In the 7 years I have been dribbling my thoughts into Think Defence there are a few things on which I have been consistent; the ISO container is the greatest invention since the Bailey Bridge, commonality is not a dirty word, logistics are critically important, and, the F-35B is worth it.
Yet to be discovered tribes in the middle of the Amazonian rain forest could not have failed to notice the untrammelled hype that surrounds the F-35 in general, and the STOVL F-35B in particular. The amount of coverage is staggering, some of it informed, some of it not. Being developed under the un-staring eye of social media and a long line of people who seem to live for being critical has exposed every developmental misstep to ruthless criticism. Reports are often selectively quoted, conclusions drawn without context, over-simplification of complex subjects is rife and correlation confused with causation.
It is also an extremely polarising aircraft, read anything on-line, and it seems you are either a Lockheed Martin shill or thick as mince critic who knows nothing.
I suspect, the reality is somewhere between, whilst the F-35 is not the cure for cancer, it is not cancer either.
Into this toxic environment I go, a look at the F-35B.
Concept v Execution
PowerPoint concepts are easy to create, but the hard yards are done by those bringing the concept to fruition. What is absolutely a truism is that the conceptual vision rarely matches the hard world of reality at the first pass, there are always problems, they are always delays and there are always, without fail, let-downs.
No longer are we developing wooden wonders; modern combat aircraft are complex, they require primary research, cutting-edge materials, software engineering at an unprecedented scale and fabrication that is mind-boggling in its accuracy and precision.
We need all things because that is what delivers combat success in a modern environment, it really is that simple.
Winners don’t have great moustaches and dashing trousers, they have information and technological dominance allied with well-developed tactics, training and a huge amount of backup.
Doing hard things is therefore, hard.
So we must look upon the difficulties with cutting-edge developments like the F-35 with some degree of sang-froid.
Let’s not dismiss the missteps though, let’s not forgive the blatant over promising and under delivering that seems stock-in-trade for the defence industry, but please, let’s put things in perspective.
What of the concept?
The concept of the F-35 is very well thought through; a family of combat aircraft with a high degree of commonality to drive down operating costs, low purchase costs through automated fabrication, large quantities and concurrency, reduced observability against modern defence systems, data from its (and others) many sensors tied into an information processing architecture gives the pilot an advantage not available to others and finally, an ability to share with others.
All good, except realising the vision has been beset with problems.
It is probably fair to say the marketing hype has oversold the initially realisable attributes of the aircraft.
That the F-35 is six years late and much more expensive than planned is a matter of record.
One of the very first posts on Think Defence asked if anyone knew how much an F-35 would cost, there was no answer.
One can read about flyaway non-recurring costs in inflation adjusted dollars set against a set of future financial and economic conditions that may or may not actually be relevant, they may include development costs amortised over a number of final production aircraft that might be fewer or less and then just when you think you have it, someone pops up and tells you the engines aren’t included.
The reality for the UK is this, we, as in the public, won’t know the Joint Combat Aircraft programme costs of until the National Audit Office update their major projects reporting to Parliament.
US costs are not the same as UK costs, this is important to understand, but there is a wealth of information on US costs to form an estimate, but that is the problem, the wealth of information.
Estimating F-35 costs is the full-time work of several hundred people, most of them disagreeing with each other! Lockheed Martin, the Joint programme Office and the Government Accountability Office all disagree but no one is saying they will be cheap, on that, there is broad agreement. Anywhere between $100m and $140m seems to be reported range. I am not going to try and sift through the multiple methods of calculating costs but will simply say, it won’t be cheap, and it will be much more than originally claimed.
The original predicted cost of 40-50 million in 2014 dollars each has proven to be relatively wide of the mark.
We have all read the ‘can’t dogfight’ claims and the counter-claims, we have observed the controversy on the USMC declaration of IOC but whilst all this was happening an interview with the Secretary of the US Air Force slipped into the open with barely a ripple of interest.
On concurrency, she said;
The biggest lesson I have learned from the F-35 is never again should we be flying an aircraft while we’re building it. People believed we could go faster, cheaper, better by designing and building the F-35 concurrently, and that the degree of concurrency would work. Indeed it has not worked as well as we had hoped and that’s probably the understatement of the day. It has taken us too long, it has cost us way more money than we ever imagined possible. We’re very focused from now on to driving the cost down per unit and they are coming down.
Ouch.
Whilst concurrency is a perfectly normal and acceptable means of controlling cost and development timescales in complex projects one does have to wonder if the boundary has been pushed a bit too far on the F-35 programme?
She went on to say about the current problems;
I would sum it up in one word – software
IOC is merely a point on a line to the all-important Full Operating Capability (FOC) but the software issues are significant, they are not insurmountable of course, but with much of the aircraft’s utility reliant on software the seriousness of software issues is the main concern.
Lt. Gen. Jon Davis, the USMC Deputy Commandant for Aviation said of the recent testing;
Right now, inside the 2B software, we have some latency issues with trying to tie all four airplanes together. There’s no latency at all with the first two airplanes; there’s no latency problems with ships three and four, It’s when I try and tie all four together that sometimes a target is kind of slightly misplaced on the ground, or it’s not but I’m not confident in 100 percent of the cases exactly where it’s supposed to be.
I love the language, “kind of slightly misplaced on the ground”
What!
Availability rates were also much lower than expected, most weapons are not integrated, the helmet and streaming video not ready either.
Depending on where you sit on the spectrum of F-35 love/hate these can either be described as development issues to resolve whilst the aircraft is in, you know, development, or, a disaster that means the whole programme should be cancelled.
A well-designed and executed operational test and evaluation programme should find all sorts of issues, that is what it is there for, but the scale of these problems surely goes beyond what would normally be found in operational testing, so the reality is again, somewhere between the ‘nothing to see here’ and ‘the world is about to stop turning’
The next few years will need Lockheed Martin to resolve the current software issues, integrate national and international complex weapons, deliver enhanced capabilities with new software releases, ramp up production to drive down costs and resolve the problems with the maintenance and logistics system.
A great deal is riding on the next few years, and it would be foolish to say there is no risk to delivery or cost.
And yet for all this, recent testing has confirmed the potential of the aircraft, there is momentum in the programme and some measure of confidence that a corner has been turned.
What about the UK?
Many of the criticisms of the F-35 fail to recognise that it operates in a team, as in fact, do other aircraft.
At the tip of the iceberg is the aircraft and pilot, but the rest of the iceberg is what allows it advantages to be exploited. Weapons development, training, tactics development, expeditionary logistics support, intelligence analysis, airspace battle management and the ability to move data from numerous sources, analysis it, transform it into useful information on which decisions can be made.
When discussing the F-35 therefore, the aircraft has to be placed in a much wider context.
Operating concepts are developing all the time, teaming the F-35B with Typhoon and other systems has not yet begun, but there are opportunities we probably haven’t even thought of, yet that will eventually be exploited.
For the UK, all these supporting strands need to be developed or modified to allow us to make the most of our existing and future planned investments in the F-35.
The Challenge Ahead.
The USN, USMC and USAF have their own problems and issues to deal with regarding the F-35 but for the UK at least, the path forward is clear.
The next five years will be challenging for the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy, there are many moving chess pieces on the table, but current plan is achievable and manages risk well.
After the rancour of SDSR 2010, the RAF and RN have played a smart game, ultimately realising that they need to work together for of each other. There is much to observe that is positive in the current RAF/RN relationship and long may it continue.
One of the most enduring challenges we will face is making sure the manning pipeline for air and ground crew can be aligned with the aircraft as it comes into service. This is an often underestimated challenge in on-line discussions but one that is vital for success.
With our partners in the USMC the next five years will see the F-35B gradually come into service with the RAF and RN. Let’s hope the obvious synergies between the UK and US (and Italy) can be exploited to improve outcomes for all, and we can learn to ignore the shrieking when a USMC or Italian F-35B squadron sails aboard HMS Queen Elizabeth.
Spain and Italy operate the Harrier. Italy is on board with the F-35B and if Spain wishes to replace their Harriers, there really isn’t any other option for them other than the F-35B.
It would seem to make obvious sense in these difficult budgetary conditions to increase pooling and sharing, there is no reason why UK F-35B’s could not operate from an Italian navy vessel, or a possible future Spanish F-35B squadron work from a Royal Navy carrier.
Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands are also F-35 partner nations who will be purchasing the aircraft. In addition to the already announced and developing European maintenance arrangements there is significant potential for sharing resources under a NATO umbrella for operational development and training.
The F-35B for the UK is a JOINT aircraft, it is not for the RAF and not for the RN, it is for both. Introduction timelines will change over the next few years as other programmes change and manning falls into place, but it is probably fair to say the ‘land’ role will take priority in the near team with carrier strike following soon after.
This isn’t a bad thing.
It is also easy to forget that by 2018, the planned production rate will be peaking at 160 aircraft per year, by the end of August this year, BAE will have delivered 200 rear fuselage assemblies. The UK is a Tier 1 Partner and has invested a couple of billions of the Queen’s Pounds in the development of the aircraft, much British know-how, experience and technical expertise is being used.
What the UK’s final numbers and purchase profile remains to be seen
There is a huge amount of speculation about how many F35B’s the UK will purchase with some expectation of clarity in SDSR 2015. I am not sure the purchase profile is all that important, but the final numbers are of course critical.
Final numbers will be dictated by final price; that much is certain. The current duty rumour is an initial purchase of around 50-60 with additional purchases later. It is this split purchase rumour that has prompted speculation about a split buy of B and A models, or even B and C (for the refuelling probe and other factors) but this would be a mistake.
Fleets within fleets don’t seem to be a great idea.
Block 4 software, in its various forms, will include additional UK weapons but much of this is subject to confirmation and some way off, 2019 to the mid-2020’s in a number of incremental releases.
In this period, there are also big things happening with the other RAF fixed wing combat aircraft.
A Brother from Another Mother
With the focus on the F-35 it is easy to almost forget we have the Typhoon in service.
Typhoon is our strategic risk hedge, it allows us to have two types of fast jet in service that complement each other perfectly.
But we need to keep our foot on the Typhoon pedal in the next few years.
Tornado is undoubtedly still the ground attack king of the hill, it can fire Brimstone and Storm Shadow, carry the RAPTOR pod, drop Paveway IV and deliver superb close air support. They are big boots to fill, in fact, I think Tornado could be argued as one of the finest aircraft the RAF has ever had.
But Typhoon will fill them, contracts are in place or delivered for Brimstone, Storm Shadow and Paveway IV integration, Meteor and CAPTOR E-Scan are on the way and a few additional developments like the conformal tanks and aerodynamic enhancement package are ready to go should we need them.
In the next few years, pending any additional extensions, Tornado will be phased out of service as Typhoon completes it enhancement programme. The main outstanding issue is what to do with the extremely valuable RAPTOR pod, but there are many potential options here.
This then provides the UK with swing role aircraft that can just as easily duke it out with Russian (or Indian) Flankers as it can stomp on ISIS pickups!
The 2030 OSD for Typhoon may well be extended, I hope it is. If anything, I would like to see us picking up an extra couple of dozen Tranche 3b Typhoon and push the Tranche 1’s out of service as soon as possible if they are costing us a disproportionate amount of money to maintain.
Perhaps they could be gifted to the Baltic States?
What about the but?
There are two words we should be thinking about when discussing the F-35B, risk and balance.
Although the risks around the F-35B are diminishing as the aircraft progresses, but there is a risk that unit prices may not fall as predicted and development milestones missed.
The US is reportedly reconsidering their purchase volume and many of the partner nations have yet to commit to quantities, including the UK, of course. Costs are predicated upon production volume, so there is a risk the F-35 can only be afforded in smaller quantities.
Joining the commercial risk is technical risk, again, although relatively small as the aircraft programme pushes through it development milestones, there is uncertainty simply because we cannot predict the future, uncertainty gives rise to risk.
This brings us to balance.
I have some sympathy with the viewpoint of US critics of the F-35B that it is consuming a disproportionate amount of the USMC’s finite budget. This has resulted in many other essential capabilities being cut, curtailed or delayed. From this side of the pond it looks like the USMC has their funding equation skewed far too far to the F-35B and not enough on their other programmes, armoured vehicles for example.
The UK must not repeat their folly.
To restate from above, the aircraft is the tip of the iceberg and so in a world of finite budgets we should ensure that the pursuit of aircraft numbers does not rob these vital enablers of funding. Much better to have a smaller number of F-35’s supported by a functional training pipeline, sufficient logistics to keep them flying and a range of complementary systems and capabilities to extract maximum value than more aircraft without any of these things.
The F-35B must also compete with other capabilities across all three services that need introducing, maintaining or modernising.
Risk and balance means the UK should not bet the farm on the F-35 and maintain investments in the Typhoon, E3, complex weapons integration, realistic collective training, ISR collectors and the means to analyse and disseminate and distribute intelligence information.
I would also like to see greater investment in offensive electronic warfare, stand-off decoy and jamming systems and even roll on roll off systems for transport aircraft. Developing Reaper and a modest increase in fleet size would seem sensible, all whilst continuing our investments in the joint UK/French FCAS programme.
Spreading investment across multiple areas increases resilience and flexibility.
What might this look like in practice for the F-35?
An initial purchase of enough F-35B’s for a couple of squadrons to be sustained, maybe around 60 or so.
This gives us enough for continuous at sea training on the carriers with USMC and European partners, flexibility to mix and match with Merlin, Apache, Wildcat and Chinook in whatever form Carrier Enabled Power Projection (CEPP) takes, a simultaneous land-based capability to complement Typhoon and the ability to surge onto the carrier(s) to create a larger strike package if needs dictate.
This is achievable within a balanced budget, a budget that has to cover many other requirements.
It might not be enough, it might not be the final number purchased, but it does mean we are not distorting the rest of the equipment plan.
Finally, although it may be unfashionable, I would also like to see the austere location operating concept developed further with increased investment in expeditionary airfield combat engineering and logistics.
Summary
The F-35B is not a lemon, it will eventually provide the UK and our allies with an expensive, although extremely capable aircraft that meets the UK’s requirements to a tee.
To reduce risk and maximise our investment in it, we should plot a prudent course and balance the desire for aircraft numbers with investment across multiple complementary capability areas and sustainability, i.e. the underwater part of the iceberg.
Typhoon will remain for some time an extremely potent aircraft and developments in the pipeline will allow it to fill Tornado’s big boots.
Complex weapon development and integration is planned, unmanned systems in development and whilst stand-off capabilities remain an area for additional investment, the picture looks good.
This is what the UK is doing.
After the 2010 B to C to B again wobble, the MoD and RAF/RN have plotted a clear and sensible way forward that is prudent and recognises there is much more to capability than an aircraft, however good it is.
For that, they need to be congratulated.
I have huge issues with concurrency. Having worked on the Jaguar we had massive issues with the Jaguar GR3/Adour 106 programme. The engine especially never reach FOC, with allsorts of quick fixes and lash ups tried to gat clearance for overseas deployment. never happened. The F16 was not a good study for concurrency. The F16A achieved FOC with the USAF and many other forces and has been continuously developed throughout its service life. The F-35 seems to have been given IOC as a political move to try to keep the wolves at bay. Once very limited numbers are delivered at IOC standard, deliveries should be curtailed until the contractor can deliver the agreed FOC standard airframes. There will be further developments in the pipeline but a firm set of capabilities that must be available should be set in stone before major production begins. This may mean certain ordinance is not initially available so the UK may only be able to drop Paveway IV and have to wait for Brimstone and Storm Shadow and limited to ASRAAM and AMRAAM instead of Meteor.
We should not expect the F35 to d be able to do everything we want from the day it enters squadron service. Rather like the initial Tornado GR4 programme, where we tried to cram in too much at the same time. Rather we should look, ironically at how the Jaguar was developed to incorporate the lessons of GW1, adding GPS, TIALD, IDM and so on over time. So get the F35 into service with a good glitch free level of capability agreed as the FOC and then develop the platform over time.
Nice post!
It all sounds rather sensible to me.
48 always sounded a bit lean, however an initial order of 60 F35B would enable a comfortable 2 squadron structure with plenty of spares if a ‘surge’ was needed, or the option of standing up a 3rd unit if eating into air-frame hours and having a smaller sustainment force were considered acceptable….and if the money was available of course!
As for the wider RAF fleet, keeping a small amount of Tornado’s around to bridge the looming gap in numbers (if not Brimstone, Storm-Shadow and Raptor capable aircraft) for at least a couple more years is looking more likelier by the day in my view.
Keeping some T1 Typhoon’s is an argument that’s been done to death so i won’t rehash it, and whilst it’s a lovely idea on paper i have been saying the same thing as TD has for ages…purchase a couple dozen more new build Typhoon’s to take the pressure off of the wider fast-jet fleet. With a 20% cost reduction, a maturing platform and a production line good to go i’d say it’s an idea that has a lot going for it.
Beyond serving the needs of the UK through the RAF a top-up order would sustain the line post 2018 and could only help the possibility of more foreign sales by demonstrating a level of commitment and confidence in Typhoon which has been seriously lacking from the primary Euro-fighter partners for a number of years.
Something in the region of 140 T2/T3 Typhoon’s and 60 F35B out to the 2030’s and beyond would be what i’d aim for, with Tornado remaining in play only until more of the former and significant numbers of the latter arrive to take it’s place, by 2021 if i have my optimistic hat on, but certainly no later than 2023-2025.
@jh
Having a similar lift system to Harrier is academic when talking about size, space and as for range. Look how that has changed for F35 in real life test conditions.
If you read my other posts you see that I see no F35 variant as suitable for QRA.
A longer range heavier payload is always better given everything else being equal. However better is miles away from unsuitable as you said.
So we will have some form of F15E replacement that may be based on F35.
APATS. I suspect you know full well, that the X-32 had a Pegasus style rotating nozzle , whereas the F-35 has the Soviet style lift fan. The X-32 had a quoted combat radius a little larger than the F-35 (approx 60 miles).
Sure the RAF could use the F-35B for QRA over the North Sea, but there is no need for STOVL on that mission, so why not use a longer range, higher G aircraft for that task? F-35A or Typhoon t3b for example.
Perhaps the RAF could launch F-35B from Cyprus to bomb IS/Daesh, but again that does not need STOVL & a longer range/heavier payload aircraft would be better.
The USAF will need to replace F-15E eventually. If LRS-B is as cheap as claimed, perhaps they will just buy more. However, if LRS-B is expensive, then an Advent/AETD engine, big wing, F-35E could be the answer. Not expecting a decision before 2018-20.
In reference to the CVF and F35B debate I am sold on the argument that by going with this approach the number of a/c (and qualified pilots) available for a surge is probably 3-4 times more than if the RN had magically gone for a CTOL a/c.
I’d like to see a permanent CAP sqd of 16 F35Bs plus 4 AEW Merlins permanently assigned to each CVF plus a tailored air group of upto another 20 a/c. This could range anywhere from 2 x 9 a/c F35B RAF sqds for a strike role, to a mixture of Chinooks / Merlins / Apaches / Wildcats when operating in an amphibious assault / SF Base role. What’s not to like :)
@Allen
‘The USAF are, I’m given to believe training up officers who are non-pilots to fly drones and also there are articles in the press stating the USAF is even considering letting non-officers fly drone missions.
Does the RAF, in this ear of tight budgets, really, really need to be spending huge amounts of cash on training pilots to sit in jets to fly missions more suited to drones that could be controlled by a non-pilot?
Or is it political, in that the RAF are determined to maintain their ‘Top Gun’ image?’
All ‘drones’ are controlled by pilots (whether they are called that or not). I’m going to guess what you mean is that the pilots background is that of flying manned a/c? As far as I know the USAF are creating a stream of pilots that are trained on nothing else but UCAVs and there will be no cross over to that of manned a/c. In effect they are pigeon holed. I would find it very remote that the USAF will ever have ORs piloting UCAVs, it’s not in their make up. All of their aircrew are officers and I’m pretty sure historically they have always been.
I’m not sure what you mean by your other paragraphs, do you mean why do use aircrew from manned aircraft background? Or do you mean we should have fewer manned a/c and more Reaper etc?
In reference to the Netherlands QRA requirements, the recent Benelux agreement the total joint F35 order could be around 90-100 a/c, about 4-5 squadrons worth. Given the geographical location and size of airspace I’d doubt that the F35 will have any material limitations. Given however the Netherlands close link to the RMs, whether they should consider a two variant order and swap out some for a squadron of F35bs.
In the singular case of the UK there is absolutely an inherent contradiction in the selection of the B. The B was always intended as a Harrier replacement, as such it takes a range and internal payload hit compared to other variants (especially the C) but that was fine because it was a Harrier replacement; however, it then had to become the Tornado GR.4/DPOC replacement, to which it is less suited and the C would be more suited.
Is this the end of the world? No. Is it less than optimal, yes. More crucially is the UK getting a significant power-projection capability (which is what it wants), yes. Thus we can all stop worrying.
What exactly about the X32 made it more Harrier likens given the size of the aircraft and the role it is required to fulfill what exactly does STOVL have to With QEC size. This was driven by aircraft numbers, munitions and fuel/stores.
What other roles The variant unsuitable for and why?
So B And cannot take advantage of stealth, sensor fusion and missiles, even for A A dogfight is a last resort. We need to get our heads round this.
Why would F35E have the range? It does not exist.
Lots of statements not much analysis in support which is what @TDs post highlighted.
I would not have built a 65000 ton STOVL only carrier & prefer the more Harrier type solution of the Boeing X-32, but we are where we are, so have to make the best of it.
breakingdefense.com says the RAF are training with the USMC at Beaufort in the States & will bring RAF F-35B back to the UK in 2017. Doubtless there will be much propaganda about the UK having a “Superfighter” but frankly I have doubts about early F-35. I think it only makes sense to buy them in numbers when they have the block 1 engine upgrade from 2018 & block 4 software from 2019. It will take several years to get them in any significant numbers, so we are looking at a UK 30 aircraft fighter shortfall from 2019 until 2022-23, unless Tornado is extended or more Typhoon 3b are bought.
F-35B may come right for the QE/PoW, but the limited range & payload, makes them unsuitable for other roles.
F-35A has the higher G airframe & internal gun giving it limited dogfighting capability. F-35B & C are just stealthy bomb trucks.
If the F-35E is ever launched, that would have the range needed to replace GR4 properly.
A few RN V-22 with the roll off tanker kit, might improve F-35B combat radius.
What will the French do after Rafale? Or the Germans do after Typhoon? Do Western oriented nations only want a single fighter choice? (F-35).
‘Although it may be unfashionable, I would also like to see the austere location operating concept developed further with increased investment in expeditionary airfield combat engineering and logsitics’
What do you envisage the rough investment required? The way the F35 has the engine nozzle angled down at an for short take off operation would I presume start to damage the trackway we used for Harrier and AM2 matting is a logistical heavy weight (would this be prone to damage too?) Does any one know what the USMC are considering as I think their expeditionary runway ops tend to be AM2 affairs.
It would stack up well on a cost basis in comparison to new Typhoons and I suspect not too badly against refurbing the T1’s as that’ll come to a pretty penny no doubt but how would it stack against the Typhoon as an Aircraft?
As an outsider looking in, I note this comment from the author of the article,
“This then provides the UK with swing role aircraft that can just as easily duke it out with Russian (or Indian) Flankers as it can stomp on ISIS pickups!”
Why are we even using such expensive pieces of kit to “stomp on ISIS pickups!” when drones could – and by all accounts are doing – hit the target in question.
The USAF are, I’m given to believe training up officers who are non-pilots to fly drones and also there are articles in the press stating the USAF is even considering letting non-officers fly drone missions.
Does the RAF, in this ear of tight budgets, really, really need to be spending huge amounts of cash on training pilots to sit in jets to fly missions more suited to drones that could be controlled by a non-pilot?
Or is it political, in that the RAF are determined to maintain their ‘Top Gun’ image?
@Steve
Fighter vs. fighter combat in WW2 and later was about 80-90% surprise kills, and turns were usually limited to 90° turns. A Bf 109E was able to outturn a Spitfire if a German Spain veteran was up against a RAF rookie. The sustained turn rates of WW2 fighters were not so terribly different as most interested people think today.
Today’s primary option for A2A surprise attacks would be a medium range low signature propelland missile with combined passive radar homing + imaging infrared + imaging UV sensor. That’s what Russians (R-27) and French (MICA) are trying (primarily with IIR sensor, though), and ASRAAM and IRIS-T are capable of to a more limited degree.
The F-35 design team on the other hand attempts to prevent surprise with DAS, though minimized signature missiles (possibly with re-startable solid fuel rocket!) could counter this.
F35 accelerates quite nicely up to around the transonic region becomes sluggish above that speed which is fine for strike. Acceptable for point defence task and good self escort ability but more limited in the air defence arena. It will do fine for what we need it to do but we’ll need another decade to get it full up and running.
Anyway nice video of a f35 pilot talking thru his experiences
https://vimeo.com/124614167
Sorry if this is a repost but Lewis Page (ex-RN Officer for 11 years it seems ) has an article printed in the Torygraphy (slagging off the Torys) about the state of the UK armed forces .
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/11642595/Break-up-the-RAF-and-stop-buying-British.html
He passes comment on the F35 and how its a stitch up we don’t have CATOBAR carriers so we couldn’t buy the F/A-18 series which would of supplanted the Typhoon in the RAF also so BAE bloated the quote on fitting cats and traps. APATS did you ever meet? I suspect not as he was not ‘lost at sea’ ;-)
I suspect an F-35 carrying just 4 internal AMRAAM’s and perhaps a pair of AIM-9 on the wings will climb sufficiently, against an F-16 with external AMRAAMs and a tank or two, that there isn’t really anything to worry about. Unless you happen to live near the runway and have sensitive hearing.
@APATs – interesting thought. For QRA, where would you put one of those v a Typhoon on broad % capability – 75%?
I wonder, slightly tongue in cheek, how a comparison of the whole life cost of 40 new Gripen NGs, v 40 new tranche 3 Typhoons v maintaining the tranche 1 Typhoons through to 2030 would look like. Thinking purely UK / FI QRA
@Hohum
No real fears once it is airborne and in the area in a real fight but as a QRA platform it has to scramble and get there. Often conducting a visual interception and escort.
If I was SAAB I would be pushing Gripen NG hard as a relatively low cost higher performance QRA asset.
APATS,
I am not sold on that yet. Assuming the radar performs as planned (no reason it shouldn’t) and helmet mounted sight (seems to be coming together) as well as the EW system it should offer far more than most customers have currently. It will fight differently (at range) but not necessarily worse.
@Hohum
Unfortunately it does not seem to be able to replace the F16/F18 a2a capability that many countries rely on F16/18 for.
ATA, then A/F-X were intended A6 replacements; they had little if anything to do with JSF.
NATF was an F-14 replacement and equally had little to do with JSF. That requirement was “kind of” fulfilled by F/A-18E/F.
JSF was and is an F-16, F/A-18 ABCD and Harrier replacement. It is not intended as a replacement for the dedicated deep strike or air superiority platforms.
Don’t ever remember JAST having an Affordable component, certainly CALF did. An F-16 replacement needed it given the numbers!
The inception programs leading to F-35 were primarily three channels:
1) UK/USMC: Stems from AV-8A/C and GR.1/3 replacement needs. Most history here can be found under ASTOVL though Typhoon technology directly linked with JSF.
2) USN: Combat fleet replacement with ATA, later the NATF and A-X / AF-X programs.
3) USAF: Main driver that continued into JAST was MRF if memory serves, which is where the F-16 KPP’s originate
Other than F-16 performance, a lot of requirements weighted towards Strike there, along with all that entails.
On the way to JAST, ASTOVL and related developments managed to spawn SHAR FA2, AV-8B and GR.5 (plus the further derivatives of the last two) through spin-offs of the higher technology developments.
ATA, NATF and A-X were disastrous for the USN, credibility was ruined to the point that even the F-14 Quickstrike couldn’t be sold to Congress at any key decision point, even as a project de-risking bridge, leaving them with only the Super Hornet. The Rhino has done OK, but it has underperformed compared to the alternatives at the time.
My knowledge of MRF is incomplete. There’s historically not been as much UK engineering in the USAF compared to USMC and USN. I do know that it was the scale of F-16 (and mooted F-15) replacement that sparked Congress to combine the development threads. Looking back, the F-35 total cost will be argued against 3-4 individual programs.
Aforementioned USN programs had little credibility any more and needed a program owner with a track record, USMC had a significant but niche requirement but came with a solid partnership with the UK, meanwhile the USAF had the bigger order book to fill and more flexibility in delivery time.
Can’t help wondering with my Alternative History hat on what the FAA/RAF would have looked like today had we backed P.1216 instead of Typhoon and accepted the offer to join the Advanced F-14 Family development program. Have a feeling that would have carried the pro-F-14 argument going on in the USN to the detriment of Super Hornet.
Imagine the size of the CAPTOR-E array and the volume of Brimstone/SPEAR/Meteor and other pods that you could carry!
http://i.kinja-img.com/gawker-media/image/upload/s–HhxOjZMH–/c_fit,fl_progressive,q_80,w_636/qaj8w0anhpyapbxchgvr.jpg
JSF had little to with ATA; that requirement basically just went away after the death of the A/F-X programme. Much to the chagrin of the USN.
Other than that, yup, JSF was a bundling up of programmes for an F-16, F/A-18 and Harrier replacement. The attack mission became predominant due to the lack of enemies with a credible air force in the 90s so the JSF ended up being specced to take 2,000lb bombs internally (helping to make it look fat) and being fitted (again internally) with all the stuff we used to buy separately and hang off pylons (EW suite, targeting pod, etc) thus helping make it expensive.
The JSF fell out of several programmes
aston (supersonic replacement for AV8b) calf which followed on from this. MRF designed to replace F16s. ATA designed to replace A6. Also the advanced attack, advanced fighter attack programme.
The main thrust was a replacement for F16/F18, it unfortunately does not do this in certain areas
Those countries that previously flew F16s as air defence assets are suddenly faced with an A variant without the kinetic performance to be a QRA asset.
As I said very happy with UK B variants as we have Typhoon for QRA and also happy with B for Fleet Defence (defending a far smaller area),
If I was Norway or the Netherlands I would be less content.
Whatever the programme appellation, it was always intended primarily to replace the F-16 and F/A-18 for US and allied use; as far as job demarcation goes, that mean not really air superiority or long-range strike but more everything in between.
However, if you are running a single-platform fleet then it does mean just about everything.
AKM – I didn’t know that – now I do. But I still struggle with the above definitions pushing the ‘strike’ part of its capability towards ‘bomber’ (old Sea Harrier as FRS1 only carried missiles for the ‘strike’ bit, didn’t it?) and sliding the ‘fighter’ capability towards an additional or secondary role. Like I noted above it seems like there’s a tad of ‘situating the appreciation’ going on.
F-35 was always intended to be the US replacement for the output of the 1970s LWF programme (F-16 and F/A-18) with the Harrier bundled in later.
Chris: “as I understood it the programme was started because filling USAF with F-22 was prohibitively expensive; cheaper aircraft were to be bought instead”
Sorry but that’s just wrong. The original program was called the Joint Affordable Strike Fighter (rapidly dropping the “Affordable” tag) after the merger of the Common Affordable Lightweight Fighter and Joint Advanced Strike Technology programs. It was always seen as an air to ground partner to the F-22, right from the beginning.
While I have no inside knowledge on the matter, it seems awkward to me that this aircraft was to be primarily a bomber? Reasons being: as I understood it the programme was started because filling USAF with F-22 was prohibitively expensive; cheaper aircraft were to be bought instead (then USMC raised the need to replace AV8B)? And the programme name was Joint Strike Fighter – sort of pushes the Fighter label to the fore? And the aircraft designation is F-35, not A-35 or even F/A-35? All ways round it seems the programme was to deliver fighters, albeit with ground strike capability. Now the combined wisdom of TDers has it that it was really a ground strike aircraft all along but can carry air to air weapons too? Simple question then – was it always going to be that way? Or has programme history and justification been rewritten because the aircraft capability has turned out that way?
First Gen 3 HMDS delivered for LRIP7 aircraft arriving in 2016.
Visual problems resolved in a lighter, less cumbersome dome apparently.
http://www.janes.com/article/53587/rockwell-collins-delivers-first-gen-3-helmet-for-f-35/
(Obligatory carbon fibre shot worthy of Top Gear)
http://www.janes.com/images/assets/587/53587/1515725_-_main.jpg
You have highlighted one of the issues. It was not originally marketed as a light bomber with decent a2a. Whilst I have no issues with the UK purchase of the B variant as an expeditionary carrier and land based aircraft I would be less happy if I was one of the countries that may be buying the A variant as it’s only Fj.
To say I was a fan of the F35 may be overstating it as I’d rather see it in service before I finalise my views. I do however remain very optimistic that it will offer us a substantial capability enhancement, particularly for the RN. The programme has been subjected to an unprecedented level of public scrutiny and I suspect 90% of comments about issues / capabilities are either exaggerated or misinformed. By 2020 (say) we will be operating 5th gen fighters off our carriers and will still have a world class AtoA swing role fighter in Typhoon. I’m not sure the Russians or the Chinese will have any serious number of better aircraft by then. What we need is a roadmap for post IOC enhancements to capitalise on its abilities. I remain open to operating two types of F35 if there are significant capability advantage that outweigh any lack of commonality. I also feel sure that there will be further variants down the line. The key long term issue will be what comes after Typhoon and whether a more AtoA capable fighter is needed and if so who builds it. As to numbers, of the B I hope we get at least 75-80, or enough for 4 12 plane squadrons, 2 in FAA 2 in RAF so sake of argument. In SDSR 15 I’m hoping we see an initial commitments to around 50. In terms of RAF FJ in SDSR 15, and as part of a rebalancing or our expeditionary capability to air and sea, I would like a commitment on Tornado retention to cover ongoing ops and until F35 is never IOC and a longer term commitment to keep Typhoon numbers at around 150 (i.e. 2 extra squadrons) by retaining T1s in QRA and / or a trickle buy of further new aircraft, whichever is the most cost effective longer term option.
F-35 is not an air-superiority fighter, its a light bomber with reasonable A2A functionality. However, it’s BVR capability (and low frontal RCS, networking and sensors) will make a potent A2A platform when required.
@Sc
The F35 and especially the B variant we are buying is not an interceptor. Let us wait and see what comes out of PAK FA T50. Given the countries involved habe no 6th gen experience and make poor engines.
As for SU34 machine 1.8 at high altitude not with full load. F35 machine 1.6 plus with a couple of 100 mileage 4 meteors, you do the math
Will the F-35 be good enough to take on the PAK-T50? Japan does not think so. It’s already not fast enough to catch a fully-laden Su-34. Is it worth sacrificing our military aerospace industry for?
Does anyone else worry that the much touted networking seems to be a US-only satellite system that needs a special gateway to communicate with anything that’s not an F-35 and might not work at high latitudes because it’s a geosync satellite? if data link between aircraft has to go up to a sat and back, every time, no wonder they have trouble with latency. I worry that as a result it’s inherently a capability that plugs into the USAF, like, say, Denmark’s F-16 force, not one that adds rare high-end value to a coalition, like, say, the carrier or the Aussies’ buy of EA-18s.
JMH – ref “the acquisition and bidding process are screwed up and the more reporting there is the more confusing it seems to get” – seems much the same both sides of the pond, but then we did decide to import and employ the US procurement model… You are quite right, of course. As is often the case with ‘big process’, the demands of every possible interest group to have a say in management of the project cause hugely distended decision loops with layers of vetoes and overrules, the accumulation of vast amounts of data from which decision justification can be drawn, and a total aversion to decision-making unless a large committee is involved such that all committee members can disown bad decisions and claim credit for the good ones. None of this vast and very (self-)important management body is likely to be focused on efficient value-for-money progress, for that requires pragmatism and pragmatism requires experts to accept less than perfection in their particular area of expertise. That would be like admitting their speciality is less than the most important aspect of the whole programme – tantamount to career harakiri.
Engineers know there is no such thing as a perfect design. What there is though is the best compromise to suit the task at hand. All design is a compromise; anyone believing otherwise is misguided, living in a world of fiction, or a major project committee member.
So you can’t have the fastest most stealthy agile fuel efficient largest internal stores bay best multi-band sensor fit lighter-than-air lowest price artificially intelligent high altitude ground attack STOVL long-loiter carrier-based interceptor. There are too many contradictory requirements; they cannot all be met in one piece of equipment.
Multi-role, often seen as a real advantage, is all too often the worst of all worlds as the compromises to get acceptable performance for each role mean that none are much better than adequate. Would you design your MBT with room for a section of dismounts and a cargo area for replen and a full set of recovery gear and excavator arm and for good measure a folding bridge on top? Truly multi-role, truly useless at all of them.
I wonder what is being sacrificed to keep the Tornado in service for a couple more years.
Every buyer of the F-35 (A, B and C) will have its doubts of the actual capabilities and role that the aircraft will play. The UK made it simple with the faster (or fastest) version that has IOC. That version is find and yes it is joint but it has to be fully joint and pick up all roles of joint–maritime based strike, ISTAR over land and sea, mini AWACS, and fleet air defence.
Just a thought on the air-air combat agility. Almost all the top 100+ fighter aces of all time got their kills in the BF-109, an aircraft that could not match it with the Spitfire in air-air agility. As Eric Hartman demonstrated in just 3 years of combat (and 352 kills against both Soviet aircraft and USAF Mustangs): pick your target, dive in to fire at close range and zoom out without manouvering. I understand that Euro fighter is designed to do the same at supersonic speeds albeit with BVM or WVR missiles.
its kind of another argument in favor of further developing the Typhoon. Not even the US is going to be flying large numbers of 5th generation aircraft until close to 2030. The Russians 5th generation fighter (if you can call something with a 0.5m2 RCS 5th Gen) is rapidly coming off the rails and they may just get 12 by 2020 with no doubt nothing more than a show piece capability. Given the Chinese inability to build even a simple jet engine I can’t see the J20 or J31 showing up in large capable numbers anytime soon either. Suddenly a Mach 2+ capable Typhoon, armed with Meteor and a massive mechanically scanned AESA radar and a stand off cruise missile with a 300 mile + stand off range (SPEAR IV) does not look so bad in the world of 2040.
Its also safe to assume that the world of 2040 will probably be even more peaceful in this one and governments from Europe to China and North America will be even more bankrupt than they are today paying for the elderly. All of which means 6th generation fighter programs may never happen.
Its also worth remembering that the early Tornado was a bit of a lame duck in the early days. Showing up for Gulf War 1 without a laser guided bomb option and having to rely on 30 year old Buccaneers to designate targets. Much the same as Typhoon in Libya.
correct me if I am wrong but the project itself seems to have morphed a lot from the early days of the program. I don’t remember seeing a lot about sensors fusion etc when they were pitching it at the $50 million mark. However after the US canceled F22 production (as it was the wrong aircraft, too expensive etc etc) (now its out of productions its the best thing since toasted crumpets and jam) the put a lot more onto the F35 plate than it was originally suppose to cover like a2a etc.
The F-35 has the most powerful jet engine in operation. It is the first operational fighter with a lift fan. It is the first fighter with a 360 IR imaging. The stealth coatings are new. The data links are of a new design. The helmet is new. Most of the project is new.
And the fact that those planes were flying in limited conditions is exactly my point. I don’t really see the difference in the end. either way you are building planes that aren’t 100% where you want to be while you work on an updated model. In some cases you can retrofit the upgraded. In others you can’t do it. It has the same perils as concurrency in my mind. If the F-16 stopped with the A model it would have been a useless dog.
What exactly new pieces of equipment are you referring too? H
helmet mounted sight? Infra Red search and track ?
Assorted screen tracking and bombing systems have been around since the early days of the jaguar.
The other fighters you mention were up flying and into service and THEN they added new engines, capabilities etc.
Eurofighter was affected by the end of the Cold War and spats with co production and workshare.
The worst way of seeing the difficulties is draw the wrong conclusions from the wrong lessons.The US had a system of testing and low production exactly to fix these sort of problems, but they ignored most of it. The belief seemed to be this time its different
A few things…
1. I am sick of hearing about concurrency. Frankly I would fire anyone who whines about it anymore. Almost all fighter programs are concurrent in many respects. The love child of the cheap and affordable crowd was the F-16 which went through what I would call massive concurrent development (all new engine, new avionics, new aero-shapes) as it moved from the A to C models. Was it concurrent? I guess not in some respects. They built a fighter that could initially basically drop bombs and shoot sidewinders which is what they set out to do. But then they spent not an inconsiderable amount of time and money adding capabilities to the thing for years. The F-15 was much the same story. As is the Eurofighter. I don’t have the time or accounting background to do it but if you were to drag all the development that was basically ongoing from day 1 for the F-16 through when the USAF said that is what we really want I am curious what it would be. It seems like you either decide to build explicitly limited A (or Tranche 1 models) while you sort all of it out or you try to make it so you can upgrade everything as you go along. Someone is going to have to show me a development and production model where you don’t either have concurrency risk or build significantly sub-optimal products that people then want to toss away (see Tranche 1 Typhoon, F-16A’s). Both ways are expensive and take a long time. I am not convinced that it makes much difference in the end.
2. The acquisition and bidding process are screwed up and the more reporting there is the more confusing it seems to get. You can read very detailed select acquisition reports on the F-35 and there simply is comparable information on other platforms out there that is produced on an annual basis. There is a special report here and there on some of them. But a lot of stuff seems to get covered as commercially sensitive information so we are left to do some guessing. What we do know is that it sure seems like most fight programs are pretty much equal amounts of cluster-screw and they all seem to end up massively over budget. Eurofighter, Rafale, F-22, F-35 all went well over budget. I would guarantee T-50 goes well over budget (or gets delivered as basically a showpiece in very small numbers with pretty limited capability).
The problem to me seems to be the buyers want it both ways. No one wants to get caught buying something that will be viewed as obsolete by the time it gets built. That means any new project is going to be full of new technologies. That makes them almost impossible to bid with any accuracy. If you went to Lockheed, Northrop, BAE ect today and said build me something with two F-135 engines, the exact sensors from the F-35, a weapons capacity of X and a fuel capacity of Y I would guess they could probably quote you something reasonably accurate. The problem (and its not really a problem, just reality) is we ask them to bid an aircraft that is integrating all sorts of other new pieces of equipment. It isn’t basic engineering like building a bridge or a highway. It would be very hard to bid with any assurance and the bidders have every incentive to bid low.
You can try to mitigate these things, which you should, but to some degree the auditors and accountants need to just chill out a bit. Imagine applying the standards one sees for accounting for government risk to some of the highly successful tech start ups we have seen in the last 20-30 years. Like many government things it seems like these auditing processes were started for good reasons but they seem in many defense organizations worldwide to have decided they are really the ones in charge. In all honesty every GAO or DOTE report on a weapons system early in its development process reads like the thing will never work and will cost 2 trillion a copy. Everything they don’t know right this second is seen as a terrible risk. It strikes me as more than a bit over the top. I find UK’s NAO reports to be more artfully written but often of the same basic tone.
“The biggest lesson I have learned from the F-35 is never again should we be flying an aircraft while we’re building it.'”
hello!. That lesson was supposed to be learned by the experience with the Supermarine Swift back in the early 50s.
The experience of Lockheed with the F22, where the software program was very poorly managed and executed should have been a further ‘lesson’
I am probably well out of the box – as I frequently am! I have no dispute about the potential value of the F-35. Where I start to get uppity is firstly cost assessment – someone please show me any military project, although there are quite a few civvie one’s that didn’t over run by a factor of at least 2X. Next is the equipment requirement vision. We sometimes get it right, but more often fail to challenge our thought process, resulting in expensive UOR – have we ever reviewed how we got our decisions so badly wrong? If so please point me in that direction. Thirdly it is in the scope of our equipment – this is broad brush but we seem hell bent on grabbing the latest Gucci toy, rather than looking at a simple robust platform, I’ll use Lightning 2 as an example. It is also supposed to be a ground attack aircraft. Does it make sense to have a multi billion aircraft on a strafing run? Should we use drones? Possibly, but they have their own limitations. What about a stealthy aircraft that is cheap? Not saying it has all the bells and whistles, but perhaps has a better coating, is able to fly very low and can have a very stealthy over watch? Just throwing stuff at the wall to see what could stick.
some very well made points TD,
I would also like to see is continue to develop typhoon and replace tranche 1 with tranche 3 aircraft and develop an offensive electronic attack capability beyond CAPTOR E and the DASS.
I would be pretty happy with an F35 B purchase of around 60 as well.
Nice missive TD but I think you may be “cruisin for a bruisin”!
I feel you are right all versions of the F35 will reach maturity (Eventually and not inexpensively), None the less as a platform it will be excellent but as an aircraft it just leaves me cold, I like you hope they keep the pedal to the metal as far as the Typhoon goes, there is a lot more mileage in it yet. Unfortunately I can’t see anyone taking us up on any tranche 1’s but I do hope they decide to trickle out another couple of Squadrons of Tranche 3’s, have all the three’s as F/B and the 2’s for QRA, what have we got about, 42 or so tranche 2’s? Would that be enough? I’ve no idea to be honest…