There is still a need though, what if we set our sights even lower than a P8/319MPA or even C295/ATR72 and looked at a very low cost replacement for the offshore patrol, search and rescue type ‘offshore tapestry’ tasks.

They would need to be twin engined, all weather capable and equipped electro optical, radar and communications systems with the ability to drop Lindholme gear or other rescue equipment. A pretty limited specification, no weapon systems but able to cover the majority of UK offshore tasks with the notable exception of ASW.

A few ‘value’ options

Viking Twin Otter Guardian 400

Viking of Canada recently resurrected production of the venerable DHC Twin Otter and have been getting some serious orders from customers as diverse as the Vietnamese Navy and Zimex Aviation in Switzerland.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Viking Guardian 400

The Series 400 has many improvements over the old model and its versatility is obvious; wheels floats or skis and the environmental hardening to operate in these diverse environments mean its legendary toughness has been retained.

Viking have also introduced  the Guardian 400 specifically for the surveillance, security, sovereignty and search and rescue market that has an extended range fuel tank (10 hour operations) and an electro-optical and infrared imaging turret which can be displayed on either the flight deck Honeywell Primus Apex Multi Function Display, or on a separate cabin console.

The Guardian 400  will be equipped with 4 crew observation stations, rescue equipment drop hatch, air operable cargo door, search light, and a galley with adjacent lavatory and not forgetting, 4 wing hard points for additional stores.

The basic model is as cheap as chips.

The Vietnamese Navy order works out at about $5 million Canadian each and that includes initial training and logistics. The target airframe cost is less than $4 million Canadian.

Doing some rounding, that’s about £3.5 million pounds including training

Hawker Beechcraft King Air 350

We already operate the King Air 350 for training and in the guise of the Shadow, using a maritime patrol variant would not unduly stress the logistics system.

King Air 350 Maritime Patrol

Costs are a variable with a wide variety of equipment and support options but performance is good, especially endurance and speed.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Britten Norman Defender 400

Again, the UK Coastguard, Manchester Police already and MoD already operate the Defender in one form or another so introduction would not be difficult but whilst cost is very low, performance is not exceptional for the role, perhaps too short legged.

Britten Norman Defender

Click here to view the embedded video.

Evektor Outback

A less obvious option is the Czech Evektor EV-55 Outback, a new aircraft design said to have very low operating costs. Although not yet mature, I am sure a basic EO and radar fit could be integrated.

Tecnam MMA

The Tecnam Multi Mission Aircraft might be on the small side with a modest payload of just less than 150kg but capital and operating costs would be very low, it is claimed they have the lowest operating costs of any similar aircraft.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Dornier Seastar

A bit of a wild card, the Dornier Seaplane Company have recently launched the SeaStar, a true amphibious seaplane. With the ability to land and take off in 2-3 foot waves it has obvious advantages in the search and rescue application and can be fitted with a variety of payloads.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Bombardier 415 MPA

An aircraft with a very long track record the 415 MPA is a versatile aircraft and can be configured to carry a specially designed jet boat (see the video) for sea rescues and able to operate in Sea State 3 conditions.

Bombardier 415 MPA

Click here to view the embedded video.

UPDATE

How about a few extra mid range options?

There really is a wealth of off the shelf options.

Elta/Bombardier Dash 8

The Bombardier Q Series Multi Mission Aircraft (thanks Paul) has been adopted by a number of users and the Q400 has a speed of 360 knots, longer fuselage and longer range. Teaming up with Elta, Bombardier are offering the Q400 MPA variant equipped with EL/M-2022A maritime search radar, Electronic Support Measures and MOSP type electro-optical sensor, and, additional communications intelligence COMINT array. The aircraft also mounts a side-mounted gun pod, aft-mounted countermeasures dispensers and side-mounted containers which could carry various stores, for search and rescue missions or other tasks.

Q400 MPA

Embraer 145MP

Renamed from the p99, the EMB 145MP is the latest ASW/SAR/Patrol varient from Embraer equipped with a full suite of sensors, mission equipment and weapons.

EMB 145 MP

EMB 145 MP

Saab 2000 MPA

Last in the list is the Saab 2000 MPA, equipped with, again, a full suite of sensors, mission and weapons systems.

Saab 2000 MPA

Although the strategy of deficit reduction would seem to most people to be entirely sensible one has to question the tactics and most of all the priorities that inform these tactics.

Maritime security is important, the UK depends on port and offshore facilities for much of our energy and trade needs.

This is serious stuff.

The deficit reduction plan has reduced security around our coastline and dramatically increased risk.

SAR-H, we covered the SAR-H PFI collapse a few days ago, whilst the existing excellent service will continue this lack of coherence and clear way forward will impact the service in the long term.

Emergency Towing Vessels, arguably one of the most inexplicable decisions the Department of Transport have announced that they will withdraw funding for the four Emergency Towing Vessels that cover UK waters. This was announced as part of the Comprehensive Spending Review last year but less than 2 days after the announcement, one of the vessels, the Anglian Prince was called upon the rescue the grounded HMS Astute.

The Herald is reporting that a report from the MCA highlighting the significant risk of such a move will be ignored in order to save the sum total of £12m per year.

HMS Astute and Anglian Prince

Coastguard Stations Closure, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency has launched a consultation exercise for modernising its Maritime Rescue Coordination Centres, this modernisation will see the 18 existing centres reduced to 2. Overall staff numbers would fall from 596 today to 370 over a four year period.

Nimrod, with the withdrawal of Nimrod MR2 and the subsequent cancellation of Nimrod MRA4 the ability to mount long range SAR coordination is limited a capability provided by an ad-hoc collection of aircraft including the E3 Sentry and various C130′s, neithe rof which can in any way offer the level of capability offered by Nimrod.

Taken together, it would seem the current government are quite happy to take serious risks with maritime security and safety, its simply not good enough when we see daily announcements about the huge sums allocated to the EU, overseas aid and climate change initiatives.

To put the top hat on these capability reductions the UK has launched another consultation process, this time on how to treat oil spills. In light of the withdrawal of funding for the ETV’s perhaps we are admitting that a spill is inevitable because we can’t prevent it with a spot of emergency towing so lets skip straight to the spill clean up.

The strategy might be fine but our tactics seem to be from the Colonel Blimp school of planning

Once the pointy sharp stick stuff has been done, the logistics follow up will generally include the Bay class LSD(A) and combinations of LCU Mk10’s and Mexeflotes to get the bulk of the stores onshore. As capable as this is, a deep water port with container handling and roro facilities will for any operation of decent scale, be a pre requisite for continuing operations. The Points class RORO ships and commercial vessels will then bring the bulk of the materiel. Of course, not all operations start with an amphibious assault and not all operations are of such a scale that they need a deep water port.

Amphibious logistics are simply about throughput, the ability to offload from ships, usually onto smaller ships/hovercraft and deposit their cargo onto shore, ready for movement inland. Its a complicated, finely choreographed, operation that has to deal with many variables. This has resulted in many imaginative solutions and proposals, mainly from the US of course but in some respects the UK with its Albion/Bay/Mexeflote/Points capability has many advantages. The QinetiQ partial air cushion catamaran (PASCAT) demonstrator shows that the UK can still innovate in this area. The PASCAT concept from IMAA builds on the sidewall hovercraft from the sixties. As innovative as it is, it still doesn’t solve the problem of capacity, for that one needs a port, not a beach.

The earthquake in Haiti bought into sharp relief the need for port facilities, even the combined capabilities of a number of nations amphibious ships, serious capacity did not start moving until port facilities had been re-established. The allies faced exactly the same problem of logistics in 1942, when they started planning for D Day. Planners knew there was little chance of securing a deep water port, so basically built their own, the Mulberry, the remains of which can still be seen. The principle problems were twofold, providing a protected anchorage and some means to bridge the gap between the shore and a ship at anchor. Although amphibious transports were used, everything from the DUKW to the LCT, the Mulberry was instrumental in the success of the operation. A little known aspect of Mulberry was the US RHINO floating barge ferry.

Rhino pontoon ferry and LST - D-Day +

These diverse systems have evolved into the UK Mexeflote and very impressive US JLOTS, seen below in a couple of videos.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Despite being very impressive for RORO cargo these still do not handle break bulk or ISO containers particularly efficiently, container handling is especially slow in comparison with established.

It is arguable whether any significant advances have been made since Mulberry and Rhino.

Instead of planning ever more expensive large scale hovercraft, PASCAT or T Craft, we should perhaps be concentrating here, improving a known and thoroughly unglamorous capability, yet one which is likely to be increasingly used. As it becomes easier to deny ports and push amphibious operations further away from within striking distance of such facilities  the need to deliver actual real life bulk cargo, which means containers, into an austere location, will be more needed than ever.

Piers for use on beaches

This was the basic requirement laid down by Winston Churchill to the D Day planners, and the resultant Mulberry’s handled between 5,000 and 7,000 tonnes per day. Although the situation was of course quite different, one wonders what the transfer rate was in Haiti?

We always assume these are new problems that no one has ever faced before but in this case, again, we have been here before, particularly in the aftermath of the Falklands Conflict.

Based on technology and systems developed for the North Sea oil industry, the Falkland Islands Intermediate Port and Storage System (FIPASS) was designed to resolve a number of issues; port access, refrigerated warehouse space and personnel accommodation. Six North Sea oil rig support barges (300×90 ft) were connected together and linked to the shore via a 600 foot causeway. Four of the barges carried warehouses, with provision for refrigerated storage.  In addition there was accommodation offices, which include a galley and messing facility for 200 persons.

The first cargo ship to use Flexiport unloaded 500 tonnes of general cargo and 60 ISO containers in 30 hours, by way of comparison, the same load, offloaded using Mexeflotes took 21 days

All this cost £23 million, or about £50 million in todays money.

The company responsible for FIPASS (ITM Offshore) developed the concept further but have since gone out of business, Flexiport is now marketed and supported by ASP Ship Management. One of the key advantages to using barges is they do not transmit any load to the sea bed, improving siting flexibility. Flexiport is designed to turn any coastal or river anchorage into a working deepwater port by mooring custom designed and built pontoons in sufficient depth of water to enable ships to lie alongside and connecting the quayside formed by the pontoons to the road system ashore by a prefabricated bridge or causeway.

Of particular interest is the container port concept.

Simulation has confirmed this can handle 150 TEU’s per hour and can be expanded to include accommodation, storage, repair, aviation support or RORO facilities. It is very flexible and quick to install, except for the causeway to shore.

The US has also been looking at improvements to their capabilities and as might be expected, have come up with some fantastic solutions but one of the lowest profile yet potentially revolutionary, is the Lightweight Modular Causeway System or LCMS.

LCMS was originally designed to enhance interoperability between MPF, MPF(F), and JHSV, the wider programme even looking at PASCAT designs. The Joint Enable Theater Access Sea Ports of Debarkation (JETA/SPOD) Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) has demonstrated that a hybrid design, incorporating elements of land based tactical bridging equipment and floating causeways can support significant loads up to main battle tank weight. Although it is primarily designed for direct unloading of intermediate ships it could be combined with the Flexiport. The system is compact, allowing 120 feet of causeway to be shipped or stored in a space with a footprint equal to that of three 20-foot ISO containers.

Unlike other systems, the LMCS uses no in-water connections. And in contrast to the current causeway systems (ELCAS) can be deployed by seven trained personnel and be operational in approximately 3 hours. An equal number of personnel can recover the system in approximately the same time. The system is stored in a folded configuration with floatation bladders empty. When deployed, the system is sequentially joined, or assembled, and the floatation bladders are inflated. The bladder nearest the shore can be partially inflated as needed to provide a ramp-like entry and exit point. A unique feature of the LMCS is that the floatation bladders will not be filled with high-pressure air. Instead, they will be rapidly filled with only the volume of air suitable to provide floatation for the roadway system. This significantly speeds up deployment times and can be done with a prepressurised compressed air system (similar to that used to inflate aircraft emergency exit slides) or with a lightweight portable blower system that is smaller than a commercial vacuum.

LCMS has also investigated a powered system for dragging ISO Containers of 463L pallets along its length using a deployable winch system.

As you might realise, the concept of air supported bridging is not a new one, I guess you knew that already!

On its own it will also enhance ship to shore capabilities but as we mentioned above, the causeway from a Flexiport to shore can be a construction bottleneck, combining the two would yield significant benefits.

Instead of having to transfer containers, vehicles and break bulk cargo from container or RORO ships onto shallow draft lighters (JHSV etc) so than can mate with the LCMS causeway, combining it with a large Flexiport allows these deeper draft cargo vessels to unload directly, cutting out the middle man and supporting significant offload capacity in the early stages of an operation. Container and break bulk offload would use commercially available handling equipment

The standard sized offshore barge is in widespread use, designs are mature and there are many manufacturers. Usage includes floating pipe layers, accommodation, heavy lift cranes, power stations, ROV operation and salvage. Since the Flexiport concept was envisaged things have moved on considerably, dynamic positioning and other technologies have lowered operating costs and improved utility.

Offshore barge

Helicopter Barge

For other designs have a look here and here

Some have limited self deployment capability but in general are either towed or carried on FLO/FLO vessels.

Pipe Laying Barge aboard a FLO FLO Vessel

One of the claimed advantages of the Flexiport model that uses these offshore barges is that they float, therefore no load is placed on the sea bed. Their size, anchors and ballasting will contribute to stability but if absolute stability is desirable there are other options.

Jack up or self erecting barges are used for salvage, craning and offshore construction, especially for wind turbines. This design could be used instead of the free floating type. If more mobility is required the offshore wind turbine industry has created a solution, the MPI Resolution, Discovery and Adventure. These combine the features of a jack up construction barge with a normal self propelled vessel. Although smaller than the larger offshore barges above they are much more mobile. Although much smaller than an offshore barge, because they sit on the sea bed, stability for load handling is assured and it is unlikely that anything above 100 tonnes would be handled anyway.

The first of the class was constructed for less than $30 million

Click here to view the embedded video.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Using a similar design concept, the vessel could be converted to act as the Flexiport loading pier, with a container handling crane and a self deployable lightweight floating causeway.

Deployment time could be measured in hours not weeks, as with conventional methods.

Solutions can often be found in the offshore industry but we tend to ignore them and go off on tangents, designing bespoke military solutions.

This is innovative but not high technology, and an area that is crying out for investment.

It would not even be a large investment.

The FDR littoral series of posts is summarised below;

Part 1 – Introduction

Part 2 – Hover and Raiding Craft

Part 3 – Fires and Support Craft

Part 4 – The C3

Part 5 – Ship to Shore

As an attempt at a more balanced fleet the suggestion on Think Defence was a slight increase in the Astute numbers to 8, keeping Type 45 at 6, a small quantity (6) fully specified C1 and a couple of novel C2/C3 concepts from a number of our contributors. Obviously with the loss of maritime fast jet aviation we would be out of the forced entry amphibious game although the combination of UAV’s, FLAADS/CAMM, Attack Helicopter and Type 45 might mitigate some of the loss of capability.

That is not to say that we could not still engage in amphibious operations because not all operations are in the teeth of advanced jet fighters so we should accept a capability reduction and recognise that future operations may have to be conducted in conjunction with allies that can provide the fast jet component.

To bring our FDR Maritime section to a close the next few posts are on amphibious/logistics capabilities and a look at a few innovative concepts.

The Royal Navy currently has 2 Landing Platform Dock (LPD), HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark and together with the Landing Platform Helicopter (HMS Ocean) form the forward element of an amphibious operation. Supporting assets are the 4 Bay class Landing Ship Dock (Auxiliary) and the RFA Point class RORO vessels (although these are not strictly amphibious in the truest sense of the word)

Bay Class LPD(A)

HMS Bulwark (Albion Class)

HMS Ocean

Hurst Point (Point Class RORO)

Taken together it is a reasonably sized and capable force although as can be expected, short in some areas.

The Albion class do not go out of service until 2033 and 2034 but HMS Ocean in 2022, acting in the auxiliary LPH role the 2 remaining CVS are also due out of service in 2012 and 2015. No plans have yet been made public for a replacement for HMS Ocean but it is widely thought that the second CVF will act in this role, although one might consider the QE class to be rather large.

If we are to cancel CVF there exists an obvious need to replace HMS Ocean.

There is an ongoing debate about the utility of specialist LPH and LPD versus the general purpose LHD. Many of the newer types of vessels coming into service with other navies seem to favour the general purpose LHD route with enhanced aviation and well decks; it is probably fair to say though that these are coming into service with navies that have smaller amphibious fleets than the RN so their vessels have to be jack of all trades. However, the RN is shrinking and these vessels will be operating alone more often than not so the flexibility offered by a LHD may well be worth accepting the inherent compromises.

With the inexorable rise in vehicle weight and volume as evidenced by the likes of FRES and PPV the specialist LPH becomes increasingly unable to support anything other than a light force. This light force would still be considered a Royal Marines area but even the Royal Marines have been subject to the weight trend. The Viking and Jackal being cases in point, both cannot be lifted by anything other than Chinook. This fact won’t change because there is a well deck, obviously, but the well deck means that a single vessel can support a more rounded and capable force alone, without the support of a Bay or Albion. The UK needs to get more out of its force so whilst the compromises imposed by having jack of all trades vessels are recognised, they are worth accepting.

The Spanish and Australian Navies have ordered similar designs in their Juan Carlos and Canberra class; at approximately 27,000 tonnes the Navantia BPE design is much larger than the Illustrious class and HMS Ocean. The design is inherently flexible and could operate F35B’s or helicopters; with hangar space for 12 aircraft, accommodation for over a 1000 troops, a well deck slightly larger than the Albion class, extensive hospital and command facilities. The design flexibility allows it to be used as an aircraft carrier although without the ability to generate sustained sortie rates or for an extended period.

Canberra Class

Juan Carlos Strategic Projection Ship LHD

If we were to replace to replace Ocean and the CVS class with a pair of these then the through life costs savings would be considerable, especially in crewing. As funds permit it might even be possible to obtain a third or fourth and operate them as a compact carrier with 6-8 F35B’s per ship, much less that the CVF of course but at least the RN could retain some fast jet aviation capability.

At a reported cost of less than 500 million Euros they would also seem excellent value for money.

The Bay class have proven to be exceedingly useful and versatile, they are relatively new so their replacement is somewhat out of scope for this post, perhaps more of the same would be useful.

Although strictly not an RFA asset the Point class, operating under a 25 year PFI, provide an excellent capability. Based on the Flensburger 2700 RORO design it has 2,700 vehicle lane metres, 10,000nm range and two access ramps. A total of 6 vessels are available for use, 4 manufactured at Flensburger and 2 at Harland and Wolff. Interestingly the project was completed 20 months ahead of schedule, the last of the class, Anvil Point, being launched in 2003.

Although the PFI concept seems to offer capability at a greater cost than outright purchase this one does show how they can be effectively operated, with little fuss or drama. The commercial charter market has seen significant shifts in the last couple of decades with the greater prevalence of the large and usually highly utilised pure car pure truck carrier, which cannot carry explosive cargoes because they do not have open decks (IMO regulations) so when the armed forces need vehicle and container shipping capacity the commercial market is less likely to be able to find suitable vessels.

As a part of this project only of 4 out of the 6 ships are used for the strategic joint rapid reaction force (JRRF) on a daily basis. The last two are chartered out on the commercial market but obviously available for MoD use when demand dictates. The Danish military have a similar concept (ARK), except they have a number of vessels on permanent charter.

The benefit of the UK approach is that the design can be dictated, for example the Point class have twin screws, rudders and bow thrusters which provide extreme manoeuvrability, have a shallow draught and reinforced and extended loading ramps for loading and unloading in a wide variety of locations. The double and strengthened hull increases build costs but given the monetary and operational value of likely cargoes mean this is a wise investment; something of note for those that seem to think that commercial off the shelf is always the answer.

As with the Bay class, their replacement is many years away.

However I am also been a soldier, and as a life long plane spotter I am also a proponent of air power, so hopefully I can provide a balanced, although maritime centered viewpoint.

Threats

I started to cover the potential threats to the UK’s maritime interests already in my comments to this posting: http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2009/12/fdr-all-at-sea/

If the future defence review proceeds in a logical and sensible manner, the threats to UK interests should be discussed and determined and integrated with stated UK foreign policy.

OK, now we have the ‘fairy tale’ scenario out of the way, I will integrate some discussion of the threat into this paper, which is really based around of a view of capabilities and assets.

Major capabilities

What 2 major capabilities do we provide that most if not all of the NATO allied navies (except the USN of course) do not currently have ?

* Strike Carrier with fixed wing aircraft (only France has this capability)
* Major amphibious group including the Royal Marines (although France, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands have amphibious capabilities, they are all smaller)
*SSN

All three of these major ‘capabilities’ are actually ‘systems of systems’ in that they facilitate the provision of multiple different effects as required by the ‘war fighter’ or in support of diplomacy.

So, if they are all expensive, which one should be cut ? Although I have made many arguments about why fixed wing air is good, and why the CV(F) would provide a great capability (flying Sea Gripens ?) I am also of the opinion that if money can still be saved by NOT building these carriers then they should be cut.

If contractual penalties would actually make it more expensive to NOT build them, then they should be completed, but some serious effort should be put into selling the hulls to India (!)

See http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2009/12/fdr-supporting-articles/

Why cut the carriers ?

Well because the US has them, the French has one, the Italians and Spanish have STOVL carriers, so in the NATO context we can rely on others to provide the naval air group. However other than the U.S.M.C.  in the shape of the Royal Marines, and the RN’s amphibious ships, the current amphibious capability is a far greater than that available to any other European navy, so we should nurture this capability, and develop it further as it is some thing ‘special’ that we bring to the ‘party’.

Also the FDR discussions on Think Defence so far seem to have a slant towards ‘strategic raiding’ versus long term ‘nation building’ campaigns, amphibious capability appears to be key to such ‘strategic raiding’.

The SSN’s are also a scarce capability, with only France sharing it within Europe. SSN’s are a major weapon of sea control in a major conflict and an very valuable intelligence gathering tool in ‘peace time’; and of course as the preferred launch platform for Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles, they now have a valuable role to play in “limited conflicts”.

Finally of course, as long as we have SSBN’s then we need SSN’s to protect them, but more on that later.

So, to recap before proceeding, the CV(F) programme and its related JCA programme (F35) should be cancelled and the savings channelled back into the ship building programme, so lets examine that next:

Surface combatants

The work horses of the RN (or any ocean going Navy) are the frigates and destroyers. How many of them do we need ? Well if we have no carrier strike group to escort, we need ships to do the following:

* Escort the amphibious groups
* Fulfil global presence requirements – Caribbean, Persian Gulf, South Atlantic
* Fulfil NATO task group requirements – e.g. Anti-terrorist/people trafficking/anti-piracy
* Homeland security

Homeland security is a wide category, this could even include integrating T45′s into air defence (or even missile defence) of the UK, down to security of nuclear subs berthed alongside, nuclear weapons etc.

Instead of laying out a huge amount of analysis on this set of requirements, instead I will lay out what I think can or should be done on a limited budget in the context of what we have, and what we know of existing plans:

Type 45 is our primary air defence ship class

The programme various known at one time or another as the Future Surface Combatant is aimed at replacing:

* T22B3 with a highly capable vessel termed the C1
* T23′s with a less capable unit called termed the C2
* A multi-role vessel to replace MCMV’s / OPV’s and Survey ships termed the C3.

Lets examine each of these in turn:

Type 45 Air defence destroyers

The sunk costs are done and dusted, the building of the hulls is apparently now a very efficient process, so I would like to see at least two added to the build as an outcome of having no carriers, for a grand total of 8 – the current buy of 6 is just not enough.

If you have 1 in long term refit, 1 in short term maintenance, 1 on deployment,  1 on enroute to or from a deployment, then you might have 2 available to provide air defence of a major amphibious task group – not enough !

So a modest increase to 8 would ease things while not breaking the bank.

T45′s should be fitted with Phalanx mounts as T42′s are retired (preferably with SeaRam) and fitted with 8 x Harpoon’s as T23′s are retired.

T22B3 replacement – FSC C1

To lever the sunk costs of the T45 programme, the C1 highly capable ASW focused ship should be a T45 with different sensor and weapon fit. 8 ships without the expensive PAAM’s but with the same VLS suite for the shorter range Aster 15 missile (SAAM system)  with a cheaper radar such as the Thales APAR or the newer Herakles. Also there would be no need for the SM1850 (SMART-L derivate ) 3D surveillance radar.

The Navy Matters site has a page showing past suggestions of either shortened or lengthened variants of the T45 hull (see http://navy-matters.beedall.com/mvd.htm) however I would keep the hull identical except for any tailoring of the fan tail / quarter deck area required to fit the Type 2087 towed array sonar, as this would keep the manufacturing costs down.

As well as the standard fittings for the Merlin HM1 and the above mentioned towed array, I would fit a battery of 8 Harpoon missiles where the 3D surveillance radar is currently fitted. These missiles would again be taken from retiring T23′s.

T23 replacement – FSC C2

OK, time to get a little contentious, I would suggest licensing of the Danish Absalon Support Ship design to build the C2 ‘general purpose’ frigate. I would make some minimal changes to the design of the ship, getting rid of at least half of the ‘flex deck’ probably ending the flex deck at the forward end of the hanger.

The extra space could be used for a large and well equipped sick bay, a small ‘flag command’ area and additional communal spaces for the crew, as these assets are going to be ‘sweated’ with lots of long deployments !

The rear part of the flex deck would be retained, but to save money I am not suggesting the RN buy two Combat Boat 90E for each C2 frigate, but the rear boat launch and recovery facilites could still be used with large RHIBS (or for RHIB based MCM or ASW Unmanned Surface Vehicles.) The Danes have kept the costs of these ships and their Iver Hutfeild class ‘cousins’ down very well, by not gold plating them.

So the RN version would stick with the SMART-S as the main radar and could even use the same combat system as the Danish vessels. I would add the new Common Anti-Air Missile that is being developed as a Sea Wolf and Rapier replacement as the main anti-air and anti missile system, plus two Phalanx / SeaRam mounts, and 16 x KDA NSM3 missiles for anti-ship and land attack.

These ships have Chinook sized flight deck, a hanger sized for 2 Merlins and we could probably add a lift in the hanger down to the flex deck, so maybe additional small UAV’s (Scheibel Camcopter for example) could be carried.

The Absalon has a crew of 100 plus accommodation for an additional 70 crew, while I am not sure that the ships flight is included in that 100, if carrying two Merlins equates to a ships flight of 25, then 45 extra’s might include an platoon of RM, an RN ‘board and search’ team, a ‘Flag Command’ staff, additional medical staff etc, whatever is required for the mission at hand.

So, hopefully staying away from any gold plating, we could afford 12 of these ships.

FSC C3 – the ‘everything else’ replacement…….

The C3 is envisioned as a multi-role vessel that can do deployed MCM, take over the role of survey vessels such as HMS Enterprise, and also replace the OPV’s. The BMT Venator is an interesting design for this type of ship, and you can go and read up on it here: http://www.bmtdsl.co.uk/Documents& Resources/?/188/2642/2642

Even if you don’t like this particular design, it does show what might be possible, and it also shows that the decline of the specific MCM ship is complete. This appears to be OK, as there no longer seems to be a discernible mining threat to the UK’s ports and waters (?). We might be able to afford between 9 and 12 of these ships ?

One note on these vessels – I would not equip them with a folding hanger and capabilities to operate the Lynx helicopter – I would buy MQ8B UAV’s instead. This would allow us to retire the Lynx and have a single type fleet based on the Merlin, as all the major surface vessels are big enough to carry and operate them. This would include buying new Merlins to be fitted with the radar from the SeaKing AEW & C aircraft.

Surface combatants totals

So we would end up with:

* 8 x T45
* 8 x T46 C1
* 12 x T24 C2

For a total of 28 major surface units – still less than the previous SDR mandated 32, but hopefully with no carriers, no F35′s and the use of existing designs, this could be affordable. It would certainly be a highly flexible force, with excellent accommodation facilitating long deployment cycles.

Amphibious shipping, 3 Commando Brigade and Support helicopters

To keep the budget down I don’t make any suggested enhancements to the amphibious flotilla, other than to ensure they are all fitted with better defensive armament capability. As noted at the beginning of this piece the amphibs and the Commando Brigade are a key capability that we poses that others don’t and in order to fully support the ‘real word’ use of these assets we must invest in helicopters, specifically in replacing the Sea King MK4 ‘Junglie”.

For commonality this should be a folding tail Merlin HC3 derivative.

It will obviously be declared to the Joint Helicopter Command and thus does not just impact on amphib ops, but on all deployed UK forces operations. However there must always be enough of them on hand to have at least 14 available to fly from HMS Ocean as required. As for the Ocean, I would ensure she gets the ‘service life’ extension or refits required to keep her in service.

Maybe we can replace with 1 or even 2 vessels when the budget is less constrained.

The one blue sky element I would suggest, is a little investment in hovercraft.

The UK has to major manufacturers of diesel hovercraft that are exported all over the world. Griffon Hovercraft provide the small Griffon 2000TD craft as used by the Royal Marines already.

However they have also supplied Sweden with the larger Griffon 8100TD wich has ballistic protection, NBC filtering, can carry a Viking armoured vehicle or around 80 fully equipped marines. See http://www.griffonhoverwork.com/products/8

Griffon have recently purchased (or merged with) British Hovercraft, so on the same site you can see their craft such as the BHT160 which are available in well deck configurations able to carry up to 20 tonnes, see: http://www.griffonhoverwork.com/products/11

So I think a modes investment in these vehicles would vastly improve our over the horizon amphibious raiding capability, our general littoral abilities, and even our ‘brown water’ ops if required.

In part 2 and 3 of this series I will examine the submarine fleet and the RFA support flotilla respectively.

JED CAWTHORNE

Editors note

In this post Jed pre empts many of the issues in the ThinkDefence FDR series, more to follow

Some of the themes I intend to cast my usual ill informed eye over are

* We are an island you know!
* The great CVF can of worms
* Building a multi tier force
* Forward basing
* Inter service rivalry and its corrosive effect
* Piracy, arrghhh
* Coastguard functions

Anyone got any other themes for discussion, no jokes about seamen or salty old sea dogs please :D