The Future?

:D Can we open a sweep stake? Split it up into grids…

for a number of years i lived in a nation adjacent to one of those UK sized lakes.

i was also intimately familiar with the lack of infrastructure when i broken my knee and was subjected to a three hour drive on dirt roads in a landrover twenty years older than i was.

so much space, in so much isolation, the idea of holding and controlling a theatre of operation is positively ludicrous.

i repeat my suggestion for the three light-cavalry regiments scattered across the adaptable brigades to be brought together into a third rapid-reaction brigade focused around high-mobility/low-footprint interventions.

wheels and 40mm CTA designed to self deploy up to 500km from point of entry, with short term resupply capable via a minimal air-bridge.

3 heavy brigades
3 rapid reaction brigades (marine/air-mobile/light-cav)
6 infrantry

africa is happening.

A case for dfid and defence diplomacy if ever I heard of one. Invest in upgrading or building airstrips and ports to aid the locals, water, fuel storage and connecting roads. Then periodical test the airstrips by flying in an a400m or docking a frigate in a port. Ect ect. Build relations with the locals, and send the engineers to build the occasional bridge.

I know this is completly against the current concept of uparmouring everything, but to me Africa is a prime area to use light mobile units based around unarmoured or lightly armoured vehicles, forget FOB’s and logistic routes etc, stay mobile and don’t consistently travel the same roads and IED’s will be a minor issue, 100 landrovers each carrying 4 guys and 20 trucks of supplys with a weekly resupply by air.
How many times do you see on TV, african troops moving around in pickup trucks etc, they don’t seem to have an issue with IED’s. It seems to me that IED’s really became an issue in Iraq as we were using the same roads regularly to link up FOB’s.

ET, one of the problems that conventional armies face against such irregulars is a problem of supply which has pros and cons. An irregular army can simply disperse home to their families where they get fed, effectively disappearing while a conventional army is tied to a “home” base. The flip side to all this is that conventional armies can deploy far from home as their “home” travels with them, and since they are externally supplied, they don’t have to keep an eye out for planting/harvesting season, while an irregular army is pretty much unlinked to a supply base, they can’t deploy far from home and they have seasons where they can’t fight or the next year they will starve. Think something like that happened with the Maori in New Zealand, Rocco might have more light to shed on that.

They also don’t have a serious IED threat because their area of ops is very accessible by vehicle. Not many roads to funnel people into a killing trap.

If you want to really defeat a threat like Boko Haram, the solution is 2 fold. Concentrate into larger villages for self defence and use the increased manpower pool to provide a decent perimeter security. 400 men attacking a village with 3-4 watchmen is a cakewalk. 400 men attacking a protected community with a 100 man security force is a chancier proposition, especially if initial resistance allows more and more people to arm themselves in defence.

@ Observer

I see your point about pros and cons, but the tactics we have used in Afghanistan i.e. establishing a FOB and then patrolling out from it gives a target for the enemy to attack and then allows them also to avoid the regular patrols in a small area, i can see that defending villages is required but if we defend every village we would need 100’s of thousands of troops to combat a few thousand enemy fighters, i would rather see our troops taking the fight to the enemy by patrolling into ambushs and fighting the enemy they find. By keeping them always mobile you cover a far greater area with fewer troops on the ground.

For resupply I would establish a base at an exisiting military airfield preferably a heavily defended one, i would have CASEVAC and vehicle recovery helo’s based there as well as using it as a base to send out helo’s with supplies to the troops in the field.

The vehicle I would use would be a Snatch with a GPMG/HMG mounted on the roof (I don’t know whether they actually make these) or possibly a WMIK either a landrover or jackal, a mix of these types might work well. I would be aiming for a vehicle heavy unit so they can carry more supplies and are also able to lose a few vehicles and still carry the same number of personnel.

Basically we should have better trained troops using better vehicles and weapons, but similar tactics to the groups using technicals to raid villages.

ET, ow that is the wrong way to go about it. You need to let them learn to defend themselves or you’ll just be running around putting out fires all the time. You don’t deploy your men there, you arm the villagers. And you need a system of ID cards to spot strangers and to track them, along with no weapons zones (no weapons in towns except for militia or military).

Trying to play Rambo and doing both the direct route and going it solo is a mental problem the Americans have. Try not to emulate them.

In this case, a Home Guard is enough to sort things out, no need to be too heavy handed, just help them out with a bit of air support and some infrastructure for ID cards is enough. And maybe some Special Branch type training.

I never liked patrolling for the sake of patrolling, for one, there is no point unless you are actively tracking and pursuing an enemy and for another, patrols getting ambushed is always bad news, the enemy has surprise and if he did his work well, he’ll have numbers. Afghanistan is a strange story where you are doing “presence” missions and “hearts and minds”, not really search and destroy. Much better to let the enemy attack an entrenched position then make them pay dearly for sticking their noses out. Even better if you can find out who was supplying them with food and burning their suppliers out if voluntary, offer to give them guns, guard towers and a radio to call for air support if the villagers are continuously being robbed. After you ambush the next few “tax collecting” parties that is.

x – I have tried to interest HMG in fine C-130 transportable light armour including 4×4 8×8 & 10×10 covering weights between 7 & 17t but on all occasions I managed to get a response, it was ‘there is no requirement for such vehicles’. There is clearly a need, and a capability gap in UK combat vehicle terms, but no Requirement. Of late the MOD has decided it will not even bother to respond to e-mails which is far from professional, but hey. Having spent years hammering on the fine taxpayer-funded oak doors of MOD Main Building and being rebuffed without serious consideration, its tempting to say the Army deserves to go fight in whatever inappropriate wagons they have and hang the consequences, except its the front line soldier that suffers for the lack of gumption of the decision-makers.

I suspect the lack of any Requirement being met allied to the capability gap and the mounting likelihood of a skirmish through the Sahel has resulted in the rush to get hold of a few VBCI. At this point I could swear. But instead I will use a bit of video to illustrate the view on going French for 8x8s after years of refusing to admit there was a need for the like: http://www.tubechop.com/watch/2883851

x – all my vehicles would fit inside vertical lift aircraft – MOD just hasn’t bought big enough vertical lift aircraft yet…

Sphinx looks like a good bit of design even though its a direct competitor to my turreted 8×8 (hmph!) but if you want to take CV90 then you might as well take ASCOD/FRES-SV as they are pretty well the same spec (weight size protection firepower). On the other hand, I also have tracked light armour with common support with the wheeled vehicles but with similar punch to CV90/ASCOD. Just saying, like, if reduction in support burden is seen as important…

Weren’t we very successful in malaya by creating and reinforcing a local armed police? Equally I seem to remember that we managed to run an empire with a smaller army than we have now by raising and supporting local troops?

Chris,

I sympathise with you regarding offering your vehicle designs to deaf ears. Certainly not be responded to is rude, although caveat, if you are sending emails to named people (eg Boggins123@mod.uk) you might find that Boggins has been posted away once his tour in procurement ended. And your emails are now being cheerily put into a spam folder. That’s where I happily auto-Outlook emails from pushy sales people I don’t want to be bothered by. EDIT that sounds horrible, I do not mean it to refer to you!

I think you might also slightly misunderstand how the MoD procures things. There is no official Requirement unless the Defence Capabilities Board have authorised it, so allocating funding. And the funding for Army wagons may be less highly important than, I don’t know, a pair of spastically large carriers or pointlessly over designed VTOL jets. So with a limited pool of money, the carriers and the jets get funded, the wagons don’t. No funding, no official requirement. It’s not the “fault” of the Army. The need is still there, but not funded.

Anyway, I wish you’d have been able to come and see me when I was running the Army’s input into FRES SV from 2000 to 2003. Back then, the doctrine and emerging KURs and URs were pointing towards something of about 10 tonnes that we could fly into, oddly enough, Africa (recall that Sierra Leone was on our minds back then). If you’d had a wagon, even a prototype, you’d have had me looking at it, telling you what the priorities were, acceptable trade offs, and probably also the offer of a trial by ATDU for a month or so (at your cost). If you only had PowerPoint engineering, I’d still have given you an hour of discussion time. The key thing was, I’d have got just as much information from you as you did from me, helping me to build a business case that would secure funding. Then we’d have requirements.

Things have changed a little organisationally in the last ten years, but one tip: don’t immediately go to the the desk officer, go to see the trials units and ask them what the Army needs in a wagon.

All, FRES was designed for this sort of discussion. Forget whatever kit we might end up with, think instead about the really simple concept. Go first, go fast, go home. Nip out the trouble as it buds, not as it is blossoming. Stabilise the situation, then hand over to the more numerous and probably local peace-keepers such as the African Union. FRES is about kinetic effect in all domains, including social and political, and the FCO and DFID are part if the solution. FRES is not about endurance.

…. As a follow on, the highest risk identified in the FRES UV and SV Initial Gate Business cases in 2000 and 2002 respectively was that of political inertia, bluntly that the politicians would spend so much time fannying around politicking that “the trouble” whatever it was would have grown in scale to a level that FRES could not handle, and only a full blown heavy deployment could handle it. And that of course would impose additional delay as it would require shipping, not aircraft.

Similarly, we could have satisfied so many more UORs for both Afghanistan and Gulf 2 if the decisions to deploy had been made more quickly, or authority to start spending had been untied from PM level decisions. Both came so late in the day that we could only proceed with UORs that could be delivered in time.

Just to give an idea of size of continent were dealing with,

http://maps101.files.wordpress.com/2013/03/5e01ab85f93a24658b52edc568e71798.jpg

Air transport is vital bring back the Sherpa.

APATS, very true. There was a similar phrase about the old 24 Airmobile Brigade in the Cold War, which was planned to be a highly mobile anti-tank reserve equipped with hundreds of Milan and to be choppered in to wherever was needed, rapidly engage the enemy, and then pull out if it survived. I think the phrase went “fight and fly, or dig and die?”

I did not mention it above, but enhanced intelligence was very much part of the FRES doctrine. I won’t mention any specific programmes for OPSEC reasons, but lots of intelligence programmes that have been funded inherited some of their rationale from FRES. I recall a chart shown by the then DEC ISTAR which visually linked about half of his portfolio to FRES. And he was a charming Naval officer of prodigious intelligence (there are other sorts, before you declare “what other types are there?” ;) ). He was the right man in the right job, and he really understood was FRES was about, delivering strategic effect, not wagons.

Or get stuck into stabilizing an inherently unstable government for a decade or more…

dave, Gerald Templar’s strategy is still very important reading and some of his measures have taken a life of their own even decades past the Emergency, like ID cards or centralized towns.

As an add on to Phil’s strategic overview, fortifying villages and arming them turns them into de-facto outposts and keeps out the insurgent as well, and does this with indigenous “forces” that need not cost you a single man. The villagers themselves have a burning need to secure their own areas as it is their own security and that of their children on the line, so they are even more motivated not to sleep on the job. And you don’t even have to supply them at all as they are self supporting, and they have a very good eye for strangers, more so than troops that get rotated in and out frequently.

Ironically, I’m pro-gun control, but in this case, an armed population might just be the key to solving the problem. It’s like the old saw of giving a man a fish vs teaching him how to fish. In this case, it is defending someone and teaching him how to defend himself.

“stay mobile and don’t consistently travel the same roads and IED’s will be a minor issue, 100 landrovers each carrying 4 guys and 20 trucks of supplys with a weekly resupply by air.”

This seems like a recipe to repeat the snatch land rover debacle. The insurgents in both Iraq and Afghanistan turned to IEDs because every time they tried to go head to head with international forces they got smacked down by overwhelming firepower. You can drive around the desert all day long, but at some point to have an impact on the population you’re going to have to approach the various villages and towns. Settlements that will be surrounded by farmland, forcing you use a formal road network….

Let’s not repeat the mistakes of the past by sending our soldiers into a conflict zone in the western equivalent of a technical, not least because we’ve spent all that money on mine protected vehicles.

RT – ref insult – taken to heart and deeply wounded…

Ref e-mails to MOD – not going to name names on the web. There are many and various that have chosen not to respond. Am beginning to suspect the insidious hand of Cheltenham playing sillyb*ggers under the excuse of national security.

Ref 2002 – at the time I was trying (unsuccessfully) to convince my then employer that FRES was a project worth engaging. They really really weren’t interested. A lot of the ideas upon which the designs later developed were already in place (in my mind) but the development work didn’t start until ex-company & I went our separate ways. And that was years after RT left the project office, apparently.

Ref talking to trials units – access is limited but I did get a couple of hours with ATDU who offered a raft of suggestions for redesigning undesirable bits out of some of the more radical vehicles; the 8×8 APC got the parting shot “we’ll be keen to trial it when its roadworthy” without an attached list of ‘you need to change this’ comments, which I took to be quite positive. Sadly between Powerpoint/CAD and a working roadworthy vehicle is a yawning chasm that can only be filled in with heaps of cash, and I’m clean out of savings. Had there been the smallest amount of genuine interest from MOD IPTs (or indeed any other permitted customer) then I would have sought investment capital and looked for industry partners. But there was no way I’d risk other people’s money on a whim likely to come to nothing – that would not be honourable at all.

Would love to get into greater detail but as much as we all respect TD Towers its not really the right place.

Chris,

Don’t give up. The country needs Barnes Wallis 2020…. ;)

Here’s a complete random thought. I have a concept doing the rounds of my brain whereby protection against IED blast is partly achieved by a combination of metal sandwiched honey combing filled with water, and sacrificial plastic plugs at the ends of the panel facing 90 degrees (or in reality, more than 45 degrees) away from the axis of blast direction. The honey combing material being compressible like formed wood pulp, the water being incompressible. The honey combing having some “optimum” amount of holes allowing water to be squeezed from cell to cell. Thus the overall blast energy is both redirected sideways, and the energy per square inch of hull of the blast effected area much reduced. And the plastic plugs at the end plates fly off readily to vent the water in great gouts when the IED goes off.

Probably explained that really badly. I did a bit of MathCAD modelling in a lunch hour which sort of indicates that it might work. but my MathCAD is not highly advanced, and I’m a BD bloke so not taken seriously by the Engineers. Then again, they don’t know who to go and have a G&T with, nor what to say when they are with a Customer. ;)

I don’t do trucks but should have did c23 to stop the comedians ….:)

RT

Rohacell cores sound like what your after. Though I wouldn’t go for the water tends to degrade composite.

Oh dear….

RAF spy plane breakdown stalls UK efforts in hunt for Nigerian girls

http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/uk/defence/article4094366.ece

An RAF spy plane sent by David Cameron to help find hundreds of school girls kidnapped in Nigeria by Islamist militants has broken down en route.

(Apparently, it made it as far as Senegal)

@x

Interesting, although not for those in the pictures, they both look slightly silly in different ways. Interesting in who and how their chosen audience recieve and understand the message they are trying to send in there respective PR stunts.

As Sir H, they breakdown all the time, larger aircraft perhaps less so, but no great surprise. Just this flight is in the spotlight.

LateRooms.com > World > Africa > Senegal > 4 & 5 Star Luxury Hotels in Senegal

http://www.laterooms.com/en/r578_hotels-in-senegal.aspx?q=1_luxury-hotels

I’m sure there sorted by now mind.

@x

I know the context is different and so are the times, what they are trying to achieve hasn’t. They both look a bit silly in trying to achieve it (what’s with the chemistry lesson googles?? and couldn’t they find at least a half decent poster to hold up?)

But put that to one side, I think it’s more intersting to gauge the reaction and success of the message they aiming for. Politicians would/will try for whatever medium or message that works, more a means to an end.

@ Mark

naturellement, why else press on? ;)

I’ll be a bit controversial here and suggest disbanding both 3 Cdo and 16AAB. Build an intervention/reactive brigade around the Rifles regiment with the combat support from the disbanded 3 Cdo and 16AAB.

Keep the Royal Marines as our littoral and raiding specialists (and fleet protection) like the Norwegian Coastal Commando’s, with the Paras continuing as our airborne element with a bit like the US Rangers. No artillery and a small detachment of specialists for each formation.

The New brigade will be fully mechanised with Foxhound, Viking and maybe some medium armour, and trained in amphibious landing (as in step onto the landing craft from the well deck and then step off onto the beach/port)

@Topman

Those chemistry lesson goggles were the issue for fighting vehicles!

Not really Phil, we decided our force density for the AO we operated in. We could have increased or decreased as we saw fit.

@x
So I am, I see 2 politicians on a PR stunt both trying to look good both for a political end.

@Phil

We could have pulled out like the Canadians and Dutch, if we did not have the resources to do both. And it still does not mean that NATO controlled our force density.

Sir H,

Of courses planes break down all of the time. They are probably more expensive in maintenance terms than either polo ponies or teenage daughters, which I have found as equally unreliable and ruinous. To say nothing of lawyers.

To quote a great man, “speak softly and carry a big stick”, but to add my own words to that “and don’t brag about it until you have clubbed OPFOR to death”. In other words, don’t have a big press release about sending Sentinel to Nigeria until the ruddy thing has actually got there, and as it’s important national PR stuff, send twice the spares, just in case.

To be fair to the MoD, I suspect the pre-publicity was a Number 10 idea, not 6th Floor.

RT – giving up is becoming an ever more pressing option, being propelled by the unwillingness to spend what’s left of life in abject poverty while fat MOD cats retire on fat pensions congratulating themselves for jobs well done.

Ref waterbombs – funnily enough I asked the same sort of question about putting water filled bladders between spaced armour. It was a while back, but if I remember right the opinions of those that ought to know were that it wasn’t a good idea for blast protection because 1) bags leak and pack down so there’s no guarantee of the quality of barrier across the entire area, 2) blast fronts move so fast that water is as hard as iron, 3) water is much heavier than the airgap it fills and for many situations probably less effective. Apart from that it was good. Maybe in a thinner sandwich of closed-cell honeycomb sheeting it would be a better option*. You need an armour specialist to advise. Interestingly the use of diesel fuel tanks as additional protection has been considered – apparently diesel slows ballistic projectiles just fine, and unless a lot of spray/vapour is generated in the vicinity of an ignition source its pretty inert. Self-sealing fuel tanks help obviously (unless the sealant is the one they just found out is as volatile as rocket fuel).

* But probably not for IEDs and related nasties. To defeat some of the nastier related nasties the armour becomes hideously heavy and must include some serious materials science; I’d guess if water was effective and lighter the armour specialists might have seized upon it already?

APATS – best you don’t tell RTR you think Challenger is a ‘total failure of a tank’ else they might feel like demonstrating to you personally that it can be quite effective…

‘I’m dubious about how rigid the government manpower limits were’

I think they definitely have a bearing on force composition. Just before my last tour we lost a Sqn about 4 weeks before we deployed, due to a cap on numbers (allegedly).

@Phil manpower limits were very much controlled by the tresury. trying to get any small increase was like blood from a stone.

For example the Engineer Group had 520 pax on H15 not including CIED and other elements (a RHQ, 3x CS sqns, a talisman Sqn and a support Sqn).So I don’t think the caps were on manpower per se.’

That does not show that numbers were not capped, it was probably the right composition of the Engr Gp to support the number of troops in the field. It does not mean the number as a whole were not capped.

As a side note, didn’t Rumsfield cap the numbers the US could use for the invasion of Iraq despite advice that a larger force would be needed.

APATS,

Correct. CR1 was nothing but a Chieftain with a body kit. Same FCS.

CR2 was a CR1 with some new physical metal doodads but nothing much to write home about, but a whole new digital brain and new eyes.

If Chieftain was the 50% solution, CR1 was the 60% solution, and CR2 the 95% solution.

….APATS, to follow on from above, but the iThingy ran out of juice while editing.

The CR2 being the 95% solution to a question that the world stopped asking in 1989.

May I be deliberately controversial? As opposed to my normal self, being controversial merely by existence but being unaware of such. ;)

I think we (UK) could have won GW 1 and GW 2 without heavy armour, or at least our bit of it. There may have been some extra casualties, but in the tens, not an order of magnitude. I base that on what I observed personally in GW 1, while serving with a recce Regiment. We killed far more Iraqi AFVs with indirect fire than either 4 or 7 Armd Bdes did with direct fire, we took more square kilometres of terrain, we took more prisoners. That is no fault of either armoured Brigade, merely that they were concentrated onto compact targets, we were allowed to roam relatively free in the enemy rear area. I was not in GW2, but again the existence of CR2 did not by itself seem to make a critical difference, although if was always useful and perhaps shortened engagements.

I may get shot down here but changing the focus and composition of our military in going to be the key point in the 2015 SDSR, post Afghanistan. There are those who believe we need to return to the good old days of an Army made up of heavy armoured formations in order to conbat a threat that has not existed for decades and will probably never again. There are also those who feels that operations in Iraq post GWII and in Afghanistan were/are an aboration and should not be taken as how future conflicts may have to be fought. To them COIN is a dirty idea and prevents planning to fight REAL wars against conventional enemies.

The facts are when one tries to add a little realism in to future ideas is that we and our allies are going to be far less likely to actually send ground troops into harms way, and when we do it will be to put out fires rather than prevent them, and we will n ot stay around to rebuild thing after. More importantly these operations are goiung to be against third tier or at worst second tier opposition. Nearly everybody in these4 catagories has learnt the lessons from GWI, GWII and Afghanistan, the foremost of which is that you cannot take on first tier opposition by conventional means which means we need flexible forces that can adapt, and have greater in theater mobility and smaller logistical footprints. We need some formations that can get in theater fast, but the follow up need to arrive in a more timely fashion.

To this end the Army needs to evolve into a regular force of medium and light formations with a smaller number of heavy formation mainly made up of reservists with a small regular core. Current FF2020 is still stuck in the past, with its current form made to fit available equipment rather than planning for the future.

We should have no more than two heavy/armoured brigades total. The teeth of these should comprise of a total of 4 Armoured Regiments, 4 Armoured Infantry Regiments and a single enlarged artillery Regiment, all of which should have one regular squadron/company/battery with the remainder manned by reserves.

We already have the two light brigades in the form of 3 Cmdo and 16 Airmobile though both need additional material to reach their true potential. The former need additional BV210s in existing and new variants whilst the latter needs to be equipped with a number of Foxhound variants. In neither case am I advocating equipping both formations fully with the relevant platforms but both need a protected mobility capability in addtions to airmobility and in the former amphibious mobility.

So what is the rest of the Army doing, well they need to evolve into medium cavalry formations, and yes these need to formed around a wheeled platform. This needed to be the best we can afford in the number required and that is going to mean compromise. Therefore no bespoke designs but a platform bought off the shelf with initially MINIMUM modification. Once we have the platforms in the numbers required, additional improvements can be incorporated incrementally over time, this there neccessitates that any platform chosen must have growth potential which logically means a newer design and really precludes the LAV/Striker platform as it is already maxed out. This still leaves a number of very capable platforms available. Mobility and protection need to be the main initial main drivers, but again there is going to have to be a compromise. Any platform impervious to RPGs and IEDs is going to be too heavy and too costly. As for firepower well again I am going to upset some people buy initially nothing heavier than a 12.7mm and/or 40mm AGL should be considered. Airpower is going to be the main tool against opposition AFVs, but an eventual platforms mounting a large calibre auto-cannon will eventually provide enhanced direct fire capability. Until then the Infantry will have to rely on their integral anti-armour/structure capabilities together with their organic indirect fire assets.

Speaking of indirect fire, the Artillery is going to go through a major evolution. It will need to have both far greater in theatre mobility and strategic mobility. The AS90 and GMLRS are not suited to this role. The 105mm Light Gun is a great piece of kit but nowadays its accuracy cannot compete with GPS enahnced munitiona available to 155mm guns and so the Army and Royal Marines need to be equipped with the M777. Whether towed or portee it is a game changer and it is the only platform with the mobility, range and firepower to meet our requirements. Saying that there is an alternative, sort of and that is the introduction of a 120mm mortar and an associated guided muntition such as the Swedish Stryx laser guided mortar projectile. This could be further enhanced by using a UAV to designate targets. With Watchkeeper and Reaper the UK is fairly well equipped in this area both now and inthe near future which is one of the few bright spots.

So far I have concentrated on the Army as this is the service that will need to under go the most radial change. But I will now move on to the RAF. The RAF’s equipment plan is pretty much set for the next decade or so. It is rightly trying to bring its five Typhoon squadrons on line and enhancing them. With Meteor and Storm Shadow integrated and the fleet brought to a common standard, that being T3 it will have reached its realistic potential. The F-35C though must be its main priority. Together with the Navy’s new carriers they will be on of the cornerstones of the UK’s future defence and we must purchase suffient airframes to meet our actual needs and not those of the Treasury. In my mind this means being able to surge both carriers each carry no fewer that 32 aircraft or a total of 64 or 4 deployable squadrons. This means the UK will have to purchase a quantity nearer to 100 over time to maintain a force similar in size to the Typhoon fleets. Of course savings could be realised by not having a national OCU , but rather use the US system as other nations are planning to do. An independant OEU is also not neccessary. Instead 3 to 4 airframes can remain in the US working with them and other nations. The lack of code access also points towards this. Picking up additional A400 is also a sound idea, whether we intend to use them in the traditional role or as has been mentioned in other threads used as a hybrid MPA or Tanker. I often wonder if the RAF’s curretn PFI for AAR covers rotary platforms. I would be surprised if it did as this was not a capability requested by the MoD. We must also ensure that the E3D fleet is kept current. There is a great danger of this not happening with the need falling throughthe cracks as other programmes remain in the spotlight. On the rotary side, the retention of numbers is going to become an issue with the Chinook fleet. Some of the original airframes are now over 30 years old. Additional airrames are going to be needed sooner rather than later to avoid a shrinking fleet.

And now the Navy. It obvious priority must be bring both CVFs into service fully capable even if one is moved into reserve almost immediately. Its next two priorities must be CROWSNEST and like the RAF the F-35C. The T-26 may have to take a back seat as it is a much lower priority with new auxilaries to support the CVFs hight up the ladder. This mean the faithful T-23 will have to soldier on for longer but any new kit purchased to allow this will probably be able to be moved to the T-26 in time. Regarding the T-26, it needs to be more a GP platform than one keyed to ASW. This role should be the domain of the new Astute SSNs comming into service and the Navy’s Merlins and Wildcats. Like the Army the Navy appears to plan based on the good old days where the fleet was designed for ASW operations in the Atlantic, with other capabilities gained through chance rather than planning. I am not saying the T-26 should not be capable of ASW operations, but it should not be a driving force behind its design. I would prefer to see a modular option for this allow for a number of the force to carry a Towed Array when needed for operations and training. Since the Falklands war has any Navy surface vessel actively pursued a hostile submarine? Turning to amphibious lift the current two platforms are sufficient to carry out the foreseeable limited amphibious operations. What is needed is sufficient RFA vessels to carry an entire medium brigade and support in one lift, and if neccessary land them at a location where modern facilities are lacking. This does not mean a fleet of LSTs but rather the vessels must be able to off load my themselves in any port with what they bring with them.

Fianlly the glue that will hold all this together. We must have sufficient logistics and other support assets to carry out operations without relying on other nations to bail us out. We need to retain greater stocks of spares and other consumables rather than rely on last minute UORs to fill holes, and we need sufficient to allow units to train effectively. We also need in increase the size and number of exercises that are conducted annually, ensuring the troops train with the kit they will fight with. The last minute dash for kit prior the GWII should never be repeated, nor should the constant UORs issued for equipment needed for Afghanistan. When we do next intervene onthe ground we should at least have the right basic kit on hand, with UORs begin used to optimise this rather that buying whole new platforms. This again support the wheeled medium AFV plan.

Is all of the above going to require additional funding, well obviously yes but if the 2015 SDSR mandates we maintain the ability to deploy and fight then this time the Treasury is going to have to open its wallet. If it cannot be pursuaded to then the Government is going to have to acknowledge that we cann do what we would like and lower its sights. Our Armed Forces must evolve to meet the realistic threats of the future and capabilities must be matched by capacity through the allocation of additional resources.

As a passing shot if the replacements of the Vanguard SSBNs has to come from the core budget then those plans should be scrapped. If Politicians what a political weapon then the MoD is not the department who should be made to pay for it.

I’m not saying we were short, I’m saying that caps on manpower exist. Whether it was capped at a Brigade or Company is immaterial you adjust your force structure within the given constraints of manpower, tasks and threats.

You yourself implied that our manpower was dictated by ISAF, which it was not. We were the sole decision makers in what we wanted to add or not to the operation, ISAF worked with what they could get.

But I will add that if there was no cap on manpower why did we ask the Tongans to help with Bastion security? which we equipped with our money, we have reserves after all.

I don’t think we should head back to traditional peer v peer war footing because I don’t think it’s going to happen. It’s probably going to be I don’t know what to call it but a mix of peer and coin all rolled into one all at the same time. And as I would agree with mike Istar, transport priority.

Social media really gets my blood up. Great loads of people have signed up to a fracking twitter campaign but how many are ready to jump in the back of armoured vehicles and #bringbackthegirls. The answer is naff all of them. Its just to easy to hit your like button or whatever the hell it is on twitter. So when people scroll down theyre feed and stop cooing at that lovely kitty they click a button to ‘show their support.’

The fact that governments, the only people who can really change this situation just click retweet show they are just as bone idle as the general populace.

The next publicity article I want to read from the MoD will declare that: 10 helicopters (preferably puma), 4 typhoon and some RPAS have deployed to an airfield in Nigeria along with a large number of paras backed up by associated C130.

Stop faffing around with twitter and actually do something.

No… ok now watch this video of a budgie on a skateboard :(

Lack of sleep can really mess up you r perseption. Youare right I did mean the F-35B.

Regarding manpower issues, I strongly believe we should do all that is possible to refrain from conducting persistent operations in the future. Our armed forces will be too stretched if we do and it is not what we should be doing. I have said it many times before but there are many other nations who whilst no having the hi-tech toys we and other western nations have do have manpower. We and other could still provide support with ISTAR assets for example, but many lower tier nations are realising the value of these assets and the costs are comming down.

As to the future, well more so than ever who controls the sky has the decisive advantage and this is one area the west should retain dominance for quite a while to come against reasonably likely opposition. Control of the air dictates that any opposition cannot fight in a conventional manner against western intervention forces. With modern technology it isn’t really a numbers game any more when talking about airpower. One platform, manned or unmanned over friendly forces will deter most opposition. Airpower has already supplanted heavy armour as the support tool of choice for the infantry. So the planned 5 Typhoon squadrons together with 3 to 4 F-35B squadrons and the two Apache Regiments should meet our nations requirements in this field.

With the Army, as I stated above I would reduce it to 2 mainly reserve Armoured Brigades, the 2 rapidly deployable Light Brigades and 3 to 4 Medium Brigades. In infantry terms that is a total of 22 regular and reserve infantry battalions plus Special Forces. It will leave us with only 2 Armoured Regiments but each of the 3 Infantry Battalions with have a close support company added equipped with a direct fire variant of whatever wheeled AFV is chosen. They will also have organic Recce, Indirect Fire, ATGW and ISTAR assets.

Digitisation needs to be moved forward. Air,land and Sea based assets need to be on the same net and able to see what each other sees and communicate effectively. I am not advocating a return to the grand ideas behind the US Army’s defunct FCS programme, but for example if a SF patrol observes and enemy patrol, this information need to go out to all who need to know and they need to be able to either hand of the action or be able to directly control other assets to directly engage. We could reach a situation where all units operating in the field have a “Guardian Angel” LO UCAV allocated to them. Technology advances mean the cost of such platforms is going to drop year on year as long as they are built to do the job and not keep pushing the envelope. Weapons such as DM Brimstone and the recently introduced guides rockets are ideal for this, being light weight, highly accurate and reletively cheap, especially the latter.

Pier to pier I believe is a thing of the past. GW1 was probably be its last case and that is borderline. Globalisation has meant most countries are too interlinked to conduct major conventional wars against each other. More like is a return to proxys such as we have seen in Ukraine. The world economy is too fragile to survive a major pier on pier war with out a major impact not just on those immediately involved. Look how commodity price rises can reduce growth in GDP to zero or worse.

When talking of comodities, Africa is going to be key and here China is buy influence and proxys rapidly. It has to because it has not means of effectively putting boots on the ground on this continent, but it is rapidly gaining the ability to control vital commodities and cause disruption if needed. It has literally bought Governments and ensured the survival of said Governments through investment in infrastructure and jobs, bringing the locals on side. Like the French we need to be able to support our friends in Africa and if neccessary deploy military forces rapidly and decisively. This is where our overseas aid should be spent. Together with France we could have a more than adequate intervention capability to meet future obligations in Africa. We have the tools to help African nations improve their security and economies without resorting to Neo-colonialism. Being invited in to help rather than kicking in the front door should be our aim, but we will retain the ability to do so theie are humanitarian issues of a critical nature. Plans should be made as how we and the French could intervene to prevent another Ruanda for example with aggreements in advance as to access and basing for such operations.

WWIII and similar fantasy conflicts should really be left to the fiction writers. The Neo-conservative thinking especially in the US needs to be consigned to the scrapheap. Iran is not a threat even if it did develope the bomb. How would it use it? Against Isreal would lead to its own distruction. In fact against any other country it would lead to its destruction by one means or another. If it gave a device to a terrorist organisation the results would be the same. No the bomb to Iran is a political tool and an exercise in seld-esteeme.

Finally looking into a “Crystal Ball” can anyone come up with a reasonable threat senario where we might have to fight a peer to peer conflict and against who, and therefore blow my opinion out of the water?

“Pier to pier I believe is a thing of the past”

So true. No one has tried to move Australia in the last few decades. :P

As for peer to peer, I don’t know, China’s been getting very aggressive these few days. Won’t be surprised if someone pops off a round soon, either Vietnam or the Philippines.

BTW Lord J regarding 120mm mortars as artillery, are you familiar with the range of a 120mm mortar vs a 155mm 39 cal or 53 cal? I do see some utility in retaining some army artillery and not having to rely totally on air support. For one, the response time is shorter, for another, if airspace is contested, aircraft might not be able to range freely, so no air support for you.

I really would prefer the UK having the ability to fight a near peer. It’s easier for a traditional army to learn COIN than for a COIN army to learn peer to peer warfare. And less fatal.

RT, I get your point on CR2s but please remember the GWs were situations where the allies gained total air supremacy, they could go nearly anywhere they wanted to. We can’t really take that for granted.

Simon

The funny thing about traditional capabilities is they are in a constant process of change because the threats they are supposed to counter continually changes.

I am with Lord Jim with his suggestion of a reserve-heavy armour formation.

I’d formalise it, and move the {three} armoured brigades out of the reaction force and into the adaptable force, at the same time as moving the light-cav in the opposite direction.

@ Martin – “If we are going to have three rapid reaction brigades would it be worth organising them into a light Division with a deployable HQ?”

I’d defer to someone with actual military experience, but my first thought would be; don’t we already spend a fortune on HQ-ARRC?

I think you go medium weight for the majority with a small core of heavy that can be built on. Medium is good for near peer and COIN, with useful utility in a peer conflict, it’s easier to move up to heavy from medium than from light as well.

So I suppose the Italians are on the right track.

@Phil
‘We were not on a UK mission, we were making a contribution to a NATO mission.’

I’m sorry if I misunderstood, but that’s how I read it.

‘I don’t believe it was a case of 9,500 pax and that is your lot’

Of course it was, those caps have been placed on armed forces the world over since their creation. What was the reason for drawing down so quickly after the invasion of Iraq, job done or political will and money?

@TD

I had the pleasure of working with Canadians with their Cougar’s on Glamoc ranges, they said their mobility was hindered but they seemed willing to go up against BMP’s and BTR’s, although tanks are a very different matter.

‘The 9,500 figure would have had some basis in reality’

Yes it would have, but the bean counters would have said you can a have a Brigade and that’s your lot after consideration to military advice, the services would have configured said brigade as they saw fit.

‘effectively deciding how much they could afford to contribute’

I rest my case. We could have offered 500 or 20000 there was a reason we stopped at a brigade, don’t forget the Americans sent 20000 Marines into Helmand.

Sorry 10000 Marines.

@APATS

Are you saying that NATO are to blame for our initial assessment of 4500 personnel required for Helmand? or did they rubber stamp our plan?

@Phil

‘we’re not disagreeing’ fair enough

Re Force levels

My experiences tell me there was a hard limit controlled outside the MoD. One example, we were tasked with a (very) modest increase in numbers. Less than 40 people, this wasn’t some thought of a SO3, it was brought about and agreed quickly at the very highest levels (in a meeting measured in minutes) however trying to get the ok from HM Treasury took many months. This was despite an OK for the very modest uplift at the very top. Second example, another section wanted an extra person (yes an increase of 1), nowhere near the level of effort from the chain of command yet to get the extra post into Afghan took 12 months. The idea an extra couple of dozen people in theatre and no-one would bat an eyelid is totally at odds with my experiences.