I always like to speculate about the possibility and all round utility of putting a GMLRS on one of her Majesty’s War Canoes
I am not alone either.
A post Libya Jane’s Defence Weekly reported on a Royal Navy lessons learned document in which the two major shortcomings were a lack of precision land attack capability and organic unmanned ISR.
Jane’s quoted Colonel Pierson RM, the Deputy Director of NATO Operations in Libya;
It was evident that the Libya campaign showed the need for precision fires, [perhaps the Lockheed Martin] Guided Multiple Rocket Launch System (GMLRS), from the sea base, deep into enemy littoral territory.
We have discussed this many times.
I think this is rather a large deficiency and would enable a reduction in reliance on air power to deliver over the shore attack.
Of course, we are as poor as church mice with a Wonga loan so any development costs of putting GMLRS onto a frigate, destroyer or even amphibious vessel would increase the overall programme cost significantly. Others have pointed to exhaust gas management and corrosion as being significant barriers.
We have also discussed how the Army Fire Shadow Loitering Munition would have a great deal of maritime utility (I think more than in a land environment) and whether the Type 26 and associated programme for a medium calibre gun system with precision munitions could fill the gap.
With these in mind I thought I would just throw in an of off the shelf system for discussion.
IMI TRIGON
The TRIGON is a large system. The rocket has a diameter of 306mm compared to the 227mm of the MLRS/GMLRS although much smaller than the 610mm ATACMS. It must be noted that the ATACMS can use the standard MLRS/GMLRS launch modules
Trigon uses the Long Range EXTRA rockets from IMI
[scribd id=208608694 key=key-27e6b02si6qtqy4z61t0 mode=scroll]
CEP is not brilliant at 10m but with a large 120kg payload and 150km range, arguably, it doesn’t need sub metre accuracy.
I have also read a number of reports that the Republic of Korea will use the Hanwah Corporation LOGIR seeker on a 130mm MLRS type rocket to be made by Lig Nex 1.
http://greenstylo.blogspot.co.uk/2013/10/south-korea-has-developed-k-mlrs.html
So there you go
What is stopping us?
Does anyone else think that comments should be less than a billion pages?
And who the hell is “Snicker”? Is this just a 20,000 byte copy and paste?
Observer, exactly the reason why guided 120 mm (US) mortar rounds got top priority (during the Iraq campaign)
“Using GPS means that you can fire the round high and let it come from above instead of trying to play marksman with 227mm.”
GPS 227mm rounds are much more useful in an urban setting where being even slightly off may mean blocking terrain (buildings) between the airburst and the target. Or at least that was the theory. A uni-mate of mine once commented on the difficulty of using artillery in urban terrain, the buildings act as “bullet” proof picket fences where you have to hit exactly between the buildings to hit your target. Using GPS means that you can fire the round high and let it come from above instead of trying to play marksman with 227mm.
Sometimes, you just need the capability. Just in case.
As for M&S’s anti-F-35 rant, I just have to point out 2 things.
1) F-15s cost about 1.5m per. Don’t see him crying about it.
2) They are twin engined. Fuel usage is even more horrifying than a single engine.
F-35 has its’ problems. 1.35M cost isn’t one of them and neither is fuel usage, there are mainstay fighters out there that are worse.
Good stuff coming up, before reading the “book” after Obsrv’s contribution, let e dwell on that one a bit:
Diehl (German) developed a homing anti-tank munition for GMLRS. It is not strictly speaking unitary as there are two independently working sub-munitions.
– then they converted it for use on the 155 artillery pieces
Now a northern nation in Europe ordered something similar from Nexter. Their normal artillery range is 38-40 km, but the announcement had no details about sacrificing some of the range (which, regardless, is likely) nor whether the munition is unitary, or practIically the same as that developed by Diehl.
– the point here is the same as put forward by Obsrv: precision rounds’ utility may not correspond to the sky-high price, but then again, a homing round compared pricewise to a missile to produce the same effect might still have a strong case.
Mister Andersen,
(Always wanted to say that…)
Some comments on the LINK’d article:
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Recently Admiral Johnathan Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), provided his view of the way ahead for systems development in the US Navy. He stated that we must move away from building ‘luxury’ platforms with expensive built-in capabilities and begin looking at developing ‘pickup truck’ platforms capable of morphing into new capabilities based on the payloads they carry. The CNO states that these ‘pickup trucks’ would be able to evolve with technology and mission with the substitution of modular mission packages such as is the intent with the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)[i]. What about the platforms we have today that are not designed for modularity? What if we took the CNOs general idea, jumped it to the front of the line, and didn’t wait for special ships to be developed. Modular, containerized firepower is within reach with “off the shelf” systems available today and they could be useable on virtually any platform.
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Not unless we move to aero-ballistics as principle strike warfare mechanisms to completely exit the ICD environment, including BASM. Not unless we move to cheap, ELO, potentially VTOL, targeting mechanisms which can either loiter in threat airspace for days, slowly working up the emissions backtrail of the threat, or be pushed forward on low value, high speed, assets. In the latter case, I would argue that the kinds of low signature and high speed required of a midrange JHSV like Spearhead would very much qualify it as a ‘luxury’ vehicle, even if it is built entirely around a modular store delivery system.
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The advent of advanced anti access weapons has created a capability to capacity mismatch during entry operations for the Joint force. With a little ingenuity, however, the United States could develop a modular and containerized firepower enhancement from “off the shelf” systems to cover that gap.
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No, it’s a doctrinal one. STOM exists for one reason: to bypass the ICD and secure a beachhead defacto by deep operations which cut out a chunk of the enemy’s coastline and shadow his eyes and ears there-in.
In this, the /capability/ miss-match has absolutes which cannot be exceeded (F-35C = 584nm radius, DF-21D = 1,000nm radius) but the potential exists, through JPADS drop of Army ECTs (Expeditionary Combat Teams) and Marine RAP insertion from Stiletto type vessels carrying CH-53K to get across the moat, quick, do the insert using _internal carry_ mounted forces and then leave, before the Dragon has time to lift and eye and really sniff at those 50knot fishing boats. It is these persistent ground teams that will be able to sit and hunt with short range UAS as masted ELINT sensors to do sufficient damage to nearshore/inshore forces to create the shadow zone you need. You then lee your naval TF in this blindspot and _work laterally_ to ‘expand the bubble’. Using the coast itself as shield.
Interdicting the enemy ability to vector FAC-M and drop mines and release CDCM is all about killing his eyes and brain and that requires persistence and self-sufficient force protection which is simply not present in the naval battle space because we can neither avoid the long-track nor afford the expenditure in TBM-D weapons to transit such a wide moat. Even as our ability to hunt with F/A-18F/F-35Cs (supported by EA-18s, supported by E-2C yadda-de-yadda-yadda) is numerically insufficient to stop massed boat and missile combined arms ops without severe sortie lag overmatch. And, thanks to our stupid overemphasis on manned airpower, we do not have the means to separate our targeting (APY-9 E-2) from our fires (naval SAM bastion) sufficient to shoot what does not immediately have options to kill us back.
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For many years, the Navy has said that they can create a “Sea Shield” to protect entry forces from attack by enemy aircraft and missiles. The issue with “Sea Shield” is that the shield doesn’t extend very far inland and has less capacity than in the past. As the Navy retires CG-47 Ticonderoga class cruisers and replaces them with fewer DDGs with fewer Vertical Launch System (VLS) cells, the number of missiles declines. On top of that, every missile is not created equal. In a VLS in Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) equipped DDGs, those cells will be split between SM-2 or 6, SM-3, RUM-139 ASROC, and BGM-109. This means that only a fraction of the cells will be able to counter incoming anti-ship missiles and even fewer will be able to deal with threats to the landing force ashore. Further complicating the capacity challenge is the fact that all MK-41 VLS missiles must be reloaded pier-side with special equipment, forcing these ships “off-line” and limiting the duration of the shield. These AEGIS systems will also be further from shore because the most important thing for the “Sea Shield” to protect are the platforms providing that shield. If the DDG is lost, then the rest of the flotilla will have to withdraw because they will only have point defense capability. By standing off further from shore, the DDG has more time to detect and destroy missiles before they get to the DDG or carrier, but those are not the only high value assets in the flotilla. Naval task forces must also be able to introduce forces into enemy territory, so those ships and aircraft involved in the entry operation are equally valuable as part of the bid for success.
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The Key to inshore AD is network stackable LADS with modular, high power, electrical capacitance. Nothing else is going to be fast enough reacting and able to avoid saturation. Not when a simple C-14 mounting 4 C-701 can be cookie cuttered to the tune of 750-100 hulls in equating to the cost of just the one Frigate/LCS. This ability to stack is a key enabler because it makes your 100KW weapon into a 1MW spot with just ten emitters (three to five per hull). Your absolute range is not going to be any better (3-4nm) but your spot energy will ramp up so massively that what looks like a giant cigarette burn with the Firestrike system as cratering, deformation and thermal peel will instead become .25 second explosive detonations of warhead.
And even this will not be enough. Unless you also _dedicate_ yourself to OTH targeting, at range, with rapid effects delivery from a deep magazine. What this means is that you don’t diddle about with an MQ-8 and a fewer APKWS or Hellfire per chopper. You put a long range mount (127mm/155mm) on deck with 100-200 rounds of CLGP and you use a JET POWERED (higher ceiling, bigger MEP, faster groundspeed = forward tripwire) targeting platform to zoom up and take pictures, even lase, if that’s what you guidance looks like. So that you kill four missiles at a time. On Boat.
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No more Tarawas! There are those who say the U.S. will never attack a heavily defended beachhead again, and they are right and wrong at the same time. The United States will not voluntarily attack into the teeth of a beach defense, covered by intersecting fields of fire from machine guns, Anti-Tank Guided Missiles, rockets and artillery, barbed wire and land or sea mines. Instead it will seek to circumvent those defenses – enveloping them, cutting them off and defeating them. To further this discussion, we must understand what defending a coastline in a modern world really entails. It will mean more than just setting up the kind of defenses described above. A well-constructed coastal defense will include mobile anti-ship and surface to air missile systems stationed tens of miles inland, capable of reaching hundreds of miles out to sea. It will involve mobile guided rockets, artillery, missiles and mortars as well. Each of these threats must be dealt with. Attackers must be able to disperse the force over a broader frontage to make the force more unpredictable and harder to target, and able to exploit a wider choice of entry points. The joint force must also be able to move from a wider variety of platforms. The joint force cannot be constrained to the traditional choices. This array of platforms covering a wide frontage must be able to protect themselves at greater distances than they can today, and protection doesn’t just mean shooting the arrow, it also means killing the archer.
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No, it means staying away from the cans.
It means learning to think past the white water and fight the war inland.
It means stripping down your warfighters to the absolute minimum necessary to stay mobile, stay independent (organic targeting, no network crap) and stay force protected. Because you are not hunting the threat fires delivery systems you are hunting their sensor apertures. Where both are associated, fine, kill’em all. But don’t think in terms of enabling Le Grande Invazione, think in terms of enabling the freedom of operations that allows the fleet to either move rapidly in-lee, sweeping up and down the coasts. Or standoff, well out to sea, and hostage assets which maybe the other team doesn’t want to lose /in peacetime/ as profitability.
As soon as you become fixated on holding an amphibious anchorage, you solve the enemy targeting problem to the extent that now he can Glamorgan you with garbage truck C-802 and nothing you do in terms of ‘operational art’ matters. Snicker, thought I couldn’t work it in there didn’tcha?! :-
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So after we put a bunch of missiles and rockets in a box, how do you provide fire control for them? The Navy already has part of the answer in Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC). Ships that are limited in air defense radar capability will link with those DDGs, CGs, E-2s and F-35s; as well as Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar (G/ATOR) or other land based radars that may be available, to develop an integrated air defense picture.
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The military equivalent of a LAN in that that it’s all internalized to the extent that you are force protected like a huddled bunch of muskox facing outwards against the wolves and hence you have no real depth of acquisition with which to feed your network outside data from the greater tactical picture.
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The Air Defense Coordinator (ADC) will validate and prioritize inbound bandits and task the best positioned air defense system to engage the inbound threat. With a limited number of DDGs and CGs providing cueing over a wider area, we don’t want the missiles to rely on semi-active guidance (ships radar illuminates target until end game). It would be preferable to use the ESSM Block II missiles with their semi-active/active guidance so they can guide themselves to the target after acquisition, allowing the DDG/CG to start shifting to new targets as required. Provisions could also be made to allow smaller surface combatants to tie in their Close in Weapons Systems (CIWS) and SeaRAM radars for cueing in the event that a DDG/CG is not available in the area as a stop gap measure.
A tenet of the Chinese martial art Wing Chun Kung Fu says, “the hand which strikes also blocks.”
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I prefer Mr. Miyagi myself: “Don’t know, never been attacked by tree.”
If you’re in the forest, any and all trees must be treated as falling threats, whether you can hear the chainsaws or not. Value and certainly _signature_ split your forces between sea insert for maybe 200-500nm and air for another 150. And ‘everything else’ which is clustered up around that ginourmous MASINT block which is the battlegroup. The battlegroup exists solely as a logistics base and a means to comfort the enemy that you are respecting his seaspace. Especially as Chinese and Iranian ROTHR technology comes online, you will be a fool to try and move that traveling circus inshore at 20 knots average when you can send a 50 knot JHSV in with the war winning targeters for long range Aeroballistic HCMs.
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Using this mindset, the same integrated radar pictures can be used to determine the point of origin for CDCM and SAM systems. Once the point of origin is determined, the Supporting Arms Coordinator (SAC) or the Fire Support Coordinator (FSC) (in coordination with Strike Warfare Coordinator when appropriate) could task a suitably equipped ship to launch one of its GMLRS rockets or ATACMS to neutralize the launch platform.
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Takes too long. Time Of Flight while stood off 25nm over the local radar horizon, to hit a target firing back from 15-20nm inland (the enemy will also want to stay away from the cans of beachhead CAS sorties) is going to be on the order of 80-90 seconds with an average Mach 3 midcourse speed which is more than sufficient for a TEL to retract the tube and trundle off down the lane.
There is simply no getting past the need for independent, persistent, eyes on capabilities.
Having said this, ATACMS was originally designed to be MCG steered by Pave Mover and so the reality is that if you can keep the target under track, you can adjust your weapon trajectory to hit it because the ATACMS also has a complex flyup maneuever to burn speed, followed by a tipover to stabilize range and then a terminal dive to M74 release.
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Due to the short time of flight and ease of launch, the rocket could be able to arrive on target, even at maximum range, before the CDCM system could be prepared for movement. These systems would predominantly be used in general support, in an on call fire support role or potentially in an automated counter battery role to protect the entry force.
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See above.
During Desert Storm a SCUD fired from right under an F-15E’s nose and despite this, the crew could not step down fast enough (clouds) to catch the launcher.
Better not to be in the path of the falling tree because both saturation and combined arms effects from other platforms are going to be withering if you don’t take into account the reality of everyone being netcentric to some degree.
Leave the seaspace vacant and ‘nothing to see, move along’ applies. Push ground combat elements inland to track and sterilize threats so that you have a salient into their NCW and can shadow their weapons further up or down the coast, and things get easier.
EIther way, don’t be inshore with a high value, high signature, force; risking the totality of your expeditionary warfighter in one go, without a good reason. Forget Tararwa, replaying Inchon is not necessary to win most wars.
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For major operations, this modular, containerized firepower could be taken a step further by using ships taken up from trade. If a common feeder size container ship in the under 500 TEU category were to be used, it could potentially hold over 700 missiles in MK48 VLS launchers. This would create a truly inexpensive arsenal ship. Panamax class container ships could carry thousands of missiles, but the dispersion created by using smaller ships reduces risk. If these small container ships were fitted with applique unmanned navigation systems and their empty holds filled with buoyant material, helping them stay afloat in the case of attack, they could be pushed out ahead of a task force, reducing the risk of loss of friendly lives. As with the Club-K, there would obviously be concern about the systems being used in a perfidious nature[vii]. To avoid this, the US would ensure that ships taken up from trade were declared as combatants, marked appropriately and integrated into naval task forces in compliance with the San Remo Manual and Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Convention[viii].
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Ridiculous.
The enemy will hunt your singleshot battleships, simply to discombobulate your entry plan. A 700 shot loadout of 800K ESSM would run on the order of 560 million, not including the 40 odd VLS containers. More than the insurance value of the boat. You are NOT using these as cheap enablers for the gloryhog manned units, you are REPLACING THEM with the Arsenal Class. Which means you now have to consider the reality of force protection for them as a function of splitting your task force or _alternatively_ going for more than an adhoc, ‘as little as we can get away with’, investment and _optimizing the platform around the capability_ (designing the capability before the platform) so that you have a system of sufficient independence from the main CSG that you don’t need to assign the same degree of force protection to it at all. Everyone knows I like aeroballistic HCM myself, but it doesn’t have to be that way.
Tomahawk is a Neanderthal solution. I can give you a 7ft long, 300lb MALD with a warhead (already tested) and datalink (already developed) and take it 500nm from the boat.
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As part of the MALD-J Increment II study, Raytheon looked at data links that would give the jammer the ability to adjust its activities based on in-flight commands.
Spencer said the company’s work showed that incorporating a data link is technically viable.
But, according to the Air Force’s acquisition office, service officials “determined that pursuing a data link was not cost effective for the resulting gain in operational capability.” Thus, it’s not being pursued further.
The MALD air vehicle roughly resembles Raytheon’s AIM-120 advanced medium-range air-to-air missile.
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Raytheon has already tested a warhead that would give the MALD air vehicle the ability, when coupled with a seeker, to attack a ground target once the MALD air vehicle’s fuel expires and it descends towards the ground.
The potential also exists for the MALD air vehicle to host a payload that disrupts enemy communications, said Spencer. But he said the company does not currently plan to mature this concept or test it on its own dime.
As for the Air Force, the service acquisition officials said there are “no plans at this time” to develop the MALD air vehicle beyond the role of decoy and jammer. In the past, USAF officials have expressed interest in a kinetic option (i.e., warhead).
Spencer said there has been “some interest” in MALD from potential foreign buyers. But IOT&E must be done before the option of foreign sales opens up.
The MALD air vehicle fits on any aircraft that has 14-inch suspension lugs, he said. This “basically means if a US fighter can carry a 500-pound bomb, it can carry the miniature air launched decoy,” he said. It can be integrated either with smart or dumb interfaces, meaning via a 1760 bus or a pulled lanyard, respectively.
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http://www.airforcemag.com/Features/newtech/Pages/Box041910mald.aspx
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The MALD-J is launched by a fighter, bomber or unmanned aircraft system, flies up to about 925km (500nm) and weighs up to 136kg (300lb).
MALD-J is the air force’s only option to field a “stand-in” jammer against radar threats. It is derived from the baseline MALD, which is designed to spoof radars.
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http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/raytheon-moves-mald-j-forward-with-new-contract-341745/
If you want to put an extant landattack capability on a 500 ton fishing trawl, be my guest. But make the _capability_ worth it in leveraging the functional utility of other Operational Elements.
Which is to say, give it the ability to be used in preplanned attacks that support landed, light, mobile forces which use the naval magazine depth to conserve their own force protection loadouts and which further has at least the /option/ of onboard targeting of it’s own.
You play shoot and scoot reactionary games with threat area, guided and precision fires that can displace in a heartbeat, I guarantee you all’s you will do is create bill board effect on which all your 30 knot assets are front-lit trying to support idiots attempting to getting off a beach they never should have been on to begin with.
You will be swarmed and you will be pulled under because targeting naval assets on flat, cool, water is really pretty simple. Even a Silkworm can do it. Whacking snakes in the weeds is not nearly so simple or rewarding.
But if you use mobile inshore forces with supporting relays of smart hunting weapons to both target and attack with, now, from a single ‘vantage point’ (masted datalink directional X/Ka band aperture) you can direct fires which are not minutes out by maybe only 10-20 seconds. Because they are already transited into the target area and simply orbit holding, by sectored grid reference, waiting for the first sign of a missile plume like these-
ATACMS
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ipr_hPAcR_Q
IRGC Silkworm
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eZ7Y-lKd4co
Dumb MLRS rockets with lots of APERS sub-munitions are of course now illegal, although UK and I think France still have stocks of AT-2 anti-tank mine warheads which are legal.
GMLRS delivers an 80 kg warhead to 70 km (officially, in actuality UK has achieved around 90 km). Currently USFA, USMC and RA have all fired around 800 GMLRS each and have developed effective and efficient operating procedures, UK notably has led the way on procedures that can be used with ‘troops in contact’. Of course the issue with precision munitions is the need for precision targeting, which takes us into the wonderful world of mensuration. A rocket warhead also gives lots of scope for clever and optimised weapon design. At the moment they are unitary charges but new designs with a small number of optimised sub-munitions will add flexibility to the effects available.
It’s becoming increasingly clear that precision shells are not particularly good value for money. Their destructive power is relatively small because their HE payload is limited (L15 HE is the benchmark with 11 kg of HE), furthermore the shell is configured for high firing stresses, ballistic effectiveness and target effect, this means compromise and a sub-optimal warhead design in terms of effects and range is limited to about 25-30 km. Add rocket assistance and the HE payload drops even further and the amount of wasted steel increases as the price of increased range. Shells are great for suppression, they are not so good for destruction where having sufficient HE is the key. The need for precision shells will decrease further with the advent of course correcting fuzes which will vastly reduce shell dispersion.
@ David Andersen – A very interesting article. I wrote a post for TD about something similar;
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2012/03/a-ship-for-all-seasons-or-the-return-of-the-auxiliary-cruiser/
and TD has written a number of times about containerised weapon systems, particularly the Russian developments:
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2013/08/club-k-container-missile-system-2013/
Some great discussion here. Follow the link below to a proposal to containerize GMLRS and ESSM into an expandable firepower enhancement system. I will have to look a the numbers for NSM to see if it would fit.
http://www.innovationinmilitaryaffairs.com/latest-articles/2014/2/20/firepower-capacity-building
The idea being to use off the shelf systems to reduce development cost.
S O,
I’m not a chemist, so let me put it in Cavalry terms. It was a bit breezy from one direction, then bloody windy from the other direction, then it went back to being a bit breezy from the first direction.
S O,
I’m not a chemist, so let me put it in Cavalry terms. It was a bit breezy from one direction, then bloody windy from the other direction, then it went back to being a bit breezy from the first direction.
The press releases for Soft Vertical Launch made much of how the concept could be applied to lots of missiles, of much larger sizes, and CAMM was just the beginning. Although I’ve not heard anything further to date.
But Soft Vertical Launch seems like a good way to launch MLRS rockets from a ship – build a stack that consists of:
<[army rocket][squib pointing thrusters][soft launch piston]
…so the rocket motor ignites when it is 100' above the ship, and pointing at 45º.
Of course, you would still need loads of work on the guidance software, and getting EM compatibility… and EM compatibility is best done in the initial design, rather than trying to add it later, so a new missile (i.e. hoplite) might be cheaper when all is said and done.
Or perhaps, when the next guided rocket is developed, it is done as a 3-service missile (like CAMM), able to cope with the most severe EM & environmental requirements, but sold to all 3 services for use (= larger production run, so a lower unit cost).
“It was astonishing, lasted close to 3 minutes, consumed the local oxygen to the extent that the local wind direction changed.”
Explosives contain their own oxidizer and need no atmospheric oxygen (and chemically bind very little of it). That’s why they are no thermobaric or fuel air explosives.
Explosives add a lot of gas volume to the area when fires, though.
@BB
The main advantage of Block II is the littoral engagment capability, in terms of land attack it has a short range and a small warhead. If Fireshadow ever works it is also short ranged and would need to be cleared for use at sea and a means of launching it decided.
We will in all probability keep our Harpoons until a decision is made to replace them with something new. In terms of strike capability we retain the TLAM capability via SSN, then T26 will introduce the 5 inch gun along with strike length launchers which will at the highest level be complimented by the introduction of F35.
I expect the Royal Navy’s likely requirement is to be able to hit relatively few, but key targets.
The path of least faffing about would seem to be Fireshadow and Harpoon block II.
Fireshadow has previously been said to have the potential for vertical launch; but even without that, plenty of space within the cavernous shed of a Type26.
The Navy already uses Harpoon, but not the latest missile. Block II Harpoon has the ability to hit seaside targets at range – so you could take out the novelty rock emporium with greater safety from eyeball sited artillery, though not targets further inland.
If there is a need for persistent bombardment from Navy ships, at greater range than a 127mm gun can manage, then perhaps consider the 155mm gun system developed for the USN’s Zumwalt destroyers.
I doubt the big gun would squeeze into the Type26, and I doubt there’s much of a need for it in the Royal Navy – the Americans have greater ambitions when it comes to marine landings; but the system development itself has been paid for, unlike John’s suggested 8inch gun. There’d be no need to go the way of the Zumwalt ships (most advanced warship evar, apparently). A hull large enough and strong enough to mount a couple of 155 guns, and using systems from the Type26 program would be comparatively low risk. The question is whether it would be worthwhile to spend the money to swap three frigates for three big-gun warships, to fill such a niche role.
@ Mark. CAMM/Sea Cepter only has a range of c. 20km and its warhead would be an order of magnitude smaller than GMLRS. Its surface to surface (active radar + data link) option would be great vs a number of threats if implemented, but the MoD have no requirement, so aren’t willing to pay for it AFAIK.
@ M&S. Do you play Command Modern Air/Naval Operations at all? For that matter, does anyone else here do so?
Would it not be better to further develop camm missile it’s supposed to have a limited surface role as it is.
I haven’t encountered the other end of the combined Smerch and Iskander use reference that TD made, but a std Smerch battery includes the target surveillance , rocket tube launched type of device that M&S was advocating above. By far more primitive and not as long lasting, being older by decades.
Would it not be better to bring back the 8″/55 cal Mark 71 gun? Perhaps a 4 nation programme? (US, UK. France, Italy). My old favourite of a hull toughened for light ice, ought to be able to cope with the recoil of an 8″ gun.
Mr Fred,
TEOTWAWKI is the end of the world as we know it.
MLRS (not GMLRS) used to be known in the Army as the Grid Square Removal Service. My Squadron called for fire on a massed target on Objective Lead in Gulf One. We had 24 rocket Pod Containers (RPC) assigned, which I think was the largest assignation made during the whole short war. Each RPC is 6 rockets, so a total of 144 rockets concentrated onto an area about 5 Kms by 3 Kms.
A lot of no doubt very good men died in that event, so it is not a matter for levity. But the effects were as ECS describes. It was astonishing, lasted close to 3 minutes, consumed the local oxygen to the extent that the local wind direction changed. That was from one kilometre away from the edge of the box as an observer. Christ knows what the poor Iraqis experienced.
Elm Creek Smith,
Could you expand TEOTWAWKI? As far as I can tell it’s either something starting Total Effect On Target or Fozzy bear has crept into the comments.
TD,
1. Let’s quantify ‘not cheap’ in a peacetime setting:
12 F-35B Aircraft X 135 million dollars.
1.25 Manning Ratio.
20hrs per mission, per month, flight time to maintain currency (more for squadron/section/flight lead qualification)
31,000 dollars per flight hour
12 months a year.
12(X135,000,000)X 1.25 X 20(X2) X31,000 X 12. By my reckoning, one squadron of JSF just cost you 1.62 billion to own and 18.6 million per month and 223.2 million per year to train.
Cost of a wooden round loadout on a penny per mile oil burner? Say two hundred million to develop, + 200 rounds X2 million dollars per round (Tactical Tomahawk is 800,000) = 600 million dollars. Less than three years of flitting about bombing sea gulls and raising the ire of the RSPB assassinating poor sea gulls up at Garvey.
Now, let’s talk about depth. Average rating of SFC on the F135 runs the gamut between .7 to .886lb/lb/hr.
The F-35B runs on 14,000lbs internal (recent documents point to an ‘operational’ capacity of 13,000lbs due to weight creep and hot’n’hit margins) while also being a fuel-cooled jet in critical areas of flight control (EHAs) and auxiliaries (fueldraulics and AMAD). This atop a typical naval reserve equate to as much as 2,500lb for safety purposes around the boat.
If the maximum military thrust of the F135 is in the range 30,000lbf and you fly at -flight idle- which is the minimum setting possible for a jet engine, around 60% IRT, then you are talking about 18,000lbf of thrust.
18,000 X .7 = 12,600lbs of fuel burn, per hour.
Obviously, there will be compression losses as altitude increases so let’s assume that, by 20,000ft, you are down to 12,000lbf or 8,4000lbs of fuel burn, per hour.
Subtract your 2,500lb margin from the internal gas and you have 11,500lbs which comes to 1.36 hours of flight time.
Say flight idle buys you 320 knots X 1.36hrs = 435.2nm. Divide that in two as a radius and you can ‘search for targets’ all the way out to 217nm. Add 30 minutes for loiter and now you’re down to 137nm.
The very /notion/ that you are doing deep attack, fixed wing, because the F-35 is ‘more flexible’ is thus a total crock.
Which also points up why you want to shift to something off a DDG or LHD like VARIOUS-
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q1fxDIIBRjE
Or (if you can ever get your 70,000 ton jeep carrier squared away) the MRE-
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3A5gg8FkyZ0
The principle reason indirect fires don’t work is that they lack targeting. And they lack targeting because navair (manned) will _never_ allow the development of a high cruise efficiency, loitering, ISR platform. They can’t. Because the very nature of the manned option (4-6hrs endurance, tops, in the NTISR mission) drives it out of that capability region.
And they are too job-security saavy to ever let anything robotic survive to exit R&D.
There is a way to beat this. At least for high value/TCT threats and conditions like UCW where you have SpecWar over the beach and nobody within a 1,000nm able to push conventional airpower to their assistance.
And that is to mount a drone on the front end of ONE missile and use another to release a high altitude SATCOMMS LTA to provide transient (1-2hrs on battery) communication. The key reality here being that you can do updated tracking on things like mobile indirect fire systems so that you don’t get into a shoot’n’scoot exchange of misses.
While I look to the reality of Klub/Uran-
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mbUU_9bOcnM
As being likely landlaunch or air launch systems which are encapsulated within a marine containerized system at minimal HERO and IM risk by pressurizing the container as a sealed dry bay.
The driving consideration here then has to be the relative ease with which a threat weapon can pick out a naval target against a nice cool-constant sea backdrop vs. the clutter of land, a missile can find multiple targets and even autonomously thread the needle between threat radar detection zones while accurately classifying individual ship hulls-
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LvHlW1h_0XQ
Whereas a system coming the other way might not, at least not without adaptive FSCL interface as MITL cueing.
The simplest way to explain this is the old saw: If the enemy is in range, so are you. But you are standing against a backlit billboard of constant clutter harmonic and temperature threshold whereas he is wearing multicam and well down in the bushes. Next to a nunnery.
If you push off to a minimum 25nm radar horizon (1/3rd of your 150km GMLRS range point), you now have less than 60nm of penetration over the beach and that is, ironically, right in the F-35s sweet spot.
Bluntly, naval platforms cannot act as though being afloat puts them in a vacuum of threats simply because they are in a wet operational environment. They have to take into account the value of their hulls and the ease with which their cool-flat location makes it possible for weapons fully 2-3 operational generations earlier to _hunt them down_ and bust their chops.
This doesn’t mean that you cannot resort to guided ballistics, only that you had better be willing to consider RORO applications to low value hulls because smart naval commanders are not going to let you risk their boats inshore, even as a commercial adaptation doesn’t drag you down into the muck of contractor make-a-buck as ‘integrations costs’ within an existing platform. Something to further consider if your primary employment application is the support of unacknowledged/UCW forces who don’t need the conspicuity.
OTOH, let’s look at the alternative to the near-shore CAS. Say with the rescue of the Oil Workers in the deep desert-
>
“We stayed on the runway for two hours because we found out that some other guys were travelling across the desert in vehicles when they heard the plane had arrived.
‘Bloodbath’
“The SAS weren’t prepared to leave without them,” he said.
“They did an absolutely marvellous job and it was great to see them.”
“These guys have guns and knives so, yeah, a little bit scary”
End Quote Peter Dingle Oil worker from Fleetwood
The operation to fly RAF Hercules plans deep into the African state to carry out the rescue mission was kept a close secret.
The rescued Britons were picked up and flown to Malta before being transferred to the UK.
Mr Dingle said that the security situation in Benghazi had deteriorated rapidly with gangs of looters closing in on their compound.
“Obviously, we knew what was going on in Benghazi which, apparently, was a bloodbath,” he said.
“Up to a 1,000 people were dead and right in the area where we were working there were looters and robbers – these guys have guns and knives so, yeah, a little bit scary.”
>
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-lancashire-12613224
>
The two dozen UK citizens among the workforce of the Sirte Oil Company have been officially warned not to risk taking the 150-mile road to the port of Benghazi, from where they could sail to safety. The only advice they have been given is to stay put.
But yesterday morning Mail photographer Mark Richards and I were able to make the journey in the opposite direction.
>
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1360764/Libya-protests-Mailmen-brave-guns-death-squads-rescue-British-workers.html
It’s 361nm from Tripoli to Benghazi. Another 150nm south of there is a hypotenuse of 390nm, straight line radius.
Which means that if your Carrier is busy providing fleet support and airdefence duties off the Libyan capital, you have an ENORMOUS distance to go to give Rescue Ranger support.
Well beyond what the F-35B can sustain, without massive tanker drag all the way to target.
Equally importantly, once there, having expended ‘both bombs today!’ you are at least 2hrs from being able to RTB and return.
It then being this _intermediate to long range_ distance which you want your rocket based alternatives to fulfill because, when the bad guys are pounding on the doors, and the SAS says “On The Double Quick!”, they aren’t requesting a faster hearse service.
This then is the design point which I would aim for. At least 25 if not 50nm offshore so that a detached DDG/FFG is not itself a targeted vulnerability. And another 200nm inshore to give you middling depths of support with massive repeat fire saturation, at need.
And again, I would consider an electric powered targeter atop every sixth missile, (two per pod) just to make sure that if the comms got fouled _I_ could keep shooting the bad men.
Even if the SAS were ‘busy’. Or dead.
This obviously is the reverse of the perception now. And it principally has to do with the fact that nobody thinks you can target CAS fires without a man in the cockpit ‘right there’ to mark targets.
Which is, seriously, about 3 wars before approach that is based purely on Hollyweird-
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8T6_bpLwTrc
There are no lines. There is no time. You deliver preemptively based on what you see because if you wait until the ground force does, it’s too damn late for anything but funerals.
MLRS was created within a specific set of circumstances.
I wish we would discuss the MRL concept for the 2020’s or 2030’s instead of fortifying the technological lock-in in the 1970’s concept of (G)MLRS with ever new expenditures.
@ TD – I can see a use for such a system although I think the precision rocket assisted artillery from the 127mm gun may remove most of the benefits.
There is always the MBDA Hoplite which would be perfect if it actually existed. I’m guessing to develop something new we would be looking at the 500 million to 1 billion range. Not an insurmountable problem if enough nations were interested.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RKNOeFrNVsE
It may be the case that if all western navies standardise on a set VLS system that we can in the future seek a wide range of weapons for different niche capabilities. But I think sticking an extra launcher onto the already crowded deck is a non starter.
The problem is that to have a meaningful load the ship may need some radical redesign. The pods have to be got from the magazine to the launcher, each pod (6 std rkts or 1 ATACMS) is roughly 4m x 1m x .75m and wt 2200kgs. Just having a couple of launchers deck mounted and permanently loaded would be a bit of a joke, a joke enhanced by increasing ammo options, currently only the two but others on the horizon. Vertical launch would need a missile re-design. Of course the current vehicle mounted launchers were designed for dumb rkts, so they are precision engineered to achieve accuracy, if you are only going to fire guided msls simpler, cheaper more easily navalised lnchrs should be a runner.
The only real advantage to the MLRS/GMLRS is in the initial throw weight even in a ground launched version. Once your 16 rockets are gone from the launcher, that launcher takes some time to reload, hence is out of action. The real effectiveness of “steel rain” is multiple launchers firing multiple rockets on area or multiple targets. It gives a TEOTWAWKI effect on the enemy, but the launchers need to move and reload before re-engaging to avoid counterbattery fire. The GMLRS, of course, is more accurate and can be more selective, but it doesn’t usually give the “steel rain” effect.
As for software shortcomings, anything can be updated, even on the fly. The Standard 3 missile our navy used to shoot down the failing spy satellite in 2008 was merely (!) reprogrammed.
Yep, I think I kind of talked myself out of it for the bog standard GMLRS but when you start looking at the big boys like ATACMS, LORA and the various 300mm systems things get more interesting, for both naval and land applications because then you are looking at 300km plus range with high levels of accuracy so they would not be a complete replacement for aircraft but you start to trade off numbers, one against the other. We all know the F35 is going to be eye wateringly expensive so if we can maximise their value by using long range rockets more and expensive F35’s less, especially against targets where they are unlikely to be heavily defended a la Libya, then I think we would be daft not to have a good look
I always wondered why we never had a ground launch option for Storm Shadow
Oh, hang on, course I know why :)
We have 42 M270 MLRS vehicle
Drive one up on to the deck of a Bay class use the standard vehicle (there is a ramp up from the lower deck I thing).
Its not the best option but it would work in good weather.
I can imagine you parking 4 of them on the deck of the QE launching a broadside.
Cheapest option no installation costs.
@TD
I think you more or less hit the nail on the head. The key to me is flexibility, a ship has limited space and systems that can carry out more than 1 task rule.
A GMLRS type system may actually be better than the 127/64 at long range precision HE “application” but the gun can be used for policing type actions, e.g warning shots, shot across the bow or disabling fire, it can also be used against surface threats of a variety of sizes and there are some clever rounds being developed.
Not sure 150KM out ranges too many shore based anti shipping missiles and unless I want to bombard the beach then i have to come closer inshore anyway. Again it is useful but my Typhoon and F35 can provide air defence, recon, vis id of a snooper etc etc. I also quite like the though that F35 with Storm Shadow can put a lovely hole in a target that is over 700 miles away from where we launched it from:)
So I think the reason you are on a loser is not that the system is not very capable but that it is maybe not flexible enough.
I think you would probably have to crunch some numbers on the different types of target and the difference between weight of fire and accuracy.
Whilst the 50-100km Vulcano with the guidance version might achieve good accuracy with semi active laser guidance the amount of HE would be very small, except of course if you emptied the drum in a mad few minutes and then the numbers might swing in favour of the 127mm, with the added benefit of being able to fire at shorter distances and with a range of natures.
So you are probably right that this has less appeal than using finite budget for a 127mm main gun.
Although I did say making better use of what we have in the inventory should be an objective where this gets much more interesting is when you look around at different rocket systems, the Russian, Brazilian and Israeli systems for example, plus ATACMS.
By using these bigger and longer range systems, especially the ones that can outreach shore based anti shipping missiles, 150km plus say, you can encraoch into the F35’s land attack space. Use these long range rockets in a land environment and you can dominate a much large area, carry out deep strikes sooner than with manned aircraft because you dont need the SEAD/DEAD phase and if you do have credible anti aircraft targets they can be swamped with these at relatively low cost and at a high density.
Of course all that reduces (note, not eliminates) the requirements for the Typhoon and F35B, so we are on to a loser straight away.
Have a look at how the Russians combine their Iskanders and Smerch systems together.
Very interesting
They even have a rocket launched UAV that is used by the battery commander
@RT Glamorgan. I’m surprised you had to think M&S bangs on about it all the time. Is there not anything that will fit into the VLs?
So right now we have 4.5 inch unguided and extended range NGS; and then sub launched Tomahawk.
In the future we will have ?????? 5 inch unguided or maybe guided, maybe range extended NGS ???
Carrier borne F35 with guided bombs, SPEAR 3 (?) etc.
Oh, and sub-launched Tomahawk.
F35C is a very, very expensive bomb truck which might be in high demand if deployed. So something between NGS and Tomahawk, and cheaper than F35 delivedered ordnance (and more widely available) seems a good idea.
We also need to replace Harpoon – so going with the Noggies lovely NSM / JSM would seem to be a good idea. So if we do, then in absolute best case scenario we would have:
1.5 inch / 127 mm NGS fires – 100km max (?) smallish bang – laser guidance from UAV ?
2. NSM / JSM – 200km-ish, bigger bang, no external guidance required
3. F35 with Paveway, SPEAR 3 etc (and NSM ?) 500km (ish) fairly big bang but potentially low availability (carrier can only be in one place at once).
4. Tomahawk – 1000km plus (classified ?) bigish bang, fairly expensive, fairly low availability (how many SSN avail ?)
Do we need anything else ? Right now before we get to this version of the future, could we stick a tracked MLRS launcher on the flight deck of a Bay class and use that if the weather is not too bumpy ? You would need something the size of a Bay, with its cargo decks and lots of space to handle the rocket packs and the reloading. Want a bigger salvo, park two launchers on the deck.
Adding a GMLRS / HIMARS type launcher to an existing warship design is a non starter, the ammo comes in large modular packs, no existing RN design / forcasted design would be able to fitted with such a contraption – unless you ditch the packs and go to loading of single rockets, either automated (think of a Sea Dart launcher) or by hand (the original Sea Wolf launcher).
So if we really need it, then it looks like a quick and dirty botch job to an RFA amphib or a STUFT off shore support vessel as per TD’s links above; but if we get OTO Backcock 127mm WITH Vulcano, I would need to be convinced of the need.
I’m a fan of the concept, but purely from a land systems perspective, there’s going to be some integration issues. Others above point knowledgeably to ship integration issues. So it would not be as cheap as chips.
The fire control software of GMLRS is based on the NATO Armaments Ballistics Kernel (NABK), which assumes a static position on launch, even if the munition is terminally guided. Not undo able, but a complex piece of re-engineering, and once done, you couldn’t then trundle the launcher off the ship and start using it on land without a complete software reload.
The thermal trail is awesome. It’s going to be pointing like a big red hot finger back at the boat. Again, not a show stopper.
I don’t know about ship motion. Old style MLRS had a safety feature to prevent firing if the launcher was moving. Again, only software but it leads to my last observation, the safety case. It’s not going to be risk free.
However, Carlos Fandango never worried about that sort of thing . He lashed up an Exocet to a lorry in 1982 and took a potshot at the Andrew (cannot recall at which ship – was it Glamorgan?). So where there’s a will there’s a way.
I like the flatrack idea. Probably means reloads won’t be as fast as a fully-automated mount, but has to be much less expensive and you can put it on inexpensive, NSFS-of-opportunity vessels.
Anyone thought about quad-packing SPEAR 3???? From what I remember they are a good bit shorter than Seaceptor and around about the same diameter
Use the shorter length to add some form of booster and cold launch as is done with CAMM
Just an idea likes
I certainly don’t underestimate the physical or EM challenges of putting anything on a small ship with a complex EM environment so would an alternative be to put them on a large ship with a less complex EM environment?
Would also observe that the IMI system seems to have addressed the challenges
“Could we have dispensed with the need for at least some of the Storm Shadow and long range RAF strikes or even the sub launched Tomahawks?”
Yes. We could have had a real carrier!
Slightly more seriously, a few years (8-ish?) ago now, one particular bloke in ABW came up with the idea of idea of Project Brian. This was essentially a proposal to build new T23, which would have been dimensionally altered to fit some GMLRS systems. I suspect this may be what Apats was referring to.
It was billed as low-cost, which was unfortunate because it assumed that dimensionally changing the ship would cost nothing, qualifying a land-based rocket system for a complex EM environment would similarly cost nothing, complying with regulatory standards in all sorts of areas on the ship would cost nothing and that matelots twenty years from now would be happy to live in 1990s-style messdecks.
Apart from that, what wasn’t to like? Quite a bit apparently.
People also need to remember that IM refers primarily to the behavour of the explosive material when damaged, hit, heated. There is a entirely different piece regarding how the varous electronic components behave when exposed to high-power RF emissions at close quarters.
Given the dimensions, it may be possible to make use of the MLRS pods for more roles. Notably, the NSM missile, which is about the right length (slightly shorter than ATACMS including booster), and would potentially make sense as both a shore-based and even ship based system. This would also give us a c.200km+ range missile for land based strike missions. In fact, knowing the love of containerisation here, it also occurs that it would be possible to stick the launcher component from HIMARS onto a PLS pallet, and just use a datalink for the control system. It’s the right length for it, and I doubt it’d be too difficult to do…
Ideally we would be going at this from all angles:
– Replacing the existing Harpoon and go for the NSM, which could be fired from ships, helicopters (EH-101s easily), fighters and ideally MPAs… This gives guided missile strike capability out to c.200km.
– Adopt the OTO Babcock 127mm, ideally retrofit for at least the T45s, and the new build T26s. Then buy the Vulcano guided 127mm shell, giving us guided NGS out to c.80km
– Go for the transport aircraft launched Storm Shadow, as was proposed a number of years ago. Instantly this would give us the ability to project very long range strike pretty much anywhere in the world, without the need for Typhoons having to constantly refuel all the way. A C-17 and A-400M based solution would give us a simultaneous launch capability of at least 100 missiles (figuring on about ten missiles each, over ten or more aircraft)! Obviously the likelihood of needing or being willing to launch hundreds simultaneously is low, but it is more the ability to that counts here.
– Buy some more Tomahawk missiles for the subs, and ideally add them into the Type 45, as had always been the idea. This could either be via adapting the TLAM to use the Sylver A70 (good export boost potential for TLAM, since it would provide an alternative to Scalp Naval), or add in the sixteen cell Mk.41 alongside the existing A50s.
These measures would be relatively sensible, and could be done in stages, e.g. buying the NSMs now, and retrofitting the ships with the OTO 127mm once there’s a chance of funding it. A Type 26 frigate with Vulcano and NSMs would be an excellent boost to the Royal Navy’s gunboat diplomacy!
As for the issue of the ship based UAVs, I was actually quite disappointed that they went for the basic ScanEagle UAV, when it’s bigger brother, the RQ-21 Integrator is just about to enter service, and is a lot more capable. It also operates the same way, and uses the same basic equipment, it is just bigger, and can carry much heavier/better sensors. I would have liked to see the Royal Navy getting both the RQ-21 and ideally the Saab Skeldar or Schiebel CamCopter mini helicopter UAVs. They would have complemented each other really well, with longer range long endurance from the RQ-21, and more localised coverage from the CamCopter (which has even been shown equipped with the LMM missile!)….
If Fireshadow works, and there seems to be a question mark over that, then deep integration of that system with Sylver and CMS-1 seems like the near ideal solution. Especially if someone finds some sense and T26 is built with 32 full size VLS cells rather than 16 and those silly CAMM tubes.
As for organic ISR; stealthy VTOL UAV is requirement.
Worst case, park an MLRS launcher or two on the deck of a container ship with some old concrete-filled containers around it/them and a few extra deck plates welded on.
SOMEONE figured out how to handle rocket exhaust back in WW2. It shouldn’t take a genius to figure out how to mount an exhaust deflector to an MLR box that would raise or drop out of the way for reloading the MLRS/GMLRS.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VSKhPMpbQkk
Forty seconds in you can see the LSM(R) going to work.
What’s stopping us? Buy this and the case for precision NFS goes out of the window and puts a dent in the case for renewing TLAM and even the land attack capability of F35. Oh, and no money.
These folks managed to figure out corrosion and rocket blast issues back in the “olden days.” This ship served as a fire support vessel in Korea and Vietnam with 5 inch rockets. Seems like mounting a exhaust deflector that lifts or drops out of the way to the back of an MLRS pod wouldn’t be beyond the capability of some smart guy out there.
http://www.navsource.org/archives/10/06/100652518.jpg
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VSKhPMpbQkk
@TD
I Remember asking this question to a few people years ago. The issues are movement of the Ship and the requirement to have a proper PCS input to the system which would also require to be fully tested for the more complex and compressed EM environment at sea.
Alternatively, have it on an ISO flatrack and lash a dozen to either of these when you need them
https://www.flickr.com/photos/marcomcginty/7091967671/
Or even one of these
https://www.flickr.com/photos/7537146@N06/5474790980/
Job done
Pretty much all military munitions are going IM now as well
In the past, a few (rumored) arguments against GMLRS have stemmed from lack of IM ratings for munitions; difficulty in ammo stowage, handling and reloads; and corrosive rocket exhaust.
IIRC, EXTRA was designed to be fired from the standard MLRS system too.
It would be nice to have a single naval MLRS that could handle a range of munitions, including LAR160, GMLRS, EXTRA and ATACMS. But what ship do you put it on? How much space, weight and volume does it consume? How much will it cost?
@TD: yes, we definitely need something that fits in between TLAM and NGS, and GMLRS would seem to fit the bill. What about cold launch from Mk41 to allow for quad packing?
Just imagine being able to launch an ATACMS or GMLRS (or the system here) from an RN ship or even a bloody RFA in Operations off Libya
Could we have dispensed with the need for at least some of the Storm Shadow and long range RAF strikes or even the sub launched Tomahawks?
What are the launchers everyone wants on any future LPD/H?
I would sooner see anti ship missiles fitted but yes in the long run this looks like an intelligent idea.
COuld you just crane them over the side of the ship before firing to get rid of exhaust gasses?
I would say that becuase VLS has become the main armament of surface ships people are reluctant to invest in bespoke missile launch susytems at sea.
It there anything smaller than a TLAM that could give precsion land attack fires that will quad pack into a standard Sylver or Mk 41 launcher?
The simplest thing might be to talk to USMC about the HIMARS which is a half a GMLRS but apparently assembled with shipboard-duty (stowed!) and amphibious-duty in mind i.e. corrosion-resistant.
As a standalone permanently exposed mount, adding an additional ‘hood’ over the big launcher-box does not seem implausible for added protection.
YouTube will show the rapid ‘hands-on’ reloading.
24″ ATACMS makes for a potent 180nm range projectile with nasty sub-munitions, with 2 per GMLRS-box.
And that could make any boat, vessel, ship a “Land-Attack” element.
We’d just order a bucket of paint for afterwards…