It seems by the time the Type 26 Global Combat ship gets to the manufacture stage it should really be called the Type 29.
The MoD announced today that it had awarded a contract to BAE…
The Prime Minister has today announced a major boost to the UK’s shipbuilding industry as the Ministry of Defence signs a contract with BAE Systems worth £859million
The contract will deliver…
The new contract will include investment in essential long lead items for the ships, shore testing facilities. There will also be investment in key equipment for the first three ships – such as gas turbines, diesel generators and steering gear – allowing suppliers to plan, invest and secure their workforce on the project.
So no ships then, just more designs, some shore facilities, and bits of 3 ships.
It was reported by the BBC that the contract will ‘support progression’ to the manufacturing phase.
Apart from the usual guff about transformation and new ways of doing things the simple reality of the Type 26 is still far from a tangible design and welding work.
Type 26 has a long pedigree, like FRES. It came out of the Sustained Surface Combatant Capability pathfinder project in 2006 that ultimately went nowhere but you might remember the C1 and C2 concepts. Planning had actually started in 1998 with the Future Escort Project with trimaran hullform proposals, remember RV Triton
The Concept Phase progressed to Initial Gate in March 2010 after the Future Surface Combatant, another name for it, also faded away. SDSR 2010 merged the types into single design of vessel based on an identical hull, 8 were to be ASW optimised and 5, General Purpose.
None of the costs for Future Escort, Future Surface Combatant or others appear in T26 costs by the way.
As it wended its way through the investment approval process it was announced that approval would be split into Main Gate 1 and Main Gate 2. Main Gate 2 would come at the end of the Assessment Phase and constitute the bulk of the project. In November 2011 the Capability Decision Point concluded which identified the key assumptions and baseline design upon which detailed design work could continue in the assessment phase. The Assessment Phase was extended from December 2013 to July 2014 and then again with it planned to conclude at the end of 2014.
This would allow the Main Gate 2 decision to be made and production to commence immediately after.
As we know, this didn’t happen, hence the Offshore Patrol Vessel order to keep selected trades in work at BAE (they would have to be paid in any case courtesy of the Terms of Business Agreement (TOBA))
Type 23 frigates are planned to start going out of service in 2023 (HMS Argyle, launched in 1989), a short 8 years from now.
The approved cost for Type 26 Assessment Phase was £158 million and as at 31st March 2014, the actual costs were £173m, some £15m over. This against a contract award in March 2010 to BAE (leading the Naval Design Partnership) of £127m.
We have all seen the various designs, seen talk of exports to every nation in the known world and discussed the subject at length over several posts on Think Defence.
Type 26 was billed as a low risk solution, after all, the vast majority of its major systems are off the shelf or will have been designed, developed and integrated with others vessels underscores this.
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From the pointy end;
- Medium calibre gun, already in service with a number of naval forces
- Mk41 VLS, likewise
- Sea Ceptor and Artisan radar, fitted to Type 23 under separate design and development contracts and transferred to T26
- Sonar 2087, as above
- Countermeasures, Phalanx and 30mm cannons, walked over from T23
- Propulsion and power, we already know from T45 what not to do, major systems off the shelf
- Combat management, navigation and communication, likewise
- Chip fryers, as fitted to QE!
All good stuff, a sensible evolutionary design that will de-risk major systems outside of the design and build phase, plenty of room for growth, compliance with modern standards and expectations, endurance for extended deployments and improvements in certain key areas like the Mk41 VLS, mission bay and medium calibre gun.
What’s not to like, nothing, that’s what.
But the question is, what will the contracts awarded so far actually give the MoD?
- Some nice graphics and a final design
- Shore facilities and 3 (count em) sets of gas turbines, diesel generators and steering gear.
A billion quid plus change, plus the costs of additional external cost audits, the FSC, Future Escort costs which will not appear in any Type 26 numbers, Artisan, Sea Ceptor and a few other systems.
But don’t worry chaps, the target manufacture cost at last official airing was £250m to £350m
Welcome to Maritime FRES
Think Defence 
Did you perhaps never bother considering that shore support facilities are pretty essential to the ships and that these things are all rolled into the final per hull cost. which is why T45 rolled out at £1BN per hull but further units would have cost half this?
R&D and essential shore side support is divided amongst total hulls but why let that get in the way of you being able to post a funny picture?
Site becoming more tabloid than broadsheet every day.
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Nothing wrong with Tabloids APATS, makes for a nice humorous diversion from the depressing reality.
Shore support facilities, OK, accept the premise they are essential, but what are they and how are they different to T23/existing facilities, if you want to be serious 🙂
Would be interested in exploring the premise that shore facilities for T45 meant the final cost per hull was a billion, not PAAMS. Given the gucci top notch nature of PAAMS I can see that, where is the T26 equivalent, or specifically, where is the T26 equivalent that isn’t already bought and paid for?
Future Escort was knocking around in 1988, its 2015 and we still don’t have a final design
Come on APATS, joking aside, surely you can’t see this as ‘walk along, nothing to see here’
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@TD
Only certain pieces are being transferred from T23 and how many of these are already supported or fitted? I never ever said that shore facilities not PAAMS was the reason for the £1Bn price tag, i actually said “R&D and essential shore side support is divided amongst total hulls” so they add in together.
T26 will bring its own challenges and requirements, what people and sadly you fail to realise is that when building a new warship design there will be several contracts involved not just a simple xBN pound for y hulls award. it is only at the end that you do the costing per hull. So you entire concept of a “manufacture cost” along with your obligatory snide picture is invalid because such a contract or cost does not exist in isolation. 😦
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It is a funny picture though
Of course I understand the difference between assessment, demonstration and manufacture phases but…
Am off to bed, to be continued ☺
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Just one thing to say on the T26 build saga AAAHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH!!!!!
How hard can it be to sign a f**king build contract for a frigate.
£350 million has already been pissed up the wall on the B2 rivers. It’s not even a case of our previous issues where we did not have the cash to make the orders. Now we have the cash but no design to build. Zero chance this will get done before the election now so it will have to wait for the long drawn out process of SDSR 2015. God knows how long that will take.
All this would not even have been so bad if the B2 rivers were a useful design but they are going to be able to do little other than replace the existing Rivers which we only bought a few years ago.
Worst of all not a single person will get fired over this. Can you imagine loosing your employer £350 million and not even thinking it might cost you your job.
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There is a clearcut Formula for all projects that have an “F” in their name. Take CVF for starters:
“estimate the cost of the two ships at £6.2bn.
when the contract was approved, costs were put at £3.65bn.”
ADD the shoreside and you have a round £7bn.
So FSC becomes
– not the latest official 250-350m
– but 500-700m
Per Hull, shoreside now included. And with all those hand-me-downs! I.e. they willcost the same as the shorter batch-run T45s, effectively.
Anyway, we have now sailed into a safe harbour, as ships so not bring out new, dubious commentators in the same way as topics starting with “U”.
“Nothing wrong with Tabloids APATS, makes for a nice humorous diversion from the depressing reality.”
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T29?
Thought for a minute we were also getting C3/MH(P)C.
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You can see what is going to happen, the cost will escalate, then HMG will say ( after any election) “We can’afford13, we will have 9 instead”.
Trust me I’m a politician
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Looks like this is the extra bunce for BAE to try and get the design right, some money for the Clyde consolidation / ship factory and long lead items. All sensible, but frankly all dependent on having a ship design that can pass its certification and move to production drawing.
It should also be pointed out that the history back to T22/23(R), then FE, then FSC, then C1/C2 to GCS and T26. TD is a decade out in his origins. T22/23(R) actually kicked off about 95 and then became FE in 97, before being FSC in 99. Several attempts to navigate the approvals process from the first attempt in 99, again in 2003 and 2006-ish all fell over because MoD preferred to cut fleet numbers and/or extend T23. Not an option now.
The issues such as they are, are primarily naval architectural. Perfectly soluble with sensible people allowed to make decisions. One hopes the days of weapons engineers in charge are over.
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NaB, on Future Escort, it was a typo, 1988 should have been 1998, the year at which it first gets an outing in Hansard but appreciate it will have gone back a few years before that before it leaked out into the real world!
Will correct now
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@ NAB
If the issues are solvable then one would have hoped they would have been solved a long time ago without the need for a £350 million gap fillies for vessels that you have pointed out are of virtually no utility.
As TD points out they were not short on time to get things ready having started in 1998 and they are not even short of money. It’s running our armed forces this way that has left us in the s**t so badly with a £34 billion a year budget being pissed up the wall.
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No doubt many of the same people responsible for the f**k will be writing in the telegraph to tell us how shocking it is than we only have an escort fleet of 14 because the T26 program only delivered 8 vessels.
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In my view it strengthens the need for a RN Arleigh Burke type class approach with evolutionary enhancements.
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I know I’m in the minority seeing value in small in smaller ships, but the RV Triton looked a great design for a OPV(H) – why did the RN decide not to at least use the investment to further this area?
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Because it was revolutionary… And our civil servants, service chiefs and ministers nowadays run shrieking to the safe haven of ‘what we already know’, preferring to peak out from the undergrowth…
…No Dowding, Fisher or Haldane anymore.
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Always liked Triton and the Trimaran concepts… shame RN decided against.
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@DH
It was not revolutionary it had advantages and disadvantages note that that type of Hull is anything but prolific among warships even today.
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@NaB
‘Looks like this is the extra bunce for BAE to try and get the design right, some money for the Clyde consolidation / ship factory’
Oh well that’s fine then! How much money has so far been spent on ‘getting the design right’ and how much more will be pissed away before they actually arrive at something workable?
As Martin said it’s a f**king frigate! A nice looking and sounding one admittedly but still a frigate, do other nations building comparable vessels take this long and spend this much!
Also does BAE actually put any of it’s own money into building the frigate factory or consolidating the Clyde? Or does it expect every penny for every aspect of the venture to be funded out of the national pocket?
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It’s a bit of a shame that the MOD has already wasted so much money on boats we don’t need (Nellies, T45s, the latest 3 little dinghys) that the inevitable defence cuts post SDSR 2015 will probably mean they won’t get these boats that might actually be useful.
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Imagine a future were the RN is using trimaran design frigates , the worlds largest military spender is looking for a fast stable design to cover a perceived gap that has developed as its primary warship has grown too lardy for littoral work and far to expensive to risk inshore. They look east across the water and choose a proven ship design which they evolve and build under licence with lots of lovely IP royalties flooding our way . Instead they looked west and bought into a car ferry.
p.s. All ready had a rant on the open thread on this one , we will end up with max 8 ASW T26 ( more likely six)if we are lucky and no GP versions. By the time ship four is laid down a new design process will start for basically an Arleigh Burke type combined AAW/ASW, you might as well do one thing while doing the other.
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TD the money wasted on programmes that never made it into production are the natural consequence of taking an investment holiday. We cut our armed forces in half since 1991. Consequently we decided that we “didn’t need” lots of the previously planned new kit. Unfortunately the programme development costs were already hard wired into the overhead. So they went to waste.
Could we have saved more by ruthlessly terminating these programmes in the 1990s? Probably. But the skills atrophy of Trafalgar>Astute would have been repeated all across the estate.
The other option would have been to ‘scrap and build’: to keep buying new kit at small scale and ruthlessly retire anything in need of ‘midlife’ upgrade. Tornado, Warrior, T23 all scrapped or sold before their time to make way for the new equipments. Politically tricky but probably better VFM and definitely better industrial policy. We didn’t, that’s history now.
If (and it’s a big if) the forced have now arrived at a stable scale then the wastage of ‘non programmes’ should drop out quite naturally. Because thing don’t get cancelled when we really, really do need them.
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Challenger the customer always pays for capex. Either it borrows the money and pays upfront or the supplier borrows the money and claws the payback through the price. That’s how capex works.
Today the UK government can borrow at almost zero cost and certainly for less than BAE. So it actually makes financial sense to capitalise the ship factory that way. The side benefit is that the price for the ships themselves will be a more transparent unit cost. And politically an easier sell because of it.
What it does show up is the long term uncertainty over the number of units. By paying for the factory separately both BAE and MoD have dodged the question of how many units will eventually be ordered. Don’t blame them. Its almost certainly because HMT and No.10 have still yet to accept the new reality of a resurgent threat and the need to spend credibly on defence (the 2%). Now that is the worrying bit.
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@ Monkey – don’t the USN already have a trimaran optimized for littoral work that they are not very happy with.
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Is this ship likely to be bought by anyone other than ourselves?
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Mark, T26 has been linked with Brazil, India, New Zealand, Australia and Uncle Tom Cobbley and All but for all the talk of compromising to make it exportable, for putting export at the front of every major project investment approval it doesn’t look rosy for T26. I hope we can sell some, I really do. Maybe better if we concentrate on exporting the clever bits inside them. France has just sold 4 frigates to Egypt, there is an export market i suppose. NaB might be able to shed some more light on export options
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@PE
Well i’m aware and accept the fact that a customer always has to pay for the production costs one way or another so stumping up for the frigate factory is as you say just a more direct stream of funding that’s then separate from the unit cost per ship.
So i can backtrack on that point, but what about ‘consolidating the Clyde’. Should the closure of Govan or Scotstoun also being funding by the state?
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It is truly a woeful tale, and entirely avoidable, but there is a fundamental problem at play here, and it’s not unique to Defence either. The politicians we elect, and then appoint as Ministers are often unwilling and invariably unable to exercise power effectively at this level – probably because they have never done it before in the military or industry. I wonder sometimes how many of them would pass the rigour and scrutiny of a Senate appointment hearing. I write as if this is a new phenomenon, and if you’ve slept through Thucydides, you’ll know it was almost as bad 2,500 years ago.
The problem is that there is nobody in authority who has control of the situation; nobody banging tables, and getting civil servants, military officers and industry captains to jump. The incumbents are hostages to processes which they allow to plod along, without ever taking control and of course we see the results. There is no leadership and drive. I’ve seen this at play, and capable politicians can make things happen, but they have to be brave and forceful enough to take charge, and it helps if they have a solid knowledge of their brief rather than a parachute aide memoire.
Although I think that so many of the answers (even if we haven’t ever got all of the questions) lie in more Astutes, nevertheless, I think that we need a surface fleet of 25 FF/DD as well, It’s just the minimum necessary for an economy of our size, with global interests, submarine proliferation threats and levels of international instabilty we haven’t seen for years.
The problem now will be building pressure on capable FF/DD numbers in the early 20s, as the Type 29s inevitably slip, in addition to Type 23 obsolescence and irrelevance in all but the ASW and policing role. I think that I’d be seriously tempted to push the 3 (?) remaining, un-sold/scrapped Type 42s through an overhaul to get another 10 years life out of them as simple GP ‘frigates’; can’t see why they couldn’t fulfill Gulf pirate work, Caribbean duties and for now, South Atlantic work. Even at £50m a pop for sticking some Harpoons on them, 30mms, miniguns and a general tart-up, for 10 years of hull life would be a bargain. And it could keep Portsmouth docks fed for another 2 or 3 years. Seems a retrograde step perhaps, but years of under-investment in new hulls and delays in the 29s are starting to bite and 3 more GP frigates would be very useful.
Then stretch the 23s OSD dates, and order 19 Type 29s to manage the fleet up to 25. Do this in one contract over 10-15 years, to screw the price down, and you’d see how many ‘free’ builds we’d get compared with ordering batches of 5 and then 4, which is the risk scenario. I’d imagine that you’d get 19 for the price of 16. This is also the best way to generate exports; at 2 hulls being built every 12-18 months, there would be slack available to release some to other customers, and when there is a hull about to go down the slipway, and a long production run commitment, the attraction to export customers is so much greater. Commitment creates confidence, lowers production costs and speeds up manufacture. Also, we’d somehow have to involve Portsmouth in this business, if I had my way; I’m not comfortable about putting all our eggs in one shipyard basket in a potentially break-away region.
They make it so bloody complicated, it’s untrue……
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TD,
Construction of warships involves the awarding of multiple contracts, not a single one “for manufacture”. This looks like it marks the beginning of the construction phase of the Type 26. The hulls/superstructures themselves (what the Americans are now calling the sea frame) will only be ordered later. All evidence that I have seen indicates a logical development programme for the Type 26 concept & the ship, with modifications over time but without any of the abrupt course changes and programme terminations & restarts we have seen with FRES.
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Keith, yes and no
The UK’s procurement cycle has clear delineation between assessment and demonstration and manufacture.
This contract is a bit of a hyrbid and as APATS says, will be spread over the build but it doesn’t alter the fact that so far we have conservatively spent £300m plus with very little to show for it since around 97/98 or so, over 15 years in assessment phase.
This latest contract will by a finished design, some shore facilities 9whatever they actually are) and long lead items for ships 1-3
Over a billion quid for a design and the other bits.
Hence me taking the piss a little and calling it the Type 29 maritime FRES
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Suspect the costs to get the Type 42 serviceable and back to sea would be eye watering. Quite apart from material condition they must be riddled with obsolescence issues. But the real killer would be skilled manpower. The engineering person ell with that experience must be long gone. If you did want more Patrol Ships it’s the Batch 2 Rivers or nothing.
What you say about speculatively over building T26 for export has some merit. Even if we only expect to operate 13 we should plan to build 16 on the assumption we will shift a few along the way. It worked with T23. Adopting that Tempo at the outset gives us an inbuilt war contingency for little marginal cost.
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TD the root cause is the same: the shrinkage of the force size leading to an investment holiday. It’s not pure incompetence. But it is still a mind boggling waste caused by trying to carry on ‘business as usual’ when the financial resources weren’t there. The 1997-2010 government mostly at fault for that.
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@Martin
I should of said alternative future were they were brought
the concept into service and bought into our design rather than the modified Australian car ferry.
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To elaborate it’s at TB/GB issue. Blair wanted to be the statesman on the world stage but he never held Brown’s feet to the fire to make him write the cheques that SDR98 required. Brown in turn didn’t have the political interest to force a more pragmatic foreign policy approach. So the MoD was left to muddle through, during which time all their available effort was going into UOR for Telic and Herrick. So its little surprise that both FRES and T26 were left to bleed programme cost without delivering anything tangible.
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Now with the current lot it is much more of an issue of competence. Between them Fox, Hammond and Fallon have been pretty successful in driving financial control and accountability. But they are only now starting to get into the detail of technical capability. Like how to run a Naval Design Partnership so that you actually get a workable ship design. As NAB hints it sounds like the wrong specialism may have ‘captured’ the programme for a while.
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Hopefully we get at least a half dozen first rate ASW frigates out of this to perform their designated roles of keeping the CASD safe and the CBG supported , all else I think will be secondary to Adm Z’s plans for the RN’s role . Next on the list is obviously some form of Amphibs , at least two . How long and how much will they sting us? Before anyone says why don’t we just buy the Mistrals they almost certainly won’t be compliant with whatever standards and there is no 10+ year design process to spin out is there?
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Replacing Albions with Mistral 1:1 is superficially attractive.
But having hard won a functioning NDP we need to use it if we want to keep it. Depending how T45 goes we might not need another Destroyer design until 2030. So if they’re not designing a RN LHD what are they going to be doing?
France and NATO between them need to conserve and rotate the available Mistrals. Germany and Poland could maybe take 1 each to show their commitment to the Baltic States.
India or Brazil will want to build their own. Australia just bought LHDs. NZ and Canada probably have no requirement. The Far East will build their own if they want them.
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Peter, I have never used the word incompetence, I never used that word with FRES either. I am sympathetic to the general view that a thousand well intentioned decisions got to the debacle that was FRES, am pretty sure the same is true of Type 26.
But at some point you have to ask some difficult questions because too many tasks and not enough ships start sounding a bit hollow when you take 15 years and a billion quid plus to get to an agreed design and a handful of bits and pieces
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TD the number of active ships in the fleet is all about operating cost not about procurement. We were not short of ships. We retired T22 and T23 hulls to save manpower, not steel trades.
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Peter,
Manpower is a function on money.
Ships are a function of money
Money is finite
Fairly simple equations at play
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So can we assume that at least these items “… 3 (count em) sets of gas turbines, diesel generators…” are settled on and will be consistent throughout the class?
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Just bite the bullet and go with an UK version of the FREMM, any additional costs going to moving it to UK standards.
I’d prefer the Italian version as the base standard with a double hanger
Swap the LM2500 for the MT30
If we can’t go the Mk45 5inch go we go with the Oto version (no downgrade there) and if the Mk41 won’t fit we should look at a mix of A50/A70 Sylver silos – 32 silos.
BAE can invest in the Naval Scalp through MBDA and the ships can be built in the UK …. it may appeal to some nations who traditional buy British.
We have 16 tubes for Land Attack missiles – would be interesting to see if the A50/A70 can fit Kongsberg JSM VL missile under develop and 16 tubes with which we can quad pack the CAMM (64 air defence missiles)
So for the RN
144m long
Type 997 Artisan Radar
Type 2050 bow radar – Sonar 2087 for ASW versions
1x OTO 127/64
32x Sylver A50/A70 – 16x Naval Scalp, 64x CAMM
1x AW101, 1x AW159
2×4 Harpoon
2x Phalanx CIWS
2x 30mm
the Italian contract was €5.8bn for 10 FREMMS so about €580m each or £470m each.
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No point now Dave, contracts have been placed
If we want to build our own ships, we have to buy them
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This might help clarify if any export orders will be on the near horizon
Small Naval Efforts Thrive, Larger Ships Lag
http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/show-daily/idex/2015/02/21/mideast-naval-programs-warships-frigates-corvettes-patrol-amphibious-idex-navdex-dhabi-saudi-kuwait-egypt/23508519/
‘Fast patrol craft, offshore patrol vessels and corvette-sized warships continue to dominate most naval needs in the Middle East/North Africa (MENA) region, even as political and financial instability concerns grow. Larger and more expensive programs, including frigate or submarine acquisition, remain an elusive goal for many navies.’
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DN, I think that is because most navies are essentially defensive in nature and therefore don’t deploy at extended distances like the RN does. I suppose this has an influence on the type of ships that buyers want.
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TD – I stand by the comment. The reason we have not enough ships is not because we built too few and too late. It is because we have been desperately to save the wage, training and pension cost of sailors.
Fix that problem and we can easily build enough physical units for them to operate. We had the budget to build 8 Astute. We chose to build 7 for the same money to save on the wages and on-costs of the 8th crew.
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TD I agree most navies just play about in their own waters. So how many potential navies does that leave us to sell to? Nations like Australia already having recently invested in frigates, Canada will be looking but will the T26 be at the right price for the international market?
@PE
‘We had the budget to build 8 Astute. We chose to build 7 for the same money to save on the wages and on-costs of the 8th crew.’
In other words we did not have the money for 8. If you cannot afford the insurance for a Ferrari, then you cannot afford a Ferrari.
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Think Defence
Contracts can be cancelled. Think of the NIMROD MRA4 debacle. Best not to waste that sort of money only to buy from an external source anyway
Simply because we don’t buy one generation of ships doesn’t mean we can’t continue with other versions – derivatives of the River class for example all the way to the armed Khareef class. The German Navy doesn’t buy all the MEKO types
After all, the Dutch in one generation, built Van Speijk class frigates before going back and building the Kortenaer, Karel Doorman and De Zeven Provencien frigates.
In an era of ever decreasing budgets … £859m in a contract which also items such as shore testing equipment, engines etc. can easily be reinvested in the alternative with BAE Systems given the sop of other items purchased for the new vessels plus the construction occurring in UK shipyards
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Don’t disagree DN – but we should have awareness of where the main cost drivers are. It isn’t crap procurement that is causing the manpower shortage.
It’s the manpower costs that are determining the reduced size of our forces, and that in turn is what has stressed procurement and is driving cost, delay and waste into the equipment programmes from FRES to Typhoon to Shipbuilding.
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@TD&PE….
Agree with PE on manpower cost reductions being primary driver of cuts to armed forces and of the civil service manning of the MOD being outsourced to contractors.
I have postulated in the past that the reduced crewing requirements of t26 (125) to t23 (180) and also of Astute (98) to Trafalgar (130) may allow leeway for a small increase in the numbers of both fleets heading towards the mid 2020’s. The big ‘elephant’ in the room being how do we crew two QEC carriers without an uplift in RN manpower.
Think the next SDSR may not be as harsh as we think given improving govt tax receipts amid general GDP growth. We may indeed dip below the mythical 2% for a few years until deficit removed but in cash terms with GDP growth and consequent tax receipts, a flat plus 1% equipment increase in budget is doable, we could fudge the 2% and commit to restoring it in the 2020 – 2025 timeframe.
Oh yes and my favourite hobby horse of having public duties and red arrows et al funded from crown estates revenue rather than the surplus being swallowed up by the treasury! 😉
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Its the lack of integrated long term thinking that pisses me off. On the T45 pages of the old Navy Matters site, there is discussion of how variants of the T45 were proposed as replacements for T22B3 and T23. A longer stretched variant to replace the T22’s and a shortened version to replace the T23.
Even with changes to machinery (as we have now learnt that the T45 plant might not be so great after all) there would have been massive commonality in hull, ancillary machinery, communications and command systems, identical bridge etc etc and the cost savings of a long production run of a modular hull (different lengths and arse end’s for towed array etc) may have been substantial. Yes, the RN may have received less than perfect ships, but we are back to gold plated versus 75% good enough.
So yes, TD is right, the surface combatant programme into the T26….. it is in indeed the naval version of the FRES saga !
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Scrap them. As has been said, Nimrod-esque, but whatever. Not worth being bent over the barrel by BAE Surface Ships again, and again, and again. It’s not incompetence, its collusion between supplier and client and gross, gross corruption.
Frankly we should be outsourcing our military equipment, even warships. We wont of course, because defence ministers and senior BAE management have bills to pay, mortgages to sort, taxpayers to screw.
FWIW, I’d happily ask Huntington Ingalls if they wouldn’t mind building a dozen UK-variants of the National Security Cutter. They’d be more than happy to expand their current run of eight and we wont have to go through the problems associated with first and second in class. We can fit all the extra bobbins on when they arrive.
But that’s fantasy land.
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Weren’t the T45 variants proposed when significantly more acoustic deadening was in the design and later dropped?
Small mercies for the whole fleet, altered versions may have provided even more of a headache for replacing the engines.
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TD
Yes it would seem we are again destined for a UK only bespoke ship. Coming from the aerospace industry I find it odd we are fixated with designing and building ships independently with almost zero chance of having any other country operating the same vessels or subs.
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@Jed
I take your point: I have long envied the evolving designs that led the USN from the Tico to the Spruance (common hulls and power plants) and ultimately to the Arleigh Burke which they have now stuck with for some time, evolving the basic design from Flight I to Flight IIa and most likely to a Flight IIb or III before long. (I grant you, they wouldn’t have stuck with the Burke quite this long given the choice, but they are reaping the rewards of a low unit cost and a practiced and efficient shipyard building them.)
And I thought a stretched T45 ‘cruiser variant’ batch 2 would have gone a long way to addressing the shortfalls of the design. I also thought a trick was missed in not developing the single faced SAMPSON, a lighter weight, cheaper alternative targeted at the frigate market, and which could have equipped capital vessels, as well, providing a common radar architecture for the fleet just as Aegis has done for the USN.
But that short version to replace the T23s was just horrible. A short fat hull which would never have been as quiet as the T23 (or the T26 if we ever get it).
Regarding low build volumes, low manpower, low everything…
I think the RN is going to have to add the word ‘corvette’ back into its dictionary at some point. A hangar-equipped corvette (or Patrol Frigate, if you prefer) could do anti-piracy/smuggling, presence/surveillance and still contribute something in a hot war as a light/close escort, and could probably be done on a crew of less than a hundred if we returned to single role specialist hulls as was once the vogue.
Under the original S2C2 plan that led to T26 (T26 is not a direct descendant of the Future Surface Combatant – that one died and was replaced, wholesale, by S2C2) this corvette probably equates to a C3 with elements of C2 thrown in to beef it up a proper light General Purpose warship, with a distinct emphasis on it being General Purpose, which would keep a lot of expensive specialist gear off it (and thus keep costs and manning down).
A corvette program would be a far better inheritor of old T23 equipment like Artisan, but the 2087 TAS would still go to the T26 as the fleet specialist ASW platform. The General Purpose corvette could then support the T26 and MCM fleets by acting as a lilypad for ASW/MCM aviation assets (I say assets in order to cover both manned and unmanned), or taking over protection of the fleet train and freeing up T45/26 to pursue their specialist roles, or forming the bulk of the escort for the ARG.
Retire all the River class (batch 1 and 2) to get 3 or 4 additional corvettes and settle on a surface escort fleet of three classes.
There is a caveat: we would need to buy more RFA ships to get the corvettes where they needed to go and keep them there for a useful period. Alternatively, we can re-visit forward basing. Singapore looks like a good candidate (I already think we could use a couple of SSK based out of Singapore, but that’s a fantasy fleets idea).
EDIT
@Overseas
I will take a bakers dozen National Security Cutters off the shelf right now and call them Patrol Frigates. Job done.
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The NSC cutters cost over £400 million a pop and that is without the systems we would need.
We are going Ff/DD and OPV mix far better suited to tasking than Corvette.
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I’m not sure about this ‘using bits off the T23 for the T26’ idea anyway – I think the timing is not going to work in our favour. Maybe for the first few vessels but thereafter won’t Artisan be old hat? Might also question why we are proposing to upgrade all the T23s.
I’m all for trying to keep 13 T26s but the prolonged process may leave some of their kit out of date and prompt a end to the T26 (after 6 to 8 ships) and worst case that’s it but hopefully into batch 2 territory with a better AAW radar, making it truly a GP escort
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Most of the T23 upgrades are de-risking the new systems for the T26.
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@TOC – can see that logic, as long as there is not too large a gap between fitting on T23 and transfer to T26. The transfer should be as de-risked state of the art kit and not sub par 2nd hand stuff.
@MSR – I’m with the DD/FF and OPV fleet mix – provided we maintain DD/FF levels at around the 18+ mark for a credible tasks group escort and our long legged standing commitments. A cut in DD/FF number mean we either cut those long legged tasking or look to some alternative ‘cheap’ long legged patrol frigate – more like a Thetis than a corvette type – to cover some of the more benign taskings or FRE / TAPS back up. I hope we maintain the 13 T26s and it doesn’t come to needing another type. Down the line I’d hope the MHPC or MH capability may prove additional patrol / ASW options but that depends on the vessel type chosen.
Our biggest single capability gap remains MPA
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@Mark…
Think your forgetting PAAMS was a collaboration on missiles and launchers and combat management, we just went with a more capable radar by all accounts to keep a sovereign capability.
We’re now going MOTS as regards small caliber guns and 5 inch gun, mk41 launchers anti-ship and land attack missiles. As well as MOTS diesels gas turbines and transmissions.
Also we’ve developed a rather neat solution for local area missiles with CAAM (a development of ASRAAM ) with huge export potential- to be sold via MBDA a collaborative european missile producer.
And sonars through THALES, 2087 variants of which are sold to all and sundry.
As regards the ship itself then i think you have to go unique ..see the Horizon type where different requirements were insurmountable with french and italians…. we have requirements for much longer legged ships than the other european countries and differing manning requirements to the Americans.
I think if you take off all the above expensive bits from the price you get a design bespoke yes but one that isnt compromised and suits our specific requirements at a not unreasonable cost … provided you build enough of them. (And export a few, or the design, using UK produced expensive kit )
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Apats
Yes indeed, a cool £400mn for a 4500 tonne platform. It would be £500mn per ship after fitting the VLS (ditch the 57mm).
Maybe some savings in economy of scale, perhaps.
These GCS will cost £500mn each and more, after all the extra ‘costs’ are added, and will come decades late if at all. And for what? A Type 23 (Batch 2). The Cutters would arrive far earlier and more quickly replace the T23’s (and requiring 60-odd fewer crew members too).
We should take advantage of the benefits of joining US build streams and join their programmes, seeing as the single (military) shipbuilder the UK has is so obviously disinclined to doing a proper job.
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Wirralpete
No hadn’t forgot the paams system, I just don’t see that we are operating that differently from the french, they operate pretty much in the same locations as us and have the same scale as we do.
I’m not sure how different our requirements really are with others and how much we make them different to ensure that they are different. And that’s not just for ships.
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@overseas
So you would be happy with 450 million and have no gun, no strike silos, no ASW capability and no mission bay?
No thanks
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@mark
The difference between ourselves and the French is we have enduring presence in places like the Gulf where we have K1 and K2 DD and FF plus 4MCMVs 2 RFAs and an Hq. The French dip in and out.
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From the £859m you can remove the quoted £200m for the Frigate factory , say £59m for shore facilities (drydock 6 @Portsmouth) leaving £600m over three ships for the propulsion and steering gear. (The MT30’s and generators for the CVF’s came in at £96m for 4 so £25m for the single MT30) . So £200m per ship and 700,000 man hrs per ship at £100 ph(?) and £10m for steel gives £280m per ship basic plus all the other stuff . BAE System should be able to bring these in at £400m or less by my fag packet calcs.
997 Artisan 3D radar-FREE
2087 towed Sonar-FREE
2050 bow sonar-FREE
SCOT-5 satcom-FREE
IRVIN-GQ DLF decoys-FREE
8 × 6-cell CAMM VLS canisters-FREE
3 × 8-cell strike-length Mk 41 VLS -£?
1 × BAE 5 inch Mk 45 naval gun – £?
2 × 30mm DS30M Mk2 guns-FREE
2 × Phalanx CIWS-FREE
2 × Miniguns-FREE
4 × General purpose machine guns -FREE
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@PE
‘It’s the manpower costs that are determining the reduced size of our forces, and that in turn is what has stressed procurement and is driving cost, delay and equipment programmes from FRES to Typhoon to Shipbuilding.’
Manpower has only recently began to bite. The programmes you mentioned were ongoing during a period of platforms taking priority over personnel and with larger budgets. Miss management (either our own or someone else’s) has been the common denominator in all our major projects since the early 90’s. Inception to delivery takes too long full stop. we would have had FRES if they had just written out the requirement and then let industry build some prototypes. Typhoon has and is a nightmare to be honest how long did it take to get into service and when will it reach it’s full potential?
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Apats
Is that what I said? I don’t think it was, but hey ho, as it goes.
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Apas
Ok so we keep ships permantly in the gulf and the French don’t ( I may prefer that method but that’s a government one). My question would be this say we had agreed with the french several years ago we would buy the fremm but we wanted to build for example the aft end ship block in Portsmouth for all fremms but we’re happy for final assembly in a french dock. Also we would fit the artisan radar and the camm missile in place of the French radar and aster. Would the RN rather be accepting the first fremm this year at a rate of 1 a year from now or is it happy to wait another 7-8 years to receive the type 26 to replace type 23.
DN
Typhoon first flew in 1994 was delivered to the RAF in 2003 became operational in 2005 took on qra in 2007 became multi role in 2008. It’s fully potiential is limited only only by what people want it to do which hasn’t been thought of yet.
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@Mark
After the common destroyer programme we were once bitten twice shy. A permanent presence creates huge extra capability requirements, K1 and K2 come with specific requirements, K2 is currently ASWC for Cog BG
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DN you misunderstand me. I am not referring to failure to recruit or retain. I am referring to the cost savings from ‘Salami slicing’. The biggest juiciest saving that gets the Treasury salivating most is the reduction in planned manpower levels.
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Monkey,
There is excessive use of the word “free” in your post. This is the defence industry, in which there is no such thing as “free”***. Integration at the very least costs “lots”, and “lots” is dependent on how cocked up the previous procurement has been, how many changes of requirements, how fucking stupid the IPT Leader has been, and how much net margin the company concerned needs to make (plus 10%) to keep the City quiet.
*** clue. Look at the small print of any defence company official letter/email etc. Does it say “Registered Charity”? No.
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What adjustment to fleet size do we make for attrition in the event of a conflict? You can’t just knock ships up, can you?
The way this Government’s review had it was: “The Royal Navy will be equipped with 19 frigates and destroyers to protect a naval task group and meet our standing commitments at home and overseas. These will include six new Type 45 destroyers and new Type 26 frigates. This force, though smaller than currently, will provide military flexibility and choice across a variety of operations from full-scale warfare, through coercion and reassurance, to presence and maritime security (in particular protecting trade and energy supplies). ”
So how big is this “task group”, what could it do and how much battle damage can take before the rest of the Navy can’t meet the other normal jogging tasks?
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Apas
Hindsight is wonderful but considering how things turned out perhaps we made the wrong call twice. If your saying that a type 23 can undertake those roles and by inference it must be more capabile than a fremm asw frigate fair enough I’ve no knowledge of either. I suspect had industrial partners been more amenable on the common destroyer the government would have changed any outstanding RNs requirement issues to suit once the radar issue was sorted.
Given that the RN force structure is shrinking and the defence budget which I see little to suggest it will change, if the requirement of permanent presence is what is driving RN ship costs up and making them uncompetitive for foreign sale then its time to start asking the government to stop doing it if no more money for defence is forthcoming.
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@RT
The implication by the RN is that they are saving money by not demanding brand new everything and are making do with what will be 30 year old kit. As you say though by the time the kit has been tested, refurbed , retested , reinstalled , retested etc costs will incur.
@Jennings
There will be little or no room for losses, we have 6 AAW Destroyers of which eventually a least one at a time will be in deep maintenance to fix their known problems ,the engines for one, and another in minor overhaul leaving no room. The same will go for the T26 to an extent at some point. Missions will be prioritised and co-operation with our allies will be essential. A purely British task force ala 1982 will be very unlikely though.
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@ Mickp – I don’t think we need to worry about artisan becoming old hat. The US has shown that a phased array radar can stay relevant for decades with upgrades and I don’t see any new tech beyond phased array likely to cause any revolution any time soon.
T26 is a great idea, If the cost stays in the £400 million range then it’s way cheaper than FREMM or anything the US might have. They just need to start building the thing.
@ TD – I don’t think T26 can be compared to FRES unless the program is canceled again and they start over. It is hopefully still on course to deliver something.
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http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/naval/2015/02/21/france-egypt-frigate-fremm-dcns-rafale-export-corvette/23674673/
A few more interesting details about FREMM sale to Egypt. with note to the €800 million price tag and the question of just how much did the French tax payer have to subsidize these sales.
I don’t think the British public or press would let our ministers off with such deals.
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Stark contrast there to T23s with availability in mid-80s (%).
So, why would the T26s be more like T45s than T23s? RE. “There will be little or no room for losses, we have 6 AAW Destroyers of which eventually a least one at a time will be in deep maintenance to fix their known problems ,the engines for one, and another in minor overhaul leaving no room. The same will go for the T26 to an extent at some point”
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Martin
I would suggest we should think of the Egypt deal as a clever way to maintain Key industrial capacity. French austerity programme (driven by German Eurozone policy) needs to cut government spending; defence has been a major recipient already. More cuts were likely to come. Surely, this allows he French government to avoiding taking decisions (because of short term austerity driven defence cuts today) that would effectively eliminate a key industry.
The French government can issue bonds today to fund the entire programme at a fixed rate less than 1 % (ridiculous I know, but that’s the Eurozone low risk “discount” compared to the UK/USA). The project finance cost for the Egyptian government will be higher than 1 %, but lower than they could finance themselves. On top of this the margin on the equipment sold will keep the French defence industry going. This is all paid for by very cheap finance. France government can safely slow down the acquisition of ships and aircraft for its own use (cutting the defence budge in the short term).
Whilst financing the Eqyptian government is risky, government to government debt does tend to get paid eventually. Egypt is also (defence) financed from the US and Gulf States, so it might not even pay this cost itself.
For all we know there is a wheeze where this sort of financing doesn’t get reported as Government debt either (much like Private Finance/PPP debt doesn’t in the UK government books). The French government is much less allergic to national debt that the UK government (or at least the Tory end) is.
The UK has one major advantage over the French if we chose to do something like this; we can create Money out of thin air by creating pounds (Quantitative easing). We have already invented 375 billion pounds worth (equivalent to funding the government deficit for about 4 years), which has largely been spent on bailing out the banking sector. This is on top of the amount borrowed to actually fund the deficit (average 100 billion pa for the last 5 year). The main risk of printing money is inflation; but as we have seen there is too little demand in the UK/world economy today for this to be a serious short term consideration.
BTW I know government debt raises some peoples hackles, but as a % of GDP, government debt exceeded 100 % of GDP between 1915 and 1963 (ish), peaking at over 200 % just after 1945. Government debt has yet to reach 100 % of GDP, whilst the nation/world is in the middle of the worse economic crisis since the 1929/1939 depression. There is some slack here, especially if you’re investing for the future.
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@PE
‘The biggest juiciest saving that gets the Treasury salivating most is the reduction in planned manpower levels.’
I agree but it is not this that has caused the problems with the projects. How many design studies do we have for every new major project? how is that driven by the reduction in manpower? the carriers were not over budget due to adding sudden automation due to a lack of manpower form cuts neither where the T45’s, Astutes or FRES.
@Mark
Tornado which was a tri-national project first flew in 1974 and was introduced into service in 1979–1980. So that’s 5ish years from first flight to service and with the added bonus of being able to do exactly what it said on the tin. A Typhoon dropping a Paveway on a target illuminated by a Tonka in Libya is hardly multirole in this day and age especially when the Typhoon was meant to replace the Jaguar as well. We all know why it has dragged out a bit with some of the partners being less than forthcoming with funds but still.
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DN
Typhoon also did exactly what it said on the tin it assumed the air defence task which was its primary mission. And no it could and did self designated over libya and that was available from 2008 which at the time was the only paveways in UK service. It took some time for tornado to take over the air defence role from its first flight it was a matter of priorities for the respective airforces.
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I once put an extra million onto a contract (sole source, easy to do). Pure bunce, and solely because the IPT Leader was a cunt who had been fucking us about.
He retired as a full Colonel, and had the nerve to LinkedIn me asking for a job.
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If you want to build escorts with reasonable price within your country, you shall continue to build it. I was a bit surprised that you were all so much in hurry to produce T45s and CVFs. You built 6 T45 in 6 years, and are going to build 2 CVs in 3 years. If you have split it to a T45 per 2 years, and 2 CVs in, say, 6 years shift, you would not be needed to order River B.2 for TOBA.
19 escorts with 35 years life. Simple calculation shows 1 ship per 1.8 years.
It is the same for T26s. If you are to build only 8 to 9 ships, you shall take it into account that you have about 20 years (24 at most) before you need T45 replacement. In other words, if the first T26 is entering service in 2022, you shall build it in 1 ship per 1.5 year pace, at the fastest.
If you really want to export warships, you shall focus on light-frigates or corvettes, as noted elsewhere. I see almost no chance for the “light-cruiser-like” T-26 frigate to be built in Britain for export. Only hope is to sell its design to, say, Canada, Australia, Brazil and NZ, although with very small possibility.
There is almost no country in the globe, who cannot build frigates on its own and also needs a “cruiser-like” large frigate. Its the same for France and Germany: what they are selling is light frigates (La Fayette, Floreal, MEKO200, or corvettes), never a real frigate.
Up to here, I am “serious”.
From here, I admit I am talking a personal “fantasy fleet”.
In this sense, promoting Khareef-class makes sense for me. Introducing, say, 3 “99m-class OPV based corvette” has ALMOST NO MERIT to RN itself. But, if, only if, you have a budget to build 9 T26s, you can think of making it 8 T26s and 3 99m-corvettes.
Here, the top requirement for the corvette is to enable to build 3 of them with the same amount of money for the 9th T26, INCLUDING ALL THE DESIGN WORKS. At the same time, the second top requirement is to make the operating cost of these 3 vessel as a whole the same as a single T26. Thus, these corvettes will have no SAM, no S2087, and possibly no SSM other than those mounted in the helicopter. All these armaments must be designed to be “fitted for” but not with. Only a 5 in gun, a CIWS and a Wildcat. It must be diesel propelled (and hence up to 25 kt in its speed) and have a complement of only 50, including 7 (TBC?) for Wildcat. Quite limited vessel, BUT that is what is needed in the globe.
With this design, I believe, there will be a chance to export it.
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Mark
‘Typhoon also did exactly what it said on the tin it assumed the air defence task which was its primary mission’
Ok I may have been mistaken when I said the Typhoon relied on the Tornado for target designation, but was not Typhoon always touted as a multi role aircraft and when it was delivered it could not fulfill any air to ground. This aspect was rectified by our own programme to integrate the lightning pod and paveway and was not part of the overall programme, so it did not arrive being capable of doing what it said on the tin.
Considering the airframe was meant to replace the jaguar which could carry a number of air to surface weapons the addition of the capability of dropping an LGB is hardly multirole. What was the state of weapon integration on the Grippen when it entered service with true swing role capability?
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DN
Yes but it had been agreed with all the partners that it would initially be delivered with air defence capability and ground attack would be added at a later date we accelerated the ground attack capability when it was decided to retire jaguar early. Beyond paveway and crv7 I’m not sure jaguar used any other ground attack weapons in UK service when it left service.
I’m not sure what gripen had available when it entered service. I do know it took the same length of time from first flight to being delievered to the Swedish airforce as typhoon did.
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@ Nick – your assuming that Egypt will pay the full price for what it’s buying. That does not seem likely to me. I can’t imagine British taxpayers being keen on subsidizing a foreign military like Egypt. The press would have a field day.
Also it’s the real interest rate you have to take into account on government borrowing. we still have inflation and France does not so every year that debt becomes more expensive.
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Martin
we have a different political tradition than France. Its commonplace to see Hollande (or predecessor) signing big multi-billion deals just as many large French corporations are part government owned or controlled (eg Airbus). The UK government seems to act a facilitator for UK plc (and unfortunately a rather poor one at that).
If it became a choice between loosing a national strategic capability and finding a way to subsidise it we would close the facility (eg AFV manufacturing and Military ship building the way we’re going). France (or Germany for that matter) would rather keep the capability and finance exports of existing designs.
Are you sure our way is better in the long run ? Wouldn’t BAe plc have been better off with its stake in Airbus in the long run rather than selling it to pay for its US acquisitions ? This is a UK Industrial strategy question of some importance. Oh, I forgot, we don’t have an industrial strategy.
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Mark
But was that another decision taken after the fall of the USSR when the peace dividend was the main goal of all politicians, it was a way of saving money from the project as the Germans pretty much did not want Typhoon at all after 1990 especially with the costs of reunification looming large.
The Gripen may have took as long but when it was delivered it was capable of doing everything that the programme had been asked to deliver.
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DN
The entire production contract decision for typhoon was taken well after the fall of the Berlin wall. I’m not so sure gripen was capable of doing everything when delivered, what weapons and missiom were alvailable to gripen at IOC?
I know the A and B versions were incompatible with nato standards and had no aar capability and were restricted on flight endurance with the crew support system onboard because that was the reason they brought bae systems on board which resulted in the upgrade to the C standard the sweds operate today.
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Mark
‘The entire production contract decision for typhoon was taken well after the fall of the Berlin wall.’
Is that not what I said? the decisions were taken after the fall of the USSR and Germany wanted out of the project full stop. Wasn’t that why the contract had been written to penalise any nation that withdrew and which came back to haunt us when it came to signing for tranche 3 or was it 2?
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@DavidNiven
Libya was as much about meatware as hardware. We only had a few Tiffy pilots trained on air-to-ground, and even they had little combat experience (on Typhoon at least), whereas the Tonka pilots had been plinking Terry in the desert for several years. So they used their skills in target ID in complex environments, the Tiffies had the latest mapping/comms electronics for coordination with other forces. Makes much more sense than sending them out in unmixed pairs.
@Martin
UK CPI inflation is 0.3% year-on-year.
@Nick
BTW I know government debt raises some peoples hackles, but as a % of GDP, government debt exceeded 100 % of GDP between 1915 and 1963 (ish), peaking at over 200 % just after 1945. Government debt has yet to reach 100 % of GDP, whilst the nation/world is in the middle of the worse economic crisis since the 1929/1939 depression. There is some slack here, especially if you’re investing for the future.
Justifying debt by comparison with WWII will lead you into all sorts of trouble. Borrowing money does not necessarily create wealth in itself, but for certain it takes economic growth from the future and moves it to the present day. So much of the spending in WWII came at the expense of the economy in the 1950s-1970s – arguably the growth in the 1980s was only possible once the inflation of the 1970s reduced the impact of the wartime debt. But you can blame the cancellation of CVA-01 and TSR-2 on the debt inherited from WWII – if we hadn’t had the debt interest to pay, we would have had an extra £1.0bn/year in the government budget. Right now we’re paying £48bn/year in interest – without that we could double the defence budget, cut income tax AND bung some money at the NHS.
Trouble is that government has little concept of what “investing for the future” actually means. If HMG had assigned Chelsea Barracks to civil service pension funds or the Crown Estates and borrowed a mortgage to redevelop into luxury flats, that would generate a rent income for centuries to come that could be offset against taxes. That’s a use of national debt that deserves the term “investment”. Instead the term has been so abused that it now covers all sorts of non-capital spending which doesn’t produce long-term income that can cover the debt interest, let alone the principal.
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@RT
Didn’t he ask you for a job because he thought you owed him a favour after he signed off an extra £1m for your company? I thought that was how the revolving door worked?
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@ChrisM
“IPT Leader was a cunt ”
If you swung a £1m add on just for giggles on a contract past this guy would you want him working for you , better to point him at your opposition and say we don’t have a position at this time by they might 🙂
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A couple of daft questions:
Type 45 and Type 26 are quite close in size. Is it intended that if the UK wanted/needed more destroyers they can be made out of a Type 26 hull?
Would there be any roles that could be fulfilled by a trimaran based on a Type 26? The extra deck area would give space for, erm… containers! Would it be too wide? Too pointless?
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@ A different Gareth
The T26 was conceived to come in an air defence variant so its entirely possible that it will eventually replace the T45.
As for a Trimaran, It would be an entirely different design and I just don’t really see any point in a Trimaran for a frigate.
@ Nick
Only time will tell if the Franco German protectionist model is better than the Anglo free enterprise one. BAE for all their faults is a pretty dynamic company. Dassault in comparison is a joke. Airbus has been successful but I think largely on being a pan European company. Its doing everything it can to break its state link. Its profit margins are ridiculously low which is the main reason BAE sold its stake to focus on higher profit margin businesses in the USA.
Airbus can’t gain access to the US market in the same way as BAE which was one of the reasons they wanted a merger.
I am often amazed just how long the French have kept their state intervention model going while maintaining a fairly high productivity level. However the wheels are coming of now and its hard to see them going back on.
State intervention can be a good thing though when used correctly. Just look at Rolls Royce. Our main national champion had to be taken over by the government to stave of bankruptcy. The company was able to reform and go back into the market place and do very well.
If RR went bust today the government would certainly step in. If GE in the US went bust I would guess the same would happen. The trouble with French intervention is its ongoing basis which requires the government to pick winners and losers.
From a UK perspective Typhoon has been a fairly big export winner with real contracts signed with the Saudi’s and other in the gulf. For the French Rafale is a liability requiring public financing to sell to Egypt and probably to India as well.
In terms of industrial strategy and national champions Airbus bolts together bits of planes in France because French industrial strategy requires air planes to be made in France. Meanwhile the UK with no industrial strategy does not make a single plane yet has the second largest aviation industry in the world.
which is the better result?
Would you trust either Cameron or Hollande to run a sweet shop let alone decide the industrial future of the UK? Because that’s what national strategy requires.
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T26 has NEVER been conceived as an Air Defence Ship or variant thereof. The requirement – all the way back to 97 onwards, has been pretty much as it is now. ASW primary role, with surface warfare, land attack and local air defence.
A lot of kit-obsessed fantasy fleetists have convinced themselves that it should have an equivalent area AAW capability to T45, but that has never been a consideration in the programme.
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NaB,
But in order to compete with the likes of FREMM on the international market it has to have it as an option, does it not? Maybe not to the level of T45, but the rate we’re going with these things they will be replacing T45 anyway. 😉
Has the need for exportability been dropped?
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@ NAB
BAE hs certainly considered an air Defence variant for the export market
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/britains-future-frigates-06268/
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A speculation piece in the DID (without any input from BAE natch) does not a credible option make.
ISTR making the point some time ago that exportability was unlikely to make much difference on this class.
That is not to say we shouldn’t consider it – and by all means have the design set up such that customer-demanded kit / capability can be substituted for the RN kit, but one has to be realistic – the navies who want the high-end ASW capability that we require will want to build it themselves (USN, Japan, Korea, India, Spain, Italy, France, Netherlands, even the Aussies and Canadians). While it is conceivable that one might be able to get a couple of ships licence built for one of those countries or a couple of others like Norway, it simply is not going to have shipyards hooching with new builds, as Lord Drayson so fondly imagined. The market simply is not there atm.
Although there is a market for smaller, less developed ships, there are two problems with that. Firstly – the RN does not and will not have a requirement for small, short-legged ships plastered with ASuW kit, until we transition from being a blue water navy with oceanic reach, to a pure coastal defence force. Pirates and druggies are not the requirement drivers, they are merely opportunity tasking while undertakeing other roles. Second – the asian shipbuilding industry is rapidly becoming capable of servicing those demands themselves. VT had to work exceptionally hard to land the Khareef, despite being one of the historic suppliers of choice to the Omanis.
The only way to get a sustainble UK shipbuilding capability is to support it, BUT and this is where we’re falling down at the minute, ensure that its MOD customers are capable of holding it to account. Letting it spend £160M putting more detail into a non-viable design is a classic case in point – the issues needed to be caught much earlier and fixed before the systems engineers were let out of the box. That neither BAE or MoD were capable of identifying this and doing something about it in a timely fashion illustrates our failings perfectly.
The other thing that would help would be to allow that industry to access a very limited number of commercial contracts for specialist vessels (primarily offshore MPSV, DSV, OSCV or similar) that would maintain skills, spread the overhead and potentially allow the industry to grow a sympathetic client base – much like the Norwegians do. But that is an EU renegotiation issue……
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heard a rumour that Nansen Class are looking för Møre capable missile defence…will it mean replacing ESSM or adding to it?
latest publicity has been favourable (RIMPAC):
“Only a single NSM was fired during the exercises, Rostad said, although the Fridtjof Nansen also launched two Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles, the ship’s primary surface-to-air weapon.
The frigates of the Fridtjof Nansen class are the only warships to carry the SPY-1F radar, a lightweight version of the bigger SPY-1D sensor fitted on other Aegis ships.” as per defencenews; the rumour from elsewhere
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Likely looking at SM-2. SM-6 wouldn’t be outrageous, but would be dependent on the performance of the SPY-1F.
You would expect a desire to increase Mk41 cells in either case, as you would lose out on the ESSM quad packing. Possibly something that Sea Ceptor could mitigate for them if placement for cold launch boxes could be worked.
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Sorry, hit Post accidentally.
Caveat with regards to Sea Ceptor replacing ESSM is similar to discussions with replacing Aster 15 in that the Nansens use the active AEGIS versions which has target and discrimination advantages, if not the raw kinematic advantage Aster 15 has.
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i used to think the Nansens were a model acquisition:
– here’s themoney
– youdecidehow many hulls & what to put on them
now they can’t man them all, ,but on the other hand, the kit needs upgrading
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s300 is limited to 15 FC channels; guess no one (exc. those operating s400) knows about them, ifsuch a limitation still exists.
not sure all the features that come with AEGIS are pure positives? however, the Nansens seem to have mismatch between the sensor capability and what can be fired with their assistance?
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The Nansens’ are believed to be packing CEC to interoperate with their extensive Nørge-American land based systems as well as US assets. There’s also targeting for the Skjølds to consider as well. This was further hinted at with the interest in MQ-4C as a communication node (q.v. BACN) as much as for broad area surveillance in a sympathetic sensor bandwidth.
But on the face of it the Nansen sensors do seem to outmatch their armament significantly. You could argue that, similar to the UK and maybe more so, they have need for very capable sensors given the regions they need to operate in without suffering too much degradation in poor (sensor) weather.
I’m sure the SPY series and AEGIS has its problems like everyone else does.
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V interesting..
I am aware of the drones discussion with the supplier at the one end of the table and the Norgies and us at the other end, but what is BACN?
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BACN is an airborne communication node
Like a universal translator for the different types of communication systems, fascinating stuff actually
The US have even used their old B57’s
http://www.wired.com/2012/09/air-force-universal-translator/
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From the context, I’m guessing (B)? Airborne Communications Node.
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Specifically Battlefield Airborne Communications Node, but it’s more a reference to the entire topic of bandwidth and I feel BACN is a good entry point for a new reader.
The US (and the rest of us) are critically aware that sharing the sensor networks and engaging cooperatively that we’re developing requires large amounts of bandwidth with processing and analysis occurring at the right place. There’s also issues with splitting out highly stealthy communications to the rest of the network that are not so equipped (e.g. F-22 to F-18’s).
Far more material than can be covered in comments or just one article. Battlefield Airborne Communications Node (BACN), Multifunction Advanced Weapon Datalink (MADL), Tactical Targeting Network Technology (TTNT), Advanced Tactical Datalink (ATDL), Intra-flight Datalink (IFDL) as well as Link 11/16/22 along with using AESA as a datalink are all associated technologies in a complete web, but well worth putting in the time to research.
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Click to access 3-Defence-Tpype-26-Global-Combat-Ship.pdf
The last couple of paragraphs are most illuminating, not to mention ambitious.
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Ooh, six years eh? 😉
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The joys of government. I was obviously under the misapprehension that the Type 26 design had been finalized, whereas the wording
In parallel, we will continue work better to understand programme schedule, cost and risk. This
approach draws on key lessons from the Queen Elizabeth Class Aircraft Carrier programme by
ensuring that the ship design is sufficiently mature, the supply chain is fully mobilised early in the
programme to de-risk material supply, and a full joint analysis of programme risk is completed
before awarding a build contract.
makes it clear that the design isn’t final at all (I know NaB has been saying this for quite a long time). As someone highlighted earlier, we have been designing this warship class for over 15 years. Gobsmacked hardly starts to sum up my feeling on this subject.
How long will it take to build and fit out on of the yet to be fully designed ships these days ? For 2022 to be the initial target date for delivery of the first unit, it seems like that there is a least another year or two of design activity.
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Its not like we don’t know what the weapons and equipment fit will be is it ? That’s already been decided (and much of it bought or on order for type23 refit).
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Just to clarify.
We haven’t been designing these ships for fifteen years. The requirement has stayed broadly the same since 99 (with one excursion into la-la high speed territory circa 2004) and the project has had several restarts, but there has not been a “design” being worked on for that period.
What happens is that in the pre-concept and concept phases, design work is undertaken to flesh out what the requirement looks like physically, so it can be costed – at concept level – for the submissions to the IAB. Until relatively recently (2010?) the project never made it through main gate, usually because someone could say, we’ll just extend the T23/cut hull numbers and spend the money on something else. Now the T23 are beginning to struggle, that’s no longer an option, so having passed IG, the design should start to get fleshed out properly.
The reason you can’t just pick up the “old” designs and move them on is that standards and proposed systems change or their details become clearer. Hence in 99, FSC looked at Aster 15, whereas now you’re looking at Sea Ceptor. In 99, the 6″ MCG was still in play, now it’s Mk45 mod4. The Great White Turbine was flavour of the month in 99, not so much now. Accommodation standards were different. MARPOL 12A was not an issue in 99, it is now. E&E policy has changed, etc etc.
This is not to excuse where we are now. There are some fairly obvious flaws in the design arrangements that can and should be fixed. That they have not been to date is primarily due to lack of an overall authority, MoD/RN insistence on owning the “arrangement” but being reluctant to allow it to change and a flawed cost model that allegedly prevents certain options (that would probably go a long way to resolving the issues) being considered affordable. And way too many people doing detail too early in the name of “risk reduction”. Great if your chosen design path works, not so great if that isn’t right and you’ve hundreds of people burning hours that may or may not prove nugatory.
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Nick,
Time boxing is a techhnique normally used for speeding up projects. Looks like here it is being used for not sstarting any earlier than absolutely necessary:
– first t23 to be withdrawn in 2023
– allow a year of sea trials for first-of-class t26, 2022
– there is a point where constructing slowly becomes appreciably more expensive than doing things at a”normal” pace… There you have it, your couple of more years of designing
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Nick – I don’t have knowledge of the T26 programme in any depth (although a lecture given by BAE to IET members was illuminating) but if this programme mirrors FRES then it might not be entirely BAE’s fault. Shock horror. The biggest issue with FRES was no-one in MOD had the guts to state “This is the capability we want, here is the requirement, go build it now.” Instead there was an interminable merry-go-round of studies and assessment phases and technology insertions, each study round taking the full term of office of the initiating desk officer. The reports would be reviewed by the new officer in post and because the world had moved on the studies’ recommendations were no longer just right for the job, so a new study with new ‘more realistic’ requirements would be kicked off. Every now and then the programme name was changed to hide the total lack of progress, but for those on the inside it was clear “the CVR(T) Replacement Programme” has been running since the mid/late 1980s and hasn’t delivered yet.
The IET members’ meeting hinted that much the same issues had affected their ship design (I think I first tripped over “the Type23 Replacement Programme” when it was Future Surface Combatant) such that they were still in the study-report-assessment-reappraise-restart loop – this was October 2012. It was moderately clear that BAE had just presented their latest study to MOD and had already had feedback that changes were needed.
Sometimes the obvious culprits are culprits, sometimes they are the fall-guys taking the blame to keep the customer sweet. Most times its a mix of the two, but the balance of fault is rarely even.
NaB – thanks; your third paragraph puts detail to the constant moving target view I picked up.
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That
” The reports would be reviewed by the new officer in post and because the world had moved on the studies’ recommendations were no longer just right for the job, so a new study with new ‘more realistic’ requirements would be kicked off. ”
Is the sophisticated equivalent of an infantryman not wanting to do battle shooting himself in the leg through a loaf of bread… Can’t be proven that inability to engage was self inflicted.
I do attach as much blame to the macro circumstances and the squeezing of the proverbial elephants through a door that was getting ever smaller.
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Would be interesting to see a study of just how much has been spent on design studies by the MOD over the past two decades. I bet it adds up into the tens of billions.
Design studies were fine when we had a larger budget nd were trying to push the technological frontier but given our current budget I think we need to rationalise the process some what.
Countries like Italy have forces a similar size to us with a budget of 1/3rd of what we have. Would be interesting to see a comparison on how much they spend on design studies.
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Martin – it wouldn’t affect current UK shipbuilding, but the studies in the Land environment were not only broad and deep, but competitive too. So multiple parallel studies would be done by as many industrial groupings as MOD chose to engage. This is the reason why there were for example both Lancer and Sika TRACER design/mock-up/prototypes. You have to believe the studies produced more documentation than the modern bid process demands, so each team at the end of each revised study probably delivered multiple 4-drawer filing cabinets worth of detailed reports which were within a few months worthless. Marvellous.
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It’s nowhere near tens of billions. Prior to the current (post 2008-ish) effort, I’d put it at below £50M.
To recap – T22/23(R), FE, FSC spent less than £10M (in those year £, not doing conversions) in the years 97-99. That excludes the money on RV Triton, (circa £25M all told). When the project team was closed in 2000, the money stopped and the output thus far was filed.
The next go around the buoy (circa 2003-2004, the high-speed half-wittery, if memory serves) was fairly brief, so if anything like £5M was spent I’d be surprised. When it didn’t get through IG, the team closed, the money stopped and the output was filed.
Then you got Pathfinder in 2006-2007 which probably ate another £5M.
I make that £35M or so if you include Triton.
Then you get to the NDP efforts post 2007, leading up to Initial Gate to 2010. That would be another £10M or so.
After that you’re into the big bucks of the Assessment Phase where large project teams stood up and you really start to eat money – something like £160M or thereabouts and counting. Nothing like all of that is nugatory – far from it. But what you are doing when the design is not right is paying for a project team that burns shed loads of money and at some stage will be sitting there spinning wheels.
Big handful figures and my recollections, so there’ll be some dates awry, figures adrift in that. Still, very far from tens of billions.
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Follow up question is: what are we running studies of now and do we expect actually to buy anything after?Presumably UV, Crowsnest, MPA are all burning up hours. But equally all 3 could be tangible and much needed capabilities by 2020. Are we burning any money on studying things we’re not going to buy before 2030? Taranis or a new heavy Tank or some other exotic whiz – bang?
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@TOC
“The Nansens’ are believed to be packing CEC .”
I can assure you , they dont.
“But on the face of it the Nansen sensors do seem to outmatch their armament significantly.”
Not really….The SPY-1F radar is based on the same obsolescent technology as the SPY-1D (meaning magnetron powered PESA tech) but it is smaller and much much less powerful, and simply lacks the brute force strength (and range ) of its bigger cousin. And unlike the 1D it doesnt support any form of BMD .
It is however adequate for short/medium range AAW engagements with ESSM/SM-2, though the latter is probably unlikely given the Nansens limited number of VLS cells ( they have room for , and will eventually be fitted with 16 MK41’s, but thats it.)
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thanks MKP,
I picked up the missile defence as future priority for Nansens from a Nordic cooperation report ( that was given as a one-off, whereas potential was found in CV90, NH helos, future corvettes…).
if it is not a secret, which systems are in the running?
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NaB
Thanks as ever, very illuminating. My question/thought would be what exactly is a design in this context. I would think (guess) broadly speaking you’d want to have a 3D CAD model of the ship, broken down into a fairly detailed level. Into the design space you’d then fit you desired equipment and weapons etc and budget for the number of crew needed (which leads into crew space etc etc).
I appreciate that as the concept changed, the design would change to reflect the new concept, which would mean that you end up with multiple designs over time. These would have various individual names.
In case of the Type 26, we have had a series of conceptual models (both CGI and physical models and drawings) for at least 12 months or so. I had understood that we have pretty much made our minds up on the broad equipment requirements and especially the weapons and electronic payload plus helicopter capacity/space.
The current announcement seems to mean that this published conceptual Type 26 design is at such a high level, that before you can actually start building and costing the programme BAe now need to go off and do all the detailed design work which is needed to actually build the warship, cost the programme and determine the implementation timetable. As a sop, we have also placed (or will place) some orders for long lead time items on the basis that the specific requirement here will not change it is safe to do so.
I don’t actually know how much cash we have spent on the Type 26 design to date (over 100 million ?), but it seems like we will have spent about the cost of one hull on the design so far, plus quite a bit more on the previous concepts (50 million + by your estimate).
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Chris
Whilst I doubt that BAe are entirely faultless, the customer (MoD) is paying so it isn’t unexpected that BAe to ask them to pay for it. I guess in the olden days, when the design was inhouse, the cost was much lower (now BAe margin) and the inhouse design would continue to change until it was decided to start construction. Also I guess designs were more evolutionary then as well.
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What I take from NAB ‘ explanation is that since 2010 we have wasted money by doing design tasks in the wrong order: working up details before the overall arrangement was stable and viable. All that work will now have to be revisited. This sounds like a failure of management more than anything else.
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This article kind of sums up all our issues with exporting warships.
The saudi’s our biggest defence customer are preparing a $16 billion dollar contract to renew their Eastern Fleet ,an area where we have more naval presence than almost anyone and we are not even in the bidding
http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/show-daily/idex/2015/02/22/saudis-detail-eastern-fleet-for-us/23865799/
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Martín,
do you think SFO would have something to do with it? the Saudis prefer state to state deals (ehmm… their state being a family business, but shuts out alle kinds of nuisances on the other side).
about the details:
the Nansen Class light radar seems to be coming into play… the range restriction not being of significance in the Gulf. however, defending against incoming missiles is not a mute point in restricted Waters.
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What has happened with T26 is more like executing detail early in the belief that the overall hull design would meet its requirements. That isn’t necessarily wasted effort, but it has meant a huge number of people burning money doing that detail and they won’t be able to go further until the hull design is ready to enter lofting (ie preparation for steel manufacture and fabrication). That can’t happen until the design meets its requirements and cn demonstrably be shown to do so in calculations.
CGI stuff is rarely representative of the detail of a design. You can usually get a couple of the team juniors to knock something up in a couple of weeks. Looks great at defence shows etc. Lesson – CGI is not reality. Cold hard calculated numbers and 2D drawings tend to be a much better reflection of reality. 3D CAD is good, but only when required. You know you have a design ready to build when you have a set of drawings and their associated parts lists which the shipyard purchasing department can buy.
As for exporting warships, the Defence / Maritime Industrial Strategy took teh decision to size the UK shipbuilding industry to what MoD was going to order. That was later amended to include an aspiration for export to gapfill when it became clear that the MIS programme wasn’t going to fit what was in the budget. What that meant was that we either had to maintain spare capacity in design and build to cover for this, or hope to sell export versions of our RN warships.
People plumped for the second option, which in any case is the default position as we have next to no spare design resource to design stuff for export customers. The sort of “stuff” that these export customers want doesn’t really fit what the RN needs, which is the essence of yesterdays post and in any case, the asian yards will soon be filling much of that market.
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@Martin
“12 1,150-ton corvette-like warships”
If only a UK based warship manufacture had an on going project , possibly even entering production, with a comprehensive sensor and armaments suite fully detailed and already cutting steel . Perhaps a manufacture with a big window before its next big domestic project commences , ah well .
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NaB
what exactly do you mean by Hull design. I assume its more than the shape of the hull itself ?
I had thought (ie I watched the marketing BS) that the whole point of using 3D VR CAD these days was to make sure that the spaces you designed could actually fit all of the things you wanted to use it for, to avoid any costly reworking during the actual build phase (when you discover you SNAFU’ed.
If BAe haven’t spent their 100 million or whatever, designing to this level of detail for the MoD since 2010, just what have they spent the money on ?
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@MKP
Thank you, appreciate your feedback on CEC.
I wouldn’t describe the active/passive phased arrays in the SPY-1 series as obsolete though (especially when the UK seems to be more than happy with pulse dopplers in new programs…), you can still perform an awful lot of clever functions with that many radiators and receivers.
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@ACC
“if it is not a secret, which systems are in the running?”
Well …no systems are really.. AFAIK its only a feasibility study at this point, to find out if and where the Norwegians might contribute. Theoretically the Nansens could house SM-3’s since their MK41’s are the strike version, but they would have to get targeting data from somwhere else. Or upgrade to an ABM capable radar suite…..extremely unlikely IMO….even the Norwegians have a finite amount of money to spend on defence,
The only platform in the nordic countries with any kind of true missile defence potential, on land or sea , is the Iver Huitfeldts . These are currently scheduled for a major ABM upgrade of their SMART-L radars (turning them into AESA’s) and CMS in the 2017-18 timeframe.
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The actual numbers for T26 assessment is in the post text above, the NAO report it at £173m to April last year against an approved cost of £158m. We have from April to this contract to pay for as well.
Will be interesting to see the final numbers but anyone bet on it being under £200m, plus the £50m estimate by NaB on the various studies, projects and programme previous. Wonder where the couple of million quid we have spent with McKinsey will be accounted for
Lets call it £250m worth of deciding what we want, or a couple of T23’s in old money 🙂
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Nick
I think they were happy that all the equipment physically fitted in the planned hull. But what they couldn’t do was prove that the completed ship would meet all various rules and regs. Sounds like there was some wishful thinking and the problem was skated over for a while in the hope that it would ‘turn out alright’. Now they’ve run the numbers and even the wilful optimists have had to admit that it hasn’t. So the dimensions and arrangement have to be tweaked not to physically fit stuff in but to meet rules and regs on things like damaged stability.
Sounds really boring but if we seriously expect to send ships into harm’s way then its a must.
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@TOC
you are welcome 🙂
But there are no active phased array versions of SPY-1(other than development prototypes) and while they may not be completely obsolete yet, they are definitely getting long in the tooth. Technologically speaking SPY-1 is at least a generation or two behind solid state radars like Artisan( which is what i assume you where alluding to ? )
But lets not forget that the Nansens are already a decade old and when they were being projected in the mid-late 90’s, the SPY-1F was not a bad choice, using known and very capable technology, as opposed to the then newly developed and untried AESA tech of APAR.
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I thought the Iver Huitfeldt’s were receiving the ELR update, but if it’s the full EWC that’s quite an upgrade and almost begs outfitting with a BMD capable missile system.
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@Morten
The link Martin posted above re Saudi potential buy talks about SPY-1F as the only Radar that would meet the Saudi requirement. That sounds quite surprising from what you describe. You would have thought the Saudi’s would be looking for something more up to date (Artisan for example).
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@Peter Elliott
I assume these sort of things are well known and understood as part of the basic requirements that the submitted design has to meet. From a commercial perspective, I wouldn’t pay any supplier to rectify the design if they submitted something to meet that failed at a basic parameter level as you suggest. Crazy world of defence spending I suppose ?
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Nick
Up thread NAB tells of “RN / MOD insistence on owning the layout”. If the maximum dimensions were also locked down early then it sounds like the customer was actually the one insisting that the designers achieve something technically impossible, not the supplier.
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@TOC
The ELR upgrade is a software only modification and as the cost of the IH planned upgrade is said to come in at a staggering +$80 million….per ship ! …im fairly confident we are talking about the EWC upgrade.
As a reference the original cost for the entire Thales Netherlands AAW system , including APAR, SMART-L and acssociated CMS and software, was roughly 110 million dollars per ship.
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There’s a reason real shipbuilders don’t use VR until they get into production engineering……
As for what the money is spent on, have a little think along these lines. What are the structural loads on the global hull and individual struictural members? What about individual panel loads? Waht plate thickness and sections used?
Then think about systems. Here’s a list of systems likley to be on the ship – diesel oil filling and transfer, diesel oil stripping, diesle oil service & supply, ditto for AVCAT, seawater cooling, high-pressure sea water, chilled water, demin water, firefighting, lube oil systems, HVAC, main electrical supply and distribution, local electrical suply and distribution, conditioned power supplies, internal comms, gas monitoring, smoke and fire detection. Every single one of those systems will have requirements against it – heat loads, flow rates, min and max operating temperatures, reversionary modes, failure modes, trip alarms, shock requirements, environmental requirements, toxicity requirements, compartments / other systems they have to interface with, automatic and manual change modes etc etc. That’s in addition to the propulsion system and combat system items you buy from your OEMs. All of those systems need to have individual requirements written that are consistent with each other (transverse engineering) and then allow you to move on to the details of the system design, like what working pressures, flowrates at various parts of teh system, what pipe sizes and materials, how many pumps, valves, strainers, filling points, bulkhead/deck pens, coolers etc etc you have in the system design.
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Lets ignore all the projects prior to T26 and just look at T26 assessment and round to £175 million
If we say a person costs a thousand pounds per day that is 175,000 days effort expended on T26 so far
480 years
Complex, your not kidding!
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@MKP
Good news for Danmark and NATO all round really.
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@nick
“The US Navy is reportedly working to define details of the LoR, including what air radar the Saudis want to fulfill the anti-air requirement. Sources said that while no specific radar is listed in the LoR, the only system that fits the requirement is the SPY-1F lightweight Aegis system from Lockheed Martin.”
To me, this sounds an awful lot like one of the requirements is that is has to be a US radar ;-)…..and for a corvette-light frigate sized vessel, i know of no other US naval radar other than SPY-1F.
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Right then:
American for the Gulf side
– these would fit the corvette requirement to a t. ” Sa’ar 5 ships were built by Huntington Ingalls Industries (formerly Litton-Ingalls Shipbuilding Corporation of Pascagoula, Mississippi)”
1,275 tonnes (full load)
1,065 tonnes (standard)
French for the Red Sea
We stand at the ready to clear any mines (only a fleeting probability, and not worth investing in)
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For me, if the Type 26 costs £500 million to get to production, is the right design, comes into service as projected and serves this country well for 30+ years, then frankly it will be money well spent.
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…executing detail early in the belief that the overall hull design would meet its requirements. That isn’t necessarily wasted effort, but it has meant a huge number of people burning money doing that detail and they won’t be able to go further until the hull design is ready…
I can only imagine that this has come about due to major changes in the basic design at some point?
If certain areas can be designed in isolation (like the command and control suite) then fair enough, they’re making good progress, but if they’re calculating cable lengths before they know how far it is from A to B then its madness.
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@ Mike “For me, if the Type 26 costs £500 million to get to production, is the right design, comes into service as projected and serves this country well for 30+ years, then frankly it will be money well spent.”
Agreed – it is an extremely important vessel and may just see out my lifetime although I do very much hope to see the mythical AAW derivative. So its no more DD/FF fantasy fleet design for me then
Its gestation seems to be not the greatest project ever for all sorts of reasons, but as long as we get an evolvable design with no major T45 type issues (eg hull or propulsion) then let’s crack on.
It should be built in batches in my view – not radical redesign but enough to keep design on tickover (barring other major vessels) and kit relevant. So 8 ASW in B1 (order soon please), 4-6 B2 (either more ASW or ‘GP’), and 0-8 B3 (multirole ASW/AAW and possible T45 replacement) – DD/FF numbers maintained in the 18-22 range dependent on changing needs
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“Batching” is nearly the worst of all possible worlds. It gives the impression of maintaining design capability, but does not actually deliver.
The fundamental skill in ship design is understanding how the overall features of the design interact and equally importantly why they are the way they are (including how they contribute to the operational performance of the ship). That knowledge is lost relatively quickly if not exercised from first principles over time on a relatively frequent (say once every eight to ten years) basis. Batching does not do this, because the overall hullform and arrangement stay similar by definition for an extended period, so you’re not doing the whole thing.
In essence, the most valuable bit is that fundamental knowledge. Lots of detailed design is exercised on a frequent basis by A&A modifications – you learn the basics of what has to be considered in a compartment design or modification (eg equipment siting, power cabling runs, lagging, stand-off distances, dustproofing etc etc), but you don’t learn how it affects the overall ship. In essence you learn how to do parts lists and apply specific standards. That’s not the same as early stage design process, which is where most of the value is added. Design is not the same thing as sitting in a drawing office.
The benefits of having similar batches are also vastly overstated. Once you start modifying things, you have to modify the general arrangement drawings, the system diagrammatics, the local structural drawings, the compartment drawings, the electrical drawings etc etc. No, you don’t have to do the whole ship, but you still end up amending a huge number of technical documents and drawings and maintaining them through life.
Where you can save money (for the umpteenth time) is through using standard components (subject to through-life support arrangements) like gas turbines, diesel engines, pumps, switchboards, radars etc, etc. This is particularly true for the marine eng components as they can (in general) sell product into both commercial and military marine markets, thereby maintaining sales volume and design throughput. You get interchangeable parts (even if your diesel is higher power, if you’re using a limited number of cylinder bores, the spares are common) or starter motors for pumps – stuff like that all simplifies the logistics support chain immensely. If you have mil-specific requirements like shock or toxicity, then you only need to do one set of tests and your OEM has a volume to sell against, offsetting his RN/MoD specification design and testing costs. Even things like operators manuals and drawings for equipment items on each ship all become standard items, rather than bespoke to class / batch.
This bit really isn’t rocket science……..
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NAB
So let’s assume the NDP successfully finishes the T 26 design over the next year or two. It then takes a couple of years messing with a possible midlife upgrade to T45 which might or might not involve ripping the whole engine room out. Either way they’re done on that project by 2020.
Would you have them start work on a RN LHD, or jump straight into another Destroyer design? Or work on ‘fantasy’ designs we might just need (but probably wont) like a BMD Cruiser. By my reckoning 2020-30 could be a long decade with little real ‘need’ to exercise those skills.
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MHC. Future Amphib. FSS. Landing craft? T45(R). Will need to be thinking what T45 replacement looks like towards the back of the 20s.
One advantage of having a relatively “slack” forward programme, would be the time available to iterate properly, learn and apply lessons, rather than the start / stop disband, start/stop, disband that has characterised this prog. Funnily enough, QE is a great example (within limits) of an extended period in design. the difference being that from 2003 or so, the team was kept together.
QE’s “issues” such as they are, are less “technical” than “political” – specifically having the temerity to be significantly larger and more capable in intent than the CVS.
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@NaB: “MHC. Future Amphib. FSS. Landing craft? T45(R). Will need to be thinking what T45 replacement looks like towards the back of the 20s.”
Not wanting to derail the thread, but I think we need to be clear on what we need to protect UK sovereign complex warship design capabilities. I’d argue that there should be enough “off the shelf” or commercial designs that would meet Future Amphib, FSS and Landing craft needs (or could be adapted with relatively small effort if needed). I’d also like to see small mid shore patrol craft design, but again I think there is enough out there that means that it would not warrant specific sovereign capabilities.
Therefore, I agree with a new @2,000t design for OPV / MHC requirements and then straight onto a T45 replacement… This means to me either we need a “smaller” team or we need to share design capabilities with allies (like Australia and Canada) even if we do not build their ships.
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Suspect if the Design Team can be kept together with a solid knowledge retention cycle, they’re not necessarily tied to shipyard drumbeat allowing them to design vessels constructed elsewhere.
Point is not to break them up but keep them designing from “first principles”.
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@NaB and APATS if your on line
NaB based on your post on commonality of components not the steel envelope they are fitted being the primary consideration, surely looking at learning the lessons from the T45 & T26 process could lead us to a new class , to please TD well call it T29 😉 , with the pace and knowledge accrued we can keep conceptual as well as detail design skills on the front burner. By ordering only the minimum T26 say 8 ( that’s still 16 years of construction ) we could enhance the designs including lessons learnt from actual active use of the T26 for the final stages as they accrue years of active service. Would a long term combined ASW and AAW vessel suit the RN’s needs or do they have a preference to keep the mission sets separate?
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Repulse
I suspect we are either in the complex warship design business or we are not. So although a Mistral or a Canberra would probably meet our requirement for a future Amphib we actually can’t afford not to design our own if we want to keep our skills going.
The question is would we be happy to rely on DCNS [or Navantia] to design our combat ships too? Even if we still erected them on the Clyde. Would our ‘allies’ actually do that for us? Would they let us have bespoke designs to meet all our requirements? Or would we have to accept a knock off of whatever they happened to be working on at the time for their national government?
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@PE: I’d agree with you if we were discussing a CVF design (though didn’t the French pay for part of that design?). For amphibs I would either partner or take off the shelf and adapt as we did for the LSDs. Also, this all “works” for aircraft etc already.
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The bigger question is actually do we need to maintain a sovereign capability to design and build complex warships from nose to tail (or is that stem to stern)
Armoured vehicles, nope
Aircraft, nope
Ships, yes
Its a valid question
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@ monkey
[Quote] Would a long term combined ASW and AAW vessel suit the RN’s needs or do they have a preference to keep the mission sets separate?
I am neither a Boffin nor a Politician, but will offer this: the threat axes for AAW and ASW are quite different. When doing effective AAW you generally can’t do effective ASW at the same time, so there isn’t really a lot of point having a multi-role asset (assuming we’re talking AAW at T45 level, and ASW at T23 level, of course, and not just a bow sonar and a Merlin).
The USN try to get away with combining both functions in the Arleigh Burke because:
a. they don’t have any other designs of major surface combatant since the withdrawal of the ASW-specialist Spruance, save the remaining Ticos (which are in the bow sonar/ASW helo category).
b. they have so very very many of them!
In a future fleet of 6 T45 and 8 T26, then I suppose another half dozen Multi-Purpose cruisers would be quite nice, argued on the basis of their switch-role capability to plug gaps as needs arise.
But I’d probably vote for another two or three Astutes, instead. Remember, that too is a design capability we need to nurture.
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@TD: “The bigger question is actually do we need to maintain a sovereign capability to design and build complex warships from nose to tail (or is that stem to stern)” – good question. It seems to me looking at the failure of the Horizon project, related to the question, is the RN unique in its requirements and if so why (and should it)?
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@MSR: I’ve never really understood why our ASW replacements need to be so big – should be smaller and simpler in my view. Alternatively a single class with less specialist ASW capabilities would be an option when backed by more SSNs.
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Should we be building our own Aircraft (e.g. Taranis) and Armoured Vehicles (e.g. …?) too?
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Toc
On aircraft no. The single biggest mistake for defence aerospace in European was allowing the building of rafale and typhoon. Both are probably poorer aircraft as a result and they’re would have been significant benefits in the countries concerned and the export market.
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” I’ve never really understood why our ASW replacements need to be so big – should be smaller and simpler in my view.”
Justify why and how they should/could be smaller. In your own time, go.
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@MSR
Regarding trying to do two things at once be it AAW operations and ASW operations I will accept that is the case having zero operational/doctrine knowledge , hence the question , but if a vessel can do either to T45 or T26 capability on demand and provide self preservation against the other , would it be more useful to combine it on one vessel so you can task it according to threat ( and then having a very complicated,very expensive piece of kit probably in our terms overmanned) or keep the roles separate as much of the time it will be doing neither . The next generation of vessels , the hypothetical T29 , would need to have its role defined very early. For instance the next gen of Arleigh Burke are proving a challenge due to power and cooling requirements being significantly higher for the AEGIS which no doubt has knock on effect elsewhere. We have plenty of time to decide but the future doctrine of the use of a very limited number of escorts would need to be confirmed first.
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I’m still impressed at the huge amount of engineering involved in making an ASW ship so quiet: Prairie-Masker, isolation materials, resilient mount choices, braids, flexible couplings, hanger selection, space designed for cable and hose slack, reduction in arcing, extra cost for quiet valves and coating…
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Interesting question on aircraft. Have we actually given up a sovereign design and build capability, or do we just think we have? What part of airframe and flight control system design would BAE not be capable of? What part of engine design would RR not be capable of ? Avioncs?
Suspect only Mark can answer that one.
We “got out” of sovereign aircraft design and build primarily because the development costs were perceived as too high. Each new aircraft design tended to need new engine development, new airframe technology, new FCS (digital FBW), new materials etc etc.
LO is probably the eqiuvalent today (or maybe autonomy in terms of sensing and control). But do we really need a new engine for each new aircraft now? New radars? Previously it was capability driven. Is it now more supportability / obsolescence-driven? Don’t know – interested to find out.
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What was the last aircraft we developed and built end to end
Was it Harrier, Hawk, or perhaps Nimrod
The only thing that should be absolutely ring fenced is crypto and submarines, the rest must be open for discussion
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@NAB
We still actually have a sovereign aircraft design and manufacturing capability but development costs for a new platform are seemingly too big to actually do anything with it. We bought JSF instead and haven’t done much since. Hence the industry will die off in the next decade and we’ll be wholly dependant on the US in the future and take a massive hit on exports.
Capability is still a massive driver for aircraft e.g. survivability against threats forces LO, advanced sensors etc.
Technological change is also important, e.g. EJ200 a great engine, but incorporating new technologies makes it smaller, lighter, more thrust, less fuel consumption (maybe 20% fuel consumption reduction if civil developments are matched). This new technology has a big impact on the overall platform.
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@TD
Hawk was the last operational aircraft in the 1970s, but you could include Taranis.
There’s nothing on Typhoon that we couldn’t have done ourselves, but the programme would likely have been cancelled in the early 90s.
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TD
I would say yes for keeping design and integration ownership but building on the MOTS approach for some major components. After all Type 26 isn’t actually nose to tail British in the sense of all major components being sourced from the UK.
So we could add a lot of value and get ahead of the market by designing a new generation of tracked armour now with a forward mounted BAE diesel – electric transmission, but utilising a MOTS Leopard turret in the tank version, a Scout turret on the AFV and a flat top for APC / utility. With a new cold war kicking off it could be a smart national investment. Who else is ahead of us on this right now??
With Taranis we seem to be well in bed with the French but I’m not sure what we’re up to. For me this product should be a shoestring affordable version of LRS (B) i.e. an optionally manned long range bomber. But whether anyone in Europe (including us) is actually willing to pay for that capability is a very open question. So this may be a red herring altogether.
I can’t see us going away from manned aircraft for QRA. Logically they will also continue as multi role workhorses too. Eventually therefore West will need a Typhoon/Rafale/F 22 replacement. Whether we partner with the USA on that may hinge on whether Congress is willing to share their best technology this time round.
As a curveball if the French and Germans can’t or won’t play we might to better in Europe to partner with the Swedes’ Gripen replacement. They already seem to have the right philosophy on integrating MOTS components and lack some of the hang – ups that make our traditional defence industrial partners awkward at times.
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@ Repulse
The Other Chris has just partly answered your question on why modern ASW assets get bigger. They are complicated. Way more so than good old stalwarts like the Blackwood or Whitby class ships ever were.
Recall that T23 was, in its original configuration, little more than you suggest in your ASW corvette idea: a Towed Array tug with some self-defence and a place to land, refuel and rearm (but not hangar) a Merlin which would visit the Type 23 “lilypad” but would live permanently on board a CVS. But the hull dimensions were the same. A big hull to fit the tech into. The RN then maxed out the available displacement adding all the post-Falklands Experience kit onto it, which made it much more general purpose in addition to its specialism… because that is what experience taught us was needed!
@ monkey
Oh, hell yeah, multi-role vessels that can be tasked according the threat would be cool. The yanks would love it if it worked out that way, but anecdotal evidence seems to suggest that the Arleigh Burke ain’t so good at ASW.*
*(Whether this is a specific function of the design being inferior as an ASW platform, or the fact that the USN surface fleet hasn’t typically spent as much time practicing ASW ops as you might expect, is up for debate – we’ll find out shortly after a recent new standing order was issued that all US surface vessels conduct live fire exercises every day (!) including streaming the TAS. Details here:)
http://cdrsalamander.blogspot.co.uk/2015/02/vadm-rowden-not-fan-of-mission-command.html
The doctrine is the driver, here. When your hypothetical T29 cruiser is creeping about slowly and quietly, dragging its TAS and directing its helo, it isn’t well placed to protect the local HVU from air threats. In fact, it probably isn’t within 100 nmi of the HVU at that stage! That is just one scenario.
Then there is the Treasury Question. T29 Multi-Role Cruiser = well, why do you need these expensive single role ships? And bang! Suddenly you get a fleet of 9 instead of 19.
… and my steak and ale pie is ready. Priorities, you know.
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@NaB: “Justify why and how they should/could be smaller. In your own time, go.” Ultimately, I do not see the logic of putting a strategic asset in harms way, which is ultimately what we would be doing with the T26s – if operating in UK waters or an escort to a task group (the two most likely scenarios), then there is no need for mission bays, satellite comms, tomahawk VLS, or even a hanger (assuming a ASW sqd of Merlin’s is on your carrier / support ship or a nearby base).
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by the time we get to a T45 replacement how many hulls are we looking at?
3…, is that even viable as a build class?
in which case, do we get to; bugger-the-doctrine, we build sequential classes of six ASW/AAW cruisers on an 18 months schedule with a new design every nine years!
we are already looking at how disruptive the carriers and trident successor are to wider naval shipbuilding, might we not reach an inflection point if numbers decline at their current rate….
talk of “capabilities not platforms” might seem a little hollow then.
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@TD & Hannay
There was the British Aerospace EAP and Agile Combat Aircraft (ACA)projects that came in to the Eurofighter program. Both British only project that then gave there info over to Eurofighter to allow the program to progress faster.
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@NaB
The JMSDF operates a good number of high-end ASW escorts below 6,000 tons. Our current high-end ASW escort is smaller than 5,500 tons full load and is in the process of being modernized to T26 standard. All of those vessels are great at doing their job.
T26 will have the same systems as a T23, plus ISO-mission space, a strike-length VLS and indoor squash. Maybe this should be justified in times of tense budgets and (too) low numbers.
@MSR
“The USN try to get away with combining both functions in the Arleigh Burke because:”
This will change. The next Arleigh Burke flight will be primarily AAW/BMD vessels, with ASW going to LCS/SSC. The ASW modules is tested starting September 2014, with the Austal variant being the preferred platform. Planned IOC early 2016.
Btw, talking about f***ed surface programs; the Congressman effectively sinking a BMD-cruiser based on the Zumwalt hull…
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/01/roscoe-bartlett-congressman-off-the-grid-101720.html#.VOz_Dq10zcs
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@Repulse – or 5″ gun. Still needs long legs though
For the current nature of our standing commitments, the need to escort CVF and our limited budget I don’t think we have an option but to do T26 as it is but. If however we ever needed a larger number of smaller / cheaper / stripped back vessels to do ASW in the North Atlantic say then it shouldn’t be beyond BAE – should it?
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@ Repulse
I realise you are addressing NaB but I’ll stick my oar in, anyway. I’ve finished my steak and ale pie, after all.
[Quote] Ultimately, I do not see the logic of putting a strategic asset in harms way, which is ultimately what we would be doing with the T26s
Then why do you have them? T45s are, for instance, essentially capital assets in their own right – HVUs that are potentially critical to a mission’s success and thus in need of escort, themselves – but they are only this important for one reason: scarcity. And that was a political decision, not a doctrinal one. The same will apply to T26 if it doesn’t get beyond 8 hulls (hell, even if it does get to 13 there will still be too few, but that’s another topic).
[Quote] – if operating in UK waters or an escort to a task group (the two most likely scenarios), then there is no need for mission bays, satellite comms, tomahawk VLS, or even a hanger
Possibly, but what do warships do when they’re not fighting wars? What has the RN’s ships done ever since the Age of Sail? Bread and butter. Patrol and presence, anti-piracy, constabulary, disaster relief, you name it. And all the stuff you mention is dual role: it supports the peace time functions just as much as the wartime stuff (with the possible exception of the strike length VLS… although watch this space for VLS-launched drones that can co-ordinate SAR ops with a P-8!)
Basically you want a modern version of the Blackwood which, to be clear, was a thousand tons lighter than the T12 and related Leander, and which is precisely why I mentioned it earlier. And all the reasons why the RN hasn’t built another one since hereby apply. To sumarise: it was crap.
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Do we still have a sovereign design and build capability for a complete aircraft very touch and go for anything beyond prototypes to be honest, it would require a country wide effort much like cvf, likes of messier dowty, meggit and martin baker, gkn, smiths, selex would be vital, fuel and systems tend to be dominated by Parker and Fokker, the bits were we would struggle would be the high level systems engineering and the specialists who get the aircraft over the line from a test program to an inservice aircraft. The bill would be trident submarine esq in size and I wouldn’t see a big market for a UK only designed front line fastjet.
TD I’d be open to building submarines with the americans
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@ Mark
[Quote] TD I’d be open to building submarines with the americans
Then kiss goodbye to any future Tier One status in partnerships such as we have with F35 – a status we earned by having something to contribute. As soon as we go beyond component collaboration in submarines (such as the current arrangement regarding the launch tubes for Successor) then it’s a slippery slope. Sub design being so expensive all round, we will inevitably devolve more and more of it to the yanks and invest in keeping less and less of it on our own shores. It would be a political inevitability given that the biggest criticism of every new sub project in this country, after the nuclear question has been debated again, is the incredible cost of it all!
Building subs with the Americans will result in one thing: the UK will become a customer, not a producer.
Better hope the oil price picks up and new reserves are found in the North Sea, because if we became a customer we would have nothing to show for ourselves: no technology to trade, no brains to pick, no achievements to parade. We would only have our wallets… just like the Gulf States, in fact!
I really don’t want to be like the Gulf States.
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Some interesting stuff from the market.
Ship yards are desperate for exports so the market is flooded with designs.
Here are three
Austal Multi-Role Vessel
http://www.austal.com/en/products-and-services/defence-products/naval-vessels/austal-multi-role-vessel.aspx?source=category
A smaller relative to the US LCS. Its got multi role in the name.
Sigma Frigate 10514
http://products.damen.com/en/ranges/sigma-frigate/sigma-frigate-10514
Small but interesting package very multi role
Multi Role Light Frigate
http://www.luerssen-defence.com/en/naval-vessels/frigates/multi-role-light-frigate
German concept?
The question is what are the chances for type 26 vs. all the others designs world wide?
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I’ll never understand how defence companies end up spending so much. Considering Wembley stadium – which had enough problems of its own – cost about £17m to design. The construction aspect of the stadium was less than the cost of a Type 45, despite employing at one point 3000 workers and using 22,000 tonnes of material for the pitch bedding, 90,000 cubic metres of concrete, 23,000 tonnes of steel and 35 miles of heavy duty power cabling. Defence inflation indeed.
I fully appreciate that warships contain lots of expensive items and that making all those varied components work together safely and effectively will cost money, but sometimes it just seems like they’re taking the raw piss out of the MoD (and by extension taxpayers).
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Part of what’s fueling the mounting criticism is surely that for about 4 years everything regarding the T26 seemed almost too good to be true.
A 5,500-6000 ton high-end warship, with highly capable (albeit cross-decked) kit like Artisan, Type 2087 and CAMM, innovations and additions such as a new main gun, larger more capable VLS and a mission bay, a large flight-deck and hangar, all for £240-350 million with one coming into service per year from 2021 onward’s, and the prospect of a few export sales to boot!
I really wanted to believe all the hype would translate into reality, should have known better i guess.
Fact is as plenty of others have said we really have to make T26 work. The T23’s are getting to the tipping point where they will start to seriously wear out and become prohibitively expensive to keep running on and on. CVF needs a high-end fleet escort as well, so even if we only get 8 those 8 are an integral part of the future vision of a RN built around a carrier battle-group.
I hope things turn out a little better than producing 8 or so for over £500 million a pop and seeing them not come into service until the mid 2020’s.
I’d like to think that if the design can be made to work and the unit price stays closer to £400 million we will see a follow on batch that can be built more efficiently and use the experience gained with the earlier vessels.
It would be good to see the RN get more out of the basic hull and design than one small batch of ASW platforms. Also in terms of keeping design skills going surely replacement amphibious vessels, MHC, MARS SSS and a few other bits and pieces could allow us to keep some sort of capability. Naval design work can’t purely rely on coming up with a new frigate or destroyer once every 20-30 years.
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@Chris B.
Imagine having to fold Wembley into a tenth of the space, then filling it with a lot of things that emit EM radiation, and a lot of other things that will go wrong if exposed to too much EM radiation. Including lots of things that go bang. Some of which are designed to go bang, some of which are not meant to go bang but will if you give them a chance.
A closer comparison would be oil industry engineering. Take St Malo/Jack, a 160,000t-displacement platform entering service in the Gulf of Mexico. We hear a lot about Maersk Triple E’s costing tuppence-ha’penny, but the oil platform costs $7.5bn. That’s in the commercial sector, with lots of outsourcing of manufacturing to cheaper countries, COTS kit and so on.
http://fortune.com/2014/06/09/chevron-goes-to-extremes-in-the-gulf-of-mexico/
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@ El Sid,
If only you could put the EM emitting thing somewhere out of the way, like on top of a giant mast….
The idea that designing something like Wembley is trivial in comparison to a warship doesn’t really hold up. British building regulations are notoriously complex and stringent, more so in the case of football stadiums. You simply don’t show up at a meeting with the authorities to explain how you intend to dispose of the human waste of 90,000 people or how you’re going to stop over 5,000 tonnes of roof from falling on them with back of the fag packet calculations and a design drawn on a napkin.
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The things that are designed to emit EM are the least of your worries, it’s things like generators that can cause more problems. Are you going to put them on top of a mast too?
I don’t want to get into a urination contest, but without taking away from the challenges of something like Wembley – the one thing that you don’t have in a ship or oil platform is the luxury of space. That makes it vastly more difficult to package things together, especially when there’s a much higher density of electronic “stuff” than Wembley, which may all interfere with each other.
Building regs may be stringent – but you don’t have to design a stadium to withstand a torpedo hit, or to still float when it’s had a hole ripped out of it. Fire management would be a lot more complicated at Wembley if the seats were perched on top of several 100 tonnes of fuel and high explosive, with no fire engines for 1000 miles. And so on.
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@Chris B.
Sometime I wonder whether you are just stringing people along. 😉
Wembley Stadium has 35 miles of heavy duty power cabling? Quite impressive until you compare it to the 350 miles of heavy duty electrical cabling (“…enough to circle the M25 almost three times…”) connecting a Type 45’s major equipment with much less routing freedom or accessibility than on land.
A QE carrier has 250,000+ km of electrical cabling (various) and 8,000 km of fibre optic cabling. In view of the wider range and greater number of gizmos on board an albeit smaller PAAMS-fitted Type 45, I suspect it goes a fair way towards matching those figures.
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@ El Sid,
For a start the oil platform you brought up didn’t cost $7.5 billion. Two minutes on Google reveals that the $7.5 billion price tag is for the total infrastructure investment for the entire field. Seems the Fortune reporter didn’t pay enough attention to his guide.
“Building regs may be stringent – but you don’t have to design a stadium to withstand a torpedo hit, or to still float when it’s had a hole ripped out of it. Fire management would be a lot more complicated at Wembley if the seats were perched on top of several 100 tonnes of fuel and high explosive, with no fire engines for 1000 miles. And so on.”
— Maybe not a Torpedo hit, but the stadium would have to meet fairly stringent rules regarding damage to its supporting structures. And I’m not entirely sure something like a Type 45 would actually survive a torpedo hit. Meanwhile fire management in something like a football stadium is complicated enough, considering that it has to account for the presence of tens of thousands of fans who need to be evacuated immediately.
@ Dunservin,
There seems to be a difference of understanding in the term “heavy duty”. In respect to Wembley we’re talking about the sort of cabling that arrives on spools that have to be lifted off the truck using a crane. The sort that if you stripped it down to strand widths comparable to the general cabling in a Type 45 would go a lot further than three times round the M25.
I also find it odd that you only picked on the cabling? Why not the fact that the project used almost five times as much steel as a Type 45? Seems very much a cherry picking exercise to me?
Now before we get bogged down in the minuate, the point is not which one costs more to design or build, the issue is that Wembley cost about 10 times less to design than the assessment phase for Type 26.
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@MSR: Re Blackwoods – agree the design was compromised by the lack of a gun and to a degree space, but at the time they were still the best ASW ships around. However rectifying these flaws does not make a T26.
Also the navy is very different now. At the time the Blackwoods only accounted for a small part of the fleet if as expected we only get 8 T26s, these will account for 60%.
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As others have pointed out, we’re buying the T26 to be part of our 19 surface combatants that don’t just sit off the UK coastline, or be part of a CVBG, they deploy individually around the world. That means they need hangars, boat decks, self-defence AAW, sitcom and yes VLS with TLAM in them. Quite often a better bet than one of our seven A boats with minimal salvo capability.
As for the Type 14s being “the best ASW ships around”, that’s just laughable and explains why they were officially described as “second rate” compared to the T12 and also why they were discarded so quickly. In fact the Cod wars probably kept some of them in service for longer than would otherwise have been the case.
McZ – you’ve obviously never been on a T23 then! Your JMSDF ships are of a similar vintage to the T23. The newer ones are nudging 7000te plus. It’s not the kit on the ships, it’s the accommodation and other standards like escape and evacuation, damaged stability. They all require space and volume. Of the 13 T23 in the class, all bar four are beyond their original design lives and struggling in a number of areas.
On sovereign capability, its worth thinking just how few western yards are out there. Euro-consolidation will only lead in one direction, just like the military aircraft industry, with the same eventual outcome. All for what in the great scheme of things would be regarded as chump change.
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A good question:
Armoured vehicles, nope
Aircraft, nope
Ships, yes
Its a valid question
The first one, a tragedy (going from 62 to 0 in world record time)
The second, better than what it looks. But what does it say when the Brit content in Gripen (not coming into service) is higher than in the future mainstay (f35)
Ships? P&O probably has the largest integrated cruise liner design capability… And builds none. Not saying we should go as far, but just give due consideration. And was Horizon a failure? Some pretty nice ships in the French and Italian navies I can see.
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Wonder if we’re going to see an investment in Block IV TacTom to accompany T26?
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Chris was not comparing Wembley to a Frigate per se but drawing attention to the complexities of major engineering projects, like Wembley.
The complexity with fibre optic cabling is not the distance, but the design and connections, both Wembley and complex warships use exactly the same design rules, blown fibre equipment and termination methods. A frigate will be no more or less complex in fibre optic terms with a data centre, or university campus, or football stadium. If you want complex and tight space problems, try putting fibre optic into a limited space data centre or telecoms node. Frigates, a piece of piss!
Go and look at the telecom figures for the Olympic Park if you want to see complex by the way.
Whilst we are on the subject, Wembley will also have been subject to stringent evacuation and crowd flow modelling in order to get its insurance certificates, trust me, these things are massively complex and require attention to detail that borders on the obsessive.
So, the point is, Wembley may or may not be more complicated in terms of cabling or damage control but it is a complex engineering challenge with many external and internal influences, multiple interested parties and attention on cost as any other major engineering project.
The point, therefore, that Chris was making, is that of comparative complexity and relative cost.
My daft example of the Type 26 Assessment Phase is part of this, arguably, we have spent £250m but at least £180m on the Assessment Phase for T26.
At this point, we have not de-spooled any electrical cabling or blown any fibre
The assessment phase is defined as;
The Assessment Phase is defined as ‘the second phase in the acquisition cycle after the Concept Phase and beginning with Initial Gate. The aim of the Assessment Phase is to develop an understanding of options for meeting the requirement that is sufficiently mature to enable selection of a preferred solution and identification, quantification and mitigation of the risk associated with that solution. At the end of the Assessment Phase a Business Case is submitted to the Investment Approvals Board for Main Gate Approval’.
£180m, really
Are we actually all OK with the fact that an absolute minimum of £180m has been spent on meetings, conference calls and presentations.
If you think so, then perhaps that is the point Chris was making, there is the real world and the defence world
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TD – ref this https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2015/02/the-type-29-global-combat-ship/comment-page-1/#comment-323850
TOC – ref this https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2015/02/the-type-29-global-combat-ship/comment-page-1/#comment-323855
Should we retain national defence build capability? Yes. But clever people need to work out how to make these businesses (if they are private sector commercial companies) survive without constant taxpayer rescues. Alternatively, HMG could set up its own organisations to do whatever they consider critical (research, design, development, manufacture, qualification, support, training, disposal) and contract the ‘easy’ bits to organisations of their choice. The point is simple – when push comes to shove and allies are fully committed to their own national defence equipment needs, we need to be able to continue the supply/support of UK defence materiel. Whatever it is.
A case from history (as we all like historical examples): We have discussed before the T18 Boarhound heavy 8×8 armoured car, designed to meet a UK requirement specifically to improve the 8th Army’s capability in North Africa. 3m wide, well protected, fast (for armour), turning circle of a supertanker, 57mm main gun which was the UK QF 6-pounder made locally. Very good for scampering round flat hard desert. The design/development/manufacture contract went to the Yellow Truck & Coach in Pontiac, Michigan in July 1941. At the point where the prototypes were completed and an order for 2500 was laid, Yellow Truck were diverted to the design/development/production of a vehicle required urgently by the US Army, the DUKW. Just 30 T18 armoured cars were delivered by May 1943, well after the North African campaign was dealt with, and about the time the next planned engagements in Italy were being considered. The 10ft wide 8×8 with very large turning circle – 80ft – was clearly not going to fit well with twisty European lanes. The contract was terminated. Had the vehicle been delivered in decent quantities in 1942 it may have helped the North Africa campaign, but clearly the US company was going to support the US military’s needs as a priority, and so it did. Note Wiki fails to mention the delay to T18 delivery caused by DUKW work for reasons best known to itself.
That is an example where current allies have differing priorities – consider the worse implications if parts vital to the nation’s defence equipment are sourced from companies that might find themselves on the opposition’s side of conflict.
So there are two options, one is to go with a cheap-as-chips buy-from-anywhere strategy in which blind hope that other nations’ suppliers will always be responsive to UK needs reigns. Let’s call this the budget head-in-the-sand model. The second option is to take defence of the realm seriously and ensure the security of supply is covered – either by very careful selection of international suppliers allied to major UK stockholding of replacement parts, or by sourcing from the UK. It might cost a bit more. Offsetting the potentially greater ticket price of buying British is additional UK employment, additional UK Intellectual Property, potential for export and potential for licencing use of our IP, and a greater capacity to spin-off civil projects from the military products both in terms of the knowledge base and the manufacturing capacity and facilities. Perhaps we should label this the French, or the American, model.
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TD – ref Wembley vs. Frigate – while they might be as complex and possibly (I doubt but cannot guarantee not) as regulated, I would be surprised if the interaction from the customer was anything like that of military work. Bear in mind every single aspect of a military project has a military, defence scientist or MOD desk officer controlling the designer by mind-numbing micromanagement. Every decision is open to challenge, any on the MOD side can demand their useful suggestion must be adopted or the product will not be accepted, all design is distrusted and must prove compliance to MOD specific standards, COTS must be used but must meet all Def Stans* and just for good measure regular meetings involving everyone must be held. I would be very surprised if the Wembley contractors had such overbearing constraint. It should also be considered that this divide and control stovepiping within projects causes some major incompatibilities downstream that cost a lot to fix.
*Example – all diesel engines must comply with current EU emissions regs. All ECUs must comply with the Def Stans. But. To meet the EU regs manufacturers of engines spend a fortune in development and have to change designs something like once a year to keep up with the ever-changing standards. They do not make their ECUs sensors interconnections or cabling to UK military standards (which are of course very similar to German or American standards but different thus needing special testing and qualification). So the designer has to use civilian parts and re-case, rewire, re-qualify, suppress, shield, seal, and produce unique military adapted units. By the time that work is done a new EU standard is in force and new ECUs sensors wiring etc etc are on the COTS market. What a complete mess.
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However sensible TOBA and UK sourced military procurement is I think there comes a time where we have to kick the politicians into reality and suggest that we’re being taken to the wallet cleaners.
If you need to maintain steel bashing and design then why did we outsource the Tides when we’ve just flushed money after the River batch 2’s?
It feels to me as though we are being bent over a barrel and royally shafted by BAES time and time again. Just like every other western capitalist corporation they’re only in it for one reason… and that’s not to make sure Britain’s defences are good.
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@ TD – went you put it like that £180 million sounds silly. However we seem to have a design (maybe not the right one) but something for our money.
It’s all the concept studies that really get me. Especiqlly given just how risk adverse our procurement strategy is what’s the point in spending millions examining trimaran or plastic tanks when all we end up doing is copying what the US is doing.
The British military establishment has to learn to live with in its very limited means. Grand innovation is not something we can afford. we can look at a few specific items like better radar or sonar and interesting innovations like mechanically scanned AESA. However we lack the means to think really big and innovative any more. Yet we still seem to authorise £100 million + defence study’s like sweeties.
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Martin, NaB
I suppose the sensible question to ask, is (roughly speaking) what is the cost of designing a modern warship on a global basis. I don’t think any of us, are concerned that design costs something, but we want to understand whether the Type 26 cost is about par or what all the faffing around has cost the UK.
My problem is that I had thought that the 180 million to date was the cost of the design (given that much of weapons and electronics fit was going to come across from the T23) and now we find out that it wasn’t.
In our cost conscious times, surely it is total programme cost (which includes operation and maintenance etc) which the Treasury is focusing on.
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Martin
The strange thing is that the UK has rather a lot of people very good at doing innovative research (proportionally we get a bigger slice of the EU wide research fund than any other country).
I don’t think that any junior Defence minister sticks around that long to really influence the way a project is actually managed (with the exception of the procurement people anyway). When you write “government” you really mean “Civil Service” surely. It is also clear that the government has a problem with just about any project of any size (just look at today’s news on the combined benefit simplification – 700+ million in and not a lot to show for it – with a high likelihood of being largely dumped past the next election).
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Martin said:
“The T26 was conceived to come in an air defence variant so its entirely possible that it will eventually replace the T45.”
I didn’t mean it as a Type 45 replacement for when Type 45 begins to leave service. More a ‘What does the UK do if it loses a Type 45 or two?’ question. It might take a decade or more to settle on a new destroyer design and get it into production, and I am guessing there would be no chance of building a new Type 45 from scratch. But there could be that Type 26 production line available if Type 45 equipment would fit.
Then in ? years time when designing the next new general purpose ship gets underway you’d do it with the goal of being a destroyer but capable of being made as a frigate in case the UK lost a Type 26 or 3. Not modular. Not multi-role. The type of ship being baked in on the production line.
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NaB: Re “As for the Type 14s being “the best ASW ships around”, that’s just laughable and explains why they were officially described as “second rate” compared to the T12 and also why they were discarded so quickly.” From all the publically available information I can find, in the late 50’s / early 60’s when they were built the Blackwoods proved to be the excellent anti-submarine platforms, which is the specific reason why they were built. I can understand why they were “second rate” when compared to broader capabilities, but that is not the argument. Additionally, as I said before adding the bits that the Blackwood lacked does not make a T26.
I am comforted however by your statement that we will get 13 T26s – it would mean 40% of our fleet would be put unnecessarily in harms way (IMO) rather than 60%.
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@ Nick
No doubt the UK has a lot of innovative people. However by in large our defence procurement strategy won’t go with innovative ideas. We are to risk adverse and have no budget. So there is little point in wasting money on design studies and the like.
its a serious amount of money that could actually go into procuring kit. We need to wake up to the realities that a 30 billion quid budget does not let you have a radically innovative military procurement strategy.
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Point in case is FRES. The UK has spent as much on desig studies as other European countries spent on procurement of an entire 8X8 fleet.
Did the French and Italians do 5 separate design studies before buying FREMM?
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All this would not be so bad if we actually bought any of the kit we developed in these studies. But for FRES we are ending up with ASCOD + Boxer
And our three class C1 C2 C3/ Trimaran Frigate program is replaced by Slightly fatter T23 frigate with a VLS launcher.
Zero inovation in any of these programs.
The only area where design studies still have a place is in aerospace because their is a fair bit of tech transfer into industry but by in large for land and naval systems its a waste of time.
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Looking at those European 8×8 fleets they arer largely untested in combat. So we don’t know the extent to which their lack of design studies has left them with compromised solutions. How many of them have V-Hulls for mine protection for example. Of course if you don’t intend to use your equipment against an actual enemy thats not such an important consideration.
The Americans have certainly continued to develop Stryker to iron out various problems. The 8×8 we will probably buy for UV will be a much more developed animal than the original OTS vehicles of the early 2000s.
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Peter Elliot
If you truly believe the FRESS scandal will result in anything being deployed within 10 years. (At which point some of the European armies will have had 8x8s deployed for 2 decades and will probably be looking to upgrade)………….
Then can I interest you in a bridge the govt want to sell?
Due to cuts they have to get rid of Tower Bridge and of course it’s hush hush. Nothing public you understand.
Is payment in un marked non sequential cash- US dollars made through a govt Nigerian subsidiary ok……?????..
Or to put it another way.
How many v floored 8x8s have the UK got in service for our billion quid?
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@Repulse
As you see, in Japan, we do not have mission bays and tomahawk VLS in our ASW destroyers, but we have satellite comms and a hanger. T-26 look quite large and expensive vessel. If we simply compare it with T23s, it is 60% larger with the same asset “in view of ASW”.
You added mission bays and tomahawk VLS. This is why T26 is so huge and expensive. Better living standard is also making it high cost.
Since you have mission bays, you shall be able to disband 1 or 2 Bay classes? I think no. Why not delete mission bay and ADD another Bay class?
Since you have TLAM VLS, you can disband CVFs? I think no. Why not delete TLAM and put money to integrate more land-attack capabilities (Brimstone, storm shadow etc..) to F-35Bs?
But all these ideas are old options, you didn’t selected.
T-26 as it is I agree well designed to its requirement. In other words, the requirements themselves are making it large and expensive and killing any possibility for export.
This is the way RN selected. More capable and larger frigate, and of course, much less hulls. From 13 T23 to maybe 8 or 9 T26s. In view of keeping your complex warship building capability, this is NOT optimized. I am afraid the current T-26 requirement is thus severely threatening the future ship building in UK. If you selected more compact solution, with a bit limited requirements, i.e. direct replacements for T-23s (say 5500t FL or so), the situation would have been better, I suppose.
But now, you have no choice. You must proceed with current T-26, and make the best out of it (not only as a warship, but also for your industry).
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‘Looking at those European 8×8 fleets they arer largely untested in combat’
Boxer, Freccia, Rosomak,Pandur and VBCI have all been deployed to Afghanistan.
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DN – how many of those went into areas that the Taliban were actively bombing? I heard a lot of talk of our allies staying out of the real redzone areas.
Genuine question I don’t know.
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@Donald of Tokyo
UK frigates are typically deployed in the “cruiser” role when not escorting, in the traditional sense rather than the modern sense, required to deploy globally and operate as independently as possible.
This is in contrast to the majority of other nations fleets (one of the reason’s why there’s limited export customers).
Hence the requirement for larger stores, accommodation and flexibility (via large flight deck, spacious hangar, a VLS, “mission deck”, etc) which result in the larger physical size.
As mentioned previously from those more in the know, these items of themselves are not the source of the higher cost solely: Look more towards the higher end combat systems, sensors (radar, ELINT, ESM, sonar, TAS, etc) and the man-hours to combine everything together.
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PE
IED’s were/are pretty much a threat wherever you went regardless of the regional command you came under some places may have been slightly more kinetic than others but, pretty much every nation have received casualties due to combat in Afghan, even the Germans 😉
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Martin
I can’t quite see why you’re still banging on about design studies – particularly now you know we haven’t spent “tens of billions” as you had it yesterday. Trimaran served its purpose in that the hydrodynamic and structural models were validated, which means if we wanted one (say for MHC) we could now design one.
Here’s another thought – its probable that T26 hasn’t spent enough on early stage design studies that might have demonstrated the problems they’re currently seeing earlier, instead of opening the box of systems engineers and plunging into detail.
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And on TDs assertion that we ‘ve spent £180M on meetings and powerpoint. Of course we haven’t. There is an awful lot of engineering design that remains applicable from that amount, not least the contract specs for a lot of the long-lead items. You wouldn’t get into cutting cable spools or blowing fibre till you do production engineering and manufacture after Main gate. It’s also worth reminding people that the expectation in complex projects is to spend at least 15% of the total programme cost prior to main gate. On a £4bn plus programme thats about £600M by my maths.
As a point of reference the US spent $6Bn on the development of Zumwalt. For 3 hulls.
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‘As a point of reference the US spent $6Bn on the development of Zumwalt’
Is that a comparable class of vessel to reference against the T26?
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NaB, see the next post post but we need to be clear what is in
Concept
Assessment
Demonstration
Manufacture
As per the CADMID theory, you don’t get into contracts before you enter Demonstration, so far we have £180m on assessment and £859m on what looks like a weird hybrid between Demonstration and Manufacture
DN, good point, given the whole concept of T26 was supposedly low risk, old wine in new bottles stuff?
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DN – yes it is. DDG1000/DD(X)/Zumwalt started life as a replacement for the USN Spruance class with a bit more LA capability added.
That it looks the way it does and cost what it did is substantially a result of the design philosophy applied.
TD – Of course you get into contracts before Demonstration & manufacture. The entire point of the assessment phase is to de-risk your options which means making sure you have a specification against which someone will contract and of course a price offer, with which to go to MG with.
This particular one (and in particular the £859M) is complicated by the ship design running behind, the need to start modifying the Clyde yards and what I suspect is a machinery test facility at Whetstone. It’s primarily three ship sets worth of propulsion gear, which isn’t going to be affected by the design changes required to the hull – you never know they might even make it easier.
CADMID theory is fine and dandy. But it’s still theory. Sooner or later people have to put that theory into practice and it isn’t clear cut. Wouldn’t it have been nice (for example) if the demonstration phase for QEC had included a the costs to do the adaption / conversion detailed design, while still proceeding on the STOVL assumption? Which would have meant letting that contract and maintaining it throughout the assessment phase.
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Thanks NaB, back to my question then
What has our £180m delivered
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200 plus comments in this thread, for a start.
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@ Chris,
Even commerical projects have their problems. With Wembley for example there was a lot of wrangling at the start over whether it should have an athletics track or not (first they didn’t want one, then they did, then they didn’t), whether there would be a hotel built on an adjacent site, what infrastructure upgrades would be included in the project. There was a lot of wrangling over the arch as well, with the sub contractor complaining that the main contractor wasn’t giving them enough information, then changing the design, then refusing to pay (there was a big legal battle over it), and in the end they walked off part way through and a dutch company was brought in to finish the arch.
As for the detailed specs, on a commercial project the standards can be just as demanding. Something as simple as a fire door has all kinds of requirements attached to it, everything from the core material, to the hinges, the locks, even the paint.
Which is one of the reasons I’m always sceptical when people run off a list of “ah well see you don’t understand, we have to know such and such rate, and this and that object has to comply with certain standards and be designed to such and such spec”. Because that’s not a military exclusive problem. Even civilian equipement has to meet all kinds of regulations and standards. Even stupid things like household kettles have to meet all kinds of requirements surrounding electrical safety, environmental health, safe disposal etc.
And normally it’s not ever a thing that the designer has to take that much account for. So for example the fire doors. There are lots of companies that make them. You can practically guarantee that any company making fire doors in this country will be making them to the standards required by law, so rattling off all the issues with a fire door is actually a little pointless because somebody will have already taken care of that particular problem for you.
I just need a phrase to describe the phenomenon now. Something like “Engineers bluff”?
*Please note I acknowledge the difference between rattling off specs and problems for a specific item that has already been accounted for like a fire door, versus the general bespoke problem of for example how to build a stadium in such a way that it can evacuate 90,000 people within the time allotted to get a sign off for its fire safety certification.
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@TOC “UK frigates are typically deployed in the “cruiser” role when not escorting, in the traditional sense rather than the modern sense, required to deploy globally and operate as independently as possible.”
Head of nail hit squarely there. T26s are global combat ships or global patrol cruisers if you like. Well defended against air, sea and subsurface attack, with significant strike back capability with a mix of say 16 TLAMS and 8 LRASMs say in the silos, as well as a good old fashioned decent gun and helo(s). Good long legs also. They also escort CVF and mighty capable in that. I am firmly of the belief that we could do task group escort ASW with less sophisticated and smaller vessels (like an OHP equivalent) but we don’t have the resources or need to develop another class at this stage. Cutting metal on the first of 13 T26s has to be the priority – at this stage I wouldn’t be quibbling about a few extra £100m in the scheme of things to get the design fixed and metal being cut.
If the Russians really do start ramping up Sub capability to cold war levels then that may be the time to thing of more T26s and / or a cheeper ASW dedicated vessel for the North Atlantic. Its only replaying the discussions / plans pre T23
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ChrisB – I accept there are standards in all varieties of production for all varieties of customers. But, to get a proper parallel, imagine the case if the Wembley Stadium customer issued his own set of standards that were different to the ones nearly everyone else uses, but which had to be met without question. Now add to that a customer installing their own personnel not only having the ability but the mandate to shadow every designer and tradesman, and to tell them what changes they must make and how they must prove the work has been done. “I require this fire door to be transparent.” “I will not accept a heavy solid structure; I demand it to be light and delicate.” “It must meet all my specifications.” “I desire it to be COTS.” “It must be painted this precise colour blue.” “It is too expensive; buy a different one or I will not pay.” “It is late – why have you not taken delivery yet? Your management is not up to the job.” “What idiot decided it should be transparent?” And so on. I very much doubt the civilian contractors have such a degree of – um – help.
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@ Chris,
Now that I can agree with you on and if true demonstrates just how appalling MoD procurement has become.
Commercially you would expect a degree of oversight and some meddling in the details, but only to an extent. To belabour this stadium example, you wouldn’t specifically tell the contractor what seats to put in unless there was some kind of new seat you were dead set on. Obviously the contractor can’t take the piss and order seats made out of cardboard without your permission, and they may invite you to try out a number of options to see which one you like, but no you wouldn’t expect the level of cocking about from the customer that you mentioned there.
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ChrisB – much of the world uses the US MIL-STDs for compliance to all the pesky military specific environmental type things (EMC, paint specs, shake rattle & roll, fuel types, transportability, electrical supplies, cable sheath materials etc etc etc – there are hundreds possibly thousands of the things) but the UK has its Def Stans which are not a one-for-one match. Nor are there authorised lists of equivalence between the two. Some MIL-STDs are more onerous than the Def Stans, some Def Stans are more onerous than the MIL-STDs. Mostly they are just different, meaning that a fully qualified unit compliant to MIL-STDs will end up being re-qualified to Def Stans before HMG sees fit to use it.
As for helpful customers, we have used this clip before several times, but its here again because its just so painfully like real life… https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aXQ2lO3ieBA
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Chris, that sounds like the basis for a really interesting post, how about picking a handful and describing the specification differences
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@TOC
Thanks for pointing out. My comment is in two aspects.
Larger store and accommodation is OK. But T26’s crew is SMALLER by 30% compared to T23. Even if you add 50 Marines, it is the same. Better living standard will make it a bit larger but I do not think it is the driver of making the ship 60% LARGER.
Then, do you really need Chinook capable flight deck? TLAM? What is the mission deck for? If you think they are not driving the cost, you may not care (but the “space” and “steel” is fully designed and built to naval standard, with many-many details which could be costy to a certain amount; Is it significant or not, I admit I don’t know *). But, at least it will drive the hull size and thus the operation cost significantly. I am afraid RN is losing LPH (almost surely), (CVF looks safer), and possibly one Bay-class or the RoRo ships in place of these costs.
This is the point of my question.
T26 fighting system is modest (or comparable) to FREMM. TLAM is cheaper than SCALP-N. CAMMS must be cheaper than ASTAR15. S2087, CAMMS, ARTISAN are cross decked (at least they say so) from T23s. And, every “complexity” shall be the same, or even less, compared to FREMM.
Then, it is the hull (scilent) and/or standards (longer deployment) making the T26 cost high. The latter everybody says, “not driving the cost” (although I doublt it). Then, is it the scilent hull driving the T26 cost?
Note that (not 250-350M GBP planned) but 400M GBP per ship for a ship like T26 is “reasonable” for me. (It is trying to be cheap in several fields, e.g. only 1 GT, unified (single) MFR, no ASROC, only 1 Merlin etc…). The point is, cross-decking the major equipments from T23 is contributing to what extent? May be it is quite minor contribution?
On the size vs cost issue: My background is sensor-system development. I know it is QUITE different from navy ships, rather similar to S2087 or ARTISAN sized sub-system. May be it is my personal experience, but making thing larger is, at the end, “costy”. The simplest reason is that we do not give up any single requirement (INCLUDING significant margins) to the end since we think we have enough space/power/weight budgets. I see similar things elsewhere. But note again, I have never been involved in ship buiding so I may be wrong.
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@ Chris,
” Some MIL-STDs are more onerous than the Def Stans, some Def Stans are more onerous than the MIL-STDs”
The same happens to an extent in the civvy world. You only have to look at the f**king death trap that the Americans refer to as a plug and then compare it to its sterling cousin (haw haw) to see the difference in approaches to safety standards.
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TD – ref writing a standards comparison – God no. In a sane world Gov’t funded officials would do the nauseating detail comparison and publish the declared equivalence. They would be doing so under duress, because its so unbelievably boring. So for one, I am not going to pour through standards picking out differences as life’s too short to volunteer for that, for two I can’t be fussed to answer all the expert disagreements the comments would throw up, and for three the differences are deep in the detail. Like in shake rattle & roll standards would a 50ms sawtooth bump of 9g be more or less violent than a 40ms 12g half sinewave? I don’t know; there are people that should and do know. But more importantly there are no clear reasons why other nations’ standards aren’t good enough to buy to.
ChrisB – aha! BS1363 I believe. Yes I agree the British electrical plug is robust and mostly foolproof. It all went downhill a bit when the flex colour code was changed (because of the Germans, you know*) from green Earth, black Neutral, red Live over to green & yellow Earth, blue Neutral, brown Live. One of my managers of the time did a logical and intentionally incorrect assessment of the new colours: “Hmm. Blue. That’s a fairly benign colour, I’ll guess that’s Neutral. Brown is also a dull shade and is the colour of mud – that must be Earth. This last wire has a really dangerous looking yellow stripe down it – obviously its the Live wire.” Still, the law has said we can’t buy equipment without plugs any more because Nanny State has decreed we are not intelligent enough to wire a plug.
The pre-modern German colour code of green, black & white used the black as Live, using the reasoning black is a colour associated with death. White was Neutral.
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@Chris – Based on your manager, that law sounds very sensible…
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TL – yes, but – its the daft colour code that is the root of confusion. Wouldn’t you have thought a more rational solution would have been green Earth, white Neutral and red with dangerous yellow tracer Live? (The tracer stripe being useful for those with red/green colourblindness.) Muddy brown does not warn of danger.
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To tell the truth this is one law I’m really not going to criticise. Anybody wiring up a plug should know what they’re doing, and part of knowing what you’re doing involes getting appropriate information, rather than relying on your intuition. Anything else is just asking for trouble.
You suggest using red as indicator for danger. In China, red is the ‘lucky’ colour – which would tend to indicate safe. Intuition about colour may just be common sense, but common sense comes from cultural norms.
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@NAB
‘yes it is. DDG1000/DD(X)/Zumwalt started life as a replacement for the USN Spruance class with a bit more LA capability added.’
Weren’t the Spruance class destroyers? and if so would that make them equivalent to our T45? but the T26 is our frigate replacement is it not?
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Perhaps a good comparison would actually be T45
How much did that cost to get to build stage
Did that cost include PAAMS (cutting edge and expensive stuff) or was it just for the ship?
Would make a an interesting discussion I think
As would comparison with IverH or the FREMMS
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@DavidNiven
Weren’t the Spruance class destroyers? and if so would that make them equivalent to our T45? but the T26 is our frigate replacement is it not?
Spruances were ships with a big sonar and not much else, that lived in the ASW screen of a battlegroup. Later they had Tomahawk tubes added to give them a secondary land-attack capability. So they were the operational equivalent of T23, albeit a much bigger ship.
You have to remember that the USN uses “destroyer” in the same way that we used “throughdeck cruiser”, to disguise capability from the politicians. So the Zumwalt is really an Iowa replacement for supporting troops on land, it’s the same size as the Graf Spee. It should really be a BM, a Battleship-Monitor, but Congress wouldn’t fund new battleships so it gets called a DDG destroyer
Same with the Burkes, they’re the size of cruisers but the USN couldn’t request a fleet of 60-odd cruisers.
The FREMM programme is costing the Frogs €9,500m (£6.9bn) for 11, with a unit cost of €670m (£490m) in FY14
http://www.senat.fr/rap/a14-110-8/a14-110-819.html#toc308
That includes two air-defence ships which obviously cost a lot more, at the same time the current exchange rate flatters any costs in Euros. The Moroccans bought their one (which is a bit cut down from the French spec) for €470m (ordered in 2008), but that probably represents a bit of a discount.
http://www.usinenouvelle.com/article/a-brest-le-maroc-prend-possession-de-sa-fregate-fremm-mohammed-vi.N236729
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DN & El Sid
Zumwalt is a destroyer. The clue is in the designation – DDG1000.
The fact that it is 16 000 te is nothing to do with it being an Iowa replacement, nor is it another go around the “through-deck cruiser” buoy. It is 16 000te, primarily because the requirement to adopt low RCS via a tumblehome hull, led to a displacement (and associated cost) best described as comical.
Don’t get hung up trying to ascribe frigate / destroyer / cruiser appelations to displacement, cos they ain’t valid no more….
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‘Don’t get hung up trying to ascribe frigate / destroyer / cruiser appelations to displacement, cos they ain’t valid no more…’
Fair enough. 🙂
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Sure, function should prevail. Therefore:
“should really be a BM, a Battleship-Monitor, but Congress wouldn’t fund new battleships so it gets called a DDG destroyer
Same with the Burkes, they’re the size of cruisers but the USN couldn’t request a fleet of 60-odd cruisers.”
BM would be a good one.
As for the cruisers, didn’t the Congress get quite upset about the USN withdrawing half of them? And the Navy response was, honest, we are only saving the other half for a rainy day (and to prove that we are asking you to fund some of the refurb items upfront!).
I still think the T26s will fill the cruiser boots and AWD, of the Australian ilk, would be a good label for the T45s.
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NaB,
So can you define a frigate, destroyer or cruiser then?
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The traditional role definitions appear to be the way to go for sure: Destroyers designed to destroy stuff, Cruisers designed to cruise and join the Line (whatever that definition is today), Frigates to cruise and escort, Battleships to be in at the sharp end trading full-on hammer blows.
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@NaB – conversely, just because it has a designation, doesn’t make it so. A rose by any other name and all that. The first few Ticos carried the designation DDG initially. No doubt you’re going to say that NATO pushes ships into the FF/DD/CG strait-jacket, but that didn’t stop the USN inventing whole new categories like LCS and JHSV. So there’s no real reason why they couldn’t use the existing BM(G) classification and follow on from USS Wyoming (BM-10).
I’m looking at the mission, and Zumwalt’s focus on the support of troops on land doesn’t really fit any of the historical missions of “destroyer” – which in itself is a highly moveable feast :
Early 20th century – torpedo boat destroyer
Mid-late 20th century – battlegroup/convoy escort, mainly ASW
21st century – mainly AAW
Anti-shipping, anti-submarine, anti-air. None of those look like naval fire support to me. But that’s exactly what a BM monitor does.
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What I’m driving at is that the traditional designations used through the last century have pretty much lost their meaning.
Take destroyer – RN have ascribed that to an AAW ship for the last forty years or so,except when they wanted it to seem “cheaper” which is when we got TFF, FFG90, CNGF etc. In the (modern-ish) RN frigates have been either ASW specialists or general purpose ships. Size hasn’t been particularly relevant to designation for forty years or so.
In the US, the converse has applied. You’ve had destroyers of both AAW and ASW flavour (Adams/Coontz/Kidd vs Sherman/Spruance) with more recently GP flavour as well (AB). Frigates in the USN have tended to be more the second-line, (often smaller) ships of various persuasions (Knox, FFG7, Garcia). Cruisers tended to have a command function (even when known as Destroyer Leaders – like the Leahys and Belknaps ), whereas in the RN our more recent ships with a command function were either T42 (as AAWC) or T22/2 and T22/3 as flag-fitted.
Point is, it’s a potmess, with very little rhyme or reason to it that I can discern any more. Would I call an LCS a frigate? Possibly, possibly not. Would I call DDG1000 a destroyer? Not from choice, I’d probably call it a cruiser or more likely an abortion. I’m sure that it’s not an attempt to hide the function (like through deck cruiser), simply because the ship was subject to far too much scrutiny throughout its gestation for that to work.
Where once there was relative consistency, now there is chaos. But it’s only a designation, there is at least some precedence. It’s not a hanging offence like making up words to fit a designator, like Carrier Vessel Future, Carrier Vertical Strike, or worse, non-sensical acronyms like CATOBAR.
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With technology, has that function/ differentiation gone?
“Cruisers tended to have a command function (even when known as Destroyer Leaders – like the Leahys and Belknaps ), whereas in the RN our more recent ships with a command function were either T42 (as AAWC) or T22/2 and T22/3 as flag-fitted.”
The (accounted for!) opportunity cost of keeping T42s going, while waiting for T45s was noticeably high.
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A good old £200m T42 run on cost accounted for by NAO in their 2008 report (may, or may not have been cut off at that point).
… For the T45 delay, and as I read it, they were obsolete for AAW, so that would be attributable to the command function (or not, cfr T22s?)
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“With technology, has that function/ differentiation gone?”
No – because it’s about people and space for them, as much as connectivity, bandwidth and comms bearers.
Can’t quite wade my way through your syntax to work out the question on cost. Whatever cost quoted by the NAO was almost certainly based on : extra bodies (250 on a T42 compared to around 200 on a T45), support costs for the last bits of equipment (particularly GTs), the material state of the ships themselves (all the batch 3’s were suffering badly) and there’s probably some accounting cost for maintaining the Dart on the books as well (missile support costs are eye-watering).
By the time the 42s finished, there were no spare Tyne GTs – Edinburgh finished her final deployment with only one working.
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@NaB
For all your reasoning, I’m fine with the 8,000 tons cruiser path. I also get the advantages of the T26 hull, despite I’m highly critical on operational applicability.
But It is also perfectly clear to me, that numbers will suffer. I guess, you’re really hoping, we get 13 T26 one day. Which will not happen IMO, which will definitely not suffice to protect domestic design expertise and which is min 6 too few, anyway.
As it currently stands, LCS-2 is the USN’s implementation of the ASW-problem. A second-line vessel, you may say. A second-line, we don’t have and will not get. And that’s a major mistake, not a single comparable western European Navy is making.
Re. Zumwalt: the hull was designed to also accommodate the more challenging CG(X) hull, including AMDR of a much larger size. This was cancelled for almost comedy-like reasoning and by influence of the amphib-mafia (they wanted a San Antonio-based BMD-cruiser). I guess, once the advantages of the Zumwalt class and Arleigh Burke+AMDR cost become clear, we will see a rush back.
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@mcZ
“As it currently stands, LCS-2 is the USN’s implementation of the ASW-problem. A second-line vessel, you may say. A second-line, we don’t have and will not get. And that’s a major mistake, not a single comparable western European Navy is making”
I would say that yet again the USN is failing to take ASW seriously, they are very poor at it now and are about to get even poorer. Old chinese SSNs and CBGs spring to mind, Norwegian SSks continually sinking carriers on exercises is another. If you want to do ASW seriously, you need to take it seriously.
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@ APATS – Agreed, Given the overwhelming nature of the US Surface fleet it seems like a no brainier for a belligerent such as China to focus on SSK production to fight an asymmetric war.
do you think part of the issue is that the U.S. Has historically outsource much of the obligation to the likes of the UK and Japan?
The USN seems to have an SSN mafia, carrier mafia and amphib mafia but not much of an ASW frigate mafia. even the SCC program seems to be tied to having more missile’s and guns on an LCS than noise reduction and better sonar.
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I like Spruances. Learned a lot about how a warship should be screwed together reading about the Sprunace class. And the RCN Tribals.
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@APATS
“Norwegian SSks continually sinking carriers on exercises” ….isn’t everybody ? …..though to be fair the Norwegians are probably some of, if not THE best, submariners in europe , in my experience ahead of both the Germans, Dutch and Swedes. And their commanders course is brutal…even compared to Perisher.
And while US surface forces possibly dont take ASW seriously , their silent service certainly does, to the extent of having service members going through pretty much all the european submarine courses.
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thanks NaB, you confirmed what apats had said earlier on some other thread.
i took th 2008 number just because I ran into it, not saying that was the cuf off för that cumulative cost, which is directly attributable to the T45 prgrm.
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@APATS
“If you want to do ASW seriously, you need to take it seriously.”
So, what ASW can be seriously done with just 8 frigates?
The only difference in ASW-equipment between LCS-2 and T26 will be, that the active sonar is fixed in the latter case, that LCS-2 can operate two helicopters simultaneously and that LCS will outnumber T26 by at least 3 to 1.
Maybe we can sink some slow SSKs by throwing one of those unnecessary square-boxes overboard?
To “sink” a carrier, when your bloody arse is not under threat, no Nixies and barely any active sonar operating… IMO, those “lessons” are not applicable to real shooting.
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The 2017 US. Naval Defense Budget call’s for the Building of three BMD/Arsenal Ship’s of ~27,500-tons based on the San Antonio class Gator-Freighters. 288-VLS and a Single BAE 32MJ Rail-Gun…
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@ El_Sid.
Actually, the Arsenal Ship is designated as a “BBG”…
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