12. A full review of the UK’s defence requirements is needed urgently, but this review should form an integral part of a wider Strategic Review of Security. It should not be a Strategic Defence Review conducted in isolation from the rest of government thinking on national security risks and responses. The defence component of this wider review should focus on increased capability specialisation; capabilities required to handle risks that are specific to the UK; a reduced commitment to the full

Spectrum of conventional war fighting capability; an emphasis on post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction capabilities; and a new approach to the UK’s nuclear deterrent, Trident

This makes a lot of sense, combining defence in with a wider review of strategic security issues is an obvious ‘good idea’ although the recommendation makes the assumption that we need to reduce commitment to the full spectrum of war fighting capability and concentrate on stabilisation and reconstruction capabilities. This alone is worthy of a prolonged debate, do we maintain a balanced capability able to flex up to full war or down to a low intensity operation or move the force balance away from capabilities to meet the challenge of interstate war.

13. The future defence investment programme should pursue greater UK defence capability specialisation within the context of a deepening of European defence integration and the wider NATO alliance of which we are apart. We need a focus on command and control assets, tactical ground-air support, heavy lift aircraft, cyber warfare capability, and special-forces. We also need to emphasise high quality Service personnel training and an increase in overall service numbers.

We absolutely refute the recommendation that the UK should deepen European defence integration. Given the recent farcical EU mission to Dharfur and ongoing ‘commitment issues’ in Afghanistan our EU partners are simply too unreliable and any further integration would be beset with the same old national priorities and self interest that are the current realities. Whilst one should be under no illusions about our position in the transatlantic ‘special relationship’ we must recognise that the US, NATO and even the Commonwealth represent the future of our security. The EU is simply unable to commit to any operation where there is any serious opposition and we need to be realistic. The selection of capabilities that we need to concentrate on also seem rather ill thought through and arbitrary, lacking any real insight or recognition of where our EU partners might take up the slack in the areas we neglect. The desire to concentrate on high quality training and an increase in overall numbers is sensible.

14. The Government should give high priority to the capabilities required to deal with a range of UK-specific security challenges. These might include major civil contingencies, major terrorist incidents on UK territory, small scale risks to UK communities living abroad, and some elements of maritime security.

The MoD and government have in recent years developing a strategy and doctrine for civil resilience that explicitly excludes the military in all but the most extreme cases, see JDP2-02 for further reading and the civil defence sector, primarily local authorities and emergency services, have made significant headway under the guidance of the civil contingencies secretariat and Civil Contingencies Act.

That said, the military brings a range of unique capabilities that can contribute significantly to the response phase of a major civil or security incident and the recent summer flooding demonstrated that these organisations and operators of the critical national infrastructure still require military resources in times of extremes.

Is it a reasonable expectation for a nation to draw on these capabilities during times of significant distress, we think so.

It is definitely worth looking at how the military can contribute more to an integrated civil response capability, resources permitting.

15. The Government should thoroughly re-examine, as part of a Strategic Review of Security, its projected defence equipment requirements. This re-examination should explore all viable options for capability downgrading and quantity reductions, as well as for complete cancellation of some equipment programmes. For illustrative rather than comprehensive purposes, we suggest that programmes such as the Future Carrier, the Joint Strike Fighter, and purchases of Type 45 Destroyers and of Astute class submarines should be in the frame.

No programme or capability should be off limits in any review but the recommendation here is to trade off so called high end assets in favour of the unconventional capabilities discussed elsewhere, for example special-forces or close air support. Although only mentioned for illustrative purposes those in the frame would seem to centre on the maritime domain, these would not be easy choices. Without, for example, the Type 45 destroyers, any amphibious or maritime task group would be completely vulnerable to air and missile attack.

16. The UK should create a Stabilisation and Reconstruction Force, only the headquarters of which should be a permanent standing element.  This would be a joint civilian-military force, partly staffed from a trained civilian reserve, capable of being deployed in to still dangerous post-conflict environments at short notice.

We like this idea, it makes a lot of sense but issues of force protection and integration of civilian and military capabilities, aims and objectives would need to be carefully managed. The current three way tug of war between the MoD, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and UK Aid (DfID) creates neither economies of scale or effectiveness of application.

We believe the woeful UK Aid should be disbanded and primacy once again given to the FCO, wielding the capabilities of defence and aid with a single purpose, the advancement of UK security and interests.

17. The future of Britain’s independent nuclear deterrent should be considered as an integral part of the recommended Strategic Review of Security. This should consider:

Whether, as the Commission believes is the case, a minimum UK deterrent is still needed

• The best and most cost-effective way to provide it, including consideration of whether we should replace the Trident system, as is currently planned, seek to extend the life of the current system further or decide that some other system for providing Britain’s deterrent in a nuclear armed world would be better suited to the strategic circumstances in which we then find ourselves
• The opportunity costs of maintaining our deterrent, in all its possible forms, for other sectors of the UK defence and security budget. This must take into account the costs that would be involved in decommissioning Trident and its facilities.

We also believe the UK nuclear capability is intimately tied into our security and status as a nation and in these matters perception IS reality. We must not be perceived, in the growing uncertainty and proliferation in the next 50 years, as going weak on our ultimate means of security. There may be more economic means of wielding the system but whatever means chosen, it must be credible, effective, instantly deployable and survivable. These factors point to a submarine launched system, i.e. Trident or its replacement.

18. In order to maintain the option of refreshing the current system as part of the Strategic Review of Security, the UK should continue with the crucial ongoing preparatory work on the concept, design and assessment phases of the Trident refresh.

Agreed

19. To provide maximum additional flexibility in our position, the UK should also now recommence detailed exploratory work on the costs and viability of a further run-on, beyond 2024, of the existing Vanguard submarine hulls, so that the Strategic Review of Security, should it conclude that Trident is the appropriate way to go, can also consider this option if desired.

Agreed

20. Finally, before any further decision of substance is taken on this matter, Parliament must have a further opportunity to vote

Again, agreed

Our response is here

1. The Government should direct more resources at the situation in Pakistan, both in terms of capacity building and operational support to help the Pakistani security forces deal directly with the threat from militants, and in terms of development assistance

Yes, but these resources must be closely linked to the UK’s security

2. In relation to Afghanistan, while acknowledging the need for a long-term commitment on the UK’s part, the Commission believes we need much more clarity and realism on the nature of the end state we are there to help deliver. The focus needs to be on helping the writ of the democratically elected government in Kabul run throughout the country, and on preventing Afghanistan from being used as a base from which to attack us. It should not be on trying to implant our own cultural norms in a country that is not ours.

Democracy is a Western cultural norm and not automatically the answer. The end state must not be a stable democracy per se but an improved security situation that does not provide a safe haven for terrorism that destabilises the region and ultimately provides a springboard for the export of that terrorism.

3. The international community needs a single plan for Afghanistan, developed in partnership with the Afghan authorities, with tightly defined priorities and a determination by all members of the international community to operate it with real unity of purpose and voice

Yes, but easier said than done. That should not deter us.

4. The use of military force, both in Afghanistan and in the border areas of Pakistan, must be locked more firmly with in a coherent political plan that is designed to defeat the adversaries we face

Yes

5. The UK government should, with international partners, further develop its efforts at narcotics eradication in Afghanistan by pursuing a multidimensional strategy focused on crop destruction, livelihood substitution, and dealer network disruption. This will help both to develop Afghanistan’s legal economy and to undercut the Taliban, which profits from the narcotics trade.

Our previous strategies with regard to poppy eradication have been woeful, disconnected from reality and resulting both in record poppy crop numbers and a growing alienation in the ordinary rural community.

Evidently what we are doing has not worked.

Meddling with economic reality by buying opium poppy is simply naive and should be vigorously resisted. Another problem is the corruption and poor governance that accompanies narcotics economies, this makes any top down enforcement strategies almost impossible. In the short term we may have to recognise that there is little we can do, concentrating on the security situation and building the infrastructure and agricultural development of impoverished rural communities that will provide a realistic alternative to the poppy. Only from the ground up will the situation be resolved, with the aim of undercutting funding for the Taleban.

6. The Government should support and encourage the US to pursue a wider regional approach to improving the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan

If Pakistan and India could make progress on the Kashmir situation this would provide both political and resource benefits. We must recognise our limitations and encourage the USA to devote resource to resolving or at least de-escalating the tensions between India and Paikistan.

7. The UK’s capacity for combined civilian-military stabilisation and reconstruction operations must quickly grow in-country and increasingly be Afghanised where possible. We have been good at winning military victories in Afghanistan, but less good at building a stable peace afterwards

Yes, we have been good at winning tactical battles but the wider strategic situation still favours the Taleban and the desire to involve more Afghan forces such as the ANP and ANA can bring its own problems, especially the child raping ANP.

There is no silver bullet but we need numbers and the only pragmatic way to achieve that is with Afghan forces, however imperfect.

We also have to bolster the legitimacy of the Afghan government and security forces and the single most important part of this is tackling corruption. Corruption was one of the reasons the Taleban enjoyed such strong local support and as we empower the often warlord influenced local forces we simply reinforce the old ways of corruption and make our job impossible.

Context

There is no doubt that a defence review is well overdue and the recent announcement by the MoD that one will take place is welcome news. Whether it reports before the next general election is of course another point, any incoming Conservative government will have their own ideas. The IPPR report is not to be scoffed at because of the breadth and depth of it’s analysis. Many commentators have chosen to characterise it as left wing rubbish produced by a pet New Labour think tank. This is to do the report a disservice; it deserves some consideration even if one might not agree with its conclusions.

The report summary is split into 4 parts, a set of observations on the current security environment, a statement of principles that should underpin the UK’s response to this environment, a summary of conclusions and finally a list of its 109 recommendations.

Observations

Without seeking to repeat verbatim what the report states (go and read it yourself) they are summarise here;

• The process of globalisation and power diffusion continues
• Unstable and fragile states are growing in number and outnumber stables ones by 2 to 1
• Climate change, poverty and inequality are exacerbating the problem of instability
• Transnational criminal networks continue to expand
• A globalised neo-jihadist ideology has emerged
• Proliferation of nuclear weapons continues
• Rapid advances in information and biotechnologies have created new dependencies and vulnerabilities
• Humanity is exposed to a greater risk of pandemic
• Critical infrastructure is increasingly fragile and in private hands
• The position of the US is changing
• Individual EU nations continue to decline
• Spending constraints on security will continue and worsen

These all paint a fairly bleak picture but the report is at pains to offer some optimism and steers away from the ‘we’re all doomed’ position. It is hard to disagree with any of these observations; they apply equally to the UK and many other nations.

Principles

Underpinning the IPPR’s recommendations are 9 key principles, these being;

• The objective of national security is to protect the UK population from the full spectrum of risks
• These risks must have a wide definition including man-made and natural
• British sovereignty must be exercised responsibly
• Increases in multilateral cooperation is needed
• Extensive partnerships between the public and private sector must feature in security policy
• Demonstrating and establishing the legitimacy of state action is a strategic imperative
• A commitment to building national resilience is an integral element of national security
• A range of flexible national capabilities, both civil and military, should be forged into a cohesive whole

Again, there is not much to disagree with there, all common sense.

We will look at each of the chapters in turn.

In presenting the paper the Institute and publishing committee aims to look holistically at the issue of national security, encompassing not only defence but intelligence, social cohesion and societal resilience, in this its aims are entirely laudable, sensible and logical. The paper has been created by a committee of senior figures within the defence, academic, political, business and intelligence community. By making the committee so wide ranging its aim was no doubt to achieve a balanced position but as with any such endeavour there many a ‘former’

Out of the 13 members of the committee over half have the word former in their descriptions. This is not highlighted as a necessarily bad thing but to illustrate that there are some that are not ‘current’

The members of the committee were

• Lord Paddy Ashdown, Co-Chair, former leader of the Liberal Democrat Party and former High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina
• Lord George Robertson, Co-Chair, former Secretary of State for Defence and former Secretary General of NATO
• Dr Ian Kearns, Deputy Chair, IPPR
• Sir Jeremy Greenstock, Director of the Ditchley Foundation and former British Ambassador to the United Nations
• Sir David Omand, former Security and Intelligence Coordinator in the Cabinet Office and former Permanent Secretary in the Home Office
• General Lord Charles Guthrie, former Chief of the Defence Staff
• Professor Lord Martin Rees, President of the Royal Society and Master of Trinity College, Cambridge.
• Sir Chris Fox, former Chief Constable of Northamptonshire and former President of the Association of Chief Police Officers
• Professor Michael Clarke, Director of the Royal United Services Institute and Professor of Defence Studies at King’s College London
• Professor Tariq Modood, Director of the University of Bristol Research Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship
• Constanze Stelzenmüller, Director of the Berlin office of the German Marshall Fund.
• Professor Jim Norton, Senior Policy Adviser, Institute of Directors and former Chief Executive of the Radio Communications Agency
• Ian Taylor MP, Chair of the Conservative Party Policy Task-force on Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics, Conservative MP for Esher and Walton and former minister for Science and Technology at the Department of Trade and Industry

Countering the perception of a lack of current experience is the extensive contributions from a significant number of individuals, listed here in full, received over a 2 year period;

• Adam Mallalieu, Director of Corporate Security, National Grid
• Admiral Lord Alan West, Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Security and Counterterrorism
• Alex Evans, Fellow, the Center on International Cooperation (New York University)
• Ambassador Bob Barry, Senior Associate, Center for Strategic and International Studies
• Ambassador Rolf Ekéus, Chairman of the Governing Board, SIPRI and former High
• Amélie Gauthier, Researcher, Peace, Security and Human Rights, FRIDE
• Andreas Persbo, Arms Control and Disarmament Researcher (Nuclear), VERTIC
• Andrew Jackson, Director of Border and Visa Policy, UKBA
• Andrew Moran, Professor of International Relations, London Metropolitan University
• Andy Baker, Deputy Director of Intelligence, SOCA
• Andy Carl, Director, Conciliation Resources
• Angela Wilson, Cabinet Office
• Angela Woodward, Executive Director, VERTIC
• Ann Snow, Policy Advisor, Amnesty International UK
• Anna Murison, Head of Global Jihad Forecasting, Exclusive Analysis
• Asima Sheikh, Independent Researcher and Consultant, Community Cohesion & Conflict Resolution, NRA/LIA
• Babak Ganji, Consultant
• Baroness Pauline Neville-Jones, Shadow Security Minister and National Security Adviser to the Leader of the Opposition
• Baroness Sarah Ludford MEP, Liberal Democrat Member of the European Parliament and Liberal Democrat European justice spokeswoman
• Basia Spalek, Senior Lecturer in Criminology and Criminal Justice, University of Birmingham
• Ben Rhode, Research Analyst and Programme Coordinator, International Institute for Strategic Studies
• Bob Ainsworth MP, Minister of State for the Armed Forces
• Bob Keen, Head of Government Relations, BAE Systems
• Bruce Mann, Head of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat, Cabinet Office
• Carol Naughton, WMD Awareness Programme
• Carolyn Hayman, Chief Executive, Peace Direct
• Catherine Barnes, Consultant on Conflict Issues, Conciliation Resources
• Catherine Fieschi, Director, Counterpoint, British Council
• Celia McKeon, Director of Policy, Communications and Comparative Learning, Conciliation Resources
• Charles Farr, Director General, OSCT
• Charlie Edwards, Senior Researcher, Demos
• Chris Allan, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
• Chris Coverdale, Founder, Action Against War
• Chris Earnshaw, Deputy President, Institution of Engineering & Technology
• Chris Rampling, Deputy Head, Counter-Proliferation Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
• Christopher Beese, Chief Administrative Officer, Armorgroup
• Claire Hickson, Head of Advocacy and Communications, Saferworld
• Clare Algar, Executive Director, Reprieve
• Claude Boucher, Deputy High Commissioner to the UK and Former Canadian Ambassador to Haiti
• Claudia Seymour, Child Protection Adviser, UN Expert Group on the Democratic Republic of Congo
• Claudio Cordone, Senior Director for Research and Regional Programmes, Amnesty International
• Cleo Paskal, Associate Fellow, Energy, Environment and Development Programme, Chatham House
• Clive Stafford-Smith, Director, Reprieve
• Commissioner on National Minorities, OSCE
• Conor Gearty, Professor of Human Rights Law and Director of the Centre for the Study of Human Rights, LSE
• DAC Cressida Dick, Deputy ACSO, MPS
• Dan Nelson, President of Global Concepts & Communications, LLC, and Senior
• Dan Smith, Secretary General, International Alert
• Daniel Korski, Senior Policy Fellow, European Council on Foreign Relations
• Darryl Howlett, Senior Lecturer in the Division of Politics and International Relations, University of Southampton
• David Hendon, Head of Business Relations, BERR
• David Newton, Conflict Adviser, DfID
• David Williams, Director, Cohesion Directorate, DCLG
• DCI Andy Coles, Head of Training, ACPO TAM
• DCI Tony McCarthy, Detective Chief Inspector within Special Branch, Office of the National Co-ordinator Ports Policing
• DCS Andy Rintoul, Detective Chief Superintendent, HMIC
• Denis O’Connor, HMI, HMIC
• Detective Inspector Andy Slater, Staff Officer to ACSO, MPS
• Detective Inspector Steve Wilkinson, Head of Human Trafficking Unit, MPS
• Detective Superintendent Peter McGowan, Deputy National Coordinator of Ports Policing / Protect, ACPO
• Detective Superintendent Peter Wickstead, SO15, MPS
• Dieter Helm, Professor, Oxford University
• Dilwar Hussain, Head of Policy Research Centre, The Islamic Foundation
• Director, Centre for the Study of African Economies
• Doug Turner, BT Group Engineering Services, BT
• Ed Husain, Co-Director, Quilliam Foundation
• Edward Howker, Journalist, The Independent
• Elizabeth Stubbins-Bates, David Davies of Llandinam Research Fellow in International Relations, LSE
• Eric Joyce MP, Parliamentary Private Secretary, BERR
• Eric Metcalfe, Director of Human Rights Policy, JUSTICE
• Fellow, Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation
• Francesca Klug, Director, Human Rights Futures Project, Centre for the Study of Global Governance, LSE
• Frank Barnaby, Emeritus Consultant, Oxford Research Group
• Frank Gardner, Security Correspondent, BBC
• Frank Gregory, Professor of European Security, the University of Southampton
• Gareth Evans, President, International Crisis Group
• Gary Hindle, Head of Security and Counter-Terrorism, RUSI
• Gemma Mortensen, UK Director, Crisis Action
• General Sir David Richards, Commander-in-Chief Land Forces
• General Sir Hugh Beach, Board of Directors, VERTIC
• General Sir Mike Jackson, former Chief of the General Staff
• General Sir Richard Dannatt, Chief of the General Staff
• Geoff Miller, Head of Risk Management, United Utilities
• Glenn Kelly, Counter Proliferation and Security Cooperation, Ministry of Defence
• Gordon Corera, Security Correspondent, BBC
• Guy Roberts, Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Weapons of Mass Destruction, NATO
• Hagai Segal, Lecturer, New York University in London
• Helen Lewis, Conflict Advisor, DfID
• Inspector Fiaz Choudhary, Chair of MPS Association of Muslim Police, MPS
• James Acton, Lecturer, Centre for Science and Security Studies, Department of War Studies, King’s College London
• James Cameron, NGOs and Humanitarian Department, Control Risks Group
• James Hart, Infinity Advisory Board Member and former Commissioner of the City of London Police
• James Leonard, Scientists Working Group on CBW of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
• James Mortimer, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
• James R. Wright, Canadian High Commissioner to the UK
• Jean-Roger Kaseki, human rights campaigner
• Jennifer Smith, Policy Analyst, CAFOD
• Jeremy Corbyn MP
• Jeremy Fleming, Head of Strategy, OSCT
• Jim Drummond, Director of the South-Asia Division, UK Department for International Development
• Joanna Kidd, Research Fellow, International Centre for Security Analysis, King’s College London
• John Almonds, Director of Security Operations, Infinity
• John Andrews, Ministry of Defence
• John Baylis, Pro-Vice Chancellor, Swansea University
• John Simpson, Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, University of Southampton
• John Tayor, Director General of Information, MoD
• Jonathan Cooper, Doughty Street Chambers
• Jonathan Githens-Mazer, Senior Lecturer, Department of Politics & Co-Director, Exeter Centre for Ethno-Political Studies
• Jonathan Stern, Director of Gas Research, Oxford Institute of Energy Studies
• Julian Lindley French, Professor of Military Operational Science, Defence Academy of the Netherlands
• Karma Nabulsi, Lecturer in International Politics, Oxford University and former PLO representative
• Katharine Adeney, Senior Lecturer, University of Sheffield
• Katherine Gregory, Project Leader, Per Capita
• Keith Weston, Deputy Director of the Resilience Centre, Cranfield University
• Ken De Souza, Policy Analyst, CHASE, DfID
• Ken Gude, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress
• Kenneth Payne, Lecturer in Defence Studies, KCL
• Kenneth Roth, Executive Director, Human Rights Watch
• Kerry M. Kartchner, Senior Advisor for Strategic Planning, Bureau of International
• Kevin McDonald, Marie Curie International Fellow, University of London, Goldsmiths College
• Lemonia Tsaroucha, Lecturer on World Legal Orders, UCL
• Lin Homer, Chief Executive, UK Border Agency
• Liz Siberry, Director, CPNI
• Lord Alex Carlile, Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, House of Lords
• Lord Andrew Turnbull, former Head of the Civil Service
• Lord David Owen, former Member of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict
• Lord Mark Malloch-Brown, Minister for Africa, Asia and the UN, FCO
• Lord Toby Harris, Home Secretary’s Appointee, MPA
• Lyndon Powell, Director of Human Continuity Operations, Infinity
• Lyse Doucet, News Correspondent and Presenter, BBC World News
• Maajid Nawaz, Co-Director, Quilliam Foundation
• Malcolm Chalmers, Professor of International Politics, University of Bradford
• Malcolm Savidge, BASIC board member
• Marian Fitzgerald, Visiting Professor of Criminology, University of Kent
• Mark Rodmell, Head of Aviation Facilitation, Department for Transport
• Mark Sedwill, International Director, UK Border Agency
• Mark Segal, Senior Conflict advisor, DfID
• Mark Smith, Programme Director, Wilton Park
• Martin Lynch, CEO, Infinity
• Mary Kaldor, Co-Director, Centre for the Study of Global Governance, LSE
• Mary Shockledge, Head of the Conflict Prevention Team (ISD), FCO
• Matt Cavanagh, Prime Minister’s Policy Directorate, 10 Downing Street
• Mia Hakl-Law, Researcher to Edward Fitzgerald QC, Doughty Street Chambers
• Michael Dale, EDS
• Michael Rutter, Director of Energy Resilience, BERR
• Mick Jenkins, Infinity Operations Director and former counter-terrorist intelligence officer
• Mike Short, Vice President of Research and Development, O2
• Misha Glenny, freelance journalist and author
• Mohammad Mahroof, MCU – SO15, MPS
• Moty Cristal, former negotiations adviser to the Israeli Prime Minister and CEO, Nest Consulting
• Narcis Serra, former Minister of Defence and Vice-president of the Spanish Government
• Nathan Oley, Strategic Policy Adviser, APA
• Neil Davison, Senior Policy Adviser, Royal Society
• Nicholas Wheeler, Professor of International Politics, Aberystwyth University
• Nick Low, Head, Nuclear Issues Section, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
• Nick Ritchie, Post Doctoral Research Fellow in the Bradford Disarmament Research Centre, University of Bradford
• Nigel Inkster, Director of Transnational Threats and Political Risk, International Institute for Strategic Studies
• Norman Dombey, Emeritus Professor, University of Sussex
• Oliver McTernan, Co-founder and Director, Forward Thinking
• Ollie Welch, Ministry of Defence
• Owen Greene, Chair of the Management Board, Centre for International Co – Operation Security, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford
• Owen Pengelly, Head of the Central Sponsor for Information Assurance, Cabinet Office
• Parag Khanna, Senior Research Fellow, New America Foundation
• Patrick Lamb, Deputy Chief Executive, International Financial Services London
• Paul Bernstein, Vice President, Science Applications International Corporation
• Paul Collier, Professor of Economics, Oxford University Economics Department and
• Paul Cornish, Head, International Security Programme and Carrington Chair in International Security, Chatham House
• Paul Grasby, Head of Social and Behavioural Science Unit, OSCT
• Paul Ingram, Executive Director, BASIC
• Peter Ingram, Ofcom
• Peter Power, Managing Director, Visor Consultants (UK) Limited
• Phil Vernon, Director of Programs, Africa and Peacebuilding, International Alert
• Philippe Sands, Professor of Law, UCL
• Professor Antonio Jorge Ramalho da Rocha, Institute of International Relations, University of Brasilia
• Professor Colin McInnes, UNESCO Chair of HIV/AIDS, Education and Security and Director, Centre for Health and International Relations, Aberystwyth University
• Professor Paul Rogers, Professor of Peace Studies, University of Bradford
• Rachel Briggs, Senior Research Fellow, National Security and Resilience Department, Royal United Services Institute
• Regina Finn, CEO, OFWAT
• Revd Canon Flora Winfield, Churches Together in Britain and Ireland and World Conference on Religions for Peace
• Richard Dowden, Director, the Royal African Society
• Richard English, Professor of Politics, Queen’s University Belfast
• Richard Fletcher, Senior Policy Advisor, EADS
• Richard Norton-Taylor, Security Editor, The Guardian
• Robert Bonner, former first Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency
• Robert Chatterton-Dickson, Deputy Director – CT Policy, CT Department, FCO
• Robert Lambert, Research Fellow, Department of Politics, University of Exeter
• Robert Picciotto, Visiting Professor, King’s College London
• Robert Whalley, Consulting Senior Fellow, IISS
• Roger Styles, Deputy Director, Central Sponsor for Information Assurance, Cabinet Office
• Rt Hon Gordon Brown MP, Prime Minister
• Rt Hon Jacqui Smith MP, Home Secretary
• Rt Hon John Hutton MP, Secretary of State for Defence
• Rt Hon Nick Clegg MP, Leader of the Liberal Democrats
• Sally Benton, Corporate Information Officer, MPA
• Salman Shaikh, Special Representative to Europe, Muslim West Facts Project
• Sara MacNeice, Campaign Manager on terrorism, security and human rights, Amnesty International
• Security and Nonproliferation, US State Department
• Shami Chakrabarti, Director, Liberty
• Sheikh Aliur Rahman, Director, Consultancy, Double Barrel Design & Consultancy Ltd
• Shenaz Bunglawala, Project Officer, Engage
• Siddharth Ramana, Researcher, BASIC
• Sima Osdoby, Secretary of the Board, BASIC
• Sir Ian Blair, former Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis
• Stephen Fidler, Defence and Security Editor, Financial Times
• Stephen Rimmer, Home Office
• Stephen Smith, Home Office
• Stewart Wood, Prime Minister’s Policy Directorate, No. 10
• Stuart Croft, Professor of International Security, Warwick University
• Sumit Rahman, Policy Advisor on Official Statistics, Economic and Domestic Affairs Secretariat, Cabinet Office
• Sunder Katwala, Chair, Fabian Society
• Superintendent Dal Babu, former Chair of the National Association of Muslim Police, MPS
• Susan Kincade, Senior Partner, Global Concepts and Communications, LLC
• Tara O’Toole, CEO and Director, Center for Biosecurity, the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center
• Terry Thompson, Booz&Co
• Thomas De Saint-Maurice, IDRC
• Tim Fox, United States Navy
• Tim Kellow, John Bright Peace & Security Programme Officer, UNA-UK
• Toby Fenwick, Birkbeck College
• Tom Daschle, US Senator
• Tom Porteous, London Director of Human Rights Watch
• Tony Payne, Professor, Department of Politics, Sheffield University
• Trevor McCrisken, Associate Professor in American Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick
• William Hughes, Director General, SOCA
• William Nye, Director, National Security Secretariat, Cabinet Office
• Willy Rickett, Director General, Energy, BERR
• Zachary Katznelson, Legal Director, Reprieve
• Zaiba Malik, Journalist

Defence is in fact represented by a single person on the main committee, excluding Lord Ashdown (a former marine) in the shape of General Lord Charles Guthrie, a former Chief of the Defence Staff.

There are no representatives of Royal Air Force or Royal Navy and whilst a former Chief of the Defence Staff would in fact have an overarching view of defence issues the report might have been less open to accusations of service bias if this were not so, especially given some of the recommendations suggest a land force element bias in future defence spending. The list of contributors also does not include anyone from the Royal Navy or Royal Air Force, there are 4 Generals, one Admiral (in an intelligence capacity) and even a representative from the US Navy. In fact, serving military personnel seem very poorly represented, being outnumbered by defence journalists and private security organisations.

In suggesting a change in defence funding priorities the headlines have inevitably focussed on the attention grabbing ‘huge cuts in defence’ angle, such is the superficial and nature of much of the defence and security news agenda in the mainstream media.

In a series of forthcoming blog posts on the document we will seek to analyse the findings and recommendations. At some 144 pages with several hundred bibliography items it will take some analysing!

Click here (PDF)