We have regularly discussed future maritime patrol on Think Defence, but it is an especially interesting subject because it spans so many capability areas and has so many implications in other areas.
Before we Talk Turkey!
Before we can get to the discussion about requirements and equipment, there are a number of issues that need to be considered.
The Shadow of Nimrod
It should be clear that while Nimrod might not appear in any formal requirements documents and frankly, the MoD and BAE would prefer everyone just forgot it, Nimrod will cast a long shadow on any future purchase of even a remotely similar aircraft.
First, after spending the better part of £4b on Nimrod MRA4 spending many millions or billions, so soon after, on an aircraft not made in the UK is going to result in a rough ride in the House of Commons and mainstream media. We should not underestimate the importance of this, after all, the Treasury and Mr UK Taxpayer has already handsomely funded a Maritime Patrol Aircraft but the money was, let us be kind here, squandered.
Second, the legacy of XV230 (the Nimrod MR2 that crashed in Afghanistan) was the Haddon Cave inquiry and resultant changes in airworthiness management. The issues in achieving full release to service on the Airseeker aircraft shows the difficulties in using older aircraft. This does not make it impossible but simply adds to the time and cost of doing so should the ‘answer’ be something like a refurbished P3. There is no point bemoaning the MAA processes, they are what they are and if, as some suggest that they are too restrictive and risk-averse the RAF and MoD only has itself to blame.
Third, related to the second, is a general reluctance to enter into development or modification programmes after the trauma of MRA4 that any proposal with the words ‘convert’ or ‘UK specific’ is likely to see it confined to the round filing cabinet. Low risk, off the shelf, is probably at the top of the shopping list.
Buying the most cost-effective low-risk solution also provides a handy counterpoint for the inevitable backlash in the House of Commons.
The Gap Keeps Getting Larger
I know it might be a facile argument, but an uncomfortable truth is that the UK has been without a maritime patrol aircraft for some years now after Nimrod MR2 was withdrawn in early 2010. By the time of SDSR 2015 it will be 5 years and by the time any new system is bought into full service it will be getting close to a decade.
The argument goes, if we have been without such a vital capability for so long, how come the world has not stopped turning. Wiser souls will simply laugh at that, but it is often not the wisest that make the decisions and whatever argument one deploys it is difficult to counter.
Scottish Independence
I think it is impossible to frame any sort of requirement for future maritime patrol without having the issue of Scottish independence resolved one way or the other. If independence happens and the expected wishes of the Scottish people is to remove the UK’s nuclear submarine force and associated facilities the requirement for maritime patrol will change.
Areas and routes to be monitored will be different and this would need to be factored into any programme.
The General Lack of Cash
In our previous discussions on SDSR 2015 I think we came to the conclusion that whichever party comes into power in 2015 a genuine increase in defence spending is highly unlikely. With the economy still not in rude health, a low perceived direct threat to the UK, defence inflation higher than general inflation and numerous other calls on public finances SDSR 2015 is likely to concentrate on maintaining the road to Future Force 2020 as defined by SDSR2010 (and subsequent revisions) than anything else.
Consequently, the likelihood of embarking on a major procurement project is unlikely.
The very long shadow cast by Nimrod, a lack of headroom in the equipment plan (do not be lulled into a false sense of security by unallocated underspend), a general lack of funding and the simple fact that we seem to be getting on just fine without points to an almost impossible task of getting MPA back on the MoD’s purchasing agenda.
Why bother discussing it then?
A good question, the answer, it remains a requirement, and you never know what might transpire in the next few years so apart from the general interest value the subject is still important enough to consider.
Implications on Other Capabilities Areas
This is where the debate gets interesting
Because almost any of the choices available potentially has an impact in other capability areas these secondary implications might form a central part of the decision.
It is in these secondary options where the potential for combined cost savings and/or capability improvements could be found and simply cannot be ignored.
Focusing on the Maritime Patrol/Surveillance requirements excluding these secondary areas might be desirable from a single requirement perspective, but I do not think it sensible or realistic to do so.
The potential is simply too great ignore.
A few examples spring immediately to mind;
If the P8 is the DS answer, would it be possible to withdraw Sentinel and thus make savings by virtue of deleting an entire fleet? Maybe the surplus R1’s could be reconverted back to passenger carrying, replacing the HS125 and BAE146 fleets, perhaps they might be converted to the aeromedical role.
If the second mooted choice of the C295 is selected, again, what are the secondary impacts. Could non MPA C295’s be purchased at the same time and used to replace the C130J’s as the RAF transitions to the A400M. Could a C235/295 be used instead of Shadow, HS125, and BAE146.
Not all of these need to happen overnight and could be included in the overall justification in the context of a long-term platform strategy.
Requirements
The conventional approach is to define a requirement, fulfil requirement and move on to the next project.
However, as we all know the big fat grey thing with big ears in the room is money.
With this in mind the purist approach is never used in reality, available funding always dictates, or at least influences, requirements. There is no point defining a requirement that is so high as to be unachievable so inevitably trade-offs and compromise must be a central feature of any requirement.
Requirements start with the wider context, into which they are placed.
The Wider Context
The UK remains an expeditionary focussed nation, globally engaged and with a diverse range of interests. Maritime security and protection of deployed naval forces is an obvious requirement.
The UK is a nuclear power making use of ballistic missile submarines, the SSBN force. Protection of the deterrent is a key requirement and although this is being provided currently by naval vessels and helicopters the overstretch on these assets and opportunity costs of not being able to use them elsewhere should be obvious.
The UK has a range of allies that mostly have their own maritime patrol aircraft capability and thus can more or less be relied upon to provide some aspects of the requirement. Our nearest ally, France, has a fleet of Breguet Atlantique maritime patrol aircraft but no C17’s. France has recently taken advantage of the UK’s C17 fleet and there is absolutely no reason why in a coalition operation, France, and others who may or may not be involved, could contribute their aircraft.
This brings me on to defence planning assumptions and the acceptance that for the majority of operations, the UK will not be operating alone.
Many people argue that the UK is increasingly dependent on ‘others’ for an increasing number of military capabilities but in this case, our allies are generally pretty flush with maritime patrol aircraft. They will not, of course, contribute to UK only tasks such as SSBN protection but those arguing for a more contributory and load sharing approach to defence matters might point to this area as one which could be shared.
The seven military tasks as defined by the 2010 SDSR are as follows;
- Defending the UK and its Overseas Territories
- Providing strategic intelligence
- Providing nuclear deterrence
- Supporting civil emergency organisations in times of crisis
- Defending the UK’s interest by projecting power strategically and through expeditionary interventionProviding a defence contribution to UK influence
- Providing security for stabilisation
It could be reasonably argued that a maritime patrol aircraft would make a significant contribution to all of them.
A range of threats exists that are countered by maritime patrol aircraft
We might consider the threat posed by a resurgent Russia seeking to compromise the deterrent, direct conflict with Iran or states such as Syria and even the much discussed future conflict with China. Personally, I find citing China or operating supporting the USA in the Pacific to be rather weak arguments for, almost anything actually, but the truism of ‘you never know what might happen in the future’ remains true.
To summarise, the wider context, into which a maritime patrol aircraft might sit, present some compelling arguments but some that can be relatively easily dismissed.
When placed in a wider context, the case is strong, but it is not irresistibly strong; hence, the obvious situation we find ourselves in.
The Requirement Span Dilemma
With this subject, there is a particular dilemma and it is unavoidable.
If it is accepted that the primary role of a Maritime Patrol Aircraft is deep water long range Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) this drives us to conclude that only an aircraft like the P8, P3, or P1 will suffice. Unfortunately, it is the most expensive option and the reality is the likelihood of using deep water long-range ASW capabilities is relatively low.
The principal cost driver therefore, is for a capability that is the least likely to be needed.
This is the same argument that is common to many major equipment projects; why do we need Typhoons when flying up against ancient Mig 23’s, why spend money on Challengers when we only ever seem to face Chieftain era enemies and why invest in; well, you get the picture.
Maritime Patrol is not going to answer any of these questions, but the issue must be considered.
Setting our sights high narrows the field, accepting compromises in capability provides much greater choice and lower cost.
Recognising that we need ASW less and maritime security type capabilities more would almost certainly result in a lower spend.
Missions
Just what do we need this aircraft to do, missions should inform requirements?
Anti-Submarine
I think what many people fail to realise about anti-submarine warfare is that it is a team sport, many players and many layers. Submarines, frigates, helicopters and even fixed sensors all play their part so the lack of a maritime patrol aircraft does not all of a sudden render the UK’s anti-submarine warfare capability void but it does reduce its effectiveness.
All the players can score a goal on their own but together are much more effective.Working with other parts of a well-trained team they up the effectiveness and provide a greater deterrent to submarines operating in a given area. We should not, therefore, get overexcited about the prowess of a maritime patrol aircraft in isolation but understand something simple, given the effectiveness of submarines, you want a full team.
The importance of the anti-submarine requirements comes down to acceptance of risk.
Without them, you place your surface and sub surface force at greater risk, with them, you reduce that risk.
The ASW task could be boiled down to a couple of areas; deep ocean ASW supporting transiting shipping groups and the SSBN fleet and shallower water or inshore ASW characterised, for example, by operating supporting operations in the Middle East and the Gulf of Arabia.
I think it is obvious, although the former has a much lower likelihood than the latter it is equally obvious that the impact of the former is potentially much greater.
Of all the requirements, the split between the two broad ASW areas, has the greatest potential for influencing costs and, so the requirements definition comes down to a impact v likelihood discussion.
The current threat levels to the SSBN force could be argued to be relatively low and this might have been instrumental in the risk-based decision to cancel MRA4.
We cannot be certain the threat will remain at the current nuisance levels. In an expeditionary context the rapid advance and proliferation of both quiet air breathing submarines and a number of associated technologies mean that submarines will likely comprise a much larger threat in the future. If we are to retain freedom of movement the threat of enemy submarines must be taken seriously.
We might also consider the proliferation of non-state submarine manufacturers e.g. narco subs. I do not think anyone is proposing dropping Stingray torpedoes on narco subs, though!
The basic military requirement is to detect, classify, deter and if necessary, destroy enemy submarines
Search and Rescue
The UK has a clear international obligation in this regard and is coordinated by the Department of Transport, these obligations are derived from voluntary adherence to the
- Convention on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) (1974),
- Maritime Search and Rescue Convention (1979),
- Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and,
- Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago 1944) (Annex 12).
The three key functions of UK Search and Rescue are;
- Maritime SAR in offshore, inshore and shoreline areas
- Aeronautical SAR over land and sea
- Inland SAR
Of these, item 2 is the most relevant for a maritime patrol aircraft.
The UK SAR framework and resultant organisation is complicated with many agencies, devolved governmental bodies, private sector and voluntary organisations playing their parts. Into this mix is the MoD whose stated SAR responsibility is
The MoD has responsibility for providing SAR facilities for military operations, exercises and training within the UK and, by agreement, exercises responsibility for the co-ordination of civil aeronautical SAR on behalf of the DfT. Where the coverage provided by military SAR assets meets the civil SAR coverage requirements, they will be made available for civil maritime and land-based SAR operations. The high readiness SAR assets are SAR helicopters, maritime surveillance fixed wing aircraft and mountain rescue teams. The MoD also establishes and maintains an Aeronautical Rescue Co-ordination Centre (ARCC) for the operation and co-ordination of civil and military aeronautical SAR assets.
As we know, the familiar grey and yellow Sea King helicopters of the RAF and Royal Navy will be replaced soon by the SAR-H PFI. After a rocky start and a controversial restart the programme is back on track.
The DFT and MoD awarded a Gap – SAR contract to Bristow Search and Rescue who will operate this until the contract main start in 2015, read more about Gap SAR here.
The contract is for the provision of rotary SAR only.
Looking at the image below, which shows the UK’s SAR area, it is clear that helicopters simply cannot cover the vast distances involved. Long-range search and rescue including on scene coordination and air dropping of rescue equipment was carried out by the Nimrod MR2, with one aircraft held at 2 hours notice to move.
When the MR2 was withdrawn this cover was delegated to Hercules and E3 Sentry aircraft on as needed basis and mutual aid agreements with the French, who provide similar coverage in their area using converted Dassault Falcon business jets.
The diagram below shows the extent of the UK Search and Rescue Region (SRR), covering 1.25 million square nautical miles of sea and over 10.5 thousand nautical miles of coastline
Many have commented on the general inadequate nature of this current provision, characterising the Governments approach as akin to the image below
So far, that luck has held, there have been no instances that would require a fixed wing aircraft beyond the range of helicopters. This simple fact is used often to make the case that there is no case and it would be fairly foolish to hang on to SAR as justification for a new maritime patrol aircraft.
The underlying lack of demand and improving safety of shipping combined with general direction of travel as demonstrated by the SAR-H PFI should be obvious that fixed wing SAR as provided by Nimrod MR2 is not at the top of the shopping list.
It could be relatively easily provided by extending the PFI to include a couple of modified business jet, types of which there are many available off the shelf.
Alternatively, simply extending cooperation with the French or Irish governments and maintaining basic cover with combinations of whatever long-range aircraft were available.
I can see the attraction of outsourced civilianised long-range SAR.
Equally, it all comes from public expenditure and because it is used much less frequently than the rotary SAR provided by Bristow’s there exists a possibility to share resources between a military MPA and declaring this as a search and rescue capability.
So, SAR is an argument for MPA, but let’s face it, not a strong one.
Offshore Maritime Security
The UK offshore environment is a very complex subject, informed by a number of national and international laws and conventions.
Broadly speaking, it is divided into 4 areas, internal waters, territorial sea, EEZ and continental shelf.
Other states have many rights within this area such as innocent passage and in some regards the UK has relatively little legislative jurisdiction, fishing for example. A number of international conventions also complicate matters, the OSPAR Convention on waste dumping another example.
Devolution of power to Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales also contribute to the patchwork of legislation that governs the UK EEZ.
British Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies that are not part of the EU, such as the South Atlantic, also have EEZ’s. Combined, the UK has an enormous EEZ, the fifth largest in the world, over 6.8 million square kilometres
Beyond the obvious fisheries protection and pollution monitoring role there is also a more security focussed need for protection of offshore infrastructure such as oil and gas rigs.
Offshore and near-shore infrastructure is becoming increasingly important in the UK’s energy mix.
Wave and wind infrastructure is now increasingly likely to be placed at greater distances from shore and as gas and oil exploration pushes into deeper water the need for airborne security platforms will only increase.
Demand for energy, competition for natural resources and a greater demand on energy imports (particularly LNG) point to an increased requirement for effective surveillance and security.
The offshore hydrocarbon industry is moving increasingly towards underwater compression infrastructure so the traditional oil and gas platform may become a thing of the past. Shell are currently trialling a sub-sea compressor in their Ormen Lange gas field off Norway. This facility requires power from the shore, another sub-sea cable requirement that joins the many sub-sea cables that need surveillance and protection. Perhaps future production facilities around the Falkland Islands will not look like what we expect at all.
Smuggling interdiction, general policing support and other counterterrorism roles complete this broad section and in some circumstances, these might take place some distance from the UK, anti-piracy for example.
By having a deployable capability, it could also make a valuable contribution to coalition maritime security operations such as counter narcotics in the Caribbean or counter piracy in the Gulf of Guinea
The UK has recently established a single National Maritime Information Centre at Northwood as a single point of contact and information fusion, analysis and dissemination. The 2010 SDSR recognised that no single body could or should be responsible for maritime security so the establishment of NMIC was a good move, at least it would provide some measure of coordination. There is still duplication though, with overlapping surface and aircraft provision across the numerous interested parties. As resources continue to be pressed, low profile but vital functions such as MSOG and NMIC are likely to be starved of funding undoing much of their good work and ensuring they fail to achieve their potential.
Of the two lower-intensity tasks that any maritime patrol aircraft would fulfil I think a much stronger argument exists for high endurance maritime security than search and rescue.
Anti-Surface Warfare
An area, which seems to have fallen away with the withdrawal of Harpoon and Sea Eagle is the anti-surface warfare role. Given the increasing effectiveness of ship-borne anti-aircraft weapons and proliferation of aircraft carriers one might assume that this is a role best left to tactical fighters like the F35B with a pair of Joint Strike Missiles from Kongsberg, I would tend to agree. It is; however, another valuable capability that would be good to regain.
ISTAR supporting Joint Operations
The Nimrod MRA4 had a very capable ESM system and the MR2 at one point in Afghanistan was one of the few platforms able to provide full motion video to ground forces. A maritime patrol aircraft can provide a wide range of sensors and the crew to analyse and disseminate useful intelligence to other elements of any joint force. Their long endurance and ability to operate in non-segregated airspace provides a valuable persistent capability.
Radar, passive electronic detection, electro-optical and sonar technologies are often combined onto a single aircraft.
Since MR2 though, the RAF and British Army have improved their general ISTAR capabilities immeasurably, both manned and unmanned, and a multipurpose maritime patrol aircraft might not make as significant contribution to joint operations as previously.
Over water; however, things are relatively different and maritime ISTAR supporting joint operations remains a significant gap.
Summary
Establishing the need for a maritime patrol aircraft/capability is obviously a prerequisite to going shopping but the simple fact that the UK does not currently possess such a capability should be evidenced that the need is not compelling.
In 2012, the Defence Select Committee published their findings on Maritime Surveillance, the summary was as follows;
The Committee has serious concerns following the decision in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) to cancel the Nimrod MRA4 maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) programme. Although the MoD’s own capability investigations have concluded that a MPA is the solution to the UK’s maritime surveillance requirements over the next 20 years, the MoD has postponed any decision on a further MPA until at least the next SDSR in 2015. The UK therefore now has no current or planned sovereign MPA capability (i.e. a capability that could be operated independently) and the MoD has acknowledged that the resultant capability gap cannot be completely covered by an existing single asset or collection of assets. The reduction in certain sovereign long range maritime surveillance capabilities also highlights the UK’s interim dependency on allies for support in protecting the increasingly important reaches of the UK as well as its wider defence and direct military capability.
The video clip below accurately described the MoD’s response to their concerns
Since then; however, the mood music has changed and those with money burning holes in their pockets are betting on a P8 or C295 purchase to be announced in the 2015 SDSR, no doubt fuelled by selective leaking from the ISTAR Optimisation Study that is ongoing.
We have to be careful about being too specific equipment centric when looking at options, instead of fixating on a like for like Nimrod replacement could a mix of equipment offer more for less?
A hi-lo mix, staggered introduction, selected use of unmanned systems or those already in service all need considering. The market has not stood still either, technology marches on and of course we have to consider sovereign independence, technology and industrial strategy.
To summarise, there are many factors, which make the acquisition of a maritime patrol aircraft challenging.
Some aspects of the mission seem to be obvious, but others can be questioned and the means of meeting those mission requirements might not be as clear-cut as initially thought. Every paper I have seen on this subject starts with the answer, Boeing P8 Poseidon, and works back from there, swiftly dismissing any alternative.
In the next part of this series I am going to look at a range of options, the gold standard P8, a bargain-basement C235 and all points between, including a handful of wild cards.
One thing I will be doing is looking at some of the wider aspects, recognising that a narrow blinkered look at the subject might not be optimal and preclude taking options for cost reduction or capability improvements in other areas by virtue of the decision on equipment for maritime patrol and surveillance.
Every choice will be a trade-off against cost, time, complexity, industrial benefits, risk and capability.
I do not think there is any single obvious answer to this question
Onwards…

@Andrew Wood
The question for me is if we procure a capable long range ASW-MPA that is also good enough to to overland ISTAR how many of those exisitng types could we eventually take out?
Get the core aircraft right and could you by 2025 evenutally have a single flexible multi-role Land/Sea ISTAR and standoff weapons platform instead of all that lot?
Tempting to base it on either Atlas or Voyager airframes for maximum commonality, although A320 should also not be ruled out without studying the possibilities.
@NaB: sounds very sensible. Protects the deterrent on egress/ingress without a new platform.
Much as I like the C-295 I cannot see us fielding a wholly new aircraft type.
We already have the following aircraft used as transport or support aircraft (all based on transport airframes): C-17, Sentry, Sentinel, Shadow, Air Seeker, Voyager, BAe 146, Hercules (until 2022), A400
P-8 also suffers from the same issue but at least the 737 airframe is widely used in the UK and we can draw upon US Navy support.
Sea Herc is just the wrong airframe. It is not an efficient cruiser and it’s a very awkward shape for a mission systems platform.
Sea Atlas, Jed, not Sea Herc.
Sensory bits can be hung off the outsides and mission systems can be palletised and rolled on. But the most difficult bit is fitting a bomb bay in a way that doesn’t compromise the structure or weight distribution of the aircraft. We don’t want to have to open the back ramp to lob a torpedos or anti-ship missiles out by hand!
Maybe if we did want a big Airbus solution a preliminary study would be needed to see which of A400, A320 and A330 would be least difficult to fit with an internal bomb bay. Then just roll the mission systems and sensors from C-295 across.
Once upon a time, before the reversion to STOVL, there might have been an option to acquire some S3s for use both landbased and on the carrier. Would have needed a new sonics set, comms and radar (Merlin CSP fit anyone? Don’t LockMart do that too as well as being the S3 design authority?), but would have provided aircrew and most importantly ASW controller slots, as well as potentially COD & AAR. However that has obviously gone, more’s the pity.
Just as a thought, we need to think precisely what seedcorn skills it is that we are trying to preserve. Is it multi-engine pilots? Probably not. M/E pilots flying all-weather / night sorties close to the oggin? Possibly. Sensor operators that can maintain a recognised maritime picture, on the surface and below? Yep. Sonar operators that can run localisation and prosecution of an acoustic contact? Again, yep. Tactical co-ordinators that can maintain co-ordination between multiple surface and air assets in relatively close proximity? Pretty much.
Aside from the flying a multi-engine variable altitude profile over the sea, most of those skilsets can be provided by Merlin crew. Trouble is that there are precious few slots in the existing Grey Merlin force. As a wild option, what about standing up another squadron of Merlin, potentially using the cabs not getting the HM2 upgrade, possibly augmented with a couple of newbuilds. It will be tricky, as (AIUI) the folding bits of those cabs are included in the programme to make the HC3/3a fleet maritime capable. Still – if the problem is crew slots to maintain perishable skills, then the solution might be a set of platforms for which support arrangements (inc log support, regulation and airworthiness, training etc) are already in place. Got to be cheaper than a fleet of new cabs with different support arrangements. Reconmmission 819NAS and stick them up in Gannet again or FOB them out of Stornoway if required. Not Nimrod coverage, but adds value and most importantly provides the aircrew slots at relatively low overhead.
Sea Herc ?
Longer ranged and more consumables weapons than C295, less expensive than P8 ? Overland ISR capable, TD has posted before on how easy it is to add bits to a Herc using doors etc
Or is there legs to an 8th Astute and upgrading all the remaining Merlin HM2 to full HM3 standard for ASW, and contractor owned and operated fixed wing for SAR and EEZ patrol ?
Interested why some people think EEZ patrol is a military role ? Are we going to bomb illegal fishing vessels from the air rather than arrest them ???
Brian Black,
You massively overestimate the scale of that “consciousness”. Fiscal realities are what they are.
MPA will be funded, as they are one of the defence tools that remain in the political, media, and public conciousness.
A newspaper’s defence editor might not be able to tell you coherently exactly why MPA are needed, but they can easily ramble on about Nimrod’s fate and capability gaps – much like aircraft carriers. And Nimrod, all types, always had that presence in the media’s minds, what with cost overruns and the crash – what you might expect to be fairly invisible capabilities have been splashed across headlines for decades.
There will be something pulled out of the bag. The question is whether we’ll see an impressive operational capability or simply an extension of the seedcorn initiative, with just enough aircraft of the minimum specification, and just enough operators to keep things ticking over.
It would be less challenging if we lowered our ambition with the aim of maintaining a seed for regeneration of a more effective capability as other equipment programmes complete.
So as other have said, half a dozen C295. Yes it is compromised, yes it might not 100% do the job but the most important thing is it maintains a perishable skillset
I think we overlook the skills aspect, it is more important than kit
The longer we are without, the harder it will be to regenerate
I have to agree with Andrew Wood and others here. A new MPA is an expensive capital programme and not short of running cost either, without sacrificing something else it seems like it will be challenging to find budget space for it.
@ Repulse
“Add additional sensors to the Sentinal and buy 4 more airframes
– Buy another OPV with a flight deck to sit in EEZ waters and extend the range of the Merlins.
– Pay the incremental cost of an 8th Astute to increase ASW coverage in UK waters.”
I recon you could easily buy and run a fleet of 9 P8’s for less than all this.
@ Engineer Tom
“Just a quick thought, if EEZ/fisheries protection isn’t a role the RN should be filling, why do we have OPV’s or PB’s, the fisheries protection squadron is the oldest front-line squadron in the Royal Navy.”
We have it because DEFRA pay for it. Not sure why the DFT does not have to pay for SAR. Even the DFID is paying up for military services these days.
Just a quick thought, if EEZ/fisheries protection isn’t a role the RN should be filling, why do we have OPV’s or PB’s, the fisheries protection squadron is the oldest front-line squadron in the Royal Navy.
@as
Thanks – if airships can’t fly in bad weather they would not be any use.
@RT is bang on the money in regard to political will and intent.
I am looking forward to TD’s second instalment though I think I should get out more.
Interesting comments on the political aspect of the purchase of a new MPA class. My thoughts are if Labour get in they will go for it (to the detriment of other capabilities) just to show up the current government.
If the Tories stay in power then I think we will not go for a direct replacement, but continue a more indirect replacement through extending existing platforms – this would be my favourite anyway.
Alongside ASW Merlins and UAVs (focus on wide area surface search), for real sub hunting I would do the following:
– Add additional sensors to the Sentinal and buy 4 more airframes
– Buy another OPV with a flight deck to sit in EEZ waters and extend the range of the Merlins.
– Pay the incremental cost of an 8th Astute to increase ASW coverage in UK waters.
Cheaper than introducing a whole new class and more appropriate for the threat level.
@ Somewhatremoved
“Remove SAR and EEZ protection from the equation.”
Agree on the SAR bit – it’s being outsourced anyway. Do not agree on the EEZ protection bit, I guess it’s a question of what you are protecting it against? I’d argue that even using military assets to identify potential illegal fishing whilst searching for suspicious vessels is a good balance. However, no need for a P8 to do this, converted UAV Predators would be fine :)
@ RT – I agree with your assessment of SDSR 2015 from a budget point of view. There will certainly be no new money but I think given SDSR 2010 was coalition decision there will not be the political ramifications of approving it in SDSR 2015.
If Labour get in then its a nice headline for them approving it to show how good they are on defence.
If the Tory’s get in they can blame the entire thing on the Lib Dems and show how a proper Tory government is tough on defence.
The only political eventuality where I can see this being an issue is a Tory Liberal Coalition which I just can’t see happening again.
However if the service chiefs want an MPA they will have to find the money. A buy of 9 – 12 P8’s is totally out of the question. However a smaller initial buy of 5 or 6 C 295 with a hope of some more in the future is not inconceivable.
I’m also guessing that no matter who comes in in 2015 most talk of austerity will be over. As long as the deficit is below inflation no one will care too much about cutting it. It seems to be some sort of Religious cause for Osborne largely because I think he does not have any knowledge or other policy idea. The country has run nearly continuous deficits since records began yet still managed to have one of the lowest debt level in the G7 before 2008. All talk of drastic cuts and surplus will by 2015 be political suicide.
If as is likely Miliband gets in he will need to find extra money for social projects but with defence spending at or very very near 2% of GDP is seriously doubt any politician will look for defence spending cuts.
If we are being honest the UK only has one foreign policy and that is to keep the USA in NATO and having even the largest European partner fall below the absolute bare minimum I think will be too much to bare.
I am sure Osborne wanted significantly bigger cuts in 2010 but this barrier was what stopped him getting them so instead he lumped the successor program on to it instead.
… Just a thought. Cameron took the decision to cancel the Nimrods. Later, unrelated, he took the decision to perform a double U-turn on the carriers and jets. Whatever decisions are made in SDSR 2015 (even if he is PM), he’s unlikely to be PM in 2025 when big ticket items from 2015 actually get delivered, so he won’t get any credit for them. He’s not going to want the experience of wasting political capital on yet more u-turns, which is how it would be presented if he suddenly funded MPA after scrapping Nimrods.
By strange early morning logic, I believe that I have concluded that Ed Miliband is the only one who can save the UK MPA capability…. Odd thoughts as I don’t think I’ve ever heard him speak on defence, and he want’s to spend our money on 200,000 social houses per year by 2020, and that’s £2billion a year he needs to find from somewhere.
@ SR,
I am more cynical than you. The Tories won’t allow any significant expenditure on MPA as they are vulnerable to the still misunderstood decision to scrap the Nimrods. The Liberals don’t care about defence, and while Labour have historically not been as bad as feared, they have promised a “zero-based review” of all Government spending, with no new borrowing in the first year. They also have lots of social and welfare ambitions they want to fund out of a static total of money.
So with all of that as background, I don’t think MPA (or much else) is going to be funded.
Which then implies the MPA capability holiday might stretch to 2020 or beyond, and so interesting questions as to how we could regenerate it, if at all.
@SO
Dude, do you ever wonder why most of the 1st world navies and air forces persist with this sonobouy and MPA malarkey when it is obviously a crock? I mean, they have their own submarines and stuff with which to test these tactics, and yet they still stick with it?
Do you think it’s just that they are stupid or is it some sort of conspiracy involving Big Sonobouy? I’d love to hear your take on it.
‘Cause there is an MPA mafia, you know.
http://www.vpinternational.ca/
SO,
So safe to say you didn’t read the other posts then. Cool – bothers me not. Where did you do your ASW training by the way – Janes Fleet Command or just Hunt for Red October on repeat?
RT,
A good question well asked. SDSR2010 was also about getting us out of Afghanistan, shutting down a completely disastrous MOD procurement clusterf**k as well as a significant redress of the overall Defence budget. Given that HERRICK ends next year and that the Defence budget has been significantly improved, the priorities are likely to have changed.
@Somewhatremoved:
“You don’t understand the difference in tactics between hunting SSN’s and SSK’s.”
That’s hardly the source of our disagreement here. Your idea of SSNs and SSKs is 1980’s material at best, and you get the SSBN thing wrong even for that era. So more like 1970’s.
Hint; a German non-nuclear sub kept moving while submerged (not even snorkeling) for a couple weeks last year and SSKs don’t need to push anything through the surface during engagements. This actually became a non-essential step in 1944 already.
They don’t need to do so to receive fleet HQ messages either (in fact, they can stay at 200+ metres depth and just let an antenna rise up to only a few metres depth now). ESM potential is extremely limited for subs (and ironically, SSNs have often bigger ESM suites than many SSKs) and more sensible for defensive than offensive purposes.
Finally, the modern notion that non-nuclear subs are for coastal purposes only is anglophone bullocks, only recently typically heard from two countries with SSNs but no SSKs. Subs operated even with a snorkel for weeks on oceans and that was when snorkels were so rudimentary that cruise speed while snorkeling was limited to 5 kts. The record was a snorkeling travel from Norway to Argentine. Other subs made it from France to Singapore non-stop, without refuelling.
About sonobuoys; the passive ones are largely obsolete. Even SSNs are now too silent for such tiny passive acoustic sensors. Their only utility by now is probably to be elements in a multistatic sonar. This requires at least one active sonobuoys, though – and you cannot let them emit much noise for very long. Echo reduction by anechoic tiles is huge.
You cannot effectively search an ocean and likely not even the North Sea with sonobuoys. Their effectiveness is too limited and the open sea is huge.
Finally; to hunt SSNs or SSBNs is probably a stupid idea anyway. You won’t get all SSBNs (except in the case of China) and a single survivor can kill your country off on its own. SSBNs will on the other hand not be aggressive, so you can simply avoid both them and nuclear war (and the SSNs that are probably escorting the SSBNs).
SSNs on offensive missions will run out of ammo after a few hits and need to reload, but few harbours and few auxiliary warships can resupply them, so go after those. It would take more assets to hunt them satisfactorily than they would destroy with their single loadout if your ships have decent countermeasures and signature management.
———————————————————–
Feel free to explain how exactly a turbofan MPA of 200+ million USD fly away price may be worth its life cycle expenses in ASW, for just claiming that someone else doesn’t understand basics without addressing a single one of his points is really a no-show.
@ Somewhatremoved
“Remove SAR and EEZ protection from the equation.”
I have to agree. I think these are tasks the military did largely because it had large numbers of MPA and Helicopters sitting around anyway in the past and they may as well have been used for something however I think these roles should be split of and given to the Coast guard.
The should facilitate as split by with the coast guard possibly getting the C235 and the MOD getting the P8 but possibly only 4 or 5 and using it as a replacement for Sentinel.
@Deja Vu
To my knowledge lighter than air craft either rigid or non rigid still can not operate in adverse weather so is useless for e.g. SAR
They are not as uncontrollable as they once were but you still can not operate them in weather conditions as bad in which planes and helicopters can still take off.
I am sure there are good reasons why a lighter than air craft either rigid or non rigid would not be suitable, but I would like to hear them. I can see that rapid deployment from base to patrol area is one of them. But a fleet of modern airships with a modular fit of sensors for the different roles could allow capacities to be developed as and when. If big enough crews could work shifts with adequate off duty facilities and patrol endurance could be days rather than hours. Just a thought.
Has the actual political priority of maritime surveillance increased since number 10 and the MoD took a decision that it was not that important back in 2010? I don’t think it has.
I would expect SDSR 2015 and 2020 to continue to non fund it.
SO,
You don’t understand the difference in tactics between hunting SSN’s and SSK’s. They are completely different. I wrote a piece on this on the last MPA thread – have a look.
@SO
“Apats:
“Actually an MPA able to drop multiple buoy lines and carry weapons is extremely capable of hunting and killing a submarine.”
This may matter in the English Channel, but on the open oceans you first need a lead, and that’s difficult to come by now that even SSKs have AIP.”
I was not suggesting that the MPA flies around and drops buoys randomly.
Active sonobuoys remain extremely effective, especially as they are dropped in lines.
Jeremy M H;
P-8 = U.S. military aircraft = gold plated by default.
DoD procurement found the philosopher’s stone; they can turn any big ticket project into a gold-plated project, even if based on a COTS product.
——————-
Apats:
“Actually an MPA able to drop multiple buoy lines and carry weapons is extremely capable of hunting and killing a submarine.”
This may matter in the English Channel, but on the open oceans you first need a lead, and that’s difficult to come by now that even SSKs have AIP.
High-flying aircraft don’t even attempt to use MAD for chance contacts (wouldn’t help much against non-magnetic steel hulls anyway) and the diesel smoke detector have become useless decades ago.
AIP subs can move deep enough to avoid leaving distortions on the ocean surface.
ASW aircraft are essentially down to looking at surface ships with imaging radars and optical sensors.
Anything below the waves is a mystery to them unless they get a lead. The passive SOSUS networks were quite ineffectived against Akula and Kilo already.
It’s questionable how effective tiny sonobuoys are in face of anechoic tiles and silent AIP.
ASW helicopters can at least use a bigger dipping VDS.
@Daniel H.
I do find the idea that the P-8 is a gold plated solution to be a bit of a funny narrative to a degree. The P-8 is basically taking one of the most produced and cost competitive airframes in the world and adding the necessary mission systems to it. I real gold plated solution would honestly start with a customized airframe for the mission.
What the P-8 really is is a full featured solution to the problem. It does not have a lot of extras thrown in that would make me use the gold plated description. You are looking at basically a $70 difference in the cost of the base airframe for something that goes a great deal further.
If you put identical mission systems and capabilities into each then one could presume the mission systems would cost pretty much the same. Any additional savings above the airframe is likely rooted in having less capable radars, ESM and the like.
Brain Black – “….for a few extra pennies….” – Er, try an entire platform development budget. An A320 MPA exists as little more than some Powerpoint presentations and maybe a few engineering studies. Certainly nothing to get think about seriously investing in.
A319/320 based MPA is unlikely to happen now. Far too much development work to integrate the systems, especially for the numbers that the UK and any other European nations might be interested in buying.
With the benefit of hindsight, we could of looked at using the A319/320 as the platform for our long range ISTAR platforms – MPA, ASTOR, ELINT (and eventually) AWACS. Fleet commonality and could of potentially merged some of the different platforms over time.
Remove SAR and EEZ protection from the equation. They are not military tasks. I would not want those to be causal factors affecting the final decision to purchase a weapon system. If as a consequence the aircraft or system procured can contribute towards those tasks then all well and good, but the purchase decision must address the military requirement. The UK maintains its EEZ quite well enough for the moment and frankly it’s a job for the Coastguard and the rozzers, i.e. a civil task, not military.
There are two requirements to fulfil. Protection of the deterrent, and an expeditionary capability. The requirement for the former is clear – only P8 will suffice as it is the only aircraft available with the sensors and the weapon load capable of detecting, localising and prosecuting an SSN at long range. The latter can be answered by a number of options but the greatest requirement for any expeditionary capability must be range and endurance above all else. Buy C295/235/whatever, and if you operate more than a few hundred miles from your expeditionary airbase then you have a wasted aircraft.
There is no long ranged alternative to the P8 available to the UK – deliberately, because Boeing does not want a competitor affecting sales. Therefore by necessity a new aircraft must be conceived. We have the expertise in designing and building such aircraft for we are no longer in the business of needing MPA specialists to build MPAs – we have systems specialists. Nimrod MRA4 would have been absolutely fine if the MOD hadn’t interfered and insisted on stupid savings measures like reusing hand-build fuselages. Specify the requirement, write a decent commercial contract and pay up-front and let industry get on with it.
The content of the fuselage need not be ten tonnes of pig iron frames housing twenty ZX Spectrum computers. Modern computers are already far more powerful than we need – the Merlin HM2 combat/mission system is a great example. You need the basics – radar, EOD, mission system, radios. None of this is heavy. Only the radar has the potential to cause issues if the radome is too large, but maritime search radars are compact anyway (being invariably India-band with small antennas) and active arrays are even more so. You need a handful of operators, for even the most intensive missions (which will be ASW for ASuW isn’t intensive) only need four or five with modern acoustic processors. Okay, so if it’s an RAF operated aircraft you also need a large galley, but I think we can squeeze a few ratpacks and a kettle in somewhere.
Your only variables therefore are weapon load and expendable sensor load as well as choice of airframe. Carrying weapons externally adds significant drag so a weapons bay is required – or else you affect the primary requirement, range/endurance. Adding a weapons bay is a nightmare on a civil aircraft. You need up to 6 weapons for an effective attack – whilst I have no desire to compromise our ASW capabilities, reflect on the fact that submarines have countermeasures as well and other things can look like submarines, especially to a human being under pressure in a shooting conflict (lots of whale sushi in 1982). On expendable sensors, if you are hunting SSK’s then you need active buoys as an SSK makes virtually no noise (nothing for passive buoys to pick up). You rely on non-acoustic (i.e. radar, ESM, visual/EO) for detections and active buoys to localise (effectively expendable dipping sonars). You also need bathy buoys to analyse the water column.
There is nothing in the UAV world, either available now or planned, capable of carrying out the ASW mission. What is available with sufficent range is expensive – Global Hawk/BAMS, not a lot else.
That article from the commons was priceless from my point of view. MPs find it most concerning that the government cancelled your MPA and you haven’t now got anything. How do you plead?
We will not buy cn295 we will buy the gold plated p8 but not till 2020 and the SAR will be a proveded by a private company personnally i think sea atlas would be the perfect answer but we won’t get it it would cost to much
The government’s response to the select committee sessions quoted clearly indicates that they see the need for something to fill the Nimrod shaped hole.
” The Government fully recognises the importance of maritime surveillance to the UK. The Department has accepted a capability gap and increased risk by deleting Nimrod and we assess that other assets used as part of a layered approach can reduce this risk to some degree, and it remains within tolerable levels.”
It’s also been said that the seedcorn initiative can’t continue indefinitely. Any benefit from that would be lost if a new MPA wasn’t pursued from 2015.
I think there will almost certainly be some sort of civilian contract for a fixed-wing aircraft to cover domestic SAR, for long-range search and control. We might expect to see a small business jet used for those roles, but adding specific requirements such as being able to spread oil dispersants might favour a cargo aircraft like a C295 or C-130.
The C295 would be my best guess for the MoD. Perhaps less than optimal, but it looks like the number one budget option that would allow the capability to survive long-term.
On their website, on the C295 MPA page, Airbus rounds off with this line,
” For longer-range ASW missions Airbus Military offers the A320 family with the potential to provide true oceanic coverage ”
That line suggests that for a few extra pennies you could get everything that the C295 offers, including weapons carriage, on a longer-ranged platform.
The A319, a short-bus version of the A320 with greater endurance, would be plenty big enough for a MPA; using the A320 family could also provide potential for a future VIP fleet or AWACS replacement, and gives some benefit to UK manufacturing with A320 wings being knocked out in Wales.
Though I recognise that a high end MPA fleet is where we should be in a perfect world, we are not in the position at the moment to develop it, my choice would be to aim for a fleet of 12 C295’s by 2020, they would be tasked with EEZ protection, with 2 based in FI. and then in SDSR 2020 to decide what to do in the long term which I believe should be a P8, or equivalent, fleet.
Also as most of our operations are joint operations what is wrong with having another country provide the MPA assets if we are providing transport or other assets they don’t have, France don’t have a problem asking us for C17’s when they need them, even in a FI conflict we should be able to call upon France for some assets though MPA may be pushing to far towards a combat role.
In summary SDSR2015: some C295 to provide security please, SDSR 2020: a plan for the future MPA please.
PeterE – ref video! Coooo! Do they come in matt green? How much would an RA Battery’s worth cost??
Peter,
I know, what a shame :-)
@ Simon
Anything can be shot off a catapult :D
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-wVADKznOhY
But to be useful you also need to fold up the wings and tail and a strengthened fuselage both for launch and for arrested landing. Actaully – basically redesign the whole airframe. And of course the RN currently has no catapults. Other than that, good idea!
Just think, if the MPA and AEW version of the C295 could be shot of a catapult…
Just musing about the C295, which, as an aircraft, I’m starting to like…
Could the MPA “fit” be modular?
In other words, could we use the same airframes for tactical lift if necessary?
Transporting 50 fully equipped troops 1000nm to an austere grass airfield sounds rather useful.
Having seen the many arguments I feel the right option at SDSR 2015 is a C295 MPA buy of suffiicent aircraft to provide full time cover for SAR and decent level ASW and surface patrol. Not sure how many aircraft that would need and where they would need ot be based to give full UK wide coverage with a decent response time. North / South basing as QRA? I would allocate a flight of 2 aircraft to the FI.
Although the C295 will siginficantly enhance SSBN cover over what we have now and in a relatively low threat status, I accept the argument that it may change if the Russians press ahead with SSN activity. I also accept the need for a longer legged MPA to cover any major force deployment.
I feel there will also need for a commitment to buy a very small fleet (6?) of either the P8 or somthing equivalent. The answer has to be off the shelf so P8 is about the only candidate at present but if Sea Atlas appears then its an attractive possibility
I would hope we could gain some economies by adopting the C295 to replace a number of other types in various light transport and similar roles
TD,
Your diagram of combat>security>safety made me laugh. It nicely demonstrates a need for a hi-low mix on just about everything.
I just wanted to suggest that “maritime security” only needs a 200nm radius of operation so suits copters and short range aircraft well. It does not directly require a long-range MPA.
My gut feeling is that the primary requirement for MPA that is difficult and expensive to “cover” with other assets or even other procurement strategies is the deep water ASW and SSBN protection. I’d therefore put the MPA decision in the same bucket as the decision to keep Trident.
xbradtc,
…finding the targets for those fast jets is the role of an MPA.
Sentry can do that as well as any MPA, if not better. A 1MW radar is not to be sniffed at ;-)
Going back to my point above too, maritime strike jets will not have the legs for very long range operations (especially on scramble, where a tanker might not be airborne). So you simply don’t need a 1200nm radius of operation, ship detecting, MPA.
@Xbradtc and TD
I honestly think that, at least on a proper MPA of any sort, having a good ASuW capability is something that is very useful in a pinch.
For the sake of making a quick point I am going to vastly over-simplify things but having something like Harpoon, JSM or eventually LRASM on an MPA in reasonable numbers (2 to 4 on a standard patrol) vastly complicates the situation for the other side in any sort of active shooting conflict. Being hunted by something that could range several thousand miles out from its bases inflicts a lot of virtual attrition (in the form of things that now need escorted around) as well as operational restrictions on what ships you can operate alone and very importantly what type of EMCON you are operating under. Do you keep your radars off within possible patrol areas? Because if an MPA stumbles (or is directed by other assets to your area) and acquires you visually you could be dead before your combat systems power up. Do you turn your radars on to make sure you are not surprised? Well now you are pretty easy to track yourself.
Mostly though adding some anti-ship missiles to an MPA really does not take that much doing if it is a proper MPA. Doing it prevents you from being stuck in that situation where you happened upon a surface ship and can’t do anything but make faces at it. For the very marginal cost of doing it I can’t see deploying an MPA without that capability.
I would agree that ASuW is best left to tactical aircraft. But finding the targets for those fast jets is the role of an MPA.
May I remind you that the Argentine lack of MPA meant that many A-4 strikes were fruitless, as they had not fuel to search for targets? Had the Argentine P-2 fleet been operational, losses to the task force might have been even higher before even entering San Carlos Water.
The forecast for our budget deficit in 2014/5 is around £95 billion or 5.6% of GDP, in 2015/16 £80 billion or 4.4% of GDP with deficits continuing until 2018/19
At the time of the 2010 SSDR the deficit was forecast to be 1.1% by 2015/16
Because of this and because of the impact of Trident replacement costs I actually expect another cut in conventional military spending with the Type 23/26’s most at risk. I am an active member of the Conservative Party and do not get any strong sense that the party is that interested in the detail of defence issues as I have seen little real debate about the cuts already made so I think until the 2015 election we won’t see any major changes
I think decision makers will feel that we have got away with cutting capabilities and won’t see a strong need to restore those capabilities except for the carriers which have a certain national ego associated with them.
My gut feel is that we might look at a civilian long range SAR capability or maybe small incremental purchases of P-8 like we did with the C-17 but I do not expect any proper planning unless events force it on us ala 1982 Falklands
@TD
I think it is generally a team sport with what we call the “weapon train” being crucial. However if any asset is likely to prosecute on its own it is likely to be an MPA, the beauty of an MPA is range and speed, it can if bases are available range hundreds of miles ahead of a TG. It can self deploy Mid Atlantic or GIFUK Gap against an SSN intrusion.
It tends to conduct offensive or forward ASW .
Escorts and Helos generally concentrate on protecting the MEU. If you launch your amphib force/air raid or get your convoy through without ever going “hot” on a submarine you have achieved your aim.
Perhaps I should have said less likely, wanted to illustrate it is a gang sport
@TD
“On their own, a maritime patrol aircraft may not hunt and kill a submarine”
Actually an MPA able to drop multiple buoy lines and carry weapons is extremely capable of hunting and killing a submarine.
“lso highlights the UK’s interim dependency on allies for support in protecting the increasingly important reaches of the UK as well as its wider defence and direct military capability”
How long will they be prepared to cover us for? Make no mistake they currently are.
Great post though nicely sums up all our mutterings and issues from the MPA thread.