The source of this power is written evidence to the Defence Select Committee from Dr Sue Robertson, Subject Matter Expert on the Electronic Support Measures (ESM) system for the Nimrod MRA4.

The first thing we must note is that she was connected to programme, a programme widely acknowledged as being poorly managed, hugely over budget and several years late. That said, her evidence to the Select Committee is uncompromising and deserves to be read, after all, if we are to be a development superpower and bail out the Euro surely we can’t afford waste and inefficiency in defence.

The note is split into a number of sections and I would urge everyone to take the time to have a read, again, the link is here

Some selected excerpts…

I, like most people, assumed that the aircraft would not be completely destroyed until further consideration had been given to the capability loss and that it should be possible to “mothball” the aircraft in case the requirement changed in the future. The contract that MoD had with BAe Systems was terminated “for the Convenience of the Customer”.

However, despite appeals from many people, the government ordered the immediate destruction of the aircraft. The considerable opposition to this action led to claims by the Defence Secretary that the aircraft had not flown, that the aircraft was unsafe, it was more than 10 years late and that those working on the aircraft did not believe that the “technical difficulties” with the aircraft could be overcome.

There are four issues here:

• The implication that the Nimrod had not flown
• The assertion that MRA4 was unsafe
• The claim that the Nimrod was 10 years late
• The implication that those working on the aircraft did not believe it was viable

The implication that the Nimrod had not flown

Here is a summary of the flight history of the five MRA4 aircraft that had been flying.

PA01 first flew on 26th August 2004. It had no mission system, but was used for air-frame testing for the next 5 years.

PA02 first flew on 12th December 2004. It was used extensively for Mission System Testing and had completed over 230 flights, including testing in the McKinley Climatic Facility at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida and airfield performance trials at Istres in France.

PA03 first flew on 29th December 2005. It was used for Mission System Testing and had completed over 60 flights.

PA04 first flew on 10th September 2009. It was delivered to, and accepted by, the RAF on 19th March 2010. At the time of cancellation of the programme the aircraft was cleared for flight and had recently been flown by BAe Systems personnel.

PA05 first flew on 8th March 2010. Mission system data was recorded during flights of this aircraft.

The original plan was for PA01, 02 & 03 not to be used in service, however, it should have been possible for PA02 & PA03 to have been put into operation with relatively little extra cost, so there would have been 4 aircraft ready for immediate use.

The Nimrod had not passed its flight tests yet

Liam Fox, Secretary of State for Defence in a BBC TV broadcast on 27-jan-11.

The assertion that MRA4 was unsafe

A document “leaked” to The Sunday Times led to the following Newspaper Article:

“MoD Documents reveal that Nimrods had ‘critical fault” By Simon McGee in The Sunday Times on 30 January 2011

In the following paragraphs the italic font indicates the text of the Newspaper article. I have interspersed the text with comments on each of the “issues” which are mentioned in the article.

The nine Nimrod aircraft cancelled amid a storm of condemnation and at a cost of £4 billion were designed with the same critical safety fault blamed for the downing of an RAF Nimrod in 2006 with the loss of 14 lives. Liam Fox, the defence secretary, has been accused of leaving a “massive gap” in the nation’s security by scrapping the fleet of maritime patrol planes. But classified documents seen by The Sunday Times reveal Ministry of Defence (MoD) safety tests conducted last year on the first Nimrod MRA4, built by BAE Systems, found “several hundred design non-compliances”.

There are always non-compliances which emerge through a development cycle as complex as that of a military aircraft. They are either fixed, or it is agreed that they can be accepted into the Design. Either way, they remain on the “list” for ever, forming part of the record of the development process.

problems opening and closing the bomb bay doors,

There was no problem with the bomb bay doors.

failures of the landing gear to deploy

The landing gear never failed to deploy/retract. There were 2 instances of nose wheel door indication failure due to incorrectly positioned nose wheel door micro-switches – this had been fixed.

overheating engines

There are no recollections of any engine overheating during flight trials.

gaps in the engine walls

Gaps were found between the engine bay fire wall and surrounding structure. A temporary fix enabled flight test to continue and a permanent fix was later found.

limitations operating in icy conditions

There were limitations at the time of cancellation of the programme as QinetiQ had not finished its final testing. As QinetiQ provided wider clearances the limits on operating conditions would have been expanded.

concerns that “a single bird-strike” could disable the aircraft’s controls

If a bird had flown into the open bomb bay and hit an area 6 ins x 4 ins there may have been an effect on the aileron system A cover guard was to be introduced to mitigate against this remote possibility.

the most serious problem discovered by Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) inspectors at MoD Abbey Wood in Bristol involved a still unresolved design flaw. It concerns the proximity of a hot air pipe to an uninsulated fuel line, widely blamed for an explosion on board Nimrod XV230 on September 2, 2006, near Kandahar airport in Afghanistan. A three-page summary of the faults, labelled “restricted” and written on September 17, last year, stated: “The work being undertaken by the MoD to validate the BAE Systems aircraft’s safety case during the week of September 13, 2010, identified a potentially serious design defect: a small section of a hot air pipe was discovered to be uninsulated in an area that also contains fuel pipes, which is outside the design regulations.

All the control, fuel, engine and mission systems on the MRA4 were new design, the only parts carried over from the MR2 were the fuselage and empennage.

The hot air pipe which is referred to in the Newspaper article was insulated along its length of more than 8ft, apart from the last 4 inches, where it went through a bulkhead into the intake nacelle. The fuel feed pipe from the No. 1 tank travels through the same space between the fuselage and the inboard engine fire wall. Analysis looked at the likely failure rate of the fuel pipe, the maximum temperature of the engine intake anti-icing off-take and the likely usage time of the engine anti-icing system and concluded that a design solution would be needed. This was being worked on and a temporary solution was to isolate the No. 1 tank which would have resulted in a temporary reduction in flight duration. The loss of XV230 in Afghanistan was caused by fuel leakage into the bomb bay.

At the time that the programme was cancelled the MRA4 was cleared for flight by BAe Systems flight crew, but the process of flight clearance for RAF crews had not been completed by the Military Aviation Authority (MAA). The MRA4 was the first aircraft to undergo the process of release-to-service by the newly-established MAA.

The claim that the Nimrod was 10 years late

The initial contract for the development of the MRA4 was signed by the then Conservative government in December 1996. The in-service date for the aircraft fleet was slipped (to the surprise of those of us working on the project) last year by a year to autumn 2011. This would have given a total development time of 14 years. Whilst not ideal, this does not compare unfavourably with other aircraft development programmes [a table is then included]

It seems that the government has a naive view of how long it takes to develop and commission military aircraft, given the time-scales of other military aircraft programmes listed above.

If the MoD believe that the MRA4 was 10 years late, the aircraft would have been expected to have been delivered in 2000, only 3 years after development had begun. In fact the original in-service date for the MRA4 was 2003, which was in itself unrealistic.

For example, the Atlantique 2 was a re-fitted version of Atlantique 1 and took 12 years to be put into service after its re-fit.

The MRA4 is a not a re-fit of the MR2, it is a re-built aircraft and it could have met its in-service data of 2011.

The programme was 10 years late

Secretary of State for Defence, Dr Liam Fox

The implication that those working on the aircraft did not believe it was viable

BAE Systems are quoted as saying (The Sunday Times 30-jan-11):

“At the time of the cancellation of the MRA4 programme, we were working with the Ministry of Defence – in the normal way – to resolve a number of issues relating to the aircraft. We are confident that these would have been resolved to enable the aircraft’s entry into service as planned.”

Having worked on the Mission System, I am also confident that the remaining issues would have been resolved sufficiently for the aircraft to have provided adequate capability on its entry into service.

It is unrealistic to expect that any military aircraft will be perfect in every respect at the start of its service life. I would have expected that, in common with other aircraft programmes, the optimisation of the mission system would have been an on-going activity throughout the life-cycle of the aircraft fleet.

“….they were not even sure that they could resolve some of the technical difficulties…”

quote by the Secretary of State for Defence on British Forces News (03-feb-11)

[Comment]

The above is a slightly modified extract and it is worth noting that some of the supporting information, especially on MRA4 alternatives, is a little dubious, but the underlying thrust is that the aircraft was more or less at the final hurdle and ready for service, bar one or two faults that one might expect of an aircraft new into service.

The issue of the fuel line fault is clearly of note and whilst only experts could comment on the actual issue (not an ESM specialist) it should be clear there was still an issue to resolve before absolute final clearance but was this fault of such a magnitude that it justified cancelling the whole programme for. Again, I am in no way qualified to make that judgement but if the aircraft was indeed unsafe then the MoD should be seeking redress from BAe. I get the feeling that the safety issue, whilst important, has been over hyped as justification for cancellation. Some have reported that the MRA4 cancellation was some pathetic retribution for BAe being unwilling to let the MoD off the hook on the CVF contract.

Accepting the potential for bias and couple of dodgy points on MRA4 alternatives it is still a serious report.

The final issue that is highlighted in the evidence is the inference that the Secretary of State for Defence basically tried to mislead and misinform, or lie and bullshit depending on your viewpoint, which is pretty serious is it not.

Just to provoke debate, I thought we could split this into high, medium and low risk. I suppose I could have done it by capability or cost, but we will examine those factors too.

Before making my suggestions on what might be out there that we could purchase, I am going to suggest that the billion pounds sterling includes a capital purchase of aircraft, some contractor support, training (i.e. buying simulators, or simulator hours)  a spares and maintenance package etc.  I have no idea how much each of these aircraft might cost, but I am sure if you have seen figures anywhere, you will all chime in via the comments.

By the way – I consider “MPA” to mean a fully ASW capable armed aircraft, NOT an unarmed maritime surveillance type.

There are a number of other options described in the Think Defence post, The Future of the RAF 13 – ISTAR #07 (Maritime)

High Risk – New

Looks good on the web and no doubt the most capable solution I am examining here, but I also label it as high risk for one simple reason: it does not exist except on paper. Airbus is attempting to keep the risk low by using its FITS mission system which is already in use on other aircraft. The A319 would be very capable with extra fuel tanks for long endurance, an 8 weapon station bomb bay plus four underwing hard points.  However compared to some of the options, its big making it expensive to start with, and oh, did I mention, it does not actually exist yet……..

A319 MPA

High Risk – Second Hand

The USN retired its fleet of S3B Viking carrier borne ASW aircraft to the desert bone yards a couple of years ago (end of 2009). A 2004 Full Scale Fatigue Test by LM determined that the airframe fatigue life could be as high as 23,000 hours (the average number of flight hours on all S3′s at the time being less than 13,000 hours). Of course flying these aircraft from runways would eat up the life much slower than catapult launches and arrested landings. The main problem is that the USN removed the sono-bouy launchers and acoustic processing equipment during the 1990′s. However upgrades to the rest of the aircraft were constant up to its requirement. I suggest we could probably get these aircraft dirt cheap, and we could buy twice as many as we need in order to strip aircraft for spares etc. I label this as high risk because we would need to buy new (or re-integrate) original sonobouy launchers, the sonobouy receiver and acoustic processor of the Merlin HM2 could be fitted, but this would mean integration and would cost some money.

However its most high risk because integrating new kit can cause problems, which equal budget increases and delays.  However with respect to the rumour that the FAA might be flying the MPA’s – this is a jet aircraft which might allow us to keep some FAA pilots current on jets, and it only has a small crew of 4, so the wages bill would not be too steep !

See here and here

Low Risk – Second Hand

P3 Orions. Yep, thats what I said, Orions….. Building on its experience re-vamping Brazil and Spain’s P3s, Airbus Military will rebuild some for us, again using the FITS mission system. I suggest this is low risk as they have done the rebuilds before, and so this should be a known quantity. We could pick up old airframes from the USN and off we go. However, this is a bigger aircraft, it maybe turbo-prop but the running costs might be a bit higher. Personally I don’t like the idea of refurbishing an airframe almost as old as the Nimrods !

P3 Modernisation

See here

Low Risk – New

The jewel in the Airbus Military crown ? The C295 MPA is already in use with the Chilean Navy and Portuguese Air Force, and based on the earlier CN235 which is in use with many more air arms. With 11 hour endurance and 6 weapons stations this dual turbo-prop could be the optimum commercial solution. Procured as “Military Off the Shel” with out gold plating by MoD, the C295 could be the “good enough” solution to give us a low risk, viable solution for probably pretty low capital acquisition and running costs.

C295 MPA

See here

[TD, Jed, what about the ATR42/72]

Re-using Nimrod mission system components

3 out of the 4 options above are from Airbus Military and all come with the FITS mission system, which can be considered low risk as they have been fitting to planes for the last 15 years. We could introduce an element of risk by re-using some of the systems developed for the Nimrod. The Thales UK Searchwater 2000 radar (which is generally accepted as being best in class) springs to mind, so with TD’s mantra of : “commonality, commonality, and more commonality…..” in mind how about –

The A400M Option

Yep, I went and said it didn’t I !

I am not sure where I want to place this option on the spectrum of risk, but here goes:

You fit the Searchwater in the aircraft (and ESM and other antenna would not be permanent fixtures on the airframe too), but all the other mission systems, displays processing etc go into a purpose designed pod which is rolled into the A400M’s cavernous hold. The hold being much bigger than a Nimrod’s cabin I assume we would fit crew rest area, galley etc. The rear para-trooping doors could be replaced by port and starboard sono-bouy launchers. The main issue would weapons fit. We know there are outer wing hard points for hose and drogue refueling pods, a pair of Stingrays on each of these would be pretty low risk.

As the A400M rear ramp has a 6 tonne cargo capacity, would it be beyond our ability to design a reasonably low risk solution using drogue chutes to pull a Stingray out of some sort of magazine fitted to the ramp ? With the good ground clearance of a tactical airlifter, perhaps under fuselage hard points could even suffice ?

Of course the other problem is the A400M is not in full production yet, so it would take a while for us to get any online, but otherwise just thing of the commonality………..

http://www.airbusmilitary.com/A400M.aspx

Make use of kit we already have ?

I will finish with a more off the wall suggestion. We don’t need an ASW capable MPA, because we could simply upgrade ALL remaining (38 ?) Merlin HM1 to Merlin HM2 standard AND fit some of them (for shore based use) with the in-flight refuelling probe which has been tested on Merlin’s before, AND buy some KC130J fitted with SeaSpray 7500E radars (as the USCG Herc’s).  Or we could even get Marshall’s to refurb and upgrade some second hand Herc’s (or our own, like the two they did for the Dutch Air Force !). These aircraft could do the long range surface search and SAR tasking, while being able to air-to-air refuel Merlin’s could keep them on station longer when sanitizing the approaches to the west coast of Scotland for any nasties lurking in wait for our ‘bombers’……

To finish on a really, really blasphemous note, perhaps Marshall’s or FRA could even provide the Herc’s on a “power by the hour” basis…….. !

Original story here

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-12291372

Have scoured the web for a viewable ‘outside the UK’ version of this if you cannot see the video at the link above

Anyway, that will be £4.1 billion please, or in other currencies

4,7 Billion Euros

6.5 Billion Dollars

Still, we do have to save £200m per year, wouldn’t want to sacrifice the defence of the UK in order to fund colonial guilt trips, African Mercedes dealerships, Indian space programmes, condoms for Africans or government grants to make sure lesbians can play squash would we.

I don’t want to hear about lessons learned, smart procurements, intelligent customers or any of the other complete bollox that regularly spews forth from the MoD, what I do want is a public enquiry so the whole country can see why £4 billion, enough to give every single secondary school in the UK a million each, has been so shockingly wasted.

We need to find out who is responsible.

Some stories from the media

http://www.defencemanagement.com/news_story.asp?id=15313

http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2011/jan/27/nimrod-loss-massive-gap-former-defence-chiefs

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/defence/8284935/Scrapping-the-RAFs-4bn-Nimrod-fleet-risks-UK-security.html

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/defence/8285004/Nimrod-MRA4-would-have-been-formidable.html

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/defence/8285013/Analysis-Russia-will-be-delighted-by-Nimrod-decision.html

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/8284697/No-need-to-scrap-Nimrod.html

It is time to close the book on Nimrod but I thought I would end on a quote from Liam Fox about the SDSR

But defence as a whole will, and must, come out in a stronger position

Whatever, we need to move on.

So the question becomes ‘what next’

Taking a platform centric view, it was such a versatile aircraft with a range of capabilities that included anti submarine, ISTAR, electronic intelligence, anti surface, search and rescue, communications brokerage, land attack, maritime security patrol and many more. Its inherent versatility makes answering the ‘what next’ question quite difficult.

Below are 4 rather simplistic views of what it did.

Anti Submarine; the primary role was that of anti submarine warfare and many believe that this is an anachronism in the likely future hybrid wars amongst the people, but anyone who even vaguely takes note of current military affairs cannot have failed to notice the roaring trade in submarines across the global defence market. Modern submarines are very difficult to find and destroy and there is increasing use of improvised and mini submarines that should give naval planners reason for concern. Submarines can be a devastating weapon and what Nimrod delivered was anti submarine capability at range, unlike the about to be upgrade Merlin and existing Type 23 frigates. The capability of the Nimrod/Merlin/Type 23 (including the personnel of course) triad was without peer and one of those legs has now been taken away but we have to ask if the loss is terminal. One of the primary missions of Nimrod was to ensure the safe passage to its patrol areas of the Trident submarines and it is planned that this role will be carried out by Merlin and Type 23 which is not ideal because the anti submarine bubble around a naval task group will be limited by the range and endurance of the Merlin helicopter.

Anti Surface; the final weapons fit was not clear but it would have been capable of carrying more or less any of the RAF’s air to surface weapons between its wing hard points and cavernous weapon bay. In many respects it would have made an ideal semi strategic bomber, equipped with multiple Storm Shadow in the stand-off role and even with a large number of Paveway IV’s or Brimstones its range and endurance would have given the RAF a capability very few other nations possessed.

Maritime Patrol and Search and Rescue; providing long range search and rescue and coordinating the protection of offshore infrastructure would have been a major part of usage but in light of the move to a PFI or outsourced model for helicopter search and rescue, the complex relationship with the Maritime and Coastguard Agency and the need to concentrate on core defence tasks we might question whether it is the MoD that should be providing this capability. The UK has treaty obligations for search and rescue but this does not have to be delivered as a military capability. Maritime patrol is also a task that could be argued has more to do with border control and law enforcement than a military task.

ISTAR and Others; equipped with an impressive ESM suite, various electro optical sensors and a comprehensive communications fit the MRA4 would be a versatile ISTAR and communications coordination platform, but with the rapid advances in long range high endurance unmanned systems and the Scavenger project likely to include some maritime element many of its capabilities are or will be duplicated elsewhere.

It was the synergy between these 4 broad capability areas that made the Nimrod such a versatile and useful aircraft but it may be that we can resource the requirement in other ways.

Options

The first and depressingly inevitable option is that we never come back from taking a capability holiday, lean on allies like France and Ireland for SAR cover and employ the Merlin and Type 23 in the ASW role, accepting the reduction capability and an increase in risk.

As Future Force 2020 takes some sort of shape over the next decade the main question is should the maritime patrol and anti submarine role be covered by a single aircraft, some combination of manned and unmanned systems or gapped completely.

A second important question is does the SAR/Patrol role need to be covered with a military capability.

We might also look at joint capabilities with NATO allies and in light of our recent bilateral agreements with France on greater military cooperation, however undesirable politically for many, may also be on the cards.

For the overland and expeditionary ISTAR role the Scavenger project may yet result in a suitable system. Using Nimrod to provide full motion video coverage during the early stages of operations in Afghanistan was a short term expedient and has now been replaced by a range of other systems. Accepting that the overland ISTAR and communications relay capability area has been assumed by others the remainder is maritime patrol, search and rescue and anti submarine.

At this point we come to a fork in the road, on one side is the future where the MoD retains responsibility for UK search and rescue and the other is where that requirement it goes off to the magical land of PFI. Given the current state of uncertainty about the helicopter search and rescue and rescue PFI the outlook is unclear. If it does go outside the control of the services then there are many off the shelf options that any winning bidder might use.

Making the assumption that SAR/Patrol remains a military task.

Current cover is provided by C130’s and maybe even an E3 Sentry but despite the undoubted qualities of these two aircraft and the MoD maintaining they are suitable, no one is being fooled and the limited life left in the C130 fleet as A400 comes into service means that whatever happens it is not a long term solution.

In the previous post on manned ISTAR I suggested a possible option would be to reuse the Sentinel airframes and convert them to provide long range high speed SAR. Using an off the shelf radar and EO system fit, removing the DAS and the ASTOR system would allow a decent capability to be generated. A Sentinel based solution would provide credible SAR and maritime patrol capability but there would be downsides, the aircraft is not really optimised for low level searching and beyond locating vessels in distress or providing radio relay capabilities the lack of storage space, an adequate payload bay and under wing pods makes the dropping of any meaningful rescue supplies remains a difficulty.

Although this might seem attractive the capabilities would be relatively limited in almost everything but its prodigious range and also in the previous post I thought converting them into strategic ‘eyes’ by fitting the same Goodrich DB-110 sensor as found on the RAPTOR pod would be a better use of the airframes.

If we want to aim high for the maritime patrol and anti submarine role then there are two obvious contenders, the Boeing P8A Poseidon and Airbus 319MPA. The P8A is just about to come into service and uses a modified 737 airframe; the Airbus product is still in the PowerPoint stage but would at least offer some UK industrial benefits and cockpit commonality with the A330 based FSTA. But the question remains, why invest in these when we have just dumped the MRA4 which is arguably a much better aircraft, and more or less bought and paid for?

If Future Force 2020 were to include a maritime patrol aircraft that did not have the word Nimrod in its title then the lowest risk would be the P8A, it maturing in the same time frame, but it would be very expensive although we would no doubt be able to piggy back on the development path. The low rate production order has only just been placed for 6 aircraft for $1.53billion, or snip at £170m each.

The French have just started an upgrade programme for their Atlantiques and the Avismar programme is looking to supplement these with a long range and fast business jet derivative to replace the existing Nord N262, the Falcon 200 fleet and Falcon 50 maritime surveillance aircraft. It should be noted that funding has yet to be secured but it cannot have escaped the notice of UK and French ministries of defence that there are obvious synergies. Dassault and Thales, who have jointly conducted a mission assessment, are proposing a Falcon 2000 business jet-based option for the mission. The primary mission would be monitoring sea lanes and combating illegal traffic, along with search-and-rescue and medical evacuation. While the system is not primarily intended to attack targets, the ­Falcon 2000s would be equipped with two weapons stations under each wing.

If the UK and France did pursue some sort of collaborative programme based on a small business jet it would still leave the anti submarine role unfulfilled.

Something more applicable to our modest pockets would be the C295 MPA or ATR72 ASW.

The Airbus Military C295 MPA is a derivative of the well established C295 twin turboprop transport in service with many forces worldwide. The C295 is a stretched version of the C235 which also has a maritime patrol version; notable users include the US Coastguard. For the MPA version changes made from the baseline transport design includes the installation of the fully integrated tactical system mission suite (FITS) configured with four onboard operator stations, sonobuoy dispenser equipment, magnetic anomaly detector boom, defensive systems, 6 under wing hard points and a FLIR sensor turret. Endurance is stated as

Click here to view the embedded video.

One of the great strengths of the C295 MPA is its versatility, the rear cargo door and palletised mission systems allow the same aircraft to be used for a number of roles. Standard 463L pallet compatibility means that in an expeditionary deployment it can carry its own spares or other stores, as an example. The FITS mission system is mature and extremely capable, including search radar, electro-optic / infrared sensors (EO/IR), electronic support measures (ESM) / an electronic intelligence system (ELINT), COMINT, a magnetic anomaly detector (MAD), an IFF interrogator, a SATCOM, a datalink and a Link-11. Endurance is reportedly 11 hours or 6 hours on station at 200nm range.

C295 MPA Pallet

More or less in the same class as the C295 MPA is the ATR72 ASW which is a more combat oriented derivative of Alenia’s ATR72 maritime patrol aircraft, itself a stretched version of the AT42. The launch customer was Turkey and Italy has also started to purchase them in small numbers.

Endurance is comparable with the C295MPA, 7 hours at 200nm and is equipped with a rotary sonobuoy launcher, magnetic anomaly detector, defensive system, weapon hard points and a full range of sensors and mission equipment. Although they can be converted to carry cargo there is no rear cargo ramp like the C295 which makes them slightly less versatile but the reported cost of the 10 to Turkey was 260 million Euros.

Capital and operating costs of either of these would be significantly lower than the P8A or 319MPA but let’s not be kidding ourselves that they are in the same capability division.

Even if SAR/Patrol is hived off then the justification for a small force of ASW aircraft remains, if only to relieve pressure on the Type 23 and Merlin providing cover for the nuclear deterrent submarines as they enter and leave and a small modicum of long range support for an embarked task group. Going down the cheap and cheerful route allows some skills to be retained even if we accept the very real difference in capabilities between MRA4 and say an ATR72ASW.

Maybe this is a clutching at straws post but the madness of gapping maritime patrol and extended range ASW hasn’t quite sunk in yet.

## Other posts in this series ##

The Future of the RAF 01 – Introduction

The Future of the RAF 02 – Tasks and Trends

The Future of the RAF 03 – A Takeover Bid

The Future of the RAF 04 – Fast Jets

The Future of the RAF 05 – A Bargain Basement

The Future of the RAF 06 – A Reverse Takeover Bid

The Future of the RAF 07 – ISTAR #01

The Future of the RAF 08 – ISTAR #02 (DABINETT)

The Future of the RAF 09 – ISTAR #03 (SIGINT)

The Future of the RAF 10 – ISTAR #04 (Watchkeeper and Scavenger)

The Future of the RAF 11 – ISTAR #05 (Manned Airborne ISTAR)

The Future of the RAF 12 – ISTAR #06 (High Altitude Platforms)

The Future of the RAF 13 – ISTAR #07 (Maritime)

The Future of the RAF 14 – Strategic Transport and Refuelling

The Future of the RAF 15 – Tactical Transport

The Future of the RAF 16 – Vertical Lift #01 (Introduction)

The Future of the RAF 17 – Vertical Lift #02 (Basic Requirements)

The Future of the RAF 18 – Vertical Lift #03 (A Sensible Future)

The Future of the RAF 19 – Vertical Lift #04 (A Radical Future)

The Future of the RAF 20 – Building Regional Security

The Future of the RAF 21 – Summary

When the cancellation was first announced in the SDSR the costs already sunk and costs to cancel were a little unclear. With the passage of time these became clearer, at the point of cancellation the project had consumed £3.9 billion. The cancellation and disposal costs were only estimated but these have now been confirmed at approximately £200m

The project was cancelled to save £200million per year.

TOTAL COST OF PROGRAMME = £4.1 BILLION

I also sense some media spinning, the fact that the £200m cancellation costs include some compensation to BAe has been prominent in all the media stories, trying no doubt to deflect some of the outrage. Other less well publicised sources specifically exclude compensation costs.

The dismantling process has been in progress for some time, unceremoniously ripping out anything that can be salvaged. The speed at which the dismantling process has been carried out is reminiscent of the the TSR2, decision made, lets make it impossible to reverse. Whether any official photographs will emerge is not certain but one can imagine fairly draconian restrictions on contractors and staff regarding camera equipment.

Angus Robertson, a SNP MP who has campaigned for the Nimrods, accused the Government of “gross vandalism”.

“I cannot think of a single example of nearly £4 billion worth of taxpayer’s property being sawn to pieces and sent to the landfill. It’s an unimaginable waste.”

The following series of pictures are courtesy of Chris Ward and show the MRA4′s after being stripped, ready for cutting.

Nimrod MRA4 (in better condition)

Spot the Cutter

It is likely that Hill Demolition will carry out the dismantling and disposal of the aircraft, their specialist expertise has been used by the MoD on previous occasions as seen in the website screen capture below and if you look carefully at the pictures above you will see one of their cutting machines next to the aircraft.

Hill Demolition

To try and see both sides of this argument, there are some logical reasons that maybe, just maybe, can justify the decision but they are very very thin and there is a certain sordid quality to the spectacle of such a superb engineering achievement, that has cost over £4billion, getting chopped up and thrown in a landfill.

A grubby end

I write on behalf of a group of former aerospace workers and supporters in the North West of England, committed to saving the Nimrod MRA4 maritime surveillance and intelligence gathering aircraft from cancellation and scrapping as a consequence of the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR).

The gravity and urgency of the current situation cannot be over-stated. Within a matter of days the circumstances could become irreversible.

If MRA4 is scrapped, £4billion of public money will have been wasted on the programme. Five aircraft have flown comprising of three development aircraft, which have completed a test programme and two production aircraft, one of which has been delivered to the UK Customer. The remainder of the nine aircraft ordered are in various stages of advanced build. Scrapping these existing aircraft will represent waste on a scale that is unprecedented, even for this country. This at a time of recession when the Government claims to be targeting waste as well as cutting spending.

Moreover, the loss of MRA4 as a defence asset will open up a huge gap in the UK’s maritime surveillance and airborne intelligence gathering and co-ordinating capability. This is unacceptable for an island country heavily dependent on free movement along its sea lanes and at the same time vulnerable to the ever-present risk of terrorism. The security of shipping, offshore oil and gas rigs, offshore wind farms and nuclear power stations in remote coastal locations will be compromised.

It is just not good enough for the Government to talk in terms of an alternative, mitigating range of measures including naval ships, helicopters and re-deployed transport aircraft. Such a system would be incapable of operating, communicating and co-ordinating anywhere near as effectively as the MRA4, which provides all the necessary capabilities of surveillance, intelligence gathering, communications and air-sea rescue in a single platform.

The ultimate nonsense would be then at a future date to lease or purchase a far less capable alternative, possibly from the United States, the cost of which would have to be added to the £4billion which would already have been wasted.

In its response to the Commons Defence Select Committee’s First Report on the SDSR, the Government acknowledged and welcomed the Committee’s right to review the SDSR implementation proposals. This has not yet taken place and it appears that disposal of MRA4 is being rushed through before the Committee has had the opportunity to do so.

Therefore, as a matter of the utmost urgency, we call upon the Prime Minister and his Government to immediately suspend the irrevocable scrapping of these unique world class aircraft, pending further detailed review and consideration by the Commons Defence Select Committee.

The Programme: – Badly conceived, late and over budget.

But the Result: – A unique world class aircraft virtually ready for service with the RAF.

Then Cancellation: – A hasty ill judged decision which makes no sense at all.

Disposal: – Scrapping these aircraft would be an act of unparalleled vandalism with taxpayer assets; it would be the most disastrous event in the history of the British Aircraft Industry and will have a significant impact on the RAF and the defence of the UK.

Reconsider: – A final chance for Prime Minister, David Cameron and the Government to reconsider all options to save these aircraft from destruction before they are scrapped in early 2011.

The disastrous destruction of the nine production and three development Nimrod MRA4 aircraft moved a step closer over the last two weeks of November following the rejection by the Ministry of Defence of options proposed by BAE Systems aimed at saving all or some of the aircraft. As a result of the MoD rejection of the options, primarily due to lack of backing from the government, approximately 380 sub contract staff were laid off at BAE Systems Warton on the 24th November 2010, with a further 1400 staff at BAE Systems sites at Warton, Woodford, Chadderton, Prestwick, Farnborough, and RAF Kinloss put on notice on 9th December. The impact on people and the local communities is just one result from PM Cameron’s brief cancellation statement on the 19th October, where he dismissed the aircraft in just a few seconds. This hastily made, ill judged decision is the greatest blunder in the history of the UK Aircraft Industry and will have a significant impact on the RAF and the defence of the UK.

The following identifies why.

The Programme: The Nimrod MRA4 programme has had its well publicised problems and no pride can be taken in its eight year slippage. The original contract was awarded in December 1996 for the supply of 21 aircraft with the expectation of a minimal development programme. Although the MRA4 design uses refurbished MR2 fuselages, the MRA4 is essentially a new and very complex aircraft. The design and manufacturing programme was challenging and it eventually became evident that a specific development programme was required. A controlled stop was therefore applied to the production programme, while the three development aircraft went forward, achieving first flight on 26th August 2004. Initial results from the flight test programme demonstrated the previously unappreciated performance and capabilities of this “new” Nimrod MRA4, compared to Nimrod MR2, and allowed the customer to be comfortable with the reduction in fleet size from 21 to 9. BAE Systems were therefore awarded a realigned contract for 9 production aircraft in July 2006. The three development aircraft completed their design and development flight test programme in March 2010, which was also a momentous month for Nimrod MRA4 flying. On the one hand it saw the final flights of the trials fleet after a five and a half year, 1900 FH, 630 flight test programme with PA1 and PA2 flying into Woodford on 9th & 5th March 2010 respectively in order to be put into storage. On the other hand the second of the production aircraft PA5 made its first flight on 5th March and PA4 (first flight 10th September 2009) had the privilege of impressing the Chief of the Air Staff, ACM Sir Stephen Dalton, and Capability Manager (Information Superiority), AVM Carl Dixon, with a one hour flight on 2nd March. It is almost unheard of for a high tech programme not to suffer some cost growth and Nimrod is no exception. However, with the aircraft exceeding its specification time-on-station and the Customer happy to reduce the fleet size recognising the enormous capability of the aircraft, the overall programme cost has grown by only a modest 28% (from £2.813bn to £3.602bn) as clearly stated in the recently published 2010 Major Projects Report (HC489) from the National Audit Office.

But the Result: It is vital to stress that the Nimrod MRA4 offers a step change in capability in comparison with the previous Nimrod MR2 aircraft. It would have met the UK’s Maritime Patrol, Reconnaissance, Intelligence and Strike requirements well into the 21st Century. The Nimrod MRA4 would have fulfilled a number of roles: anti-submarine and anti-ship warfare and attack; maritime reconnaissance and intelligence collection; search and rescue; counter-terrorism; and protection of the 200nm EEZ and its fisheries, wind farms and gas and oil rigs. Performance data includes the following: -

• Gathers, processes and displays up to 20 times more data than the MR2.
• Equipped with more than 90 antennae and sensors and contains over six million lines of software code.
• Able to fly 6,000 miles or 14 hours without refuelling and can scan an area the size of the UK, over land or water, every 10 seconds.

The Nimrod MR2 aircrew, widely acknowledged for their world-beating maritime patrol expertise, who have flown in the MRA4, have highly praised the aircraft’s capability and its systems and were looking forward to operating the Nimrod MRA4 in RAF service. This view was supported by the Chief of the Air Staff, who said that he expected Nimrod MRA4 to form the centrepiece of the RAF’s long term combat ISTAR fleet. This supports the fact that the aircraft is truly a unique world class product with a performance capability far in excess of the new American P-8, which has less than half the range, endurance and weapon capability of Nimrod MRA4, is heavily dependent on support from an unmanned aircraft known as BAMS (Broad Area Maritime Surveillance) and is still in development.

The Cancellation: There has been an outcry of concern from many informed sources following the cancellation statement by Prime Minister, David Cameron.

These include significant statements from: -

• Secretary of State for Defence, Dr Liam Fox has put the point quite succinctly in his leaked letter: “Deletion of the Nimrod MRA4 will limit our ability to deploy maritime forces rapidly into high-threat areas, increase the risk to the Deterrent, compromise maritime CT (counter terrorism), remove long range search and rescue, and delete one element of our Falklands reinforcement plan.”
• Chief of the Air Staff, Sir Stephen Dalton, has said in a post-SDSR message to the RAF that “not bringing Nimrod MRA4 into service as planned will lead to the loss of an important and potentially highly adaptable Combat ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance platform.”
• Sir Mark Stanhope, First Sea Lord, said on Tuesday 9th November, at a Conference on the Future of Defence Procurement, that he is “very uncomfortable at losing Nimrod”.
• Sir David Richards, Chief of the Defence Staff admitted to the House of Commons Defence Select Committee on 17th November that not bring Nimrod MRA4 into service was a risk.

Minister of Defence Equipment, Support & Technology, Peter Luff has identified a number of mitigation measures (use of other assets and closer collaboration with allies) to fill the capability gap resulting from the MRA4 cancellation. However, these measures will be far less effective than the capability that would have been available by the operation of MRA4 by the experienced aircrew at RAF Kinloss. Further, the adoption of such mitigation measures will be at a cost, which has not been defined. Peter Luff has also stated that not bringing MRA4 into RAF service will provide a savings of £2bn over the next 10 years (£200m per year). However, this perceived saving has not been clarified. Did it take into account the costs associated with the adoption of mitigation measures plus the cancellation and disposal costs of the aircraft and other MRA4 assets? The answer must be no, since these costs have not yet been fully defined.

Were other options for the RAF operation of MRA4 in a more cost effective manner ever investigated, for example, operation from RAF Waddington instead of RAF Kinloss, or operation by BAE Systems on a PFI leasing basis?

Nimrod MRA4 could have been cancelled on a number of occasions over the past 14 years, but those responsible in Government and MoD have always seen fit to keep it going due to its essential multi role capability.

So what is different now?

The threats have not changed (in many cases they are greater the aircraft has completed intensive testing and is virtually ready for service. Cancellation would result in an unforgivable waste of money. It makes far more sense to allow the RAF to operate this extremely capable aircraft in the most cost effective manner rather than rely on other far less capable measures. The resulting operating costs would be money well spent ensuring the UK has the best long range maritime patrol aircraft available. It has been stated by Secretary of State for Defence, Dr Liam Fox, that it was a very difficult decision not to bring Nimrod MRA4 into service. It is apparent that this difficult decision was hastily made during the conclusion of the SDSR discussions without the full implications being known.

The resulting cancellation statement by Prime Minister David Cameron was ill judged and left little or no scope for reconsideration.

Disposal: Following the cancellation decision, BAE Systems, received formal notice to terminate the contract, but were also invited to consider any innovative options to save the aircraft from an unjustified demise. The company proposed some options, which all required support and further funding from the MoD. These options were all rejected by MoD since they had no funds from government to consider any such proposals. Therefore, plans are now being formulated which would see the task of scrapping the aircraft commencing early this year, with the intention of completing the disposal as soon as possible.

Reconsider: The Government has made much of the fact that as well as cutting expenditure to meet the budgetary deficit, reductions in waste are also essential. To scrap Nimrod MRA4 at this late stage would constitute a Government-commissioned act of waste on a colossal scale. Does this government want to be responsible for the message and images that would be sent out, following expenditure of £4bn, by the sight of these fine, fully functioning aircraft being sent to the wreckers yard, compounded by the fact that the strategic, military and civilian roles they serve, ever present and remaining just as vital, were no longer able to be met in an adequate manner?

To accept the impact on capability and the colossal financial waste in order to save an estimated £200m per year for the next 10 years cannot be justified. Therefore, even at this late stage, there is a final opportunity for Prime Minister David Cameron and his colleagues in government to reconsider the cancellation and disposal decisions. They must have the courage and integrity to take heed of the outcry of concern from the many informed sources since the cancellation statement, recognise the full impacts of these hastily made decisions towards the end of the SDSR and accept that there is a compelling case for them to be urgently reconsidered before it is too late to save these aircraft from destruction.

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This from the MoD today

Ministers and Service Chiefs have made clear that the decision in October’s Strategic Defence and Security Review not to bring the Nimrod MRA4 into service was difficult, but it will not be reversed and the dismantling process is underway.

There is also the small matter of a capability gap, no long range SAR, ISR or maritime attack.

In a written answer today, Peter Luff has confirmed the annual savings achieved by not bringing MRA4 into service at this late stage will be £200 million per year over the next ten years. I wonder if this includes the cost of flogging Merlin’s to death when providing cover for the Vanguards, inevitably introducing a future UOR to cover the capability gap and many other factors?

£200m a year is roughly twice what it costs for the House of Commons, £150million a year more than the budget for The Arts Council of England, £11million more than the yearly grant to the British Council and a £100m more per year than our spend on development aid for India, the same India that is buying 8 modified P-8A Poseidon Maritime Multimission Aircraft from the US.

Are we really stupid enough to spunk a £4 billion  investment up the wall and lose vital capabilities for the sake of saving £200m a year?

As the local protest movement moves up a notch the parliamentary questions are getting more and more interesting.

Angus Robertson (Moray, Scottish National Party)

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence

(1) for what costs his Department is liable in respect of redundancies for (a) BAE systems employees, (b) military service personnel and (c) civilian personnel arising from the cancellation of the Nimrod MR4A programme;

(2) which components of the Nimrod MR4A his Department owns; and what the monetary value is in each case;

(3) what the (a) current and (b) projected annual costs are for storage of the Nimrod MR4A airframes and components;

(4) what stage of completion the remaining Nimrod MR4A aircraft have reached.

The response is pretty eye opening

Peter Luff (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Defence Equipment, Support and Technology), Defence; Mid Worcestershire, Conservative)

Following the Strategic Defence and Security Review announcement on 19 October 2010 we have begun discussions with BAE Systems to terminate the contracts for production and support of the aircraft. Until these negotiations are complete I am unable to comment on the likely costs or the impact on personnel employed on the Nimrod MRA4 programme.

To date the Ministry of Defence (MOD) has taken delivery of: the training simulator and building (approximate value £150 million); one production standard aircraft (approximate value £90 million); various rigs (approximate value £100 million) and various spares (approximate value £10 million).

In addition, the MOD has funded the design and development programme, which produced three trials aircraft, and work under the production contract including the purchase and manufacture of components for the production aircraft. Ownership of components funded under these contracts is with the MOD, however, as they are an integral part of the overall contract it is not possible to individually identify the components and their current values.

Storage costs cannot be separately identified in the current Nimrod MRA4 contracts. Any future storage costs associated with the termination of the contract will be a matter for negotiation with BAE Systems.

One Nimrod MRA4 aircraft has been delivered, three aircraft are over 90% complete and the remaining five aircraft are over 40% complete.

The last paragraph is pretty stunning, we have ordered 9 aircraft, already taken delivery of 1 with 3 standing at 90% and the remaining 5 at 40%

One of the reasons we decided to get rid was because we could rely on our allies.

In the news today were details of Frances ambitious plans to update and expand its own maritime capabilities.

Aviation Week are reporting

A core element of the modernization thrust is the upgrade of Dassault Atlantique 2 maritime patrol aircraft (MPA). Dassault and Thales are talking with the French government about a contract to be signed before year-end to fully define the scope of the upgrade, which aims to ensure the MPA will remain in service past 2030, industry officials note.

France maintains 27 of the aircraft, with 22 on the flight line.

In the long term, the Atlantique 2s will be augmented with a new maritime surveillance platform, known by the French acronym Avsimar, which is to lead to a new aircraft that would be fielded around 2015.

So it looks increasingly likely that we are outsourcing maritime patrol to the French.

We sometimes get seduced by the ‘sunk cost’ argument where there is a reluctance to cancel something because the huge sums already invested. CVF is a good example, cancelling that might not save any money in the short term but the operating costs are significant so those sunk costs would be small in comparison with the long term savings.

From a financial perspective MRA4 satisfies the general rule of sunk costs but the running costs are relatively small, regardless of the capability loss so there isn’t even a strong financial case for cancellation.

Most of the costs have already been spent, as at July 2010 the total expenditure on MRA4 was £3.9billion.

The estimated total cost of the support solution up to the currently anticipated achievement of initial operating capability in October 2012 is £0.6 billion. In addition, the estimated cost of pay for RAF personnel undertaking the training until 2012 is £17.2 million

The Nimrod MRA4 is without a doubt the poster child of those famous toxic projects that the Labour government inherited from the previous one and is a perfect illustration of how good old fashioned bungling, political interference and industrial primacy over defence.

Two things have conspired to condemn the Nimrod MRA4

1. The word Nimrod

2. Political gain

Nimrod has a toxic brand identity; the wing issue, general bungling, £400million each and finally the safety issues. Despite BAe’s own staff and the types operators being absolutely crystal clear on how bad an idea it would be, the MoD and BAe decided to save £4.37 by upgrading old MR2’s to the new MRA4 standard. The ill fitting wing issue is well known and not worth repeating here but the fact remains that MRA4 is largely a new build aircraft, only parts of the fuselage and vertical stabiliser remains from the MR2 and those have been thoroughly inspected and re-lifed. For all intents and purposes, MRA4 is a new aircraft. The MR2 safety issues, accident and subsequent enquiry said more about the RAF and MoD than it did about the aircraft but there is no doubt even the MRA4 has been tarred with the same brush. A risk averse MoD and gutless government is simply scared of the name.

Secondly, there is maximum gain to be had by blaming the cancellation on the previous government’s incompetence in defence acquisition, what better example than a programme that would have delivered 9 aircraft at over £400million apiece?

But what are we losing?

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Capabilities

Equipped with 4 RR BR710 Turbofans engines the MRA4, on one ‘tank of fuel’ fly for 6,000nm or 15 hours, can carry a huge quantity of weapons and other stores on 9 bomb bay/4 wing hardpoints, has an incredibly sophisticated mission system (the same as the US Boeing P8 Poseidon), long range Searchwater radar, an Electronic Support Measures system, Link 11/16, a wider range of sensors and more communications equipment than you can shake a stick at!

All this is held in an airframe that can operate equally well from 200ft to 36,000ft and has been proven to satisfy all requirements for several months, the first has already been delivered to the RAF.

In some ways, it might be argued that the MRA4 did not quite have some of the capabilities, especially for

Allies and Alternatives

One of the justifications for the cancellation of MRA4 is that we can rely on a combination of allies and alternatives to fill the gap.

Allies such as France and the USA do have long range maritime patrol aircraft but the French ones are just as old as the MR2 and nowhere near as capable as the MRA4.

The US is currently in the process of introducing the 737 derived P8 Poseidon but that is making the MRA4 look like a well run project. The MRA4 is derived from a civilian airliner (the Comet) it is a sturdy design with an old fashioned thick wing and inboard engines but the P8 Poseidon uses the Boeing 737-900 as its donor airframe. The 737, especially the wing and engine configuration, are wholly unsuited to the kind of low level manoeuvring required for the role and this has led to all manner of very expensive workarounds to compensate, especially for operating a medium, rather than low altitude.

The proposed A319 MPA remains nothing but a design study and would face exactly the same problems as the P8 but with a smaller payload.

For some of the less warlike roles of maritime patrol there are a number of off the shelf alternatives but they are a very poor substitute for MRA4 and would have only a fraction of the military usefulness.

Anti Submarine Warfare is a particular UK specialism and one which we neglect at our peril. New submarine designs are increasingly capable and being sold the world over, many think that anti submarine capabilities can be filed under ‘cold war relic’ but nothing could be further from the truth. The west has not faced a credible submarine threat for a long time but that is changing very fast and as we reduce numbers and consolidate capabilities onto ever more expensive but fewer surface platforms the loss of even one of these to a submarine would be catastrophic.

For alternatives, why bother when they would be more expensive and less capable.

For allies, the Maritime Patrol role, at least with a military role, is an area where our allies are rather poorly resourced and the MRA4 would have been much more sought after than almost anything else we have.

Missions

For the impact of loss of the MRA4 the best person to describe it is none other than Liam Fox MP, Secretary of State for Defence

Deletion of the Nimrod MR4 will limit our ability to deploy maritime forces rapidly into high-threat areas, increase the risk to the Deterrent, compromise maritime CT (counter terrorism), remove long range search and rescue, and delete one element of our Falklands reinforcement plan.

Remember that letter!

To pick on just a few of those areas

Long range search and rescue is a treaty obligation (International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, 1979), one which we have been struggling to comply with since the MR2 was withdrawn (cobbling together a patchwork of capabilities) and will obviously continue to fail to meet with the MRA4 decision. Before withdrawal the MR2 carried out about between 1 and 2 search and rescue missions per month, the majority being beyond the range of a Sea King. Using a £400m military aircraft for long range search and rescue is perhaps a little overkill but using the Nimrod means the public purse does not have to fund a separate aircraft fleet just for the role. We might transfer this to the coastguard, perhaps rolling it into a revised SAR helicopter PFI deal but would this really be economical?

Nimrod also protects the Trident submarines as they enter and leave home waters, now this role can be carried out by Merlin helicopters and frigates but this means an increase in standing commitments from the RN at a time when frigates and helicopters are at a premium. The noise signature of helicopters is considerably more than the jet engines of the Nimrod and therefore much less detectable by modern submarine acoustic systems. Perhaps weakening the survivability of Trident will be used as another excuse to get rid of it by the Liberal Democrat’s.

Piracy was highlighted by the SDSR as being a particular threat, the MRA4 would allow the few surface assets we have in the area to be maximised and hugely improve our output.

Another huge capability loss will be the communications relay and ISR facilities offered by MRA4.

The real strength of Nimrod MRA4 is its versatility.

So, let’s keep the Red Arrows, increase the aid budget and shovel yet more cash into the EU but a capability as vitally important as MRA4 is tossed aside, just as it is coming into service. Perhaps the Red Arrows was a dig too far but its the sentiment, difficult decisions have been dodged across all three services.

Without sounding too hysterical, people will die because of this decision.

That’s not really very strategic is it?

UPDATE

In a recent Parliamentary written answer, Peter Luff MP (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Defence Equipment, Support and Technology) stated

But it is the aircraft’s future support costs that contributed to the decision not to bring it into service, despite its advanced state. Since the withdrawal of the Nimrod MR2 in March this year, the Ministry of Defence has sought to mitigate the gap in capability through the use of other military assets, including Type 23 Frigates, Merlin Anti Submarine Warfare helicopters and Hercules C-130 aircraft, and by relying, where appropriate, on assistance from allies and partners. Although it was originally assumed that such measures would only be required for a limited period of time, we are now developing a longer-term plan to mitigate the impact of cancellation on our continuing military tasks and capabilities. In view of the sensitive and classified nature of some of these military tasks, and the implications for the protection of our armed forces, including the nuclear deterrent, it is not possible for us to comment on these measures in detail.

‘Thank you for your letter of 18 May enclosing correspondence from your constituent, Mr Richard Stockley, about the MOD’s plans for surplus Nimrod MRA.4 aircraft.

I fully appreciate Mr Stockley’s concerns over the future of the two Nimrod MRA.4 trials aircraft that are currently in storage at BAE Systems’ Woodford plant, following the completion of their involvement in the MRA.4 flight trials programme. As Mr Stockley notes, the Nimrod MRA.4 is currently being introduced in to service to replace the Nimrod MR.2, which was retired from service on 31 March 2010.

The option to convert the two pre-production aircraft to production standard has been considered in detail on a number of occasions but the cost estimates are unaffordable within existing financial provisions. Furthermore, the essential operational tasks of the MRA.4 fleet can be met with a fleet of nine aircraft.

Mr Stockley’s helpful suggestions that the surplus aircraft be retained as an attrition reserve or retained as instructional airframes are, in fact, impracticable as the trials aircraft were not built to the same design standard as the production aircraft and are thus not representative of the in-service fleet. Either course of action would require a costly conversion of the aircraft to the production standard before the production line closes in 2012.

A number of options remain under consideration for the aircraft. However, on a personal note I can assure you that, should a decision be taken to dispose of the trials aircraft, they will be stripped of all items that could be used as spares for the production aircraft.

I hope this explains the position to Mr Stockley’s satisfaction.

You’ve got to accept that the man does have a point, as a nation we are skint and to bring them up to production standard will cost a packet. But as I mentioned in my previous post, there were three Nimrod MRA.4 development aircraft, ZJ517 (PA03), will be fed into the production line and become an operational aircraft. So the concept is feasible, unless PA01 and PA02’s design differs greatly from PA03. Also, the fleet of nine aircraft may not always be there, it only takes a ground handling mishap, a bird-strike or a hanger fire to seriously deplete their numbers, and if these two prototype aircraft were to be scrapped, where would the replacements come from? That to me is the most important issue regarding the prototypes.

Hopefully, with an eye on long term-ism, the airframes will be preserved and converted when the financial climate is somewhat sunnier – fingers crossed! On a positive note though, it is good to see that the MOD have at least given it some serious consideration.

Conveniently forgetting the last 20 years of MoD bungling, Chief of Defence Material, Sir Kevin O’Donoghue, commented on the MoD’s performance;

To have reached this point in a complex programme so soon after the assessment phase began in summer 2008 reflects highly on the Defence Equipment and Support staff involved

It may well do but please let’s stop blowing smoke up our frocks and suggesting that this is anything but a rushed, back to the wall decision, based on running out of time due to what is possibly one of the most inept programmes in the MoD’s sorry history.

Making such a significant decision so close to an election and Strategic Defence Review is ridiculous. Another few months will not make any difference in the grand scheme of things.

At least it looks like the term FRES has been quietly dropped, perhaps an MP might table a question to inquire about the total cost of the programme, including delays and UOR’s as a result.

The vehicles will enter service, as long as the assessment phase goes according to plan, some time in 2015. Given that GD have yet to actually produce the Scout variant, unlike BAe, does anyone on this planet have any confidence that this date will actually materialise.

No word on contract value yet either, expect this to leak out once contracts have been placed but it is expected to be in the order of £2billion, or about £33 million a piece, although this figure will also include various additions such as logistics, training and other support elements.

We should remain hopeful, at least a decision has been made and the vehicle may well turn out to be the best option.

In other spending news, the MoD has also agreed to buy 3 Rivet Joint aircraft to replace the Nimrod R1’s which are being withdrawn from service in, 2011, in fact 1 has already been withdrawn. The R1 and 51 Squadron were a serious ‘go to’ capability that the UK led the world in.

Again, with no credible alternative the MoD has been forced to buy ‘the last chicken in the shop’ because there was no coherent or credible replacement for an aircraft that’s almost exactly as old as CVR(T)

Before the end of the week, expect more, possibly for the next phase of the Future Surface Combatant.

Getting these orders in before the election sets the Conservatives up, should they win the next election, for a honeymoon period kicking from a newly in opposition Labour party, should they chose to cancel post SDR.

It totally compromises the next strategic defence review and smacks of politics, rather than sane and sensible equipment planning.

Perhaps we should be grateful for at least some investment. Normally, we would be singing from the rooftops but can’t help feeling that the armed forces are being used for political gain.

Some things change, some things stay the same.

PS

This was out 300th post.

This is the first of 9 ordered but won’t be in full service until 2012 as the whole project has been slowed down to save money. The original order was for 21 aircraft but this has been continually whittled down.

Nimrod MRA4

As the MR2′s are being withdrawn by the end of this month lets hope we don’t have cause to need a long range maritime attack and recce aircraft, you know, like somewhere down South