16AAB is unusual in the context of the British Army because it is the only one designed to deliver air manoeuvre, yet as usual, the helicopter assets do not exist to actually fulfil on the vision. Permanent fixtures are 2 and 3 Para with the 1 Battalion Royal Irish, 5 Battalion Royal Regiment of Scotland and 2 Battalion Gurkha rotating through the air assault role and 52 Light Infantry Brigade on a 5 year timescale.. 2 out of the three are assigned to 16AAB. With our previous proposal to increase 19 and 52 light infantry brigades by a battalion each these might also rotate into 16AAB

It is important that any equipment remains fully air liftable by Chinook and/or Merlin and A400.

Chinook and Underslung BVs10

The parachute battalions are the lightest of all forces, by definition, all its vehicles must be air droppable so these are generally AMTP’s, Land Rovers and Pinzgauers.

Pinzgauer 4x4 and Trailer in Air Drop Ready Mode

In the previous discussion on light vehicles I suggested that the LPPV winner would replace both Land Rovers and Pinzgauers but at 7.5tonnes starting weight the Ocelot or SPV400 might be a little on the heavy side but if these can be air dropped it would make sense to standardise on these. If not, then specialist vehicles like the PInzgauer must be retained because although the likelihood of a parachute drop requirement is low, there would be no point retaining the capability of it could not be fully utilised.

On the subject of parachute capability, it is acknowledged that combat air drops are a rare beast but the cost in retaining the capability is not massive in a wider context and it is better to have the capability should it be needed. Therefore 2 and 3 Para should be retained as they are now, even if this means hiring civilian aircraft or making arrangements with other nations to maintain parachute skills whilst the tactical air transport fleet is being heavily utilised elsewhere.

The Supacat All Terrain Mobility Platform provides supreme off road capability and is fully amphibious.

Supacat All Terrain Mobility Platform

The air assault battalions would again be more or less retained as is. The LPPV in 4×4 and 6×6 variants would be the main vehicle type but the air lift weight of a Chinook should form the upper limit, about 9.5 to 10 tonnes. To provide additional high mobility the ST Kinetics Warthogs purchased as a UOR for Afghanistan should be retained for use by the air assault battalions and increased in number.

Click here to view the embedded video.

The Warthog has been ordered in troop carrier, ambulance, repair & recovery and command variants. To be moved by Chinook as an underslung load they will have to be split, as with the Viking. Warthog is an 18 tonne version of the ST Kinetics Bronco that provides greater protection and capacity than the Vikings, which have suffered from the excess weight caused by extra armour and they have also proven vulnerable to IED’s. These will be returned to the Royal Marines.

Click here to view the embedded video.

The Warthog will have a number of modifications including external fuel tanks, a Platt MR550 Shielded Ring Mount, ECM, additional armour and many others.

Additional variants include a load carrier, equipped with a hooklift system and a fuel carrier. As the UOR vehicles are taken into the main equipment programme these additional variants should also be obtained.

Attached to the brigade is a small contingent of the Household Cavalry (D Squadron) equipped with CVR(T) but as CVR(T) is withdrawn and replaced with FRES Scout the weight issue will mean that the brigade will no longer have any light armoured recce or armour support capability, at least that can be moved by Chinook.

To compensate for this capability gap it may be possible to modify the front section of the Warthog to mount a light canon in a remote turret or other lightweight mount, sacrificing the troop carrying compartment for ISR equipment and ammunition storage.

The Recce Warthog would be equipped with an elevating sensor turret and fully amphibious as with all variants (except logistics)

Although not having the characteristic V shaped hull for maximum IED protection, additional armour and other survivability enhancements can be applied. Not ideal, but in this case the extreme mobility and role can offset this.

The only other major change I would make would be to remove the aviation element, helicopters are a strategic asset and should be retained as such.

This might seem contradictory, an air assault brigade without any organic helicopters but until the time arrives when the UK armed forces have enough helicopters there will also be too much need and not enough reality.

Phil looked at the issue in a previous post delving into the history of the Operational Utility Vehicle System programme to replace the Land Rover, RB44 and Pinzgauer.

Bringing this up to date any revised OUVS should seek to replace the Land Rover, Panther, Pinzgauer, Duro, Jackal, Coyote, Husky class of vehicles.

Land Rover WMIK

Land Rover Ambulance

Land Rover Defender 90 GS

Snatch Land Rover

RB44

Pinzgauer Vector

Pinzgauer 6x6

Pinzgauer 4x4

Tellar (Duro III Chassis)

Husky

Jackal

Coyote

Panther

As can be seen from the images, the similarities between these vehicles are obvious yet we must maintain completely different logistics, integration and training processes.

Phil makes the point that the OUVS programme is the single most important programme for the British Army because the vehicles will be so widespread and I tend to agree with him.

The UK is not the only nation that is in this position. Many of our allies and in fact most western nations have or are about to start very similar programmes; the US/Australian JLTV (Joint Light Tactical Vehicle) and the German AMPV and even more futuristic GEFAS are just a few examples.  All have recognised whilst the Land Rover, G Wagon and HMMWV have their benefits the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have exposed weaknesses that need to be urgently addressed. In the short term these weaknesses have been addressed with the US M-ATV and UK LPPV programmes.

Although JLTV has an entirely sensible set of specification there is a nagging doubt that it is overly complex, too large and likely to be extremely expensive.  The family is divided into three payload categories (a, b and c) that range from 1,600kg to 2,300kg although some of the larger payloads will be accommodated in trailers and roles include general purpose mobility with a 4 person capacity, command, ambulance, logistics, infantry carrier and close combat weapons carrier. Protection is adjustable using the A and B kit with maximum protection at STANAG 4569 4a for blast (10kg HE) and STANAG 4569 4 against kinetic energy weapons (14.55mm AP)

The German GEFAS/AMV2 vehicles are also seeking to meet a similar requirement to the JLTV and OUVS, drawing on experience from the Boxer and Fennek vehicles. GEFAS is an interesting concept because it uses the now familiar modular payload and crew system and is available in a number of configurations. GEFAS uses hybrid-electric “drive by wire” system, replacing conventional steering, braking and drive train. The electric drive function control developed by Renk company regulates the vehicle’s driving dynamics. The vehicle uses separate drives for each axle, ensuring residual mobility even when one of the axels is damaged.

GEFAS is no doubt the most innovative and forward thinking although it is not likely to progress to production.

GEFAS Crew Module

GEFAS Family

It is not clear where the OUVS programme is going because Afghanistan is absorbing not only all the money but also the intellectual capacity in the MoD, quite rightly the it is focussing on providing vehicles for the here and now.

Where does this leave the Light Protected patrol Vehicle UOR?

Of course we should proceed to get something into service that provides a survivable alternative to land Rover Snatch but beyond that we have to stop and take stock.

Whilst these examples might not exactly suit UK requirements or support UK industry in any way the decision on whether to buy off the shelf, buy into another programme or develop our own has to be made. Post Afghanistan, the vehicles will be in a poor shape and OUVS or something similar needs to be back on the agenda.

If we are replacing such a large number of vehicles and in order to achieve some economies of scale, maximise standardisation to reduce logistics overhead, get exactly what we need and take advantage of export potential it would seem sensible to go our own way.

Whilst JLTV and GEFAS might seem innovative designs the UK is not without its own areas of innovation. As we stated in the previous post on vehicles the UK is a hotbed of automotive design innovation across both the military and civilian space but it simply needs to be galvanised. Taking a quick look across some of the current military vehicle designs and proposals from UK manufacturers/designers it is abundantly clear we are more than capable of meeting our own needs.

Modular armour as found on the Puma German infantry combat vehicle shows that protection can be adjusted quite simply, in the field. The Artec Boxer also has modularity with its mission modules, as does the Ocelot LPPV designed by Force protection Europe and Ricardo.

Boxer Module Swap

On a lighter vehicle the Ocelot from Force Protection Europe and Ricardo also takes a modular approach to payload configuration.

Ocelot LPPV Modular Payload

The Supacat HMT Extenda even provides the ability to increase load carrying capacity with a simple bolt on set of wheels and the HMT/Jackal family has legendary mobility.

Supacat Extenda Concept

The Ocelot uses an under body ‘skateboard’ assembly to carry all the running gear with bodies simply sliding onto it and the TMV 6×6 also takes a similar approach to chassis design although it is not certain if the payload system is fully modular.

TMV 6x6 Chassis

TMV 6x6

The Universal Engineering Ranger looks like an extremely well protected yet light weight vehicle that is perhaps on the large side for this requirement but shows how a clean sheet of paper approach can yield extremely interesting and capable vehicles.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Creation UK contributed to the Ranger vehicle and a number of others including the Zephyr SRV, Zephyr 6×6 and the Lockheed Martin AVA that was originally proposed for the OUVS (Large) programme.

Lockheed Martin AVA

To move forward we have to accept that the days of the Land Rover being synonymous with the British Army are over. It is simply not survivable enough on the future non linear battlefield. If we need a lightweight 4×4 for nipping to the ranges then we should be buying cheaper ‘white fleet’ alternatives like the Ford Ranger, Toyota Hilux or similar.

Once we have accepted this then looking at a future OUVS concept becomes much easier!

To take advantage of the deep well of UK automotive innovation I think we should split out the design and manufacture of the vehicle and take take the unusual step of funding a series of demonstrators and design concept vehicles from a wide number of design teams. There are literally hundreds of alternatives from many manufacturers and nations and part of the this development phase should be a comprehensive market assessment with a view to taking the best features and incorporating them into a base design concept whose manufacture can be tendered to any number of organisations under licence from the MoD.

Splitting the intellectual property between a composite design house and the MoD, with manufacturing a completely separate activity would be an unusual approach but one which would maximise design innovation and drive down manufacturing costs.

What specification would we need for a light/medium weight vehicle family that can replace the Land Rover, Duro, Jackal, Coyote, Panther, Husky and Pinzgauer?

A suggestion

Configuration – 4×4 and 6×6. The TMV and EVA place the driver position above the wheels that conventional wisdom says is bad from a blast survivability perspective, but if the driver and passenger can be accommodated in tandem, rather than side by side, a deep V shaped capsule might mitigate this.

Weight – Light weight is an obvious requirement but even the 6×6 version should be sub 10 tonnes so that it can be liftable by Chinook. This may be a difficult requirement to meet but the vehicle family is likely to be the backbone of the light role units so air portability is a key requirement and one that should not be sacrificed for protection. Additional protection may be added that will increase the weight but that would be a tactical decision.

Mobility – as per the LPPV road and off road mobility will need to be well developed, small turning circles, good approach and departure angles and a high tip over angle are necessities. We do however, have to be realistic about what can be achieved in a wheeled vehicle taking into account the protection requirement.

Survivability – Taking lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan the design should incorporate everything from shaped hulls, blast attenuating seats and self sealing fuel tanks. A key innovation should be tuneable protection, the cab modularity might be able to satisfy this requirement to some extent but as a minimum for an enclosed cab the blast protection should be STANAG 4569 Level 3 with greater levels available and Level 1 for artillery and kinetic. It may be desirable to have an open cab configuration so KE and artillery protection might be sacrificed but bast protection should be common.

Trying to defeat the latest RPG’s is likely to add too much weight and/or cost and complexity so we must be realistic about what can be achieved beyond lightweight composite armour

Logistics – Ease of maintenance and reliability must be considered from first principles, everything from engine swaps to changing fluids should be considered and any design proposals passed in front of a REME VM for consideration!

We should take a strict approach to component commonality in order to drive down maintenance and logistics overheads.

Power – Enough power generation and distribution capability for communications, weapon stations, sensors and ECM equipment

Modularity – The modular payload of the Ocelot or Boxer is a feature that has yet to be fully appreciated but the undoubted utility should be a key feature of the new design. Payload options may be a standard personnel carrier, open top weapons platform (WMIK style), flatbed cargo, ambulance or any other variation. The 6×6 version is likely to have a greater range of payload modules as per the 6×6 Pinzgauer or Duro trucks currently in service, everything from communications equipment to diver support to a platform for the common anti air modular missile and everything else in between. The modular payload design would provide a great deal of flexibility.

Load System – Fitting some of the 6×6 versions with a hook lift or DROPS type system would significantly improve utility. We should not be afraid of looking to the civilian marketplace for logistics innovation; the Stellar Industries Light Duty Hooklift system, for example, provides DROPS like capability in lightweight vehicles. Whether this is used for dropping off a mixed pallet of ammunition/food/water or a complete radio enclosure it would provide a new capability with hundreds of applications.

Lightweight Hook Lift (DROPS)

This is a video of a typical small hooklift system

Click here to view the embedded video.

I have deliberately left off a requirement for propulsion type. If the design phase could demonstrate reliable and cost effective hybrid electrical propulsion using in hub motors then why not but this should not form a central part of the specification because we have to avoid over complication and reaching too far into the future. Innovate with design and application, not unproven technology.

So at the risk of repeating myself, the UK has the skills to produce an innovative vehicle family that does exactly what we need and could be a significant export earner, if only we can harness the talent and direct it with enough funding and political willpower.

We should avoid taking the cheap and safe option.

The UK armed forces have in recent years seen an explosion in vehicle types as a result in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Putting aside the politics of protected vehicles for one moment, it is clear that these additional vehicles have been in response to operational need so long term planning issues have generally been last on the list of things to consider. The very fact that we were so under prepared and reacted so slowly is another argument but we are where we are and must now start thinking about a coherent road map for the future, sorry about the pun!

Excepting the heavy metal of MRLS, AS90, Challenger and Warrior plus derivatives, vehicles currently in service include 4×4 and 6×6 Pinzgauers, Vector, Snatch, WMIK, various types of short and long wheelbase GS/FFR Land Rovers, Land Rover Ambulance, Saxon, various types of Bulldog, Scimitar, Sampson, Sultan, Samaritan, Stormer, Spartan, Viking, Mastiff, Bv206, Panther, Husky, Wolfhound, Jackal, Coyote, Fuchs, Quads/Bikes, Ridgeback, Terrier, Bushmaster, Supacat ATMP, Springer, Warthog and Tellar (have I missed any?) and this is before we even get into engineering plant and logistics vehicles!

In an era of asymmetric warfare having unprotected assets, like for example a Pinzgauer or Duro based communications vehicle, in the force mix, is simply untenable, as it creates soft targets that are easy to exploit. Putting these vehicles in convoys with more protected vehicles might alleviate some of the issues but that is a risky strategy and limits manoeuvre significantly. Even against nation states in what one might consider ‘conventional’ operations the IED is likely to feature heavily.

IED’s and RPG’s/Small Arms are the weapon of choice for these manouverable aymetric threats and the proliferation of guided weapons means we shoud also consider protection against these as a priority. Defeating IED’s involves more that simply sitting in mobile pillboxes and we will cover this in a future post but passive protection measures remain an important part of the force protection mix.

Therefore, all vehicles, no matter what their function, must be survivable against small arms and modestly sized IED’s with as much RPG protection as possible and this will mean a fundamental shift in the way we approach the vehicle matrix.

In a previous post we suggested that the mechanised brigades lose their Warriors and Challengers which would allow a close support Challenger variant to be fielded and the existing FV43x/Bulldogs in these units to be replaced with Warrior conversions so that the armoured brigade consisted of three primary types, Challenger, Warrior and FRES Recce Block. FRES Recce Block will replace Scimitar, Sultan, Sampson, Samaritan and hopefully the Stormer flatbed currently used for Shielder mine system. It would be a good idea to take some of the FRES base platforms and introduce a standard flat bed, high mobility cargo platform a la Streaker. The Quad Bikes and Springer represent a niche capability so would be left as is.

The mechanised brigades and other units will therefore use various types of wheeled vehicle but the types should be radically streamlined for the obvious logistics, maintenance, training and cost benefits.

Size, weight, logistics/transport planning, air mobility, cost, adaptability, ease of maintenance, fuel consumption, ground mobility and survivability are all key considerations.

Later in the post a two weight class family will be proposed but before looking at specifics it is worth looking at the US experience to see if any pointers for the future can be found and exploited.

In Iraq the US HMMWV and up armoured versions were increasingly vulnerable to IED’s and so the MRAP programme was born and whatever the arguments for and against there is no doubt that casualties were reduced as a result of their introduction (amongst many other measures it must be said) The resultant political consideration of US casualties reduction contributed to a sustained US presence, in this respect the IED and MRAP might be considered as strategic weapons. These early MRAP’s were mainly based on commercial truck platforms and as such suffered mobility issues off road but Iraq had a well developed road infrastructure and many of the conflict areas were urbanised so these limitations were less of an issue.

Afghanistan, with its poor road infrastructure has exposed these mobility shortcomings and the US have moved with their usual stunning speed and introduced the M-ATV from Oskosh. Over 5,000 have been ordered and the first are already in theatre, total order value is over $4billion already out of a total MRAP buy of almost $35billion. The contract was awarded in June 2009 and the first ones arrived in October of the same year, this speed compares very well with the time taken to get UK vehicles into theatre and makes Lord Draysons crowing about the 6 months it took to get an already in production vehicle (Mastiff) into Iraq in 6 months look rather hollow.

The Oskosh M-ATV is based on the chassis of the Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR) truck with its TAK-4 independant suspension providing excellent mobility. Even though it has better mobility and is billed as being more suitable for Afghanistan it is still large and weighs in at over 11 tonnes.

The US is seeking to replace all its MRAP’s and HMMWV with the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) but although the ambitious programme is progressing, it seems to be at quite a slow pace, funding issues have even resulted in other nations being invited into the programme, India for example. The JLTV is still a very large, heavy vehicle and rather embarrasingly a journalist tipped one of the contenders over on a press day.

Moving up the weight scale is the 8×8 Stryker, introduced several years ago as part of the interim Brigade Combat Team and Land Warrior concepts, it has seen service in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In a recent sensationalist Washington Post article the Stryker was dubbed a ‘kevlar coffin’ by one of the soldiers, a term that has been used before in relation to the UK’s vector vehicle although it was likely the soldier in question was larging the danger up in order to impress a female reporter!

Since they arrived at the outpost on Sept. 13, the Blackwatch unit – Bravo Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Infantry Regiment, with the 5th Stryker Brigade – had lost three soldiers and two civil affairs officers. IEDs had destroyed three of their four Stryker vehicles. Overall, 21 of 350 Strykers have been destroyed since the 5th Brigade deployed in southern Afghanistan in July; more than two dozen Americans have been killed and nearly 70 wounded.

I think a Company has more than 4 vehicles, perhaps she meant a platoon, usual MSM hyper accurate reporting I guess. Welcome to the jungle as they say. We have been dealing with the very same issues since we deployed to Helmand.

Another more balanced article from the US Army Times was critical of the Stryker but placed the vehicle in the context of tactics and procedures.

The Stryker has more technology than my kids bedrooms and its speed lent itself to chasing insurgent mortar teams around Bagdad but the rapidly inserted field expedient of slat armour, driver shields and the placing of sandbags on the floor pointed to a design that was suffering from survivability issues. Before they were deployed to Aghanistan a number of enhancements were added included additional belly armour, Kevlar flooring, blast attenuating seats and foor pedestals. Modifications to the suspension were also made to balance the weight of these additions and ensure that ride height was not too low and close to the source of an explosion. The extra weight has of course severely impacted mobility and fuel consumption, mobility was one of the trademarks of the Stryker in Iraq but in Afghanistan, it is a different story. The Stryker is also being modified to the A1 revision that includes even more imporvements

There is no doubt it has been a controversial vehicle with as many supporters and detractors but perhaps the fairest assessment is that in the right conditions it has excelled, in different conditions like Afghanistan, it has been found wanting in many but not all regards. The Canadians have also used similar vehicles with mixed results.

The US Future Combat System programme is now defunct but a better defined although equally ambitious programme has now emerged. The Brigade Combat Team Modernization (BCTM) program with the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) is postulated to have the mobility off road of a Bradley with the urban mobility of a Stryker, a tough trick to pull off. Key requirements are versatility, survivability and mobility. We know these are generally that trade offs are usually required so to major on one needs a compromise in another, this seemingly circular argument and the inability to settle on tangible and achievable specifications were the undoing of FRES so it will be interesting to see where this goes. Generaly Dynamics have even pitched a ‘Super Stryker’ design into the mix.

UK experience is similar in some ways to that of the US although we have favoured mobility over protection in many cases with the Jackal, WNIK, Snatch and Vector. The argument about these vehicles is an emotive one because so many service personnel have been killed or injured driving in them but these bare statistics do not show the full picture. Could their mobility have resulted in much lower overall casualties when taken in the round. We have also moved at a much slower pace for a variety of economic, political and other reasons.

Outside of Iraq and Afghanistan we decided on Pirahna V as the FRES Utility Vehicle after a competition between the VBCI, Pirahna and Boxer in the Trials of Truth. Although the deal collapsed after GD and the MoD could not agree on commercial terms one gets the impression the real reason was a realisation that there was and is a very big question mark over the basic design and survivability of 8×8 combat vehicles. Despite centralised tire inflation, air suspension and other advancements they have a high ground pressure, small wheel size pushes ground pressure up, small wheel sizes are dictated by steering travel and the need to minimise hull intrusion. As with all designs you improve one area only to compromise another. This means that in order to have anything like the levels of IED protection that the MRAP style vehicle has the 8×8 has its mobility compromised which subsequently means they have to travel more and more on roads, where you might as well have had an MRAP.

Given our assertion that the IED is not going away, in any spectrum of conflict, the 8×8 it would seem, is an evolutionary dead end. Not mobile enough to avoid vulnerable points and not well enough protected against IED threats that its lack of mobility forces (unlike tracks) forces it into the road danger zone. The holy grail of vehicle design is something with the mobility of tracks and the IED protection of an MRAP/PPV, with added direct/indirect fire protection as well.

Is this possible, probbly not, which leads us into compromise or accepting multiple designs that we take from the toolbox as needs dictate.

The Mastiff has an enviable reputation for protection against IED’s and mines yet even its most ardent supporter would admit that it is not particularly mobile off road, even the mark 2 with its improved suspension.

So the debate between wheels v tracks or MRAP v 8×8’s is far from over and even further from have a definitaive answer. We examined the wheels v tracks debat in an earlier post and came down on the side of tracks for high tempo, high mobility operations but a wheeled solution may be more appropriate for a mechanised formation, supported by the FRES tracked component for specific applications and scenarios. The RAND study into medium weight vehicles makes for interesting reading to inform this debate although it is a few years old.

The question is therefore not, one v the other, but what is the optimal mix and what design criteria should be emphasised.

Although we should be wary of seeing everything through an Afghanistan shaped prism these large vehicles are often just too large to negotiate narrow streets or too heavy for fragile infrastructure, highlighting the mobility v protection argument. If one has to dismount because the vehicle is too large then overall survivability is of course reduced although ironically, walking can be safer in many situations. Because of their high centre of gravity caused by the V shaped hull there is a very real danger of rollover. Rollovers have caused many casulaties in both accidents and as a result of IED or other enemy action.The existing designs lack mobility which means they get stuck quite often, an immobile vehicle creates severe problems, attracting unwanted enemy attention and requiring significant recovery resources, blocking roads for locals denying movement for friendly forces.

Fuel consumption is on and upward trajectory because the large MRAP type vehicles have very poor fuel consumption compared with their predecessors. The latest US design described avove, the Oskosh M-ATV, has a 7.1 litre engine in a design that has 6 seats max!

Given that every single litre of fuel has to be expensively moved to theatre and in asymetric conflict logistic patrols present tempting targets the amount of combat power having to be devoted to logistic force protection should be a wake up call for the military. We need a concerted effort to reduce fuel consumption because not only does it reduce costs it also improves combat manouver capabilities.

We also need to consider maintenance and logistics overhead, having multiple vehicle types with different engines, transmissions, vetronics systems, tyres, hydraulic hoses and battery leads make an already complex supply chain even more difficult. Availability has been constrained by the availability of spare parts in theatre for years and this simply has to stop. The answer is not a better logiustics system or more spares (although that would help in the short term) but a common set of parts across multiple vehicles.

The General Vehicle Architecture (GVA) project is seeking to achieve this commonality in the electronic domain but we need to be much more ambitious and extend this to mechanical components.

The UK has a golden opportunity to create a coherent and consistent vehiclular designs with significant export potential, we are blessed with a wide variety of military and civilian vehicular design expertise, from Lotus to BAe and McLaren to Supacat. Much of the world uses UK automotive and component expertise, lets gather these and have a strategy rather than a series of ill thought out projects and programmes that lurch from one crisis to te next without delivering anything of lasting vaue for the armed forces or UK PLC.

In the next post I will look at these options.

One of the central debates preceding the order of battle or establishment of Army formations is what are they required to do, this come from strategy and doctrine. Strategy and doctrine often lag real time events and no matter how units are organised there are likely to be unforeseen events that make that structure sub optimal. For all their much vaunted military prowess, the Israeli experience in Lebanon was that they had prepared for the wrong option and were found seriously wanting. Instead of poorly trained insurgents then encountered small highly effective teams that had lots of firepower and a sophisticated appreciation of terrain and manoeuvre. The Israelis had concentrated too much on counter insurgency or anti terrorism and unlearned the lessons of combined arms close combat, not realising that the enemy had evolved. They didn’t make the same mistake in Gaza.

The Israelis have the advantage of knowing intimately the terrain they will be fighting on and even then they got their choices wrong, this illustrates the difficulty of matching strategy, doctrine and organisational structures. It also highlights the dangers of neglecting combined arms close combat because Lebanon might have been classed as an asymmetric conflict against non state actors but the fact is that those non state actors needed an old fashioned combination of indirect fires, close combat manoeuvre and concentration of armour to provide protected mobility.

The distinction between traditional armoured, armoured infantry, mechanised infantry and light role infantry is disappearing with composite brigades that incorporate all types, although many of the armoured regiments and armoured infantry battalions are now either based on Mastiff or provide drivers for such. The Future Army Structures (Next Steps) seems to be reinforcing this composite approach although this may be as a result of shrinking numbers, ongoing commitments and cost concerns rather than any grand doctrinal shift.

When we look at these issues it is easy to come up with simple answers to simple questions but the reality is that seemingly simple questions usually require complex answers beset with uncertainty and messy compromise.

So this is one idea amongst many.

In our proposed structure the idea was presented to retain a traditional mix of armoured, mechanised and light role formations with some changes in composition and equipment. Conservative, perhaps, but the structure has served well and still provides a reasonable basis on which to flex up or down depending on need.

In summary, the armoured brigades reverted to a more traditional 2×2 square formation (2 armoured regiments and 2 armoured infantry battalions) with a single FR regiment in order to concentrate combat power yet in a smaller overall package and the mechanised infantry brigades had 3 mechanised infantry battalions and a medium armour support/ reconnaissance regiment. In line with UK doctrine the armoured vehicles in general provide protected mobility rather than as fighting platforms, dismounted infantry generally engaging with the enemy whilst support fires are provided by vehicles.

The choice of vehicles is an interesting conundrum; generally speaking we should be pushing for FRES types but as Afghanistan has shown, there may be a requirement for vehicles that provide enhanced protection against IED’s, that conventional tracked vehicles cannot provide unless some scientific or engineering breakthrough occurs.

The proposal here then is to recognise that one vehicle simply cannot provide the mix of protection and mobility that suits every threat environment and to keep moving towards this Holy Grail (the old FRES concept) will result in huge amounts of wasted time, wasted money and a solution that meets neither requirement in its entirety. As I mentioned in a previous post, the IED is not going away any time soon but then neither is the 30mm canon or 155mm shell fragment.

This means that FRES and its variants will still be introduced into the mechanised infantry brigade but the existing vehicles like Bulldog and Mastiff will remain. There is plenty of life left in both types.

The mechanised infantry battalion will be based on the innovative Commando 21 organisation. This is a relatively conservative proposal, no masses of high technology but, a straight forward reorganisation to provide greater firepower at the battalion level.

Command Company; will consist of a pair of HQ groups, reconnaissance troop, indirect fire troop, anti tank troop and machine gun troop.

The reconnaissance troop will have 4 FRES Scout, 2 FRES Sensor Platforms (in our previous post) and 2 protected mobility FRES that will carry sniper/forward air controller sections. The troop will be supported by a recovery variant. Depending on prevailing requirements the FRES variants may be replaced with lighter wheeled vehicles such as the Light Protected Vehicle or other similar types.

The indirect fires troop will consist of 8x 81mm mortars. I have kept the 81mm in this formation because its true advantage is its light weight and logistics footprint, to go with the heavier 120mm strips the weapon system of its principal advantage. In of the earlier posts in this section I proposed SPIKE-NLOS as a possible supplement to 81mm mortar for organic precision fires but its range is longer than would be needed across a typical battalion area of operations and the US NLOS seems to be heading for failure. 81mm precision mortar rounds seem to be showing promise but the main concern is the proportion of the bomb weight that is taken up with guidance equipment reduces the combat effect on target. The ‘missile in a box’ idea has great potential but would not be able to moved by foot, which again, makes the 81mm so useful. There are many options here but in general I would propose to stay with the 81mm and migrate to supplement (not replace) with precision systems as they mature.

Anti tank troop will be equipped with the Javelin guided missile, either being carried in FRES protected mobility, Bulldog or lighter vehicles.

Machine Gun Troop, the sustained fire role for GPMG continues to demonstrate its relevance and should be retained.

Logistic Company; will provide engineering support and logistics for the battalion.

Close Combat Company x2; will comprise a company HQ and 3 close combat platoons (1 more than existing)

Stand Off Company x2; will comprise a company HQ, one close combat platoon, a heavy machine gun platoon and an anti tank platoon. Vehicles for both close combat and stand off will be either Bulldog or wheeled protected patrol i.e. Mastiff and related vehicles.

I will be looking at vehicles in more detail in the next post.

Not the recommended means of entering the water but it looks like fun.

Click here to view the embedded video.

There is an Army urban myth that a fuel tanker version (UBRE) was stolen by a disgruntled soldier in Germany and driven all the way to the French coast, where he decided to take the direct route and ‘sail’ it to England across the English Channel. The story goes that he got half way across and ran out of fuel (they were extremely thirsty) but was subsequently employed by Alvis as a test driver.

Mots likely total nonsense given the general unreliability of the Stalwart, border controls, massive fuel consumption and many other factors but what a story!

ps

Thanks to Richard for the video link

Current organisation

In total the British Army has 36 Regular Battalions available for service and this total combined with the 14 TA battalions (excluding The Royal Gibraltar Regiment) could give a mobilisation strength of 50 infantry battalions.

1st Battalion, The Parachute Regiment is not counted in the above total, as it constitutes the core of the Special Forces Support Group.

On the armoured side there are 6 Challenger 2 regiments, one of which is the training regiment and 5 Formation Reconnaissance Regiments.

The Army is organised into a number of divisions. The ‘readiness divisions’ constitute the core of our land power and are allocated to the NATO Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), these are:

1st Armed Division – British Forces Germany

• 7th Armoured Brigade (Germany) (1 Challenger Regiment, 2 Armoured Infantry)
• 20th Armoured Brigade (Germany) (1 Challenger Regiment, 2 Armoured Infantry)
• 4th Mechanised Brigade (UK) (1 Challenger Regiment, 1 Armoured Infantry, 1 Mechanised Infantry)
• 102nd Logistics Brigade (UK)
• Formation Recce Regiment
• Artillery regiments are deployed at Brigade level

3rd Division

• 1st Mechanised Brigade (1 Challenger, 1 Armoured Inf, 2 Mechanised Inf)
• 12th Mechanised Brigade (1 Challenger, 1 Armoured Inf, 2 Mechanised Inf)
• 19th Light Brigade (3 x Infantry Battalions)
• 52nd Infantry Brigade (3 x Infantry Battalions)
• 101st Logistics Brigade
• Formation Recce Regiment
• Artillery regiments are deployed at Brigade level

The so called ‘regenerative divisions’ replaced the old Military Districts in the UK and host the remainder of the infantry battalions in ‘General Service’ role.

Re-org constraints

• Can’t put more forces in Germany
• Can’t have more than 6 regular tank regiments
• Can’t have more than 7 Warrior battalions
• Can’t have more than 36 Infantry battalions in total
• Don’t want to increase budgets !
• Don’t want to reduce size due to operational tempo and requirements

Suggestions

So in a very brief article, with much detail on vehicles and equipment to come in follow up articles, this is my suggestion for a re-organization of the Army:

1st Armed Division – British Forces Germany

• 7th Armoured Brigade (Germany) (1 x CV90120T Regiment, 2 x Armoured Infantry)
• 20th Armoured Brigade (Germany) (1 x CV90120T Regiment, 2 x Armoured Infantry)
• 4th Armoured Brigade (UK) (1 x CV90120T Regiment, 2 x Armoured Infantry)

Turn 4th Brigade back into Armoured Brigade and give it a second Warrior battalion. Cut 7th Warrior battalion from orbat – spread the resulting surplus Warriors around (more on this later).

4 regular Army armoured Regiments convert to CV90120T (oh oh, this is actually spending money on a new requirement !).

4 x TA Infantry Battalions convert to Armoured role on Challenger 2.

Final (5th) regular Armoured Corps regiment would provide squadron strength regular cadre’s to the TA Challenger 2 regiments, thus a deployable Challenger 2 regiment could be pulled together at reasonably short notice without activating TA.

A single Royal Armoured Corps training regiment would have both CV90120T and Challenger 2. This is an increase in armoured capability, and introduces a considerable medium armoured capability via the CV190120T.

3rd Division

• 1st Mechanised Brigade (1 CV90120T, 3 Mechanised Inf) – Mechanised Infantry (Tracked)
• 12th Mechanised Brigade (3 Mechanised Inf) – Mechanised Infantry (Wheeled)
• 52nd Infantry Brigade (3 x Mechanised Infantry Battalions) – Mechanised Infantry (Wheeled)
• 12th Mechanised Brigade loses its Armoured Regiment, although technically on paper this could be the Challenger 2 regiment composed of the regular Cadre’s for the TA armoured regiments.12th Brigade would be ‘Wheeled’ mechanised infantry using RG35 and LPPV (Ocelot) variants
• 1st Mechanised Brigade based on Warthog as ‘tracked’ Mechanised Infantry. All variants used including repair and recovery, command, armoured logistics, flatbed logistics, ambulance and 120mm mortars
• 52nd Infantry Brigade – would become fully mechanised using Mastiff 2 / Wolfhound / Ridgeback vehicles and LPPV (Ocelot) as required
• 19th Light Brigade be removed from 3rd Mech Division and re-role as GS Infantry as part of one of the regenerative divisions.

Infantry re-org detail – : If we take total of today’s 36 ‘line infantry’ battalions and swap them around:

Current structure is 37 with 1 Para not counted (so 36) and with 18 battalions allocated to 1st and 3rd Divisions plus 2 air assault = 20. Leaving the 3 ‘regenerative’ divisions with 16 infantry battalions. Add 1 Para (SFSG) back and the tilt is slightly towards ‘readiness’ formations at 21 to 16.

If all below are allocated as ‘special to role’ and not available as ‘standard’ infantry battalions

• 3 x Para battalions as ‘Para-Rangers’ Special Ops
• 2 x Air Assault Infantry Battalions
• 1 x Army Commando

That leaves 31 Battalions.

With 1st Armoured Div and 3rd Mechanised Div having 18 infantry battalions as the ‘readiness’ forces, that leaves 13 battalions as part of the ‘regenerative’ divisions. Add the 6 special to role battalions and that gives a 24 / 13 split.

If 19th Brigade is moved from readiness to regenerative then that evens out at 15 ‘standard’ battalions each. So we get a 21 / 16 split i.e. the same as we have now.

So what do I mean by ‘special to role’ battalions ?

I am against the ‘light’ role as a title.

Light fighters should be specialists with a very special role. In my opinion there is no room in the modern battlefield for non-armoured / mechanised infantry unless they have a special role to play. The fact that ‘general service’ infantry battalions in the ‘regenerative’ divisions are seen as ‘light’ roled is simply because we cannot afford enough armour for everyone – but more on this in a later article.

So I would turn all the Para battalions into “Para-Rangers” – a level of Special Operations Forces below the Special Forces themselves (essentially similar to the US model). This would thus acknowledge that these highly trained light fighters have a special role. Similarly two replacement infantry battalions allocated permanently to the air assault role would train in a specialized light fighter role and would be the experts on air mobile / heliborne operations.

Finally I leave an extra Army battalion allocated to 3 Brigade, Royal Marines. Simply adding another RM Commando is not realistically achievable. With an Army battalion allocated to the Viking based ‘mechanised amphibious’ role, fully trained Green Berets can concentrate on their specialist light fighter role while the Army Commando’s could be put through at least the All-arms Commando Course at a whatever pace is realistic given the training resources available.

What if further cuts were demanded (god forbid) in order to fund various programmes ? Well we can fantasize about a Government that cuts international aid (or something) and increases defence spending, but……..

If we had to, I would contract the above scheme by 3 Brigades / 6 Battalions – removing one Mechanised brigade from 3rd Division and one general service brigade from the regenerative divisions.

Don’t forget if we cut these ‘teeth’ units there would be other cuts to supporting elements too, reducing manpower further.

Of course the politicians would then have to commit to not over-committing the armed forces !

I would essentially keep the Regiments structure as it is today:

(Org chart courtesy of www.armedforces.co.uk)

Recce (Sabre) Squadrons

The biggest change of course would be the replacement of the Scimitar CVR(T) with the shortened FRES Scout variant of the CV90. While I would prefer the Upgraded Warrior to have the unmanned turret from Nexter as developed for the French VCBI, I can see the point of a ‘recce’ vehicle retaining a manned turret with good direct view optics, and giving the vehicle commander the chance to stand up high in his hatch with a pair of bino’s (if the tactical situation allows it).. So, we will go with the CTA40mm turret as suggested for the CV90 FRES Scout bid. With 12 vehicles per squadron, full regiment strength is 36 CV90 Scouts.

Supporting Vehicles

The Spartan APC would be replaced by the ‘protected mobility’ APC version of the full length CV90, with an RWS equipped with a 7.62mm / 12.7mm MG or 40mm GMG as required.

Sampson recovery vehicles, Sultan command vehicles and Samaritan ambulances would be replaced by the similar existing variants of the CV90 that are already in production for various user nations, and these are distributed across the Regimental HQ Squadron, the Squadron HQ Troops and the ‘Fitter’ section as required.

Command and Support Squadron

I would add some capabilities to the Command and Support Squadron. Based on Command Vehicle and protected mobility APC variants, this is where I would put my tactical-mini UAV capability. I think we need a small, tactical system, able to be stowed in an APC, with the command and downlink workstation in a Command vehicle. Preferably something ‘hand launched’ – for the role of the Recce regiment, I don’t think we need longer range or endurance. I would suggest, just as a starting point the IAI Skylark 1 system.

Even smaller is the Lockheed Martin Desert Hawk, being used in Afghanistan by the Royal Artilary for patrol over watch and other roles. You can see how small it is when compared to its laptop ‘control station’

I think we can go with maybe 4 air vehicles and 2 Command Vehicle workstations. The Regiment should also have Rover ground stations and obviously the capability to receive imagery from larger tactical UAV’s and from helicopters etc.

The other capability I would add here is a mast mounted EO and radar surveillance capability, such as that deployed on the Canadian GD built LAV-RECCE (or Coyote as it’s known over here):

See: http://www.gdls.com/programs/lav2_coyote.html

Note that we already use the MSTAR radar, and I believe it is normally deployed on a Spartan APC, also that I am not suggesting fitting this kit to a standard turreted FRES Scout, but to a variant of the CV90 APC, with perhaps 4 vehicles in the Squadron (1 for each Sabre Squadron and 1 spare).

Recce Squadron ATGW and Support Troops

Currently the ATGW squadron is on paper comprised of 4 x Striker ATGW carriers, however their heavy Swingfire wire guided weapons were withdrawn sometime ago. The discussion of what ATGW to deploy into the Squadrons, and how provoked considerable discussion of missile types etc in the comments on the original FDR FRR posting.

I am only going to be slightly radically by suggesting providing anti-tank firepower in the guise of a Troop of 4 x CV90120T medium tanks with the RUAG light weight / low recoil 120mm gun, firing standard NATO APDS-FS rounds. These are also capable recce vehicles in their own right, and provide many rounds than an ATGW system. Of course, in my re-ogranised army, these are also the mounts of our regular Armoured Corps Regiments !

The Support Troop provides 4 x Spartan APC’s for dismounted recce ‘scouts’ for sneaky forward and doing recce on foot. As Spartan can only carry 4 x dismounts, and a CV90 APC could carry 8, we will drop the vehicles down to 2. However I would replace the other 2 Spartans with 2 x CV90 with AMOS 120mm breach loading, automatic smooth bore mortars. This is a truly multi-purpose weapon system with a direct fire capability, and the ability to drop rounds ranging from IR screening smoke (very useful to a recce unit) to the Strix IR guided top-attack anti-armour weapon. Also if we really wanted to add another ATGW to our mix, then the barrels of the AMOS can fire IAI LAHAT tube-launched laser guided missiles. A good idea might be to add a fifth APC to carry additional mortar rounds.

CV90 AMO

A Support Troop conundrum – anti-air capability?

I am sure most readers would admit that the British Army is not well endowed with air-defence capabilities. Sure we have the Starstreak HVM as our ‘manpads’ and mounted on a variant of the Stormer APC (a stretched CVR(T)). However as the Recce Regiment can be expected to be operating at the ‘forward edge of battle area’ or indeed fluidly operating across an asymmetric battle space, should it have some more AA capability embedded ? There is an AA version of the CV90 with a different turret mounting a Bofors 40mm with the requisite sensors and fire control:

CV90 Air Defence

The ‘dust bin’ on the turret is radar – perhaps we would just use the standard IR Air Defence Alerting Device (IR-ADAD) and replace the Bofors with the standard CTA 40mm – lower rate of fire, but adequate for anti-helicopter ? Of course we could fit the same turret with 8 x Starstreak launchers as used on the current vehicles, and Starstreak is useful against targets other than ‘fast movers’.

For now let’s just say 2 CV90 AA with IR-ADAD and CTA 40mm turrets with high angle capability.

Soft skinned vehicles and ‘close recce’

The Regimental HQ, HQ Squadron and Recce Squadron HQ’s have the ‘Truck Utility Medium – Fitted For Radio’ (TUM-FFR) – or to you and I, the Landover Wolf with Bowman. There has been much support on in comments on previous posts for the use of the Fennek wheeled armoured recce vehicle to provide a ‘close recce’ element. This could be provided by replacing the soft skinned Landover’s in this role. However although my father was Household Cavalry (the Blues) and I have a good friend from the TA who was regular Army Blues and Royals, I have to admit I am not sure how the Landover’s are used. If they are not being used by close recce teams, but are just general purpose runabouts for the HQ staff, then a Fennek procurement is not appropriate. Perhaps Panther CLV would suffice in this role (it has room in back to throw bergens) with its roof mounted RWS conferring additional sensor capability. Otherwise even the Husky would provide 4 under armour seats, radios and some load carrying space in the back.

Note that unlike the original FRR article, I am not suggesting the use of Jackal / Jackal 2 – I would equip the recce platoons of Mechanised Infantry Brigades with these vehicles, or keep them available for FRR use ‘as required’.

Should Combat Engineers be added as standard element ?

Combat Engineers have their own recce troops, we might expect some to be attached to the ‘dismounts’, however in a highly asymmetric battle space, with fluid manoeuvre warfare do we need a little more embedded capability ?

How about a single CV90 APC, fitted with a dozer blade and perhaps a roof mounted “Mini-Python” minefield breaching system, attached to each Recce Squadron HQ ?

The alternative Formation Recce Regiment, vehicles summary:

• 36 x CV90 FRES Scout in 3 x Recce Squadrons
• 12 x CV90120T Medium Tanks in 3 x Anti-tank Troops (1 Troop per Recce Sqdn)
• 6 x CV90 AMOS in 3 x Support Troops (1 Troop per Recce Sqdn)(plus 3 x CV90 APC for ammo)
• 6 x CV90 AA in 3 x Support Troops (1 Troop per Recce Sqdn)
• 48 Recce Scouts (“dismounts”) in 6 x CV90 APC in 3 x Support Troops (1 Troop per Recce Sqdn). This equates to 6 x 8 man full sections or 12 x 4 man ‘brick’ Recce teams for close recce.
• 4 x CV90 APC with mast mounted EO / Radar (in Command and Support Squadron)
• 4 x CV90 APC ‘Combat Engineer’
• 14 – 18 x CV90 Command Vehicles (to replace Sultan in HQ elements)
• 6 – 8 x CV90 APC (to replace Spartan in HQ elements.)
• 4 x CV90 Ambulance (to replace Samaritan in HQ elements)
• 4 x CV90 Armoured Recovery Vehicle (to replace Samson in Fitter Sections)
• 8 x Fennek / Panther CLV / Husky as required (to replace TUM-FFR)

Approx. 111 CV90 variants, plus 8 wheeled vehicles !

A powerful and flexible formation, whadya think ?

In addition to contributing to an intelligence picture it will provide medium armour support and a number of other functions, primarily equipped with the FRES Scout and related variants, although there is still a place for the lightweight vehicles in order to provide a degree of flexible capabilities.

For FRES Scout and the Base Platform the MoD have opted for a tracked chassis, recognising that the advantages of tracks outweigh the disadvantages, in our proposed Mechanised Brigade structure the Medium Armour Support/ Reconnaissance Regiment would be equipped with the FRES Recce Block family, including the protected mobility, scout, repair, recovery and fire support variants.

Each Regiment would consist of 2 Reconnaissance Squadrons, 1 Fire Support Squadron, 1 Support Squadron and HQ elements. The HQ element would consist of protected mobility and command variants, enough to support distributed operations as the Regiment may be deployed over a wide area.

Reconnaissance Squadron

A Reconnaissance Squadron would consist of a Squadron HQ, 3 Reconnaissance Troops and a Logistic Support Troop.

2 of the Reconnaissance Troop’s will be equipped with 4 ASCOD FRES Scout each and the Logistic Support Troop would be tasked with various support functions like repair, recovery, force protection and ambulance.

ASCOD FRES Scout

The third Reconnaissance Troop would be equipped with a combination of lighter vehicles like Jackal, Coyote, Force Protection Ocelot (if it hopefully replaces LR and maybe even Jackal) and quad bikes depending on the requirement. It is important that at least one troop in the squadron retains some degree of helicopter air mobility.

Dismounted infantry might be organic or attached from other units as needs dictate (thanks gents)

The existing Formation Reconnaissance squadrons are nominally scaled for another troop, the Guided Weapon Troop, that uses the Striker version of the CVR(T) equipped with the long range Swingfire Anti Tank Guided Weapon. The Swingfire is now long out of service so this capability area remains essentially unfilled, originally they were designed to provide overwatch and anti tank cover for the Scimitars that would be deployed in harms way forward and on the edge of the area of operations. It might be argued that this role is now taken by the Apache AH1 Attack Helicopter and RAF aircraft to some extent, but they are a finite and usually over tasked resource that might have trouble operating in restrictive airspace or very bad weather.

FV102 Striker

I think there is still a need for ground launched long range guided weapons.

The certainties of the Cold War produced some extremely advanced autonomous anti armour weapons like Brimstone, able to selectively destroy large quantities of military vehicles with very sophisticated guidance technology in fire and forget mode. Iraq and Afghanistan have confirmed the ‘old fashioned’ man in the loop systems are now of greater use, as evidenced by for example, the dual mode Brimstone. Top attack weapons are also of less value when attacking small targets hiding behind cover in buildings for example, restrictive rules of engagement and the desire for greatly reduce collateral damage means that some of the advanced modes of operation are now less practical. The increasing use of Javelins to attack small groups or even individual Taleban in Afghanistan is another stark example.

The UK has engaged with MBDA in along term partnering arrangement for complex weapons but there is some synergy between an Army requirement for a long range anti tank missile and the RAF Selective Precision Effects At Range (SPEAR) programme. SPEAR has been going in one concept form or another for nearly a decade and included 5 capabilities; Capabilities 1 and 2 to be met by developments of the Raytheon Paveway IV and the MBDA Dual-Mode Brimstone, respectively, other improvements are also being considered. Capability 3 is understood to correspond to what was previously SPEAR Drop 2 and there was some talk of an extended range Future Anti Surface Guided Weapon (FASGW) or Sea Skua replacement, being used by the RAF. The fourth element of the revised program encompasses upgrades to the Storm Shadow cruise missile, while the fifth element could cover a longer-range cruise missile. Up to date information on SPEAR is hard to find but the partnering arrangement does not appear to include any ground launched missile or a replacement for the Attack Helicopter’s Hellfire missile. The UK has also participated in a number of other programmes including the European Modular Missile and the Multi Role Combat Missile. The US has also finally got to grips with a common missile in its revitalised Joint Air to ground Missile (JAGM) that will be launched from both helicopters and fast jets and will have a tri mode seeker, multi purpose warhead and 16-28km range, depending on launch platform.

If the UK decides that a ground launched long range missile is desirable then in the long term it should be striving for commonality across all three services with a single family of missiles that can be launched from fast jets, helicopters, small ships and vehicles/ground mounts. Dual and tri mode seekers might reduce logistic complexity but will inevitably drive costs up so a single missile ‘family’ might be an appropriate route, one thing is certain, we need to maximise commonality across all three services, the Common Anti Air Modular Missile programme is an excellent example of this, we should ensure that the same approach is followed for anti surface target missiles as well.

In the short to medium term, it should be relatively straightforward to use the already designed Hellfire vehicular launching system on the ASCOD base platform or even design one similar to the Striker configuration. The Hellfire II long range guided missile has a number of warheads options, 500 – 8,000m range, fires from a defilade and has the ability to detach the fire control unit from the launching vehicle (like Striker) would make this a powerful and versatile system.  Although the Hellfire is larger than Swingfire, the ASCOD2 is larger than the Striker.

An even cheaper option might be to use Javelin and a dismounted infantry team.

Another alternative might be the CRV-7PG I mentioned in the post on heavy armour.

Fire Support Squadron

The role for this squadron would be to provide direct fire support for dismounted infantry and other units, in this proposal the Mechanised Infantry brigade is much lighter than the existing ones, no Warrior and Challenger for example, so this squadron is the Brigades heavy hitter.

The ASCOD2 already has a version that uses a 105mm tank gun and the version with the Royal Thai Marines have selected the version with the Denel Land Systems LMT105 turret

ASCOD2 LT105

Other options that have been prototyped with the ASCOD chassis include the Oto Melara HITFACT turret and the General Dynamics M6801 auto loading system from the Stryker MGS, although the latter is the perhaps the least suitable as it uses a complex/expensive unmanned mounting and the main reason the US selected the weapon was because it came from old M1A1’s rather than any inherent suitability for a lighter chassis.

ASCOD and GD 105mm

The CMI 90mm or 105mm weapons might also be considered.

The 105mm direct fire canon would seem a sensible route to take for direct fire support and there are many NATO standard ammunition natures in production from a variety of sources, it is a low cost and low risk option although there are also a number of 120mm weapons that might also be considered from Rheinmetall and Oto Melara to name but two.

Each Squadron would be scaled for 4 troops with 4 vehicles each plus the standard Logistic Support Troop.

Support Squadron

The final element of the Medium Armour Support/ Reconnaissance Regiment is the Support Squadron that would provide a number of disparate functions but comprise 4 Troops plus the standard Logistic Support Troop.

1 Troop – Remote Fires Integration, this troop would be manned by forward air controllers and make up Tactical Air Control Parties as needed. Individuals would be able to integrate all forms of indirect fire from land, air or maritime platforms. Given the increasing need and availability of precision indirect fires the ability of Army units to direct those fires needs to expand. Vehicles might be split between a FRES ASCOD Protected Mobility and other high mobility vehicles such as Jackal/Panther in the short term and in the medium term, hopefully the Ocelot. In any case, a mix of vehicles should be used.

ASCOD FRES Protected Mobility

2 Troop – Observation, this troop might be larger than normal with a broader range of roles including long range sniping missions, ground observation and NBC Reconnaissance. In an increasingly urbanised environment and where there might be restrictions on the use of aircraft and UAS the need for enduring passive and active ground surveillance remains.

A typical vehicle might be the FRES ASCOD with a hydraulic articulated boom that mounted a sensor head; electro optical, radar and acoustic. For an idea of a similar vehicle have a look at the Czech Sněžka reconnaissance vehicle.

Sněžka reconnaissance vehicle

3 Troop – UAS, in an earlier post we suggested a Brigade level UAS to compliment and/or replace the Watchkeeper 450 and the Boeing/Insitu Scan Eagle would be the preferred system because it does not need any fixed launch and recover facilities. As ground based UAS become viable they might also be integrated. Each troop would be equipped with 3 systems. Again, vehicles would be likely a mix between FRES ASCOD and lightweight vehicles.

A fourth troop might consist of an NBC Reconnaissance capability, detached from a centralised ‘pool’ of divisional support units although this would not be the norm.

This is a departure from currently accepted structures because it places UAS and remote fires control outside of the Royal Artillery.

The Challenger 2 is without a doubt one of the best main battle tanks in anywhere in the world, highly mobile and superbly well protected it gives UK armed forces a formidable edge.

Challenger 2

Improved incrementally over a number of years there are still a number of improvements that it needs to remain in the premier league. In our previous post on structures I suggested that Challengers be restricted to 2 armoured brigades but that these brigades revert to the more traditional square structure with 2 armoured Regiments and 2 Armoured Infantry Battalions. An armoured Regiment consists of 4 Armoured Squadrons each equipped with 14 Challenger 2 and supporting elements such as medic and repair/recovery. Each squadron has 4 troops of 3 Challengers plus 2 in the HQ.

The existing Challenger 2 should be improved to 2E level with new engine/transmission, fire control systems, sensors and remote weapon stations. In addition, the 120mm rifled canon should be replaced with the Rheinmetall 120mm L55 canon. This is not for any inherent technical reason (those arguing the relative merits of rifled versus smoothbore can go on forever) but basic industrial and cost realities. The UK is the only nation to use a rifled main gun so any ammunition is both costly to develop and manufacture. Barrel life is also longer with a smoothbore and we can tap into other nations supply streams.

Fitting the smoothbore L55 has already been demonstrated in static firing tests and apart but to accept 1 part ammunition would be a complex and expensive task, so expensive it might actually be worth a new ammunition design and manufacture phase.

Challenger 2 fitted with L55 Smoothbore Cannon

If possible, the switchover will enable access to a much greater choice of ammunition natures and commonality with other NATO nations. Ammunition available for this weapon, off the shelf, includes the very high performance Rheinmetall DM63 kinetic penetrator and the DM33 PELE round. General Dynamics manufacture a wide range of 120mm smoothbore ammunition including the ‘interesting’ M1028 cannister round and IMI make the Stun Cartridge (CS) that is essentially a huge thunderflash, the APAM multi purpose round and the tank launched LAHAT guided munition for engagements beyond 6,000m.

Although the Russians have recently cancelled the BMPT Tank Support Fighting Vehicle it is an interesting concept developed directly from experience in fighting in built up areas with main battle tanks. The accepted wisdom is not to take a tank into built up areas unless one has lots and lots of infantry support, tanks can be vulnerable at close range from all manner of active and passive defences.

BMPT Tank Support Combat Vehicle

With the proposal to go square there is a lot of Challenger 2’s in each Armoured Brigade, a UK version of the Russian BMPT would provide a valuable improvement in capability especially in the close confines of urban or semi-urban terrain. In typical open tank country it could be argued that such a vehicle would have little merit but as the world becomes increasingly urbanised and high performance anti tank weapons proliferate, the danger levels for armoured vehicles is increasing.

The Challenger can be fitted with other turrets as this diagram of a version with Marksman anti aircraft turret shows.

Challenger Marksman

The proposed Challenger fire support vehicle would be a conversion of existing hulls and they could be deployed in each troop (2x Challenger 2 MBT and 1x Challenger 2 FSV) or concentrated in a dedicated troop, the actual deployment options would be determined from doctrinal development and exercising. They might even be deployed as a dedicated squadron.

Whilst the Russian BMPT favours multiple cannons, grenade and missile launchers with a 5 man crew the Challenger version would be armed with a remote turret. A 3 man crew would be housed in the hull to maximise protection and minimise weight, this weight reduction would improve the power to weight ratio and therefore mobility. The remote turret would house an extendable mast mounted sight and be armed with a high elevation mount 40mm CTA canon, 40mm GMG and 7.62mm machine gun.

In one of our previous proposals we suggested that the CRV-7 Precision Guided Rocket would have utility as a low cost guided weapon against fixed and slow moving targets, if the system comes into service it would be a useful addition, either that or a 4 round Javelin launcher.

The CRV-7 is in service with the RAF and Army Air Corps in a number of unguided variants, incredibly effective with a much higher energy and accuracy than other similar rockets Kongsberg and Magellan have been quietly working on the precision seeker head that is available in semi active laser, GPS and even anti radiation although only the first two have been successfully demonstrated. Kongsberg are also marketing the CRV-7PG in a naval mount and it was also due to be fitted to the Canadian Multi Mission Effects Vehicle.

A bulldozer blade should also be fitted.

The key mission for the Challenger FSV would be to protect Warrior and Challenger from ATGW/RPG teams, suppression and destruction of small vehicles and support weapons. At greater open terrain ranges then the Challenger, Warrior, FRES and supporting indirect fires should be able to cope but in close confines reaction time and agility count whilst still being as mobile and survivable as Challenger because inevitably, they will get hit. For this reason the well protected Challenger teamed up with an extremely fast slewing/elevating medium calibre weapon like an automatic canon is ideal. the 40mm CTA is the logical choice and can have two ammunition natures available at the flick of a switch, some of these advanced rounds will have delayed fusing for through obstacle and over defilade attack.

The Warrior has proven to be reliable, tough and capable but the existing turret and 30mm RARDEN canon can be improved.

Warrior

The various studies to improve the Warrior and field the 40mm CTA canon in a new turret have recently been slipped by 12 months due to budget issues but the programme should not be delayed indefinitely and confirmed as soon as possible.

Warrior MTIP2

Our previous structure proposal envisages the re rolling of some existing Warrior infantry units to the mechanised role which means a number of Warriors would be made available for conversion to the various secondary roles currently fulfilled by the FV43x series. The FV43x series, especially the excellent Bulldog conversions, should be retained as war stock and used when the need dictates.

Bulldog

UPDATE:

Have added some extra information in the post to reflect comments.

As we have said in previous posts, that depends on the role the UK assumes in the coming years but if we are to make a prediction that despite future conflicts being unpredictable a reasonable guess can be made that the days of heavy armour on heavy armour clashes are likely to be less common.

However, the need for an armoured capability is still obvious, even though it is likely not to be used as much in future conflicts it still remains a core need and if one examines the operations in Iraq in 2003 onwards Challenger provided invaluable support. Remember, the aftermath of the invasion was supposed to be a classic COIN operation, yet Challenger 2 remained a key weapon system. Although the UK has not found the justification for deploying Challenger 2 to Afghanistan, other nations have deployed main battle tanks to great effect. Despite being perceived as a cold war relic the main battle tank remains a potent and relevant battlefield weapon, no matter what the nature of that battlefield is.

Armoured units comprising Challenger 2, Warrior and FRES Scout are still going to form the hard core of Army fighting capability in the foreseeable future.

The traditional distinction between mechanised and light role is their means of transport. Mechanised units have used Saxons and Bulldog armoured vehicles with heavy armoured support and were eventually to be replaced by the FRES medium weight concept.

Light role units have generally relied on air mobility and lightweight vehicles like Land Rovers and Pinzgauers, with the de-rigueur moustache of course.

Operations in Afghanistan, which in a global guardian context, are likely to be the prevalent type have seen these distinctions blur. Armoured infantry is still used occasionally but the light role and mechanised units are increasingly using the same equipments scales and vehicles, substituting helicopters for Mastiffs as the need arises.

The UK has two deployable divisions;

1 (UK) Armoured Division, comprises 3 combat brigades, the 4 Mechanised, 7 Armoured and 20 Armoured. All the usual combat support and combat service support regiments are also represented and the division is stationed in Germany.

3 (UK) Mechanised Division, comprising 1 and 12 Mechanised Brigades, 19 Light Brigade and 52 Infantry Brigade, again with all the usual CS and CSS formations.

In addition to the deployable divisions the Army also has The 16th Air Assault Brigade as part of the Joint Helicopter Command and various other smaller units like theatre support, special-forces and special-forces support.

In 2003 the ‘Arms Plot’ was abolished with each of the combat units assigned a specific role, armoured, mechanised or light and the role of armoured brigades reduced, many of them re roling to formation recce.

The question is, are the likely future conflicts going to see a distinction between light role and mechanised, could they be merged into a single versatile infantry capability that could operate in either role, a return to the original FRES concept of a medium weight force perhaps?

6 Division is in fact not a Division but a deployable divisional headquarters unit that was formed to share the command rotations of Iraq and Afghanistan. After being reinforced it deployed to Afghanistan as Joint Task Force 6.

Although only lifed to 2011 I think this should be continued with as a permanent arrangement, in fact expanded to provide a two deployable ‘command HQ Division’ capability that can deal with the full range of operational tasks. This Divisional HQ could then create composite units (as happens now) as the requirement dictated.

1 and 3 Div could then be collapsed into a series of self contained brigades.

The Army structure could then be…

2x Deployable Divisional Headquarters including divisional support elements

2x Heavy Brigades, equipped with Challenger 2, Warrior and AS90 etc

6x Medium Brigades, equipped with FRES and Protected Patrol Vehicles

2x Rapid Reaction Brigades, 16 Air Assault and RM 3 Commando (I know this is RN)

Plus special-forces, theatre support and other elements

This would be an overall increase of 2 brigades, allocated to the Medium role.

Any takers?

FAS is actually old terminology, first mentioned in the defence 2003 Defence White Paper (Delivering Security in a Changing World) but the Army (as other services) are constantly looking to the future, re-organising and usually reducing in size. Just looking at the recent defence reviews, from Option for Change (1990) through Front Line First (1994) and the Strategic Defence Review of 1998 with its subsequent revisions the unrelenting trend has been change, merging and looking to the future.

What characterises these reorganisations is a common thread of reduction in manpower, especially Infantry units.

Fast forward to 2010 and it is the Army that is no doubt carrying the major burden of operations. Before I get any howls of protest everyone acknowledges that the other services are making vital contributions and in some areas as stretched as the Army but when taken in the round Afghanistan is a land operation and a sustained one at that.

FAS, as is usual with these types of re-organisation that seek to squeeze a pint out of a thimble was inevitably not a complete success, with intervals between tours getting longer not shorter and this was even worse for certain pinch point trades.

In response to these pressures, in 2009, the then Chief of the Defence Staff (General Sir Richard Dannatt) announced that the Future Army Structure (Next Steps) would be initiated to allow the Army to cope better with these ongoing demands. Next Steps is planned to retain more experienced soldiers by reducing the number of brigades from 10 to 6 but increasing their size to approximately 4,000. Brigades will consist of a battalion of Challenger 2 main battle tanks, one of armoured reconnaissance, an armoured infantry battalion, a mechanised infantry battalion and two light role battalions. No details have emerged on the RM, 16 Air Assault Brigade, combat support, combat service support or higher formations headquarters.

It’s hard not to be cynical when FAS was characterised as;

an Army for the challenges of today and tomorrow

Facing the obvious increase in non deployability due to injury from operations and other factors a number of activities have also been undertaken including increasing use of Manning Control Points to remove soldiers unfit for deployment.

Manning is an extremely complex subject best visualised as a series of four conveyor belts; recruits, junior ranks, senior ranks and officers. Each of these conveyor belts moves at a different pace and one also has to consider training and skills, promotion opportunities and actual manpower requirements. Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have tended to produce unexpected variations in the conveyor belt, adding a number of problems and pinch point trades continue to plague all the services with several specialist areas woefully undermanned.

The link between strategy, structures and manning are of course close ones.

If the future defence review takes the RUSI option of Strategic Raiding then after a future draw down from Afghanistan the Army would likely see a considerable reduction, if the option is Global Guardian then it is obvious that the Army will need to increase in size.

I think there will be no decisive result from any future review and the likely outcome will be a typical fudge but my preferred option is to retain a rounded force capable of any contingent operation and for this, the need to increase the Army is self evident.

At an operational level one of the enduring characteristics of the British Army is the ability to organise itself for the task at hand, new formations and units being formed as required. This is in sharp contrast to other nations and is a quality that should be retained, there is nothing like operational experience to create effective organisations.

There is no doubt that the Army is stretched but there are few definitions of what harmony, stretch or overstretch actually look like.

All these factors conspire to create a great deal of fluidity and uncertainty when looking at the structure of the Army so no more than general themes can be suggested.

• Equipment
• Armoured vehicles
• Organisation
• Territorial Army

Anyone got any other suggestions?