UK defence issues and the odd container or two

UK Defence Organisation – Levene and Army 2020

A post from a new contributor, MartinR

The Levene Report on changes to the MOD sensibly pulled a number of defence organisations into one central joint forces command. However it also appeared to push the three armed services into deeper silos than before, each with their own budgets, etc.

I believe that an opportunity was missed to bring the three armed services together at the operational level. I would like to discuss this.

Annex I is a rough sketch of how I suggest that HM Armed Forces should be organised. It does not show everything, as I do not know everything, but it provides a framework. I have not included training organisations, establishments or units.

I suggest reducing the number of 4 star officers to four, as the numbers of service personnel do not, in my view, warrant more. Each 4 star officer should be a member of the Defence Staff, rather than the Naval, General or Air Staffs.

The 4 star officers should each command elements of all three armed services and the civil services to achieve their shared aim of defending the United Kingdom’s people, territories and interests.

I consider that the three armed services should remain separate entities. However they must always be looked on as parts of the whole; rather than as independent services that cooperate when necessary but otherwise go their separate ways.

Each armed service should be headed by a 3 star officer, who is the head of his service, and who concentrates on his service to ensure that it is always ready to play its part in defending the nation. However he must be subordinate to the CDS & VCDS.

The present system resembles a battalion where all the company commanders are lieutenant colonels, rather than majors, who consider that they can do as they wish, with just a nod to the CO & 2IC every now and then.

If the Navy complain that the RN cannot possibly be headed by a Vice-Admiral they should be reminded that Lord Nelson was a Vice-Admiral and if that rank was good enough for him…..

UK Defence Forces

The main change that I would like to see is that all the people who do the fighting should be under one operational 4 star headquarters at Northwood. All operations and exercises at home and overseas should be commanded by HQ United Kingdom Defence Forces.  HQUKDF replaces PJHQ.

CINCUKDF would directly command the 3 star Naval, Land, Air and Joint Forces operational commanders without there being any involvement, other than supportive, by the service chiefs of staff. CINCUKDF would report to CDS and would have access to the Secretary of State for Defence.

CINCUKDF would be responsible to the CDS for the conduct of all UK defensive and offensive military operations. He would be looking at the ‘Here and Now’, whilst his 4 star colleagues would be looking at ‘Ways and Means’ and ‘the Future’.

CINCUKDF would not be able to use the strategic deterrent without the explicit approval of the Prime Minister; though would be responsible, with CUKNF, for ensuring that the SSBN is in place, defended and ready to launch when needed.

HQ UKDF should be where all the operational decisions are made. The forces commanders should be based at Northwood, so that they, and their staffs, might plan operations and major exercises together under the command of the CINC.

It is unlikely that Northwood could house all the personnel required to support the commanders and so the commanders’ staffs should be split between Northwood and the service HQs in Portsmouth, Andover and High Wycombe.

HQUKDF should also command territorial defence, which should be a Joint Forces responsibility. All support provided by the Armed Forces to the civil authorities and to service personnel and their families should be delivered by Defence Territorial Command through ten Defence Districts.

Army 2020 links the Adaptable Forces to the regional brigades, presumably to save money, but it would seem to me that this will result in brigade commanders trying to look both ways at once. It would be better if the money were saved by having a tri-service command looking inwards and having separate Adaptable Forces looking outwards. 

UK Naval Forces

I suggest only minor changes to the way the Naval Forces’ waterfront organisation is designed. My changes are simply to bring the design into line with the design that I suggest for Land and Air Forces.

UK Land Forces

I am impressed with Army 2020, it makes the best out of a bad job, but consider that dividing the fighting elements of the Army into two parts – Reaction & Adaptable – is likely to produce a ‘first eleven / second eleven’ split, with resulting morale problems within the second eleven.

I suggest an alternative organisation in Annex II, which follows the A-FORM process at divisional level, rather than at major unit level. The roles, location and equipment of all major units in Annex II are taken from the various Army 2020 publications.

Three combat divisions, each with 12 major combat units under command (10 if the Scots leave the UK), move through the ‘training for operations’, ‘operations’ and ‘other duties’ cycle.

Each GOC and his senior staff should remain in post for the three years of the cycle, which will allow them to have experience across the A-FORM cycle. This should help when a new CUKLF is being selected.

The third major-general would be from HQ London District. If there is a very good reason for there being a major-general in London then this could be the divisional headquarters, though it would be better if it were with 1 Signal Regiment in Stafford, which has a long history of being a divisional HQ.

Each combat division would have two brigade headquarters, one armoured and one mechanised, each of which could command an overseas force for six months during an enduring operation.

One brigade would provide an armoured reaction force and the other a mechanised (protected mobility) adaptable force during the years that the division is on, ready for, or training for, operations.

Each division would also have four light battalions (two if the Scots leave us) which could be used with either the reaction force, the adaptable force or independently.

Each armoured brigade would be able to form three armoured battlegroups from the armoured regiment and the two armoured infantry battalions – each with one armoured squadron, two armoured infantry company groups and one armoured artillery battery. A fourth armoured squadron would be held in reserve.

A command battlegroup would also be formed from the armoured cavalry regiment – three cavalry reconnaissance squadrons, a cavalry command mobility and protection squadron, a UAS artillery battery, a brigade HQ & Signals squadron and an intelligence company. The command battlegroup would resemble 30 Cdo IX Group RM, though with more assets.

Each mechanised brigade would have three mechanised battlegroups and one command battlegroup.

If the Scots leave the UK the loss of The Royal Scots Dragoon Guards would cut our cavalry regiments down to five. Their command and ISTAR role would have to be taken on by an infantry battalion; or the 9/12L & QRL merger could be halted.

Let us hope that the Scots do not leave, as their leaving the British Army will be a major loss to the Army and the UK. If they do leave; perhaps a defence treaty could keep them in the British Army.

Cyprus should be garrisoned by two light battalions from the ‘operations’ division on one year tours.  The ‘operations’ division should also continuously provide an infantry company group on a two month tour in the Falklands.

The garrison in Brunei should remain with the Gurkha battalions. Public Duties should be carried out by two infantry, usually Guards, battalions from the ‘other duties’ division.

In an emergency; the ‘training for operations’ combat division should be able to deploy overseas on combat operations. If ‘push comes to shove’ the harmony guidelines go out the window.

The combat divisions should be very flexible, with force packages tailored for each operation or major exercise by HQ UKLF and the division’s command staff, based on the orders given to them by HQ UKDF. Close support units (eg 7 RHA) would continue to have a close relationship with the combat units they usually support.

Each division should also have tailored combat support, command support and combat services support packages from two support divisions.

I would put all combat services support units together under one divisional HQ – this would allow for the maximum flexibility, common standards of service provision and could avoid unnecessary duplication – and the combat support and command support units under another. The former would be from Support Command and the latter from Force Troops Command.

I have not shown reserve infantry, cavalry, special forces and artillery major units (other than HAC) as I consider that they should disband, with the reserve companies, squadrons and batteries being subordinated to regular major unit HQs; see Annex IV. This should allow for improved integration. All regular major units would have two reserve minor units under command.

Where regiment/battalion sub-units are concerned they should be looked at as semi-independent minor units (with sub-units being troops and platoons) each with its own unique title. They are commanded by majors, rather than captains as in the US Army and other armies, and so should be able to act independently.

The names of the regiments that got us through the two world wars have disappeared from the British Army’s Order of Battle and from the uniforms of our soldiers. I consider this to be a great shame, and so I suggest in Annex IV that, whilst the old regiments cannot be resurrected, their names could still live on in their successor regiments as the names of companies and squadrons.

Where equipment is concerned I consider that the protected mobility vehicles are more suited to RLC (Mastiff) & major unit (Foxhound) battlefield bus/taxi duties, with the Jackals being used for force/route protection.

The light cavalry regiments and mechanised battalions should, I believe, be equipped with VBCI/Stryker/Boxer type 8 x 8 mechanised infantry fighting vehicles manufactured in the UK; if ever we have the money for them.

UK Air Forces

I suggest, in Annex III, a minor reorganisation of our air forces. I believe that air power, because of the speed and range of modern aircraft, must be held together and commanded at the highest level in any Theatre of Operations; which is why I suggest that the Apaches are held centrally and not in 16 Air Assault Brigade.

However I also see the advantages of aircraft that are integral to RN vessels and Army combat formations being manned by personnel from the RN and the Army. JHC has paved the way with this and I have followed this design where close air support for naval and land forces is concerned.

As the RAF shrinks the number of squadrons gets smaller. At the same time wing commanders command flying squadrons and squadron leaders command flights. If each flight becomes a squadron and each squadron becomes a wing then the RAF would have twice the number of its historic flying squadrons in its Order of Battle and the rank titles would mean what they say.

The squadrons would be much smaller than USAF squadrons but this should not matter as I am sure that allied air commanders are more interested in (a) how many aircraft they have; (b) their capabilities; and (c) how many sorties they can generate, rather than the size of the squadrons that they belong to.

Aircraft are extraordinarily expensive to purchase, maintain and operate and there is no point in a ‘fantasy fleet’ exercise. But the lack of maritime patrol aircraft concerns me.

I consider that using Atlas (low-level anti-submarine and rescue operations) and Voyager (high-level maritime ISTAR) in the MPA role would make more sense, providing that they can be equipped to carry out the role, than using them all in the strategic transport role, especially now that the Afghan campaign is coming to an end.

Also using Atlas to air drop troops and supplies over enemy territory is risking a very expensive bit of kit in a role far more suitable for the Hercules, and so some C130Js should be retained.

I would also hang on to the Lynx Mk9 for as long as possible; the Army needs more tactical air mobility than Wildcat can provide. In both cases this depends on the money being available.

Rank structure

The present rank structure was designed when the nobility and the gentry provided the officers and commoners provided the other ranks. This is why a wet behind the ears 2Lt is, in theory, senior to a very experienced WO1.

Times have changed and the rank structure should also be changed in all three services. WO1s should equate to Capts; WO2s to Lts; and SSgts to 2Lts. The WOs and SSgts would, I am sure, prefer to remain in the WO and Sgts’ Mess, rather than move to the Officers’ Mess.

There is no good reason why a tried and tested RSM or CSM should have to salute a 2Lt and call him ‘Sir’. The latter might well become a great asset to the Army but when he starts his career he has potential, rather than actual, value; he is certainly not as valuable as the RSM or the CSMs.

Aviators

The Navy consists of sailors; the Army has soldiers but the RAF has airmen and airwomen, which is a bit of a mouthful. Why not call the latter – aviators? Then we could talk of sailors, soldiers and aviators.

The original usage of aviator was for pilots only but there is no reason why we cannot use it for everyone in the RAF. Of course we could simply talk of Andrews, Ruperts & Kevins but that would only apply to the officers.

Conclusion

None of the above is going to happen; even if anyone of any importance in government sees the paper and agrees with it, or some of it.

The three services will not wish to give up their independence (and the three 4 star positions); the Army will not wish to change their plans and the Treasury will want major cost cutting plans, not cosmetic changes.

Unless the Russians get really bolshie and frighten our politicians SDSR 2015 and SDSR 2020 will be seen by whichever of them are in power in those years as opportunities for plunder; not for improving our defences.

However I have enjoyed the exercise, which will have to do for me. I hope that it has been of interest to TD readers.

 

Annexes

Annexe I (Armed Forces)

HM ARMED FORCES
COMMANDERS, STAFFS, FIGHTING & SUPPORT FORMATIONS
**** HM ARMED FORCES MOD London – Chief of the Defence Staff
  *** HQ ROYAL NAVY Portsmouth – Chief of the Naval Staff & 1st Sea Lord (Policy & People)
  *** HQ BRITISH ARMY Andover – Chief of the General Staff (Policy); Adjutant-General (People)
  *** HQ ROYAL AIR FORCE High Wycombe – Chief of the Air Staff (Policy & People)
  The CDS is the principal advisor on defence to the Secretary of State for Defence and commands all defence personnel. The Chiefs of the Service Staffs (CNS, CGS and CAS) are heads of their services but do NOT command all members of their service. Their role is to advise the SofS, the CDS and Ministers about matters relating to their service and to fight their service’s corner where budgets, etc are concerned. They are staff officers, not commanders, whose tasks are to look at ‘Ways and Means’ and to look to the future of their services. Their aim is to get the best people and equipment in the right numbers to meet the needs of their service. The Army – being larger where personnel are concerned than the two other services put together – has two three star officers, rather than just one.
**** UNITED KINGDOM DEFENCE STAFF MOD London – Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff
  *** DEFENCE POLICY & PLANNING STAFF MOD London – Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff
  *** DEFENCE PERSONNEL STAFF MOD London – Chief of Defence Personnel
  *** DEFENCE EQUIPMENT STAFF MOD London – Chief of Defence Equipment
  *** DEFENCE HEALTH SERVICES MOD London – Chief of Defence Health & Surgeon-General
  *** DEFENCE INFORMATION SYSTEMS MOD London – Chief of Defence Information Systems
  Defence staff officers look at long-term defence policy from a tri-service viewpoint, rather than from just their own service’s viewpoint. Defence Staff officers also serve in the UK Defence Alliances Staff, the UK Defence Forces HQ and the UK Joint Forces HQs.
**** UNITED KINGDOM DEFENCE ALLIANCES STAFF MOD London & SHAPE – Chief of the Defence Alliances Staff
  *** DEFENCE ALLIANCES POLICY STAFF MOD London & UKDEL NATO – Deputy Chief of the Defence Alliances Staff
  *** DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE MOD London – Chief of Defence Intelligence
  *** THE UK DEFENCE ACADEMY MOD London – Vice-Chancellor
  The FCO is responsible for forming and maintaining alliances with other countries. The MOD is responsible for making them work. Defence Alliances Staff are in the FCO, the MOD, SHAPE, UKDEL NATO, BDLS Washington, Embassies and High Commissions.  Now that the threat of invasion from the East has lessened, the load on HQNATO & SHAPE must be lighter than during the Cold War and so DSACEUR is also CDAS and PERMILREP NATO is also DCDAS. Constant monitoring of the military intentions and capabilities of allies, potential enemies and neutral countries is vital. The Defence Academy allows allied personnel to study and discuss issues together.
**** UNITED KINGDOM DEFENCE FORCES Northwood – Commander-in-Chief, UK Defence Forces
  *** HQ UK DEFENCE FORCES – Command Staff Northwood – Deputy Commander-in-Chief, UK Defence Forces
    CinC UKDF is responsible for the day to day defence of the United Kingdom’s people, territory and interests. He and his staff are responsible for present and near future operations/exercises at home and overseas, rather than for long term strategy.
  ***  UNITED KINGDOM JOINT FORCES HQ UKDF Northwood – Commander, UK Joint Forces
    ** HQ UK JOINT FORCES – Command Staff HQ UKDF Northwood – Deputy Commander, UK Joint Forces
    ** DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE COMMAND HQ UKDF Northwood Responsible to CUKJF for day to day operations but work within the policies set by CDI; CDIS & CDH.
    ** DEFENCE SIGNALS & CYBER COMMAND HQ UKDF Northwood
    ** DEFENCE MEDICAL COMMAND HQ UKDF Northwood
    ** HQ BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE HQ UKDF Northwood – Initial recce, planning, command and logistics.
    ** BRITISH FORCES CYPRUS Cyprus Each overseas commander reports directly to CUKJF.
      * BRITISH FORCES SOUTH ATLANTIC Falkland Islands
      * BRITISH FORCES GIBRALTAR Gibraltar
    ** DEFENCE TERRITORIAL COMMAND HQ UKDF Northwood HQ Defence Territorial Command and the ten Defence District HQs are responsible across the territory of the United Kingdom for: (a) co-ordinating territorial defence; (b) liaising with the civil authorities and providing military support when needed; (c) providing support to Regular & Reserve Units, Service families, Reservists and Veterans; and (d) Public Relations. They are staffed by personnel from all three Armed Services and the MOD Civil Service.
      * DEFENCE HQ LONDON Horse Guards
      * DEFENCE HQ SCOTLAND Edinburgh
      * DEFENCE HQ WALES Cardiff
      * DEFENCE HQ NORTHERN IRELAND Belfast
      * DEFENCE HQ NORTH-WEST ENGLAND Manchester
      * DEFENCE HQ NORTH-EAST ENGLAND York
      * DEFENCE HQ WESTERN ENGLAND Birmingham
      * DEFENCE HQ EASTERN ENGLAND Cottesmore
      * DEFENCE HQ SOUTH-WEST ENGLAND Plymouth
      * DEFENCE HQ SOUTH-EAST ENGLAND Aldershot
  *** UNITED KINGDOM NAVAL FORCES HQ UKDF Northwood – Commander, UK Naval Forces & 2nd Sea Lord
    ** HQ UK NAVAL FORCES – Command Staff HQ UKNF Portsmouth– Deputy Commander, UK Naval Forces
      * HQ ROYAL MARINES HQ UKNF Portsmouth  
        III 1 ASSAULT GROUP RM RM Tamar  
    ** RN FLEET COMMAND – RN/RFA at Sea HQ UKDF Northwood Warships & RFAs at sea move from flotilla to flotilla according to their role & location.  3rd Flotilla commands all ships operating independently.
      * FIRST FLOTILLA – RN/RFA East of Suez HQ UKNF Bahrain
      * SECOND FLOTILLA – RN Reaction Force HQ Portsmouth/At sea
      * THIRD FLOTILLA – RN/RFA West of Suez HQ UKDF Northwood
    ** RN HOME COMMAND – RN/RFA at Home HQ UKNF Portsmouth  
      * PORTSMOUTH FLOTILLA Portsmouth CVF; DD45; FF23; Patrol
      * DEVONPORT FLOTILLA Devonport LPH; LPD; FF23; SSN(T); MCMV; Survey
      * FASLANE FLOTILLA Faslane SSBN; SSN(A); MCMV
      * ROYAL FLEET AUXILIARY  FLOTILLA Portsmouth RFA
  *** UNITED KINGDOM LAND FORCES HQ UKDF Northwood – Commander, UK Land Forces
    ** HQ UK LAND FORCES – Command Staff HQ UKLF Andover  – Deputy Commander, UK Land Forces
      * 3 COMMANDO BRIGADE Plymouth Reaction Forces. RM Commandos are part of the NAVAL SERVICE but fight as LAND FORCES.
      * 6 AIRBORNE BRIGADE Colchester
    ** 1 DIVISION – Combat York Each Division spends one year training for operations, one year on, or ready for, operations and one year on other duties. Armd Bdes are Reaction Forces. Mech Bdes are Adaptable Forces. Where enduring operations are concerned each Bde HQ can spend six months in theatre. Each Bde has six Battle Groups under command. BGs can serve with either Bde in their Div. UKLF tailors a force package to suit each operation/exercise.
      * 1 ARMOURED BRIGADE Tidworth
      * 2 MECHANISED BRIGADE Edinburgh
    ** 2 DIVISION – Combat Stafford
      * 4 ARMOURED BRIGADE Bulford
      * 5 MECHANISED BRIGADE Chilwell
    ** 3 DIVISION – Combat Bulford
      * 7 ARMOURED BRIGADE Bulford
      * 8 MECHANISED BRIGADE Aldershot
    ** 4 DIVISION – Combat & Command Support Aldershot Combat Support, Command Support and Combat Services Support packages are put together by UKLF to meet the needs of the Combat Divisions and Brigades. The packages are flexible and will change according to need. CCS & CSS brigades are responsible for policy development, trade training and updating and maintaining specialist skills. Bde HQs are combined with specialist Corps HQs.

See Annex II for Combat, Combat/Command Support and Combat Services Support units.

      * 9 ARTILLERY BRIGADE Tidworth
      * 10 ISTAR BRIGADE Upavon
      * 11 ENGINEER BRIGADE Aldershot
      * 12 SIGNALS BRIGADE Donnington
    ** 5 DIVISION – Combat Services Support Andover
      * 13 PROVOST BRIGADE Andover
      * 14 MEDICAL BRIGADE Strensall
      * 15 LOGISTIC BRIGADE Aldershot
      * 16 EQUIPMENT BRIGADE Grantham
      * HQ 17 SUPPORT BRIGADE – NATO area HQ BEF Northwood These brigade HQs bring together CSS assets to support operations, exercises & training overseas.
      * HQ 18 SUPPORT BRIGADE – Global
  *** UNITED KINGDOM AIR FORCES HQ UKDF Northwood – Commander, UK Air Forces
    ** HQ UK AIR FORCES – Command Staff HQ UKAF High Wycombe – Deputy Commander, UK Air Forces
      * HQ 1ST EXPEDITIONARY AIR FORCE HQ UKDF Northwood Commands RAF units operating overseas
      * HQ RAF REGIMENT HQ UKAF High Wycombe Protects RAF units operating at home and overseas. UK CBRN Defence Force.
        III 9 GROUP RAF – Force Protection RAF Honington
    ** RAF FIGHTER COMMAND HQ UKAF High Wycombe  
      * HQ RAF FIGHTER COMMAND HQ UKAF High Wycombe  
        III 1 GROUP RAF – Air Defence & Strike RAF Marham Tornado GR4 / Lightning FGR2
        III 2 GROUP RAF – Air Defence & Strike RAF Coningsby Typhoon FGR2
        III 3 GROUP RAF – Air Defence & Strike RAF Lossiemouth Typhoon FGR2
    ** RAF SUPPORT COMMAND HQ UKAF High Wycombe  
      * HQ RAF SUPPORT COMMAND HQ UKAF High Wycombe  
        III 4 GROUP RAF – ISTAR and

Maritime Patrol

RAF Waddington

& RAF Brize Norton

Sentry; Rivet Joint; Sentinel; Shadow; Reaper; Defender AL2; MPA.
        III 5 GROUP RAF – Strategic Airlift RAF Brize Norton Globemaster; Atlas; Voyager
        III 6 GROUP RAF – Air Assault and Command Mobility RAF Brize Norton                     & RAF Northolt Hercules C130J; BAE146; BAE125; AW109; Islander AL1
    ** TACTICAL AIR COMMAND HQ UKAF High Wycombe Close Air Support for Naval & Land Forces
      * HQ TACTICAL AIR COMMAND HQ UKAF High Wycombe  
      * 2ND TACTICAL AIR FORCE HQ UKLF Andover  
        III 10 GROUP RAF RAF Valley Tactical Strike – Hawk
        III 11 GROUP RAF RAF Odiham Tactical Airlift – Chinook
        III 12 GROUP RAF RAF Benson Tactical Airlift – Puma
      * FLEET AIR ARM HQ UKNF Portsmouth  
        III 14 NAVAL AIR GROUP RNAS Culdrose Maritime Air – Merlin & Wildcat
        III 15 NAVAL AIR GROUP RNAS Yeovilton Commando Air – Merlin & Wildcat
      * ARMY AIR CORPS HQ UKLF Andover  
        III 16 ARMY AIR GROUP AAC Wattisham Air Cavalry – Apache
        III 17 ARMY AIR GROUP AAC Middle Wallop Air Support – Lynx & Wildcat
            See Annex III for UKAF details
(NO TRAINING FORMATIONS, ESTABLISHMENTS OR UNITS INCLUDED)
Notes:
Each Army brigade has a unique number. The Army is too small to have brigades using the same number. It is also too small to maintain historic brigade numbers, such 51 (Highland) Brigade. It is best to start again and number from the top.
RAF groups are commanded by group captains and consist of a number of wings commanded by wing commanders. A group commander can also be the station commander. It is strange that a fast moving flexible force with global reach ties its aircraft to static air stations. The aircraft need a base, as do the air crew, but they ought to be able to deploy forward as fighting formations.
Tactical Strike Wings: Hawks are used for low-level close air support for UK Land Forces. Typhoons & Lightnings are far too valuable to be risked. The Hawks and their pilots are also used for fast-jet flying training in 4 Flying Training School.
III = Captain RN; Colonel; Group Captain.

 

Annexe II (Land Forces)

UNITED KINGDOM LAND FORCES HQ: ANDOVER
3 COMMANDO BRIGADE Reaction Force HQ: Plymouth
SBS RM RM Special Forces Poole, Dorset
30 CDO RM Commando / HQ & ISTAR Though part of the NAVAL SERVICE              3 BDE fights on land and so is also part of UK LAND FORCES. Plymouth
40 CDO RM Commando Plymouth
42 CDO RM Commando Chivenor, Devon
45 CDO RM Commando Arbroath
43 CDO RM Fleet Protection RNB Clyde
6 AIRBORNE BRIGADE Reaction Force HQ: Colchester
22 SAS Army Special Forces Hereford
1 PARA  (see notes) Airborne Infantry / HQ & ISTAR  (see notes) Colchester / Hereford
2 PARA Airborne Infantry Colchester
3 PARA Airborne Infantry Colchester
1 GURKHA Light Infantry Shorncliffe
2 GURKHA Light Infantry Brunei
1 DIVISION   HQ: YORK
1 ARMOURED BRIGADE Reaction Force HQ: Bulford
RDG Armoured Cavalry / HQ & ISTAR Scimitar II Catterick
QRH Armour Challenger II Tidworth
1 SAXON  (see notes) Armoured Infantry Warrior II Bulford
5 RIFLES Armoured Infantry Warrior II Bulford
1 GRENR GDS Light Infantry Aldershot
2 SCOTS Light Infantry Edinburgh
2 MECHANISED BRIGADE Adaptable Force HQ: Edinburgh
SCOTS DG Light Cavalry / HQ & ISTAR Jackal Leuchars
4 SCOTS Heavy Mechanised Infantry Mastiff Catterick
3 SCOTS Light Mechanised Infantry Foxhound Fort George
3 RIFLES Light Mechanised Infantry Foxhound Edinburgh
1 SCOTS Light Infantry Belfast
2 RIFLES Light Infantry Lisburn
2 DIVISION   HQ: STAFFORD
4 ARMOURED BRIGADE Reaction Force HQ: Bulford
HCR Armoured Cavalry / HQ & ISTAR Scimitar II Windsor
RTR Armour Challenger II Tidworth
1 FUSILIERS Armoured Infantry Warrior II Tidworth
1 MERCIAN Armoured Infantry Warrior II Bulford
1 COLDM GDS Light Infantry Windsor (Public Duties)
1 IRISH GDS Light Infantry Hounslow (Public Duties)
5 MECHANISED BRIGADE Adaptable Force HQ: Chilwell
LD Light Cavalry / HQ & ISTAR Jackal Catterick
4 RIFLES Heavy Mechanised Infantry Mastiff Aldershot
1 R IRISH Light Mechanised Infantry Foxhound Tern Hill
2 YORKS Light Mechanised Infantry Foxhound Catterick
2 LANCS Light Infantry Weeton
2 MERCIAN Light Infantry Chester
3 DIVISION   HQ: BULFORD
7 ARMOURED BRIGADE Reaction Force HQ: Tidworth
RL Armoured Cavalry / HQ & ISTAR Scimitar II Catterick
KRH Armour Challenger II Tidworth
1 YORKS Armoured Infantry Warrior II Warminster
1 R WELSH Armoured Infantry Warrior II Tidworth
1 LANCS Light Infantry Cyprus
2 SAXON  (see notes) Light Infantry Cyprus
8 MECHANISED BRIGADE Adaptable Force HQ: Aldershot
QDG Light Cavalry / HQ & ISTAR Jackal Swanton Morley
1 SCOTS GDS Heavy Mechanised Infantry Mastiff Aldershot
1 WELSH GDS Light Mechanised Infantry Foxhound Pirbright
2 ANGLIAN Light Mechanised Infantry Foxhound Cottesmore
1 ANGLIAN Light Infantry Woolwich
1 RIFLES Light Infantry   Chepstow
4 DIVISION Combat & Command Support HQ: ALDERSHOT
9 ARTILLERY BRIGADE Also HQ RA HQ: Tidworth
1 RHA Armoured Artillery Regiment 155mm SP Gun Larkhill
19 RA Armoured Artillery Regiment 155mm SP Gun Larkhill
26 RA Armoured Artillery Regiment 155mm SP Gun Larkhill
3 RHA Light Artillery Regiment 105mm Gun Northumberland
4 RA Light Artillery Regiment 105mm Gun Topcliffe
7 RHA Airborne Artillery Regiment 105mm Gun Colchester
29 RA Commando Artillery Regiment 105mm Gun Plymouth
12 RA Air Defence Artillery Regiment Starstreak HVM Thorney Island
16 RA Air Defence Artillery Regiment Rapier Thorney Island
10 ISTAR BRIGADE Also HQ Int Corps HQ: Upavon, Wilts
5 RHA  (see Annex IV) ISTAR Artillery Regiment Catterick
HAC  Reserve ISTAR Artillery Regiment  London
32 RA ISTAR Artillery Regiment Light UAS Larkhill
47 RA ISTAR Artillery Regiment Light UAS Larkhill
14 R SIGS Electronic Warfare Signal Regiment St Athan
SRR Special Forces ISTAR Regiment Hereford
7 INT  Reserve Military Intelligence Bn Bristol
1 INT Military Intelligence Battalion Catterick
3 INT  Reserve Military Intelligence Bn Hackney
2 INT Military Intelligence Battalion Upavon
6 INT  Reserve Military Intelligence Bn Manchester
4 INT Military Intelligence Battalion Bulford
5 INT  Reserve Military Intelligence Bn Edinburgh
11 ENGINEER BRIGADE Also HQ RE HQ: Aldershot
12

FORCE SUPPORT GROUP

20 WG RE Air Support Engineer Regt Wittering
36 RE Engineer Regiment Maidstone
39 RE Engineer Regiment Kinloss
42 RE Geographic Regiment RAF Wyton, Cambs
71 RE  Reserve Engineer Regiment Leuchars
75 RE  Reserve Engineer Regiment Warrington
25

CLOSE SUPPORT GROUP

22 RE Armoured Engineer Regiment Perham Down
26 RE Armoured Engineer Regiment Perham Down
35 RE Armoured Engineer Regiment Perham Down
21 RE Engineer Regiment Catterick
32 RE Engineer Regiment Catterick
23 RE Airborne Engineer Regiment Woodbridge, Suffolk
29

EOD & SEARCH GP

33 RE EOD Regiment Wimbish, Essex
101 RE EOD Regiment Wimbish, Essex
11 RLC EOD Regiment Didcot, Oxon
1 RAVC MW Dogs Regiment Aldershot
170

SUPPORT GROUP

62 WG RE Infrastructure Works Group Chilwell
63 WG RE Infrastructure Works Group Chilwell
64 & 66 WG RE Infrastructure Works Groups Chilwell
65 WG RE Reserve Infrastructure Works Group   Chilwell
Monmouth Militia RE Reserve Infrastructure Works Group Monmouth
12 SIGNALS BRIGADE Also HQ R Signals HQ: Donnington
1 SIGNAL GROUP 22 R SIGS ARRC & JRRF Signal Regiment Stafford
30 R SIGS ARRC & JRRF Signal Regiment Nuneaton
ARRC SB ARRC Support Battalion Innsworth
2 SIGNAL GROUP 10 R SIGS Technical Support Signal Regt Corsham, Wilts
15 R SIGS Information Systems Signal Regt Blandford, Dorset
32 R SIGS  Reserve Signal Regiment – Paired with 2 R SIGS Glasgow
37 R SIGS  Reserve Signal Regiment – Paired with 16 R SIGS Redditch
39 R SIGS  Reserve Signal Regiment – Paired with 21 R SIGS Bristol
71 R SIGS  Reserve Signal Regiment – Paired with 3 R SIGS Bexleyheath
7 SIGNAL GROUP 1 R SIGS Close Support Signal Regiment Stafford
2 R SIGS General Support Signal Regiment York
3 R SIGS General Support Signal Regiment Bulford
16 R SIGS Close Support Signal Regiment Stafford
21 R SIGS Close Support Signal Regiment Colerne, Wilts
5 DIVISION Combat Services Support HQ: ANDOVER
13 PROVOST BRIGADE Also HQ RMP HQ: Andover
1 RMP Military Police Regiment Catterick
3 RMP Military Police Regiment Bulford
4 RMP Military Police Regiment Aldershot
RMP SIB Special Investigation Branch Bulford
MCTC Military Corrective Training Centre Colchester
14 MEDICAL BRIGADE Also HQ RAMC, RADC, QUARANC, etc HQ: Strensall
OPS HQ RAMC Reserve Operational HQ Support Group Strensall
306 RAMC Reserve Hospital Support Regiment Strensall
335 RAMC Reserve Medical Evacuation Regiment Strensall
22 RAMC Field Hospital Aldershot
202 RAMC Reserve Field Hospital Birmingham
207 RAMC Reserve Field Hospital Manchester
208 RAMC Reserve Field Hospital Liverpool
33 RAMC Field Hospital Gosport
203 RAMC Reserve Field Hospital Cardiff
243 RAMC Reserve Field Hospital Bristol
256 RAMC Reserve Field Hospital Walworth
34 RAMC Field Hospital Strensall
201 RAMC Reserve Field Hospital Newcastle-upon-Tyne
204 RAMC Reserve Field Hospital Belfast
205 RAMC Reserve Field Hospital Glasgow
212 RAMC Reserve Field Hospital Sheffield
1 RAMC Armoured Medical Regiment Tidworth
4 RAMC Armoured Medical Regiment Aldershot
5 RAMC Armoured Medical Regiment Tidworth
225 RAMC Reserve Medical Regiment Dundee
253 RAMC Reserve Medical Regiment Belfast
254 RAMC Reserve Medical Regiment Cambridge
2 RAMC Medical Regiment Rutland
3 RAMC Medical Regiment Preston
6 RAMC Airborne Medical Regiment Colchester
15 LOGISTIC BRIGADE Also HQ RLC HQ: Aldershot
2 RLC Operational Support Group Grantham
1 RLC Logistic Support Regiment Bicester
9 RLC Logistic Support Regiment Hullavington
157 RLC Reserve Transport Regiment                                     Cardiff
3 RLC Logistic Support Regiment Aldershot
10 QOG Logistic Support Regiment Aldershot
151 RLC Reserve Transport Regiment                                     Croydon
4 RLC Logistic Support Regiment Abingdon
27 RLC Logistic Support Regiment Abingdon
154 RLC Reserve Transport Regiment                                     Dunfermline
6 RLC Logistic Support Regiment Dishforth
150 RLC Reserve Transport Regiment Hull
156 RLC Reserve Supply Regiment Liverpool
7 RLC Logistic Support Regiment Cottesmore
158 RLC Reserve Transport Regiment Peterborough
159 RLC Reserve Supply Regiment Coventry
13 RLC Airborne Logistic Support Regiment Colchester
17 RLC Port & Maritime Regiment Marchwood
165 RLC Reserve Port & Enabling Regiment Plymouth
29 RLC Postal, Courier & Movements Regiment South Cerney
162 RLC Reserve Postal, Courier & Movements Regiment Nottingham
152 RLC Reserve Fuel Support Regiment Belfast
167 RLC Reserve Catering Support Regiment Grantham
16 EQUIPMENT BRIGADE also HQ REME HQ: Grantham
3 REME Armoured Equipment Support Battalion Tidworth
105 REME Reserve Equipment Support Battalion                     Bristol
4 REME Armoured Equipment Support Battalion Tidworth
103 REME Reserve Equipment Support Battalion                    Crawley
6 REME Armoured Equipment Support Battalion Tidworth
101 REME Reserve Equipment Support Battalion        Wrexham
1 REME Equipment Support Battalion Catterick
102 REME Reserve Equipment Support Battalion Newton Aycliffe
2 REME Equipment Support Battalion Leuchars
106 REME Reserve Equipment Support Battalion Glasgow
5 REME Equipment Support Battalion Cottesmore
104 REME Reserve Equipment Support Battalion Northampton
7 REME Aviation Equipment Support Battalion Wattisham
HQ 17 SUPPORT BRIGADE Each brigade manages the Land Forces Supply Chain to, from and within one or more Theatres of Operations or Exercises. The brigades command Combat Services Support Groups in each Theatre that provide medical, logistic and equipment support, etc to deployed Land Forces. CSS Units are assigned to the CSSGs by HQ 5 DIV according to need. HQ: BEF Northwood
HQ 18 SUPPORT BRIGADE HQ: BEF Northwood
17 Brigade operates in the NATO area and 18 Brigade operates globally.  
Household Division Mounted Regiment
HDMR Ceremonial Regiment (CO – Col, 2IC – Lt Col)

HCMR Sqns + King’s Tp RHA + 3 x Guards Public Duties Coys

London
NOTES: See ANNEX IV for Army Combat Unit details
AAC Regiments are shown under UK Air Forces
COMBAT DIVISION HQs are deployable. If a fighting brigade is deployed to work alongside allied formations then a 2 Star divisional HQ should be deployed to work alongside the host nation headquarters and other allied headquarters.
BRIGADES have unique numbers. The Army is too small to have brigades using the same number. It is also too small to maintain historic brigade numbers, such 51 (Highland) Brigade. It is best to start again and number from the top.
1 PARA is a specialist major combat unit providing support to Army Special Forces and to 6 Airborne Brigade HQ.
HQ & ISTAR Units: 6 x Cavalry Regts & 1 PARA follow RM 30 Cdo Information Exploitation Group concept.

Command Battle Group formed by:

Cav Regt / Para Bn HQ Sqn/Coy; plus Cav Recce Sqns / Para Recce Coy; plus

Bde Command Mobility & Protection Cavalry Sqn/Para Cmd HQ M&P Coy; plus Bde HQ & Signals Sqn, R Sigs; plus

UAS Bty, RA; plus Int Coy, Int Corps; plus CSS yeomanry sqns from framework Regt/Bn and from a combat support regt.

SPECIAL FORCES units (22 SAS; SBS RM & SRR) operate and exercise together under the command of HQ UKDF but come under their brigade HQs for administration, etc. They are the tip of the spear. Their brigades are the blade of the spear and provide operational support and reinforcements to their special forces units.
ARMOURED FORCES deployed for an enduring operation can form two Task Forces of ;

1 x Armoured Infantry Battalion; plus

1 x Armoured Combat Group of 30 x Challenger (HQ has 2 x tanks and the two squadrons have 14 x tanks each) from the Armoured Regiment; plus

1 x Armoured Cavalry Sqn; plus

Combat Support / Combat Services Support units.

Each Task Force serves in Theatre for 6 months. Task Force HQ is from deployed Brigade HQ.

1 & 2 SAXON – New titles for 1 & 2 PWRR to bring the modern regiment’s title into line with the other regiments, such as 1 MERCIAN, 1 ANGLIAN, etc. The modern regiment recruits in the areas occupied by the Middle Saxons (Middlesex), the South Saxons (Sussex) and the West Saxons (Hampshire, which was part of Wessex).

 

Annexe III (Air Forces)

HQ UNITED KINGDOM AIR FORCES Cdr, UK Air Forces(CUKAF) reports to CINCUKDF HQ UKDF Northwood
HQ UK AIR FORCES     AOC HQ reports to CUKAF HQ UKAF High Wycombe
  HQ 1ST EXPEDITIONARY AIR FORCE     Commands RAF units overseas HQ UKDF Northwood
  HQ RAF REGIMENT     Protects RAF units at home and overseas. UK CBRN Defence Force RAF Honington
  9 GROUP RAF Force Protection Wings & Sqns RAF Honington
HQ RAF FIGHTER COMMAND     AOC FC reports to CUKAF HQ UKAF High Wycombe
  1 GROUP RAF       RAF Marham
    1st Strike Fighter Wing (OCU) 201 SQN RAF 202 SQN RAF Lightning II RAF Marham
    2nd Strike Fighter Wing 617 SQN RAF 619 SQN RAF Lightning II RAF Marham
    3rd Strike Fighter Wing 801 SQN RN 809 SQN RN Lightning II RAF Marham
  2 GROUP RAF       RAF Coningsby
    1st Fighter Wing 3 SQN RAF 12 SQN RAF Typhoon FGR4 RAF Coningsby
    3rd Fighter Wing (OCU) 11 SQN RAF 15 SQN RAF Typhoon FGR4 RAF Coningsby
    5th Fighter Wing 29 SQN RAF 111 SQN RAF Typhoon FGR4 RAF Coningsby
  3 GROUP RAF       RAF Lossiemouth
    2nd Fighter Wing 1 SQN RAF 9 SQN RAF Typhoon FGR4 RAF Lossiemouth
    4th  Fighter Wing 2 SQN RAF 16 SQN RAF Typhoon FGR4 RAF Lossiemouth
    6th Fighter Wing 6 SQN RAF 43 SQN RAF Typhoon FGR4 RAF Lossiemouth
             
HQ RAF SUPPORT COMMAND     AOC SC reports to CUKAF HQ UKAF High Wycombe
  4 GROUP RAF       RAF Waddington
    1st AWACS Wing 8 SQN RAF 20 SQN RAF Sentry AEW1 RAF Waddington
    1st ISTAR Wing 5 SQN RAF 28 SQN RAF Sentinel R1 / Rivet Joint R1 RAF Waddington
    2nd ISTAR Wing 13 SQN RAF 39 SQN RAF MQ-9A Reaper RAF Waddington
    3rd ISTAR Wing 14 SQN RAF 655 SQN AAC Shadow R1 / Defender AL2 RAF Waddington
    1st Maritime Patrol Wing 204 SQN RAF 205 SQN RAF Voyager  MPA / Atlas MPA RAF Brize Norton
  5 GROUP RAF       RAF Brize Norton
    1st Strategic Airlift Wing 10 SQN RAF 101 SQN RAF KC-30 Voyager RAF Brize Norton
    2nd Strategic Airlift Wing 47 SQN RAF 56 SQN RAF A400M Atlas RAF Brize Norton
    3rd Strategic Airlift Wing 70 SQN RAF 74 SQN RAF A400M Atlas RAF Brize Norton
    4th Strategic Airlift Wing 99 SQN RAF 216 SQN RAF C17 Globemaster RAF Brize Norton
  6 GROUP RAF       RAF Northolt
    1st Air Assault Wing 25 SQN RAF 30 SQN RAF Hercules C130J RAF Brize Norton
    1st Command Mobility Wing 32 SQN RAF 42 SQN RAF BAE 146 / BAE 125 RAF Northolt
    2nd Command Mobility Wing 52 SQN RAF 658 SQN AAC AW109 / Islander AL1 RAF Northolt
             
HQ TACTICAL AIR COMMAND Close Air Support for UKNF & UKLF AOC TAC reports to CUKAF HQ UKAF High Wycombe
  HQ 2ND TACTICAL AIR FORCE       HQ UKLF Andover
  10 GROUP RAF       RAF Valley
    1st Tactical Strike Wing 4 SQN RAF 19 SQN RAF Hawk 2 RAF Valley
    2nd Tactical Strike Wing 100 SQN RAF 120 SQN RAF Hawk 2 RAF Leeming
    3rd Tactical Strike Wing 208 SQN RAF 209 SQN RAF Hawk 2 RAF Valley
  11 GROUP RAF       RAF Odiham
    1st Tactical Airlift Wing 7 SQN RAF 657 SQN AAC Chinook HC2 / Lynx AH9 RAF Odiham
    2nd Tactical Airlift Wing 18 SQN RAF 22 SQN RAF Chinook HC3 RAF Odiham
    3rd Tactical Airlift Wing 27 SQN RAF 51 SQN RAF Chinook HC3 RAF Odiham
  12 GROUP RAF       RAF Benson
    4th Tactical Airlift Wing 33 SQN RAF 203 SQN RAF Puma HC3 RAF Benson
    5th Tactical Airlift Wing 230 SQN RAF 232 SQN RAF Puma HC3 RAF Benson
  HQ FLEET AIR ARM       HQ UKNF Portsmouth
  14 NAVAL AIR GROUP       RNAS Culdrose
    1st Maritime Air Wing 814 NAS RN 854 NAS RN Merlin HM2 RNAS Culdrose
    2nd Maritime Air Wing 820 NAS RN 857 NAS RN Merlin HM2 RNAS Culdrose
    3rd Maritime Air Wing 824 NAS RN 825 NAS RN Merlin HM2 RNAS Culdrose
    4th Maritime Air Wing 815 NAS RN 816 NAS RN Wildcat HMA2 RNAS Yeovilton
  15 NAVAL AIR GROUP       RNAS Yeovilton
    1st Commando Air Wing 845 NAS RN 848 NAS RN Merlin HC3 RNAS Yeovilton
    2nd Commando Air Wing 846 NAS RN 849 NAS RN Merlin HC3 RNAS Yeovilton
    3rd Commando Air Wing 847 NAS RM 659 SQN AAC Wildcat AH1 – Reconnaissance RNAS Yeovilton
  HQ ARMY AIR CORPS       AAC Middle Wallop
  16 ARMY AIR GROUP       AAC Wattisham
    2nd Regiment AAC 653 SQN AAC 662 SQN AAC Apache AH1 – Air Cavalry AAC Wattisham
    3rd Regiment AAC 654 SQN AAC 663 SQN AAC Apache AH1 – Air Cavalry AAC Wattisham
    4th Regiment AAC 656 SQN AAC 664 SQN AAC Apache AH1 – Air Cavalry AAC Wattisham
  17 ARMY AIR GROUP       AAC Middle Wallop
    1st Regiment AAC 652 SQN AAC 661 SQN AAC Wildcat AH1 – Reconnaissance RNAS Yeovilton
    5th Regiment AAC 651 SQN AAC 665 SQN AAC Lynx AH9 – Air Mobility AAC Dishforth
             

NOTES

RAF groups are commanded by group captains and consist of a number of wings commanded by wing commanders. A group commander can also be the station commander. Each wing consists of two flying squadrons (each bearing a traditional squadron number), one command squadron and one support squadron. Each squadron is commanded by a squadron leader, though additional squadron leaders can lead in specific aspects of the squadron’s tasks.

FAA groups are commanded by captains RN; wings by commanders RN and squadrons by lieutenant-commanders RN.   AAC groups are commanded by colonels; regiments by lieutenant-colonels and squadrons by majors.

Fighter Command: The principal objective of the RAF must be to maintain air supremacy over the territory of the United Kingdom and its maritime approaches. Even though the risk of air attack on our cities is very low at present the impact of conventional air strikes would be immense. Also the USA has set the precedent of RPAS strikes against their enemies in other people’s countries and we need to be able to counter similar strikes on our territory from other actual or potential naval & air powers.

Maritime Patrol Wing: 204 Squadron uses 3 x Voyager for high level maritime patrol and 205 Squadron uses 4 x Atlas for low level anti-submarine warfare. The end of the Afghanistan campaign should cut the numbers of aircraft needed for strategic airlift. Using existing aircraft avoids adding yet another type of aircraft to the RAF fleet. Seven aircraft are not sufficient to maintain constant patrols over the North Atlantic and North Sea but they are better than nothing at all.

Tactical Strike Wings: Hawks are used for low-level close air support for UK Land Forces. Typhoons & Lightnings are far too valuable to be risked over the front-line; they should stand-off and fire air to surface missiles at ground targets. The Hawks and their pilots are also used for fast-jet flying training in 4 Flying Training School.

 

Annexe IV (Major Combat Units of the British Army and Royal Marines)

THE BRITISH ARMY & THE ROYAL MARINES
1: Battlegroups are the basic fighting formations of the British Army and are based on the Major Combat Units (MCU) listed below plus Combat Support batteries and squadrons. All officers and soldiers in an MCU, other than those attached, wear the MCU’s cap badge, etc.  Basic Combat Units (BCU) are the Infantry Companies and Cavalry Squadrons that do the fighting and are the component parts of the MCUs. Each BCU is an independent unit with its own unique title and can operate under any BG HQ.
2: Reserve Yeomanry Regts, Artillery Regts (not HAC) and Infantry Bns are disbanded and merged with Regular Regts & Bns so that the Reserve Squadrons, Batteries and Companies are fully integrated in the Regts and Bns with their Regular counterparts.
3: Command Mobility & Protection Squadrons provide armoured mobility and protection to Bde HQ staff and attached troops.
4: AnMCU is supported by a Combat Services Support Yeomanry Squadron with: HQ Tp; Personnel Support Tp; Medical Support Tp; Logistic Support Tp; & Equipment Support Tp. Sqns are commanded by a major from the MCU. Tps are commanded by captains from the CSS corps. Sqns are staffed by officers and soldiers from the MCU and the CSS corps. Sqn establishments will change according to role & location of MCU.
THE HOUSEHOLD DIVISION (CAVALRY)
ARMOURED THE HOUSEHOLD CAVALRY REGIMENT HCR
CAVALRY HQ & ISTAR Squadron  
  1st Squadron 1st Squadron  
WINDSOR The Life Guards The Royal Horse Guards  
  Heavy Reconnaissance Squadron Heavy Reconnaissance Squadron  
  3rd Squadron A Squadron  
  The Life Guards The Royal Dragoons (1st Dragoons)  
  4 Brigade Command Mobility & Protection Sqn Heavy Reconnaissance Squadron  
  1 (CSS)Squadron  
  The Guards Yeomanry  
CEREMONIAL  &                                     THE HOUSEHOLD DIVISION MOUNTED REGIMENT HDMR
ROYAL PROTECTION                                                              HQ & Liaison Squadron Was HCMR
  2nd Squadron 2nd Company  
LONDON The Life Guards The Grenadier Guards (CO = Col)
Primary role is ceremonial. Secondary role is protection of Royal Family and central government. Ceremonial Horse Squadron Ceremonial Footguards company (2IC = LtCol)
2nd Squadron 2nd Company  
The Royal Horse Guards The Coldstream Guards  
Ceremonial Horse Squadron Ceremonial Footguards company  
King’s Troop 2nd Company  
The Royal Horse Artillery The Scots Guards  
Ceremonial Horse Battery Ceremonial Footguards company  
                                                     2 (RAVC) Squadron      3 (CSS) Squadron  
                                                    The Guards Yeomanry The Guards Yeomanry  
THE ROYAL ARMOURED CORPS
LIGHT THE QUEEN’S DRAGOON GUARDS QDG
CAVALRY HQ & ISTAR Squadron  
  A Squadron B Squadron  
SWANTON 1st Queen’s Dragoon Guards The Queen’s Bays (2nd Dragoon Guards)  
MORLEY Light Reconnaissance Squadron Light Reconnaissance Squadron  
  C Squadron D Squadron  
  1st Queen’s Dragoon Guards The Queen’s Bays (2nd Dragoon Guards)  
  Light Reconnaissance Squadron 8 Brigade Command Mobility & Protection Sqn  
  E (Reserve) Squadron F (Reserve) Squadron  
Shropshire The Queen’s Dragoon Guards The Queen’s Dragoon Guards Cheshire
  Reserve Reconnaissance Squadron Reserve Reconnaissance Squadron  
  G (CSS) Squadron  
  The Pembroke (Castlemartin) Yeomanry  
LIGHT THE ROYAL SCOTS DRAGOON GUARDS SCOTS DG
CAVALRY HQ & ISTAR Squadron  
  A Squadron B Squadron  
LEUCHARS 3rd Royal Scots Dragoon Guards The Royal Scots Greys (2nd Dragoons)  
  Light Reconnaissance Squadron Light Reconnaissance Squadron  
  C Squadron D Squadron  
  6th Royal Scots Dragoon Guards (Carabiniers) The Royal Scots Greys (2nd Dragoons)  
  Light Reconnaissance Squadron 2 Brigade Command Mobility & Protection Sqn  
  E (Reserve) Squadron F (Reserve) Squadron  
Scotland The Royal Scots Dragoon Guards The Royal Scots Greys (2nd Dragoons) Scotland
  Reserve Reconnaissance Squadron Reserve Reconnaissance Squadron  
  G (CSS) Squadron  
  The Lothians & Border Horse Yeomanry  
ARMOURED THE ROYAL DRAGOON GUARDS RDG
CAVALRY HQ & ISTAR Squadron  
  A Squadron B Squadron  
CATTERICK 4th Royal Dragoon Guards 5th Royal Dragoon Guards  
  Heavy Reconnaissance Squadron Heavy Reconnaissance Squadron  
  C Squadron D Squadron  
  7th Royal Dragoon Guards The Royal Inniskillings (6th Dragoons)  
  1 Brigade Command Mobility & Protection Sqn Heavy Reconnaissance Squadron  
  E (Reserve) Squadron F (Reserve) Squadron  
Lancashire The Royal Dragoon Guards The North Irish Horse N Ireland
  Reserve Reconnaissance Squadron Reserve Reconnaissance Squadron  
  G (CSS) Squadron  
  The Yorkshire Dragoons Yeomanry (The Queen’s Own)  
HEAVY THE QUEEN’S ROYAL HUSSARS QRH
ARMOUR 4 x Challenger II                                               HQ & ISTAR Squadron                                                8 x Scimitar II  
  A Squadron B Squadron Can form two Armoured Combat Groups, each 30 x MBT

& 4 x CVR (T).

TIDWORTH 3rd Queen’s Own Royal Hussars 4th Queen’s Royal Irish Hussars
  Armoured Squadron (14 x Challenger II) Armoured Squadron (14 x Challenger II)
  C Squadron D Squadron
  7th Queen’s Own Royal Hussars 8th Queen’s Royal Irish Hussars
  Armoured Squadron (14 x Challenger II) Armoured Squadron (14 x Challenger II)
  E (Reserve) Squadron F (Reserve) Squadron  
Gloucestershire                  The Queen’s Royal Hussars                     The Queen’s Royal Hussars Worcestershire
  Reserve Armoured Squadron Reserve Armoured Squadron  
  G (CSS) Squadron  
  The Queen’s Own Worcestershire Hussars Yeomanry  
ARMOURED THE ROYAL LANCERS RL
CAVALRY HQ & ISTAR Squadron  
  A Squadron B Squadron  
CATTERICK 9th/12th Royal Lancers 16th/5th Queen’s Royal Lancers  
  Heavy Reconnaissance Squadron Heavy Reconnaissance Squadron  
  C Squadron D Squadron  
  9th/12th Royal Lancers 17th/21st Queen’s Royal Lancers  
  7 Brigade Command Mobility & Protection Sqn Heavy Reconnaissance Squadron  
  E (Reserve) Squadron F (Reserve) Squadron  
Leicestershire                           The Royal Lancers     The Royal Lancers Nottinghamshire
  Reserve Reconnaissance Squadron Reserve Reconnaissance Squadron  
  G (CSS) Squadron  
  The Lincolnshire Yeomanry  
HEAVY THE KING’S ROYAL HUSSARS KRH
ARMOUR 4 x Challenger II                                               HQ & ISTAR Squadron                                                8 x Scimitar II  
  A Squadron B Squadron Can form two Armoured Combat Groups, each 30 x MBT

& 4 x CVR (T).

TIDWORTH 10th King’s Royal Hussars 14th King’s Royal Hussars
  Armoured Squadron (14 x Challenger II) Armoured Squadron (14 x Challenger II)
  C Squadron D Squadron
  11th King’s Royal Hussars 20th King’s Royal Hussars
  Armoured Squadron (14 x Challenger II) Armoured Squadron (14 x Challenger II)
  E (Reserve) Squadron F (Reserve) Squadron  
Dorset The King’s Royal Hussars The King’s Royal Hussars Devon
  Reserve Armoured Squadron Reserve Armoured Squadron  
  G (CSS) Squadron  
  The Hampshire Carabiniers Yeomanry  
LIGHT THE LIGHT DRAGOONS LD
CAVALRY HQ & ISTAR Squadron  
  A Squadron B Squadron  
CATTERICK 13th Light Dragoons 15th Light Dragoons  
  Light Reconnaissance Squadron Light Reconnaissance Squadron  
  C Squadron D Squadron  
  18th Light Dragoons 19th Light Dragoons  
  Light Reconnaissance Squadron 5 Brigade Command Mobility & Protection Sqn  
  E (Reserve) Squadron F (Reserve) Squadron  
Northumberland                       The Light Dragoons The Light Dragoons Yorkshire
  Reserve Reconnaissance Squadron Reserve Reconnaissance Squadron  
  G (CSS) Squadron  
  The Northumberland Hussars Yeomanry  
5: Officers and soldiers serving in regular and reserve companies, squadrons and batteries wear a Velcro patch on their right breast giving details of their minor unit’s title. See example. 1st Company
The Royal Scots (The Royal Regiment)
1st Regiment of Foot
6: Armd Cav & Lt Cav Regts form Brigade Command Battle Groups, with an attached Bde HQ & Signals Sqn, a UAS Arty Bty and an Intel Coy.
HEAVY THE ROYAL TANK REGIMENT RTR
ARMOUR 4 x Challenger II                                               HQ & ISTAR Squadron                                                8 x Scimitar II  
  1 Squadron 2 Squadron Can form two Armoured Combat Groups, each 30 x MBT

& 4 x CVR (T).

TIDWORTH The Royal Tank Regiment The Royal Tank Regiment
  Armoured Squadron (14 x Challenger II) Armoured Squadron (14 x Challenger II)
  3 Squadron 4 Squadron
  The Royal Tank Regiment The Royal Tank Regiment
  Armoured Squadron (14 x Challenger II) Armoured Squadron (14 x Challenger II)
  5 (Reserve) Squadron 6 (Reserve) Squadron  
Wiltshire The Royal Tank Regiment The Royal Tank Regiment Wiltshire
  Reserve Armoured Squadron Reserve Armoured Squadron  
  A (CSS) Squadron  
  The Royal Wiltshire Yeomanry (Prince of Wales’s Own)  
AIRBORNE FORCES
AIRBORNE 1ST BATTALION, THE PARACHUTE REGIMENT 1 PARA
HQ & ISTAR HQ & ISTAR Company  
   COLCHESTER 4 PARA Company 5 PARA Company 1 PARA forms 1 PARA Command Battle Group with attached Bde HQ & Sig Sqn, UAS Bty RA, Int Coy & FAC Sqn RAF.
The Parachute Regiment The Parachute Regiment
  Special Forces Support Company Special Forces Support Company
  6 PARA Company 8 PARA Company
The Parachute Regiment The Parachute Regiment
  6 Brigade Pathfinders 6 Brigade Command Mobility & Protection Coy
  10 PARA (Reserve) Company 7 PARA = 7 Parachute Regt RHA
London The Parachute Regiment 9 PARA = 9 Parachute Sqn RE
   6 Brigade Reserve Defence & Security Coy  
  A (CSS) Squadron  
  The Airborne Yeomanry  
AIRBORNE 2ND BATTALION, THE PARACHUTE REGIMENT 2 PARA
INFANTRY HQ & ISTAR Company  
  11 PARA Company 13 PARA Company  
COLCHESTER The Parachute Regiment The Parachute Regiment  
  Air Assault Company Air Assault Company  
  14 PARA Company 16 PARA Company  
  The Parachute Regiment The Parachute Regiment  
  Air Assault Company Air Assault Company  
  12 PARA (Reserve) Company    
Pudsey The Parachute Regiment    
  Reserve Air Assault Company    
  B (CSS) Squadron  
  The Airborne Yeomanry  
AIRBORNE 3RD BATTALION, THE PARACHUTE REGIMENT 3 PARA
INFANTRY HQ & ISTAR Company  
  17 PARA Company 18 PARA Company  
COLCHESTER The Parachute Regiment The Parachute Regiment  
  Air Assault Company Air Assault Company  
  19 PARA Company 20 PARA Company  
  The Parachute Regiment The Parachute Regiment  
  Air Assault Company Air Assault Company  
  15 PARA (Reserve) Company    
Glasgow The Parachute Regiment    
  Reserve Air Assault Company    
  C (CSS) Squadron  
  The Airborne Yeomanry  
SPECIAL 22ND SPECIAL AIR FORCE REGIMENT 22 SAS
FORCES HQ & ISTAR Squadron  
  A Squadron B Squadron  
HEREFORD 22nd Special Air Service Regiment 22nd Special Air Service Regiment  
  Special Forces Squadron Special Forces Squadron  
  C Squadron G Squadron  
  22nd Special Air Service Regiment 22nd Special Air Service Regiment  
  Special Forces Squadron Special Forces Squadron  
  E (Reserve) Squadron F (Reserve) Squadron  
  21st Special Air Service Regiment (Artist’s Rifles) 23rd Special Air Service Regiment  
  Reserve Special Forces Squadron Reserve Special Forces Squadron  
  D (CSS) Squadron  
  The Airborne Yeomanry  
THE HOUSEHOLD DIVISION (FOOTGUARDS)
HEAVY PM 1ST BATTALION, THE GRENADIER GUARDS 1 GRENR GDS
    INFANTRY                                                                                    HQ & ISTAR Company
  3rd Company 4th Company Guards
ALDERSHOT The Grenadier Guards The Grenadier Guards Division
       
  5th Company 6th Company  
  The Grenadier Guards The Grenadier Guards  
       
  2nd (Reserve) Company 1st (Reserve) Company  
Balham & The Royal Fusiliers (City of London Regiment) The London Regiment Westminster
Blackheath 7th Regiment of Foot    
   4 (CSS) Squadron  
  The Guards Yeomanry  
LIGHT 1ST BATTALION, THE COLDSTREAM GUARDS 1 COLDM GDS
INFANTRY HQ & ISTAR Company  
  3rd Company 4th Company Guards
WINDSOR The Coldstream Guards The Coldstream Guards Division
       
  5th Company 6th Company  
  The Coldstream Guards The Coldstream Guards  
       
  3rd (Reserve) Company 2nd (Reserve) Company  
Ashington The Royal Northumberland Fusiliers The London Regiment Westminster
  5th Regiment of Foot    
   5 (CSS) Squadron  
  The Guards Yeomanry  
HEAVY PM 1ST BATTALION, THE SCOTS GUARDS 1 SCOTS GDS
INFANTRY HQ & ISTAR Company  
  3rd Company 4th Company Guards
ALDERSHOT The Scots Guards The Scots Guards Division
       
  5th Company 6th Company  
  The Scots Guards The Scots Guards  
       
  3rd (Reserve) Company 3rd (Reserve) Company  
Scotland The Royal Scots Fusiliers The London Regiment Catford
  21st Regiment of Foot    
   6 (CSS) Squadron  
  The Guards Yeomanry  
LIGHT 1ST BATTALION, THE IRISH GUARDS 1 IRISH GDS
INFANTRY HQ & ISTAR Company  
  2nd Company 3rd Company Guards
HOUNSLOW The Irish Guards The Irish Guards Division
       
  4th Company 5th Company  
  The Irish Guards The Irish Guards  
       
  2nd (Reserve) Company 4th (Reserve) Company  
N Ireland The Royal Irish Fusiliers The London Regiment Camberwell
  87th & 89th Regiments of Foot    
   7 (CSS) Squadron  
  The Guards Yeomanry  
LIGHT PM 1ST BATTALION, THE WELSH GUARDS 1 WELSH GDS
INFANTRY HQ & ISTAR Company  
  2nd Company 3rd Company Guards
PIRBRIGHT The Welsh Guards The Welsh Guards Division
       
  4th Company 5th Company  
  The Welsh Guards The Welsh Guards  
       
  3rd (Reserve) Company 5th (Reserve) Company  
Wrexham The Royal Welsh Fusiliers The London Regiment Camberwell
  23rd Regiment of Foot    
   8 (CSS) Squadron  
  The Guards Yeomanry  
THE INFANTRY OF THE LINE
LIGHT 1ST (52ND LOWLAND) BATTALION, THE ROYAL REGIMENTS OF SCOTLAND 1 SCOTS
INFANTRY HQ & ISTAR Company  
  1st Company 1st Company Scottish
BELFAST The Royal Scots (The Royal Regiment) The King’s Own Scottish Borderers Division
  1st Regiment of Foot 25th Regiment of Foot  
  2nd Company 2nd Company  
  The Royal Scots (The Royal Regiment) The King’s Own Scottish Borderers  
  1st Regiment of Foot 25th Regiment of Foot  
  3rd (Reserve) Company 3rd (Reserve) Company  
Scotland The Royal Scots (The Royal Regiment) The King’s Own Scottish Borderers Scotland
  1st Regiment of Foot 25th Regiment of Foot  
  A (CSS) Squadron  
  The Queen’s Own Royal Glasgow Yeomanry  
LIGHT 2ND (52ND LOWLAND) BATTALION, THE ROYAL REGIMENTS OF SCOTLAND 2 SCOTS
INFANTRY HQ & ISTAR Company  
  1st Company 1st Company Scottish
EDINBURGH The Royal Scots Fusiliers The Cameronians (Scottish Rifles) Division
  21st Regiment of Foot 26th & 90th Regiments of Foot  
See also 2nd Company 1st Company  
1 SCOTS GDS The Royal Scots Fusiliers The Highland Light Infantry  
  21st Regiment of Foot 71st & 74th Regiments of Foot  
  4th (Reserve) Company 2nd (Reserve) Company  
Scotland The Royal Scots Fusiliers The Highland Light Infantry Scotland
  21st Regiment of Foot 71st & 74th Regiments of Foot  
  A (CSS) Squadron  
  The Ayrshire Yeomanry (Earl of Carrick’s Own)  
LIGHT PM 3RD (51ST HIGHLAND) BATTALION, THE ROYAL REGIMENTS OF SCOTLAND 3 SCOTS
INFANTRY HQ & ISTAR Company  
  1st Company 1st Company Scottish
FORT The Black Watch (The Royal Highland Regiment) The Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders Division
GEORGE 42nd & 73rd Regiments of Foot 91st & 93rd Regiments of Foot  
  2nd Company 2nd Company  
  The Black Watch (The Royal Highland Regiment) The Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders  
  42nd & 73rd Regiments of Foot 91st & 93rd Regiments of Foot  
  3rd (Reserve) Company 3rd (Reserve) Company  
Scotland The Black Watch (The Royal Highland Regiment) The Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders Scotland
  42nd & 73rd Regiments of Foot 91st & 93rd Regiments of Foot  
  A (CSS) Squadron  
  The Fife & Forfar Yeomanry  
HEAVY PM 4TH (51ST HIGHLAND) BATTALION, THE ROYAL REGIMENTS OF SCOTLAND 4 SCOTS
INFANTRY HQ & ISTAR Company  
  1st Company 1st Company Scottish
CATTERICK The Seaforth Highlanders The Gordon Highlanders Division
  72nd & 78th Regiments of Foot 75th & 92nd Regiments of Foot  
  1st Company 2nd Company  
  The Queen’s Own Cameron Highlanders The Gordon Highlanders  
  79th Regiment of Foot 75th & 92nd Regiments of Foot  
  2nd (Reserve) Company 3rd (Reserve) Company  
Scotland The Seaforth Highlanders The Gordon Highlanders Scotland
  72nd & 78th Regiments of Foot 75th & 92nd Regiments of Foot  
  A (CSS) Squadron  
  The Lanarkshire Yeomanry  
ARMOURED 1ST BATTALION, THE ROYAL SAXON REGIMENTS 1 SAXON
INFANTRY HQ & ISTAR Company Was 1 PWRR
  1st Company 1st Company Queen’s
BULFORD The Queen’s Royal Regiment (West Surrey) The Buffs (The Royal East Kent Regiment) Division
  2nd Regiment of Foot 3rd Regiment of Foot  
  1st Company 1st Company  
  The East Surrey Regiment The Queen’s Own Royal West Kent Regiment  
  31st & 75th Regiments of Foot 50th & 97th Regiments of Foot  
  2nd (Reserve) Company 2nd (Reserve) Company  
Farnham The Queen’s Royal Regiment (West Surrey) The Buffs (The Royal East Kent Regiment) Dover
  2nd Regiment of Foot 3rd Regiment of Foot  
  A (CSS) Squadron  
  The Royal East Kent Mounted Rifles Yeomanry  
LIGHT 2ND BATTALION, THE ROYAL SAXON REGIMENTS 2 SAXON
INFANTRY HQ & ISTAR Company Was 2 PWRR
  1st Company 1st Company Queen’s
CYPRUS The Royal Sussex Regiment The Royal Hampshire Regiment Division
  35th & 107th Regiments of Foot 37th & 67th Regiments of Foot  
  1st Company 2nd Company  
  The Middlesex Regiment The Royal Hampshire Regiment  
  57th & 77th Regiments of Foot 37th & 67th Regiments of Foot  
  2nd (Reserve) Company 2nd (Reserve) Company  
Brighton The Royal Sussex Regiment The Middlesex Regiment Edgware
  35th & 107th Regiments of Foot 57th & 77th Regiments of Foot & Hornsey
  A (CSS) Squadron  
  The Hampshire Carabiniers Yeomanry  
The Royal Saxon Regiments is a new name for The Princess of Wales’s Royal Regiment. This follows the modern naming convention – eg Scots, Mercian, Yorkshire, etc. The South, Middle and West Saxons lived in the modern regiment’s recruiting area.
ARMOURED 1ST BATTALION, THE ROYAL REGIMENTS OF FUSILIERS 1 FUSILIERS
INFANTRY HQ & ISTAR Company  
  1st Company 1st Company Queen’s
TIDWORTH The Royal Northumberland Fusiliers The Royal Warwickshire Fusiliers Division
  5th Regiment of Foot 6th Regiment of Foot  
See also 1st Company 1st Company  
1 GRENR GDS The Royal Fusiliers (City of London Regiment) The Lancashire Fusiliers  
1 COLDM GDS 7th Regiment of Foot 20th Regiment of Foot  
  2nd (Reserve) Company 2nd (Reserve) Company  
Newcastle The Royal Northumberland Fusiliers The Royal Warwickshire Fusiliers Birmingham
  5th Regiment of Foot 6th Regiment of Foot  
  A (CSS) Squadron  
  The Lancashire Hussars Yeomanry  
LIGHT 1ST BATTALION, THE ROYAL ANGLIAN REGIMENTS 1 ANGLIAN
INFANTRY HQ & ISTAR Company  
  1st Company 1st Company Queen’s
WOOLWICH The Royal Norfolk Regiment The Suffolk Regiment Division
  9th Regiment of Foot 12th Regiment of Foot  
  1st Company 1st Company  
  The Bedfordshire & Hertfordshire Regiment The Essex Regiment  
  16th Regiment of Foot 44th & 56th Regiments of Foot  
  2nd (Reserve) Company 2nd (Reserve) Company  
Norwich The Royal Norfolk Regiment The Essex Regiment Chelmsford
  9th Regiment of Foot 44th & 56th Regiments of Foot  
  A (CSS) Squadron  
  The Norfolk Yeomanry (The King’s Own Royal Regiment)  
LIGHT PM 2ND BATTALION, THE ROYAL ANGLIAN REGIMENTS 2 ANGLIAN
INFANTRY HQ & ISTAR Company  
  1st Company 1st Company Queen’s
COTTESMORE The Royal Lincolnshire Regiment The Royal Leicestershire Regiment Division
  10th Regiment of Foot 17th Regiment of Foot  
  2nd Company 1st Company  
  The Royal Lincolnshire Regiment The Northamptonshire Regiment  
  10th Regiment of Foot 48th & 58th Regiments of Foot  
  3rd (Reserve) Company 2nd (Reserve) Company  
Lincoln The Royal Lincolnshire Regiment The Royal Leicestershire Regiment Leicester
  10th Regiment of Foot 17th Regiment of Foot  
  A (CSS) Squadron  
  The Leicestershire Yeomanry  
LIGHT PM 1ST BATTALION, THE DUKE OF LANCASTER’S REGIMENTS 1 LANCS
INFANTRY HQ & ISTAR Company  
  1st Company 1st Company King’s
CYPRUS The King’s Own Royal Regiment (Lancaster) The East Lancashire Regiment Division
  4th Regiment of Foot 30th & 69th Regiments of Foot  
  1st Company 1st Company  
  The Border Regiment The South Lancashire Regiment  
  34th & 55th Regiments of Foot 40th & 82nd Regiments of Foot  
  2nd (Reserve) Company 2nd (Reserve) Company  
Workington The Border Regiment The East Lancashire Regiment Blackburn
  34th & 55th Regiments of Foot 30th & 69th Regiments of Foot  
  A (CSS) Squadron  
  The Duke of Lancaster’s Yeomanry  
LIGHT PM 2ND BATTALION, THE DUKE OF LANCASTER’S REGIMENTS 2 LANCS
INFANTRY HQ & ISTAR Company  
  1st Company 1st Company King’s
WEETON The King’s Regiment (Liverpool) The Manchester Regiment Division
  8th Regiment of Foot 63rd & 96th Regiments of Foot  
  1st Company 2nd Company  
  The Loyal Regiment (North Lancashire) The King’s Own Royal Regiment (Lancaster)  
  47th & 81st Regiments of Foot 4th Regiment of Foot  
  2nd (Reserve) Company 2nd (Reserve) Company  
Liverpool The King’s Regiment (Liverpool) The Manchester Regiment Manchester
  8th Regiment of Foot 63rd & 96th Regiments of Foot  
  B (CSS) Squadron  
  The Duke of Lancaster’s Yeomanry  
ARMOURED 1ST BATTALION, THE YORKSHIRE REGIMENTS 1 YORKS
INFANTRY HQ & ISTAR Company  
  1st Company 1st Company King’s
WARMINSTER                 The West Yorkshire Regiment The East Yorkshire Regiment Division
  14th Regiment of Foot 15th Regiment of Foot  
  2nd Company 1st Company  
   The West Yorkshire Regiment The York & Lancaster Regiment  
  14th Regiment of Foot 65th & 84th Regiments of Foot  
  3rd (Reserve) Company 2nd (Reserve) Company  
Middlesborough              The West Yorkshire Regiment The East Yorkshire Regiment Hull
  14th Regiment of Foot 15th Regiment of Foot  
  A (CSS) Squadron  
  The East Riding Yeomanry  
LIGHT PM 2ND BATTALION, THE YORKSHIRE REGIMENTS 2 YORKS
INFANTRY HQ & ISTAR Company  
  1st Company 1st Company King’s
CATTERICK The Green Howards The Duke of Wellington’s Regiment Division
  19th Regiment of Foot 33rd & 76th Regiments of Foot  
  2nd Company 2nd Company  
  The Green Howards The Duke of Wellington’s Regiment  
  19th Regiment of Foot 33rd & 76th Regiments of Foot  
  3rd (Reserve) Company 3rd (Reserve) Company  
Huddersfield The Green Howards The Duke of Wellington’s Regiment Barnsley
  19th Regiment of Foot 33rd & 76th Regiments of Foot  
  B (CSS) Squadron  
  The East Riding Yeomanry  
LIGHT PM 1ST BATTALION, THE ROYAL IRISH REGIMENTS 1 R IRISH
INFANTRY HQ & ISTAR Company  
  1st Company 1st Company King’s
TERN HILL The Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers The Royal Ulster Rifles Division
  27th & 108th Regiments of Foot 83rd & 86th Regiments of Foot  
  2nd Company 1st Company  
  The Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers The Royal Irish Fusiliers See also
  27th & 108th Regiments of Foot 87th & 89th Regiments of Foot 1 IRISH GDS
  3rd (Reserve) Company 2nd (Reserve) Company  
Armagh The Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers The Royal Ulster Rifles Newtonards
  27th & 108th Regiments of Foot 83rd & 86th Regiments of Foot  
  A (CSS) Squadron  
  The North Irish Yeomanry  
ARMOURED 1ST BATTALION, THE MERCIAN REGIMENTS 1 MERCIAN
INFANTRY HQ & ISTAR Company Prince
  1st Company 1st Company of Wales’s
BULFORD The Cheshire Regiment The Worcestershire Regiment Division
  22nd Regiment of Foot 29th & 36th Regiments of Foot  
  2nd Company 1st Company  
  The Cheshire Regiment The Sherwood Foresters (Notts & Derby Regt)  
  22nd Regiment of Foot 45th & 95th Regiments of Foot  
  3rd (Reserve) Company 2nd (Reserve) Company  
Warrington The Cheshire Regiment The Sherwood Foresters (Notts & Derby Regt) Mansfield,
Cheshire 22nd Regiment of Foot 45th & 95th Regiments of Foot Notts
  A (CSS) Squadron  
  The Cheshire Yeomanry (Earl of Chester’s)  
LIGHT 2ND BATTALION, THE MERCIAN REGIMENTS 2 MERCIAN
INFANTRY HQ & ISTAR Company  
  1st Company 1st Company Prince
CHESTER The South Staffordshire Regiment The North Staffordshire Regiment of Wales’s
  38th & 80th Regiments of Foot 64th & 98th Regiments of Foot Division
  2nd Company 2nd Company  
  The South Staffordshire Regiment The North Staffordshire Regiment  
  38th & 80th Regiments of Foot 64th & 98th Regiments of Foot  
  3rd (Reserve) Company 3rd (Reserve) Company  
Wolverhampton          The South Staffordshire Regiment     The North Staffordshire Regiment Stoke-on-Trent
  38th & 80th Regiments of Foot 64th & 98th Regiments of Foot  
  A (CSS) Squadron  
  The Staffordshire Yeomanry (The Queen’s Own Royal Regiment)  
ARMOURED 1ST BATTALION, THE ROYAL WELSH REGIMENTS 1 R WELSH
INFANTRY HQ & ISTAR Company  
  1st Company 1st Company Prince
TIDWORTH The Royal Welsh Fusiliers The South Wales Borderers of Wales’s
  23rd Regiment of Foot 24th Regiment of Foot Division
  1st Company 2nd Company  
  The Welch Regiment The Royal Welsh Fusiliers See also
  41st & 69th Regiments of Foot 23rd Regiment of Foot 1 WELSH GDS
  2nd (Reserve) Company 2nd (Reserve) Company  
  The South Wales Borderers The Welch Regiment  
  24th Regiment of Foot 41st & 69th Regiments of Foot  
  A (CSS) Squadron  
  The Glamorgan Yeomanry  
LIGHT 1ST BATTALION, THE ROYAL GURKHA RIFLES 1 GURKHA
INFANTRY HQ & ISTAR Company  
  1st Company 1st Company  
SHORNCLIFFE The 2nd Royal Gurkha Rifles The 6th Royal Gurkha Rifles The Brigade
  King Edward VII’s Own Queen Elizabeth’s Own of Gurkhas
  2nd Company 2nd Company  
  The 2nd Royal Gurkha Rifles The 6th Royal Gurkha Rifles  
  King Edward VII’s Own Queen Elizabeth’s Own  
  3rd (Reserve) Company 3rd (Reserve) Company  
Aldershot The 2nd Royal Gurkha Rifles The 6th Royal Gurkha Rifles Aldershot
  King Edward VII’s Own Queen Elizabeth’s Own  
  A (CSS) Squadron  
  The Queen’s Own Royal Gurkha Yeomanry  
LIGHT 2ND BATTALION, THE ROYAL GURKHA RIFLES 2 GURKHA
INFANTRY HQ & ISTAR Company  
  1st Company 1st Company  
BRUNEI The 7th Royal Gurkha Rifles The 10th Royal Gurkha Rifles The Brigade
  Duke of Edinburgh’s Own Princess Mary’s Own of Gurkhas
  2nd Company 2nd Company  
  The 7th Royal Gurkha Rifles The 10th Royal Gurkha Rifles  
  Duke of Edinburgh’s Own Princess Mary’s Own  
  3rd (Reserve) Company 3rd (Reserve) Company  
Aldershot The 7th Royal Gurkha Rifles The 10th Royal Gurkha Rifles Aldershot
  Duke of Edinburgh’s Own Princess Mary’s Own  
  B (CSS) Squadron  
  The Queen’s Own Royal Gurkha Yeomanry  
LIGHT 1ST (WESSEX) BATTALION, THE RIFLES 1 RIFLES
INFANTRY HQ & ISTAR Company  
  1st Company 1st Company The Light
CHEPSTOW The Devonshire Regiment The Somerset Light Infantry Division
  11th Regiment of Foot 13th Regiment of Foot  
  1st Company 1st Company  
  The Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry The Dorset Regiment  
  32nd & 46th Regiments of Foot 39th & 54th Regiments of Foot  
  2nd (Reserve) Company 2nd (Reserve) Company  
Exeter The Devonshire Regiment The Dorset Regiment Dorchester
  11th Regiment of Foot 39th & 54th Regiments of Foot  
  A (CSS) Squadron  
  The Duke of Cornwall’s Yeomanry  
LIGHT 2ND (LONDON) BATTALION, THE RIFLES 2 RIFLES
INFANTRY HQ & ISTAR Company  
  1st Company 1st Company The Light
LISBURN The 60th Rifles (King’s Royal Rifle Corps) The 95th Rifles (Rifle Brigade) Division
  The Royal Green Jackets The Royal Green Jackets  
  2nd Company 2nd Company  
  The 60th Rifles (King’s Royal Rifle Corps) The 95th Rifles (Rifle Brigade)  
  The Royal Green Jackets The Royal Green Jackets  
  3rd (Reserve) Company 3rd (Reserve) Company  
London The 60th Rifles (King’s Royal Rifle Corps) The 95th Rifles (Rifle Brigade) London
(Davies St) The Royal Green Jackets The Royal Green Jackets (West Ham)
  A (CSS) Squadron  
  The London Sharpshooters Yeomanry  
LIGHT PM 3RD (LIGHT) BATTALION, THE RIFLES 3 RIFLES
INFANTRY HQ & ISTAR Company  
  1st Company 1st Company The Light
EDINBURGH The King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry The Durham Light Infantry Division
  51st & 105th Regiments of Foot 68th & 106th Regiments of Foot  
  2nd Company 2nd Company  
  The King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry The Durham Light Infantry  
  51st & 105th Regiments of Foot 68th & 106th Regiments of Foot  
  3rd (Reserve) Company 3rd (Reserve) Company  
Lancaster The King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry The Durham Light Infantry Durham
  51st & 105th Regiments of Foot 68th & 106th Regiments of Foot  
  A (CSS) Squadron  
  The Yorkshire Hussars Yeomanry  
HEAVY PM 4TH (LIGHT) BATTALION, THE RIFLES 4 RIFLES
INFANTRY HQ & ISTAR Company  
  1st Company 1st Company The Light
ALDERSHOT The Oxfordshire & Buckinghamshire Light Infantry The King’s Shropshire Light Infantry Division
  43rd & 52nd Regiments of Foot 53rd & 86th Regiments of Foot  
  2nd Company 2nd Company  
  The Oxfordshire & Buckinghamshire Light Infantry The King’s Shropshire Light Infantry  
  43rd & 52nd Regiments of Foot 53rd & 86th Regiments of Foot  
  3rd (Reserve) Company 3rd (Reserve) Company  
Oxford The Oxfordshire & Buckinghamshire Light Infantry The King’s Shropshire Light Infantry Shrewsbury
  43rd & 52nd Regiments of Foot 53rd & 86th Regiments of Foot  
  A (CSS) Squadron  
  The Royal Buckinghamshire Hussars Yeomanry  
ARMOURED 5TH (WESSEX) BATTALION, THE RIFLES 5 RIFLES
INFANTRY HQ & ISTAR Company  
  1st Company 1st Company The Light
BULFORD The Gloucestershire Regiment The Royal Berkshire Regiment Division
  28th & 61st Regiments of Foot 49th & 66th Regiments of Foot  
  2nd Company 1st Company  
  The Gloucestershire Regiment The Wiltshire Regiment  
  28th & 61st Regiments of Foot 62nd & 99th Regiments of Foot  
  3rd (Reserve) Company 2nd (Reserve) Company  
Gloucester The Gloucestershire Regiment The Royal Berkshire Regiment Reading
  28th & 61st Regiments of Foot 49th & 66th Regiments of Foot  
  A (CSS) Squadron  
  The Royal Wiltshire Yeomanry (Prince of Wales’s Own)  
COMMANDO FORCES
COMMANDO 30 COMMANDO, THE ROYAL MARINES COMMANDOS 30 CDO
HQ & ISTAR HQ Squadron  
   1 Squadron 2 Squadron  
The Royal Marines Commandos The Royal Marines Commandos
PLYMOUTH 3 Brigade Reconnaissance Squadron 3 Brigade Command Mobility & Protection Sqn 3 CDO BDE
  3 Squadron 4 Squadron  
The Royal Marines Commandos The Royal Marines Commandos
  Communications & Information Systems Squadron Electronic Warfare Squadron  
  5 Squadron 6 Squadron  
The Royal Marines Commandos The Royal Marines Commandos
  Amphibious Armoured Squadron (Viking) Amphibious Armoured Squadron (Viking)  
  A (CSS) Squadron  
  The Royal Marines Commando Yeomanry  
COMMANDO 40 COMMANDO, THE ROYAL MARINES COMMANDOS 40 CDO
INFANTRY HQ & ISTAR Company  
  A Company B Company  
PLYMOUTH The Royal Marines Commandos The Royal Marines Commandos 3 CDO BDE
  Close Combat Company Close Combat Company  
  C Company D Company  
  The Royal Marines Commandos The Royal Marines Commandos  
  Stand Off Company Stand Off Company  
  B (CSS) Squadron  
  The Royal Marines Commando Yeomanry  
COMMANDO 42 COMMANDO, THE ROYAL MARINES COMMANDOS 42 CDO
INFANTRY HQ & ISTAR Company  
  J Company K Company  
TAUNTON The Royal Marines Commandos The Royal Marines Commandos 3 CDO BDE
  Close Combat Company Close Combat Company  
  L Company M Company  
  The Royal Marines Commandos The Royal Marines Commandos  
  Stand Off Company Stand Off Company  
  C (CSS) Squadron  
  The Royal Marines Commando Yeomanry  
FLEET 43 COMMANDO, THE ROYAL MARINES COMMANDOS 43 CDO
PROTECTION HQ Company  
  N Company P Company  
CLYDE The Royal Marines Commandos The Royal Marines Commandos 3 CDO BDE
  Fleet Protection Company Fleet Protection Company  
  Q Company R Company  
  The Royal Marines Commandos The Royal Marines Commandos  
  Fleet Protection Company Fleet Protection Company  
  D (CSS) Squadron  
  The Royal Marines Commando Yeomanry  
COMMANDO 45 COMMANDO, THE ROYAL MARINES COMMANDOS 45 CDO
INFANTRY HQ & ISTAR Company  
  W Company X Company  
ARBROATH The Royal Marines Commandos The Royal Marines Commandos 3 CDO BDE
  Close Combat Company Close Combat Company  
  Y Company Z Company  
  The Royal Marines Commandos The Royal Marines Commandos  
  Stand Off Company Stand Off Company  
  E (CSS) Squadron  
  The Royal Marines Commando Yeomanry  
SPECIAL THE SPECIAL BOAT SERVICE, ROYAL MARINES SBS RM
FORCES HQ Squadron  
  1 Squadron 2 Squadron  
POOLE The Special Boat Service The Special Boat Service 3 CDO BDE
  Special Forces squadron Special Forces squadron  
  3 Squadron 4 Squadron  
  The Special Boat Service The Special Boat Service  
  Special Forces squadron Special Forces squadron  
  F (CSS) Squadron  
  The Royal Marines Commando Yeomanry  
THE ROYAL REGIMENT OF ARTILLERY
ARMOURED 1ST REGIMENT, ROYAL HORSE ARTILLERY 1 RHA
ARTILLERY O / HQ Battery (The Rocket Troop)  
  A Battery (The Chestnut Troop) B Battery  
LARKHILL The Royal Horse Artillery The Royal Horse Artillery  
  Armoured AS90 SP 155mm Gun Battery Armoured AS90 SP 155mm Gun Battery  
  E Battery L (Nery) Battery  
  The Royal Horse Artillery The Royal Horse Artillery  
  Armoured AS90 SP 155mm Gun Battery Surveillance and Target Acquisition Battery  
Blythe 203 Reserve Battery 204 Reserve Battery Newcastle
  The Royal Regiment of Artillery The Royal Regiment of Artillery  
  Reserve GMLRS Battery Reserve GMLRS Battery  
  B (Combat Services Support) Squadron  
  The Royal Wiltshire Yeomanry (The Prince of Wales’s Own)  
ARMOURED 19TH REGIMENT, ROYAL ARTILLERY 19 RA
ARTILLERY 13 / HQ Battery (Martinique 1809)  
  5 (Gibraltar 1779-1783)Battery 28/143 Battery (Tomb’s Troop) The Scottish
LARKHILL The Royal Regiment of Artillery The Royal Regiment of Artillery Gunners
  Armoured AS90 SP 155mm Gun Battery Armoured AS90 SP 155mm Gun Battery  
  52 (Niagara) Battery    
  The Royal Regiment of Artillery    
  Armoured AS90 SP 155mm Gun Battery    
Arbroath & 212 Reserve Battery 278 Reserve Battery Edinburgh
Shetland The Royal Regiment of Artillery The Royal Regiment of Artillery  
  Reserve Light 105mm Gun Battery Reserve Light 105mm Gun Battery  
  A (Combat Services Support) Squadron  
  The Lothians & Border Horse Yeomanry  
ARMOURED 26TH REGIMENT, ROYAL ARTILLERY 26 RA
ARTILLERY 55 / HQ Battery (The Residency)  
  16 Battery (Sandham’s Company) 17 (Corunna) Battery The West
LARKHILL The Royal Regiment of Artillery The Royal Regiment of Artillery Midland
  Armoured AS90 SP 155mm Gun Battery Armoured AS90 SP 155mm Gun Battery Gunners
  19 (Gibraltar 1779-1783) Battery 159 (Colenso) Battery  
  The Royal Regiment of Artillery The Royal Regiment of Artillery  
  Armoured AS90 SP 155mm Gun Battery Armoured AS90 SP 155mm Gun Battery  
  205 Reserve Battery 269 Reserve Battery  
South Shields The Royal Regiment of Artillery The Royal Regiment of Artillery Leeds
  Reserve GMLRS Battery Reserve GMLRS Battery  
  A (Combat Services Support) Squadron  
  The Shropshire Yeomanry  
AIR DEFENCE 12TH REGIMENT, ROYAL ARTILLERY 12 RA
ARTILLERY T / HQ Battery (Shah Sujah’s Troop)  
  9 (Plassey) Battery 12 (Minden) Battery  
THORNEY The Royal Regiment of Artillery The Royal Regiment of Artillery  
ISLAND Starstreak HVM Air Defence Battery Starstreak HVM Air Defence Battery  
  58 (Eyre’s) Battery    
  The Royal Regiment of Artillery    
  Starstreak HVM Air Defence Battery    
  265 Reserve Battery    
London The Royal Regiment of Artillery    
  Reserve Starstreak HVM Air Defence Battery    
  A (Combat Services Support) Squadron  
  The South Nottinghamshire Hussars Yeomanry  
AIR DEFENCE 16TH REGIMENT, ROYAL ARTILLERY 16 RA
ARTILLERY 11 / HQ (Sphinx) Battery  
  14 (Cole’s Kop) Battery 20 Battery The London
THORNEY The Royal Regiment of Artillery The Royal Regiment of Artillery & Kent
ISLAND Rapier Air Defence Battery Rapier Air Defence Battery Gunners
  30 Battery (Roger’s Company) 32 (Minden) Battery  
  The Royal Regiment of Artillery The Royal Regiment of Artillery  
  Rapier Air Defence Battery Rapier Air Defence Battery  
  295 Reserve Battery 457 Reserve Battery  
   Portsmouth The Royal Regiment of Artillery The Royal Regiment of Artillery Southampton
  Reserve Rapier Air Defence Battery Reserve Rapier Air Defence Battery  
  A (Combat Services Support) Squadron  
  The Queen’s Own Dorset Yeomanry  
LIGHT 3RD REGIMENT, ROYAL HORSE ARTILLERY 3 RHA
ARTILLERY M / HQ Battery  
  C Battery D Battery The Liverpool
NORTHUMBERLAND          The Royal Horse Artillery The Royal Horse Artillery & Manchester
  Light 105mm Gun Battery Light 105mm Gun Battery Gunners
  J (Sidi Rezegh) Battery    
  The Royal Horse Artillery    
  Light 105mm Gun Battery    
  208 Reserve Battery 209 Reserve Battery  
Liverpool The Royal Regiment of Artillery The Royal Regiment of Artillery Manchester
  Reserve Light 105mm Gun Battery Reserve Light 105mm Gun Battery  
  A (Combat Services Support) Squadron  
  The Westmoreland & Cumberland Yeomanry  
LIGHT 4TH REGIMENT, ROYAL ARTILLERY 4 RA
ARTILLERY 94 / HQ Battery (New Zealand)  
  3 (Corunna) Battery 88 (Arracan) Battery The
TOPCLIFFE The Royal Regiment of Artillery The Royal Regiment of Artillery North-East
  Light 105mm Gun Battery Light 105mm Gun Battery Gunners
  97 Battery (Lawson’s Company)    
  The Royal Regiment of Artillery    
  Light 105mm Gun Battery    
  210 Reserve Battery 216 Reserve Battery  
Wolverhampton           The Royal Regiment of Artillery The Royal Regiment of Artillery Bolton
  Reserve Light 105mm Gun Battery Reserve Light 105mm Gun Battery  
  A (Combat Services Support) Squadron  
  The Northumberland Hussars Yeomanry  
LIGHT 7TH REGIMENT, ROYAL HORSE ARTILLERY 7 RHA
ARTILLERY H / HQ Battery (Ramsey’s Troop)  
  F (Sphinx) Parachute Battery G Parachute Battery (Mercer’s Troop) The
COLCHESTER The Royal Horse Artillery The Royal Horse Artillery Airborne
  Light 105mm Gun Battery Light 105mm Gun Battery Gunners
  I Parachute Battery (Bull’s Troop) V Parachute Battery (Beane’s Troop)  
  The Royal Horse Artillery The Royal Horse Artillery  
  Light 105mm Gun Battery Forward Observation Battery  
  206 Reserve Battery    
Newtonards The Royal Regiment of Artillery    
& Coleraine Reserve Light 105mm Gun Battery    
  E (Combat Services Support) Squadron  
  The Airborne Yeomanry  
LIGHT 29TH REGIMENT, ROYAL ARTILLERY 29 RA
ARTILLERY 23 / HQ Commando Battery (Gibraltar 1779-1783)  
  7 (Sphinx) Commando Battery 8 (Alma) Commando Battery The
PLYMOUTH The Royal Regiment of Artillery The Royal Regiment of Artillery Commando
  Light 105mm Gun Battery Light 105mm Gun Battery Gunners
  79 (Kirkee) Commando Battery 148 (Meiktila) Commando Battery  
  The Royal Regiment of Artillery The Royal Regiment of Artillery  
  Light 105mm Gun Battery Forward Observation Battery  
  207 Reserve Battery    
Glasgow The Royal Regiment of Artillery    
  Reserve Light 105mm Gun Battery    
  A (Combat Services Support) Squadron  
  The Army Commando Yeomanry  
ISTAR 5TH REGIMENT, ROYAL HORSE ARTILLERY 5 RHA
ARTILLERY Q / HQ Battery (Sanna’s Post)  
  K (Hondeghem) Battery 4/73 (Sphinx) Special Observation Battery The
CATTERICK The Royal Horse Artillery The Royal Regiment of Artillery Yorkshire
  Surveillance and Target Acquisition Battery Surveillance and Target Acquisition Battery Gunners
  P Battery (The Dragon Troop) 53 (Louisburg) Battery  
  The Royal Horse Artillery The Royal Regiment of Artillery  
  Surveillance and Target Acquisition Battery Surveillance and Target Acquisition Battery  
  Z Battery    
  The Royal Horse Artillery    
  Surveillance and Target Acquisition Battery    
  C (Combat Services Support) Squadron  
  The Yorkshire Dragoons Yeomanry (The Queen’s Own)  
ISTAR 32ND REGIMENT, ROYAL ARTILLERY 32 RA
ARTILLERY 46 / HQ Battery (Talavera)  
  18 (Quebec 1759) Battery 22 (Gibraltar 1779-1783)Battery  
LARKHILL The Royal Regiment of Artillery The Royal Regiment of Artillery  
  Surveillance and Target Acquisition Battery Surveillance and Target Acquisition Battery  
  57 (Bhurtpore) Battery    
  The Royal Regiment of Artillery    
  Surveillance and Target Acquisition Battery    
  211 Reserve Battery 217 Reserve Battery  
Cardiff The Royal Regiment of Artillery The Royal Regiment of Artillery Newport
  Reserve Surveillance and Target Acquisition Bty Reserve Surveillance and Target Acquisition Bty  
  A (Combat Services Support) Squadron  
  The Derbyshire Yeomanry  
ISTAR 47TH REGIMENT, ROYAL ARTILLERY 47 RA
ARTILLERY 31 / HQ Battery  
  10 (Assaye) Battery 21 (Gibraltar 1779-1783) Battery The Hampshire
LARKHILL The Royal Regiment of Artillery The Royal Regiment of Artillery & Sussex
  Surveillance and Target Acquisition Battery Surveillance and Target Acquisition Battery Gunners
  214 Reserve Battery 266 Reserve Battery  
Worcester The Royal Regiment of Artillery The Royal Regiment of Artillery Bristol
  Reserve Surveillance and Target Acquisition Bty Reserve Surveillance and Target Acquisition Bty  
  A (Combat Services Support) Squadron  
  The Sussex Yeomanry  
ISTAR THE HONOURABLE ARTILLERY COMPANY HAC
ARTILLERY HQ & Signals Squadron  
  The Gun Troop 1 Squadron  
CITY OF The Honourable Artillery Company The Honourable Artillery Company  
LONDON Reserve Ceremonial Gun Battery Reserve Surveillance and Target Acquisition Sqn  
  2 Squadron 3 Squadron  
  The Honourable Artillery Company The Honourable Artillery Company  
  Reserve Surveillance and Target Acquisition Sqn Reserve Surveillance and Target Acquisition Sqn  
  A (Combat Services Support) Squadron  
  The 1st London Yeomanry  
THE ARMY AIR CORPS
AIR 1ST REGIMENT, ARMY AIR CORPS 1 AAC
MOBILITY HQ & Signals Squadron  
  652 (Air Scout) Squadron 661 (Air Scout) Squadron  
RNAS The Army Air Corps The Army Air Corps  
YEOVILTON Air Reconnaissance Squadron (8 x Wildcat) Air Reconnaissance Squadron (8 x Wildcat)  
  670 Squadron 679 Reserve Squadron  
  The Army Air Corps The Army Air Corps Portsmouth &
  Ground Support Squadron Reserve Ground Support Squadron Middle Wallop
  A (Combat Services Support) Squadron  
  The Bedfordshire Yeomanry  
AIR 2ND REGIMENT, ARMY AIR CORPS 2 AAC
CAVALRY HQ & Signals Squadron  
  653 (Air Cavalry) Squadron 662 (Air Cavalry) Squadron  
AAC The Army Air Corps The Army Air Corps  
WATTISHAM Air Cavalry Squadron (8 x Apache) Air Cavalry Squadron (8 x Apache)  
  671 Squadron 676 Reserve Squadron  
  The Army Air Corps The Army Air Corps AAC Wattisham
  Ground Support Squadron Reserve Ground Support Squadron  
  A (Combat Services Support) Squadron  
  The Essex Yeomanry  
AIR 3RD REGIMENT, ARMY AIR CORPS 3 AAC
CAVALRY HQ & Signals Squadron  
  654 (Air Cavalry) Squadron 663 (Air Cavalry) Squadron  
AAC The Army Air Corps The Army Air Corps  
WATTISHAM Air Cavalry Squadron (8 x Apache) Air Cavalry Squadron (8 x Apache)  
  672 Squadron 677 Reserve Squadron  
  The Army Air Corps The Army Air Corps Bury St Edmonds
  Ground Support Squadron Reserve Ground Support Squadron Suffolk
  A (Combat Services Support) Squadron  
  The Hertfordshire Yeomanry  
AIR 4TH REGIMENT, ARMY AIR CORPS 4 AAC
CAVALRY HQ & Signals Squadron  
  656 (Air Cavalry) Squadron 664 (Air Cavalry) Squadron  
AAC The Army Air Corps The Army Air Corps  
WATTISHAM Air Cavalry Squadron (8 x Apache) Air Cavalry Squadron (8 x Apache)  
  673 Squadron 678 (Rifles) Reserve Squadron  
  The Army Air Corps The Army Air Corps Milton Keynes
  Ground Support Squadron Reserve Ground Support Squadron & Luton
  A (Combat Services Support) Squadron  
  The Leicestershire Yeomanry  
AIR 5TH REGIMENT, ARMY AIR CORPS 5 AAC
MOBILITY HQ & Signals Squadron  
  651 (Air Mobility) Squadron 665 (Air Mobility) Squadron  
AAC The Army Air Corps The Army Air Corps  
DISHFORTH Air Mobility Squadron (8 x Lynx AH9) Air Mobility Squadron (8 x Lynx AH9)  
  674 Squadron 675 (Rifles) Reserve Squadron  
  The Army Air Corps The Army Air Corps Taunton
  Ground Support Squadron Reserve Ground Support Squadron & Yeovil
  A (Combat Services Support) Squadron  
  The Lincolnshire Yeomanry  
Detached Squadrons
RAF

WADDINGTON

655 (Air Survey) Squadron 658 (Air Mobility) Squadron RAF

NORTHOLT

The Army Air Corps The Army Air Corps
Air Surveillance Squadron (8 x Defender AL2) Air Mobility Squadron (8 x Islander AL1)
RAF

ODIHAM

657 (Air Mobility) Squadron 659 (Air Scout) Squadron RNAS

YEOVILTON

The Army Air Corps The Army Air Corps
Air Mobility Squadron (8 x Lynx AH9) Air Reconnaissance Squadron (8 x Wildcat)
NB: 6 AAC & 7 AAC are AAC training regiments.  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

About The Author

102 Comments

  1. Jeneral28

    This plan sounds great but instead I would have one divisional HQ without any assigned units to act as a deployable, force management HQ like HQ 6th Division did in Afghanistan or Australia’s 1st Division

  2. Midlander

    Thanks for a really good post, gets you thinking about the way forward on organisation.
    Its difficult to know if radically different organisation designs have hidden problems and whether opting for tried and tested in combat approaches allows focus on training and kit delivering results.
    Can I say a terrible thing that might result in my immediate execution on TD, whats wrong with just having a USMC MEU joint operations structure and organisation and stop trying to reinvent the wheel.
    Running for cover……..

  3. The Limey

    The original use of ‘aviator’ was not for all pilots, but just for male pilots. The feminine equivalent is ‘aviatrix’. Of course, now that ‘actor’ has become acceptable for both males and females who walk the boards perhaps it is OK.

    Does having everything at Northwood not make a single point of failure to an extent that is dangerous?

  4. Tom

    Midlander – What makes you think that the USMC MEU / MAGTF system is any better that any other system?

    Re RAF OR rank – What’s wrong with Aircraftsman?

  5. Olga Edney

    A very detailed and interesting post. It’s a little difficult to follow the logic though without more explanation.

    On one minor aspect, only one role for SF is to come under military C2. Their more strategic role is to conduct discrete operations in direct support of the government, whether at home or abroad. Therefore, they cannot be subordinated to HQ UKDF.

  6. Observer

    Mid, lots of countries can’t emulate the USMC because the US works on a different scale than the rest of the planet. The reality is that they have an embarrassment of riches that they can work from, while the rest of us are working on a shoestring budget, so what works for them might not work for us, or even worse, we simply can’t afford it, LHAs for example, or an entire air wing dedicated to CAS.

    What we can do is to play to our strengths, which are small size, flexibility, the ability to upgrade technologically faster as we don’t have a whole fleet to upgrade and strategic decision making speed. Which in some ways are cons as well.

  7. Midlander

    Tom

    Your question is fair, what the MEU/MAGTF does well is jointery, which we have never really achieved consistently, especially air ground. The increasing focus on Littoral scenarios, urban scenarios both low and high tempo operations all push the need for mastering jointery with more complex systems to higher and higher levels with lower margins for error.

    Nothing is perfect including MEU/MAGTF but if we start from something which works rather than we dont know we stand a higher chance of winning and can adapt and improve using our experience. Prefer things to work and to win rather than not I guess.

    Could also serve as a common NATO approach but now Im saying seriously silly things. One observation remains is that NATO Europe spends far more on defence than our Eastern neighbour but gets little capability for all the spend.

  8. Midlander

    Observer

    Scale is an issue, but thats the beauty of it, it is fair to say that we in UK and NATO Europe are more MEU scale than MAGTF using the assets we have. The joint NATO formations involving Royal Marines and Netherlands Marines (for example) already go a little bit down this path anyway, im just suggesting for argument sake – why not consider a broader use of this idea.

  9. Topman

    Not too sure about having a shadow sqn for every sqn or splitting them down so the ranks make ‘sense’. If it makes more sense think of a Wingco running a Sqn as the right level for the unit. What the name of that rank is doesn’t really matter. Like everything else the Sqn has changed for all sorts of reasons, numbers of personnel, automatic promotion to Flt Lt (same as the army and navy do). I wouldn’t change the numbers of a sqn so the rank makes sense.

    I think sqn size suggested would be too small in any case. I can’t see how it would be efficent there would be a lot of duplication. Nor does one size fit all Sqn sizes aren’t all the same. Eg FJ sqns are different from SH Sqns.

  10. Observer

    Midlander, I disagree that the USMC does jointry better than the rest, the disconnect is there, just at a higher level than we are used to seeing. For example, they don’t play too well with the Army or Air Force, in essence, they are almost a totally separate entity from the other services. And if you use their CAS as an example, it is an example of what I pointed out earlier, an embarrassment of riches that they can have a totally separate army with its own air wing just to support them. It is not integration with their Air Force, but the exact opposite, a separation so that they do NOT need their Air Force.

  11. Midlander

    X gets it, look at the joint operation of co deployed and integrated air, ground and sea assets within the USMC.

    Observer

    The issue of scaleability is precisely what the MEU/MAGTF offers, you are right in saying we are more MEU than MAGTF. Also consider how easy it is to contruct a task force from modular units without creating artificial ready vs adaptable force complications, hopefully both can be ready and both can be adaptable.

    Also consider how some of our own units are going down this direction in a NATO context, example is the UK Royal Marines and Netherlands Marines amphibious group.

    There is something here at least making the argument for….

  12. Observer

    X, and where in that article does it show the interlink between the USMC’s aviation wing and the USAF? There isn’t one because the USMC is set up to be independent of the other services except the Navy, and even then, the link is tangential. It isn’t real “jointry” in the sense of where we have elements from other services integrating into the force structure.

    Midlander, possible. But since we don’t have a private air force like the USMC does, we’ll have to adapt instead (aka borrow from other services), which means an “air integration unit” so that air force assets can be slotted into an “MEU” for the scaling up you mentioned. Naval support, not so much. Reality is that I think the RM is closer to the RN, than the USMC is to the USN in the day to day stuff.

    Edit: I see the problem, you’re talking about “air-land integration” not “joint service”. The USMC is a joint service of itself. :)

  13. Brian Black

    My advice to anyone writing such articles would be to avoid cluttering the central theme with various petty peripheral topics.

    The article mentions renamed regiments, retitled RAF ranks, renumbed brigades, what to call the flyboys, and where to wear badges; and uses terms different to the Army’s own, such as heavy protected mobility becoming mechanized, and so on.

    Of course the RAF should use proper, normal, sensible ranks and badges. Proper army ranks, given that that’s where they originated. But all this is fluff which detracts from key themes.

    It’s an interesting structure. I also think that the possibility of the Adaptive Force becoming a second class army against the Reaction Force is a real risk.

    The plan suggested here seems to see a less prominent role for the army reserve than the Army’s own 2020 plan. So what of the reserve numbers with this structure?

    I notice the idea to keep C130 in order to keep A400 nice and safe. Everything we buy is expensive, and all military equipment is expected to face risk. We buy stuff to use it. We’re not parking up our shiny new billion quid destroyers while keeping the old tubs floating; nor are we keeping the old tankers flying so we can keep Voyager’s windscreen free of bugs. Atlas is the replacement; that’s what it should do.

  14. Chris

    BB – ref C-130 – there would be obvious savings in retiring all C-130s from UK service, in that all the support burden can switch off. Equally obvious is that A400M will be a more expensive bit of kit to use – bigger, heavier, more powerful engines make for more AVTUR per flying mile, but also bigger more complicated spares allied to a smaller customer base will up the support cost. There will be a complicated sum being done somewhere trying to work out if flogging the remaining Hercs to exhaustion in parallel with the new Airbus will be more economic than buying more Airbuses to provide all airlift capacity required and dispensing with the Herc support cost.

    I don’t know what the answer is, but I can see arguments both ways.

    Also the A400M is I presume more demanding on airfield area – longer runways, wider clearances around runway & taxiways etc. And its tactical approach/landing & take-off roll/climb may not match the pretty impressive performance of the C-130, and for that alone certain elements of the UK forces might want to keep a few handy.

  15. Observer

    One of the biggest things I regret with regards to Afghanistan and Iraq is the current confusion of roles between the Army and the Constabulary. After the initial entry, military units were left to maintain order and to fight a COIN campaign that would have been better suited to a properly equipped constabulary force. This has led to a large segment of armed forces leaning towards a force designed for COIN and not warfare. Worst thing of all? Armies are still not the best tool for COIN operations. To stop an insurgency, you need a lot more than firepower, you need the powers of an executive government.

    “Adaptive force” sounds so much nicer than “occupation army”.

  16. Phil

    There is no good reason why a tried and tested RSM or CSM should have to salute a 2Lt and call him ‘Sir’.

    Hmmmmm. He salutes the Commission. And I doubt you’d find many CSMs, RSMs who would welcome such an official change. Subbies soon learn their place in relation to WO2s and WO1s.

  17. All Politicians are the Same

    @Phill

    “Hmmmmm. He salutes the Commission. And I doubt you’d find many CSMs, RSMs who would welcome such an official change. Subbies soon learn their place in relation to WO2s and WO1s.”

    Totally agree and the manner in which Junior Officers deal with SNCOs and earn their respect is a huge learning experience which benefits them massively. More Senior Officers are always watching how it develops.
    The first time a WO2/WO1 salutes a “Subby” or calls them Sir/Maam and means it is a huge moment in the education and development of any Officer.

  18. Martin R

    Thank you for the comments so far (18.23 Saturday). I will try and be brief in my responses.
    Jeneral 28 – You could indeed do as you suggest but I think that having units permanently assigned to a divisional headquarters means the GOC gets to know the people who will work for him before they deploy.
    Midlander – The USMC is indeed an excellent fighting force but I doubt that we could afford to follow in their footsteps. I would prefer to leave that discussion for when you write a post about your ideas.
    The Limey – Amelia Erhart was an aviatrix but that was way back when. I doubt that the term would be acceptable now. As for having a single point of failure the answer is to have alternate headquarters (High Wycombe, etc) that are able to take over.
    Tom – There is nothing wrong with aircraftsman but there is no generic term for people in the RAF, whereas the Navy has sailor and the Army has soldier.
    Olga – Sorry about the logic; there is nothing I can say. As for the SF they are still part of the Armed Forces whatever they might get up to. The CDS would be the CINCUKDF’s boss.
    Topman – I am not talking about shadow squadrons. My understanding is that a flying squadron consists of a number of flights, each commanded by a squadron leader – a FJ squadron has two flights each with 6 aircraft. All I am suggesting is that the flights are called squadrons and the present squadrons are called wings. I am not suggesting that the unit is broken up. The number of squadrons in the RAF gets smaller every year and famous numbers are disappearing. If the RAF is happy with that fine but I would rather as many as possible remained.
    Brian Black – I suppose that I could have submitted a number of posts, each one covering a different point, but I did not. I was trying to cover the whole subject in one go. But I take your point. Where RAF ranks are concerned I agree that Lord Trenchard and his chums should have stuck to Army ranks but they did not. If an officer is called a wing commander then logically he or she should command a wing, not a squadron. One of the problems with the Adaptable Force is that it also has a name problem. It is Adaptable in ‘Transforming the British Army – 2012 and 2013’ but I have heard senior officers on Armed Forces News referring to it as ‘Adaptive’ as you have. As for the Army Reserves I have included all the units in the various MOD publications talking about the changes. Where the Atlas is concerned I agree but think that the smaller C130 would be better at delivering troops into harm’s way. I like to protect my taxes.
    Chris – Thank you for your comments on the A400/C130.
    Phil and All Politicians are the Same – I spent nine years in the Army in the 1960s, three of them as a sergeant in sergeants’ messes in Borneo, Singapore and the UK. I can never remember my senior mess-mates enthusing about saluting junior officers, quite the reverse in fact. The ‘saluting the commission not the officer’ cop-out was used then but was not accepted by those doing the saluting. No doubt you approach this from a different direction.

  19. Allan

    “Times have changed and the rank structure should also be changed in all three services. WO1s should equate to Capts; WO2s to Lts; and SSgts to 2Lts. The WOs and SSgts would, I am sure, prefer to remain in the WO and Sgts’ Mess, rather than move to the Officers’ Mess.”

    Apologies, if I’ve missed something but isn’t that how the US forces ‘rank’ and operate their Warrant Officers?

  20. All Politicians are the Same

    @ Allan

    No that is not how the US work, they have things called CWO or Chief Warrant Officers who do indeed rank above Cadets and Middies but below an OF1. it allows them to take command of technical or SF type detachments or become high level specialist advisors on staff without having to go through OCS and gain a commission.

  21. Observer

    Beyond the point of rank inflation, in theory, the things officers focus on should take priority over the things non-coms should focus on. Officers are supposed to focus on the bigger picture while NCOs are supposed to focus on the execution of specifics. If you let an NCO override an officer that is looking at the big picture, you end up with a sub-unit that may be taking action that is at odds with the overall action plan or actions that are meaningless because it was not coordinated with the parent unit and could not be exploited.

    OTOH, there are some officers who can’t let go and end up being overpaid sergeants.

  22. Michael Wheatley

    ‘…To stop an insurgency, you need a lot more than firepower, you need the powers of an executive government.

    “Adaptive force” sounds so much nicer than “occupation army”.’

    …now that is an interesting take on the new structure – more civilians/reservists in the “adaptive force” might well make them better suited for the, ah, Constabulary role.
    But I also agree that COIN needs the strong involvement of the executive.

    Are there any thoughts on “NATO Viceroys” or the like, to take ownership of the job of managing an occupied territory?
    (Or, so as to demonstrate democracy in action, have two such executives, and the locals get to vote for which of these foreign executives they want – the other acts as the “loyal opposition”, to demonstrate how that works.)

  23. Obsvr

    Mostly nonsense as far as land forces go.

    No value in more HQs and smaller units. I’d also suggest that with a extreme sharia position being adopted in Brunei that UK should stop stationing a Gurkha battalion there and disband the Gurkhas entirely (including those in RE and R Sigs).

    ISTAR and UAS are not the same thing.

    There are already too many RHA regts, creating more merely dilutes and defeats the purpose of RHA, also RHA batteries are always lettered never numbered.

    The reason for observation batteries in field regts is to provide a tactical group for the fifth manoeuvre unit in the brigade.

    The relationship between junior officers and SNCOs/WOs is well established and works satisfactorily. Those involved understand it. 2Lts are senior to WO1s, they just get paid a heck of a lot less (WO1 pay roughly equals a Major) and have very different roles. WOs are extremely good at ‘managing’ subalterns.

  24. Observer

    Obsvr, I do disagree that just because Brunei is implementing Sharia law, you cut all ties with it. That is simply burning your bridges out of pique. If you cut all ties, it may look nice, make you feel nice, like you’re actually doing something, but the reality is that once you do that, you no longer have any control or influence over the situation. People listen more towards advice from friends than from total strangers that posture and bluster. If you are on friendly terms with them and let it be known that you are worried for the potential for abuse in such a system, they are more likely to slow down or adjust the severity of punishment than if you start tossing sanctions and pissing them off.

    This is also not considering their situation. They are a very well off people with a fairly high standard of living, you do not often get starving people over there needing to steal to survive, so there is really no cause to commit crimes, provided that the really helpless are given a way out. Then all that is left are the crimes of mischief and unfortunately there is no cure for stupid.

  25. Obsvr

    Gurkhas are now the same if not more expensive than British troops. It just needs an excuse to get rid of them. The are also over rated, they are not the super soldiers the British media believes. Having fought alongside Gurkha, British and Australian infantry I’m allowed to say that.

  26. Observer

    Obsvr, I know. Lots of times, their duties are mostly ceremonial. I meet them often during training too. However, their history is something we really should respect, and that is why we retain them. Not because of what they can do, but because of what they have done.

    Besides, you worry too much. Give Nepal a bit longer and as they develop, the supply of Gurkhas will dry up.

  27. oldreem

    Coming late to this post, am going back some way.

    Re. airman/aviator: when REME started recruiting women the early intakes were asked whether they wanted to be called ‘Craftsman’, ‘Craftswoman’ or anything else (‘Craftsperson’??). They wisely voted for ‘Craftsm’n’ – some time before Actresses became Actors. Isn’t ‘Airm’n’ the simplest generic? ‘Aviator’ suggests piloting, or at least flying, which the great majority of RAF people (understandably) don’t. And it’s 4 syllables rather than 2.

    Re. the old chestnut of slashing ‘star’ count: as others have said, it’s the pay that matters. The 2013 Annual Report on Senior Salaries says, “We remain concerned that the overall reward package for senior officers may no longer be sufficient to ensure enough officers of the highest quality in more junior ranks set their sights on reaching 2-star rank and beyond.” A lot has changed since the days of “Usually Kipping, Local Fishing” – I get the impression that senior people in Army HQ at least are pretty busy. Smaller forces produce diseconomies of scale, both in representational posts and in the range of tasks still to be done (unless some are removed), and processes and procedures, like the kit, tend towards greater complexity, not less. That is not to try and defend every existing senior post, but to look beyond shallow soundbites. And operational commanders need someone to keep politicians and 24/7 media off their backs.

  28. Allan

    Speaking as a total outsider….before the most learned commetators on here get way too technical for me, wouldn’t it be much better to address the following questions:

    (A) How much cash is on the table for HM Forces?
    (B) What is the best way to spend that cash to achieve what HM Forces is expected to do?

    Then ‘chop and change’ as required. I’m just looking in but is it really that important to have so many bases in the UK and so many major headquarters establishments?

    It’s just that for the foreseeable future, there isn’t going to be much cash on the table and I thought HM Forces would want as much of that going to the cutting edge. Would perhaps fewer but bigger units not be of more use concentrated on fewer bases?

    I just thought that might make the logistics a bit easier to manage and a bit cheaper too.

  29. Gloomy Northern Boy

    @Obsvr – On the Gurkha front, it’s either your call or Joanna Lumley’s :-) …and more seriously we need tough straightforward Infantry and already recruit all over the Commonwealth to maintain an adequate supply of same; why fix what ain’t bust? With @Obsever on Brunei for that matter…

    GNB

  30. TAS

    MartinR,

    Sorry, I’m lost. As phenomenally detailed as this post is (and obviously reflects a significant amount of research), what is your point regarding the current structure? I hate to say it, but I got lost and switched off after a few paragraphs as well – too much detail and some rather silly points about uniforms and salutes, as well as change for the sake of change.

    The current system has three separate Armed Service HQ’s and the Permanent Joint HQ. Navy people are better at Navy tasks than Army people, repeat ad nauseum for the other Services. So where single-Service operations are concerned, there is no need for them to be Joint at the Operational level.

    PJHQ is not blind to single Service deployments and, where the need for Joint ops is concerned, delegates authority through the most appropriate Theatre Commander (for established ops, such as UKMCC and UKACC). The individual deployed elements are perfectly capable of operating Jointly at the Theatre Operational level, with the planners back in PJHQ developing the contingency plans and linking current Operations with the long-term strategic overview.

    What’s missing at the moment is a deep ingrained understanding of Jointery across the individual Services that would enable better planning and foresight in the use of Joint enablers when contingencies arise. That’s not going to happen by reorganising people into nice neat blocks with new titles. The best possible way ahead is allow the current structure to grow and evolve, as we continue to explore new ways to operate Jointly and educate our personnel through an excellent selection of Joint planning and concept courses (many of which are well-established and of exceptional quality).

    What we have now is a good system. I also can affirm that we do Jointery significantly better than anyone else at the moment, including the Americans, so I’m not inspired to follow anybody else’s model.

  31. TAS

    BB, lets not forget that the RAF came from both the Royal Naval Air Service and the Royal Flying Corps. A blend of both Army and Navy ranks seems perfectly reasonable.

  32. Observer


    *cough*
    unified rank structure here…
    Except for Commodore-Admiral, which is more or less similar to Brigadier-General. We just treat it as the same thing said in a navy sort of way. Like port for left, starboard for right and the head for toilets.

  33. MartinR

    Obsr – Thank you for your comments on 1 June 14.
    Most of the nonsense was taken from the official publications: Transforming the British Army 2012 & 2013; Summary of Army 2020 Reserve structure & the Royal Artillery website.
    All I have suggested is that the Major Units be rearranged (not made smaller), mainly so that the Adaptable Force cavalry regiments and infantry battalions are placed in deployable brigades, rather than regional brigades. I also suggest that Reserve squadrons, companies and batteries are placed under Regular Major Units in order to achieve greater integration. There are not enough Reserve Major Units to pair with all Regular Major Units.
    Where ISTAR is concerned 5 Regt RA, which according to the web-site has four lettered batteries – K, P, Q & Z – and two numbered batteries, is a surveillance and target acquisition regiment (i.e. the STA in ISTAR). 32 Regt RA and 47 Regt RA fly Unmanned Air Systems which have a deep battlefield surveillance capability, which beam back real time video and thermal imagery which is turned into intelligence (i.e. the I and S in ISTAR). No doubt they also help with Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance.
    As for the Gurkhas I understand that the Brunei government pays for the battalion to be in Brunei and allows us to carry out jungle training in its country. I have also always understood that 1 & 2 RGR are good infantry battalions and see no reason why I should change my views just because you don’t like them. I also have no interest in the internal affairs of Brunei.
    TAS – Thank you for your interesting comments on 1 June at 3.43pm. I am sorry that I lost you and irritated you with saluting and aviators, which have ruffled a few feathers, which I am not sorry about. You consider that everything is OK and that no changes are needed, which is reassuring.
    I am not sure that you are right and consider that more should be done to get the three services to work even closer together. For example the Transforming the British Army publications do not mention the role of 3 Commando Brigade. They are not in the Army but are important Land Forces, even if they do go to work by sea, as indeed may the heavier elements of the Army. Rest assured that if I post again on this or any other subject I will try to keep my post short.

  34. TAS

    MartinR,

    I think it will help to keep it pithy. But what I did not say is it’s all OK – we need to do a lot more. The blank-sheet approach you are proposing will be so disruptive and difficult to implement that it would likely do more harm than good. Remember that you are dealing with people, with ingrained attitudes, mindsets and their own ideas on how things should be. Far better to evolve towards true Joint Forces – you gain so much more. If you tell me that people should just lump it and do as they are told, I’d ask you to name one example of when that approach has ever worked on this scale.

    I personally believe that we have to evolve more towards three true Services. Sailors for Navy, aviators for Air Force and people with little shooty things for Army. Make each Service truly embody their area of responsibility – land, maritime and air. Is it not odd that the Navy and Army have their own air corps? Why does the Army operate Watchkeeper and 17 Port and Maritime? Why do the RAF Regiment exist? Re-draw the boundaries that way and then see how Joint we can become.

    3Cdo are effective as they are. It makes no difference whose budget they come under. Take away their distinctiveness, however, and you destroy the ethos and thus the formation, and end up with just another bunch of soldiers.

  35. Phil

    Spent a couple of weeks with the Gurkhas at the start of my last tour. I was bloody glad I didn’t have to put up with them for 7 months. Now I believe that they are excellent at enduring being cold, wet and miserable and I wouldn’t want one jumping into my fire-trench but from what I saw, admitedly of one sub-unit of one battalion – everything in between being cold and miserable and jumping into trenches they are shocking at. You should have seen the shit-state of the FOB at the start of tour and the new CSM dropping to his knees and rending his garments when he opened ISO containers.

  36. Jeneral28

    TAS and Martin,

    I don’t mind the army having a Port and Maritime unit. WWII saw the usage of such a unit. It helps both the RM (which will be inefficient if it has that) and the British Army.

    What I don’t get the the joint RAF-FAA control over a strike aircraft (F-35, Harrier or any future strike aircraft) and the the single service control over key component–Apache (Army) ASW/Troop/ASuW (Navy) and then large transport (RAF). If joint is bout efficiency and knowledge, then join all the elements up. Why should only the key strike aircraft be under joint? Or for that matter, the key strike helicopter controlled by the Army ?

    Agree the RAF Regiment is a “funny” unit. Now if 2 Squadron RAF Regt joints 16 AA (Not using Martin’s plan but the Army 2020) then not so bad. But right now, its role is dubious.

    MPA is a must but I would like it to veer towards Navy Command control. Or if people love the joint idea, joint-RAF-FAA again.

    But my main point is the join stuff. Either join all aviation assets or split them up into their proper role.

    I suggest:

    Army: Apache, Lynx Wildcat, Chinook, Puma & at least one Squadron of C-130, Watchkeeper
    Navy: Part of the pool of F-35B (FAA pilots only), Lynx Wildcat, Merlin Mk2 nd Mk4, MPA Scan Eagle/MQ-Triton
    RAF: The bulk of F-35Bs (RAF pilots only), Typhoon or its replacement, C-17, ISTAR, AWACS

  37. Red Trousers

    Re saluting, and the relationship between junior officers and very senior WOs.

    I recall very clearly being tremendously saluted by the RSM of my Regiment about 3 days after I was commissioned. A perfect “Eyes left” salute, except I was on the right of him. Quite correct attitude. I also knew that my every transgression and silly decision was dutifully reported to him by my Troop Sergeant, so he had the measure of me. By chance, his wife had a flat tyre one day in the Naafi car park in Herford and I swapped over her wheel for her, which he was forced to admit a “thank you, Sir”.

    That same RSM himself obtained a Late Entry Commission about two years later, by which time I’d got my knees muddy as a junior officer and held the dizzying rank of Lieutenant, which we now shared. I happened to be near the front door of the Mess on the first day of his Commission, and welcomed him to the Mess. “Good morning Keith, welcome”, with a big smile, as he really deserved his LE Commission. It felt weird to me and probably to him. We became good friends. He helped me out with understanding the boys, I helped him out with Regimental politics as an officer.

    Thirty years later, we are still friends and meet up about monthly in a pub to gossip. Me always late and apologetic for tardiness, he always immaculate in inappropriately pressed jeans. He is now fully retired and professes admiration for my ideas about making big money in business, he keeps me a bit grounded with stories about how I managed to throw a track from my wagon over an electric fence or caused a Regimental Replen to be shot up by OPFOR on an exercise because I managed to enter it from the wrong direction. And on the only occasion that I attracted the selector’s eye after an operational tour with a bit of silverware he was the first person among anyone to send me a signal of congratulations.

    IMO, that is how it should be. Respect on both sides.

  38. Brian Black

    I think we could get by without Brunei. They might pay for the battalion’s basing costs, but we’re still left with the tab for recruiting, equipping, and paying pensions. They should hire their own mercenaries.

    Brunei is not the only jungle training site either. We cut the rest of the army’s Belize training to focus on Iraq and Afghanistan. We could send troops to train with the French in French Guyana, or elsewhere; or even in Brunei still, just not based there.

    Cut the Brunei garrison and we could lose the battalion without too much pain. It’s not like we haven’t got lots of other stuff to spend the money on.

    And if shedding one Gurkha battalion, it would perhaps be logical to draw a line under the Gurkha era altogether. If we didn’t have Brunei to worry about, we’d only need one battalion to replace the two Gurkha battalions; and remember, we’re still laying off British soldiers and cutting British units. I think 2RRF are the next to vanish this summer.

  39. Brian Black

    If we were going to rejig the army, perhaps we should cut a few more units.

    The Warsaw Pact has long gone; the NATO border has moved eastwards beyond East Germany and Poland; we’re in a pretty secure position. The Poles have stated that territorial defence is their primary military concern; and the Germans like to keep much of their large army at home; no one is going to creep an army up on England any time soon.

    A lot’s been made of the army cuts; but the combined army of 2020 is near as damn it the same size as in 2010, and not so far off the army of the late ’90s. Rather than cutting the actual army numbers, the government and ministry think they can keep a 100k+ army cheaply by cutting housing and pensions and so on, by making greater use of reserves.

    Is that hundred thousand a relevant or just a psychological number though? Perhaps the 82,000 of the 2020 regular force is about what we should be aiming for. Relegate the reserve back to providing resilience to the regulars, and cut their numbers down.

    Counting up the regular infantry and cavalry in the 2020 force, there are thirty units across ten brigades. That’s not including paratroops, garrison or public duties battalions, or tanks, or the Marines. Surely for a country under no threat of invasion, without imperial ambitions, and without the stomach for occupation, we should be able to make do with that.

  40. Observer

    BB, I don’t think you’re in Brunei to worry about anything, that’s a very secure area. You’re just there to train.

    I never had the fortune? misfortune? to end up in Brunei for training, but from the people who went there, training there is in a class by itself. Somewhere along the lines of “where the hell are we now??!!” dense vegetation and at night, you can’t see your hand in front of your face without a torch.

  41. martin

    @ Observer – I’m pretty sure we are in Brunei because there is a giant Shell operation there, but as that dry’s up I can’t see much point in staying unless Brunei is willing to pay the full cost of operations.

    While the Gurkha’s do have a rich history many of the UK regiments we are cutting have a far greater one. The Gurkha’s have become to expensive and arguably ineffective as using mercenary forces brings up a host of complications.

    So a cut to Brunei and I would also argue for a serious look at forces based in Cyprus. I understand the Airbase although as we learned with action in Libya and potential use in Syria the politics of the situation may well make having a airfield in Cyprus a waste of time. But I don’t see the need to have a large British Army presence on the Island. If the airfield needs guarding then give the job to the RAF Regiment.

    I would deffinatly consider using any money saved from shutting down old colonial post to basing units in Poland or the Baltic’s as they are requesting. Moving armoured brigades to these areas is probably to expensive and too inflamatory with the Russians at this stage but a couple of light infantry battalions should not ruffle too many feathers but would send a strong message of support to our Eastern Allies and its bound to piss off Putin which is a big plus in my book.

  42. Observer

    martin, Brunei IS paying for the unit there. However, if you want to cull the Gurkha units from your organization, you have to ante up a UK unit to be sent there instead for training or you are going to lose your jungle specialists.

  43. jedibeeftrix

    the problem with that inconvenient little unit in brunei is that it is in exactly the place we want to be in the next 25 years.

    it is in the heart of economic and social upheaval that will affect the course of the whole world.
    it is in the heart of the FPDA through which we might hope to influence this world upheaval.
    it is a graphic statement of our commitment to taking an active part, our skin in the game if you will.
    it is the logical conclusion of our string-of-pearls from gib/cypress/quatar/oman/diego/singapore/brunei.
    it is a cultural statement of relevance to the region in keeping ghurka units, not foreign ‘colonials’.

    Quite frankly, for all the seeming inconvenience it is one of the last savings I would try to make!

  44. jedibeeftrix

    If we aren’t interested in maintaining a presence in the far east of all places then we are basically saying that this is the end of Britain’s “Missionary Foreign Policy” and that it is time to become a ‘normal’ european power.

    At that point we can expect an army of five brigades, a frigate navy of a dozen units, and five squadrons of eurofighter for QRA and Article5.

    If you are still wanting to talk about the relevance of Ghurkas then, I shall be amazed!

  45. Brian Black

    Oberver, the Army’s wider jungle training was slashed to accomodate the recent dusty wars; I would expect to see a return to more multi-environment training when we’ve wrapped up Afghanistan.

    Keeping an irrelevance because it’s a discounted irrelevance isn’t a good idea. We should have given up Brunei when we handed HK back to Red China. The Brunei garrison is there largely for the prestige of the Sultan.

    One of the key benefits to retaining the brigade of Gurkhas is that we can keep a battalion someplace shitty, Foreign Legion style. With today’s strategic background, that inclement shit’ole should surely be in Africa or the Arctic, not Brunei.

    If you don’t want to give up the Gurkhas, let me suggest something different:
    Give up the Brunei garrison.
    The Gurkhas take on the standing mountain and arctic warfare role from the Marines, which would surely suit them better anyway.
    Base that battalion in northern Norway, Canada, Alaska, or elsewhere according to agreement with our allies.
    Reduce 3CDO to two commandos covering the amphibious role only; shifting the other unit to the SF brigade in the fashion of 1PARA.
    We then have a permanent arctic force; and the enlarged SF group would be better able to maintain regional forward presence, proactive rather than reactive. Perhaps with operational company sized groups in east and west Africa, and partnering our French and American allies that already keep forces in those areas.

    That would be a change from a prestige presence in the far east, to a strategic and operational presence in the arctic and Africa.

  46. Observer

    … which is the exact opposite direction of your strategic interests BB. You know how much of your stuff comes from China, Taiwan or other places East? And unlike America, you can’t cut a corner and ship through the Pacific!

    What are you shipping in from the Arctic? Snow? There is bloody nothing for you in the Arctic. And everything for you in the Pacific. 7% of your imports come in from there. More than even the amount of imports from the US. Keep that in mind.

    And “multi-environment training” that somehow excludes the jungle? Pardon me but isn’t the jungle an “environment”? Or do you think you can simulate a jungle with cardboard trees?

    If you don’t want the Gurkhas, no big deal, the supply would dry out once Nepal industrializes, but abandoning your eastern presence isn’t a wise thing. You got your priorities backwards. It’s not the Gurkhas that are critical, it is the Brunei garrison and training area.

    Jedi, very true. Most of Asia in reality isn’t modernized yet, if they can get their act together, it is going to be a huge market. In preparation for this, our international airport is planning to double the current capacity to accommodate the expected increasing affluence and increase in air travel from these areas. Not something that happens now, but give it 20-50 years.

  47. Martin

    @ observer – Do we need a jungle training base?

    it’s been a while since we have had any action in a jungle.

    You would no better than me so I will ask you what impact does the Brunei Garrison and jungle traing base have on the FPDA?

    Would a locally based frigate or some Typhoon’s be better?

    @ Jedi

    I think the UK has already made it clear it does not wish to have much of a foreign foot print. If we are going to have a naval and airbase as well as land forces in the Far East the fine but a loan battalion with no support is hardly making a statement in the region.

  48. Observer

    Martin, you have to ask your budget that. A frigate and/or Typhoon squadron is better. Can you get the government to agree to pry out the funding for it? Remember, your Brunei garrison is paid for by Brunei, so it is technically free. Personally, I predict that we’ll be seeing you guys soon. there is a regional crisis center being set up, and I suspect the RN is going to be a rather interested participant. Helps them with their “relevancy”.

    As for jungle training, take a look at the map. If China gets proddy, naval warfare isn’t the only thing that is in the cards, there is still a jungle border between Vietnam and China for the potential to cause trouble, or open up a 2nd front to pressure the Chinese.

    Funny stories from the jungle training cadre that they related to me, when we first started training there, for river crossings, the boat safety monitors would toss thunderflashes into the water to scare off crocs. These days, the crocs are so used to the bangs that they would start gathering when they heard the “pop”. Never did deploy to Brunei, I did my survival training tests on our offshore islands.

  49. Obsvr

    @ BB, we think the same way on the Gurkhas, as for jungle, well Observer may be a bit too far from the Caribbean but they have jungle there, hence Belize being the jungle training facility for some time. Alternatively I’m sure that somewhere like Sierra Leone would be happy to host a jungle trg centre, Kenya doesn’t have any problems with providing bush training and if desert training was required a deal with the Omanis would probably be a runner.

    I also think the existing command split is right, PJHQ deals with operations and deployments. The functional commands deal with the rest, most importantly with training, both regular and TA/Res, not forgetting the large extent of the Army’s training organisation, basic training, arms and services schools running courses with great variation in length.

    Then there’s NATO, reducing the military committee member to 3* doesn’t seem one of the better ideas, not forgetting that in due course it will again be UK’s turn to hold the chair (last was FM Dick Vincent in the 80s). The there’s the missing HQ, the ARRC, a UK 3* command with a German 2* CoS, as the framework nation UK makes significant contribution to the HQ including at least 1 sigs regt IIRC (maybe more, it will be remembered that HQ 1 (BR) Corps had 7 & 22 Signals Regts to provide its comms).

  50. Jeneral28

    It’s not like the Gurkhas in Brunei sit idle and get paid by the Sultan there. They’ve have some defence engagement excercises in the region with the Kiwis for example. And in the 2004/5 Tsunami, they were deployed though refused by the Indonesians.

    And if you don’t want them there, the UK loses a large footprint really East of Suez. EoS in my view is not just the Gulf.

  51. Jeneral28

    Why does the UK need an 1* and 2* in Cyprus? Might as well cut the 1* if you want to save costs and deploy him back home or remove him. Besides MENA engagement and conflict, there’s no real call to have 2 senior generals there.

    And the Household Division. Does it really need 2 Guard units there all the time? Should push one of them into on of the deployable AF units to balance it out.

    It is Best to have 1* all over and at worst the 2* in Cyprus–but make him work. I in fact would want to elevate the BIOT role from Commander to Captain and improve the role of BIOT/DG. Singapore logistics base to remain but the DA there controlling the Brunei Garrison (if you want to save costs).

  52. Martin

    @ Observer

    we just let Russia invade Ukraine with barley a whimper, can’t see us fighting China in the jungles of SE Asia.

    With so many fires to fight in our immediate neck of the woods ME and NA not to mention Eastern Europe I don’t know if we can afford to do much in the Far East. As you say the Sultan pays for the garrison in Brunei so maybe its worth keeping from that point but I think if we are going to do something it should be done right like the FI with forward army, navy and RAF units deployed.

    Also giving SE Asian nations a further excuse to duck out on providing their own security might not be a good idea. Malaysia was pretty happy to see the back of us just as the Philippines was happy to see the back of the USA. Now they are all crying out for western military support because they want us to be the bad guys and let them keep all the Chinese business. None of them other than Singapore have much to offer militarily either.

    maybe its time for ASEAN to either accept its part of China’s sphere of influence and role over on mineral rights in the S China sea or take a collective stand and tell them to go f**k themselves. China is a big country but ASEAN is massive especially if combined with the likes of Japan and Korea.

    I don’t know why the USA bothers so much with the region and I am getting the impression that in five to ten years they will do a deal with China to leave for an easy life.

  53. Jeneral28

    @Martin UK presence in Brunei is not to attack China or side with US. It’s very important in Defence Engagement–see Hammond’s speech at IISS/Shangri-la Dialogue. Gurkha or regular troops or reservists it gives excellent training ground and a strategic depth for MOOTW–operations other than war–the Tsunami is a good eg. FPDA exercises–which are NO less important than NATO or ME deployments.

    Finding areas to ut doesn’t mean sacrificing engagement. Belize is almost gone that’s fine. Africa may be a place for jungle but it is unstable and not all terrain is jungle. Brunei offers depth, location and good basing.

    SE nations are not ducking out due to the Brunei Garrison. SEA nations besides Malaysia have strong armed forces. Brunei is a critical ad Cyprus is. And neither is it like Cyprus with 1* and 2* sitting there.

    If you don’t know there are RAF staff in RMAF Butterworth and RN staff in Singapore/Malaysia. British Army staff as well. So there is a UK presence in the region but not to deter China. It’s for defence engagement as much as there are troops in Cyprus.

    Don’t sacrifice one area for another. I could equally say the conflict in Afghanistan was just as useless.

  54. Observer

    Well, the opinion on Subic Bay was that it was an accident. Marcos tried to up the rental on the place by using popularist pressure in Parliament. It backfired when the US agreed to the increased rent…. but the overly stoked up Parliament couldn’t be brought to agree any more.

    Malaya, we went through this once. The British were blamed, rightly or wrongly, for the disastrous military situation in WWII, so before that, the status quo of the “White Man’s Burden” was semi-accepted when white supremacy was seen as a fact of life, but post WWII, it was hard to argue for white supremacy when they got their arse handed to them on a platter by barbaric Japanese. It may have been a bit worse because the area was bypassed in the fighting to hit the Japanese Home Islands themselves because the view from the common man was that of a British defeat, but with no British victory to counterbalance it. Remember that post WWII, there were calls for local autonomy that were never there before, the prevailing view then was “Well, we couldn’t muck it up worse than they did!” Honesty compels me to admit that it was not only Malaysia that was glad to see the British gone at that time. And the British were also glad to go. Same thing then as now. Budget.

  55. Jeneral28

    The UK’s footprint in SEA is viable and much smaller than even the Falklands or Cyprus. So I don’t see why it should be cut. Meanwhile as I said, the Household Division hold one Guard Regiment too many while the whole AF and even RF is a haywire jigsaw.

    As much as I dont agree, Sir H or pinstripedline has posted past articles a good rationale for UK presence in SEA. And again, the Gurkha presence in Brunei does not displace the defence spending in the region or that country.

    If I see it correctly, the vast amount of UK overseas deployments skew towards the MENA region and Africa. Excluding the Falklands, it is pretty large compared to the staff in SEA for FPDA and engagement and the Brunei Garrison.

    The Cyprus forces can easily sway back towards any European and Africanconflict with the SEA deployments are crucial for engagement.

  56. Jeneral28

    As for Ukraine I dont see the correlation with UK forces in the SEA doing jungle training and letting Russia slip into Ukraine. UK Forces are in fact still in Europe–so why haven’t they deterred Russian aggression? There are the Cyprus battalions and Forces, yet Russia is building up its presence in the Med? Just because the troops in one area appear to be doing nothing doesn’t mean that you should cut or withdraw them. The enduring Afghanistan operation is a more likely reason why the UK and NATO ignored the Ukrainian crisis. And in any case, there is no legal treaty to deploy UK troops to stop the annexing of Crimea unless you want all out war.

  57. Martin

    @ Jeneral28

    I’m all for defence engagement but these days one has to ask what the benefit is for the UK from the FPDA area. Middle East countries are prepared to pony up billions to buy Typhoon. I can’t think of any recent UK orders coming from FPDA countries. Singapore did not like Typhoon and Malaysia buys Russian. AUS and NZ are pretty tied up with the USA and no one seems to care much about us out there.

    With such small forces are we not better off focusing our engagement in areas that have a direct benefit to us

  58. Jeneral28

    Defence engagement in the ME and SEA are equally important. Read up on the Shangri-la Dialogue and the changing nature of the FPDA.

    Malaysia may want the Typhoon to replace its aging MiGs. Singapore requires the UK as a historical partner an interoperability. I would use the same argument back at you–why stay in the Middle East when the more you deploy there the high the threat of terrorism goes? Let the US bother there since it has far large forces that the UK can ever deploy and has a larger reason to stay there.

    Why not withdraw the UK deployments to Africa? That region can take care of its own–same way you say SEA can take care of its own.

    NZ partnering with the US? Then why not buy ESSM and not Sea Ceptor?

  59. Jeneral28

    The commercial an oil trade passing through the Straits of Malacca and the South China Seas is equal to or even more than that of the Middle East commercial or economic trade. So withdrawing from one means loosing the security of that area.

    if you use the reason of buying Typhoon, well Malaysia buys hardware for its OPV and frigates from MBDA as well. Middle Eastern countries also have as high tech defence equipment as the SEA countries–but seem to spend more on extravagant buildings. What’s the UK of the UK staying there?

  60. Jeneral28

    @Observer,

    So the British withdrew, but more because of financial cuts than the WMB.

    And it any case, it still remains. The logistics depot which used to be the Far Eastern Naval Base became the US logistics depot–with a 3 ma RN staff there. Subic Bay moved to Singapore in essence.

  61. Chris

    x – maybe its the same idea as with the RN & its Rear-Admirals? With the number of ships we now have presumably each Rear-Admiral is given supreme authority over his own pencil sharpener (if the RN owns enough of them after all the defence cuts). Maybe each of the fine Guards Regiments will be able to muster as many as a whole platoon of Guards, State Occasions, Decoration, For The Use Of? Cuts? What defence cuts?

  62. Gloomy Northern Boy

    We are a global trading nation with world-wide interests, including a very big investment in the oil business…and for that matter in quite a number of South Eastern Asian economies, as well as Australia…as well as enduring friendships (not least the numbers of Brits in places like Singapore and Hong Kong, and the long-standing barmaid exchange arrangement between the UK and Australia/New Zealand)…with a limited military budget keeping options open by light-footprint deployments like that in Brunei seems to me a much more obvious strategy to facilitate world-wide influence and justify our rather valuable UNSC Permanent Seat than most of the alternatives. Not least because anyone who imagines the Cousins aren’t willing to go toe to toe with China doesn’t know them very well, and anyone who wouldn’t expect us to support Australia in extremis doesn’t know us very well…in my opinion… :-)

    Better certainly than any proposal that involves getting mixed up in continued a long term deployment in the EU…which is not much interested in defending itself…and with whom we might fall out pretty spectacularly in the near future in any event. Let’s be honest, NATO is a dead duck without much more vigorous US support than is currently on offer…and that support is not on offer because the Cousins have increasingly lost patience with a bunch of people who expect the right to US protection, whilst insisting on being relentlessly rude to those providing it…

    The two squadrons of fast jets/patrol ship navy/Crown Militia option does have some merit, but that involves a major discussion about the kind of Country we are that we have not yet had as far as I can see.

    GNB

  63. Brian Black

    I’m not sure what you’re on about with cardboard trees, observer. We don’t need the Gurkhas to be able to conduct jungle training. As I said, jungle training across the wider army was slashed in order to focus on Iraq and Afghanistan; without either Iraq or Afghanistan on the go, it would be reasonable to expect that Army training for all environments would resume. No cardboard trees required.

    It’s a reasonable position for you to hold, that the UK should have a permanent presence in the far east, observer. I’m being a little bit cheeky to suggest that the garrison is entirely irrelevant; but we do have other areas of strategic interest, and areas of interest that I think are more relevant to the UK.

    Firstly, neither the Gurkhas or the Brunei garrison facilitate stuff coming from China to Europe. If piracy in the South China Sea is a concern, then give the Gurkhas redundancy and give the Royal Navy a couple of OPV.

    And you’re plain wrong if you think that Africa and the arctic have no strategic relevance.

    We have extremism in Africa, with AQ and similar minded groups. The threat of exported terrorism and radicalism is real. And Africa’s instability also helps drive mass migration into Europe.

    The Arctic region is of ever growing importance, with many countries eyeing up resources and elbowing their way into favourable positions. There is a growing militarization of the Arctic at the moment. You mentioned trade, and global warming has the potential to open up sea routes between China and northern Europe that would be shorter than through Suez.

    If you’ve missed what’s happening in Africa and the Arctic, then you need to read up on current affairs. These are regions that are on Europe’s doorstep, not halfway around the world. If the UK is to have a battalion outpost anywhere in the world, then I would put Africa and the Arctic ahead of the far-east.

  64. x

    @ Chris

    :) But…….

    The Guards are recruited from across the UK. I would just drop the line infantry battalion from public duties role. They always get to go when there is a bunfight so I would just exploit that and equip them as a part of our rapid reaction capability.

    According to a thread on ARRSE 4 Para is establishing a new company in Nottingham. Make of it what you will.

  65. Jeneral28

    BB,

    Correct though I suppose they act as a Opposing Force in training. Or maybe not. 1QDG was over in Brunei a few years back but I dont thnin it trained with the G battalion. As I said, the Gurkhas dont always sit idle in their paid for base. They train in other terrains too–recent training with the NZ army–on their facebook, not the British Army.

  66. Observer

    BB, the arctic sea routes are lies. The amount of trade that can be shoved through there is only less than 1% of the trade that takes the long way around. Only 70 ships made the passage last year. 17,000 take the long way around. By my maths, that is much, much less than 1%. Watch out for media hype.

    As for “strategic interest” in Africa and the Arctic in the future, might I point out that your interests in the South East isn’t “in the future” but “right bloody now”? I’m not talking about 7-8% of your imports “in the future”, I’m talking about 7-8% of your imports right now. You are right in that a set of OPVs would be a lot more useful than the Gurkhas, but we all know that it would be impossible for the UK to make that commitment.

    “it would be reasonable to expect that Army training for all environments would resume.”

    And so you recommend the shutting down of one of the training areas? How does that work?

    Anyway, it really doesn’t matter if the UK is here or not. It’s irrelevant to us, life still goes on, we still make do. The one that may benefit with greater engagement is the UK, if it thinks otherwise, so be it.

    I chose the name Observer because I can’t tell you what to do, only recommend and give alternate viewpoints, final choice is still up to the people of the UK.

  67. Martin

    @ Jeneral28

    The Oil going through SE Asia is going to China and Japan not the UK. The only vital supply for the UK. Moving through the straits of malacca is IPAD’s.

    Malaysia and NZ have bought the odd bit of kit put in pales in comparison to what Saudi is buying.

    If we can only afford to have a decent presence in one or two areas then it should be the ME and maybe Africa. I would love to have a decent presence in FPDA area but if we can’t afford to do so then it’s better to concentrate on one area nearer to home with more strategic interest.

  68. Jeneral28

    Africa can be left to the French—they have the Army suited for that region.

    Trade to the Pacific has long past through the Straits of Malacca.

    Who says the UK can afford its presence there? I have show you that it is already minute compared to Cyprus or even the Falklands.

    Odd kit? Saudi Arabia bought US F-15 and M1 Abrams. Some British buy over there.

  69. Jeneral28

    As I said, there’s equal reason for the UK to be in the ME and SEA at the same time. If you are worried about costs, reduce the Household Division. Her Majesty can gain forces as an when state visits are needed. And restructure Cyprus. Which as I said to your Russia point, has not deterred Russia at all.

  70. Gloomy Northern Boy

    Plenty of interested parties with whom we are on good terms in the Arctic…our icy and remote interests are elsewhere, and in fairness although we could do more we are probably doing enough (at the moment); although it does no harm to let the RM live in snow-holes from time to time, and ice strengthen all our warships (if we don’t already).

    And why this issue with Guards and Gurkhas? In the end they are just infantry…of which we do not have enough…and any extras required for ceremonial work make a useful pool of reinforcements when required. If it weren’t TD I’d assume it was resentment about the loss of other equally treasured but less well-connected cap-badges.. :-)

    GNB

  71. Martin

    @ Jeneral28

    I can’t see the justification to leave Africa to the French while swan around 8,000 miles from home.

    Africa is a big place and it’s falling to bits. The French can’t do it all. Its on our door step and the floods of refuges are lining up at Calais. If we don’t have an army that can do Africa then we probably need a new army. There is close to zero chance of us putting boots on the ground anywhere else any time soon without massive US assistance at least. Africa is still a theatre where we can have significant influence independently of US Geo politics and it’s an area where we have a lot of interests.

    as pops like Sierra Leone and Mali show its also the kind of place where small professional forces can make a difference to the picture on the ground.

  72. Jeneral28

    Africa’s security can be achieved through non military moves like diplomacy and post-conflict bundling.

    Your argument for withdrawal of a small detachment from SEA is weak.

    Singapore: 3 Navy personnel and 3 MOD staff. How expensive is that compared to the luxury of even the Falklands and Cyprus? Or Bahrain?

    Malaysia: Scattered RAF, RN and Army staff most in Province Wellesley. Again, how expensive is that?

    Australia: Exchange personnel esp in MPA Squadrons? You want to withdraw that?

    Africa is a gone case.

    I can say there’s zero chance of a single led African conflict with the US involved.

    Why do you hate an Asia presence so much? I resent the UK’s presence in the Gulf more. The Arabs in general hate western presence. This increases the terrorist threat back in the UK. No so much in SEA.

  73. Observer

    Martin, unless you are intending to re-enact colonialism (nothing against it, just that the PR for such an action has been pretty bad in recent years), you are never going to be able to clean up Africa. You’ll just end up stuck there again. Remember, you guys were there in the past, and it chugged along fairly well till you pulled out and it all went to crap. Unless you are going to stay there long term again, your military deployments are simply a drop in the ocean when it comes to solving that mess.

    Africa needs more guns. But they also need investment, education, one heck of a scary secret police to step on corruption and industrialization. If you can’t give them that, you’re not going to solve nuts. In that case, Plan B would have to be a reliable government developed from within.

    (I blame English translations of Greek and Hebrew bibles for the fact that “but” is now commonly used at the beginning of a sentence.) :P

  74. Jeneral28

    If troop deployments overseas is all about prevent war–which they haven’t all the time–they you are sadly mistaken.

  75. jedibeeftrix

    “Africa can be left to the French—they have the Army suited for that region.”

    This is not true for a country that has a dozen or so Commonwealth members in the continent, not if we wish to retain that Missionary Foreign Policy that the public continue to accept including lots of expensive toys that are only justifiable for power projection.

  76. x

    “Odd kit? Saudi Arabia bought US F-15 and M1 Abrams. Some British buy over there.”

    The Saudis just buy kit. It doesn’t translate into military power. If it did they wouldn’t have the West in the Gulf to help defend them against paper tiger Iran.

  77. All Politicians are the Same

    @X
    In fairness to the Saudis they also bought F3s, they probably quickly realised they needed F15s after that. They are buying Typhoon as well and purchase a lot of other less headline making kit.

  78. x

    @ APATS

    It wasn’t me who said,

    ““Odd kit? Saudi Arabia bought US F-15 and M1 Abrams. Some British buy over there.”

    I am following WWDC and can’t be bothered to type too much here.

    All I said was that the Saudis buy a lot of equipment but it doesn’t translate to military power. If the West’s military is increasingly dependent on corporations instead of uniformed personnel then the Saudis are even further down that road. They can’t operate without support from outside. Compare the equipment the Gulf states field compared to Iran; any conflict should be a walk over for the Arabs. Yet if the US upped sticks the situation would get desperate quickly.

  79. All Politicians are the Same

    @X
    I was not having a go at you, I think the Saudis simply buy stuff to keep their western friends happy with little in the way of actual planning.
    They desperately need to modernise and become more professional. Iran lacks the ability to project its power acros the Gulf, though would be funny to see some Arab states asking Israel for help.

  80. Jeneral28

    I was turning Martin’s idea back towards him regarding British troops in Africa.

    But seriously, the British presence in SEA is not about China–it wasn’t historical and i doubt it is now. If every overseas deployment is about countering a state actor, then the UK is placing too much in the ME and too little in Europe. And as Afghanistan, Libya and even Syria and even Ukraine tells us, the threats are not coming from just state actors but from internal actors and non-state actors. So harping on removing troops from Brunei because the UK wont have a jungle war with China is false. Troops presence is more than just countering state threats.

    On Sharia Law in Brunei and the British presence, well tell me a location besides the Falklands say Gibraltar, Germany or maybe Cyprus where British troops are in a democratic country.

  81. x

    @ APATS

    I know I was just explaining somebody else said that about the F15.

    I will throw it out there that sometimes I think the idea of Middle East instability is a bit of contrivance but that it is a bit too radical for some here. There are lots of “Americans” who work in the Gulf who aren’t kosher if you get my drift. I think at a high level a lot goes on between the Saudis, the UAE, and Israel but that is a tail for another day and another place.

  82. Kent

    @Observer – (I blame English translations of Greek and Hebrew bibles for the fact that “but” is now commonly used at the beginning of a sentence.) :P

    “But..” was commonly used for “Except…” back in olden times. :D

  83. IXION

    Observer and Kent

    As a kid I lived next to a retired Oxford Don.

    His dictum was that the rules of English grammar were invented by early Victoria perverts to give them an excuse to beat little boys.

    Nothing wrong in starting a sentence with but.

    Perfectly sensible start to a separate point to be made in a logical sentence.

    FRES is a British army program to provide the army with a range of modern Armoured vehicles of various types. But FRES has turned into an CLUSTERFUCK OF HUMUNGUS proportions.

    See Perfectly understandable.

  84. Chris

    Obsvr – “You can have this one nevertheless not that one”? “Nevertheless me no neverthelesses”? “You can just nevertheless out!”? Sorry; doesn’t work for me. However your preference might work for you but.

  85. Observer

    So if we went Kent’s route…

    “You can have this one except not that one?”
    “Except me no excepts” (Interesting. This one definitely works better than “Nevertheless me no neverthelesses”)
    “You can just except out”.

    We didn’t just butcher the English language, we dissected it and labelled it in individual bags too.

  86. Chris.B.

    @ Jeneral28,

    “I can say there’s zero chance of a single led African conflict with the US involved.”
    – The US is quite interested in Nigeria, on account of it being a top 5 oil exporter to the US. And if I recall there was a dust up in Africa not too long ago that was led by the Americans. Libby? Liberia? Lipids? Some shifty looking Colonel was involved.

    “I resent the UK’s presence in the Gulf more. The Arabs in general hate western presence”
    – They can hate us all they want as long as they keep buying Typhoon, Hawk and variety of other products, while selling us their oil and natural gas. We derive more value from those partnerships I’d wager than from having a Gurkha battalion based in Brunei.

    @ x,
    “I will throw it out there that sometimes I think the idea of Middle East instability is a bit of contrivance but that it is a bit too radical for some here”
    – Yeah, Syria and Iraq are dead stable. It’s all just a mirage…

    I’d agree that the Israeli’s are probably a lot more cosy (if that’s really the right word) with the Arab states behind the scenes than they let on, but then the Arab states are a lot more cosy than they let on behind the scenes with a variety of unsavoury groups who wish harm on Israel. Quite the tangled web of interests.

  87. x

    Chris_B said something trite again, yawn. Oh how we don’t miss him when he doesn’t bother to surface here.

    X said “but that it is a bit too radical for some here.”

  88. Chris.B.

    @ x,

    Well at least you dodged the point about Syria and Iraq with politician like smoothness.

  89. x

    @ Chris B

    I wouldn’t say it was smooth I just pointed out that I had taken the precaution to close down any discussion on my assertion. I am not the only commentator here who finds your rather bellicose style irksome in the least. If it was your blog then so be it, but what you have to do is see through you own arrogance and wonder what you to do stifle potential traffic to somebody’s else site.

    You are sad angry anorak who has never had an original thought in his life. Bore off.

  90. Jeneral28

    @ChrisB

    Noted, but all my points all simply countering Martin’s assertion that the UK should withdraw from SEA. It still stands that the more you see British (not necessarily “white”) faces in the ME, even in moderate Muslim countries, the more the terrorist hatred arises. The reasons for that will probably require another post by TD but it is quite simply to answer.

    As for buying Typhoon and Hawk, I’ve pointed out that they also buy American hardware, and European or even Russian as well. There’s no size comparison how much you buy equals your degree of influence.

    Africa, sure all western powers like to be involved to ruin that continent even more. As I said in previous posts, engagement in that region can take the form of non-military moves-diplomatic or even aid (loosely tied to sanctions). Defence, as many should know, is not the power of your gun.

  91. ArmChairCivvy

    @jeneral,
    Your sweeping statements about the ME make me wonder if you have actually ever been there?

    I am just curious, not meant as an attack on your person…

  92. Jeneral28

    And your nick name tells me you just sit behind an arm chair. Only the weak ones goes to such poor ways of debating.

  93. wf

    @Jeneral28: lets re-phrase it then. What support do you have for your assertion that the greater the Western armed force presence in the middle east, the larger the terrorist threat the people of the middle east will pose?

    I note that Iraqi exiles are similar in number to Somali’s, but tend to not appear in terrorist attacks. How can this be?

  94. Chris.B.

    @ x,
    So Syria and Iraq?

    @ Jeneral28,
    ” It still stands that the more you see British (not necessarily “white”) faces in the ME, even in moderate Muslim countries, the more the terrorist hatred arises”
    – Not necessarily. Terrorists are an odd bunch. Some would argue that they seem to find any excuse for a bit of a ruck. Terrorist threats to the UK have emerged from all manner of sources, Pakistan being a prime candidate. British presence in a Muslim country like Brunei could be just as antagonistic to some as a British presence in somewhere like Oman. Not sure as parking a few jets for training in the region along with a small naval presence is exactly top of most Jihaddist’s list for reasons to hate the West.

    “As for buying Typhoon and Hawk, I’ve pointed out that they also buy American hardware, and European or even Russian as well. There’s no size comparison how much you buy equals your degree of influence.”
    – They buy our equipment. This makes us lots of money which is good. They sell us gas and oil. These are also good things. The Sultan of Brunei invests a lot of money in UK markets, but then so do most of the middle eastern leaders and their more affluent subjects. I’d question what you hope you’re going to achieve by influencing the Sultan of Brunei? What’s your long term ambition for that country that is worth the total cost of the Gurkha’s, or even just the premium of recruiting them over two British battalions?

    “Africa, sure all western powers like to be involved to ruin that continent even more. As I said in previous posts, engagement in that region can take the form of non-military moves-diplomatic or even aid (loosely tied to sanctions). Defence, as many should know, is not the power of your gun.”
    – We’ve been pouring money into that continent for decades to try and help it and its people. That’s not what I would call ruining it. Certainly aid to Africa should be more complex than simply military operations. But military assistance to help build security is also very valuable, especially for a continent that has been savaged by conflict for a very, very long time. And the rewards of being on the good side of the African Union ten years from now could be very, very lucrative, to say the least.

  95. ArmChairCivvy

    @jeneral, from your aggressively worded response I can read that you have never been there, but will not own up?

    I will cut this conversation short, but will volunteer that I have been travelling in those countries, starting from the years before the ousting of the Shah, held an Unctad job in Africa, not to mention volunteer stuff to help “them” out on that continent. It is probably the reason why those dishing out the “wisdom” formed on the Internet get up my nose. Lots of teens on the defence sites, bursting with energy (nothing wrong with that, even though too much testosterone normally transforms to these “kill them all” statements) but making sweeping statements that masquerade as socio-political analysis is a step that gets your bluff called.

    Btw, the acc bit is meant to convey to everyone that I am not serving in the military… not sure if you got that bit,or any bit, right, but we are not marking papers here

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