That strategy comprises of two broad elements

1. Get the fuck out of dodge

2. Pretend it was a victory

After years of failure in Afghanistan the new strategy will be to come up with a sensible disengagement. Lets face facts, we have failed.

The government has failed, the MoD has failed and the senior military leadership has failed.

It might be fashionable to blame crusty old Cold War Generals or penny pinching Treasury officials but the truth is, they are all equally responsible. Trying to undertake a complex operation with the absolute minimum of everything was never going to work and that is making the assumption that it was worth making work in the first place.

That should be Labour’s epitaph, ‘what’s the minimum we can get away with’

With confused strategic objectives that ranged from cutting opium production one day to sending Afghan girls to school the next the real strategic objective has been to coat tail the USA. There is nothing wrong in standing by the USA if we are honest about it but the dishonesty that the current argument of ‘reducing terror on the streets of the UK’ is patently ridiculous. How many British Citizens have been killed in the UK by Islamic fundamentalists and how many have been killed in Afghanistan?

The Afghan population is unwilling to actually do anything other than sit on the fence and wait and see, whilst squeezing every last drop of money out of pockets of Western nations tax payers back pockets.

The execution of the operation has been and continues to be deeply flawed, under resources and plagued by delusional optimism. It has taken the academic and free thinking US forces to come and show the supposed master of COIN how to do it. The student has become the master. Apart from the usual suspects, our NATO partners have been dragged kicking and screaming into a conflict that they perhaps quite rightly judged to foolhardy.

We have lost nearly 300 killed and countless wounded, the cost to the public finances are simply huge and on the ground, despite good news stories from the MoD, there is very little progress.

A cynic might suggest that the current government, having spent many years in opposition complaining about underfunding will have an entirely different perspective now they are in government and might have to stump up the money to do the job properly.

Better to blame those Cold War Generals.

Facing a very real defeat in Iraq we chose to use the line of ‘supporting the Afghanistan mission’ as an excuse, providing a fig leaf for the failures in Basra.

We always seem to fall back on our our successes in Malaya, Oman and particularly Northern Island as the model for this type of operation, without recognising that each is different. Look at the force levels in Northern Ireland or the tactics in Malaya, there are no parallel with Afghanistan. We have failed to apply even our own experiences.

Out of the wreckage of Afghanistan and Iraq the British Armed Forces and Great Britain itself has to recover some of it’s reputation.

I don’t buy into the ‘no one has ever won in Afghanistan’ arguments but it is really difficult to see how we can make any real difference now.

Do we double up and put enough resources in to actually make a real difference or cut and run?

Whatever the strategy…

However beautiful the strategy, you should occasionally look at the results

Winston Churchill

PS, sorry for the sweary bits!

Read the rest of this excellent article from lee Bruce, here

One of earlier posts was a reaction to the excellent RUSI article, A Force for Honour.

In a response to our response Jedibeeftrix makes the point that the position we took, that of a mix and match rather either or, was wrong.

Have a look at their article, makes for interesting reading

http://jedibeeftrix.wordpress.com/2010/03/15/britains-future-strategic-direction-and-why-i-think-think-defence-are-wrong/

The analysis is split over 10 posts

Part 1
Part 2
Part 3
Part 4
Part 5
Part 6
Part 7
Part 8
Part 9
Part 10

To summarise our opinion…

There are some excellent ideas, many are long overdue and others just plain common sense. It provides some assurance that an incoming Conservative government will get to grip with the security, defence and resilience issues facing the UK, many of which seem to have been relegated in importance by the Labour government or simply ignored.

However

Many of the suggestions amount to nothing more than fine words and platitudes that almost any party could have voiced or one might find in any security review.

It is understood that this is a green paper or statement of intent and in the run up to an election has to be seen in that context.

Other suggestions seem ill informed, naive and superficial.

The UK Armed Forces are not the paramilitary wing of Oxfam or some adjunct to a European collective and we should not be thinking in these terms.

Finally, it does not cover funding.

We all know that Private Do More with Less is going to have to get on parade.

The appendix on Afghanistan we will leave for another post.

It is also interesting to note the absence of any reporting or analysis of any substance in the mainstream media. This is an important document yet the reporting has tended to focus on the Security and Stabilisation Force proposal or the cyber defence issue.

The need to take a much more considered approach to the protection and long term resilience is obvious but has been severely neglected by the current government. The proposed systematic modelling of all related infrastructure and services is an idea that is well overdue but may need legislation as much of it is owned or administered by private sector and overseas organisations.

Once a thorough understanding has been obtained it will form a basis for legislation and the development of minimum national standards, again, another long overdue requirement.

Most of these industries have separate regulatory regimes and requirements so whether the standards would be developed and imposed through these or by some other resilience regulator is open for discussion.

The idea of a super regulator with responsibility for short and long term resilience should be pursued with some vigour.

The protection of critical sites by armed police for example, is currently split between a number of civilian and military constabularies. We looked peripherally at this with our post on military policing and any move to create a single guarding service is to be welcomed.

Energy and cyber security also come in for special attention in the report but the term ‘cyber’ adds an air of superficiality to what is a very serious subject. Energy security is an expansive subject and closely tied up with the climate change debate, it is slightly out of the scope of this post but the suggestion of linking overall security strategy to energy security is sensible.

In regards to electronic security across the internet, SCADA networks and telecommunications networks the UK definitely needs to do more but this should build upon works already done and expertise available in both the public and private sector. There is a large international element to electronic security because physical boundaries provide little protection and transnational criminal and intelligence networks are distributed. The EU and NATO have already done much work, supported specifically by Estonia and the UK should seek to support and enhance this in addition to strengthening national capacity.

One area that does not seem to be mentioned is that of electronic attack, almost as if that isn’t the sporting thing to do, instead concentrating of defensive measures.

As all readers will know, the most effective defence is offence. In any attack the likelihood of a smoking gun is remote but this should not deter the UK from developing a strong electronic attack capability and not being shy about letting the world know about it. This might even extend to being able to interdict physical infrastructure such as satellite or undersea fibre optic cables.

There is also the intelligence benefit of electronic intrusion that should not be overlooked in the rush to defend ourselves.

In addition to technical measures the UK, in the same manner as business continuity, has created a leading standard framework for information security management. The ISO27000 series integrates with BS25999 and other management standards. The existing public sector Security Policy Framework implementation needs robust enforcement and this should extend to external third party certification.

4.7 Striking the right balance – ensuring security while protecting civil liberties and social cohesion

The final section in the document makes the point that most of the terrorist attacks on the UK have originated in this country. The growing realisation that New Labour multiculturalism has made this country a more decisive place and the self evident erosion of many deeply rooted civil liberties has not created a safer society.

There is a great hope that an incoming Conservative government would take a more robust approach and restore ancient civil liberties, lets see shall we.

The paper states that effective border control is the first line of defence against the entry if unwanted persons.

A long standing Conservative commitment has been the creation of a robust and unified border policing capability. The current patchwork of the UK Border Agency, parts of HM Revenue and Customs, local police forces, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency and many others has created an over complex, inefficient and largely ineffectual capability that a single unified agency or force would seek to address.

The commenters and authors at Think Defence have for some time supported the notion of a much stronger Coastguard with responsibilities for maritime security, search and rescue, pollution control and fisheries management.

4.5 A new focus on our capacity to deal with emergencies, including through the establishment of a new Permanent Military Command for Homeland Defence and Security

This section is prefaced with this comment…

Maintaining territorial integrity and safety becomes both more important and more difficult as terrorists and organised criminals evolve new modes of operation, and as natural hazards increase in scale and frequency.

Again, I instinctively dislike the term ‘homeleand’ because it sounds like we are aping the USA and this is a section where I think the Conservatives are simply behind the current state of reality, they make the assumption that we are on a precipice, unable to cope and cruelly exposed. Whilst there may be some grain of truth in this the reality is that the UK is one of the best provisioned and well prepared countries for ‘civil defence’ type disruption with an active emergency planning and business continuity sector that in many regards leads the world.

Military contribution to homeland security and resilience

The paper makes the bold claim that the military is best placed to provide agile and innovative command and control capabilities in support of the civil power where natural events are of such a scale, pace and danger that the emergency services cannot be expected to have adequate situational awareness and/or are in danger of being overwhelmed. Whilst this might have been true some years ago and was proven, particularly in the Mad Cow Disease outbreak, it is simply not the case anymore.

The publication of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, excellent work that has been carried out by the Emergency Planning Society, Civil Contingencies Secretariat and many many others means that the UK civil response capability is actually very good. Of course there is always room for improvement, the CCA Enhancement Programme is working to build on the work already done.

The military should always have a limited role but terrorism at home is a law enforcement matter and natural disasters are rightly in the domain of the emergency services and local authorities, not the military.

The paper makes two proposals; first, the establishment of a small military command or HQ for homeland defence security and secondly ensure there is a predictable regular armed force contribution to homeland tasks.

In the Joint Doctrine Publication 02 Second Edition (JDP-02) published by the MoD and distributed via the Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat to emergency planning agencies throughout the UK the concept of the Standing Joint Commander (UK) is detailed. JDP 02 might be a rather dry document to read but it is plainly obvious that the MoD and SJC (UK) ‘has it covered’ so quite what the Conservative proposal seeks to achieve by co-locating it with Permanent Joint Headquarters and duplicating what is already in place is unclear.

With the TA and Regular units much of the equipment needed is now centrally pooled and in the case of Royal Engineers C Vehicles (Mobile Plant) is provided from a few depots via a PFI run by ALC.

Liaison with regional responders is already done by service Joint Regional Liaison Officers (JRLO) and works well.

As the paper quite rightly states, apart from a few niche response capabilities such as protection of offshore installations, anti terrorist and airspace control, the military contribution to civil tasks is contingent on them being available and not on military deployment abroad. This is of course a statement of the obvious.

However, the military is over stretched as it is, if there were yet another target to reach, having sufficient forces available in the UK to meet a non-existent need it will place even greater stress on an already over stretched force.

Personnel would be of little use without equipment, the armed forces as the Conservatives make great play of are already under resources so keeping not only personnel but their equipment in the UK will impact overseas operations, unless the man at the Treasury is going to open the cheque book, mmm, thought not.

What of the need…

In recent years the MoD has withdrawn from civil response for a number of reasons, firstly response to this type of disruption is a civilian affair and this has forced the responder community to properly plan, resource and put in place mutual and regional aid agreements for large scale disruption. JDP 02 makes this quite clear and in the few circumstances where niche military capability has been required the established common and control arrangements have worked well.

Local authorities have less of a need because they have to come to realise that many of the capabilities that they had relied on the armed forces to provide can actually be provided me economically and affectively by themselves.

Rather than relying on a shrinking military the UK should be increasing funding for local and regional civilian capabilities. The military will always be able to provide niche capabilities at short notice but these should be on a last resort basis, pretty much as the current situation.

Standards for emergency services

Achieving standardisation across multiple responders is an obvious common sense objective but again, much work has already been done.

Involving individuals, communities and businesses in building their own safety and security

It is clear the UK has looked to those in authority to provide increasing support whilst self reliance seems to be in decline. The overall objective is increasing self reliance and a contribution to safety and security is to be applauded.

This section of the document is long on platitude but short on practical proposals, provide better, tap local knowledge, foster corporate contributions etc etc

The National and Local Risk Registers is an area that needs improvement in legibility, accessibility and clarity, the proposal calls for improvement, great, how is this to be done.

The proposal to foster greater corporate contribution to emergency assistance and support for resilience interesting, stating that the insurance industry should incentivise companies through decreased insurance premiums if they comply with the business continuity management standard, BS25999.

This proposal sounds rather like a bit of state interventionism. The insurance industry will do as it pleases, as it should be.

Instead of tinkering and dabbling the Conservatives should ensure the public sector can actually meet the requirements of the Civil Contingencies Act and have suitable continuity arrangements. Earlier in the document it talks of setting examples so rather than preaching to the private sector, which, by the way, are usually streets ahead of the public sector in resilience terms, it should simply ensure that all public sector organisations comply with BS25999, especially Part 2 of the standard which is verified by external audit. Nothing would sharpen the minds of the public sector like having to comply with a widely respected and adopted international standard like BS25999.

This would then trickle down through the private sector and massively improve resilience across both the public and private sector; the UK would then be much more resilient.

There has been a number of well publicised ‘issues’ between the MoD, DFiD and civilian aid agencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, as the paper says ‘we need a step change’

The current arrangements of DFiD, MoD, FCO and NGN’s means that inevitably there are too many chiefs and not enough Indians and those chiefs are usually too focussed on procedure rather than outcome.

To say a more integrated approach is needed is the understatement of the decade.

The proposed strategy to take forward an integrated comprehensive approach includes;

• Unity of purpose and common strategies between military, police and civilian organisations
• Clear command and control within and between military and civilian agencies, both at national and international levels;
• The ability and willingness on the part of civilians to deploy and operate in dangerous environments
• Joint training facilities and exercises for military, police, intelligence and civilian personnel.

The core proposal in this section is to create a Stabilisation and Reconstruction force that is capable of operating in high threat environments, able to carry out crucial activities that create stability and win hearts and minds (I hate that phrase but it is in the document)

These activities might include bridge building, repairing power supplies and helping to create governance structures. The force would comprise military personnel, specialists from DFiD, FCO and a range of other government departments. There are large hints that it will be funded partly through the aid budget.

Enter stage left, a considerable wailing and gnashing of teeth from the aid and development industry (make no mistake, it is an industry) so as a sop to the righteous the document restates the Conservative pledge to increase overseas aid to the magic 0.7% of GDP (or more commonly known as a Bono)

The fundamental idea of using military capability such as water treatment, sanitation, building and civil engineering, enhanced with civilian expertise in areas such as policing, governance, economic development and farming is an obviously good one, but introducing yet another organisation into an already overcrowded space is simply a recipe for confusion and inefficiency, however much it is claimed that it will create the fabled ‘unity of purpose’

The ability to erect a structure out of Hesco or drill a well is a dual use capability. That structure could be used as a sangar or school, a well might be used to provide water for a village or water for a FOB. The strength of the Royal Engineers and other supporting units is their flexibility so by creating artificial distinctions we simply duplicate activity and create conflict, pleasing nobody and actually reducing capability at a time when resources are scarce.

Without security there can be no effective development so whilst the military are still deployed, by definition, there is a lack of security and it is not ‘post conflict’

Where the military is deployed then to create a single unity of strategy and command structure then the answer is plain, the military should be taking the lead with the ability to apply reconstruction effort as simply another component that supports the military and political objective. It may have advice from the FCO and others but if the aim is to create a single unified strategy then it requires a step change in military thinking.

The key to success is flexibility and simplicity.

Currently, the military do not have this capability yet it should be a key objective to ensure that it has both the resources and backing to create such a capability using what it already has. The Royal Engineers and other supporting force elements are eminently well suited; we should enhance where necessary and provide greater resources whilst ensuring that the detailed staff and planning expertise is put in place to support the capability. Anyone involved, with a few limited exceptions, should be in the military chain of command.

The reserve forces might provide this supplementary capability, operating as sponsored reserves in specialist units but firmly within the military chain of command. The TA and other reserve forces have a wide range of experience, these should be actively exploited and the private sector might also play an active part, telecommunications and utility organisations for example.

Obviously the Conservatives do not want to raid the ring fenced overseas aid piggy bank to pay for an increase in for example, military bridging, because this would infer dual use and draw away from the 0.7% holy grail.

Instead of having the political balls to say that we are not going to reach anything like 0.7% because, you know, we are at war and skint, the policy seems to engage in a spot of shifting wooden dollars between one spending department and another, keeping everyone happy but actually being ineffectual, divisive and overly complex.

Our proposal is very simple, when the military is deployed; it should be the military that does the reconstruction.

There has been a number of well publicised ‘issues’ between the MoD, DFiD and civilian aid agencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, as the paper says ‘we need a step change’

The current arrangements of DFiD, MoD, FCO and NGN’s means that inevitably there are too many chiefs and not enough Indians and those chiefs are usually too focussed on procedure rather than outcome.

To say a more integrated approach is needed is the understatement of the decade.

The proposed strategy to take forward an integrated comprehensive approach includes

• Unity of purpose and common strategies between military, police and civilian organisations
• Clear command and control within and between military and civilian agencies, both at national and international levels;
• The ability and willingness on the part of civilians to deploy and operate in dangerous environments
• Joint training facilities and exercises for military, police, intelligence and civilian personnel.

The core proposal in this section is to create a Stabilisation and Reconstruction force that is capable of operating in high threat environments, able to carry out crucial activities that create stability and win hearts and minds (I hate that phrase but it is in the document)

These activities might include bridge building, repairing power supplies and helping to create governance structures. The force would comprise military personnel, specialists from DFiD, FCO and a range of other government departments. There are large hints that it will be funded partly through the aid budget.

Enter stage left, a considerable wailing and gnashing of teeth from the aid and development industry (make no mistake, it is an industry) so as a sop to the righteous the document restates the Conservative pledge to increase overseas aid to the magic 0.7% of GDP (or more commonly known as a Bono)

The fundamental idea of using military capability such as water treatment, sanitation, building and civil engineering, enhanced with civilian expertise in areas such as policing, governance, economic development and farming is an obviously good one, but introducing yet another organisation into an already overcrowded space is simply a recipe for confusion and inefficiency, however much it is claimed that it will create the fabled ‘unity of purpose’

The ability to erect a structure out of Hesco or drill a well is a dual use capability. That structure could be used as a sangar or school, a well might be used to provide water for a village or water for a FOB. The strength of the Royal Engineers and other supporting units is their flexibility so by creating artificial distinctions we simply duplicate activity and create conflict, pleasing nobody and actually reducing capability at a time when resources are scarce.

Without security there can be no effective development so whilst the military are still deployed, by definition, there is a lack of security and it is not ‘post conflict’

Where the military is deployed then to create a single unity of strategy and command structure then the answer is plain, the military should be taking the lead with the ability to apply reconstruction effort as simply another component that supports the military and political objective. It may have advice from the FCO and others but if the aim is to create a single unified strategy then it requires a step change in military thinking.

The key to success is flexibility and simplicity.

Currently, the military do not have this capability yet it should be a key objective to ensure that it has both the resources and backing to create such a capability using what it already has. The Royal Engineers and other supporting force elements are eminently well suited; we should enhance where necessary and provide greater resources whilst ensuring that the detailed staff and planning expertise is put in place to support the capability. Anyone involved, with a few limited exceptions, should be in the military chain of command.

The reserve forces might provide this supplementary capability, operating as sponsored reserves in specialist units but firmly within the military chain of command. The TA and other reserve forces have a wide range of experience, these should be actively exploited and the private sector might also play an active part, telecommunications and utility organisations for example.

Obviously the Conservatives do not want to raid the ring fenced overseas aid piggy bank to pay for an increase in for example, military bridging, because this would infer dual use and draw away from the 0.7% holy grail.

Instead of having the political balls to say that we are not going to reach anything like 0.7% because, you know, we are at war and skint, the policy seems to engage in a spot of shifting wooden dollars between one spending department and another, keeping everyone happy but actually being ineffectual, divisive and overly complex.

Our reaction is very simple, when the military is deployed; it should be the military that does the reconstruction.

If we can move away from the hand wringing yoghurt knitting left winged foreign policy of the Labour government then this will be a huge step in the right direction. The UK needs to understand the concept of national interest and stop trying to swan around the world stage, being a force for good.

In fact, the whole ‘being a force for good’ thing needs to be ruthlessly expunged from all strategy documents and replaced with ‘a force for the good of the United Kingdom and its people’

However, it looks like the Conservative proposal is to have more of the same, stating that our international role is not only of self interest or seen through the prism of a commercial balance sheet

Nonsense…

I simply cannot understand how this contributes to our security, the emerging nations such as India, Brazil and China are achieving power exactly because they have been singularly self interested and focussed on economic prosperity because with this approach, political power and influence follows.

The British Council and BBC Foreign Language Services are held up as key elements of our soft power policy but the Kinnock ‘clan’ at the British Council needs to be removed and a more focussed management team put in place. For some excellent analysis of the DFiD like incompetence and profligacy of the British Council readers might be interested in some excellent analysis at;

http://dblackie.blogs.com/the_language_business/british_council/
http://burningourmoney.blogspot.com/search/label/British%20Council

The UK has considerable soft power, more than we sometimes give ourselves credit for. Education, the arts, culture, engineering, diplomatic and commercial links with other nations must be co-opted for the security of the UK, although forcing the X Factor on Yemen might not yield the results we want!

We should be focussing on a foreign policy that places the prosperity and security at its heart, less wishy washy liberalism and more hard-nosed self interest.

4.2 Building a capacity for preventative action

Conflict prevention, early warning and rapid intervention are common sense and have been goals of the UK for a long time but aspirations have rarely met with adequate resources. The Conservative policy is to reaffirm this commitment to the concept.

A greater role for diplomacy

The paper highlights the gradual weakening of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office but the FCO today seems more interested in pursuing greater European integration than pursuing the interests of the UK. In return for greater resources and placing it at its rightful place in government the FCO needs to understand its role i.e. not the surrender of our sovereignty.

A wider range of government departments supporting diplomacy

A comprehensive approach is seen as essential in conflict prevention and the paper draws a direct line between poverty and radicalisation yet the 9/11 attackers were largely Saudi, not a nation known for its poverty. The attack this Christmas was perpetrated by a wealthy individual and the attacks in Glasgow were committed by doctors.

In stating that DFiD plays a central role in Millennium Development Goals, in conjunction with the MoD and FCO it maintains the notion that DFiD should be kept as an autonomous organisation.

Overseas aid should always come with either strings attached or be in direct support of the national interest so I think DFiD should simply be absorbed back into the FCO with an attendant reduction in the far left thinking, bungling inefficiency and dubious activity that has beset DFiD.

The days of the gravy train for the ‘third sector’ should be brought to an abrupt halt.

A greater role for the MoD is called for but defence diplomacy is but one of many competing requirements of the budget.

This is the substantial part of the strategy and our analysis.

The new, integrated approach to national security will, however, mean some major changes in the way we do business.

In particular, it will involve;

• A liberal Conservative attitude to foreign policy which champions an enlightened vision of the national interest
• Reducing the need for military intervention by building a capacity for preventative action, including a greater role for diplomacy led by the FCO and for contributions from a wider range of government departments
• A more integrated approach to post-conflict reconstruction – with a new Stabilisation and Reconstruction Force
• A new focus on key parts of domestic security which have been ignored to date, such as border security
• A new focus on our capacity to deal with emergencies, including a more structured military contribution to homeland security
• Much greater emphasis on the resilience of the country’s critical infrastructure, including a greater understanding of new threats such as climate change, the importance of food security and the security of our energy supplies
• Particular emphasis on cyber security; and a new concern with ensuring that security legislation does not compromise civil liberties, and with strengthening social cohesion

Probably too much for a single blog post so I will split them up

3. Some Fundamental Continuities

The new National Security Strategy, and the accompanying Strategic Defence and Security Review, will be built on certain solid foundations – most have been at the heart of bi-partisan policy over many years, including;

• NATO
• Maintenance of the nuclear deterrent
• EU cooperation
• Active involvement in international institutions
• Continued determination to prevent proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction
• Maintaining the security of the 2012 Olympic Games

No surprises here and nothing to be concerned over except that we think continued defence cooperation with the EU should be on a minimal basis. That said the Conservative policy is to only continue co-operation  with the European Security and Defence Policy (EDSP) if it can show that the capabilities being offered do not duplicate those available in NATO. It also pledges to strive for co-location of staff. I believe EDSP has changed its name to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CDSP) and it will be difficult to reconcile the natural eurosceptic nature of the Conservatives with the accelerating pace of EU integration post Lisbon.

The UK and Netherlands were scheduled to provide an amphibious brigade (the existing UK/NL structure) to act as as the EU ready brigade this year, whether this actually happens is another matter of course.

Troubled waters ahead here.

Reaffirming the primacy of NATO and committing to its reform is a positive move.

Whilst recognising that each of these alliances has problems but when taken as a whole contribute to the UK’s national security.

The report goes on to list a number of important commitments across a range of areas.

Nothing radical, just sensible modest proposals although good intentions will be difficult to implement.

To deal with the new world we need to link all the relevant parts of government…

The document strategy proposes three key new initiates, the establishment of a National Security Council, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review.

2.1 National Security Council

This has rather a USA feel to it and be responsible for all national security policy issues, replacing a number of existing disparate ministerial committees.

The NSC will;

• Agree a comprehensive, long-term National Security Strategy
• Supervise the attainment of strategic goals identified by the National Security Strategy
• Foster a culture of integrated policy-making on the national security agenda between colleagues and their Departments
• Manage crises affecting national security
• Have the capacity to decide on the creation of cross-departmental budgets for the delivery of national security policies

Fig 1 National Security Council

Fig 2 National Security Secretariat

All good stuff but the last point is perhaps one of the most interesting elements of the whole proposal because it will allow the NSC to dictate departmental budget priorities, as a committee that decision should of course be a consensus but expect conflict as vested interests and, empire building, career and other considerations to play their part.

Potentially, this injects a great deal of uncertainty into departmental budgeting processes which in the case of the MoD is the root cause of so many poor and short term decisions.

This assumes that the underlying structures will be maintained, MI5 will still be M15, MI6 will still be MI6 and the Department for International Development will still be the same. The Metropolitan Police will still be the lead agency for anti terrorism in the UK and

Given the state of inter departmental rivalry and political shenanigans as evidenced by the various inquiries into Iraq and self evident incompetence in development in Afghanistan, one can only imagine this will be like wading through treacle, wearing treacle slippers.

Whilst the UK has nowhere near the duplicated complexity of the US, the recent airline attack over Christmas has clearly shown what happens when one has too many agencies, each fighting for budget, influence and the kudos of ‘taking the lead’

Is the proposal just another layer in an already over complex situation and could we go some way to achieving the same goal by de-layering, not adding yet more red tape, although some duplication will be eliminated this is only at the governmental level. For example the existing Civil Contingencies Secretariat

A single unifying council has much to commend it, it is logical and would seem common sense but without any reform to the underlying maze of agencies and organisations it will be facing an uphill struggle from day one.

Perhaps this is a proposal that does not go far enough.

2.2 National Security Strategy

The National Security Council will be tasked with the creation of an overarching national security strategy and updating it at least once per Parliament. The NSS will set the long term framework across government for all security related work including the Strategic Defence and Security Review by;

• Defining and prioritising the UK’s national security goals and interests and the key risks to them
• Clarifying the strategic connections between different risks
• Focusing Departmental attention on these strategic connections and clearly identifying where cross-Departmental working is required
• Developing a cross-Government planning process that can be applied to each interest/risk and which brings together different national instruments
• Informing the development of sub-strategies within it (such as the Government’s counter-terrorism strategy, known as ‘Contest’), by relating broad priorities and policies to them.

Sensibly it will start with a comprehensive and systemic risk assessment with all priorities and policies flowing from that.

The scrutiny and governance aspects are also to be welcomed.

2.3 Strategic Defence and Security Review

The second major task of the NSC will be to oversee and produce a long overdue Strategic Defence and Security Review. Ominously the report states that Equipment programmes cannot be based on wish-lists or the fantasy world of what we would like to do if resources were unlimited

So that’s CVF, JCA, A400, FRES and FSC, T3, FSC and a whole host of other programmes off the menu then.

This section seems to contradict itself

Twenty years ago the Berlin Wall fell, the Cold War ended and the last Soviet tank retreated from Afghanistan. Few defence experts predicted in 1989 that a thousand weeks later British troops would be fighting in Afghanistan, or that by 2001 terrorists trained in the ungoverned areas of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border would have turned airliners into guided missiles or that by 2005 young men born in Britain and trained in Pakistan would have killed themselves and many others on the London Underground.

This basically says that the world is an unpredictable place but then the report goes on to say

That means calibrating our role and our capabilities to the sort of conflicts which are most likely to arise in the next twenty years not the last twenty

So now it seems we can see into the future!

There is nothing wrong in this approach, even with the unpredictability of the world in mind a reasonable approximation of the future can be made but we must retain enough of the balanced capability to hedge against those things that we cannot see, that just might need something we have ditched.

It talks of Cold War capabilities yet it was these that brought success in Iraq and whilst one might think that fast jets are a throwback to another era the operation in Afghanistan would be impossible without them.

Stronger integration with partners, especially the US would seem to be an objective so this means that some capabilities will be reduced, i.e. we will not pursue a balanced force approach, playing to our strengths.

Without seeing the results the review it is hard to make any comment but our oft stated position is broadly the same, specialising in what we do best and over resourcing fewer capabilities yet still retaining a small but balanced capability as a hedge against the unforeseen, which we all know cannot be foreseen!

Reaffirming that the United Kingdom is an open, outward facing nation of considerable influence this sections covers the issue of how we might perceive our global role. After reading the section it is hard to see what is different from any other political party and it does not actually highlight any changes or solid proposals, mostly ‘is’ and ‘are’ rather than ‘will’

1.1 The response to changing threats

Todays threats are indeed more complex but have been so since the last strategic defence review in 1998. The substantive proposal is to ‘understand what is happening and respond sensibly’

Oh, that alright then

1.2 Labours record

As might be expected this is just a list of Labours failings, not sure what place this has in a strategy paper that is forward looking but why miss the opportunity of scoring political points, even if many of the things highlighted were either exactly the same under the last Conservative government or had their roots in Conservative government policies of old. The accompanying Green Paper does omit the Labour bashing section.

1.3 Conservative Solutions

This is simply a summary of good intentions and what changes will be put in place, more detail follows in the subsequent sections.

There will be a fundamental reorganisation of the relationships between foreign and domestic policy with regards to security and resilience.

This is long overdue and should be applauded.

• Add 10,000 to the Army
• Forget balancing the forces
• Root out amateurism everywhere

For much of the article he makes sense but veers into the ridiculous when discussing the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force. I generally don’t indulge in ad hominen attacks preferring to look at the argument rather than the person making it but could the author be accused of seeing the future through green (ex Army Colonel that he is) rather than purple tinted spectacles, a product of his background.

It is true that there lies in front of the UK some serious and difficult decisions, at stake is the very security of the nation and the future of the armed forces.

In the red corner we have the balanced forces argument in which it is maintained that we should maintain a balanced force able to react to any eventuality in an increasingly unpredictable world. This is undoubtedly the most sensible thing to do, who could have predicted in the last 20 years we would have been engaged in operations from peacekeeping to integrated armoured manoeuvre. The single problem with this approach is that of funding, if there was political will to maintain a credible balanced force the defence budget would not have been in constant decline since the seventies. Underfunding has resulted in a shrinking but still ‘balanced’ force that can do everything, but not much particularly well, our jam is being spread thinner and thinner. There is a very real risk of failure, Iraq and Afghanistan are illustrative of what happens when your balanced but weak force is held to account.

In the blue corner is a compromise being forced not by any strategic imperative, but a lack of cash. This suggests that the UK should recognise that we can no longer punch above our weight or maintain the full spectrum of capability but instead carefully choose capability areas in which to specialise and over resource them so we become an essential component of a more integrated coalition, partners might include NATO, the US, EU, Commonwealth or others. This approach also makes assumption and a reasonable estimation of what the future holds. It is accepted that the future cannot be predicted with complete accuracy but a reasonable approximation can be made.

The article suggests that the UK should be in the blue corner.

Allan Mallinson also makes the point that amateurism is not confined to politicians and civil servants, this is a vitally important point to make and in the current climate of armed forces = omnipotent, politicians = idiot, very rarely made. After Crimea the professional military underwent somewhat of a renaissance because failures were actually recognised, sacred cows well and truly slaughtered (the sale of commissions for example) and real progress made towards a professional fighting force that took to the field in 1914 and beyond, even though many of the reforms were led by civilians. The UK Armed Forces are in danger of believing their own press, dissent and innovative thinking seem to be discouraged. Iraq has shown that the emperor truly has no clothes but there has yet to be a professional recognition and reckoning.

Where the author destroys the credibility of the article, which is a shame because much of it provides serious food for thought, is in the treatment of the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy.

Starting with the Royal Navy its obsession with capital ships is criticised, this is fair enough, I have often said that the Royal Navy needs to kill CVF in order to save itself but for the author to then lay the blame for its failings in the fight against piracy and the Iran hostage situation firmly at the door of the Royal Navy, rather than over restrictive rules of engagement, the Human Rights Act and underfunding is plain unfair and an insult to those in the Senior Service that make such a vital contribution to the security of the UK. Yes, the Royal Navy needs to change but evoking the memory of Nelson isn’t going to help.

Finally, the RAF comes under fire with the author hurling the ‘Fast Jet Flying Club’ insult into the mix with the wildly inaccurate claim that the Typhoon (in fact, he uses the provocative term Eurofighter) is solely an air superiority fighter that is being rebranded as a fighter bomber. The comment about putting a roof rack on a Ferrari is as comical as it is both factually wildly inaccurate and demonstrative of a complete lack of understanding of air power. Saying the Typhoon is ‘no way of to deliver fire support to ground troops’ flies in the face of reality, Typhoon is developing into the most effective CAS aircraft the RAF has ever had. By the end of 2010 it is likely that the RAF will only be able to field 8 fast jet squadrons anyway, that hardly seems a fast jet flying club. The RAF does perhaps need to focus more on ISR and transport, the point has been made over several posts on Think Defence but again, as with the Royal Navy, change will be painful enough without the vague insults.

To summarise, there is much to commend this article and for me the best point is about being able to recognise our failings but the ridiculous comments about the other services simply serve to discredit the piece as a whole.

Headlines include

Setting up a proper National Security Council to ensure that the Government’s preparations for and response to threats and hazards are co-ordinated.

Creating a new Permanent Military Command for Homeland Defence and Security to reinforce on our capacity to deal with emergencies in the UK.

Enhanced cyber security, including a Cyber Threat and Assessment Centre (CTAC)

As might be expected of a high level vision, David Cameron’s recent speech at Chatham House was long on strategy and short on tactics, fair enough. It has been followed up with the publication of the Conservative Party’s Defence and Security Policy documents on their web site.

http://www.conservatives.com/News/News_stories/2010/01/A_Resilient_Nation.aspx

After so many weak performances and half arrsed announcements from the Conservative defence team in the last year we were hoping for something substantive, here it is. Instead of slashing the MoD Civil Service or offering gimmicks they have come out with a serious and credible policy document.

In this series of posts we shall examine the detail and offer our usual half baked opinions!

“Who put the French to rout;

But what they fought each other for

I could not well make out.”

‘The Battle of Blenheim’ – Robert Southey (1774 -1843)

A searching question was posted on this website 18^th July, asking what was the point of Afghanistan and what we are hoping to achieve.  Before attempting to answer this question, it is necessary to understand how our forces ended up there in the first place .

Following the attack on the World Trade Centre, 11^th September 2001, the U.S went on the offensive against Osama Bin Laden, Al Qaeda as a whole, and their terrorist training camps inside Afghanistan; this operation was known as Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).  The Taliban government which ruled Afghanistan in 2001 was complicit in the setting up of these training camps and in allowing Al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden freedom of movement.  The U.S then requested that the Taliban surrender Osama Bin Laden and a number of other suspects; the U.S also threatened to topple the Taliban regime if it did not comply.  Unsurprisingly the Taliban failed to heed the threat by the United States and their regime was subsequently ousted, with U.S forces invading the country in support of the Northern Alliance and anti-Taliban elements.  This was followed up by the limited deployment of the Allied forces, including the UK to provide support for the new Afghan government and consolidate the victory.  So, the aim of the conflict in Afghanistan was to destroy the Al Qaeda terrorist training camps and capture Osama Bin Laden.  The training camps may have been destroyed but new ones have sprung up on the other side of the border in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Western Pakistan.

So, in essence one of the main aims, the closing the terrorist training camps has been achieved, although only temporarily and the main suspects are still at large.  The aims of the original mission, Operation Enduring Freedom, could therefore be deemed as a failure, or at least just a partial success.

As with any victorious outcome in battle, the victory needs to be consolidated.  Sufficient troops need to be put on the ground to deny the enemy from regaining a foothold.  With Afghanistan the existing government had been toppled, the ‘new’ government came from the opposition parties that were in exile.  The forces which swept aside the Taliban was the Northern Alliance, this was a hotch-potch of warlords and Mujahedeen commanders left over following the departure of the Soviets and the inevitable civil war, the civil war which saw the rise of the Taliban.  It should be noted at this point that it was the Northern Alliance, allegedly under the auspices of Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, which invited Osama Bin Laden to Afghanistan in the first place, not the Taliban.

As the Northern Alliance gained power, they lacked sufficient physical and political strength to maintain immediate effective control over the whole country, hence the need for an external force to provide military support.  This needed to be done until the newly formed government forces were available in sufficient numbers and of sufficient quality to provide security with minimal assistance.

So, in 2001, following the Bonn conference, the United Nations Security Council authorised the formation of an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to assist the new Afghan Government, “in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim Authority as well as the personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure environment.”

NATO officially took control of ISAF on 11^th August 2003, and in October of that year ISAF was given a mandate to extend its responsibility from Kabul and the immediate surrounding area, to encompass the whole of the country.

The physical extension of this authority was phased with Stage 1 covering the Northern regions, this being the transfer of control of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) under the control of OEF to ISAF, and the establishment of additional PRT’s.

Stage 2 was announced 10 February 2005 and covered the expansion into the west of Afghanistan; the operation was launched 31 May 2006.  Stage 3, covering the South, was launched 26 January 2006 and Stage 4, launched 5 October 2006, took control of the east, thus fulfilling ISAF’s UN mandate to cover the whole country.

In attempting to fill a potential power vacuum it is necessary to assemble a sufficient military force and move swiftly, so back in 2003 when NATO officially took control of ISAF, what the United States and the Allies did was to assemble an absolutely massive military force and………..invade Iraq.

Afghanistan at this point suddenly dropped down the list of the Allies priorities, the invasion of Iraq diverted huge amounts of military resources and re-focussed political agenda’s; this action fundamentally weakened the NATO mission.  As the leader of ISAF, NATO should have provided a large and well supplied fighting force; this would have sent a strong and confident signal to the other NATO countries supplying troops.  This sidelining of the Afghan mission fundamentally reduced the organisations’ powerbase and weakened it both militarily and politically, rendering it in many observers eyes as obsolete.  This lack of confidence in the mission explains the reluctance of many of the NATO member states to accept a positive role.  This meant that the U.S, as the major player in Afghanistan, failed to properly consolidate the victory and allowed the Taliban to maintain a foothold in the provinces to the south of the country, namely Helmand and Kandahar.  The southern provinces have always been somewhat rebellious and difficult to control from Kabul.  When the Taliban were in power they managed to achieve control of them because they, being Pashtu’s, were on home ground and severely punished anyone who defied them, unlike the Allies.  They also imposed Shariah Law, which was favoured by the conservative peoples of the South.  Previous governments which had tried to introduce liberal policies such as equal rights for women, had always met with stiff opposition from the outlying provinces far from Kabul.

So, the reason why British forces are in Afghanistan is because we were part of the coalition forces for Operation Enduring Freedom, hence our involvement in 2001, and we are there as part of the NATO force which took over control of ISAF in 2003.  Our OEF mission was amalgamated into the ISAF mission in January 2006.  Our ISAF missions are as follows:

1. Security – assist the Afghan government in the establishment of a secure and stable environment by

• Conducting security and stability operations
• Supporting the Afghan National Army (ANA)
• Supporting the Afghan National Police (ANP)
• Disarming Illegally Armed Groups (DIAG)
• Facilitating ammunition depots management
• Providing post operation assistance

2. Reconstruction and development:

• Providing security to permit reconstruction
• Humanitarian assistance

3.  Governance – through the PRT’s, ISAF supports the Afghan government institutions

4.  Counter narcotics

The British mission to the south, Stage 3, was announced by the Secretary of State for Defence John Reid, 26 January 2006.  However, the decision to go into the southern provinces wasn’t made by him, the plan was endorsed by the NATO allied foreign ministers in Brussels, 8^th December 2005.

This operation was led by the Royal Engineers and Royal Marines who constructed Camp Bastion, and was followed by the deployment of 16 Air Assault Brigade, centred around 3 Para.  It was also announced at this point that the deployment to Helmand would last three years and cost £1billion over five years; both of these predetermined limits have now been exceeded.

Because UK forces were also committed to Iraq at the time, this ensured that any troops and resources they required were diluted; it therefore came as no surprise that the forces sent into Helmand were too few and over-stretched.  What also arose at this time was the realisation that UK forces were woefully equipped with the necessary equipment to fight a vicious and protracted counter insurgency campaign.

Given the toppling of the Taliban in 2001, there has been a significant delay in the establishment of sufficiently sized force to counter an insurgency campaign.  This has allowed the insurgent forces, which are a mixture of Taliban, Al Qaeda and any miscreant with a Kalashnikov, to achieve a significant revival.  In addition to this, opium production, which was almost eradicated under Taliban rule, has increased dramatically which undoubtedly helps fund the insurgency along with a number of highly effective extortion rackets.  The current conflict at the moment is in support of the U.S and the ISAF mission, and we are fighting a war of attrition with the Taliban to see which side breaks first; unfortunately no-one seems to be in the mood to back down.

Although we may now understand why UK forces are in Afghanistan, the above doesn’t actually fully explain the point of it all.  President Obama and Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s assurances that we’re there to prevent terrorist attacks at home, have little credibility as the terrorist training camps have merely moved, such is the nature of terrorism.  The terrorist attacks in the UK have been purported by those born here, albeit with some support and direction from Pakistan, and that is where are biggest threat lies, not from the Taliban; in this sense Afghanistan is not our war.  The point of our troops being there is merely to support the ISAF and the U.S mission as part of NATO, not to directly protect the UK.

The irony of the situation is that the U.S and the U.K supported the Mujahedeen when they were fighting the Soviets, support which was quickly withdrawn once Soviet forces left Afghanistan.  Having left the nation to its own devices, and letting it suffer greatly in the process, the situation we are now deeply involved in could have been avoided had we taken the time and given the funding to help rebuild the nation; the current conflict was therefore created indirectly by our own hand.  So, in fighting global terrorism, perhaps it is also time to take a long and sober look at our foreign policy and its global impact rather than just fighting terrorism per se.

As a country we have supported the U.S in both Iraq and Afghanistan, more than any other nation.  Whatever assurances the then Prime Minister Tony Blair gave the U.S following 9/11, after eight years of conflict we have more than fulfilled our obligation.  Because we are fighting in Afghanistan, not for ourselves, but as part of NATO, it is time to question the viability of having NATO in command of ISAF and whether Stage 3 of the UN mandate to control the south of the country is actually an achievable goal.  Unless there are significant signs that we can achieve a victory in southern Afghanistan in the short term, then it is time to seriously consider pulling out and focus our attention, our troops and our resources on fighting the real enemy, the global terrorist networks, not the Taliban.

Richard Stockley

12. A full review of the UK’s defence requirements is needed urgently, but this review should form an integral part of a wider Strategic Review of Security. It should not be a Strategic Defence Review conducted in isolation from the rest of government thinking on national security risks and responses. The defence component of this wider review should focus on increased capability specialisation; capabilities required to handle risks that are specific to the UK; a reduced commitment to the full

Spectrum of conventional war fighting capability; an emphasis on post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction capabilities; and a new approach to the UK’s nuclear deterrent, Trident

This makes a lot of sense, combining defence in with a wider review of strategic security issues is an obvious ‘good idea’ although the recommendation makes the assumption that we need to reduce commitment to the full spectrum of war fighting capability and concentrate on stabilisation and reconstruction capabilities. This alone is worthy of a prolonged debate, do we maintain a balanced capability able to flex up to full war or down to a low intensity operation or move the force balance away from capabilities to meet the challenge of interstate war.

13. The future defence investment programme should pursue greater UK defence capability specialisation within the context of a deepening of European defence integration and the wider NATO alliance of which we are apart. We need a focus on command and control assets, tactical ground-air support, heavy lift aircraft, cyber warfare capability, and special-forces. We also need to emphasise high quality Service personnel training and an increase in overall service numbers.

We absolutely refute the recommendation that the UK should deepen European defence integration. Given the recent farcical EU mission to Dharfur and ongoing ‘commitment issues’ in Afghanistan our EU partners are simply too unreliable and any further integration would be beset with the same old national priorities and self interest that are the current realities. Whilst one should be under no illusions about our position in the transatlantic ‘special relationship’ we must recognise that the US, NATO and even the Commonwealth represent the future of our security. The EU is simply unable to commit to any operation where there is any serious opposition and we need to be realistic. The selection of capabilities that we need to concentrate on also seem rather ill thought through and arbitrary, lacking any real insight or recognition of where our EU partners might take up the slack in the areas we neglect. The desire to concentrate on high quality training and an increase in overall numbers is sensible.

14. The Government should give high priority to the capabilities required to deal with a range of UK-specific security challenges. These might include major civil contingencies, major terrorist incidents on UK territory, small scale risks to UK communities living abroad, and some elements of maritime security.

The MoD and government have in recent years developing a strategy and doctrine for civil resilience that explicitly excludes the military in all but the most extreme cases, see JDP2-02 for further reading and the civil defence sector, primarily local authorities and emergency services, have made significant headway under the guidance of the civil contingencies secretariat and Civil Contingencies Act.

That said, the military brings a range of unique capabilities that can contribute significantly to the response phase of a major civil or security incident and the recent summer flooding demonstrated that these organisations and operators of the critical national infrastructure still require military resources in times of extremes.

Is it a reasonable expectation for a nation to draw on these capabilities during times of significant distress, we think so.

It is definitely worth looking at how the military can contribute more to an integrated civil response capability, resources permitting.

15. The Government should thoroughly re-examine, as part of a Strategic Review of Security, its projected defence equipment requirements. This re-examination should explore all viable options for capability downgrading and quantity reductions, as well as for complete cancellation of some equipment programmes. For illustrative rather than comprehensive purposes, we suggest that programmes such as the Future Carrier, the Joint Strike Fighter, and purchases of Type 45 Destroyers and of Astute class submarines should be in the frame.

No programme or capability should be off limits in any review but the recommendation here is to trade off so called high end assets in favour of the unconventional capabilities discussed elsewhere, for example special-forces or close air support. Although only mentioned for illustrative purposes those in the frame would seem to centre on the maritime domain, these would not be easy choices. Without, for example, the Type 45 destroyers, any amphibious or maritime task group would be completely vulnerable to air and missile attack.

16. The UK should create a Stabilisation and Reconstruction Force, only the headquarters of which should be a permanent standing element.  This would be a joint civilian-military force, partly staffed from a trained civilian reserve, capable of being deployed in to still dangerous post-conflict environments at short notice.

We like this idea, it makes a lot of sense but issues of force protection and integration of civilian and military capabilities, aims and objectives would need to be carefully managed. The current three way tug of war between the MoD, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and UK Aid (DfID) creates neither economies of scale or effectiveness of application.

We believe the woeful UK Aid should be disbanded and primacy once again given to the FCO, wielding the capabilities of defence and aid with a single purpose, the advancement of UK security and interests.

17. The future of Britain’s independent nuclear deterrent should be considered as an integral part of the recommended Strategic Review of Security. This should consider:

Whether, as the Commission believes is the case, a minimum UK deterrent is still needed

• The best and most cost-effective way to provide it, including consideration of whether we should replace the Trident system, as is currently planned, seek to extend the life of the current system further or decide that some other system for providing Britain’s deterrent in a nuclear armed world would be better suited to the strategic circumstances in which we then find ourselves
• The opportunity costs of maintaining our deterrent, in all its possible forms, for other sectors of the UK defence and security budget. This must take into account the costs that would be involved in decommissioning Trident and its facilities.

We also believe the UK nuclear capability is intimately tied into our security and status as a nation and in these matters perception IS reality. We must not be perceived, in the growing uncertainty and proliferation in the next 50 years, as going weak on our ultimate means of security. There may be more economic means of wielding the system but whatever means chosen, it must be credible, effective, instantly deployable and survivable. These factors point to a submarine launched system, i.e. Trident or its replacement.

18. In order to maintain the option of refreshing the current system as part of the Strategic Review of Security, the UK should continue with the crucial ongoing preparatory work on the concept, design and assessment phases of the Trident refresh.

Agreed

19. To provide maximum additional flexibility in our position, the UK should also now recommence detailed exploratory work on the costs and viability of a further run-on, beyond 2024, of the existing Vanguard submarine hulls, so that the Strategic Review of Security, should it conclude that Trident is the appropriate way to go, can also consider this option if desired.

Agreed

20. Finally, before any further decision of substance is taken on this matter, Parliament must have a further opportunity to vote

Again, agreed

Our response is here

1. The Government should direct more resources at the situation in Pakistan, both in terms of capacity building and operational support to help the Pakistani security forces deal directly with the threat from militants, and in terms of development assistance

Yes, but these resources must be closely linked to the UK’s security

2. In relation to Afghanistan, while acknowledging the need for a long-term commitment on the UK’s part, the Commission believes we need much more clarity and realism on the nature of the end state we are there to help deliver. The focus needs to be on helping the writ of the democratically elected government in Kabul run throughout the country, and on preventing Afghanistan from being used as a base from which to attack us. It should not be on trying to implant our own cultural norms in a country that is not ours.

Democracy is a Western cultural norm and not automatically the answer. The end state must not be a stable democracy per se but an improved security situation that does not provide a safe haven for terrorism that destabilises the region and ultimately provides a springboard for the export of that terrorism.

3. The international community needs a single plan for Afghanistan, developed in partnership with the Afghan authorities, with tightly defined priorities and a determination by all members of the international community to operate it with real unity of purpose and voice

Yes, but easier said than done. That should not deter us.

4. The use of military force, both in Afghanistan and in the border areas of Pakistan, must be locked more firmly with in a coherent political plan that is designed to defeat the adversaries we face

Yes

5. The UK government should, with international partners, further develop its efforts at narcotics eradication in Afghanistan by pursuing a multidimensional strategy focused on crop destruction, livelihood substitution, and dealer network disruption. This will help both to develop Afghanistan’s legal economy and to undercut the Taliban, which profits from the narcotics trade.

Our previous strategies with regard to poppy eradication have been woeful, disconnected from reality and resulting both in record poppy crop numbers and a growing alienation in the ordinary rural community.

Evidently what we are doing has not worked.

Meddling with economic reality by buying opium poppy is simply naive and should be vigorously resisted. Another problem is the corruption and poor governance that accompanies narcotics economies, this makes any top down enforcement strategies almost impossible. In the short term we may have to recognise that there is little we can do, concentrating on the security situation and building the infrastructure and agricultural development of impoverished rural communities that will provide a realistic alternative to the poppy. Only from the ground up will the situation be resolved, with the aim of undercutting funding for the Taleban.

6. The Government should support and encourage the US to pursue a wider regional approach to improving the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan

If Pakistan and India could make progress on the Kashmir situation this would provide both political and resource benefits. We must recognise our limitations and encourage the USA to devote resource to resolving or at least de-escalating the tensions between India and Paikistan.

7. The UK’s capacity for combined civilian-military stabilisation and reconstruction operations must quickly grow in-country and increasingly be Afghanised where possible. We have been good at winning military victories in Afghanistan, but less good at building a stable peace afterwards

Yes, we have been good at winning tactical battles but the wider strategic situation still favours the Taleban and the desire to involve more Afghan forces such as the ANP and ANA can bring its own problems, especially the child raping ANP.

There is no silver bullet but we need numbers and the only pragmatic way to achieve that is with Afghan forces, however imperfect.

We also have to bolster the legitimacy of the Afghan government and security forces and the single most important part of this is tackling corruption. Corruption was one of the reasons the Taleban enjoyed such strong local support and as we empower the often warlord influenced local forces we simply reinforce the old ways of corruption and make our job impossible.

Context

There is no doubt that a defence review is well overdue and the recent announcement by the MoD that one will take place is welcome news. Whether it reports before the next general election is of course another point, any incoming Conservative government will have their own ideas. The IPPR report is not to be scoffed at because of the breadth and depth of it’s analysis. Many commentators have chosen to characterise it as left wing rubbish produced by a pet New Labour think tank. This is to do the report a disservice; it deserves some consideration even if one might not agree with its conclusions.

The report summary is split into 4 parts, a set of observations on the current security environment, a statement of principles that should underpin the UK’s response to this environment, a summary of conclusions and finally a list of its 109 recommendations.

Observations

Without seeking to repeat verbatim what the report states (go and read it yourself) they are summarise here;

• The process of globalisation and power diffusion continues
• Unstable and fragile states are growing in number and outnumber stables ones by 2 to 1
• Climate change, poverty and inequality are exacerbating the problem of instability
• Transnational criminal networks continue to expand
• A globalised neo-jihadist ideology has emerged
• Proliferation of nuclear weapons continues
• Rapid advances in information and biotechnologies have created new dependencies and vulnerabilities
• Humanity is exposed to a greater risk of pandemic
• Critical infrastructure is increasingly fragile and in private hands
• The position of the US is changing
• Individual EU nations continue to decline
• Spending constraints on security will continue and worsen

These all paint a fairly bleak picture but the report is at pains to offer some optimism and steers away from the ‘we’re all doomed’ position. It is hard to disagree with any of these observations; they apply equally to the UK and many other nations.

Principles

Underpinning the IPPR’s recommendations are 9 key principles, these being;

• The objective of national security is to protect the UK population from the full spectrum of risks
• These risks must have a wide definition including man-made and natural
• British sovereignty must be exercised responsibly
• Increases in multilateral cooperation is needed
• Extensive partnerships between the public and private sector must feature in security policy
• Demonstrating and establishing the legitimacy of state action is a strategic imperative
• A commitment to building national resilience is an integral element of national security
• A range of flexible national capabilities, both civil and military, should be forged into a cohesive whole

Again, there is not much to disagree with there, all common sense.

We will look at each of the chapters in turn.

The whole issue of why we are there, what we hope to achieve, how we are going to achieve those aims and how we measure success needs an urgent and thorough review.

Now