This Blueprint sets out the future operating model for DE&S in line with the direction set out by our Business Strategy. It describes how the organisation will ‘look’ and ‘feel’ by or during 2012. It represents an aspirational goal for the organisation to achieve over the next few years.

The Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) Business Strategy 2008-12 sets out the strategic direction for DE&S, its’ Main Board’s priorities over 2008-12 and explains the areas where the Board will drive particular development. The DE&S Business Strategy and DE&S Blueprint are designed to be read together.

Download both from here

Blueprint

Business Strategy 2008-12

A quick read through reveals some interesting stuff, nothing revolutionary or original but deserves a read.

http://www.cps.org.uk/cps_catalog/more%20bang%20for%20the%20buck2.pdf

It is my belief that there are two key issues facing the Armed forces of the United Kingdom.

The First, predictably, is funding

The level of funding for the armed forces is around 2.7% of GDP, this is the least it’s been since, well, any point in history apart from 1929-1934, the worst years of economic crisis the UK has suffered, to date, and at that time, demands on our military were virtually none existent, indeed, most nations were actively disarming themselves.

On that miserly 2.7% of GDP, we expect our armed forces to be able deploy two Divisions, each of three brigades, anywhere in the world, for high intensity combat, simultaneously, have an additional brigade strength force for an amphibious assault, a further Brigade strength force ready to be deployed on a UN peacekeeping mission, along with mundane stuff like providing air defences for the UK and air defence and garrison troops for the overseas territories, and of course, all the logistical support that requires, as per the SDR.

It’s simply not possible to provide all that with the funding received by the armed forces and meet the many international peace keeping, nation building and war fighting actions we are involved in, it’s a wonder the armed forces can rent the recruitment offices, let alone man them.

The second issue is with how the armed forces are controlled and funded by the government.

The Armed forces are not just told what to be capable of doing, for example, mounting an unsupported invasion and short term occupation of Country X which has the following military assets and topographical features, they are not even told to be capable of launching two separate invasions of indicated troop strength, they are told by central government that in the event of being ordered to mount an expeditionary campaign, what assets to use, these regiments, with this equipment, delivered to theatre by these ships, supported by this carrier, operating these aircraft and protected by these air defence destroyers, assets which the government may later decide not to deliver.

The situation is, as I’m sure most people will agree, odd.

My solution, comes in two parts, to solve the two problems, the first, is a basic agreement on the level of funding.

The Funding or the armed forces should be linked to GDP, and the tasks set by the SDR.

So, for example, an SDR requirement to maintain a brigade strength expeditionary force, along with the naval assets to transport it and the air assets to support it in a full blown war should come funding of, for example, one quarter of one percent of GDP, deploying that brigade overseas for peacekeeping should see an additional amount of spending on the military, and deploying it overseas in a military action should result in an even greater increase in spending.

Now we have set what will be spent, the contentious part arises, how it is spent and by whom.

It is my belief, that the budget, in full, should be given to a newly formed Tri Service Defence Board, made up of representatives of the three service boards currently in existence.

It would be up to them to decide the best way to meet the strategic requirements set down in the strategic defence review.

All decisions to do with spending the defence budget, from how many soldiers to employ, to how many carriers to operate, should be made by the armed forces board.

Government intervention should be limited to providing funds to the TSDB and providing them with a Strategic Defence Review every 8-10 years, with a mid term updated document, to outline what they expect the armed forces to be able to achieve.

Now of course, as a Libertarian and a Localist, I do not say this lightly, and would of course ensure the Defence Board met with the Defence Committee of the House of Commons on a regular basis, and indeed, the full House itself on a periodic basis, to ensure that the SDR is being met, and a vote of the House could over rule any decision made by the TSDB.

But, as a matter of course, the government should dictate the outcome it wants from a military action and the forces should plot the route to that outcome, and the equipment, troop numbers and training required to achieve that outcome.

Whether the armed forces achieve the aims set for them by the government using Super Carriers, Submarine Launched Missiles or Long Ranged Strategic Bombers should not be important.

The most immediate improvement would be an Urgent Operational Requirement process worthy of the name.

The current system is passable if you want to run a desert warfare exercise, discover your tanks need sand filters and then have them fitted within 18months, its less suited to subtle changes that weren’t discovered during an exercise.

A soldier in the field can quickly realise a laser guided anti tank missile that can punch through a metre of rolled steel is wasted on a mud wall, buts its quite hard to pass that up line and over to several different departments without it taking time.  Eventually, in this case, the argument was accepted and a lighter missile procured, with a better warhead en route as well, but theres no reason the next bright idea will be.

For example

The British Army currently uses the Apache Gunship as a convoy escort, a pair of which cost almost £100,000 an hour to operate in pilot time, fuel, airframe wear and maintenance costs, because that’s the Army gunship.

A PMC in Iraq used four light helicopters each with two door mounted heavy machine guns, as a convoy escort gunship, at a cost of about £8,000 an hour for the four.

If spending were authorised by The TSDB, four airframes could be purchased, weapons mounted and be deployed to theatre within a month for evaluation.

The TSDB could then make a realistic assessment, are the lower capabilities of the cheaper aircraft enough for the task we are assigning it, do we have something better to do with the higher priced aircraft, and can we afford both.

If the answer to all three is yes, the idea can be rolled out and operated in the theatre, if the light helicopters wouldn’t save enough time on the Apaches to cover their cost, it would be a military decision on whether the increased cost is worth freeing up the apaches for other duties.

In the medium term, the forces would be able to plan for the future much more accurately.  What the forces are expected to be tasked with, and the resources they will have to meet those tasks will be known a decade in advance, and if the defence board decides it will need one Super Carrier, Two Carriers, or Six Light Carriers, protected by six, twelve or eighteen air defence destroyers, it can try and procure them, if it cannot afford them, it will be up to them what capability is cut.

The Royal Navy and Royal Fleet Auxiliary Operate 108 Vessels with a total tonnage of almost 900,000 fully loaded

With modular construction methods, it shouldn’t be too difficult for the RN to order a certain tonnage a year, years in advance from ship yards, and because it’s guaranteed work, get a better price.

In the long term, once the Forces are used to buying their equipment based on what they need, rather than what they can convince the government they need

The early designs for the Eurofighter featured two models, a single engine, and a twin engine, since the RAF was politically limited to 250 fighter units, there was an in built bias to buying the best, regardless as to whether it was actually worth it.  If you’re going to get 250 jets, you might as well get 250 twin engine jets.

The official argument was that although two thirds of the cost, the single engine jets were only half as effective.  Possibly true, but even if it was, would the RAF have made the argument if they could have rolled the extra money, some £5billion in today’s costs, into another project, like a dedicated ground attack platform, or the return of infantry fighting vehicles for The RAF Regiment, or indeed, they could be adults, say that the army currently has a greater need, and The TSDB could buy MRAP’s for the next Afghan War.

Although there is a possibility we could end up with three almost entirely independent armed forces, it would be in the best interests of each of the services to work together, because a joint flying school would cut the cost of pilot training for all of those involved, and the money they saved would be kept by them to be used on other things, there would be an inbuilt bias towards cost effectiveness.

Of course, the Army might refuse to buy Lynx Wildcats, and insist on buying turbo props to act as artillery and mortar spotters, but as long as the House of Commons steps in before we have an Army submarine service, an RAF Tank Brigade or a RN space program, I cant see things being much worse than they are now.

Dominic Johnson

It was actually a good attempt at balancing these seemingly opposing ideals but in the face of market led manufacturer consolidation and growth combined with short term and falling defence procurement budgets it is crying out for a revision. DIS 2 has long been promised but has now been kicked into the long grass of the next Strategic Defence Review, due, realistically after the next general election.

The difficulties of maintaining strategic sovereign capabilities AND a competitive market are not unique to the UK, looking at the G8 they all have the exactly the same problems to a greater or lesser degree. If one looks at the major equipments of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia or the USA there will be found mostly indigenous produced items. Aircraft, tanks, rifles, ships, helicopters and transport vehicles are typically those categories that have a large proportion of natively designed and produced equipments.

There are of course some variations but the trend is to by ‘home grown’

We should also not forget that after the USA we have the world’s largest defence export industry, earning valuable foreign currency, paying tax and supporting thousands of highly paid jobs, whose occupants also pay tax.

It is very tempting to say the Armed Forces should have the best the world can offer and to hell with the industrial consequences, the emotion of this argument is hard to counter but it is just as important for the status of the nation and in a practical way to own the means of maintaining one’s own defence.

When comparing Defence with other spending departments it should also be noted that other departments simply spend, health and social security for example, only support the economy by supporting a workforce. Defence not only does this but makes a significant contribution to the nation’s wealth by virtue of these exports.

Can we make a special case for defence?

With the rough comes the smooth, trying to juggle these conflicting priorities means we often end up with unmitigated disasters, huge losses, cancelled projects, poor equipment and massively late into service.

This is not however, systematic of having such an approach because there are examples where UK designed and produced equipment is both world beating in terms of capability but superb sellers on the open market.

These aircraft examples pre date the formalised DIS but are still relevant

The Case for the Prosecution – Nimrod AEW

A shocking waste of money, the Nimrod AEW3 was poorly conceived, badly managed and technologically well beyond the capabilities of the time. After extensive cost over runs the project was cancelled and the US AWACS purchased instead. The E3 Sentry AWACS was relatively low cost in comparison and has since given sterling service. The 11 Nimrods converted to AEW3 standard had the lowest flying hours in the overall fleet but because converted them back to MR2 standard would have been too expensive they were reduced to spares stock. The current problems with the Nimrod may well have been relieved by having these airframes available.

Buying off the shelf resulted in a relatively quick and relatively low cost capability that has enduring utility.

Nimrod AEW3

The Case for the Defence – The Hawk Trainer

The Hawk single engine jet trainer has not only given sterling and unsung service it has sold like hot cakes. Although perhaps coming to the end of its useful export life users include the USA, Australia, Canada, India, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Oman amongst many more.

Hawk Trainer of the Red Arrows

The Case for the Confusing – Apache WAH64 Attack Helicopter

We could have purchased the Apache helicopter direct from the USA but seemingly gold plated it, resulting in it being late into service and hugely expensive in comparison. But, look at this gold plating and it becomes evident why things are never clear cut. Improvements over the standard model include folding blades so it can go to see (the USA have the USMC Cobra so folding blades were never a requirement for the US Army), vastly improved avionics, sensors, defensive aids and other areas. It also changed the engine to a type that was planned to be in service on the Merlin, much more power as well. The cost savings of this decision should not be underestimated; maintaining logistic, training and maintenance streams for two engines when one might do is significant. Invest in one area and avoid spending more in another or achieve significant performance uplift. In fact, the US Army are now looking to transfer some of the technology from ours to their versions. The first 8 airframes were manufactured in the USA and the rest at Westlands and the overall programme was a significant investment at about £2.5 billion. Roughly a staggering £35-40 million each, hugely expensive. This is getting confusing!

Westland AH64 Apache

These are just three examples to illustrate the competing arguments from a narrow equipment perspective. No doubt others could be found to show different arguments. The point we are trying to make is the knee jerk reaction of buying everything off the shelf is not the magic bullet it would appear.

Looking at some of our other home grown major equipments the export success has been poor, Warrior, Type 23 Frigate, Type 45 Destroyer, Challenger tank, SA80 and many others are hardly setting the export market on fire but they are definitely the best in their class. Another example might be the Light Gun and 81mm mortar, both designed by the publically owned Royal Armament Research and Development Establishment and manufactured by Royal Ordnance. These have proven to be both world beaters in both a technical and commercial sense. The USA even use both, being the largest user as well.

The system we have is not brilliant and there is still huge room for improvement but throwing the baby out with the bathwater is simply not a sensible option, commercially, militarily or strategically.

.

The report was due to be published before the House of Parliament summer recess. John Hutton MP, the former Secretary of State for Defence appointed Bernard Gray to review the self evidently poor performing acquisition of defence equipment, supplies and services.

Bernard Gray has good form in the MoD, he directed the widely respected 1998 Strategic Defence Review and has extensive experience in industry. He also worked as a defence correspondent for the Financial Times.

The MoD and PM announced the report will be delayed until after the recess and that the version in circulation is a draft copy only. Of course the final copy will be a far cry from the first draft, multiple revisions and a careful pouring over every word by officials will see that the final report, instead of being damning, will say…

“We have made some mistakes but things are improving, we have delivered billions of pounds of equipment for Afghanistan and we remain committed blah blah blah.”

It is likely that we will never actually see the report, its recommendations will be rolled into a wider review being carried out by Lord Drayson and this will in turn be rolled into the next defence review and the successor to the Defence Industry Strategy, DIS2, the elusive document that has often been promised but never sighted.

John Hutton stated in the last defence debate

“Bernard is likely to recommend changes to the basis on which the MoD plans its expenditure at the strategic level, including the conduct of a Strategic Defence Review every Parliament, and putting the Departmental [equipment and support] budget onto a longer-term settlement – as well as changes to the way in which we control and conduct our acquisition internally – the creation of a new, more powerful Executive Committee with the clout to ensure the affordability of the defence budget on a long-term basis, as well as some further possible changes designed to build on recent improvements to the effectiveness of our acquisition staff within Defence Equipment and Support”

Never missing an opportunity to score a cheap political point Liam Fox immediately demanded the report be published, saying it represented 12 years of incompetence.  As we have noted before on this blog the Conservative party have an equally incompetent record on defence procurement (Nimrod MRA4 and Chinook HC3 anyone) and have yet to actually come up with any sensible solutions for how they would reform the MoD.

Over on Nick Robinsons blog at the BBC a set of slides were posted that were billed as being part of the Gray report.

The MoD responded thus

“We can confirm that these slides have not been produced by Bernard Gray or by the Ministry of Defence and that they do not offer an accurate summary of Bernard’s draft report. “

So who is bullshitting, the MoD or the BBC

Tough one that!

What is of course most surprising in this whole affair is the shocked horror surprise exhibited by the media and politicians, if they had been paying even the most cursory attention to National Audit Reports, Defence Select Committee Publications, industry publications or the plethora of reporting sources over the last decade they would not be at all surprised.

I suppose if any of these outraged MP’s actually bothered their arses to attend defence debates in the House of Commons then their outrage might be perceived as being more genuine.

The MoD procurement system is criminally incompetent resulting in billions of pounds worth of waste and entirely the wrong bits of kit being purchased.

Really, do bears shit in the woods as well

with apologies for the shocking language and bear defacation references which those readers outside the UK might not get !!!

One of the main criticisms is that we have conflated the issue of an urgent off the shelf procurement with all its compromises and that of a more considered off the shelf purchase.

Perhaps this is a fair point, a more considered off the shelf purchase might not result in us being at the end of a long supply chain for spares but then again it might. There are examples of equipments that were procured in less fraught times yet still suffer supply chain issues and the consequences of poor contracts. There are also numerous examples of equipment that was developed at significant cost despite off the shelf alternatives being claimed to be available that have subsequently proven both excellent in capability terms but also in value for money terms.

Broadly speaking, we support the general aim of obtaining more equipment off the shelf but the purpose of the post was to highlight that this seemingly simple and consequence free route does have pitfalls.

Not the same pitfalls but pitfalls nevertheless.

What is needed is not a blind faith in the benefits of buying off the shelf or a slavish devotion to maintaining our sovereign manufacturing capabilities but a balance.

There are couple of variants of off the shelf;

Military Off the Shelf (MOTS) describes military equipment that is available without significant development effort, certification or modification. Some minor work may be needed to customise them for the local market. A typical example could be small arms ammunition.

Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) describes civilian equipment that is available without significant development effort, certification or modification.

The goal of utilising off the shelf products is to achieve economies of scale, avoiding expensive bespoke development and small production runs. Military forces of all nations use a combination of MOTS and COTS products to a greater or lesser extent. Off the shelf products are also available, as the term implies, quickly.

For some supplies this obviously makes good sense and where timescales are tight and options are limited it may be the only route available.

The recent Urgent Operational Request (UOR) system has been a success in delivering much needed equipment to operations, although it could be argued that many UOR’s are a fundamental failure of planning and execution.

The Defence Industrial Strategy defines a number of capability areas where sovereign design, manufacture and maintenance should be maintained. One of the capabilities areas where sovereign capability was defined as not strategically important was vehicles.

In mid 2005 these two factors conspired to create circumstances where a military off the shelf product was the only solution. The increasing unsuitability of existing vehicles in Iraq against the threat of IED’s resulted in an Urgent Operational Requirement for protected patrol vehicles able to survive IED strikes. The issue of IED protected vehicles is a controversial one but there can be no doubt that the MoD was slow to react even though it had had much experience in Bosnia with this type of vehicle and the overall need for them. Incredibly, the ones used in Bosnia by the Royal Engineers for route proving were sold to other nations, subsequently turning up in Iraq whilst UK personnel were being killed and injured in Snatch Land Rovers. There have been many reasons put forward for this lateness including basic arrogance, a lack of appreciation of the threat and its wider strategic implications and the desire to preserve funding for the Future Rapid Effect System (FRES).

When the MoD did move, it was late and under severe pressure not only from the troops in theatre but a wide coalition of bloggers, political commentators, journalists, MP’s, the families of those killed and injured in lesser protected vehicles and former senior military personnel. One should also not discount the difference of opinion internally within the MoD. Whilst the decision makers were obviously against the concept many in the MoD were not, their voices could not have been heard outside but they were voicing them nevertheless.

The MoD therefore had to move and move quickly, despite some resistance from senior officials both in pinstripe and khaki.

The normal route would have been to create a  statement of requirements and go down the normal procurement process, a process which would have cost a small fortune and resulted in a vehicle available for service years after the conflict had ended.

The MoD did not have the time and therefore in the absence of a UK manufactured product (remember the DIS, vehicles are no longer part of the strategic manufacturing landscape) it had to look elsewhere.

Enter Force Protection with its Cougar product, a product that was saving lives on a regular basis in service with the US armed forces in Iraq.

Force Protection Inc Cougar

The Mastiff is a medium mobility design derived from the US Force Protection Cougar 6×6. Additional modifications included electronic countermeasures, BOWMAN radio installation, additional side armour to protect against off route mines using explosively formed projectiles(EFP) and a number of other minor modifications. It took only 23 weeks after the decision was made to procure the Mastiff before it was deployed in theatre, a superb achivement.

The modifications were carried out by a UK company, NP Aerospace. NP aerospace have have a long track record in modifying vehicles for use in hostile conditions, much of its business is for protected saloons. They are an extremely well established MoD supplier supplying body armour, helmets and the revolutionary CAMAC composite armour system.

UK Mastiff Protected Patrol Vehicle

First deployed to Iraq where they were an instant success the Mastiffs were eventually deployed to Afghanistan.

The terrain of Afghanistan is much harsher and challenging than Iraq and this together with the intensity of operations in Afghanistan combined with the extra weight inherent with the Mastiff modifications placed considerable strain on the vehicle. Without apportioning blame the demand for spare parts was significantly greater than planned for and as the spares demand system started to move it eventually ended up at the contract holder, NP Aerospace.

It was here that problems arose.

Problem Number 1 – none on the shelf

Force Protection inc in the USA were working flat out to meet demand from the USA and other countries and in addition US law states that the needs of the US military come first. Spare parts were increasingly difficult top obtain as parts were being assembled into complete vehicles as fast as they could.

Problem Number 2 – You can only buy them from us but we don’t have any, sorry

The second issue is a contractual one. The terms of the contract between NP Aerospace and Force Protection stated that NP Aerospace could only source spare parts from Force Protection, a fairly typical single source contract. This is not as mean spirited as it might sound and is simply Force Protection seeking to protect and maximise their investment. Force Protection had invested significant sums in design and development, created a large manufacturing capability all largely speculatively before the large orders came in. They fully understood that production would peak and then tail off rapidly as orders were fulfilled, Force Protection is a single ‘product’ company so seeking to protect an ongoing revenue stream after the bulk of manufacturing orders had been fulfilled is entirely understandable.

As one can imagine, the small print of a contract thousands of miles away was of little value or interest to the REME mechanics in Helmand but the result was a lack of spares and a lack of spares meant a lack of serviceable vehicles, the number of VOR’s (Vehicle Off Road) mounted rapidly to a peak of 30%. Substitute vehicles were forced to be used one cannot be certain that these replacement vehicles, perhaps Snatch or Vector, were attacked. Operations might have been curtailed in other areas because of the lack of available vehicles.

The inference is obvious, a lack of spares meant a lack of vehicles which could have meant unnecessary injuries and deaths.

After 18 months of negotiations the contract was amended, NP Aerospace were allowed to source spares from other manufacturers and the problems largely resolved. The Mastiff 2 with improvements in most areas including better suspension and axles is being used in theatre.

Roll forward and NP Aerospace and Force Protection have formed a joint venture in the UK called Integrated Survivability Technologies Limited (IST). The new joint venture will be the single point of contact and design authority for all UK Force Protection variants including the Mastiff (Cougar 6×6), Ridgeback (Cougar 4×4), Wolfhound (cargo variant of the Mastiff) and the Buffalo mine protected vehicle that is part of the Talisman route clearance system.

Despite these issues the Mastiff has been a great success but because of the speed of deployment the traditional and largely unseen by the public activities such as establishing logistics streams based on trials usage patterns, driver training, maintenance training and documentation were slower to be established, real problems resulted and the spares issue is perhaps the highest profile of many.

With the benefit of hindsight it is obvious that the contract between NP Aerospace and Force Protection was unsuitable but when the MoD is forced to rely on external parties, in this case NP Aerospace, for relatively simple integration work it is once removed from the small print. In years past this integration would have been carried out by the MoD and the contract for spares much more robust.

The UOR system should be commended but it creates many problems not least of which is the obvious need to buy more or less off the shelf.

By neglecting your own manufacturing and integration capability, either public or private, you are forced into a position of having to look on someone else’s shelf, after queuing at the shop door.