, power generations, compressors, extensive diver support

By maintaining a realistic view of what can be achieved it is certainly possible to envisage a range of configurations and designs for such ‘go large’ modules. Storage and moving onto the empty vessel is entirely normal in the heavy lift industry, it really is a common occurrence.

Examples below…

 

Summary

If all the vessel is used for is a transfer dock for a non-existent amphibious capability then of course, the justification for such a vessel is zero, but if we utilise a commercial design with superstructure forward there are many alternatives and a great deal of potential.

Above all, it provides the basis for experimentation and developing capabilities as we go.

Starting with a simple transport vessel the inherent flexibility to move cargo, vehicles and small craft/hovercraft is valuable. Add in some modest accommodation modules and the value increases but where it gets interesting is the ability to create demountable modules at ‘large scale’ for expanding the role menu list.

A few ideas…

Humanitarian Assistance Disaster Response; Transport of stores, personnel and the ability to deploy multiple landing craft, helicopters and pontoons.

Training and Defence Engagement; a lot of space means a lot of training opportunities and the aviation facilities would also allow that be included in the training matrix.

Maritime and Littoral Security; with a combination of multiple helicopters, UAV’s, RHIBS and larger patrol craft, and even hovercraft, it would be a very good ‘mothership’

Medical Support; Using a large module, a Role 3 medical facility could even be combined with another like an engineering and repair module. A single vessel could then deliver against multiple requirements.

Salvage, Repair and Fire Fighting; by retaining the large crane, using a modular workshop facility (similar to those used in the land environment) and modular diver support system, it would provide excellent salvage/repair and submarine tender facilities.

Experimentation and Systems Development; I think it would be taken for granted, that the large open deck, crane, services connectivity and additional accommodation would provide a very good platform for experimentation and systems development, especially emerging unmanned surface vessels and aerial vehicles.

MCM and Survey; It would be able to carry many off-board platforms, host emerging unmanned aerial vehicles in the MCM role, and carry out the MCM command function for larger and/or enduring deployments. Its excess space and excellent handling facilities, coupled with accommodation for many personnel, would make an interesting system, if unmanned systems mature as expected.

Ship to Shore Logistics Support; in addition to carrying supplies, vehicles, personnel and engineering plant for port repair, another suitable task would be that of providing a ship to shore fuel transfer capability. It would also be able to carry a great deal of supplies in their own right

Special Forces and Intelligence Support; whether carrying raiding craft, small landing craft, vehicles, personnel or even a swimmer delivery vehicle, the carrying capacity and flexibility afforded by the main deck space would provide obvious utility for special forces. Containerised signals equipment could also be used to provide an additional and innocuous capability for gathering intelligence. Unmanned systems would also be potential carries and the aviation capacity would provide another valuable enhancement.

Am sure there are many others.

Is any of this possible or wothwhile, am not a naval architect or requirement manager so I genuinely don’t know, but as ever, this is just a converstion opener.

Maybe when we next look at the strategic RORO contract we could include one these and take it from there?

 

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secundius

First I’ve even heard of the RN’s “Flo-Flo’s”! Are they going to be “Open Cover” or “Close Cover” like the USNS Lewis B. “Chesty” Puller class Expeditionary Sea Base Vessels. And what’s the “Base class Design” of the RN Flo-Flo’s patterned after…

Barborossa
Barborossa

How about a guard-ship? Imagine one of those combi-docks with the appropriate ‘big’ module, rocking up as a guardship, with a flotilla of reasonably sized OPVs- maybe not full 90m jobbies, but 3 or 4 40m , well-armed corvettes/ cutters. Or Antarctic patrol ship?

Or, one with an Air Defence Control Centre module, and Air Defence platform (both SAM and AAA), in Falklands Sound in 1982?

The only problem is getting the rn and therefore the MOD, to see the class as a system, rather than a group of ships. I can see the matelots saying something like:

‘Oh what a good idea, we’ll have one as a LPD, one as a MCM mothership, one as a PCRS, one as an aviation support ship, one as a forward repair ship, one as….. da-de-da…..’.

….Rather than buying 6-8 vessels and 12 modules. Their argument will be ‘but we must have the crews trained as complete crews’. TBH, the way you should have them is having the ships operations team and the payload team, as long as both are trained on standardised emergency procedures and protocols (easy if you keep everything standardised) it won’t matter what ship the module is ‘dropped’ onto. It will mean the rn will have to re-learn command flexibility (known as CRM in airlines and the RAF). The absurd situation where the Captain of a carrier could interfere so much with air tasking, as to reduce it’s efficiency, effectiveness and ultimately endanger aircrew, because his experience/ undestanding was outdated, limited or inaccurate must never happen again. The Task Commander, has to be the payload specialist.

ArmChairCivvy
ArmChairCivvy

A nice read; some proper TD stuff of the old ilk!
“Although many seem to focus on the more glamorous aspects of the ESB, the MCM role seems to be well suited to a future that includes and increasing reliance on off-board stand-off systems.”
– one thing we have never tried, is the high-skirt type of hovercraft for MCM missions
– the USN have, whether they entered service. I can’t remember (they have continued to rely on helicopters alot).

There is (would be!) our self-deploying MCM fleet, in support of an amph. Op. The cost per operating hour is very high, but then again, how often do we storm a beach?

One detail is (to me, a total amateur in these matters) puzzles me: why are the work boats fitted for “push” (rather than “tow”) use?
– one would think that a mexeflote can be kept in use up to one sea state higher, by pushing it (ideally by two boats) against the side while being loaded

ArmChairCivvy
ArmChairCivvy

Barborossa, you are not paraphrasing the sinking of HMS Glorious, by any chance?

” The absurd situation where the Captain of a carrier could interfere so much with air tasking, as to reduce it’s efficiency, effectiveness and ultimately endanger aircrew, because his experience/ undestanding was outdated, limited or inaccurate must never happen again. The Task Commander, has to be the payload specialist”
vs.
“First to contradict this [officially recorded cover story] was no less a personage than Winston Churchill, who wrote in his account of the war that the fuel explanation was ‘not convincing’. Nonetheless, the official story held for the next 30 years through the publication of the official histories. Yet it would be the Navy’s official historian, Captain Stephen Roskill, who in 1980 finally lifted the lid on the controversy in an explosive article for the Sunday Times. ‘The Cantankerous Captain of HMS Glorious’ drew upon testimony from Captain J.B. Heath, Glorious’ senior aviator, who had missed the sinkings due to having been put ashore before she sailed for the final time. Roskill painted a picture of a desperately unhappy ship run by a captain whose First World War legend disguised incompetence, tyranny and questionable mental stability, who had put Heath ashore when the latter could not comply with impossible orders. So choleric was D’Oyly-Hughes, asserted Roskill, the sole reason his ship was racing home independently, completely unready for combat, was in order to bring forward a court martial against his former [payload commander] officer.”
and
that is just the gist, from: https://www.historytoday.com/philip-weir/hms-glorious-history-controversy
with much more

MSR
MSR

If we had two or three RN Sea bases, would we have any real need for the LPDs? The only thing not discussed for inclusion on these platforms, and which is the LPD’s ace in the hole, is a modular combined ops room.

ArmChairCivvy
ArmChairCivvy

@MSR, the Albions are warships, these are meant to stay well behind the horizon.
– except if they are bases for hunting pirates

Strangely, in the collected comments list the MSR comment is under “Mike”? Same or different? not that it matters (exc. to the respective users)

Sol
Sol

This is an unneeded capability for the Royal Navy and British Forces. I look forward to statements telling me how wrong I am but the simple fact of things is that your forces are too small to make real use of this capability. Even in a scenario where the UK went it alone against a mythical foe, this would still rate as a luxury and not a need.

Consider this. If I recall correctly too MLPs are tasked to support a Marine Expeditionary Force ashore. We’re talking about a US Marine sized formation of approx 45K men. Can anyone here think of a need to put that many troops ashore and sustain them once there?

Additionally the Royal Marines just don’t have the level of mechanization that would require this capability.

Let’s face it. The Royal Marines have beat the US Marines to the “air enabled” moniker. Your two carriers demand that. Your force structure demands an air enabled force.

No MLPs for you. Besides. If you need one just borrow it. The Marines are putting F-35’s aboard the QE…it only seems fair.

Barborossa
Barborossa

@ ACC…
The whole norwegian campaign was an excellent example of why politicians shouldn’t be allowed to interfere with the conduct of operations; in fact WW2 is littered with screwed-up ops, dead servicemen, lost opportunities and sacked senior officers, the common factor in all of them seems to be Churchill, who with his grandiose plans, pure arrogance and ignorance, ranged from sacking very good, competent generals, because they disagreed with him (Ironside, Gort, Alexander et al) through putting cronies in charge of important industries, to the direct detriment of the war effort (putting a newspaper magnet in charge of the ministry of aircraft production) to ordering operations, against theatre commander’s advice, which resulted in manpower and equipment being wasted on ridiculous opium-smokers pipe-dreams, to the detriment of other operations. (Greece, Greek Islands, Gallipoli etc.). Considerering the bloke was the architect of the infamous ‘Ten Year Rule’, and spent his time in parliament vociferously opposing Neville Chamberlain’s plans for rearmament, I would argue he was responsible for extending the war more than any other person….

But no, I was actually referring to the Falklands War and Jerry Pooks account of operating Harrier GR3’s off the Hermes… Examples of the Captains twattery including physically preventing the setting up of a proper intel and planning cell, near the aircrew briefing room, disregarding the two highly-experienced and highly regarded photo intelligence analysts, in one case actually ordering a strike against Port Stanley Airfield, because he’d misidentified a damaged Cessna 172 and Aermacchi MB326 as Super Etendards , withholding intel from the aircrew actually doing the tasking. He had been a Buccaneer pilot, quite a few years before, had no experience of TAC-R, or Phot-R- he even refused Phot-R missions despite 1sqn being highly-regarded within NATO as a recce unit. He changed the profile of tasks, against the council of the CO…. All of this was on top of the whole air-tasking system being ‘creaky’ at best.

…Hence the reason why I said about command flexibility. The captain of a vessel cannot be expected to know everything (even if he has some experience) therefore the Captain should concentrate on the operation and safety of the vessel, leaving the payload commander to ‘run’ the task. RAF Nimrods, Sentry, Sentinel and now AirSeeker operate in exactly the same way, the Aircraft Commander very often being one of the mission specialists. From my admittedly limited experience of the rn this will require a fundamental change in the way things are done. I appreciate the leadership strengths of ‘My Ship, My Responsibility’ but modern war-like operations Involve too many specialisations, for one man to make effective decisions in isolation. Will there be command conflictions? The RAF seem to manage very well, so with properly CRM-trained senior officers I wouldn’t think so.

Barborossa
Barborossa

The worst thing about Glorious was the loss of the 24-odd Hurricanes and Gladiators and aircrew- you have to ask what difference even only 24 trained fighter pilots would have made, not to mention the scarce Hurricanes.

Simon

Sol,

Sort of agree, sort of don’t.

If we lose Albion and Bulwark then the notion of borrowing a flo-flo from the offshore oil industry is a pretty sensible move in order to unload the Bays. Basically the MLP brings the LCUs (and possibly LCVPs). The fact that it can also become a floating pierhead is just a bonus.

Ogden Dowcett

For what it’s worth, I am a fan of the general MLP concept but not a fan of the way the US executed it. In my opinion, using an Alaska class tanker with its midsection hollowed out 1) Wastes logistical capability due to the open air volume above the steel beach that if enclosed could be put to any number of uses, and 2) Provides more opportunity for Mr. Murphy to raise his head due to the direct exposure to the elements. Why not keep the basic hull structure intact and cut holes for the 3 LCAC spaces, essentially ending up with 3 LCAC sized enclosed welldecks. This would allow what is now open air above the steel beach to be used and it would provided a “sheltered” beach in which to load and unload whatever surface connectors are being used. For connecting up to an LMSR (as pictured in Expeditionary Transfer Dock Image 1) its side ramp may be able to unfold directly on to an upper vehicle deck of the MLP without having to use the ramp in the picture.

As far as a Flo-Flo goes, if the Bays are removed from service I agree with using a basic commercially available Flo-Flo and then designing mission specific inserts for the cargo area. As mentioned in the article the inserts could focus on HADR (with specific “sub” mission focusing on logistics or temporary refugee housing for example), Counter piracy, MCM mother ship. I would advocate the RFA outright buying 2, maybe 3, of the Flo-Flos for “continuous” use but have several inserts available to surge in leased Flo-Flos as needed. For a hypothetical example, after the hurricanes of this past summer Britain could have surged 6 Flo-Flos to the Caribbean for HADR ops with 2 carrying refugee inserts, 2 logistical inserts, 1 medical insert, and one Salvage Repair and Fire Fighting insert.

Not a boffin
Not a boffin

One of the more intractable problems with FLO-FLO is their availability. DTMA can (and do) contract these things off the spot market, but for an arm and a leg. That’s because they’re usually booked up for months – if not years -in advance. This can fluctuate depending on the fortunes of the world economy (and the yacht charter season) but in general you don’t get contracts that allow for MoD access within required readiness / reaction periods.

Been looked at many times over the years.

ArmChairCivvy
ArmChairCivvy

@Barborossa, for your 2nd latest: My favourite Churchill quote

“History will be kind to me. I know it. I am writing it”

ArmChairCivvy
ArmChairCivvy

And for the very latest: Yes, the incredible feat of landing 7 Hurricanes onto the carrier deck, intact, went all to waste

ArmChairCivvy
ArmChairCivvy

RE: “an Alaska class tanker with its midsection hollowed out 1) Wastes logistical capability due to the open air volume above the steel beach that if enclosed could be put to any number of uses”
– but gives a 30% chance that a ship-killer missile flies “straight through”?

Ogden Dowcett

ACC,

As far as I know, MLPs are not meant to be used in a denied/contested environment as they are not warships. I would argue that, while certainly possible, the probability of being successfully attacked by an ASM is not high enough to justify the loss of cargo capacity. Since the MLP is not a warship, I also assume that it will not operate unescorted if there is a threat of an ASM attack against them regardless of the environment they are operating in. If needed as a last resort prior to a “combat” deployment self contained CWIS systems like Millenium/Skyshield could literally be bolted to the upper decks to provide that last ditch defense if one is so worried about an ASM leaker. I know I don’t have all the information and so I recognize that maybe the MLP, as currently configured, is the optimal solution for what it’s meant to do, I just can’t help but think of the logistics capability that is “wasted” due to the missing midsection.

NAB,

Yes I understand that Flo-Flo are a low availability item due to their high demand which is why I recommended the RFA buying 2-3 of their own for normal/continuous operations and training. The leased (cough commandeered) route would be used in the exception/emergency case, like HADR ops, where it could be win-win for all parties in that the RFA gets what it needs and the companies involved get some good “we care about people” PR out of it in addition to the monetary compensation from the emergency lease.

Observer
Observer

@Barborossa

I’m not so sure Chamberlain was all that hot about rearmament, especially since he was the one who was going ‘Peace in our time’. Him proclaiming peace while clamoring for rearmament seems a bit dodgy to me.

While I’m at times dismayed by Sol’s hyperbole and sometimes slanted views, in this case I feel he’s spot on with his analysis, the current situation of the UK and the state of the armed forces as it is now does not warrant this degree of expeditionary expenditure. As such, any speculations along this line comes more under the ambit of ‘window shopping’ rather than ‘military planning’.

Pacman27
Pacman27

Never really thought about this before but the logic seems sound.

Would these be a suitable replacement for the Point class contract – giving us more flexibility and potentially the ability to make some money by using it commercially, as there does seem to be a market for them.

1. I like the idea of the large hospital solution – although have to say I think we should have a fleet of hospital/HA ships as part of our foreign aid budget.

2. The ability to act as a mothership with a well dock for hunt/sandowns seems a very good idea as well or to even launch a battalion of RM in CB90’s or LCU’s (or combination) would be great.

3. The ability to have a forward repair module (or 3) that we can forward base as necessary also seems sound.

And we always need somehing to move containers dont we.

Given the price of these and their potential usefulness I think these should be brought in when we replace the Point class, which will give us time to develop how best to use them.

I guess we underutilise our points and if we could have something that gives us more flexibility and brings back capabilities we have recently lost then all good.

Peter Elliott

Would not the HMS Glorious problem be avoided by having the ship commanded by a permenant RFA Captain, but the Task Commander being a suitably senior commissioned officer of whichever service’s module was on board. The respective roles and responsibilities would then be clear. Presumably this happens at the moment when a Bay Class is deployed with a warlike contingent on board.

Peter Elliott

Pacman – I would have thought the Bay Class would be more at risk of being replaced by these ships.

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