In an effort to provide more fact based information on which to discuss, a contributor has sent me this.
A fictional and relatively small RAF fast jet Sqn is equipped and manned as below.
I have tried to keep everything as simple as possible in order to keep this as short and clear for non-military readers. My aim is to show how vital proper manning is to the RAF as without it we simply can not operate.
Contents
Aircrew
Aircraft, Total Sqn Aircraft = 12 x Windy Weather F6s – A single seat swing role jet
However, 2 aircraft will always be in a Major Service (every 1000 hours) and 2 aircraft will always be in a Minor Service (every 500 hours). This means there should always be 8 aircraft on “the line” available to fly at any one point.
Crew, The squadron has 20 crew who require 15 hours flying a month to remain current (trained/licensed to fly)
Flying hours allocated
Currency; 3,600 hours
Combat ready; 400 hours (training for new pilots on the sqn to get to the required standard for combat ops)
Exercises; 2,000 hours
Contingency/Ops,; 2,000 hours
Total, 8,000 hours
Therefore, on average the Sqn should fly 24 aircraft hrs per day based on 5 day week which is 3 hrs per aircraft on the line per day.
The hours allocated are reliant on the engineering requirements. The major services are carried out by the aircraft manufacturer based on a pre-set contract written during procurement. The dates that these aircraft enter/exit major servicing are planned years in advance and can not be changed without paying huge penalties.
Engineer Manning
7 engineers per aircraft covering the aircraft on the line and in minor servicing.
With 3 shifts to cover a flying day of 0700-2200 daily = 210
A JEngO plus FS per shift plus WO and SEngO =8
4 Armourer per shift = 12
2 Squipers per shift = 6
2 Suppliers per shift = 6
Total Engineer Manning = 242
Other Manpower
Ops, Admin etc = 10
Total Sqn manpower = 272
Life as Normal
Using the manning figures above lets look at a normal situation and see how things work out. Everything is going to plan with no major problems or crisis affecting the hours flown, aircraft serviceability or manpower.
Weather, This is the UK and we get bad weather. A sqn can loose hours, days, weeks or even months to bad weather each year. Each hour lost needs to be gained back somewhere else increasing the amount of hours flown on the good weather days. The more hours flown per ac per day the more servicing is needed so the more man hours you need to do it but you do not get any more manpower so people just work harder. Some flying needs to be done during the day which is easy in summer and hard in winter. Other flying hours needs to be done at night which is easy in winter and hard in summer.
Real Life, People get sick, go on courses, take leave, get pregnant, get posted in and get posted out etc. So every section will be running light continuously. If a pilot misses 3 weeks due to a course and sickness he then has to fly his 15 hours in 1 week to avoid going out of currency monopolising the flying meaning other people can not fly as much. If engineers are away other may have to work a different shift to cover or certain jobs are put to one side or delayed. Just because you are a member of a flying sqaudron it does not mean you can be sent on operations to support another unit so squadrons will always be running light due to this as well.
Aircraft never go unserviceable when you want them to or to suite your manning. For example the engineers have various specialisations engines, airframes, avionics etc so you have a number of each specialisation on each shift. This is fine if the aircraft all go unserviceable for different reasons as you can spread the manpower out and work concurrently as best as possible. It rarely works out that was so if 3 aircraft have engine problems you probably can not fix all 3 at once yet you have engineers sat doing nothing as they are not trained/licensed to work on engines and so on.
Aircraft Upgrades or Modifications; Military aircraft are constantly being upgraded and modified so you will inevitably lose aircraft while this done. So again you have to fly the remaining aircraft harder and the more hours flown the more servicing is needed so the more man hours you need to do it but you do not get any more manpower so people just work harder.
Aircraft Spares; Clearly if the spare part you need to fix your aircraft is not on the shelf you have order it and wait for it to be supplied. The RAF uses some clever software to analyse wear and tear on aircraft which then dictates what, and how many spares you have on the shelf on station, those spares that are available off the shelf from suppliers and so on. This reduces costs considerably but aircraft simply do not break as and when they are supposed to so spares delays are common. Often the part you need is “robbed” (removed) off another aircraft that is broken for anther reason. This presents various issues outside the scope of this article (if it ain’t broken, don’t fix (touch) it!!) but the important factor is robbing a part takes more time than taking the same part off the shelf (removing it then possible cleaning/prepping, function testing etc) hitting your manpower further.
There is more but I think you get the idea that normal day to day life constantly affects your manpower and your ability to complete your tasks. Sadly, life is never as simple as above another other issues are common and frequent…….
Short Term Operational Tasking
So everything was going OK as per the above, there were issue but the Sqn was able to manage them with no real risk of ever getting stretched to breaking point. The phone rings and the Sqn boss is told that he needs to send 4 aircraft out to Italy as part of a NATO force to police a no-fly zone over a North African country. He has to provide 2 aircraft per day flying 6 hours each and every day for 30 days with the possibility this will extend.
Initial thoughts and assumptions are that this represents:
50% of the squadron’s aircraft, 2 aircraft plus 2 spares.
2 sorties per aircraft per day of 3 hours
4 crews flying each day, 2 crew resting and a planning crew = 7 crew
4 aircraft = 2 shifts of 28 engineers + armourers, squippers etc.
Ops and Admin staff, drivers and a Detachment Commander
Total predicted hours = 360 plus transit times (3 hours to Italy, 3 hours back x 4)
Total manpower = 80
So this does not look too bad, the only immediate concern is that you are losing 50% of you aircraft as flying still needs to continue back at base. But………..
Aircraft, Which ones shall we use?
Well first you need each aircraft to have over 90 hrs left before it’s next Minor or Major Service. So straight away that is a limitation and sods law says at least one of the aircraft you need will be broken so you have to rob parts off a serviceable jet to get it working. So you identify your 4 aircraft and start prepping them to ensure they are as serviceable as possible (most aircraft will normally carry minor, non-critical faults and unserviceablilies but you try not deploy aircraft like that). You all start prepping what spares you need to take plus you need to coordinate bombs and bullets, tools, paperwork, IT etc.
Everyone is very busy.
Crew; So you need 7 crew so who do you take? Well you need crews that are in currency and you will need to ensure some of those are your experienced crews. You identify the seven and they are told to go and fly whatever sorties, currencies etc they need and be ready to go. The rest of the crews support them but wont be getting their normal amount of hours.
Admin; Flights will be booked to get all the ground support equipment and personnel and the crews not transiting the jets to Italy. The rest of the stn supports the sqn and a C17 comes in to take out all the support equipment and most of the staff, a Tristar takes the rest.
7 days later the deployment is in full swing in Italy, it was hard work but you made it. Job done?
Meanwhile Back at Base
Crew; The requirement for the remaining crews to fly 15 hours a month remains but now there is only 4 aircraft to do it. Yet you now need to ensure that you have crews ready to augment the detachment in Italy and have to consider what happens if the operation extends beyond 30 days. In short you need to fly more with less aircraft. You may be able to cancel some exercise, but not all and some of the exercise may offer excellent training for what you will be doing in Italy so you still do them. The Sqn routinely deploys on operations 3 months a year and that wont be cancelled so you continue to prepare for that meaning more flying hours.
Engineers; The aircraft will still break but the spares shelf is nearly empty as most of it is all in Italy as those aircraft are the priority. You order more spares but it always takes time. You have lost a quarter of your engineering manning so you can no longer sustain the same shift pattern resulting in less hours available to fix and service the aircraft. The yearly 3 month det accounts for 1800 of the contingency/operational hours so with the new detachment you are going to be 160 hours over your allocation. There is no extra money for this and you can not send aircraft into Major Servicing early as its not in the contract. So you have to save the 160 hours from the Exercise allocation and this may work out as you have just cancelled one exercise. You sent the 4 jets with the most hours remaining until their next minor/major service to Italy so now you have to manage the hours left on the jets at base.
The Minor Services are done in house so if the aircraft use the hours quicker than planned due to the extra flying you can perhaps cope, a bit. But, you are short on engineers so it may take longer than normal to complete the Minor Services
At this point SEngO decides that one aircraft that is due a minor service in 15 hours and is currently unserviceable with a quite manpower intensive problem will just be left broken for now.
There is no point using valuable manpower to fix it so it can fly for 15 hours.
So the 4 aircraft become 3.
So what does all this mean?
The guys in Italy are flying more hours than are normal, the aircraft are well supported and like the warm weather so serviceability is good.
Everything is going well.
Back home crews are struggling to remain current let alone have extra hours to train for a possible deployment to Italy or for the standard 3 month squadron detachment.
The engineers are working all hours in an attempt to keep the 3 remaining aircraft serviceable. Winter is closing in so vital hours are lost each week to the weather which is fine for the engineers (more time to fix aircraft) but not for the crews. You lose 2 pilots who are posted but get 3 new pilots straight from the Operational Conversion Unit. On the face of it the seems like a result but the 3 new pilots require a lot of flying to get them Combat Ready and you need the hours for the other pilots so the new pilots get no hours for the first few weeks. The squadron boss has already started cancelling leave and courses in attempt to preserve manpower but can not cancel people being sick or pregnant. With grit, guts, strong leadership and capturing the true RAF Ethos the Sqn manages to do just about everything it needs to and not fall apart.
But then…
The squadron boss gets another call from Air Command; the operation has been extended to a total of 60 days. It is not all bad news though the sqn will be able to borrow 2 aircraft from another sqn and a further 2 aircraft will come out of major servicing and 2 will go in. The 3 aircraft have become 6.
Re-Plan Time And Initial Thoughts And Assumptions
The 7 crew in Italy need to be replaced by 7 fresh crews.
Some or all of the engineering manning will also need to be replaced.
Any manpower replacement need to be staggered for better continuity. The manpower returning form Italy will all get 7 days leave.
6 aircraft back at base is good and any hours used on the 2 borrowed aircraft will come from the lending sqns hours allocation.
Crew; So you need 7 crew so who do you send? Well you need crews that are in currency and you will need to ensure some of those are your experienced crews. But, you have already sent your most experienced people out so who is next? You identify the 7 and they are told to go and fly whatever sorties, currencies etc they need and be ready to go. This 7 need more hour than the previous 7 to do get current/competent so the flying programme crams in as much flying as possible.
Engineer; You now have 6 aircraft which initially seems good but you have no additional manpower to fix them so you hope and pray nothing serious goes wrong with any of them. 2 of the aircraft in Italy are getting short on hours so you need to prep 2 new ones and send them out to Italy. This works out well as you can swap 2 crew at the same time. Manpower is diverted to fully prepare these aircraft. As you start to send new people to Italy you have to run even lighter while you wait for the returning people to take a weeks leave. More spares need to be sent out to Italy so again your shelf starts to look a bit bare. So the 6 aircraft will become 4 for a week (preparing for the swap) but due to spares and manpower shortages the most aircraft they are able to get serviceable is 2 at anyone time. The crew want to fly them 8 hours a day resulting in more servicing requirements.
A week or so later the personnel and aircraft swaps have been completed and everyone has returned from leave. Do things start to return to normal?
Crew; The 7 crew that have returned have flown lots of hours but due to the nature of the flying from Italy they need to do some night flying to remain current. The few remaining crews who have not been to Italy are trying to get current and train to go to Italy just in case and need to day fly. Everyone still needs to continue preparing for the normal Sqn deployment which is proving nearly impossible.
Engineers; Things have picked up a bit but they are still struggling to keep more than 3 aircraft serviceable a day and morale is dropping. The crews want to fly day and night but the manning can’t cover both so the Sqn boss decides that the night flying will have to wait, prepping crew for Italy is the priority.
The 60 days are up and French have agreed to take over the sqn commitments to the no-fly zone so everyone returns home for tea and medals. The last 70ish days have been hard on everyone but it’s over now everything will be fine, won’t it?
The Sqn is back to full manning, leave has been taken and everyone is rightly proud of what they have done.
So what happens now?
Crew; Flying continues and the 3 new crew are starting to get the hours they need. However, due to the Op only 2 crews are current for night flying so the Sqn needs to fit in a night flying week somehow. Extra hours are needed to get everyone fully current again before the sqn deploys people on standing 3 month detachment in 6 weeks time. The lost exercise means they will not get to complete certain types of training before they deploy next time. This means some crew on the sqn have not flown certain missions since the last operational deployment 12 months ago. Skill fade is a real issue but there is nothing that can be done so the risk is noted but this will not stop the next deployment.
Engineers; The 2 borrowed jets have been returned so we are back, in theory, to 8 on the line forward line. The sqn is now 400 hrs over its Contingency/Operational hours so more needs to come from the Exercise allocation. However, it is now late in the financial year so most of the exercise hours have already be spent so you can gain back 250 hrs but are still 150 hours short which now have to come from the Combat Ready Allocation meaning the 3 new pilots will not get all the hours they need this financial year (to become Combat Ready). Due to the extra flying some of the aircraft are closing in on their minor servicing early so you try to fly them less as there is still a back log of minor servicing from the detachment period. The 8 has effectively become 4 but there is nothing you can do. There is a lot of catch up work to get all the jobs done that were pushed to one side during the op so it is still non-stop for the engineers.
6 Weeks later
6 crew and 20 engineers and support staff depart for the Middle East. It is mid winter and the sqn is loosing 2-3 hours flying each day due to weather and the lack of daylight as most of the flying needs to be done during the day. The sqn again enters the cycle of preparing crew and engineers to rotate through the detachment and all the associated issues as seen above.
The Sqn boss comes back from a meeting with the Stn Cdr and he is not happy. The Stn normally closes for 10 days over Christmas and despite the Sqn boss pleading that the stn remains open for a few extra days to allow more crews to get current the Stn Cdr refuses.
To be fair to the Stn Cdr his hands are tied, many of the Stns staff are civilians who can not be forced to work over Christmas even if he had the budget for overtime. Air Traffic Control, Stn Operations, the Fire Section and Medics are all short staffed due to their own operational commitments, courses, illness, maternity etc and both need and deserve time off. The Stn Cdr has also been under pressure by the council as the locals don’t like all the noise from the airfield so he has promised no noise of Christmas.
It never ends.
Summary
So there you have it, the story of one fictional sqn and how it transitions from normal flying to short notice operational detachment and then to routine operational detachment. The simple fact is a flying Sqn is a constant state of recovery and repair but it never fully recovers and just gets worn down.
Aircrew and Engineer competency is a real issue as they never get chance to completely train for what the do and consolidate experience and knowledge.
This sums up the last 10+ years of the RAF.
Yet the story above is much simplified and captures a fraction of the issues.
I only just touched at the issues for the support staff (ops, ATC etc) at the end but this is another huge issue that never goes away. You should have noticed lots of problems that needed to be solved that would require a fair amount of staff work and deliberation. If you take nothing else away from this article then take away the fact that no modern day RAF unit is ever actually fully manned and that contracts will civilian companies are a real life limitation.
There is no flex in the system at all any more and everything we do has a negative knock on affect further down the line.
In short, an RAF unit is not even manned for basic exercises and normal flying let alone operations, even small ones.
Excellent – very well written, thank you to the Anon Crab who submitted it, much appreciated.
Of course this problem is endemic to all the services, whether it’s battalions robbing a Company group from an non-deployed brother, or ships deploying as “lean manned”.
It’s even spread beyond the armed forces to the Prison Service, Fire Services etc.
The whole thought process behind running military, para-military, or public service organisations like “lean and mean” commercial operations is deeply, deeply flawed.
As a programme manager in charge of platoon levels of staffing and millions of pounds worth of budget, I have been heard to say “it does not matter, nobody has died” ! This is the exact opposite, when the proverbial hits the fan, people will die, either because there are not enough hot bodies to do the job, or the ones available are already exhausted and suffering from low morale…..
Still, I bet the FAA would have less people to do …. no I am not going to go there…
After reading that if I were the squadron boss I would be doing my best blackadder impression of underpants on the head and two pencils up my nose saying baldric I have a cunning plan.
Nice piece, it illustrates the practical ‘hidden costs’ of running an actual squadron.
Not wanting to complicate this otherwise simplified – but by no means ‘dumbed down’ overview – there are of course the ‘operational spares’: aircraft and aircrew (from perhaps OCUs and/or TWCUs) which may be temporary assigned to boost squadron operational numbers.
Don’t know how it’s done in the RAF, but it’s common in most NATO air forces to have a pool of spare aircraft (usually drawn from the training units) to temporary replace the ‘Major Service’ maintenance airframes to avoid the creation of ‘Hangar Queens’.
Problemis many types are pooled now, with one large engineering unit catering for several squadrons. This article pretty much summed up my previous trade pretty well, a constant mox of juggling aircraft, people and hope… it works, just.
Thing is, now the author has identified it, how do we go about solving it? – IF there is any way of doing that? The Idea ofpooling all the aircraft was hoped to help alliviate the situation, it did but now as airframe life starts to wane and fewer service personel, the issue is just as bad as it was, and as the author states, it’ll slowly get worse.
But pooling the resources is very common now
Agreed, really good stuff. And Marcase’s description of it as illustrating the hidden costs is the key.
Mike,
As someone who’s been in the business, what’s your if-I-ruled-the-water-cooler response? Beyond of course bringing back support numbers to saner levels. (I’d listen to that too, the whole “well there’s no way to make that happen” approach has to change or there’s no long-term hope besides tumult.) Getting down in the details of the post, what might help? Not to put you on the spot or anything — really. Just an interested question to get a debate up.
So basically the armed forces are not funded, equipped or manned for the kind of things the politicians demand them to be. Its a very enlightening piece as to how that works on the ground but the problem is really the same. We are close to the limit of the practical, military solutions, and urgently in need of some genuine ‘tough choices’ and actual leadership.
I’m beginning to think the MoD are just purely unable to negotiate a deal that is in their favour, regardless of what it entails. Useless bloody clowns.
Fair play to the RAF boys, sounds like you lot put in some real hard work for little reward.
“I’m beginning to think the MoD are just purely unable to negotiate a deal that is in their favour, regardless of what it entails. Useless bloody clowns.”
Yup. Since the Cold War and Op Banner wound down there’s no real pressure on them to actually defend the realm properly. So they can get on with their true everyday job: keeping up a pretence of defending the realm so they can provide customer satisfaction for contractors and their shareholding owners. A deal in the MoD’s favour implies nasty, tradesmen-like things like competition and efficiency, and possibly principles like “national defence is important.”
I just cant understand why governments keep pinning themselves to the wall (not just on defence) with these stupid contract incentives and penalties.
Look at the PFI deals on behalf of the NHS (by the last government). The British Medical Association has made the point that in hard times they would normally shut buildings and services that hardly get used in order to protect staff numbers. They can’t do that with these PFI’s, so they’re left with staff reductions while empty wards are kept fully maintained. Just ridiculous.
From the point of view of an unqualified layman, the core issue seems to be not enough serviceable airframes for the number of aircrew on the squadron. 20 aircrews for a maximum of 8 flying jets at any one time seems to be asking a lot of the ground crew keep them all current.
So the main challenge would seem to he reducing airframe hours while still keeping crews current. I imagine there’s a good reason that more isn’t done on simulators.
The other thing that our fictional squadron commander does that maybe I’d have done differently was send all his best crews out to Italy at the start. Leaving at least a couple of senior crew at home would help with training the crews left behind, and give a couple of mid-level crew some rapid advancement. Though on the other hand this is a decision that could end l with s
…someone getting killed or injured in action so it just has to always be the most experienced crews.
Bloody iPhone posted the message before I’d finished it.
Two obvious bits stick out.
Dont break up Squadrons.
How many of those problems would have been solved if the entire squadron went?
Not all of them, but a good chunk.
Overstore
Actual Airframes if not spares.
16 Aircraft would allow 8 on the line, 4 on service, 4 on standby.
Thats 10 Squadrons, even with the minimum Typhoon order.
Our full order is enough for 16.
And really, theres no additional cost for more aircraft “on the line”, its only flight hours that matter.
Excellent piece thank you.
****
Suddenly, the reason all units arent swing role makes sense, more skills, more drills.
****
My crazy thinking for Typhoon is 160 airframes all to the same standard, yes in know probably not realistic but bear with me. Two operating bases each with 4 Squadrons of 14 aircraft alongside a single large squadron of 24 aircraft acting as a training/reserve squadron, so actually 112-116 in frontline squadrons.
Anyhow really good article as it shows where the people are and what they are needed for in simple terms and why we could really do with more engineering folk. Thankfully I already knew quite a bit of it as a member of the family is an engineering crab albeit a rather stressed and annoyed crab atm with all that’s going on. However it really simplifies it down for my grey matter to process rather than trying to remember someone telling you.
Thoroughly excellent piece, a joy to read if only for the insight it provides. My thanks.
Quick question re harmony guidelines for enduring expeditionary operations:
If we accept that the enduring operational requirement is the same as the OP above, i.e. 4 jets from 8 active in a squadron of 12, how many squadrons do you need to sustain that indefinitely?
Where the question is leading is this: how big does the typhoon fleet need to be, in both front-line units and airframes, in order to sustain a deployment of 4 jets somewhere faraway?
I understand that QRA notionally requires four squadrons of twelve jets to properly conduct north and south.
I understand that a fifth squadron of typhoon is intended, and that we also sustain four jets in the Falklands.
Can five front-line squadrons of twelve typhoons manage both QRA, and two enduring deployments of 4 aircraft (one in FI, one somewhere dusty)?
All this predicated on the notion that there will be F35c and carriers which are likely to be responsible for much of the interventions, if not the sustained deployments.
Many thanks
I am the author of the original article and would like to thank you for the positive feedback. I want to re-iterate that this is a fictional sqn and not a fictional (wink) sqn. All numbers and figures for crew, engineers etc are made up but I believe they are representative enough to validate the rest of the article.
To respond to some of the points:
The Sqn has 12 aircraft not 8 in the eyes of the MOD and 12 is enough for 20 crew.
The argument of whether or not to send all your experiences crews out first will rage on. For short term ops like this then I think most Sqns would go for experience. However, you can not sustain this so for enduring ops you have to mix it up.
There simply are no spare aircraft or crews anymore. The pooled aircraft system helps but you are still robbing one group of people to supply another.
You can not send an entire Sqn for several reasons. First you need to maintain currency and you can not fly training trips (practice emergencies etc) in theatre. If you send entire sqns you then need some sort of roster so 1 Sqn on ops/standby, 1 on exercises, 1 on training, 1 on rest/reset. So what happens if something kicks of 1 week before the sqns are due to swap roles? Who do you send? What if there are no exercises planned while your Sqn is on Exercise Duty? Unless you have 5 sqns and rotate a “spare” in each Sqn will always cover the same period which will go down well for the Sqn who always miss xmas etc.
Additionally, the manning figures are all tightly woven together. If you increase crew you need to increase hours which mean you need to increase engineers and so on. Therefore, if you decrease hours you also need to reduce crew because you simply can not keep crews current and/or competent.
The answer to all this? Well this is even more complicated. For flexibility, and as above you have to have a multi-purpose Sqn (one doing ops, exercises, training etc simultaneously) hence why we have Jerico/Fight by Flight in the helicopter world. Therefore, you need a big Sqn with enough manpower to do it all. This is not an efficient use of manpower in the civilian sense of the world but the RAF is a military organisation not civilian. You need lots of aircraft, lots of spares and lots of engineers so that you are fully manned even when people are sick, pregnant, posted, on courses and so on. The RAF also needs to go back to the days when Operational Conversion Units (OCU) delivered fully combat ready pilots to the Sqns.
There is approx 17 operational flying Sqns in the RAF at the moment so with the big Sqn idea of lets say 500 people per Sqn that is 13500 people required just for the flying Sqns which represents just under half of the RAF manning target. By the time you add in OCUs, support staff (admin, supply, ops, atc, fire, movers etc) then add in HQs, IPTs, training bases and so on we will be over the figures set by the recent defence review.
Jedi
Its 4 squadrons worth of personnel to allow 24/7 standing of QRA not 48 jets. I believe with the use of simulators and the better availabilities of modern jet they HOPE to be able to increase the number of pilots assigned to each squadron. As for deployed force for example the last Iraq operation the US insisted that there must be 2 crews deployed with each fast jet.
Wibble
In all honesty, articles like yours are why I come here, and direct everyone I konow with even the teeniest bit of power here.
Because you just dont get that level of detail anywhere else.
Just guessing, please shoot down everything thats daft with as much detail as possible.
160 Typhoons would allow for 10×16 strong squadrons.
Say 2 are training Squadrons
That leaves 8
1 mounts QRA North
1 mounts QRA South
1 mounts QRA Falklands (trust me, we’ll need a proper presence in the SA)
That leaves 5 full squadrons for expeditionary stuff and gap filling.
Manning and tasking levels are at current levels, despite the 1/3rd increase in assets.
So, we need three air bases, North, South, Falklands.
Squadrons 1-5 are at North, 6-10 are at South, They alternate the Step up for Falklands
1 and 6 are training units, so dont exist for our purpose, that leave 2, 3, 4 and 5 at RAF South and 7, 8, 9 and 10 at RAF North.
P1
Sqn 2 is deployed for 4 months to Falklands for QRA, 3 and 7 also mount QRA
P2
Sqn 7 is deployed to Falklands, 4 and 9 do QRA
P3
Sqn 3 is deployed to Falklands, 5 and 10 do QRA
Hmm, that is gonna throw up problems.
Are trainers the most nails pilots or the ones who dont really make the grade?
I’m thinking could we have a Training unit in the UK, and use the second (advanced) to Garrison the Falklands?
I’ve kinda gone off track here, there was a question somewhere but damned if I can find it.
I wonder if we could realistically scale down to 1 QRA location, plus a warm standby perhaps
DominicJ,
You will never get all the aircraft assigned to the Sqns. Don’t forget these aircraft will have to last 30 odd years and in the time we will lose some through accidents, war etc so some will be held in reserve. Plus they will be going through upgrades throughout.
You will never assign a full Sqn to one task like QRA as they will suffer skill fade for the other skills plus it is boring!! QRA North will be covered by the Sqns in the North, QRA South will be covered by the Sqns in the South and all the Sqns will cover the Falklands with crew spending a max of about 6 weeks in MPA in order to maintain currency. The system will be no different to what the F3 did for it’s life.
I have no real knowledge of Typhoon operations but I image the real issue is the Air Defence/Ground Attack split. Will Sqns concentrate on one or the other or will it be flights in the Sqn the specialise in one or the other? Will some be true swing role and receive enough hours to be good at both? What will be the overall split? 70% AD and the rest Ground Attack as we still have GR4 and should be getting the F35? I dont know the answers to this but it is going to be tough with all the cuts.
If its one were is it to be based? In the North to cover north atlanitic traffic and our nuclear sites for example or south for London area?.
For the Raptor squadrons in america there is now a shadow squadron of air national guard using the same a/c as the regulars specifically for this type of mission. Granted they operate more standard squadrons of 18 a/c but surely there must be a case for using reservists in the UK for the QRA tasking I think only about 4 jets are ever available to QRA at each location 2 primary and 2 spare/back-up just in case. I read also that the Falklands flight requires a total of 45 ground personnel and 5 pilots(significantly less than the tornados or so the piece says) one of which is the flight boss may give some idea of requirements.
Mark,
I can not give you locations, numbers and stuff like that but you can probably google and find validated data from PMQs etc.
As for using reservist then it goes back to skill fade. You can’t train pilots just to sit and wait for an incident. They need to be competent operators of the aircraft and multiskilled so even if you use reservists they would still need all the flying hours etc of the regulars so you might as well use regulars.
Wibble
I understand that I was more asking TD were his single QRA station would be.
As for reservists. An air national guards man is cheaper than a regular i would have thought. If the reservists are only trained in air defence and the regulars all fully multi roles. It would make the QRA tasking less of an issue for the regulars. Yes they still need hours but the personnel cost must be cheaper. If it wasn’t would the Americans not just scrap the guard and employ only regulars.
The USAF employ reserves to get votes, not because they are good.
A single QRA stn is not a good ideas as you could easily loose the runway due to weather, an accident etc.
Wibble, agree on the resilience front but thats why I mentioned a warm standby, not fully manned or equipped
I do think we are a bit over resourced for UK QRA and AD. If FI can manage with a flight, are we really saying the UK needs 2 squadron locations for what might be considered a much lower threat
Mark with one QRA station although to me it makes less sense militarily it would probably be based in the South where the majority of the population is for things like possible 9/11 style events. Also with the attitude the SNP has toward defence as a whole unless it hits their votes directly then f*ck ‘em keep it down south where it’s moderately easier to support.
Wibble,
“Welcome aboard” just sounds trite after something this good. If we get the opportunity, and you the time, for one more post of this kind of quality then we here are very lucky. Thanks also for the follow-on comments.
Euan,
The Scots Nats do have a habit of being a disgrace to Scottish nationalism, don’t they?
Dominic and Wibble I remember someone wrote that the Germans thought we would need 180 Eurofighter and they were in my opinion pretty darn close to the mark with that estimate. Either going with my plan on Dominic’s that would leave 20 aircraft as spares which might be enough given reserve or training squadrons included as spares.
Jackstaff the single biggest reason I don’t vote for or support the SNP is simply their stance that they think an independent Scotland should be a full member of the EU. Although in general I could give a whole list of reasons why I would not support them so best not to get me started
Although I think you have to admit Wee Eck is a rather smart politician although compared to the rest of them that’s no great stretch.
Euan,
Wee Eck is shrewd but, as you say, there’s not much to judge by in the current generation. And as a part-Scot (with a half-Glaswegian wife) I could live with a properly thought-out confederation (with things like common currency and common defence) and the moves to federalism don’t trouble me a jot because I like the Square Mile reminded that there are about sixty million other Britons outside the higher end of the financial sector. Having spent time (including now
in a couple of other federalised English-speaking countries it can be done. I just think the SNP do a mostly rotten job of advocating things that would benefit the country (Scotland) effectively as opposed to sounding nice in a press release (like what you highlighted, EU membership.)
Very much agreed on 180 Typhoons, it’s a solid figure (as you illustrated) and a very easy slogan for MoD lobbying. That plus effective strategic transport and effective ISTAR/EW is still a very strong service. Shame they’ve been seduced by the Low-Observable Fat Bastard …
Euan,
But as you say (between the lines anyway), being a shifty bunch of bar stewards doesn’t help them either
Jackstaff that’s the way I would like to see things go to a certain extent although it would all be in the detail for instance what would be devolved and what would be a central government issue. One thing that worries me atm is the push by the Scottish Government to try and get the power to borrow money. Your also spot on reading between the lines compared to the other parties they are a bit harder to pin down
When it comes to the F-35 I’m rather on the fence about it to be honest but Lockheed Martin and the fan boys are hyping it up quite a bit which does rather annoy me at times when trying to find information. I think for the UK the F-35 is important as a strike aircraft but probably more importantly as an ISTAR platform if all its electronics work as promised it should be a real leap in capability. Although I think we should also get something like the X-47B to complement F-35 both in the strike and ISTAR roles on and off carriers. The program however is a clusterfuck and it would have been better to develop them individually IMHO with possibly the A and C version sharing commonality and developed as a joint program. With my comparatively limited knowledge of the design evolution of the aircraft compared to some folk who might come along and bash me the thing I do notice is the compromises made for the B version to work. For a kick off I doubt and we more or less know the F-35B will be nothing like as rugged as the harrier for example being able operate from a short dirt strip in a forest somewhere in Germany.
As for a “Low-Observable Fat Bastard” well the low observable bit I have questions about but I don’t know enough apart from if you give it a decent jamming capability it should be rather good. The Fat bit I don’t think is a problem for us and the reason it’s fat is because it carries tons of fuel internally as well as rather large weapons bays for 2000lb class weapons (I wish I had an excuse like that). For other folk the fat thing might be a problem if they need to use it as air superiority which is covered by Eurofighter in UK service although flown off of carriers in RN service it could be a problem. For some of the European partners I would suggest that Gripen NG would be a better low cost solution for their particular needs although I really am a Gripen fan boy to the extent of the typical F-35 fan boy. That’s the other thing, the cost which looks to be going completely and utterly out of the window and into orbit along with schedule although i do accept we can’t really know true production or operating costs yet.
Anyhow I’ve rambled on enough and away from the general direction of the thread so sorry if i’ve annoyed anyone
TD
The Falklands is smaller area backed up by AD radar and a threat of limited capability and no 9/11 senario. Plus the foot print is small due to costs.
In the UK you easily have a few Bears out to the North and a airliner with lost coms over Kent so you need 2 areas.
What a brilliant article!
The main thing i take from it is that the SDSR is proven to be dead wrong. That it doesn’t come anywhere near to observable reality in it’s manning & equipment planning for the RAF, especially in the short term.
Some time ago i saw a program about the battle of britian which had a new (well new to myself), slant on some of the reasons as to why britian won. I think it’s relevant to this as after a lot of research they found that both britain & germany had made assumptions about both of their air forces that were incorrect. It gave britian an advantage that was not apparent at the time.
We had Squadrons of 20 aircraft each, Germany had Squadrons of 12 each.
Germany thought we also had Squadrons of 12 aircraft & we thought they had 20 aircraft per Squadron. We overestimated their strength & they underestimated our strength. Our plans were hugely robust compared to their plans, due to incorrect assumptions and information.
So, today, why do we have Squadrons of only 12 aircraft when effectively that means that roughly 8 aircraft are available?
Isn’t this simply a way of fudging numbers, saying we still have X many Squadrons, basicly a way to make the RAF seem stonger than it really is?
On paper, according to the RAF’s website they have what they call 8 Offensive Support Squadrons.
7 of GR4′s.
1 of Typhoon.
For AD there are 3, not including the E3D Squadron, although 111 Squadron are supposed to have F3′s it doesn’t give a location.
2 of Typhoon.
1 of F3.
Ok, not including the OCU Squadrons & if they all have 12 aircraft each thats only 132 aircraft that they have for current operations. I know that there are spare aircraft but how often does one of them get pulled from the reserve to cover for an aircraft that is down for major maintainance or cause it’s been smashed up or something?
I don’t know how to find that out!
11 Squadrons of 12 combat aircraft each is a damm small airforce, any way you look at it.
To me that looks way, way too small to cover Afghanistan & all normal operations & then suddenly we are involved in an open ended commitment in Libya too?
All i can understand from this is that very shortly, the RAF is going to consist of a few over worked Squadrons and many Squadrons who will be trying to fix lot’s of aircraft that are in need of some major TLC. All the while trying to do this with a lot less people & fewer spare parts etc etc. If that is the case, how are the pilots supposed to keep current?
So with the SDSR, everyone is thinking in terms of plans for the future when noone is paying that much attention to whats happening right now.
I hope someone will tell me that no, you’re wrong about that due to such & such. If that doesn’t happen, then there is no point talking about Sea Grippen, Seaphoon, F35′s or Rafales etc etc cause right now the RAF looks to have a real problem.
Have i got this completely wrong or is that about right?
(please excuse my ignorance)
Generaly speaking, and odly since its the service I was considering, I know a lot loss about the organisation of the RAF than the Army and the RN.
The Other Two seems to work on a training, deployment, rest, cycle, but the RAF seems to have a much harsher peace time tasking, three active “wars” to be fought, whereas the peace time army has bugger all to do, beyond maintain a Brigade ready to deploy.
Is currency a big issue?
Could an RAF Squadron rotate through QRA training, QRA, rest, Expeditionary Training, Expedition (or standby), rest, QRA Training, QRA, Rest?
Let me just run the numbers and I’ll update
Michael
Dont pick up too much on the 12 aircraft figure I used it is a nominal figure for the sake of the article.
111 Sqn disbanded in March.
Dominic,
Sqns have to rotate through all aspects of their role to maintain currency and competency. If you lose a capability then it is very hard and therefore expensive to get it back.
Excellent piece and a good counter to those who think the RAF simply works 9-5 Monday to Friday.
Spares have been a major issue over the past two decades. In the late nineties it was directed that depot stock levels sould be reduced to one months worth, companstated for by smaller but more frequent purchases. THis soon well to pot as funding restrictions led to moretoriums halting both the pruchase of new build and the repair of existing items.Lead times on new built vary from 12 to 24 months so it is easy to see that there is a sunstantial knock on effect.
It was realised that more stock was needed so this was increased to 2 months worht but that was still half of what it used ot be ie 4.
Total support Packages and Powere by the hour contracts are supposed to have reduced this issue with spares for everything except in the flight line being the responsibility of the Contractor but the Contractor wants to make a profit and so will keep his holdings as low as possible and is vulnerable to problems at his sub-contractors etc.
Sudden increases in operational tempo cause a whole host of problems with additional spares bought at inflated prices, and if the hourly flying rate exceeds that in the contract the price goes through the roof.
Things are going to get worse as the traditional reserve pool of serviceable aircraft is reduced in order to maintain Squadron numbers with reduced fleet sizes and robbing platforms far from improving as has been promised is also likely to increase to keep detachments on operations serviceable.
How the RAF is going to be able to keep up its tasking requirements post 2017 with only 6 Fast Jet Squadrons is beyond me and the Air Staff seem to now believe their own spin.
Here Goes
There are in effect 4 Squadron level RAF tasks
The home island QRAs and two expeditionary Squadrons
Each can be divided into three parts, each lasting three months.
A “Work Up” phase, an “Active” Phase and a “Rest” phase.
That gives us 12 postings.
A Sqn would rotate
QRA (N) Workup
QRA(N)
Rest
Expedition Workup
Expedition Ready
Rest
QRA(N) Workup
Or QRA(S) Workup
QRA(S)
Rest
Expedition Workup
Expedtion Ready
Rest
QRA(S)
There seems little point to rotation between QRA (N) and QRA (S), if you have a home base, it makes stuff like having a home easier.
That would require 12 squadrons, each of 16 aircraft, and sounds like it would make all of your problems go away.
The Pilots sent to Libya would know they were on expecditionary duty, and so will have spent the previous 3 months ensuring their currency levels for things that cant be practiced when deployed are fully up top date. And after their three month tour, they have another three months to catch up on anything missed, and then another three months to ready for QRA work.
It does of course lack a dedicated training unit, and Falklands cover.
I was thinking about rolling that into one task, possibly even with the secondary Expeditionary force…
But we’re a long long way outside my knowledge base at this point.
20 pilots, at 15 hours a month, for 12 months a year, at £50,000 an hour is £250,000,000
So for 12 such squadrons, £3bn.
The RAF/FAA spent £3.8bn on combat jets in 2008.
So mine seems far better and considerable cheaper.
Although that £3.8bn did include Joint Force Harrier.
All the more reason we should have knocked some heads together in the early 80′s and said the RAF/FAA could have one aircraft and it better be STOBAR off a Medium Carrier.
Still not convinced we need two full time QRA/AD locations
If we were flying Spitfire then yes but the Typhoon has massive sprint speed and we have to be realistic about the threat, if I was slicing the cake, ISTAR/SH and AT would be eating into QRA/AD
Doh!
That was £70,000 per hour not £50,000.
If you drop to 16 pilots, thats only £200mn per year per squadron.
@ TD – “Still not convinced we need two full time QRA/AD locations”
I am sympathetic to that, the typhoon is supposed to be able to trundle around at mach 1.2 without reheat.
Jedi, I think there was a parliamentary question a while ago that asked on how many occasions the QRA north and south had been used simultaneously in the last several years, answer, none
Have a look at this
http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2011/04/01/355001/uav-trial-shows-non-pilots-equally-skilled-says-raf.html
Makes interesting reading TD it will help with the manning requirements of the look time on task. Though I would ask do we still operate the predator. I would assume that transit thru civil or restricted airspace is still required to be done by a full trained pilot though.
As for the manning requirement the US have seven 18 aircraft operational squadrons from 180 F22s are the RAF being over cautious with only five 12 a/c squadrons from 160 aircraft.
Jed/TD
Although one base can cover both patrols, we cannot guarentee one base will always be active.
If a landing jet at QRA(N) suffers a catastrophic failure and rams the runway at 45′, with a full warload, that all detonates, QRA(S) can cover for it.
If theres not a QRA(S), we’re ****ed.
I dont really see how designating one a warm standby changes much?
Not really Dom, there are usually multiple runways that could cope with an accident
As long as you have some facilities and maybe a couple of aircraft at your secondary location moving the aircrew should not really represent a problem should the primary location get flooded, weathered in etc
I think the RAF needs to step back a little from the sustained air defence in depth mission and resource for QRA
Dom
The same argument could be made against putting all our tanker transport assets in one airbase too yet were still going that way. As a tanker is usually on standby or scrambles to support QRA launch.
TD,
There are not many dual runway stns left, if any. Plus if the wind is wrong you are screwed.
I would not get to tied up with the QRA issue, it is not really all that expensive or that big a deal for the crew/sqn.
Massively interesting post, Wibble. The things I drew out of it are as follows (and are more policy/strategic than tactical/basing)
1/. Why do we contract out deep servicing of our a/c? Surely for flexibility, skill maintenance on the engineering side (rotating through the deep service depot) and maybe cost, this should be done in-house? After all, deep serviceing by the contractor would be added to the “fearsome” up front cost of the purchase, and the Contractor would want to make a profit on it? Finally, getting control over deep serviceing back to the RAF means that we have better control over the stock of spares.
2/. I constantly read that Gripen can be field serviced by an engineering crew of 6 draftees. I don’t know how much of this is SAAB PR hype, but it seems that out a/c are very much of the “hangar queen” variety. Since we have come to a plateau in performance capability for combat aircraft (until someone perfects wave-riding airframes, MHD turbines, or anti-gravity!) the MoD should be putting in more clauses in AST/ASR’s that reduce part-count and increase MTBF. Which brings me on to . . .
3/. 1000 flight hours between deep services? One way toreduce the engineering burden on an average sqn. and increase airframe availability would be to “value-engineer” furure a/c by increading durability of components and reducing parts count (less oppurtinity for parts failure, and less complexity in servicing). I fear that our combat a/c have become too fragile, because there is no incentive for the manufacturer to increase robustness. The ASR / Contract Specs. only quantify the performance required (if the whole package of bolts is working perfectly that day).
DD
Point1
TD did a write on the helicopter equivilant a while ago.
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2011/01/helicopter-maintenance/
http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/EquipmentAndLogistics/KeepingTheApacheReadyToTakeOnTheTaliban.htm
I just dont think we can bring that entirely in house.
Its closer to building a replacement than it is topping up fluids.
Its a trite fallacy to argue that the army could do it cheaper because the private sector charges a profit.
Private sector healthcare is considerably cheaper than the NHS for example.
Its also probable that the contracting out is there to provide work between building Tornado and building Typhoon.
2. Theres servicing and servicing
The Gripen might only need 6 engineers not 7, but it might take 7 hours per plane, not 6.
A “field service” might be a refuel and a quick look over and clearance for operations.
3. 500 hours and 1000 hours will be picked for convenience, not capability.
Anything but a serious increase, is likely to be ignored.
I’m sure there was a German fighter engine that needed to be senht back to the mfger and rebuilt after 10 hours.
My Car needs servicing every 10,000 miles, it doesnt explode at 10,050.
After ReReading the original article, I’m happier with my suggestion of more aircraft in Squadron and fewer pilots for them.
16 of each per squadon.
It allows for much more redundancy in the event that all your engines are knackered one week. You will have spare frames available for use, and spare frames sat in the hangar that need avionics work anyway.
Since the aircraft are far cheaper than the maintenance crew, it makes more sens to have redundant airframes sat around gathering dust than redundant ground crew air bumming.
Mark
I think the USAF is still of the opinion its getting more F22′s, and that the President, Congress, Senate and Pentagon are wrong when they say it wont.
To be fair, the Manufacturer has taken great pains to make sure it can restart production at the drop of a hat, so you can understand their viewpoint.
All the tools have been stored and extensive video guides were created as to their use.
Its very unlikely we’re going to be getting more Typhoons, unless we find a willing buyer for our early models or India can be convinced to partner on the Tempest.
DD
I dont think the RAF would be able to bring all the maintenance back in house for fast jets. They are now extremely complicated in fact the UK is general no longer has the full skill set to design one themselves. The cost for certain trades would be enormous.
Typhoon has reduced the number of maintenance personnel required to service it, has a higher availability than most jets and costs less to operate than tornado(ino it doesnt look that why but that’s because of the really weird way MOD calculate cost per hour).
As for 1000 hours for a major service. Well aircraft have a number of checks (a,b,c) that need carried out and a deep one would be a “c” check at around that number of hours maybe a bit higher. You got to remember this is not a airliner and 1000 hrs is probable 1/6 of the aircraft service life so its most like every 3-4 years it would have deep service depending on usage.
You can have 2 types of component a fail-safe or a safe life one. Both have advantages and dis-advantages and are judged on a engineering basing. Part count is being reduced but that has to be balanced against the requirements for battle damage repair and replace-ability which is unique to combat aircraft.
In the end a 9g super sonic aircraft operates in a pretty brutal environment which pushes know materials to the edge of their capability.