This series on Future Maritime Patrol was unplanned but hope you have enjoyed reading what, I think, are the various options should the UK wish to reconstitute the capability lost with the withdrawal of Nimrod MR2 and cancellation of the Nimrod MRA4 in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review.
In Part 1 we discussed the various requirements and challenges. The single most difficult challenge to the MoD is getting over Nimrod MRA4, if the taxpayer is expected to cough up a billion here or a billion there for a maritime patrol aircraft it must first overcome the very real issue of the shadow of Nimrod. Whilst we might understand the sunk cost fallacy, money having already been spent having no relation to money we would like to spend, politics does not quite work that way. Mr and Mrs Taxpayer has already spent just under £4b on a replacement for MR2 and now the MoD wants to spend more!
Anyone thinking that the money already spent is not a big issue is not living on the same planet I live on.
Another long shadow cast by Nimrod is that of air safety management, any suggestion that uses old airframes with a less than contiguous chain of safety evidence is going to cause problems in the post Haddon Cave safety environment. These problems, whilst not insurmountable, will inevitably result in a great deal of risk costs being fed into the resource build, what might seem on face value to be a bargain might not be.
The next significant challenge is making a case and defining the requirement. By the time the decision is made in SDSR 2015 (we think) there will have already been nearly a decade long gap, once a gap has been established and coped with, the case for closing it will inevitably be difficult, especially when there are so many other priorities for defence expenditure. I don’t for one minute think the UK armed forces can sit back after decade and a half of campaigning in the Middle East and East Asia for a nice rest, next stop, Africa or who knows where.
Against this backdrop is the trend to civilianisation of traditional military capabilities like Search and Rescue, trying to justify a maritime patrol aircraft off the back of the Fastnet Race or other high profile but very rare long-distance SAR is unlikely to convince anyone, unfortunately. In the overland ISTAR role things have moved on significantly since the early 2000s where Nimrod was the only platform that could loft an EO turret, ISTAR has improved immeasurably, unmanned systems and other aircraft now provide the Joint Force Commander with a wide variety of capabilities.
The maritime patrol gap is therefore simply not compelling enough to be automatically put to the top of the MoD’s shopping list, it has to justify its place like every other capability.
And yet despite this, despite the availability of numerous flavours of manned and unmanned ISTAR, maritime patrol aircraft continue to demonstrate their value. Libya, where Canadian Auroras enabled and supported naval gunfire, intelligence gathering and coordination, or Mali, where French ATL’s even got into dropping laser guided bombs show the utility of high endurance multipurpose maritime patrol aircraft.
These might still be considered secondary roles though, their true value will only be realised against a competent enemy equipped with submarines, and it here that the MoD must focus, everything else is secondary.
Submarines are the true killers of the deep with even the whiff of the very idea of one operating can have a significant strategic and operational impact. It is a fair observation that the UK has, and continues to spend huge sums of money on anti-submarine warfare, frigates, ASW helicopters and SSN’s weigh heavily on the defence budget and focussed on a submarine threat that is at best, unlikely. However, the problem with looking only at likelihood is that it ignores impact. An effective enemy submarine force, whether that be a resurgent Russia, an increasingly capable Iran or some other future force, could have a catastrophic impact on UK maritime operations. We could discuss the importance of maritime operations in the context of air deployability or general value, but the point remains, submarines are deadly.
If the impact/likelihood evaluation points to maritime patrol aircraft (with ASW) being something of value in a layered defence arrangement the details of the requirements, range, endurance, payloads and other factors can be examined.
Although it is a complex requirement, it can be readily distilled into a few key decision points.
If we accept the outside edge of range and endurance sits in the 3–5 hours at 200-400 nautical miles then systems like the C295 become the obvious choice. However, if we want to conduct top end anti-submarine warfare at range (i.e. deep water ASW) then the likely key performance parameters are 3-5 hour endurance at 800-1000 nautical miles, this puts us into the P8, P3 and P1 bracket.
If we cannot compromise on range and endurance but can on payload, a couple of lightweight torpedoes and 50 odd sonobuoys then a business jet solution might be possible.
Unmanned systems remain an outside possibility but only supporting a conventional manned aircraft and the large transport aircraft solutions based on either the Hercules or A400M Atlas remain interesting but still a conceptual and developmental hurdle.
A key aspect of our discussions has been to look beyond the narrow definition of maritime patrol and examine how the platform choice could influence, enhance capability or save money across the wider defence sphere. The point has been made that concentrating on airframe commonality is only part of the picture is well-made, system and sub system/component commonality can deliver significant through life savings. The MoD does not pay enough attention to long-term commonality and this results in increasingly small boutique fleets representing a vanishing tooth saddled with a disproportionately large tail.
Commonality also provides tactical opportunities that would not normally present themselves
The solutions were discussed over 6 posts;
Option 1; P-8A the obvious solution and likely front-runner if we want an MRA4 replacement and have deep pockets. There is still some residual risk in the programme but the key thing to consider here is we wouldn’t be on the hook for any fixes. It is, however, far from an off the shelf purchase and an expensive option although if purchased we would be in a large user community and able to take advantage of all that this provides. It might also in the medium term allow the Sentinel fleet to be withdrawn or re-used for other roles.
Option 2; A handful of P-8A alternatives such as refurbishing P3 Orion’s, the Japanese Kawasaki P1 and a development project that might bring the long talked about Airbus A319/320 MPA to fruition. The P3 refurbishment might provide an excellent capability, but we would be buying into an old design that is going out of service in many nations armed forces. The refurbishment option would also have many times and cost risks in the airworthiness certification space and politically, probably not the best idea to bring into service an aircraft that was previously rejected. The Kawasaki P1 looks on face value to be a fine option, a dedicated design with some very advanced features, but there is no certainty that we would be able to buy them and like the P8, is not quite the finished article. An Airbus A319/320 MPA would be a new design, although it must be said that the components are all known and available. From an industrial and sovereign design perspective probably the best option, but the price tag would be a big question mark.
Option 3; If we accept the range/endurance and payload compromise the C295 looks like an attractive and comparatively cheap option that opens up a number of commonality avenues, the communications fleet and tactical transport underneath the A400M spring to mind. The Q400 and ATR72 are equally capable but have less flexibility and adaptability than the C295 family.
Option 4; A business jet derived such as the Bombardier Global Express would provide some commonality advantages and could evolve into a multirole ISTAR system but although the range and endurance would probably be on a par with those in options 1 and 2, it would be payload constrained. That payload constraint might be an acceptable trade-off but in a serious conflict, at the low probability high-impact end of the ASW scale, that might compromise by prove telling.
Option 5; Finally, reusing a large 4 engine transport aircraft like the Hercules or even the A400M Atlas would address (in spades) the range/endurance payload issue (assuming the technicals of release and carriage can be solved) But Hercules is going out of the service and the A400M is expensive to start with, and the airframe design would produce a high fuel cost. Both options would allow maximum re-use of in-service equipment and the A400M especially, could evolve into a high endurance multirole ISTAR and ground attack platform.
To summarise;
If we are serious about countering Russian and other nations increasingly dangerous submarines, and we bloody well should be, the obvious answer is the Boeing P-8A. It represents the lowest risk and most capable solution, even though it is an expensive option. If the Japanese are willing to sell, the Kawasaki P1 could be a very real competitor to the P-8A. To those that moan about the cost, try counting the cost of a compromised V Force. Both would also provide a stepping stone to future capabilities that would ultimately, drive the commonality we should be trying to achieve over time.
I think if we focus on multi-mission effects, it diffuses the effect, this should be an Anti-Submarine capability to protect the deterrent and deployed naval task forces, everything else is secondary.
If we can accept compromise on range and endurance, and I make no claim either way, the other options such as C295 or business jet platform look increasingly attractive just because they are cheap.
If we were really mental and fancied blazing a multirole trail, the A400M Atlas would be an outside bet worth at least a serious study.
Gentlemen, place your bets now.
Or perhaps more importantly, what do you think should be placed second on the MoD’s wish list to pay for it?
@ TD
Touché… Although in my defence… I’m not really totally au fait with bridgery.
My recognition kind of went:
not big, or small, therefore medium; made of metal girders, therefore girder; crosses river, therefore bridge.
QED: medium, girder, bridge.
I know, I know…for my punishment, I shall go out and take photo’s of aforementioned bridge….in the rain.
@RT
That is indeed the one…
BTW, My dad a native of this area- seems to recall a RAC camp near Sturminster Newton, and indeed, there is an trading estate, with some very WW2, army looking
Bridges. @ DH, is it this one?
“Most travellers in North Dorset now encounter the Lydden for the first time. Flowing in an incised channel below the surrounding flood plain, the river passes beneath Twofords Bridge. It is essentially two bridges, with the original bridge carrying westbound traffic and probably dating from the early 19th century. In World War 2 it was considered that this structure would be unsafe for all of the heavy loads heading for the south coast in the build-up to D-Day. Canadian engineers built a steel lattice girder bridge parallel with the original structure and this survives to the present day, carrying eastbound traffic. It carries a commemorative plaque to D-Day. Just half a mile downstream the Lydden is joined by the Caundle Brook.” From http://www.dorsetlife.co.uk/2007/01/dorsets-little-rivers-the-lydden-and-the-caundle-brook/
It is listed: http://list.english-heritage.org.uk/resultsingle.aspx?uid=1304359
Seems to me to be a type of http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Callender-Hamilton_bridge
Folks have asked, if we don’t have the money for more than four or five P8, is that still the route we would take?
General shrinkage of the Navy suggests that the government sees the overall fleet as a useful contribution to multinational operations, not as a service that is expected to conduct a high-end naval war on its own. Our solo efforts are more likely to look like Sierra Leone than the battle of the Atlantic.
Five P8 would be a reasonable contribution to an American led multi/bilateral operation; perhaps not stunningly impressive or critical on its own, but against the USN neither is a dozen Lightning and half-a-dozen escorts.
For a European or Anglo-French led affair, four or five P8, plus whatever the continentals can bring along, makes it easier to get the Americans to take part too; we’d be asking for additional assets, not begging for essential capabilities in their entirety.
The same could be said for the three RAF Airseeker. Are three aircraft sufficient to effectively cover even a single enduring task? They would make a reasonable contribution to an operation, and would help to smother suggestions within the American establishment that the US was having to bailout the next malequipped ‘Libya’, or that European defence does not pull its weight or invest in enabling capabilities.
It is difficult to ‘prove’ the need for an MPA with ASW capabilities when you can’t talk easily about the threat. But there is some detail in open sources which can help.
Russian submarines were known to pose some sort of threat *before* the last SDSR: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/7969017/Russian-subs-stalk-Trident-in-echo-of-Cold-War.html
And so, as RT has said, is there any suggestion the threat has increased since the decision to gap the MPA was taken? There have been some high profile excursions leaked to the media:
http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/11/06/navy-detects-russian-sub-off-u-s-east-coast/
http://www.businessinsider.com/everyone-is-talking-about-this-russian-sub-cruising-the-gulf-of-mexico-2012-8
And Russia itself has talked about ramping up submarine operations in the same way it resurrected Bear and Backfire flights (as part of demonstrating a ‘resurgence’ of the military), and has announced plans to build more submarines, even if there remain doubts over their industrial capacity:
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/europe/130601/russia-nuclear-subs-patrol-south-seas-1
https://medium.com/war-is-boring/16ad7f45e60a
http://www.strategypage.com/dls/articles/Crises-In-The-Russian-Nuclear-Sub-Industry-1-9-2014.asp
So it is entirely possible, when looked at as a *future* threat, Russian submarines are indeed a higher priority than in 2010, not least given the lead times on getting an MPA back in to service.
Second, some of the assumptions under which the gap was accepted may have changed. The MOD’s correspondence with the Defence Committee last year (http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/defence/13-07-10-Gov-Follow-Up-Maritime-Surveillance.pdf) stated that studies had ‘highlighted operational and concurrency risks’ for airborne ISTAR. It is possible that, although the MOD is able to use its ‘layered defence’ (helicopters, surface ships and submarines) to compensate to *some* extent for the lack of an MPA, that assembling the necessary assets at any given point to provide enough depth or breadth is proving harder than expected, especially if, say, surface assets are being tasked elsewhere. Under those circumstances, revisiting the MPA gap might be prudent.
Finally, bear in mind the pressure of time and skills. The Seedcorn programme is keeping skills alive by putting MPA personnel in other countries’ crews. But if SDSR 15 doesn’t decide to regenerate an MPA, that programme will probably start to run down. After that, even if SDSR 20 then decided to bring back an MPA, it would be relatively harder and take longer as we’d be starting from close to scratch.
I’d also add that people keep saying “there is no money”; this isn’t true. There is £8 billion unallcoated funding within teh current equipment plan, mostly after 2015. The challenge is for any prospective MPA programme to make the case that it should be near the top of the list for handouts from that money. But in the first instance, it doesn’t necessitate a cut in current capabilities (on this, the new Major Projects Report and Equipment Plan should be published today, so we’ll see how much of the £8 billion is still intact).
oooh, very nearly Dave, you would have got away with it but for the schoolboy error that the MGB was not in service during WWII
Close, but no cigar :)
There’s a lovely example of a medium girder bridge, just outside Bagber. allegedly, put up by the army in WW2 and still in use on an A-road.
Ohhh! And the bear pit was just getting going…..
Not the same person, am going to draw a line under this now chaps.
Any more, straight to round filing cabinet
@NaB
Aaah! Of course….
Unfortunately there are no points in recognizing another bo derek incarnation, apparently.
Maybe there’s a possible competition there?
“I put my ideas on this blog so that they can be discussed. I’m afraid I found APATS habit of hiding behind clearance levels and attempting to obfuscate with the use of jargon irritating so we got into a slanging match which was quite entertaining but of course became self defeating.”
FFS Short@rse/Derek/Bob/Perc
Learn another big word will you? Please?
perc, lot of us here are military or ex-military, and the clearance thing is a very very big issue for us. While loose lips may not sink ships at this point in time, it can and has been known to get people into a lot of hot water. He’s not “hiding behind clearance”, he’s bound by it, same as many here on this site.
And I think he has specialist training as an ASuW. He mentioned something along those lines a year or 2 ago, way before even this “debate” turned up, so unless you postulate that he is clairvoyant and setting up credentials for an argument a year or so in advance, I think we can take that he is what he says as a given. And if he is clairvoyant, he’s wasted as anything less than a head of department in a ministry. Or head of FEMA.
This means that as someone who more than trained in ASuW (he said that he tasked them before, i.e he plans and calls for their deployment), if he said that the -295 is too short legged, then I’d take a long and serious look at their range and endurance.
APATS, what are the range and endurance figures that in your opinion would be “adequate” for the GIUK gap? Is this only from the UK for full coverage or is the figures split half/half in coverage from the UK and Greenland station? And the Atlantic, how much of it should MPA cover to protect both navy ships and civilian shipping? (Yeah we talk about protecting navy assets, but most of the time, it’s the poor merchant shipping that gets sunk).
@Red Trousers
I have been reading this blog and occasionally contributing to for quite some time. I gathered from remarks that APATS had made in the past that he might be in the RN but I obviously missed the post where he was so explicit.
Hence my use of “claim” and “supposed” at which he has evidently taken offence – which was not my intention.
I put my ideas on this blog so that they can be discussed. I’m afraid I found APATS habit of hiding behind clearance levels and attempting to obfuscate with the use of jargon irritating so we got into a slanging match which was quite entertaining but of course became self defeating.
I’ll try not to rise to the bait in future.
calm down chaps, the last few days has seen some raised hackles all round on multiple threads, lets try and be civil, even if you disagree
@ Percontaror,
APATS is absolutely crap at playing polo, wearing a stylish uniform, chatting up beautiful European girls in low dives in Germanic speaking countries, assessing terrain with an instinctive glance, and if he shoots anything like the last First Sea Lord, poaches other men’s game without realising it.
Which is one explanation as to why he is so valuable to this blog. He’s a graduate of the Andrew’s PWO course, and so therefore well qualified to talk about these sorts of things.
Anyway, winding up APATS is my job.
;)
Fence sitting but I feel:
C295 core MPA capability UK EEZ (incl FI) – not sure how many airframes that would require and where they would need basing but maybe 15 active airframes, a couple in FI, 1 in Gib perhaps?.
C295 replaces C130 for SF role and any other types it can – BA146 etc?
Could stop there I think, just. Perhaps that is phase 1, re-establish core capability
Then consider small fleet of long range MPA to provide QRA style GIUK gap / SSBN cover and ability to deploy say 2 or 3 aircraft to support expeditionary forces – 6 to 8 airframes? Would be nice if there was an airbus one on the stocks, but it seems to me P8 is the only game in town
I am not sure about putting all the eggs in one expensive (P8) basket and hence 15+6 say is better than say 12 P8
Disagree with apas point of view if you like tis only the internet after all but he has been posting here long enough that I believe he is exactly who he says he is and needs no news links to back up his credibility.
@APATS
Patronising now as well as puerile.
Didn’t your supposed RN training teach you how to make a point or advance an argument. I say supposed because I would expect much better from an RN officer.
@P
“Perhaps, as you claim to be an RN officer”
End of, sorry but I humoured you for long enough.
If you do not realise why Russian SSNs represent a threat, well you are on the wrong site try the guardian. I do not need to verify anything you need to get qa clearance at the moment yoy are the discretionary def of a little knowledge is dangerous.
@APATS
Please try not to be puerile.
I’m glad you realise that WARPAC no longer exists – that’s why NATO is losing its relevance.
Why do you think Russian SSNs represent a threat, we’re not competing for European hegemony are we?
As to your example, if you are unable to quote one, fine. Referring to an exercise involving a Los Angeles class which no one can verify does not help advance your argument.
Perhaps, as you claim to be an RN officer you could comment from your perspective on my idea for an RN mission crew in a RAF operated aircraft. Don’t worry I’m not after any classified information.
@APATS and @percontator both of you take deep breaths.
APATS I didnt realise you had this first hand knowledge and it certainly throws a new light on the debate. I can see percontators point but it is ridiculous often you cannot give examples which is fair enough. To be honest if a doctor tells me something I am infinetly more likely to listen to their point of view than than an educated sort.
So wheres your money? I suppose it depends whether we go for capability or cost savings…
One question I will ask is if you only really have a need to sanitise choke points and infront and behind the taskforce would the flexibility of basing of a C295 or even A400 mean that the range figures are less crucial. I understand if you don’t fly as far you have a longer endurance but going back to my old ways if you can put 3 295 in Akrotiri as opose to 1 P8 to cover a choke point is that any better?
@ Percolastor
Yes i do think Russian SSNs in the Atlantic represent a threat to out nuclear deterent.
WARPAC does nit exist, my values are the UK values.
In 2009 we used an MR2 to clear a channel ahead of a TG and later kill a 688 that was tailing the TG during an exercise, want more get a clearance.
@APATS
Still no examples I see. Instead of hiding behind your claimed status how about advancing the odd cogent argument.
Re NATO – apparently you see aid in expeditionary warfare to be more relevant than support against an existential threat to the UK as represented by WARPAC, interesting set of values.
Why do we need to track Russian SSNs – do you think they represent a threat to the UK?
@Observer
As I said, a nice to have.
@El Sid
Thanks for the tip, but this being an internet blog I prefer logical argument.
We have kept the B-52 force effective over the years. It’s a shame the Vulcan bombers weren’t maintained. Given their range and payload, with a crew compartment stretch they could still be effective as MPA. Of course, providing ejection seats for the whole crew would be necessary.
Perhaps even limited range MPA such as the versatile C295 would give relief to asset deployment of more capable allies (i.e. our American and Canadian cousins) in any high intensity conflict with an enemy that has submarines/surface raiders . I am sure if there was the need to keep the seaways open in the North Atlantic a certain number of P8’s (and out of storage P3’s) would be relocated to the unsinkable aircraft carrier that is the UK.
We need to keep the skill sets in place to hunt down and sink enemy submarines. A platform such the C295 would keep those skills sharpened while a more capable long range MPA is brought on line.
P.S. C295 can be mid air refuelled , right? Endurance is then down to dispensable assets such sonar buoys and weapons released.
@percontator
I suspect that the best open source way for you to learn about the relative merits of different options is not to talk about it, but to have a play with different mixes of Merlin/C295/P-8 in :
http://www.matrixgames.com/products/483/details/Command:.Modern.Air.Naval.Operations
[no connection, don’t even own a copy myself, but from what I’ve read it’s pretty much the best open-source model of post-WWII warfare on and around the sea. I suspect many here would learn a lot from it]
perc, think what APATS means is that you can clear the chokepoint before the taskforce reaches it if you have an MPA by sending it ahead of the ships. If all your ASuW systems are ship based, it would mean that the ships would have to be very close to the point to start sweeping, even with Merlin. This also might mean incredible time pressure on the escort ships as the carrier is going to be very close on their heels, so they might be forced to do casual sweeps instead of a proper look through, not to mention the time needed to double check suspicious datums. If time pressure is too tight, some areas that need double checking would have to be skipped. Not laziness or anything, more like trying to do a 15 minute job in 10min.
As for the doctor part, so far, the information he has posted before this seems tight. So far. :)
‘Perconator
Once again it’s “Trust me I’m a doctor”.”
As opposed to, trust me I have no qualifications?
It affects its usefulness by not being able to achieve certain tasks.
NATO is more relevant than ever” , I know you like to fight your corner on all points but that statement is simply ludicrous.
Bosnia. Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan, Support to the African Union, I could go on but why bother.
we may no l;longer need reforger but we still need to track Russian SSNs
@Percontator
The Merlin HM.1 has a range of 833 km (450 nmi,[170] 517 mi) and endurance of 5 hours.
The Airbus C295ASW has an endurance of 11 hours. (Since it’s faster than the Merlin I figure it can go a lot further given an 11 hour endurance.)
@APATS
Of course CN295 has limited range as opposed to say P8 but so what – how does that affect its fitness for purpose as an MPA for the UK?
“NATO is more relevant than ever” , I know you like to fight your corner on all points but that statement is simply ludicrous.
Third shock army – Reforger – GIUK gap – has that joined up the dots for you.
As we both know I’m unlikely to be training as a Principal Warfare Officer in the near future so we can assume that you are unable to provide an example.
Once again it’s “Trust me I’m a doctor”.
@P
I have been involved drawing up mission profiles involving CN295 and other MPA, I have seen the limitations imposed by CN295.
NATO is in no way irrelevant, it is actually more relevant than ever and the Russian defence budget is doing the opposite of ours. 3rd shock army always struggled to get Mid Atlantic funnily enough.
Merlin does not possess a greater range than CN295 but I have never seen a CN295 operated from a frigate. as for my last point I coulkd point you in the direction of a PWO course and Force ASW course, they are basic tactics.
@APATS
I understand that you are an insider and have insights that cannot be revealed on this forum but”there is no allegedly about it I have tasked them” is on a par with “trust me I’m a doctor” – more info needed.
Tracking Russian SSNs in the Atlantic may still be a NATO task – but the task, just like NATO itself is increasingly irrelevant. Do you think we would have abandoned the MPA role if Third Shock Army was still poised on the IGB?
If there is a threat from Russia to the UK it is much more likely to come from GAZPROM than from their navy.
Do Merlins possess a greater range than C295?
Perhaps you can illustrate your last point with an example?
In 2010 Brazil signed a deal with a French defence contractor DCNS for help constructing the first of the five nuclear powered hunter killer submarines (scheduled for launch in 2025 with their first domestic built diesel/electric next year) . In 2008 a deal with Argentina to jointly develop the nuclear reactors which will power these vessels and a nuclear powered version of their own submarines. Argentina’s was always unlikely to build its own nuclear sub as they are always short of cash but the recent discovery of the large amounts of gas and oil means their economy could turn around (According to the US Energy Department, the country has the second most important reserves of unconventional gas (shale gas) and the fourth most important of unconventional oil (shale oil)). The thought of Argentine SSN’s in our home waters is unthinkable. In 1982 Argentina had no deep strike capabilities but in 10 years could seal off the South Atlantic from any UK strike force trying to repeat the Falklands campaign. Long term we need a long range HI/LO capable MPA to put those potential threats on the bottom of the sea. The Atlas module idea would gives us that option whilst giving us flexibility on the core platform and a home built (European) long term solution that could be ramped up quickly in time of need.
@sgt pep
“There is no budget for a decent fleet of P8′s so what’s the point of buying just 4 or 5 airframes? Is such a fleet sustainable in a war scenario against another power?”
RT is basically right: which “another power” do we plan to fight? Russia’s submarine fleet will decline for years to come and will ultimately follow the US pivot to Asia. Argentina has no submarines to speak of. Iran?
Another fact is that the USN is currently stamping a whole new ASW-strategy. Continuous surveillance to monitor not-so-AIP chinese subs, ASW-aircraft flying high enough to be virtually undetectable for submerged vehicles. Add to this new, faster ASW-helicopters resulting from the FVL-program within the 2025 timeframe, and you have game-changers all over the place.
The bigger question is, are we destined to follow the Americans? Or do we still believe in low-altitude, local theatre ASW? If we do the former, we cannot circumvent the idea, that UAVs are absolutely necessary to fulfil the mission. And if we then require and create UAV-sensor nodes, why can’t we create UAV-torpedo-carrier nodes? And wouldn’t be the best bet to intercept Russian subs be an easy to forward-deploy (thinking of Bear Island, Jan Mayen, Greenland, Iceland, aso) asset?
Re. Atlas; yes, this bird will be in service, someday. From day one, it will be a scarce asset. To think, we could spare a quarter+ of the fleet for “mod-on-ASW” seems to be wishful thinking. Buying slots or “used” aircraft from Germany, Spain or France will not be as easy, as some people suggest. Airbus will definitely have contingency clauses within the original contract to prevent such a deal between partner nations.
I can only see one way to make this happen. The coming SDSR will most likely not even mention the acronym MPA, because the RAF is not interested and such large aircraft doesn’t belong into the RN-territory. The RN will then make the MoD fund a bolt-on-kit solution a la Crowsnest to fill the gap. This would be a “backdoor-policy”, not something being formalized via SDSR. IMO, this is not the worst option.
If there exists a MPA-requirement within the SDSR, there will be a lease for some initial P-8 slots, which will later materialize into buys.
@perconator
“Various posters have rejected the C295 because it allegedly has insufficient range or even insufficient payload to carry out the required tasks.”
There is no allegedly about it, I have tasked them.
“The USSR is no more and with it have gone both GSFG and the Northern Banner Fleet, so there is no requirement to protect REFORGER convoys or to help Strike Fleet Atlantic to fight its way to the Barents Sea. Consequently we don’t need to maintain Anti- Submarine Group 2 or to patrol the GIUK gap. Protection for SSBNs leaving on patrol is currently provided by Merlin helicopters.”
No and No. look at Russian military spending and it ti still NATO policy to track all Russian SSNs in the Atlantic(we have just let others do our share), We do not fly Merlins down the Clyde ahead of a patrol it is a recurrent task done at range,
“Task groups for expeditionary warfare based around a CVF will have their own organic ASW assets in the form of T23/T26 frigates with embarked Merlin augemented by Merlins based on CVF itself.”
Yes and for defensive ASW inside the bubble it is fine to have true freedom to mvre the ability of an MPA to hunt choke points and clear both ahead and astern of a TG is invaluable.
Unless there is an increase in the Defence Equipment budget any purchase of an aircraft for MPA has to be at the expense of other items in the equipment plan. With this in mind, the one candidate which requires no development effort and which is relatively inexpensive both to buy and operate is the C295.
Various posters have rejected the C295 because it allegedly has insufficient range or even insufficient payload to carry out the required tasks.
The range argument seems to be based on 2 requirements:
1) patrol the GIUK Gap
2) support expeditionary operations.
The USSR is no more and with it have gone both GSFG and the Northern Banner Fleet, so there is no requirement to protect REFORGER convoys or to help Strike Fleet Atlantic to fight its way to the Barents Sea. Consequently we don’t need to maintain Anti- Submarine Group 2 or to patrol the GIUK gap. Protection for SSBNs leaving on patrol is currently provided by Merlin helicopters.
Task groups for expeditionary warfare based around a CVF will have their own organic ASW assets in the form of T23/T26 frigates with embarked Merlin augemented by Merlins based on CVF itself. A LRMPA would be merely a nice to have.
C295 may carry fewer sonobuoys than P8, but is this really a significant problem?
The utility of an MPA depends at least as much on its ASW systems as on the aircraft carrying them. C295 offers a variety of existing or well developed options:
1) The Airbus FITS – already operational
2) Systems developed for Nimrod MRA4
3) The system newly developed for Merlin HM2.
C295 fitted with the Merlin HM2 systems could be operated jointly with the RN providing the mission crew (thereby reducing the training burden) and the RAF operating and maintaining the aircraft.
@Brian Black – Fanjet Zeppelins? To be fair, they would have a tremendous load-carrying and loiter capability. I mean, you could send one of them to patrol the GIUK gap on Tuesday and have it return several weeks later. Think of the radar you could slap on the side of one of those things! You could search for subs and aircraft all at the same time! Catch a sub on the surface, and you could fly down and knock on the hatch, invite them up for tea!
BTW, I’m new here. Captain Blimp?
@Ace Rimmer – We can still use SOSUS to track Russian Tu-95 Bears. :D Who needs radar?
Let me apologize in advance because I have been sick and haven’t had much sleep. That sort of thing makes me crankier than usual.
Why don’t you people just replace your whole air force with three Airbus 380 MPA/PAB/AEW-C/ISTAR/tankers and be done with it? Put everything on one airframe. The way things are going, it looks like Jordan will end up with a more capable force than the UK.
Politicians in both our countries seem to be more interested in buying votes from the dependent classes than doing their primary jobs of providing for the common defense. They dictate things like the JSF (F-35A/B/C) which against all odds seems like it’s going to be successful, then get panicky when the cost of fitting all the required features into one frame gets pricey. The F-22 should have replaced all our F-15s by now (except for F-15E Strike Eagles) but the price tag of that unmatched capability scared the pollys.
@TED –
“They say that in the RAF the fruit cake’s mighty fine.
One rolled off the table and killed a friend of mine.”
@GNB @X http://www.foundation3d.com/uploads/instruction/2012/10/2658-08-709962.jpg
I’m surprised that Captain Blimp didn’t write on how his Zeppelins could fill the MPA role.
I’d say there’s even money on the MoD solution coming completely from leftfield and leaving us all scratching our heads.
@Engineer Tom…well said, but from past experience this could run and run…
A cautionary Gloomy
If we start creating european military units the UK starts losing the ability to act independently when needed. Most european countries have a completly different worldview to us and also are much less inclinded to act when needed.
The Uk needs to stop pretending to be a mini USA and accept the reality that it is no longer a global power and its reach will be even more diminished in the decades to come.
It can no longer go to war against decent opposition without its allies.
There is no budget for a decent fleet of P8’s so what’s the point of buying just 4 or 5 airframes? Is such a fleet sustainable in a war scenario against another power?
The Uk and other European countries need to accept reality and get their act together. We need a common European MPA fleet.
@Observer, “Pfft, radome is so last century, comformal AESA for the future!”
Kids today, (grumble, moan, clenches pipe between teeth) in my day… ;-)
Pfft, radome is so last century, comformal AESA for the future! :P
And I’ve absolutely no idea why India would want to radome the A-50, it doesn’t really need the dome on top, even the old EL/W-2085 could be fitted flush against the hull. Must be some reason behind it, but damn if I can figure it out.
Edit: Finally figured it out. The radome was there, so they used it.
After reading TED and RT’s comments, is there not a case for an updated version of SOSUS to be fitted around the UK? If we have RAF Fylingdale as part of the air detection network, can’t we have a sub-sea network in a similar vein?
I know SOSUS was rendered obsolete by a new generation of silent Soviet subs (any points for alliteration?), but is it technologically feasible to try to develop a capable technology?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SOSUS
@TED
I have seen it argued elsewhere that Ocean should be kept in service with the RFA and frankly it is an utter non starter!
She has seen very heavy service and is close to being worn out, her most recent refit is to tide the vessel over to induction of the QE class when Illustrious retires.
Crewing and operating a worn out carrier does not make financial sense for the RFA or MOD.
@DavidHaine: “Can you imagine the Atlas with a discy, radome thing on the top?”
It would look surprisingly like the A-50 Mainstay (despite the props), and it definitely gets my vote!
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beriev_A-50
@Alex “In the MPA role, that’s not excess hold, that’s space for more fuel and of course sonobuoys. And pies.” Yeah if you can fit them in sensible launchers, have a hold tank (which it can have) but MoD pastries I wouldn’t wish on anyone tbh. Fruit cake all the way… Anyway if you can do all this with a lot of sonobuoys and weapons and also fit a MAD, a decent radar and electro optics then it works for me. Very nice endurance and it does have the air refuel capability.
Getting carried away now I can actually see airbus wanting us to do this. The more roles the aircraft can preform and is proven in service with the more sales they are likely to get. Hell they might even help us.
@dave haine @ Ted
“Can you imagine the Atlas with a discy, radome thing on the top?”
5-6 A400m doing the job of Sentry, airseeker, Sentinel, Shadow and Islander all at once is a very attractive idea and is what I have campaigned for. So if we could fit all that I would be one very happy camper. Sadly that is an ISTAR asset and not an MPA. I suspect you would need dedicated aircarft with the ‘discy, radome thing on the top’ and I should imagine ‘a discy, radome thing’ preforms particuarly well at low altitude.
As it has been established there is significant risk in the A400m MPA however I think there is an outside chance it could work. The government would never do it though!
Even if we ended up with the all singing all dancing A400m fleet we invisage I would still fight for the C295 as a fill in between chinook and A400 but it would be a reduced fleet and so you wouldn’t see so much of the cost saving.
To sum up it would be lovely to see a european option developed.
@RT “If so, why not contract the job to a largish mothership with some embarked Merlins, or even run on Ocean in that role with an RFA crew? Rotate the RAF / RN aircrew every 2 weeks via civilian flight to Keflavik, bring the boat into port once a month or so. Any number of ports with close by civilian airports in Norway, Iceland, Aberdeen, Faroes etc.”
But if you then detect a submarine you can not keep it under surveillance because you have to stay in the gap to detect others. And you have no way of prosecuting them at more than 500nm or faster than at 25kts at above that range. Motherships would be better used in and around Africa and the Carribean looking for baddies whilst frigates and destroyers should be out on the high seas, with an MPA keeping tabs on all subs.
Apologies for the long post got a hot keyboard now!
RT – you make a good point about where this MPA is going to be used, something that hasn’t really been looked at. Here would be my list:
1) GIUK Gap, North Sea, Atlantic – the traditional Coastal Command hunting grounds.
2) Gulf – given that this is where a lot of our interests are at the moment, it makes sense that we would deploy an asset like an MPA here. That said the yanks are going to be there for at least the next decade (though beyond that is less clear) and so our small MPA contribution is arguably not going to add too much.
3) Indian Ocean – basing from Diego Garcia?
4) West Africa – Counter Piracy/Counter Terrorism activities. Perhaps doesn’t really need an full on MPA.
5) Falkland Islands – Isn’t the argument that argument for everything?
We’re still talking about MPA numbers in single digits?
EDIT: We’re still thinking about the MPA purchase in terms of a single procurement rather than a sustainable program designed to deliver required capabilities?