The British Army is always transforming, and there is nothing at all wrong with that. Society, politics, culture and technology change, old threats evolve and new ones emerge. Transformation, therefore, is nothing new or unusual.
In 2018, the main driver of change for the British Army is the transition from counterinsurgency operations in the Middle East and South Asia to countering a resurgent threat from Russia. Bisecting this is Brexit, the emergence (or perhaps more accurately, increasing prominence) of what is often termed hybrid warfare, and the ever-increasing role of technology in modern ‘connected life’. The British Army thus finds itself simultaneously trying to tackle technology and societal change, an evolving threat and a changing political landscape (Global Britain?), all whilst dealing with the legacy of an equipment fleet built for counterinsurgency operations, ongoing recruitment/retention issues and continual budgetary pressure.
Like arseholes, we all have opinions, they are plentiful, although only recently I thought the British Army should be focusing on the near threat from Russia, lately, am thinking we have to start thinking both beyond that and into the most likely scenarios for future conflict, both in Europe and beyond. Although getting back our armoured mojo might provide numerous near-term benefits, is it really the best way to prepare for the future?
To start this essay, an introduction from my friend Nicholas at the UK Land Power site;
Britain’s army is one of its oldest and most respected institutions. With a history that dates back to before the restoration of the monarchy in 1660, no other full-time professional army has done more to protect the interests of the nation it serves.
Discipline, courage and tenacity are its hallmarks. The Army’s heritage and tradition have forged a powerful identity that is synonymous with the British national character. It is an organisation that is infinitely greater than any single person within it. Serving within its ranks, even for only a short period of time, is an experience that leaves an indelible mark on all those who wear its uniform. Perhaps its greatest strength is its ability to adapt and evolve when faced with new or unexpected threats. Historically, Britain has maintained a small peacetime army able to expand rapidly in times of war. Today, the number of soldiers in the British Army stands at less than 80,000. This is the lowest level since before the Napoleonic Wars in 1799. As well as manpower constraints, many vehicles and key weapon systems are approaching a cliff edge of block obsolescence. Resources for maintenance, training and the procurement of new equipment have been cut or deferred.
According to some former soldiers, the British Army is now engaged in the most important campaign of its long and illustrious existence: the battle for its own survival. In short, the time has come to reform and regenerate the Army so that it can properly protect British interests at home and abroad.
Where Nicholas and I might disagree is what reform and regeneration look like.
Many make the case for more spending on defence, threats are rising and evolving, the world is an increasingly dangerous place and defence and security are the first priorities of any government. The problem with these, noble as they are, is their reasoned arguments for more funding they often discount the political reality of it happening. No matter how many ORBAT’s or equipment suggestions we might make, they will fall on the fallow ground because of politics and plain old cash, too much of the former and not enough of the latter.
It is easy to advance a case for more defence funding and in our echo chambers, we would all agree, with the only dissent being about what to spend the extra loot on. If the MoD does get an increase in budget, great, all power to those that campaign for it, but unless that increase is sustained and significant I suspect in a couple of years’ time there will be another funding crisis and we will all be back to arguing about the same things.
This is reality
2% of GDP on defence it is now considered a benchmark, not a minimum.
There are more painful realities that advocates for spending more on the British Army need to recognise;
- To those casting a covetous eye over the DFiD budget, it isn’t going anywhere
- The UK’s debt is already too high and debt servicing payments are a significant percentage of current spending, about £50b per year, don’t be thinking increased borrowing is the answer
- BREXIT may well depress GDP, and a fixed percentage of that means a reduction in real terms
- Cutting other budgets like health or welfare budgets, good luck with that.
- Trident/Successor isn’t going anywhere either, and neither is Carrier Strike or Combat Air
- Defence inflation cannot be wished away
- Cyber and defence against hybrid threats needs funding from somewhere
The evidence would suggest those wishing for significantly greater defence funding are going to be disappointed, and those thinking the Army would be a beneficiary, even more so.
Risks, Issues and Threats
Not only does the British Army have to shape and be shaped by the environment in which it resides, but it must also anticipate future changes in readiness for when they may occur because like all large organisations, change from within is slow.
The DCDC Strategic Trends programme publication ‘Future Operating Environment’ reviews and analyses likely threats and potential deployment scenarios to 2050 but like any such analysis, there is always a degree of unpredictability.
Without veering too far into Donald Rumsfeld territory (or is it a Dunning-Kruger Black Swan!), there are threats as yet unknown and trends yet to be revealed. This does create a problem as almost any capability at any scale could be justified on the basis of ‘well you never know’, but still, it is important to recognise unpredictability and our generally woeful ability to predict the future.
It is an indisputable fact that capability rests on people
The Army continues to struggle with recruitment and retention problems, some are a result of wider societal issues; others, wholly self-inflicted. Although the torrent of bad news stories about coffins on wheels and rat infested accommodation from a few years ago has more or less subsided, they have been replaced with those about historic allegation persecutions and suicides due to a lack of mental health care provision. Whatever your view, this contributes to the risk of the Army being seen as a decreasingly attractive career option by an increasingly larger number of people.
Civilian and uniformed personnel and their families are the backbones of capability. All the shiny toys in the world are useless unless we have committed and engaged personnel that are not taken advantage of or abused, see a career and vocation, not a job, and have partners that allow them to serve the nation without being disadvantaged because of it.
The continuous attitude survey and outflow statistics tell a story, but realistic training, a sense of being valued, fair remuneration, partner employment options, a lack of petty regulation, not being persecuted by the legal profession, being treated like adults, effective mental health care, decent accommodation and food, and basic administrative systems that work all, contribute to the objective of making people want to join, and perhaps more importantly, stay.
Undermanned units make ten times things worse, placing additional burdens on those we ask so much of.
Of course, Army leadership knows all this and whilst not everything is solved with money, clearly, we need to spend proportionally more in this area.
Keeping up with the Trumps
Much has been written about the Third Offset Strategy.
Established in 2012, the Strategic Capabilities Office defined a strategy of using advanced technology to deter conflict with peer adversaries by demonstrating clear overmatch across multiple domains. Whether this strategy retains the priority under President Trump and Secretary Mattis remains to be seen but it should be obvious to any casual observer of defense, or even defence, that US forces have the budget to make hypervelocity rail guns, artificial intelligence, lasers and exoskeletons a reality.
The MoD also invested time, money and energy into following the same vision of deterrence by technology superiority, creating the Defence Innovation initiative and ensuring a fixed percentage of its budget is spent on basic research into new technologies.
It is likely that the gap between US and allied forces in pure technology terms will widen and create a significant interoperability challenge. The current US debate between capacity and capability is echoed almost everywhere else but at the minute, it does seem that capacity is a nose ahead in the US, but only a nose. Much is also made of President Trump trashing the post-war order and abandoning long-standing European allies but evidence suggests no such thing is actually happening. That said, there is a risk that ‘Trumpism’ leads to a pivot away from Europe, like the Obama pivot to the Pacific also suggested. A conflict between the US and China does seem more likely than a conflict between the US and Russia.
For the British Army, retaining a reasonable level of interoperability with allies, especially the US Army, is a core objective, but it is also a core problem.
Anyone that thinks BREXIT will leave defence completely untouched is living in denial.
There are two principle defence risks with BREXIT, one related to UK finances and the other to UK commitment to the defence of Europe.
Reduction in GDP, devaluation of the Pound and compensatory spending in other departments could mean less cash for defence over a period of years as the UK economy rebalances and recovers from any shock caused by a disorderly exit. Without getting into political arguments, this is a reality that needs to be acknowledged.
Of more concern is the potential for the above to fracture UK commitment to European defence, and thus NATO. Much has been said on this and much is yet to be said, it is not time to break out the fainting couches just yet. If a poorly managed exit generates significant financial impact, a blame game will be played out. Why should British blood and British treasure be put on the line for those who have been active in damaging the British economy will be the cry?
Regardless of your position on Brexit, your thoughts on the acceptability or validity of this position, it is as predictable as night following day that it will happen. It would be argued that given the UK is part of Europe and when Europe is threatened the UK is threatened so regardless of BREXIT, our commitment should remain in both will and wallet.
Good luck with convincing the British people of that, especially when the opposition party now has much stronger anti-Trident and anti-NATO views. Cool heads on grown-up shoulders are needed to remind both the UK and the EU that the collective defence and security of Europe is a serious game with harsh offside rules.
SDSR 2010 had barely a mention of Russia, four in total, and two of those were in the Glossary. Since then, Russia, through a catalogue of actions has risen to be a greater threat than that of terrorism.
There is a danger though, that this threat is overdone, there is also a danger it is not taken seriously.
The Russian economy is in poor health, based largely on the extractive industries and beset with corruption and low productivity, its single greatest strategic threat is US non-conventional oil and gas. But whilst many like to point out that Russia has the same GDP as Italy, and should not be seen as a threat, Italy does not spend 4.3% of its GDP on defence and does not have low labour costs and a huge legacy of nuclear weapons expertise.
Improvements and modernisation in strategic nuclear forces, introduction of the Borei (Dolgorukiy) ballistic missile submarine, Iskander-M and Kalibr cruise missiles, Bastion shore defence missiles protected by S-400 air defence missile systems, launched 55 military satellites in the last 5 years, 16 air defence regiments upgraded to the S-400, new deliveries of aircraft at the rate of 200 per year, 60 new naval vessels in the last 5 years, 3,000 new armoured vehicles delivered, new command and control systems implemented, 1,800 new unmanned aircraft, UAV based radio jamming equipment and high levels of readiness and an increasing move away from conscription
In addition to these conventional capabilities, Russia has clearly shown an ability in cyber and information operations and has a willingness to use them.
To counter this evolving spectrum of threats from Russia, NATO, the EU and individual nations are increasing defence spending, improving equipment and readiness, and innovating in response to unconventional and conventional threats alike. Even Sweden and Finland are increasing cooperation with NATO, all this is good, although we can argue the pace of change isn’t fast enough given the ground many NATO members have to recover.
The threats from Russia cannot be seen in isolation, neatly boxed off to allow defence to handle one and the security services the other, this is what the Modernising Defence Programme and Fusion Doctrine are seeking to address.
I don’t buy into the Russia panic, I don’t think every weapon system they produce is brilliant, and I certainly don’t think they are going to be marching into Poland any time soon, but just to make sure, let’s not underestimate or belittle their capability either. From a land perspective, I don’t think NATO actually has much to fear from Russian land forces on an equal basis, where we do face a threat is decision making speed disparity, approach to using area weapons and sheer weight of fire available to Russian land forces should it ever come to it.
The Middle East and Africa
The conflict in Libya exacerbated an already fragile security situation by releasing huge quantities of arms and munitions into the area. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al Mourabitoun and Boko Haram are all active, and all creating mayhem and conflict. Boko Haram, as just one example, killed 11,000 people in 2015, the scale is staggering. The French intervention in Mali came as a result of attacks by no less than five separate Islamist groups for example. The rivalry between Al Qaeda, ISIS and other Islamist groups is often intertwined with decades-old local conflict.
On top of this; corruption, water scarcity, religious extremism, transnational crime, piracy, migration exploitation, conflict minerals, great power shenanigans, human trafficking, illegal fishing, poor governance and poaching, Africa has it all. The net result is increased migration to Europe, illegal trafficking and an attendant increase in security threats for Europe.
The UK is already engaged in Somalia, Kenya, Sierra Leone, Nigeria and other locations across the area in addition to providing ongoing support for France who has a more formal operation across the Sahel called Operation Bharkane. Italy has also been quietly working in Libya to reduce the flow of migrants across the Mediterranean.
There does seem to be a feeling that Iraq may be returning to some level of stability after ISIS but the wider Middle East is still in a perpetual state of conflict. Saudi Arabian and Iranian funded proxies continue to corrupt and destabilise nations. Whether the ancient Shia/Sunni conflict will continue to find release in proxy conflicts or explode into full-on war is not clear but whatever happens, the UK has direct interests in the region and any number of indirect interests. Significant quantities of natural gas and refined petrochemical products are imported into the UK from the region and many Middle East nations are important trading partners, both for import and export. Wider conflict in the area would likely result in global economic impact.
Instability and terrorism. The ‘Arc of Instability’ from Somalia to Morocco will be of increasing concern and cannot be ignored, despite the political aversion to enduring stability and counter-terrorism operations. A key question for the UK is whether to stay engaged in the Middle East at the current level and if so, how it can be resourced. Given finite resources, it may be a question of assessing the relative value of each location in terms of threat and opportunity.
The potential for continuing and escalating conflict in Africa and the Middle East is enormous, and this only means one thing for Europe, more security problems.
And that means for the UK.
Form Follows Function
Any force design must take into account the circumstances in which it will be used, what can be afforded and how it can be optimised for the broadest range of contingencies.
Some things tasks are highly resistant to change; public duties and ceremonial functions, counter terrorism and EOD support to the civilian power, civil resilience and territorial defence of UK and overseas territories all are seen as ‘baseline activities’.
Although the days of the 1998 SDR ‘force for good’ era are well and truly over, the UK still approaches its defence and security by going forth into the world and engaging with it. Global Britain is not just a catchy slogan, we must have an outward looking view, and the British Army likewise.
In responding to the Russian threat and contributing to NATO activities, the British Army has approached the task with a blend of forward deployment in Estonia and Poland, training and capability development, industrial cooperation and a number of joint command initiatives.
Exercise Trident Juncture is one of many exercises designed to demonstrate movement at distance and multinational cooperation in order to deter Russia.
Further afield, Afghanistan is still occupying the British Army and the Adaptable Force model of capability development continues in various locations with contributions to counter poaching in Africa for example. The British Army is therefore organised and equipped to deliver a range of activities from combined arms high intensity combat to light infantry training and force development, but scratch the surface and there are some fundamental problems.
How did we get here?
The Future Rapid Effects System (FRES) was a concept based on a simple premise that in order to have any effect whatsoever you simply had to be there, being there meant speed of deployment. It aspired to bulge out the middle, with FRES brigades outnumbering both armoured and light role. The medium weight force would have been the dominant force.
Then came operations in Iraq which confirmed the value of those conventional armoured forces that were going to be largely replaced with FRES. What followed was a protracted series of counter insurgency operations that saw the heavy armoured forces finding themselves less suited to heavy protected mobility vehicles. FRES was cancelled and we ended up with lots of Mastiff’s.
The Multi Role Brigade (MRB) concept that followed was an interesting and logical idea based on the premise that the British Army is always deployed somewhere, and wherever it is deployed, it tends to take the full breadth of capabilities with it. So they had everything from heavy armour to aviation spread neatly across five equal sized formations to enable sustained deployment but one where protected mobility was dominant. For the much less likely scenario of fighting a conventional battle, there would be time to reorganise into a more conventional structure.
With the end of Afghanistan there was a realisation that the political will for enduring deployments had vanished. The Russian threat to NATO grew and the default UK response was a return to the division and conventional all arms manoeuvre.
MRB’s were replaced over a number of iterations to what is now Joint Force 2025. This will be 2 Armoured Infantry Brigades, 2 Strike Brigades, an Air Assault Brigade and a collection of light role and light protected mobility infantry. Armoured and Strike will be in equilibrium, but there will still be a preponderance of light role infantry.
And yet in achieving the ‘warfighting division optimised for high intensity combat’ we have thinned out fighting power and sustainability to make it fit. It might appear to be a warfighting division but it is one whose jam is spread very thinly. The new armoured infantry brigade will contain one less armoured infantry battalion and no organic recce. Strike is now an enabler to divisional manoeuvre and anyone questioning this, well, they obviously just don’t understand it. No doubt the division is important, but if we are really honest with ourselves, we are being optimistic at the very least, at worse, we are kidding ourselves.
To do things properly, to have a credible force, the British Army can either have a conventional armoured or medium weight capability, but it cannot have both because there is simply not enough money. Is the desire to be a framework nation and the prestige that goes with it dragging on our ability to recognise what is in front of us, so we dismiss these concerns and argue for more money that isn’t coming?
The British Army finds itself in a tough spot, beset with many risks, problems and uncomfortable realities.
Despite these, it retains and unrivalled reputation, fundamentally sound foundations, and a deep well of expertise and experience to draw from.
The next section will suggest an alternative approach.
High-Level Change Principles
UK Defence and Security change should be anchored on four very clear principles.
Mind Our Own Defence and Be Blunt with Those That Don’t; meet our NATO commitments on spending and nudge those in delinquency to do likewise. This is as much a political statement than anything else but just as important nonetheless. Defence and security exist in multiple overlapping and connected layers, but the first and obvious layer is to see to one’s own territorial integrity. To be an effective member of a coalition, one should not be an unnecessary burden on others. If your defence rests on one for all and all for one, a disparity in capability is perfectly acceptable but a disparity in commitment is not.
Work Well with Others; Effective defence and security rest on being an active and reliable partner in a coalition, this requires attention to standards and interoperability at every level. The UK is a significant military power and anyone saying the words ‘Belgium with nukes’ should, frankly, stop reading now. That said the UK military must work in coalitions to achieve mass; where possible, sub-regional multinational partnerships offer great potential for others to work with the UK. Cooperation and coordination should, therefore, be absolutely central to future plans
Prevention is Cheaper than Cure; Any common sense strategy will first seek to deter enemies and reduce the potential for conflict, a simple assumption that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. The relative amounts spent on preventative and responsive capabilities will change over time and in many cases, the same spend will cover both.
Be Credible in Response; Capabilities that are stretched drum-tight are less than worthless because they are not resilient, give decision makers a false impression of what can be achieved with them and don’t impress if we are seeking influence in a coalition. Better a well-equipped, fully manned, well trained and extremely robust capability at medium scale now than a weak, brittle larger capability without enough enablers that have to rely on UOR’s in maybe 6 months-time if the industry can help. Readiness and resilience must be key principles of force design. The days of self-delusion about ammunition stocks, training in realistic environments with live weapons, post gapping and that enablers matter less than teeth must come to an end.
These are high level, not specific to any one service, but this is a post about the British Army.
An Alternative View
The alternative described here is a recognition that;
- The Army needs money to treat its people better, they are the foundation of capability
- The Army needs money to generate capabilities that are credible and enable seamless interoperability with the USA
- The Army needs money to implement the Strike vision whilst also modernising the heavy armour
- The Army needs money for realistic training, munitions stocks, adequate spares provision and all the other things that are invisible to most looking at these things
- It isn’t going to get any, it just isn’t
- Hard decisions
The current strategy of doing everything everywhere with decreasing capabilities is fooling fewer and fewer people, logic dictates the UK has to choose, or at the very least, prioritise one over the other.
So how do you do you square the circle?
ONE – Create Space and Money by Reducing Mass
Although we can tinker around the edges to shift money from one pot to the other, reducing in size is the only realistic option that creates enough money for a meaningful change.
There is no joy in saying this because reducing personnel means potentially making them redundant, changing their lives and stopping them doing what they desire, and in no way should be viewed lightly. But if it creates a sustainable career and family life for those remain, instead of just continually asking them to do more and more with less and less then it is something that has to be considered.
Similarly, if it allows the British Army to focus and concentrate on a fewer number of things to maximise effect, then again, it has to be considered.
What that reduction would be in real terms would actually come at the end of the planning process but one could imagine it would be significant, circa 15-20 thousand.
Public duties, defence music, display and ceremonial tasks remain an important part of national life and taken together, their contribution defence diplomacy and the UK economy is significant. The general rule that costs lie where they fall for Government expenditure still applies so getting Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, the Royal Household or the Mayor of London to stump up the money is a non-starter. Whether it is training horse and rider, actually providing the Queen’s Guard, making horseshoes or keeping the Red Arrows and the Battle of Britain Memorial Flight in the air, the MoD is on the hook for it.
However, there should be no stone left unturned in looking and means of reducing the cost of delivery.
There is something to be said for the Queen’s guard comprising wholly serving infantry but no one outside of defence actually cares about this. Neither do they care that farriers are soldiers either, or RM flautists or BBMF mechanics for that matter. This is not a proposal to diminish the role of public duties, it is to make it cheaper so we can spend more on mental health provision, housing or other things, simply one of prioritisation.
The MoD should establish an arms-length body or agency that is solely responsible for public duties, defence music and other similar tasks. Instead of being solely regular personnel it should be manned by a mixture of regular, reserve, FTRS, civilians and former serving personnel that see this as a viable means of service continuation at the end of their careers.
This is a radical step and might not yield significant savings but it would demonstrate the resolve to of the Army to change whilst still retaining the essence of public duties.
TWO – Spend More on Our People
Education, vocational training and adventurous training are a key aspect of the offer, they need better funding.
For the UK defence housing and basing/training estate, an immediate independent review of the cost-effectiveness of the current outsourced service providers should be carried out. One of the change principles is about designing for people, it would seem that none of the current providers has been without controversy or is popular with users. There may be opportunities to replace the single monolithic provider contracts with localised arrangements that allow smaller business, veterans owned, non-profits and others to compete. This would also provide employment opportunities for partners and a viable transition route for some leavers.
There simply has to be a greater proportion of defence resources devoted to serving personnel and veterans mental health and welfare.
And pay and housing, obviously.
THREE – Yes, Prevention is Better than Cure
Conflict prevention is a simple concept that at its core seeks to make the UK safer by providing help to unstable nations such that they can help themselves to stabilise. The theory is that an ounce of prevention saves a Pound of cure. Getting in early, de-escalating early stage conflict and supporting overseas development efforts are all seen, quite rightly, as effective means of preventing wider and much more expensive conflict.
The Army’s Adaptable Force as part of Army 2020 continues to evolve, the August 2015 Joint Doctrine Note 1/15 describes the MoD’s defence engagement approach and (although it is a few years old) the International Defence Engagement Strategy provides additional information. JDP 05 Shaping a Stable World: the Military Contribution pulls these together and provides a good diagram that illustrates how they all fit together. Defence engagement is therefore designed to build understanding and develop capacity with the objective of preventing conflict. The Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS) is a joint Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Department for International Development (DFID) and MOD strategy for conflict prevention. BSOS also outlines three main mutually-supporting pillars of the Government’s stability strategy; Early warning, Rapid crisis prevention and response and Upstream conflict prevention.
Defence engagement supports all three of these pillars and creates effects through four broad ways; security and non-combat operations; Defence diplomacy, defence and security exports; and regional stability, conflict prevention, post-conflict reconstruction and stabilisation. The British Army and Royal Navy conduct upstream conflict prevention missions all the time and can range from a training on an opportunity basis to more involved and lengthy engagements. Some no doubt are successes, others less so, that, of course, being the nature of the beast. Short-Term Training Teams and enduring deployments like the British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT), together with regionally aligned Adaptable Force brigades, demonstrate how the British Army devotes considerable resource to the task, especially in Africa.
Fundamentally, this should be the UK’s default strategy
Capacity Building, nestled inside Security Sector Reform, can create a sustainable stability but if the two are done in isolation, they are likely to fail. Where this integration occurs, it must be sustained over a period of time and include not only training and assisting but genuine capability development that includes export finance and equipment and support from UK and local industry. There is no harm in favouring UK industry, far from it. The US approach is State Department led and incorporates Foreign Military Sales FMS and Foreign Military Finance FMF. This is an interesting model to emulate. The British Army has four Specialist Infantry Battalions (4 Rifles, 1 Scots, 1 PWRR and 2 Lancs) devoted to this activity but this is limited to infantry tasks.
The MoD, DFiD and the FCO should devote much greater resources to conflict prevention and capacity development. A new joint command should make greater use of contract, FTRS, and other personnel resources, especially the many skilled personnel we allow to walk out of the door every year. Creative and flexible engagement models should be employed.
This new joint command should, therefore, focus on the following areas and themes;
- Conflict drivers (poaching, smuggling and illegal fishing
- Demining and the removal of the explosive remnants of war
- Maritime and littoral security and exploiting the magnifying effects of airpower
- Infrastructure development
- Defence technical and medical education
- NCO and Officer Training
As SDSR 2015 is at great pains to point out defence and security are inextricably linked and an effective criminal justice system (of which the police are the most visible element) is fundamental to enduring stabilisation efforts. The UK’s Armed Forces are a great many things, but police capacity building is not one of them. As the police are the first line of defence and a key source of intelligence in any potential stabilisation scenario the lack of ability to deploy assets to bolster this capability in struggling states remains a concern, especially considering the lack of US capability in this area.
The new joint command would also include a police capacity-building capability.
FOUR – Rapid Effects
The other leg of conflict prevention is having a credible response capability but we also have to be realistic what we are responding to. Any emergent capability must have reference to current scenarios but it must also be built to endure and be applicable to the most likely scenarios.
This might be a controversial view but Russian armoured forces streaming into Poland, the Baltics States and Norway with its entire Army is not a likely scenario, not completely implausible, but not likely. More likely is conflict short of war which a ‘warfighting division’ might not actually be best placed to counter, or deter. Counterinsurgency and sustained deployments have not gone away, and it is certainly foreseeable that the UK would be involved in something akin to Operation Serval in Mali.
If we look at the ‘bulging out the middle’ FRES concept, it was sound, although execution less so. FRES has evolved to STRIKE but this seems much less well defined and is as much about supporting the heavy armoured force than anything else. Operating over larger distances at pace, aggregation and disaggregation, exploiting distributed indirect fire and dominating the cyber and EM space might be extensions of the FRES concept of rapid deployability but these are much more relevant than traditional armoured capabilities for a wider range of conflict.
Politically, I think we should focus on capability development for our eastern and northern European allies. Beyond that, rapid reinforcement from the UK, and perhaps in some parts, Germany or Poland, should be the chosen strategy.
This results in a proposition to build a rounded medium weight capability at the expense of traditional armour and a preponderance of light role infantry. In other words, a STRIKE DIVISION. This would be combined with an air mobility brigade, a small armoured capability and SF/SF Support force, and with the exception of the specialist infantry and other capabilities, that would pretty much be it.
I intend to expand on these in future releases but at a headline level;
The Divisional HQ is where all the pieces of the jigsaw come together, it is vital that the British Army retains the ability to conduct operations at this scale, even if the scale is afforded by a medium weight STRIKE division.
Modular Armoured Force
This is the tough one, but the proposal is to generate a modular armoured force that can operate in relatively small packets attached to other formations and as a means of skills retention. I get there will be many against this notion and will be no doubt reminded about the concentration of armoured force and penny packets but in the context of this proposal, I just can’t see any other way of squaring the circle.
The eventual size of this force would be open to debate but I would envisage an oversize armoured infantry battlegroup consisting of CR2 and Ajax. This means Warrior would be completely withdrawn, as would the venerable FV432. The overall size of the Ajax contract would remain largely as is but recast to include fewer Ajax reconnaissance variants and more infantry fighting vehicles, with a new ambulance variant. The engineering CR2 variants would remain, although potentially reduced in number. MLRS and AS90 would also be withdrawn
This is certainly arsed about-face, I get that, and yes, it is drastic, but the force would be built around a hundred or so upgraded CR2 and 550-600 Ajax.
Increase SF and SF Support
Always in demand and one of the enduring features of the British Army is special-forces and their various support functions. The Parachute Regiment and specialist capabilities like parachute medical, logistics and especially airfield engineering would be combined in a new SF Support function, with 16AAB disbanded as a single entity.
Air Mobility Brigade
With no parachute capability, this brigade would be solely reliant on air transport and support helicopters for inter and intra theatre mobility. The force would also be wheeled, with each vehicle capable of being lifted by the Chinook helicopter.
We could call it a Light Strike Brigade although it is in essence a light cavalry brigade.
Whether providing route security, high readiness NEO response, acting as a strategic anti-tank reserve or supporting the STRIKE division by bounding forward, its defining characteristic would be air supported mobility.
For deploying rapidly, it is probably the case that wheeled fighting vehicles can deploy quicker than a similarly sized tracked force on transporters, and we don’t have that many transporters, less than a hundred. At max effort, it is unlikely we would be able to deploy a single armoured regiment or armoured infantry battalion in one go, let alone a Strike Brigade with Ajax. We should also have a chat about bridges.
If we are deploying east, we can be sure any convoy would be being impeded by refugees and various collection of pre-deployed ‘little green men’. Route security, bridging and the ability to disperse or rapidly change routes are critical factors to getting there.
This points to an all wheeled force that exploits the operational mobility vision of FRES and the contemporary STRIKE concepts of distributed operations, cyber and EM exploitation, and distributed indirect fires and manned/unmanned teaming. I think STRIKE is a brilliant concept, but is hamstrung by a shortage of funds and saddling it with a supporting role for the heavy armour. FRES always included a heavy variant and was integrated with the legacy force but if we have to choose, as I think we have to, then wheeled is the only option.
The STRIKE division would consist of three or four STRIKE brigades with a full set of supporting divisional capabilities, implemented at strength and with real depth; port enablement, ISTAR, long range artillery and ECM for example, capabilities that have atrophied recently. A small element would also be held at very high readiness and a particular characteristic would be no gapped posts and oversized personnel groups to enable absorption of training injury, leave and training absence.
The force would be based on Boxer, MAN trucks and a recast MRV-P programme, the latter of which would be greatly expanded in size and scope.
In addition to the ‘adaptable force’ model supporting an enlarged joint conflict reduction command as described above, there would also be a flexible force that can conduct UK civil resilience tasks and operate in specialised environments, the latter to include arctic, jungle, urban and subterranean.
The ‘Force Troops’ and 1 ISR Brigade would also be retained although realigned to the organisation described above. Army Reserve would be reviewed, with a significant reduction and realignment to civil resilience, defence engagement and UK/overseas territorial defence roles.
In summary, this is a proposal to trade mass in order to spend more on our people and develop capabilities that have applicability to a wider range of more likely operations than the current force model. It opts to do fewer things, but doing them in depth rather than the thin jam spread very thinly that seems to be the current approach.
I get that many will be wholly against it and that we should all lobby for more spending, but I can’t see this happening and would rather be realistic about choices.
Have at it in the comments but as I mentioned above, I will get around to expanding each of the options in separate posts.