Early tank with an electromagnetic mine lifter, circa 1918

1918, Mark IV Anti Tank Mine Roller

Thought they were interesting!

UPDATE:

Some interesting links from Sven over at Defence and Freedom on the same theme

http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2009/02/update-ugv-history.html

http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2009/02/fact-check-military-hardware-novelty.html

http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2010/08/roman-multi-tool.html

http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2009/02/precision-munitions-history.html

FPE Ocelot Light Protected Patrol Vehicle

Let’s not be churlish, this is a great result but also lets spare a moment and think about the wasted opportunities, money, legs and lives that have preceded today’s announcement.  The vulnerabilities of the Land Rover Snatch have been known about since the early nineties, reinforced in Iraq in 2003 onwards and amplified in Afghanistan.

Of all the MoD programme we can get vexed about, this surely is one of the most shocking and by the time it comes into service will have taken nearly a decade to resolve.

Designed, developed and built in the UK by Force Protection Europe and Ricardo plc, together with Team Ocelot partners Thales, QinetiQ, Formaplex, DSG and Sula, Ocelot is weight for weight, the best protected and most agile vehicle of its kind – capabilities that have been proved by more than 12 months of blast and mobility testing.

The Ocelot is comprises a 7.5-tonne vehicle including a 1.5-tonne payload. Earlier in the year, Force Protection officials also confirmed that there was a MoD requirement for a weapons mount on board the LPPV, most likely to be either a 7.62mm General Purpose Machine Gun (GPMG), .50-calibre Heavy Barrelled weapon or 40mm Automatic Grenade Launcher.

As can be seen in the videos below, the turning circle is exceptional and a vital characteristic for the type of urban terrain these will be used in. It is a genuinely innovative ‘clean sheet’ design, its armoured ‘skateboard’ spine holds the transmission components and the interchangeable body ‘pods’ are fitted to it. The vehicle can be re-roled or easily repaired by simply swapping these modules and components.  Pods could include load bearing; fire support; flat-bed; troop carrier; ambulance and open-top vehicles.The Ocelot is also compliant with the MoD’s emerging Generic Vehicle Architecture standard to simplify future systems integration and maintenance.

Ocelot LPPV Modular Payload

The initial uses will be simply as a Snatch 2A/Snatch Vixen replacement, 200 as a UOR and an additional 200 to follow but given the modular nature and obvious growth potential we should be thinking seriously about fleet rationalisation. As a result of numerous UOR’s the Land fleet has grown like weeds, creating a number of serious training, maintenance and logistic challenges. The next obvious applications are as a replacement for the Land Rover WMIK, Ambulance and even GS types.

Only if we standardise, adapt the basic design and buy in quantity will we be able to realise the benefits of volume. Even 400 is nowhere near enough, the order should be in the thousands and not a piecemeal trickle. Give Force Protection Europe a long term contract and allow them to sub contract to other manufacturing locations, take advantage of the volume production skills and supply chains in the civilian industry and map out a long term strategy that provides a measure of certainty. this long term road map will support investment in cost reduction activities so that we don’t end up, yet again, with a boutique, niche capability that simply complicates and costs more.

The IED cat is out of the bag so the basic Land Rover in military service is going to have to be relegated to niche, low threat activities. The same could be said for many of the light logistics vehicles and command vehicles like Panther and Husky, what now for these vehicles?

The future is Ocelot.

That is of course, if we can progress from Preferred Bidder to In Service, remember the FRES UV debacle

Ocelot has also been short listed for an Australian requirement

What about huge quantities, high hundreds or even thousands, of Land Rover Snatch that are already in service and will no doubt be heading there way over to the disposal outlets?

Marshal Land Systems have suggested that surplus Snatch Land Rovers’s could be used as the base vehicle for a semi sacrificial unmanned mine/IED detection system. The MoD is reported to have released initial funding for a Technology Demonstration programme that could ultimately lead to the development of a number of unmanned vehicles for base patrol, logistics and Counter IED. It is also in discussion with G-NIUS about the possible use of the Avantguard unmanned ground vehicle. I suppose we could do what everyone else does and go and buy a Husky, where would the development contracts be though!

I have rounded up a few videos of the Ocelot below.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Click here to view the embedded video.

The defence review is occurring at a time of extreme financial pressure at home and considerable military risk in Afghanistan. Yet it would be a grave failure if it attended principally – or worse, exclusively – to the clamour of those issues. The deepest principles of national security are silent. They explain why bad things don’t happen and they must be given voice. This article also argues that geopolitics prescribe a primarily maritime framework for any British SDSR, and that the core strategic challenges are naval. The Royal Navy, however, has become dangerously weak. Urgent steps must be taken to reverse this trend before it is too late

Its timing is of course related to the pre SDSR buzz but I hope it doesn’t get get labelled as Senior Service Special Pleading because its is very interesting and relevant.

Acknowledging the dire state of the public finances, but arguing national security is not a discretionary expenditure, the paper suggests the strategic need for more surface combatants must be met through reassessing the choice of ‘seriously cost constrained’ new ships, looking closely at examples from Denmark and the Netherlands that offer a modular, adaptable design at a quarter of the price of currently planned purchases.

The paper argues for a cost constrained general purpose class of ships that make extensive use of modularity. It argues for 12-15 of these to compliment a force of 12 to 14 Type 45 and Type 26 (that’s in total, not 12-14 each)

This is a strong argument, a return to the two tier constabulary nature of forward defence with the ability to surge highly capable ships into an area should it be needed. Although the numbers and capabilities might be different it is fundamentally in line with the Think Defence position, that of  a high capability core surrounded by lower capability but more numerous types.

Jed wrote a couple of great posts on this, here and here

I also looked at it from another angle with the C3 modular concept and other posts here and here.

The authors also published a similar paper in 2007 called ‘The Royal Navy at the Brink’, arguing for a 30 ship Future Surface Combatant (FSC) comprising a 10 C1, 20 C2 ratio but the new paper recognises the financial constraints we are in.

Click here to view the embedded video.

One of the problems with the RLC is that it is too large, too diverse, too many roles and ultimately too diffuse. Transportation, logistics management (this is not transportation), ammunition storage, postal services, fuel operations, port operations, pioneers and field catering.

How can the delivering post, rustling up an egg banjo and disposing of IED’s sit within one organisation?

In some respects though, it makes sense for the Combat Service Support elements to be under one roof, it is a difficult issue to reconcile.

To make matters worse, or better depending on your viewpoint, we also have duplication of very similar functions across the three services

I am going to break this post up into a few parts for ease of reading

Counter IED

This is a difficult subject to write about whilst so much sterling and incredibly brave work is going on in Afghanistan, but it is still worth discussing.

Explosive Ordnance Disposal is a broad subject with a long history but in the modern context has evolved as much by a combination of historical accident as anything else, the need to excavate to deeply buried German bombs needing the obvious involvement of a field engineering force, the Royal Engineers, for example.

The Joint Force IED arrangement we are now seeing are a result of both the changing nature of the IED threat and the sheer volume of devices, but the underlying structures have remained. Evolving from the WWI Ordnance Examiners of the Royal Army Ordnance Corps the modern Explosive Ordnance Disposal capability traces much of its history back to the Blitz, having to deal with both unexploded ‘duds’ and devices that used time delay fuses. The ongoing ‘measure’ and ‘countermeasure’ struggle between the German designers and those tasked with clearing them continued throughout the war and this experience was disseminated widely to other nations like the USA.

Modern EOD arguably evolved from here.

The use of sophisticated improvised explosive devices (IED’s) in Northern Ireland lead to the creation of specialist units in the Royal Army Ordnance Corps, now RLC. The Royal Navy Mine Warfare Diving Branch and Royal Air Force 5131 Bomb Disposal Squadron can also trace their histories back decades.

This has led to a situation where to counter conventional and improvised explosive devices we have 2 units from the Army and one each from the other services.

This may seem wasteful but to understand why, one simply has to look at their respective missions. The Royal Engineers (33 and 101(V) Regiment) are responsible for specialist search and conventional explosive ordnance clearance. 11 EOD Regiment RLC are responsible for counter terrorist bomb disposal, explosive ordnance disposal and the recovery and safe disposal of conventional munitions which can include anything from small arms ammunition to battlefield rockets. The RN clearance branch is attached to the mine countermeasures capability and is responsible for explosive ordnance disposal underwater (RE divers also have this role) and the RAF EOD Bomb Disposal Squadron is responsible for airfield clearance operations. There is sound logic for this distinction, the RLC C-IED operators are drawn from the technical ammunition trade and this specialist knowledge is an advantage when dealing with the wide variety of devices found both on and off a battlefield. Specialist expertise takes a long time to develop, career structures are very different from the RE EOD personnel.

Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have focussed on the IED but the other skills and capabilities must not be neglected. However, whilst the UK armed forces were large it could support these specialism’s but there are obvious crossovers and duplications that might be unsupportable in a smaller force.

IED’s have gone from a specialist weapon used by terrorist organisations in Northern Ireland to a mainstream weapon that will feature in probably every future conflict and we have to ask if the existing arrangements are efficient or sustainable.

With the increasing use of direct to user delivery of ammunition from the manufacturer and more complex ammunition that needs REME support the demand for the traditional role of ammunition management might be less. It hasn’t and won’t go away though because the cost effective management of all types of ammunition is still a highly skilled and essential activity and to counter the manufacturer to user argument there is an increasingly onerous legislative environment and much more insecurity of supply. One could argue either way about the need for specialist ammunition/explosive specialists.

With a reduction of the trade from which High Threat C-IEDD operators are drawn this will inevitably reduce career opportunities and mean a greater demand on those actually able to carry out this extremely difficult task, a sustained demand for manual approaches will inevitably mean those individuals are going to suffer. The highly specialist and technical approach to IED disposal as perfected in Northern Ireland may not always be appropriate in an environment like Afghanistan, a range of response capabilities are therefore needed that operate at different levels of risk. One wonders if the current casualty rate is sustainable and if the high threat C-IED operators are both in short supply and high demand is freedom of manoeuvre being compromised?

Whatever we do, we must recognise that the often irrational animosity between the RE and RLC has to stop, the growing and evolving threat, likely greater use of technology and reducing resources demand that inter service and cap badge politics is stomped on from a great height. There are very real and practical barriers to creating a single tri service organisation beyond the current ‘joint’ but still separate arrangements but we must tackle them decisively.

A completely new EOD Corps may be the ideal end state and could amalgamate the 4 entities currently involved and be responsible for all clearance activities. A separate Corps would be large enough to sustain a variety of career paths across a number of related trades, sustainability is one of the key issues that would need to be resolved.

A much greater use of technology should also be part of the new unit, the UK has yet again, given up its clear technical lead in related technologies, especially in robotics. Talisman is a clear step in the right direction but me must continue with this and expand it.

Traditional assault minefield breaching would be retained with the Royal Engineers and the ammunition technical trades transferred to a new function within the RLC, merged with the REME (more on this later)

In addition to the non assault clearance activities the new EOD Corps would also be heavily involved with demining activities in post conflict zones as part of a comprehensive overseas aid/emergency response package (this is going to be detailed in a future post) that includes elements of military and civilian capabilities.

With the increasing use of modular mine warfare equipment, especially in our C3 proposal, it might even be possible to task this new corps with underwater mine clearance as well.

This is only a tentative suggestion, one possible way to create and perhaps more importantly, sustain, a range of capabilities in the face of likely increasing/changing demand both at home and abroad. By creating a dedicated corps that takes responsibility for all munitions disposal activities across the three services the overall workload creates the need for a larger unit, in a larger unit there will be greater career opportunities for those hard pressed operators to move within.

The challenge in such a unit would be to increase the capability whilst maintaining quality and safety, a thorny issue currently being wrestled with by the professionals in all three services.

UPDATE 1

One of the commenters took offence to me calling the Pioneers grave diggers. I thought I should apologise for any offence but simply say it was a bit light hearted, banter, no offence intended whatsoever.

UPDATE 2

Have sense of humours sharply declined?

Think Defence is not in the business of upsetting or insulting people so once again, if the grave digger comment was out of order I apologise.

It has been removed and by way of penance, if any serving or former Pioneer wishes to send me an article on your past, present or future then I will publish it

A number of things that struck me as being notable

For the past three months, their entire existence has been confined to this dusty half-acre compound and the few hundred yards beyond it where heavily-armed patrols can venture with a reasonable prospect of making a safe return. Their mission is to help secure a stretch of Route 611, the key artery that links Sangin to Gereshk, Helmand’s economic hub – their base is one of many originally Afghan-built British forts around this fractious town to ensure that the road is free of limb-taking Taliban bombs.

Outside the base, hidden explosives may be planted anywhere, while sharpshooters hide in the trees and orchards to the west, or aim their rifles through slim “murder holes”, chiselled slits in the walls of neighbouring compounds that overlook the patrol base. The terrifying reality for the men is that, of those who first arrived there three months ago, one is now a triple amputee, another was evacuated with three gunshot wounds, a third has been lacerated by a teenage suicide bomber, and a fourth, lucky man survived being shot by a sniper.

The area outside the Patrol Base is self evidently not under any form of dominance.

Outside, they can proceed only painfully slowly: it takes 15 minutes to cover just 100 yards as they check for hidden explosives and guard against ambush, tense at all times against the danger of a sniper. In the distance, both to the north and south, you can make out the sandbagged guard posts and flags of bigger British and Afghan bases, but for the troops of this particular Patrol Base in Sangin they might be 100 miles away. The white pennants of the Taliban flutter contemptuously nearby, almost certainly booby-trapped. ”It’s a joke,” says one marine over the clatter of dominoes in a nearby room. “Everyone just wants to get out with their legs intact. The population hates us around here.”

Is this COIN theory at work in the real world, the local population hate the British forces

There is little in the way of fresh food, and an occasional box of apples delivered from a larger base is regarded as a luxury. Lunch and dinner might be pasta with tuna and sweetcorn, spaghetti, or rice with tinned tomatoes. Once in a while, a few cases of soft drinks might arrive – though it is hard, with just one refrigerator on the base, to get these cold enough to be truly refreshing. ”When the fridge breaks we are sometimes drinking water as hot as tea,” says Dutchy, a wiry marine.

After three months there is only a unreliable fridge and resupply with fresh rations is intermittent. One might be forgiven for saying, hold on, these are rough tough marines, why would they need cold drinks or fresh apples, aren’t grenades and bullets more important?

Of course they are but this illustrates the fragility of the supply chain at the sharp end, a lack of helicopter lift and the dangers of vehicle movement are self evidently restraining resupply of all but the essentials.

Diesel generators provide some power, but white lights are forbidden at night and by 10pm many are turning in – a few perhaps watching a film on their laptops, taken from the base’s small selection of DVDs.

This underlines our suggestion of greater reliance of renewable energy generation because if fresh rations are a problem extra diesel certainly will be.

This next section is particularly illuminating.

Venturing out for a “lurk” at night is a nerve-racking business, but necessary if the marines are to catch the Taliban bombers who use darkness to lay their deadly explosive devices. Lying on the roof deep into the night hours, half lit by moonlight, I was with marines waiting for the shifting shadow that would reveal a Taliban bomb planter. For the third night in a row, he did not appear, but to give up on trying to catch him would be tantamount to admitting defeat. ”We will catch them one of these days,” says the marine corporal.

There is no substitute for close recce, the sights, smells and sounds laid out in front of the patrol will allow a positive target identification to made and and appropriate response to be provided.

BUT

Visual, thermal and movement sensors can provide valuable early warning to a patrol, allow ambushes and counter ambushed to be set up, cue other assets and facilitate rapid follow up. These other sensors can also serve as an effective deterrent.

Once again, this illustrates a sorry tale of the UK armed forces innovating yet allowing a hard won lead to lapse, only to be taken up by others.

Anyone familiar with operations in Northern Ireland will clearly identify the numerous watch towers and observation posts, especially the Divis Tower, Faughil Mountain, Crosslieve and Crievekeeran, that were used to provide Army units with a wide range of intelligence, support ground dominance and serve as a visible deterrent.

These even had a makeover recently with the introduction of the ‘Super Sanger‘, described as a UOR and deployed to Afghanistan, the only real difference between the ones in Afghanistan and Northern Ireland is the addition of different sensors and a remote weapon station, the concept is the same.

Examine the picture of the Super Sanger at a UOR demonstration above with this picture at this link or the picture below of similar structures in Northern Ireland.

Look at the lifting eyes, seem familiar?

A year ago, the Telegraph also reported that a lack of helicopters for resupply had scuppered plans to erect a similar set of observation towers as early as 2008. Whether this would have been a sensible thing to do might be open to debate, Helmand is not Northern Ireland, but it is a reasonable proposition. Having persistent eyes on is a proven method of restricting movement, although not a panacea

Since then, the UAV has burst onto the scene but the UK, with it’s handful of Hermes 450 and Desert Hawks, simply cannot rival the persistence of fixed installations.

Lockheed Martin were awarded their first aerostat contract for Iraq in 2004, a large design that was used above Baghdad to provide radar and electro optical imagery in addition to radio rebroadcast.

The Defence of the Realm blog followed the original story up and described the US persistent surveillance and dissemination system of systems (PSDS2) from Raytheon and its follow up, the Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment RAID system that uses tethered aerostats or blimps and towers to loft a sensor payload. This payload provides a range of sensor capabilities and meshes them into a comprehensive distribution network that is not only highly effective but also manpower efficient.

The Marines Corps’ G-BOSS (Ground-Based Operational Surveillance System) version has two cameras, a radar, and a radio link to a remote ground station. The BETSS-C (Base Expeditionary Targeting and Surveillance Systems-Combined) version has one camera. Intelligent analysis algorithms mean that the system does not rely on operators watching unmoving displays for hours and hours hoping to catch a glimpse of something interesting. The system is integrated with map displays and GPS so information on items of interest can be rapidly shared and communicated to field forces.

The strapline for RAID is mobile high ground, exactly what Helmand is in short supply of.

Equipped with ubiquitous electro optical turret like the Wescam MX20 the field and quality of imagery is excellent, RAID systems use a FLIR Systems SAFIRE III but capabilities are comparable.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Lockheed Martin have also created a range of aerostat systems and the video below demonstrates how they might even be armed for counter mortar or rocket missions.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Aerostats and towers are complimentary systems, each has advantages and disadvantages but operation is not foolproof, see the video below!

Click here to view the embedded video.

Tower systems generally do not elevate as much as aerostats but are easier to deploy and more portable, applicable to smaller locations as depicted in the Telegraph story. Large aerostats also present an irresistible target and whilst they can easily withstand lots of small arms fire they will need repairing quite often, towers are much harder targets to hit and the US and Canadian experience is that for many locations, towers are the preferred option. Experience also points to a marked reduction in enemy activity once the systems are in place.

Even a 10 metre tower can see out to approximately 10km and the higher you go, the further one can see although obstacles and terrain can diminish the actual field of view. This is where the network capability comes into play, by being able to tap into the imagery of other towers and aerostats operators can cover a huge area and diminish the effect of blocking terrain features and buildings. Pulling all the inputs together is a software suite called TerraSight from US company, Snaroff.

The BETSS-C was the second highest priority US equipment programme, only behind MRAP and to date they have spent $1.5billion to obtain several hundred systems. This is not expensive technology, the biggest cost is the sensor payload and dissemination system. Average price for a typical tactical aerostat system is approximately $1million and a tower about half that.

In this 2008 memo from the MoD to the Defence Select Committee it stated

To improve the current deployed operating base protection capability, new systems have been provided in Iraq and Afghanistan using mast and aerostat-mounted visual and electronic sensors.

One wonders to what extent these systems were/are being utilised and why more haven’t been obtained.

With the UK’s world leading expertise in CCTV systems one would have thought we could come up with something world beating. Even a casual search throws up many manufacturers and system integrators that combine the undoubted world leading experience we have in CCTV with the latest in communications technology to share the imagery.

Have a look at these links for a visual feast of ideas Advanced CCTV, Norton Integrated Systems, Rapid Deployment CCTV, IBS Security, Petards and MEL Secure

Anyone who has ever wore green will know all about Clarke masts (why they made the PU 12m impossible to get back into the box nobody has ever understood) and there is no reason why a simple CCTV derived sensor could not be integrated with such a portable mast.

We could either simply buy into the US/Canadian BETSS programme or create something less ambitious, perhaps a tactical level to support the small PB’s and FOB’s as described in the Telegraph article at the beginning of this post.

There is an ongoing debate between the Clear Hold Build COIN strategy that makes extensive use of fixed locations versus a more mobile, smaller footprint approach but whilst we are still making use of fixed locations we should be using a combination of lesson learned and the latest technology.

The Taleban have the initiative, they choose the time and place of attack, denying them the freedom of movement around our fixed locations changes the situation and technology can be used as part of this initiative.

This was a key lesson from Operation Banner.

Earlier I said that Helmand is not Northern Ireland but we also have to realise the benefits of technology, this is 2010 not 1970 either.

It does seem again, like too little too late.

The MoD has now released some more information on the work it is supporting in Afghanistan.

Scattered throughout Helmand province, these indiscriminate weapons kill and maim both ISAF and Afghan forces as well as innocent Afghan civilians.

However, the British Armed Forces now have a revolutionary new capability called Talisman which is being used to counter the threat.

I don’t mind the occasional bit of bully but come on MoD, revolutionary, you have to be joking.

This life-saving equipment is being used to support combat logistic patrols which can be up to several hundred vehicles in total and trek through the country delivering vital supplies to bases for the troops on the front line. Talisman is also starting to be used in combat infantry roles, such as for deliberate route clearances.

Major Thomas Donohoe, Officer Commanding 15 Field Support Squadron, explained:

“What Talisman brings is a remote capability. It keeps soldiers out of the contact zone of the IED, massively reducing the danger.

“The optics and the unmanned aerial vehicle lower the threat to the team on the ground. It will save lives.”

The vehicles and equipment used by the Talisman Troop include a specially equipped Mastiff vehicle, known as ‘Protected Eyes’, and a Buffalo – the most highly protected vehicle on operations. There is also a small robot on caterpillar tracks known as a Talon. It is armed with high tech optical equipment which can be operated from the safety of the armoured vehicles. Talon is used to detect and defeat the IED on the ground. Once the IED threat has been dealt with, the high mobility engineer excavator (HMEE) is brought into play.

High Mobility Engineer Excavator

One of the key differences between the HMEE and the other armoured plant in theatre, the armoured Light and Medium Wheeled Tractors, is that it can move at the same speed as the convoy without additional low loaders being needed to carry it.

It really is great news that we finally have some decent equipment out in Afghanistan but please MoD, lets stop saying it is revolutionary and lets not be slapping ourselves on the back for the time it has taken. Other forces have had this for years.

A bit more background on these subjects then…

Flails

Most people have heard of flails, having seen them in relation to D Day or North Africa and wonder if they would be part of a solution for the Counter IED mission in Afghanistan.

The flail tank was invented by a South African Army Major in 1942, Captain Abraham du Toit, although there were patents before that and another South African officer also came up with a similar idea independently. After the customary official disinterest, duplication of effort and ingenious persistence the idea eventually came to fruition as a collaborative effort in the North African desert and resulted in the Matilda Scorpion.

Matilda Scorpion

The Scorpion flails were driven by a separate engine enclosed in the box on the right, this also included space for the operator, must have been rather warm.

Writing in a post battle report Lt William Schneck wrote

The mine flail tank idea began in 1941, with Abraham S. J. du Toit, a motor engineer in civilian life and a sergeant in the South African artillery, who developed a novel device that detonated mines by beating the ground with heavy chains or wire ropes driven by a rotating drum. A test rig was built on a truck and demonstrated in Pretoria, South Africa, where a short film was produced. After General Auchinleck saw the film, he thought it was a brilliant idea and sent Sergeant du Toit to England to pursue his invention in secrecy. The general felt that secrecy was vital in order to maintain the device’s tactical surprise and value, but keeping it secret in the Middle East or South Africa was impossible. It was intended to mount it on a tank chassis for combat use. Sergeant du Toit was soon promoted to major and was closely involved in the development in Britain of what became the Matilda Baron. Although the Baron never saw combat, it did provide the knowledge and experience that eventually led to the development and fielding of the highly successful Sherman “Crab” flail tank which General Hobart used during the Normandy landings in 1944.

Before Sergeant du Toit had left for England, he had sketched out his idea for Captain Norman Berry, the South African Chief Mechanical Engineer for the 8th Army. Captain Berry soon became tired of waiting for results from England and, on his own initiative, went ahead with some free-lance experiments while the 8th Army was still entrenched along the Gazala Line in the spring of 1942. There was no precedent for frontline troops to design and build a piece of equipment of such importance and complexity. Later, during the summer, Lieutenant-Colonel Mill Colman, a member of the South African Engineer Corps, developed what he thought was a novel idea for mine clearing. The idea had come to him when he noted a tracked vehicle driving by with a length of wire entangled in its track sprockets. With each revolution of the sprocket, the wire hit the ground with great force. Based on this, he thought that it might be possible to build a thrashing device that could detonate mines. Major L. A. Girling, Commander of the 21st South African Corps Field Park Company, was tasked with constructing the first experimental unit. They called it a “mine destroying device.” Captain Berry, hearing of the latest rebirth of the flail idea, told Major Girling of similar previous developments and described how Major du Toit had been sent to England by General Auchinleck to work on a similar idea in conditions of tight secrecy. So secret, in fact, that the Allied command in the Middle East had forgotten about the matter. Captain Berry gladly unearthed the remains of his earlier experiment and handed the contraption over to Major Girling’s team of engineers, consisting of himself, Captain G.J. Barry, Lieutenant Hofmann and

Lieutenant C.D.B. Cramb. Work on the prototype flail tank commenced within twenty-four hours and by 6 August, the first mock-up was completed. This first flail prototype was christened the Durban Mark I, after Lieutenant-Colonel Colman’s hometown in South Africa. The Durban Mark I incorporated many of Captain Berry’s ideas, including an auxiliary 105-horsepower Ford V8 engine mounted in a sponson (an armored box) on the right hand side of the Matilda Tank’s hull powered roller supports to a level box and then to the drum suspended above the ground. The horizontal flail rotor was held by two lattice girder arms about six feet in front of the tank and three feet above the ground. The rotor covered the entire width of the tank and was rotated in the same direction as the tank’s movement, at a speed of approximately 100 revolutions per minute. The rotor was equipped with 24 flails, or chain assemblies, that hit the ground with a contact length of approximately 20-cm. On later versions, fielded after the Second Battle of El Alamein, the boom that carried the rotor was modified so that it could be elevated and depressed by means of hydraulic cylinders to aid in mobility when not in use.

After the tests, Major Girling’s team continued to refine their design. On 12 September, the Durban Mark I was demonstrated for the 8th Army’s corps commanders and their chief engineers. Generals Alexander, Commander-and-Chief, Middle East, Montgomery, Commander 8th Army, and Morshead, Commander 9th Australian Division, witnessed Scorpion demonstrations and were impressed with its capabilities, considering the short amount of time invested in the project. Major Girling was congratulated for bringing the project to such a successful conclusion so quickly. Brigadier Ray remarked that, in appearance, the prototype resembled a scorpion and the name stuck. General Montgomery, a deeply religious and austere man, felt the name appropriate and quoted from the First Book of Kings (Chapter 12, Verse 14): “My Father has chastised you with whips, but I shall chastise you with scorpions.” Having observed the new, unprecedented invention, General Montgomery said that he wanted twelve for the coming attack. Brigadier Kisch had explained that the production of so large a number would have to be approved by General Headquarters and that it would mean suspending other production work. To this, General Montgomery replied, “Don’t belly-ache, order two dozen.” The next day Brigadier Kisch ordered the fabrication of an additional twenty-four of the new “Scorpion” mine destroyers, combined with the first prototype, this would provide the 8th Army a total of twenty-five Scorpions for Operation Lightfoot.

According to Major Reid of the New Zealand engineers, “This idea had great possibilities, especially from the sappers’ point of view, as if we could get tanks to clear gaps through minefields we could anticipate a much longer life.” Compared to the other available alternatives such as rollers and hand clearance, the flail-type mine clearance system appeared to be far superior.

Used operationally in the 1942 second Battle of El Alamein the crew had to wear respirators due to the massive volume of dust the flails threw into the air. Nonetheless, the concept, if not the implementation, was proven. Improvements were made, concepts refined and different tank chassis tried until all the designs and operational experience culminated in the Sherman Crab.

I had a look at General Percy Hobart, a true armoured warfare visionary, and the use of armoured combat engineering in an earlier post. I think it’s one of the most interesting aspects of D-Day. The Sherman Crab was a marked improvement, the flails were driven from the main engine via a power take off, hydraulic raising/lowering and barbed wire cutters which enabled it to double up as a barbed wire breaching device. One of the most important innovations was a system that allowed the marking of a safe lane, using smoke grenade launchers, an illuminated pole launcher and chalk dispenser. The Sherman Flail performed a vital service during D Day and beyond and its importance should not be underestimated.

Sherman Crab

Flails were not the only anti mine technology, ploughs and rollers were used before the flail as early as 1918 but the flail seems to have had greater success in the war years because they were lighter and more suited to the type of terrain encountered.

Churchill OAC mark2

Despite some smaller developments, post war, the fail and roller fell out of favour and the explosive breaching charge like the Giant Viper and Python were generally seen as the answer to minefield breaching.

The flail enjoyed resurgence in the 90’s as the need for humanitarian demining of post conflict areas such as Angola and Afghanistan became obvious. Although the military still have flails in their kit bags, Singapore have recently developed the Bionix Trailblazer for example, the majority of users are now civilian demining organisations.

Click here to view the embedded video.

The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining has some excellent publications on the subject.

Another well known example is the Hydrema MCV910 (also in service with the Singapore armed forces) and there are many others.

Hydrema 910MCV2

The Aardvark Joint Service Flail Unit is made in the UK by Aardvark Clear Mine, now a wholly owned subsidiary of Penman Engineering and is extremely effective, in service all around the world including Afghanistan

Click here to view the embedded video.

Why not in British service in Afghanistan one might ask.

To understand the reason why flails are unsuitable for use in counter IED operations it is important to understand the difference between a mine and an IED.

Mines are usually well packaged, discrete devices with an integral trigger device. IED’s found in Afghanistan and other places often have the mean of initiation (or trigger) some distance from the charge and this is a problem that all mechanical demining tools have when countering IED’s. Whilst the flail might do its job and initiate the trigger or pressure plate, the main charge could well be a few metres back up the road and directly under the flail vehicle chassis.

Other significant problems include the likelihood of distributing explosive materials indiscriminately and there is the obvious destruction of the ground surface. This might cause problems with a local civilian population, especially if it is repeated.

So although flails have a place in demining operations in a civilian context and minefield breaching (not clearance) in a military operation, their use is quite limited.

The Pookie

With the previous post on Talisman I covered the Husky/Chubby vehicle and detection equipment. The forerunner of the Husky/Chubby was a vehicle called the Pookie, I also had a brief look at this in an older post on blast protected vehicle design.

The Pookie was a specialist mine detection vehicle, first built in Rhodesia in 1976, comprising a monocoque armoured capsule sitting on an open frame chassis. The donor chassis was Volkswagon Kombi which used low downward force torsion arm suspension and this was combined with surplus Formula One tyres to create a ground pressure of less than 3lbs per square foot, less than a human. This ultra low ground pressure meant that it did not even detonate anti personnel mines and allowed the detector to be used without fear of detonation, the Pookie could drive right over a mine and not set it off.

Pookie

Detection allowed the mine to be cleared or selectively detonated, standard operating procedure was to detect,mark and retire, with sappers carrying out the controlled detonation or neutralisation.

Each Pookie cost a grand total of R$11,000 each and in short order had handsomely paid for themselves.

In four years of operation not a a single mine was detonated by a Pookie but they found over 550 and had both a practical and psychological effect.

The story doesn’t end there though.

After 20 years of gathering dust the Pookie was revived to play a part in civilian demining operations.

In 1999 Minetech resurrected the vehicle and combined it with a modern Ground Penetrating Radar system from Tricon, a German company specialising in detection equipment. The basic design was improved with a new powerpack, hydraulic steering and power system.

After a series of post trials improvements the Minetech Pookie fleet was deployed to Afghanistan and may even still be there.

Again, more applicable to demining operations rather than combat Counter IED operations but an interesting system nevertheless.

It is sensitive subject, full of complexity, so apologies in advance for any errors.

There has been a high intensity programme within the MoD to counter the ever changing IED threat for some time now, an obvious reaction to the Taleban tactic of pushing out IED’s left, right and centre.

Southern Africa, Bosnia, Iraq and Afghanistan have presented different challenges, for a very informative look at the changing nature of IED’s in Afghanistan have a look here. Whilst those in Iraq would generally use military grade explosives/surplus munitions, Afghan IED’s tend to use ‘home brew’ explosives combined with accelerants, but are much larger. It has also been reported that the networks controlling the use of IED’s is much more sophisticated in Afghanistan.

Even these statements may be out of date, it is a rapidly changing situation.

The age old cycle of measure and countermeasure continues, we might deploy mine rollers so to counter them, bomb makers simply put the charge some distance away from the pressure plate. Larger devices are used to destroy even the best protected vehicles. As the COIN led strategy of increasing reassurance foot patrols becomes more common, directional anti personnel devices concealed in trees, walls and trails are becoming common.

We should not underestimate the scale and complexity of the problem, it is not going to be solved (if it can be ‘solved’) by the application of technology solutions and this complexity has to be recognised; the full range of military, commercial and scientific capabilities have now been aligned to meet the threat. In previous posts, here and here, I looked at the evolution of protected vehicles and the general subject of passively countering the IED threat, but Talisman represents a discrete capability, designed for route clearance and proving.

It is definitely not a replacement for High Threat Counter IED operators but another supplementary system for a range of scenarios and this is how it should be viewed.

The question remains though, is TALISMAN too little too late?

The story of TALISMAN is tied up with the story of mine protected vehicles, flails and civilian de-mining, in the timeline below, their stories will crossover, this is another ‘put the kettle on post’ so apologies for the length.

WWII

Although not specifically for IED disposal the flail tank is worth mentioning for background.

Most people have heard of flails, having seen them in relation to D Day or North Africa and wonder if they would be part of a solution for the Counter IED mission in Afghanistan. The flail tank was invented by a South African Army Major in 1942, Captain Abraham du Toit, although there were patents before that and another South African officer also came up with a similar idea independently. After the customary official disinterest, duplication of effort and ingenious persistence the idea eventually came to fruition as a collaborative effort in the North African desert and resulted in the Matilda Scorpion.

Matilda Scorpion

The Scorpion flails were driven by a separate engine enclosed in the box on the right, this also included space for the operator, must have been rather warm.

Writing in a post battle report Lt William Schneck wrote

The mine flail tank idea began in 1941, with Abraham S. J. du Toit, a motor engineer in civilian life and a sergeant in the South African artillery, who developed a novel device that detonated mines by beating the ground with heavy chains or wire ropes driven by a rotating drum. A test rig was built on a truck and demonstrated in Pretoria, South Africa, where a short film was produced. After General Auchinleck saw the film, he thought it was a brilliant idea and sent Sergeant du Toit to England to pursue his invention in secrecy. The general felt that secrecy was vital in order to maintain the device’s tactical surprise and value, but keeping it secret in the Middle East or South Africa was impossible. It was intended to mount it on a tank chassis for combat use. Sergeant du Toit was soon promoted to major and was closely involved in the development in Britain of what became the Matilda Baron. Although the Baron never saw combat, it did provide the knowledge and experience that eventually led to the development and fielding of the highly successful Sherman “Crab” flail tank which General Hobart used during the Normandy landings in 1944.

Before Sergeant du Toit had left for England, he had sketched out his idea for Captain Norman Berry, the South African Chief Mechanical Engineer for the 8th Army. Captain Berry soon became tired of waiting for results from England and, on his own initiative, went ahead with some free-lance experiments while the 8th Army was still entrenched along the Gazala Line in the spring of 1942. There was no precedent for frontline troops to design and build a piece of equipment of such importance and complexity. Later, during the summer, Lieutenant-Colonel Mill Colman, a member of the South African Engineer Corps, developed what he thought was a novel idea for mine clearing. The idea had come to him when he noted a tracked vehicle driving by with a length of wire entangled in its track sprockets. With each revolution of the sprocket, the wire hit the ground with great force. Based on this, he thought that it might be possible to build a thrashing device that could detonate mines. Major L. A. Girling, Commander of the 21st South African Corps Field Park Company, was tasked with constructing the first experimental unit. They called it a “mine destroying device.” Captain Berry, hearing of the latest rebirth of the flail idea, told Major Girling of similar previous developments and described how Major du Toit had been sent to England by General Auchinleck to work on a similar idea in conditions of tight secrecy. So secret, in fact, that the Allied command in the Middle East had forgotten about the matter. Captain Berry gladly unearthed the remains of his earlier experiment and handed the contraption over to Major Girling’s team of engineers, consisting of himself, Captain G.J. Barry, Lieutenant Hofmann and

Lieutenant C.D.B. Cramb. Work on the prototype flail tank commenced within twenty-four hours and by 6 August, the first mock-up was completed. This first flail prototype was christened the Durban Mark I, after Lieutenant-Colonel Colman’s hometown in South Africa. The Durban Mark I incorporated many of Captain Berry’s ideas, including an auxiliary 105-horsepower Ford V8 engine mounted in a sponson (an armored box) on the right hand side of the Matilda Tank’s hull powered roller supports to a level box and then to the drum suspended above the ground. The horizontal flail rotor was held by two lattice girder arms about six feet in front of the tank and three feet above the ground. The rotor covered the entire width of the tank and was rotated in the same direction as the tank’s movement, at a speed of approximately 100 revolutions per minute. The rotor was equipped with 24 flails, or chain assemblies, that hit the ground with a contact length of approximately 20-cm. On later versions, fielded after the Second Battle of El Alamein, the boom that carried the rotor was modified so that it could be elevated and depressed by means of hydraulic cylinders to aid in mobility when not in use.

After the tests, Major Girling’s team continued to refine their design. On 12 September, the Durban Mark I was demonstrated for the 8th Army’s corps commanders and their chief engineers. Generals Alexander, Commander-and-Chief, Middle East, Montgomery, Commander 8th Army, and Morshead, Commander 9th Australian Division, witnessed Scorpion demonstrations and were impressed with its capabilities, considering the short amount of time invested in the project. Major Girling was congratulated for bringing the project to such a successful conclusion so quickly. Brigadier Ray remarked that, in appearance, the prototype resembled a scorpion and the name stuck. General Montgomery, a deeply religious and austere man, felt the name appropriate and quoted from the First Book of Kings (Chapter 12, Verse 14): “My Father has chastised you with whips, but I shall chastise you with scorpions.” Having observed the new, unprecedented invention, General Montgomery said that he wanted twelve for the coming attack. Brigadier Kisch had explained that the production of so large a number would have to be approved by General Headquarters and that it would mean suspending other production work. To this, General Montgomery replied, “Don’t belly-ache, order two dozen.” The next day Brigadier Kisch ordered the fabrication of an additional twenty-four of the new “Scorpion” mine destroyers, combined with the first prototype, this would provide the 8th Army a total of twenty-five Scorpions for Operation Lightfoot.

According to Major Reid of the New Zealand engineers, “This idea had great possibilities, especially from the sappers’ point of view, as if we could get tanks to clear gaps through minefields we could anticipate a much longer life.” Compared to the other available alternatives such as rollers and hand clearance, the flail-type mine clearance system appeared to be far superior.

Used operationally in the 1942 second Battle of El Alamein the crew had to wear respirators due to the massive volume of dust the flails threw into the air. Nonetheless, the concept, if not the implementation, was proven. Improvements were made, concepts refined and different tank chassis tried until all the designs and operational experience culminated in the Sherman Crab.

I had a look at General Percy Hobart, a true armoured warfare visionary, and the use of armoured combat engineering in an earlier post. I think it’s one of the most interesting aspects of D-Day. The Sherman Crab was a marked improvement, the flails were driven from the main engine via a power take off, hydraulic raising/lowering and barbed wire cutters which enabled it to double up as a barbed wire breaching device. One of the most important innovations was a system that allowed the marking of a safe lane, using smoke grenade launchers, an illuminated pole launcher and chalk dispenser. The Sherman Flail performed a vital service during D Day and beyond and its importance should not be underestimated.

Flails were not the only anti mine technology, ploughs and rollers were used before the flail as early as 1918 but the flail seems to have had greater success in the war years because they were lighter and more suited to the type of terrain encountered.

Despite some smaller developments, post war, the fail and roller fell out of favour and the explosive breaching charge like the Giant Viper and Python were generally seen as the answer to minefield breaching.

Pre 1992

The Pookie was a specialist mine detection vehicle, first built in Rhodesia in 1976, comprising a monocoque armoured capsule sitting on an open frame chassis. The donor chassis was Volkswagon Kombi which used low downward force torsion arm suspension and this was combined with surplus Formula One tyres to create a ground pressure of less than 3lbs per square foot, less than a human. This ultra low ground pressure meant that it did not even detonate anti personnel mines and allowed the detector to be used without fear of detonation, the Pookie could drive right over a mine and not set it off.

Detection allowed the mine to be cleared or selectively detonated, standard operating procedure was to detect,mark and retire, with sappers carrying out the controlled detonation or neutralisation.

In four years of operation not a a single mine was detonated by a Pookie but they found over 550 and had both a practical and psychological effect. Although relatively slow it was very effective and during the latter years of its service the enemy was known to have placed a bounty on it!

Pookie

In 1979 a small number of Pookie’s detected an average of just under 6 mines per day and built at a cost of less than a single damaged vehicle repair they were a great success. None were lost to land mines although a number were damaged in ambushes that specifically targeting them. Only 1 driver was killed by a direct RPG hit. Responding to the threat of ambush they were fitted with the spider, a fearsome 24 barrel 12 gauge shotgun providing a 270 degree arc of fire.

Pookie

Each Pookie cost a grand total of R$11,000 and in short order had handsomely paid for themselves.

In response to a South African Army requirement to clear military convoy routes of anti vehicle mines in Northern Namibia and Southern Angola, RSD developed the Chubby, an obvious successor to the Pookie. The Chubby system has been continually developed since its introduction in the late eighties.

The concept embodied by the Pookie was developed further into the Meerkat and Husky vehicles as part of the Chubby mine detection and removal system. The Chubby system from RSD utilises a range of V shaped and open frame vehicles to both detect and disrupt mines and IED’s. The detection vehicles are very low ground pressure but the detonation vehicles have staggered wheels and high ground pressure.

Chubby System

Meerkat

Section of Duisendpoot Mine Detonation Trailer

To be clear, the Chubby system was available and operationally deployed in the eighties but it was designed to counter anti tank mines, not low metal content IED’s, a world of difference.

1992 to 1996

The British contribution to operation in the Balkans, UNPROFOR, IFOR and SFOR spanned this period (SFOR became EURFOR in 2005) and involved up to 10,000 UK personnel at its peak. One of the key requirements was for ordnance disposal and in particular, counter mine route proving/clearance.

The South African Mamba prototype was sent to Alvis in the UK and this ultimately became the Alvis 4, a number of long wheelbase Mambas were also supplied and these (I think) became the Alvis 8.

6 were deployed to the Balkans for use by the Royal Engineers.

Route Proving generally consisted of the vehicles driving a route immediately prior to it being opened, nice and simple!

The Alvis 4 had a number of modifications including additional armour to counter TMRP 6 and 7 mines that fired an Explosively Formed Projectile, this made vehicle handling even more hair raising. They have been variously called Alvis 4’s, Alvis 8′s, Mambas, Comanche’s, Acorns and RG-31’s by different sources but for the purpose of this post, they are Alvis 4′s.

Alvis 4 in Bosnia

How much might one expect six 4 speed manual gearbox vehicles with no ECM or comms cost and that were more hairier to drive than a Land Rover ambulance?

Wait for it, wait for it…

£1.2million in 1990′s money.

Alvis 4

Despite the cost, the Alvis 4’s/Mambas were a great success but the harsh climate and terrain of the Balkans combined with the extra weight imposed by additional armour exposed a number of limitations so they were eventually disposed of and a replacement sought (more later)

During the Balkans deployment, we purchased 3 complete sets of the Chubby route clearance system from RS Dorbyl and France also ordered a number of systems. Designed for the conditions of southern Africa the Chubby system encountered a number of problems with the weather and terrain in the Balkans, unable to cope with icy and tight mountain roads their utility was limited.

Two of the three systems were subsequently disposed of to the HALO Trust, a charity that specialises in the removal of the debris of conflict, I am not sure what happened to the third.

The flail enjoyed resurgence in the 90’s as the need for humanitarian demining of post conflict areas such as Angola and Afghanistan became obvious. Although the military still have flails in their kit bags, Singapore have recently developed the Bionix Trailblazer for example, the majority of users are now civilian demining organisations. The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining has some excellent publications on the subject.

Another well known example is the Hydrema MCV910 (also in service with the Singapore armed forces) and there are many others. The Aardvark Joint Service Flail Unit is made in the UK by Aardvark Clear Mine, now a wholly owned subsidiary of Penman Engineering and is said by some to be extremely effective, in service all around the world including Afghanistan

Why not in British service in Afghanistan one might ask.

To understand the reason why flails are unsuitable for use in counter IED operations it is important to understand the difference between a mine and an IED.

Mines are usually well packaged, discrete devices with an integral trigger device. IED’s found in Afghanistan and other places often have the mean of initiation (or trigger) some distance from the charge and this is a problem that all mechanical demining tools have when countering IED’s. Whilst the flail might do its job and initiate the trigger or pressure plate, the main charge could well be a few metres back up the road and directly under the flail vehicle chassis. Other significant problems include the likelihood of distributing explosive materials indiscriminately and there is the obvious destruction of the ground surface. This might cause problems with a local civilian population, especially if it is repeated.

So although flails have limited utility in demining operations in a civilian context and minefield breaching (not clearance) in a military context, their use for counter IED is severely limited, hence why they are not used.

1997

The US tested a Chubby route clearance system from RS Dorbyl and the US company, CSI

1998

US forces start work on the development of  the Interim Vehicle Mounted Mine Detector (IVMMD) system, using the 10 Chubby systems purchased from RSD Dorbyl. They were part of the Ground Standoff Mine Detection System (GSTAMIDS) Block 0 program, of which the IVMMD was designated as the Mine Detection Vehicle component.

1999

The Australian DoD purchased a complete Chubby set for evaluation at a cost of 4.66 AUS$

The US requested a demonstration of the Buffalo heavy mine protected clearance vehicle.

Another eight Alvis 4′s are procured for use in Macedonia and Kosovo for a combined cost of £3.3million

So the Alvis 4/8′s, all 14 of them cost a total of £4.5million, or more or less, a third of a million pounds each although this would have also included spares and other extras.

After 20 years of gathering dust the Pookie was revived to play a part in civilian demining operations.

In 1999 Minetech resurrected the vehicle and combined it with a modern Ground Penetrating Radar system from Tricon, a German company specialising in detection equipment. The basic design was improved with a new powerpack, hydraulic steering and power system.

After a series of post trials improvements the Minetech Pookie fleet was deployed to Afghanistan and may even still be there.

Again, more applicable to demining operations rather than combat Counter IED but an interesting system nevertheless.

2000

After the poor performance of the Chubby systems in the snow, mud and close terrain of the Balkans, the MoD initiate the Mine Detection, Neutralisation and Route Marking (MINDER) programme, .

January, the MoD is up and running with MINDER, a ten year programme worth up to £100million, expressions of interest were to be in to the DPA by the third week of January. The prime contractor was to work with the MoD to produce two variants, MINDER RP (Route Proving) and the reconnaissance version, MINDER Recce.

The MINDER requirements are said to be ambitious, no surprises there, this seems to be a common problem with UK equipment programmes yet in some cases it is understandable. Recognising the likely use of IED’s and mines the UK needed a system that could operate anywhere in the world.

MINDER RP was to be a mine protected vehicle that carried a sensor suite to detect mines and IED’s, a means of neutralising them and marking a safe lane. MINDER RECCE would be fitted to the army’s Future Engineer versions of reconnaissance vehicles such as MRAV and TRACER.

November, in response to a written Parliamentary question the Chief of the Defence Procurement Agency, Robert Walmsley, stated that two contracts had been awarded to Ultra Electronics and Hunting Engineering, for the Competitive Assessment Phase (CAP) of MINDER. Each contract was worth £6 million and a bid was also received from BAE Systems, which was not successful in the detailed tender assessment process. Total expected costs have risen to £344 million and initial capability was expected to be in 2005 with incremental growth up to 2010.

BAe had partnered with Mechem (part of state owned Denel) from South Africa for their bid and included a development of Chubby.

US forces start work on a remote control option for their IVMMD systems.

2001

The Royal Engineer Alvis 4’s were replaced under an Urgent Operational Requirement with the Lion MPV made by Technical Solutions Group (a subsidiary of Force Protection) in the USA. Supacat fronted the bid with involvement from a company called Seafire and the name Tempest was selected to avoid confusion. Supacat carried out a number of modifications and 8 vehicles were obtained for a total contract price of £2.7million.

The TEMPEST MPV was based on a Peterbilt 330 unit with a Marmon Herrington 4 wheel drive running gear. The relationship between Technical Solutions Group, Force Protection, Seafire and Supacat seems a little unclear. Murray Hammick was named as owner and manager of Seafire and before joining Force Protection, was also head of business development for Alvis, a contributing editor for Janes and an ex Major in the British Army. All very complex.

The MINDER Competitive Assessment Phase continues.

The Hunting Engineering consortium includes Thompson Missile Electronics, RTS Advanced Robotics, DERA and Redifon.

It is clear that the resultant concepts envisage some form of articulated arm for disruption of devices.

As part of the MINDER programme, Pearson Engineering develop the PEROCC, the Pearson Engineering Route Opening and Clearance Capability, a heavily modified commercial wheeled loader. Videos and further information here

2002

US armed forces ordered a number of Buffalo protected clearance vehicles from Force Protection after extensive evaluation in the preceding few years. The Buffalo is a heavy, extremely well protected and durable vehicle, designed to go into harm’s way and neutralise IED’s. The articulated claw is used to move materials and disrupt devices.

Buffalo

Buffalo

The Claw

The US Army deployed 4 Buffalo’s to Bagram in Afghanistan to assist with clearance operations at the air base.

MINDER is cancelled in the Assessment Phase due to ‘technical solutions not proving adequate performance’

After several million pounds has been spent the Army is left with nothing.

2003

Tempest Mine Protected Vehicles (MPV) were deployed to Iraq in 2003 in support of operations around Basra.

The Alvis 4/8′s are finally withdrawn from UK service in the Balkans.

November, US DoD initiated market research to meet Urgent and Operational Needs for blast protected vehicles used in route clearance and EOD operations, this was later to become the JERRV programme.

US forces deployed their Buffalo vehicles to Iraq.

Click here to view the embedded video.

The US Ground Standoff Mine Detection System (GSTAMIDS) Block 0 program is terminated and becomes the FCS GSTAMIDS.

2004

Tempest Mine Protected Vehicles (MPV) were deployed to Bosnia in 2004 in support of operations.

Although peripherally related, it’s worthwhile including here for background. The USMC requested TSG/Force Protection deliver the first 27 Cougar MRAP vehicles, these were a completely new design, not based on anything previous, although the obvious general principles of sacrificial components and hull shaping are self evident. The Cougar was actually designed by a small team including a British engineer and the first variant was called the Hardened Engineer Vehicle, first deliveries began in September.

The French armed forces start development of SOUVIM, a similar concept to the Chubby system.

Although the (GSTAMIDS) Block 0 programme was terminated, the IVMMD equipment was still in the US inventory, so was deployed to Iraq early in the year, immediately starting limited operations.

The Alvis 4′s are disposed of due to reliability and safety concerns, lack of spares and lack of road worthiness.

9 go to the Estonian armed forces, 4 to a US Security company (Blackwater) and 1 to Singapore

Total sale value for all 14, £44,000.

Some depreciation.

2005

The US  subsequently adopted the Cougar HEV design with some modification and they are renamed the Joint EOD Rapid Response Vehicles (JERRV)

Force Protection receive a series of orders from the US DoD, totalling approximately $87 million for the delivery of 122 Cougar JERRV. There are a number of configurations of JERRV including a 4×4 and 6×6,  subsequent orders number in the hundreds. With the earlier Buffalo, they revolutionise anti IED operations in Iraq. BAe RG31′s were also obtained by US forces.

2006

Tempest Mine Protected Vehicles (MPV) were deployed to Afghanistan in 2006 supporting a range of EOD related tasks.

March, Pearson Engineering are awarded a 2 year contract from the MoD for the Mounted Countermine Capability Concept Demonstrator (MC3D), a joint UK-Canadian programme that uses the PEROCC system described above.

May, Canada announced the EROC ( Expedient Route-Opening Capability) programme, consisting of the Husky mine detector vehicle, and the Buffalo and Cougar mine-protected vehicles. For $29.6 million (Canadian) EROC consists of six Husky’s, five Cougars, five Buffalo’s and 2 years logistics support.

Initial trials were completed in Angola of the Niitek Visor ground penetrating radar fitted to the Mine Stalker remotely operated vehicle. The trials were funded by the US Department of Defense Humanitarian Demining Research & Development Program.

July, the US 25th Infantry Division begins acceptance testing of the Honeywell T-Hawk micro UAV

The US IVMMD gets a new lease of life and the Meerkat/Husky combination is replaced with a single Husky Mk2, the resultant system becomes known as Vehicle Mounted Mine detector (VMMD)

By replacing two different vehicles (Husky and Meerkat) with a single versatile vehicle that can be used either in the detection or towing role, the logistics overhead is reduced and flexibility improved.

CSI in the US now offer the Chubby/VMMD complete system (the link includes a comprehensive system description and 2 excellent videos)

A technology improvement plan was also initiated that included installation of a Niitek Visor 2500 Ground penetrating Radar (GPR) system. The Visor 25000 is designed to counter the increasing use of low and non metallic devices and reduce false positives.

August, initial deliveries to Afghanistan begin for the Canadian EROC system.

November, in response to a written Parliamentary question, the MoD confirms that

There is currently no formal UOR for the procurement of either “Buffalo” or “Husky”, which are equipments currently used by US Forces. The requirement for a route clearance capability to support current operations is being assessed by the Equipment Capability Manager and this may lead to a UOR in the future if required.

By the end of the year, Force Protection had received orders for 137 Buffalo’s.

2007

January, the Channel 4 documentary from Sean Langan, Fighting the Taliban, is aired in the UK in which UK forces are seen driving around in Land Rover WMIK’s and the accompanying Estonians ride in their MRAP style vehicles. The Estonian vehicles, used to CASEVAC British soldiers, were the Alvis 4’s we used in the Balkans and subsequently got rid of.

See the documentary (in 5 parts) on YouTube here, here, here, here and here

Meanwhile, having taken delivery of 6 Husky’s, 5 Cougars and 5 Buffalo’s , Canadian forces are using them to great effect.

The technology improvement programme for the US Husky VMMD is completed and the resultant system is renamed (again) to become the Husky Mounted Detection System (HMDS)

Husky and Niitek

May, the MoD announces the introduction of the Tellar munitions disposal vehicle, based on the Mowag Duro chassis already in service with the Army.

Tellar

These will be deployed overseas and the image shows clearly a ‘non green’ colour scheme, they have ‘riot protection’ which might be fine for Northern Ireland but Basra and Helmand, not so sure.

The vehicle carries all equipment required by the end user to undertake conventional munitions disposal. It has also been fitted as an emergency response vehicle (blue light enabled), and is fitted with a mobile phone, force protection suite, a personal address system, and two Global Positioning Systems (GPS): a Bowman radio GPS, and a commercial GPS. It also comes fitted with a level of riot protection.

Each vehicle weighs 9.5 tonnes and costs around £415,000. 18 vehicles have been bought, with 14 to be deployed on operations, and four held in the UK for training and reserves. Tellar will deploy with the Joint Explosives Ordnance Disposal force on both Operations Herrick and Telic in the near future.

The article states they will be used by the Royal Engineers for conventional munitions disposal and deploy to both Iraq and Afghanistan.  As I will show later, they will be used for Counter IED missions in Afghanistan where its protection can be easily contrasted with that provided to US EOD personnel in their Cougar HEV/JERRV’s, the vehicles that have been in service with US forces since 2005.

US forces in Iraq started using the Honeywell T-Hawk micro UAV in counter IED operations, flying ahead of convoys to examine suspect areas.

2008

US armed forces ordered their 200^th Buffalo mine clearance vehicle, Italy orders four, France five and Canada, an additional fourteen

The Talisman project is born and orders placed, with BMT and PA Consulting as part of the team.

The MoD news release states

£96 million from the package will also be used to develop a specialist route clearance system known as Talisman, which will provide a new high-tech way of dealing with the IED (Improvised Explosive Device) threat. Among the Talisman vehicles to be developed will be the Buffalo mine-protected vehicle and the Engineer Excavator.

New and Hi Tech!

If that means Buffalo, used by US forces since 2002 or the JCB HMEE, again used by US forces for a number of years and a specialist military derivative of the Fast Track agricultural and construction vehicles, then fair enough.

Click here to view the embedded video.

November, the Talisman in service date is targeted at late 2009

The US Navy ordered 372 Honeywell T Hawk systems

Honeywell and Thales signed a teaming agreement for the T-Hawk

Testing for the US Army Buffalo A2 programme began and at this point, over 25 improvements had been incorporated into the original design, including fire suppression, additional armour, a claw mounted realtime video cameraand the Air Digger.

Further improvement and trials work continues in Cambodia and Angola on the Mine Stalker system for humanitarian demining. The system is maturing and displays a greater than 99.6% detection rate even against low metal anti tank mines. Confusingly, Mine Stalker is also the name given to the same ground penetrating radar but this time mounted on a Multidrive tractor, the same tractor that has also been used with different detector systems.

Multidrive Halo Tractor

Although humanitarian demining is very different from IED clearance in Afghanistan there are some parallels and an excellent overview can be seen here

2009

February, US forces in Afghanistan commenced Operation Gateway III which involved clearing Route 515 of IED’s using the Husky system.

Click here to view the embedded video.

March, the West Lincolnshire Coroner, Stuart Fisher, speaking at the inquest of Captain Daniel Sheperd of  11 EOD Regiment Royal Logistic Corps, urges the MoD to use more robots where possible.

A video is released that highlights the scale of the Counter IED effort

Click here to view the embedded video.

September, Thales is appointed as Mission Systems Design Authority for the Talisman project, that will be £25million please. The press release states that as part of the services, Thales will supply warehousing (honestly)

October, the MoD took delivery of 14 Buffalo’s

November, the MoD took delivery of a number of Dragon Runner robotic vehicles from Automatika, a division of QinetiQ.

At a conference on defeating the IED, General Sir Richard Dannat stated

The insurgent has chosen to put his strength up against our weakness, it forces us into bigger and more protected vehicles, or even better for them, to stay in our bases and not have any access to the people. To do our job we must integrate with the people, and the insurgent wants to prevent us from doing that. It is time for expenditure on counter IED to move from UOR to core business. If we accept that we will be in Afghanistan for three to five years and beyond, there is no doubt that this is now our core business.

As he leaves his job, in August 2009, he urged the MoD to put more resources into counter IED activity.

Improvised explosive devices are a major issue at the moment. They are a major tactical battle that we have got to win and we need to roll out more equipment so that we have permanent 24/7 surveillance over the most difficult areas and so we can target the Taliban as they are laying these things

In particular, Dannatt called for the Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) programme to be accelerated, with data and images collected by planes and unmanned drones looked at and analysed by specialist staff who then pass the information on to field commanders, who are said to believe that the lack of these specialists is directly influencing the number of fatalities the British army is experiencing

In response, Liam Fox, the then Shadow Secretary of State for Defence said

Good ISTAR capability, in addition to more helicopters, earning the trust of the local population and increased armour, is the best way to counter the IED threat. If there is a shortage of this capability, the government must do everything it can to fill that gap

In the same month, Michael Yon published his excellent report from his embed with UK forces, Bad Medicine

This lays bare the shear scale of the problem, the efforts of high threat C-IED teams and the flimsy Tellar vehicle that is used by the Joint Force EOD Task Force.

CSI continued to develop the Husky system, the Mark III now includes a large number of improvements and their is also a 2 man version to handle the extra workload resulting from the Niitek Visor 2500 Ground Penetrating Radar and other sensors.

Over 500 are now in service.

In a magazine published by the US Joint Program Office Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicles the Improved Spork for Buffalo vehicles is introduced. Initiated in late 2008, the improved claw can now grasp and rotate objects, not just rummage around. The system can be retrofitted to existing vehicles in less than 30 minutes

Improved Spork

Improved Spork and Air Knife

The pictures also show the Air Blade which is used to move debris, the vehicles with this system can be recognised by the air hose drum on the articulated arm.

December, the UK ordered 5 Honeywell T-Hawk micro UAV systems for $5.7million, each system comprises two air vehicles and ground control equipment.

Click here to view the embedded video.

2010

January, field experience with the T-Hawk micro UAV revealed a number of problems

February, whilst in Istanbul, Robert Gates, the US Defense Secretary, made the following offer

Today I told our allies that the United States will be able to offer them more intelligence, training and equipment including jammers, route clearance robots, surveillance systems and ground-penetrating radar

Operation MOSHTARAK commences with a big counter IED effort.

OP MOSHTARAK

The C-IED Task Force comprises personnel from both the RLC and RE. The RLC Ammunition Technical Officers (ATO’s) work with the RE Search Teams (REST), REST finds the devices and the RLC ATO disposes of them.

A BBC News at Ten report from Afghanistan is aired, a pretty harrowing account of joint USA-UK operations that resulted in the death of a Royal Engineers Search Adviser (RESA). The report showed US forces using Husky’s and Cougar JERRV’s to clear the route. When the US Husky contacts a large IED the force has to resort to on foot detection.

A couple of interesting reports here and here on the Task Force Thor (Target Hazard Open Roadway), the US unit responsible for route clearance.

The Python system gets its first outing in Afghanistan.

As part of Operation MOSHTARAK the Royal Engineers deployed an explosive clearance system called Python, towed behind the Challenger derived Trojan Armoured Vehicle Royal Engineers (AVRE). Detecting mines and IED’s in front of vehicle or foot patrols, called ‘Op Barma’, is usually a painstaking, dangerous and incredibly difficult task, using Vallon hand held detectors. Occasionally an opportunity exists to use more automated methods.

The Python is the replacement for the Giant Viper, in fact a mid life upgrade called Giant Viper Mid Life Upgrade (GVMLI) that replaced the motor unit and other components. Instead of the parachute system in the Giant Viper the Python uses a long strip of Velcro (honestly) to retard and straighten the hose as it deploys. Although seemingly unsophisticated it is very effective. It is nothing more sophisticated than a 228m length of rubber hose, except the hose is filled with high explosive! Launched using a rocket motor it deploys across the ground to be breached and when it lands the explosive filled hose detonates, initiating and destroying any mines or IED’s in its path, clearing a safe line approximately 7m wide and 180m long.

The Trojan and Titan (the world’s fastest armoured bridge layer) have been in service with the Royal Engineers for three years and are soon to be joined by the Terrier, a lighter armoured combat engineering vehicle that will replace the Combat Engineer Tractor.

Trojan Armoured Vehicle Royal Engineers

The operation allowed a significant section of wadi north of Patrol Base Wahid to be cleared of IED’s, although the Python provides a breaching not clearance capability meaning that clearance teams will have to make sure the area is 100% clear. Breaching versus clearance is about the management of risk, breaching means operational tempo can be maintained at an acceptable risk.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Trojan and Python have been in theatre for a while but this is the first public airing of its undoubtedly excellent capabilities and marks an interesting change in approach, in the right location it enables rapid breaching of suspected IED/mine areas with all the operational benefits that this brings.

March, the Express published a story claiming the MoD rejected the Niitek Visor 2500 GPR.

Commenting on the story, Tory MP, Patrick Mercer said

“This is yet another example of the Government dithering. American and Canadian forces are using this equipment now and lives are being saved.”

April, Talisman deployed to Afghanistan.

France takes the lead on a European Defence Agency project where member states will jointly buy a forensic laboratory to analyze improvised explosive device (IED) debris.

June, the French Army took delivery of the MBDA SOUVIM 2 anti mine/IED system. Similar in concept to the Husky, SOUVIM2 is claimed to be able to clear 150km of track per day and consists of two vehicles and three trailers. The first vehicle (designated VDM) carries magnetic and thermal decoys that trigger heat sensitive, trip wire and tilt-rod activated mines. The vehicle travels at a speed of 25 kmh and uses low pressure tires to reduce the chance of triggering pressure sensitive mines. These are detonated by the heavyweight trailer, towed behind the VDM. A follow-on vehicle is the VTR, which tows two additional trailers to tackle residual un-detonated mines to create a safe track up to a width of 3.9 meters.

British ‘bomb disposal experts’ have been ordered to detonate many improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Afghanistan rather than trying to dismantle them after four members from 11 Explosive Ordnance Disposal Regiment have been killed in just over a year in Helmand, The Independent reports.

The US orders another 76 Niitek Visor 2500 ground penetrating radar sets to be fitted to their existing Husky vehicles. The contract included spares, training and maintenance support at a cost of $106.5 million, roughly £900k each. The complete set is called the Husky Mounted Detection System or HMDS

The IED threat has evolved, especially the use of low or non metallic/magnetic content so existing metal detection systems become less and less effective. Ground penetrating radar is vital in the hunt for these difficult to detect devices. US Husky’s have primarily been used for main supply routes because of its size but the NIITEK VISOR 2500 system has been miniaturised and mounted on a Talon unmanned robotic vehicle for use in closer and more difficult terrain.

US forces now have 80 systems in theatre and Canada, 21.

Niitek are now owned by the UK company, Chemring.

In the recent visit to Afghanistan, David Cameron said:

“My biggest duty as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom is to our Armed Forces and to make sure that they have all the equipment and all of the protection that they need to do the absolutely vital job that they are doing here in Afghanistan.

“I’m pleased to announce today that we will be spending an extra £67m on countering the IED threat and actually doubling the number of British teams that are there to counter the threat from those explosive devices.”

Speaking at DVD, Peter Luff MP, the new Minister for Defence Equipment Support and Technology said.

“Tackling the IED threat is vital for us to make military progress. C-IED is not just about the bomb disposal expert defusing a bomb, vital and dangerous though that role is. It is about making sure that our soldiers have a range of tools, tactics and techniques available to them.”

Research continues, UK scientists from St Andrews University are developing a laser system that detects minute quantities of ‘indicator molecules’ given off by explosives.

Talisman gets a public viewing at the DVD show.

June, MoD DSTL scientists involved with work on detection equipment are honoured by the Queen with OBE’s for two of them.

July, The Talon robots that are part of Talisman were criticised by an unnamed ‘army bomb squad insider’, quoted in The Sun newspaper, who said the 10kg robots were too weak to lift explosives, could not cut wires cleanly, were difficult for troops to transport and were prone to falling over on uneven ground.

“The Dragon Runner is useless – everybody knows it,” the insider was quoted as saying. “It’s more of a hindrance than a help. It won’t go over uneven ground or anything with a slight gradient. Nine times out of ten it just topples over.”

The MoD release a story about how the Army has utilised the skills of a Canadian ‘cowboy’ to assist with training personnel in ground awareness.

Reinforcing the fact that technology is not the answer to all problems the MoD release another story that describes how men, machines and animals are combined to detect and defeat IED’s. Another story, close behind, looks again and military working dogs, especially in the IED detection role.

August, the MoD releases a news item describing Talisman.

In the news piece the costs have doubled to over £180million and the purpose is defined;

Talisman has been designed to provide an increased level of assurance along routes throughout the region. It consists of a suite of cutting-edge equipment, including armoured vehicles, optical cameras and remote-controlled vehicles.

This life-saving equipment is being used to support combat logistic patrols, which can comprise several hundred vehicles and trek through the country delivering vital supplies to bases for the troops on the front line

Talisman Protected Eyes

UK Buffalo

UK Buffalo and Mastiff

From this it is clear that Talisman is for route clearance and assurance, for combat logistics patrols and quite distinct from the RLC high threat C-IED teams although as with any system, new roles will be found.

It is also apparent from the release that it is a Royal Engineer operated system.

September, Shepard report that the MoD is looking at options for remote controlled vehicles, especially some of the thousands of Snatch Land Rovers that are earmarked for disposal. The Snatch Technology Demonstrator could be used for base security and counter IED systems were specifically mentioned. The Snatch TD could be used as a sacrificial lamb or to carry sensors for example.

The press release from Marshall’s includes a picture of the interior and highlights the controls

The remote driver’s position is complete with all controls, steering wheel and instruments which replicate what the driver would experience if sitting in the actual vehicle. The driver has a screen which provides him with a real time image of the view from the driver’s position in the Land Rover. This remote driver location can be fitted to any vehicle or building which has the space.

In the remotely controlled vehicle the controls are managed by a series of servos and mechanical devices which turn the steering wheel or push on the pedals. Any vehicle with an automatic gearbox can be converted. The equipment installed in the remote Land Rover has been designed to be fitted or removed in less than 30 minutes so that vehicle can revert to being directly controlled by a driver.

Other bids from BAe and MIRA are also under consideration

2011

March, pictures appear on an Australian Land Rover enthusiast forum of a remotely controlled Snatch Land Rover sporting a ground penetrating radar.

Defeating the IED

To restate what I said at the beginning of this post, it is a highly complex and difficult task.

The overarching Counter IED strategy sits on three pillars, defeat the device, train the force and attack the network.

Talisman concerns itself with the first pillar but an equal amount of effort is going into the other two. Attacking the network of individuals that make the devices, emplace them and supply materials is likely to be the most effective long term counter. All three elements of this strategy need an intimate knowledge of what we are dealing with, for this, we need to neutralise and examine, not just destroy. With knowledge of how the devices are made, emplaced and initiated we can then adjust training, tactics and procedures to minimise risk and impact but when resources are constrained this will inevitably create problems.

Finding the right balance between destroying devices in order to allow greater freedom of movement for troops, and gathering intelligence to target the Taleban networks which build and plant IEDs is difficult. All information obtained from analysing the components of a recovered IED can be fed into an intelligence database like J-KNIFE but there would but it has been reported that there is some disagreement about the balance between careful recovery and exploitation and the less sophisticated mechanical or explosive removal.

An RLC ATO takes up to ten years to train, they are the expert’s experts and consequently in high demand. The high casualty rate has placed an even greater burden on those remaining and recent news reports have highlighted the dangers of fatigue and over stretch.

There is clearly a difference between cap badges, the forensic approach that worked so well in Northern Ireland is carried out by the Royal Logistic Corps but the Royal Engineers would seem to favour the more simple destruction method.

Although joint teams of course work seamlessly on operations the inevitable resource competition between the Royal Engineers and Royal Logistic Corps simply cannot be conducive to maximising effectiveness. When the Royal Army Ordnance Corps was merged with the Royal Corps of Transport into the Royal Logistic Corps, C-IED  lost focus as other capabilities were prioritised, Northern Ireland was coming to an end and the capability might have been seen as niche. Although there are logical reasons for a difference in emphasis between the two, high tempo route clearance or deliberate neutralisation and evidence gathering, for example, this should not be allowed to get in the way of creating a coherent organisational approach to the problem, the IED is not going to go away.

This has prevented innovative technologies from being rapidly fielded and we now find ourselves having to play catch up.

Has this resulted in unnecessary casualties?

I won’t be so presumptuous to make a judgement but clearly the US and Canada have had some success with systems like the Husky and Buffalo whilst the UK has been prevaricating, arguing amongst ourselves, creating project teams and appointing design authorities.

That said, it is very probable that the IED will never be completely defeated, they are simply too easy to deploy but we can minimise the threat, thus supporting an overall operational goal.

There are a wide range of technologies, tactics and equipment ranged at the IED and its supporting players. Whether it is the NATO project to support the transport and dissemination of full motion video generated by UAV’s, the comprehensive ECM equipment fitted to most UK vehicles in theatre, tri service mine awareness training, pattern analysis, Trojan breaching vehicles, mine rollers, forensic analysis of recovered devices, airborne sensors or even a small kit to assist extraction from minefields (P-MEK) there is no doubt, the kitchen sink is now being thrown at the problem.

A large proportion of IED casualties have occurred within a small radius of a FOB, self evidently we are not dominating the ground around these locations and don’t have the persistent surveillance capabilities to assist. Yet again, US forces are better equipped, UAV’s, aerostats and surveillance towers provide this constant surveillance. Perhaps the plan mooted by 16 Air Assault Battalion in 2008 to erect a network of Northern Ireland style surveillance towers wasn’t as outlandish as first thought.

In any spectrum of operations, the IED will find use. The cat is well and truly out of that bag and those that argue that IED’s will only be encountered on enduring operations like Northern Ireland or Afghanistan, which of course we will no longer be doing, are simply wrong.

And so we come to Talisman.

Talisman comprises 5 key equipment elements;

• Buffalo Rummage clearance vehicle
• Mastiff 2 ‘Protected Eyes’ command and control
• Honeywell T-Hawk micro UAV
• QinetiQ/Foster Millar Talon robotic vehicle
• JCB High Mobility Engineer Excavator

Talisman increases the ‘tools in the box’ at long last but the box isn’t big enough and would seem to be missing some of the tools other forces in theatre have had for several years.All the components are well proven, effective and in service elsewhere, in some cases for several years. Buffalo has been in service with US forces since 2002, that’s 7 or 8 years. The JCB HMEE has also been in service with the US for some time, entering service with the US in 2007.

Whilst I have no doubt that the behind the scenes integration work is impressive, the speed of getting it into service is absolutely nothing to be proud of.

Talisman was announced in October 2008, which means the need statement was perhaps  written 6 months earlier, that would make 2 years between need and deployment, hardly urgent. Remember, the equipment is largely off the shelf and in service with other nations, we are not pushing back the boundaries of science (we may indeed be at the cutting edge but there is nothing in the published materials to suggest this)

Contrast this with the time it took Canada to get Buffalo into theatre, accepting that Taisman is not a single vehicle.

If one looks at pictures of the Buffalo in service with US forces and the same vehicle now in service with the UK (pictures above) it is clear that the UK version does not have the video camera on the Spork or the compressed air blower or Air Knife, no doubt at some point, the need for real time imagery will be

Critically, at least not in public announcements, the UK has not fielded an equivalent to the Husky with its ground penetrating radar, so effective for detecting low metallic content devices although other advanced sensors have been developed by DSTL. There has to be a reason for this omission, even accepting the fact that they are not 100% effective against low metal IED’s, the figures released by its operators show that when used in conjunction with other search methods they can improve productivity enormously. There is no magic bullet but dismissing this type of system because it does not offer a 100% guarantee of detection has to be questioned. The announcements about unmanned Snatch Land Rovers and the images of one with a ground penetrating radar show the UK is developing these systems, despite buying 3 earlier generation systems for the Balkans and then giving them away.

Instead, we rely on hand detection as per the picture below, a Vallon, mine probe, a ken eye, 2″ paint brush, professionalism and a big set of balls.

Soldier Searches for IED

The Husky is not of course a magic bullet, the picture below of a member of the Royal Engineer Search Team (REST) examining a drain for an IED shows how difficult it would be to employ a single technology; there will always be a need for brave and expert individuals like those shown in the pictures.

Search teams in Tangi

Effective tactics, techniques and procedures like terrain appreciation, avoiding vulnerable points and Op Barma drills using handheld Vallon detectors go a long way as well.

Summary

The recent UK counter IED effort is a story of missed opportunities, throwing away hard won lessons, resource starvation and piecemeal, fragmentary and over ambitious programmes that went precisely nowhere.

Talisman is surely to be welcomed, but we should not be patting ourselves on the back for speed of implementation, its constituent parts have been in service with others for many years and critically, does not include a Husky/SOUVIM type capability.

As we have been slow to adopt new technologies the UK has had to rely on the expertise and frankly huge bollocked bravery of RLC High Threat Counter IED operatives and other specialists from the Royal Engineers, RAF and RN.

And for this, we should ask if too a high price has been paid.

UPDATE

I have updated this post (February 2011) with additional information on the Multidrive/Halo Trust demining tractor and some additional background reading on flails.

Clearing mines and IED’s in front of vehicle or foot patrols, called ‘Op Barma’, is usually a painstaking, dangerous and incredibly difficult task, using Vallon hand held detectors. The people who make up Op Barma teams are generally unsung but some of the bravest individual’s one could ever meet. Occasionally an opportunity exists to use more automated methods.

The Python is the replacement for the Giant Viper, in fact a mid life upgrade called Giant Viper Mid Life Upgrade (GVMLI) that replaced the motor unit and other components. Instead of the parachute system in the Giant Viper the Python uses a long strip of Velcro (honestly) to retard and straighten the hose as it deploys.

Although seemingly unsophisticated it is very effective. It is nothing more sophisticated than a 228m length of rubber hose, except the hose is filled with high explosive!

Launched using a rocket motor it deploys across the ground to be breached and when it lands the explosive filled hose detonates, initiating and destroying any mines or IED’s in its path, clearing a safe line approximately 7m wide and 180m long.

The Trojan and Titan (the world’s fastest armoured bridge layer) have been in service with the Royal Engineers for three years and are soon to be joined by the Terrier, a lighter armoured combat engineering vehicle that will replace the Combat Engineer Tractor.

Trojan Armoured Vehicle Royal Engineers

The operation allowed a significant section of wadi north of Patrol Base Wahid to be cleared of IED’s, although the Python provides a breaching not clearance capability meaning that clearance teams will have to make sure the area is 100% clear. Breaching versus clearance is about the management of risk, breaching means operational tempo can be maintained at an acceptable risk.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Trojan and Python have been in theatre for a while but this is the first public airing of its undoubtedly excellent capabilities and marks an interesting change in approach, in the right location it enables rapid breaching of suspected IED/mine areas with all the operational benefits that this brings.

Remember, its just a joke :D

What’s your favourite, mine is 15?

ACTIONS ON: IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE (IED)

1. Household Cavalry

Regard IED with haughty disdain and rustle Daily Telegraph angrily. Maintain that presence of IED in Knightsbridge is “absolutely preposterous”. Return to regimental main effort of defending Central London from the Roundheads.

2. Cavalry

Declare IED as best thing since tinned champagne; hold impromptu Pimms party to celebrate. Declare subsequent IED detonation as even more “Wizard prang”, extend Pimms party and incorporate mandatory drinking of champagne from remains of IED as regimental custom for next 300 years.

3. Footguards

Reduce words-of-command and halting in quick time to a minimum. Deploy No.1 fatigue party in close-order to polish IED to acceptable standard, followed by No.2 fatigue party to paint IED blue-red-blue and swab immediate area. IED detonated by massed bands. Deploy 2x Battalions worth of fatigue parties to swab resulting mess.

4. Armoured Infantry

Fail to see IED. Crush IED. On realising error, detract attention by initiating faked contact against nearest dwelling using all available weapon systems. Hide remains of IED in side bin.

5. Light-role Infantry

Find IED. Fail to find a solution to IED due to environmental differences to Salisbury Plain. Attempt cordon operation and set new record for miles of mine tape used. Withdraw to nearest FOB under cover of mine tape.

6. Parachute Regt

Decide IED is a “hat”. Deploy most junior paratrooper to “crack the hat’s skull”. Call junior paratrooper a “hat” when he gets blown up by IED. Remind all others that they are “hats” because they weren’t there.

7. Royal Marines

Declare that IED is “hoofing”. Get junior men naked with IED as an initiation. Turn IED into an improvised free weight for bench pressing. Indent for extra, extra supplementary rations from “the galley”. Hoofing.

8. SAS

Deploy bearded men 200km behind IED using HALO/Landrover insertion. Tab into area of IED and capture alive. Smuggle IED out in burka and extract to UK. Write a book per team member, all with hugely differing accounts of OP.

9. SBS

Get into black rubber suits. Steal IED as above. Construct black rubber suit for IED. Move to a special swimming pool and do bad, bad things with black rubber coated IED. Turn on wave machine and let things get properly nasty. Be very grateful for UKSF non-disclosure policy.

10. SRR

Dig hole in ground to hide in. Proceed to watch IED for ten days to make association to Bravos. Divert entire Bde assets onto tasking. Manage to maintain dignity when informed three weeks later that it’s a small rock and not an IED.

11. Royal Artillery

Level entire 10 square-kilometre area around IED. IED still functional. Repeatedly remind everyone that artillery neutralizes, it doesn’t destroy. Create promotional DVD of IED neutralization with images of Apache and accompanying Tina Turner soundtrack.

12. Medical Corps

Send out a fit hottie to chat up IED. Fit hottie lightly dabs a damp cloth over IED to keep it cool and offers reassuring words. Ends up sleeping with IED before announcing undying love of IED and marrying it. IED later detonates when it catches her in bed with an Irish Guards private.

13. Chaplain Corps

Approach the IED preaching about The Lord, oblivious to having entered a come-on. Rounds from nearby insurgents pass over and around the padre without harming him. IED attempts to detonate and fails as some mysterious force prevents it from engaging. IED is later found giving sermons to scared soldiers new into theatre.

14. REME

Stand around looking at IED whilst stroking their chins and drinking a brew. Attempt to recover IED with Foden winch. IED will not move. Junior Craftsman is sent in to assist with “Tools Fine Adjustment”. IED breaks and parts are mounted on LAD bar as trophy.

15. Royal Engineers

Destroy IED using charge with 10x more explosive content of IED. Build a Sqn bar in crater. Use second massive charge to blow second crater in which to build another Sqn bar/gym complex with BBQ’s every night for rest of tour. IED appears on next Sqn t-shirt.

16. Royal Signals

IED self-destructs to avoid Bowmanisation.

17. Royal Military Police

Issue IED with penalty fine of £1000 for loitering and not having FFD/Tourniquet/Morphine. IED detonates in anger and annoyance at the monkeys wasting its time. Surviving RMP’s issue IED with penalty fine for littering.

18. Army Air Corps

Identify IED as ideal opportunity to prove AAC has an offensive role and is not just a taxi service. Launch TOW missile at IED. Missile fails due to armaments contract being given to cheapest bidder. Accept that was the AAC’s ONLY missile and disband.

19. Intelligence Corps

Deny existence of IED to reporting unit, as they are not sufficiently cleared. Issue BG’s with a list of int-based questions to ask IED. Study Q&A analysis and find two main results:

a. Suggest IED may detonate having studied trend analysis of previous IED’s

b. Claim it’s part of a come-on involving 400 Taliban insurgents, as that’s what the guy who cleans the toilets told them.

20. RLC

Get pictures taken whilst posing next to IED with another unit’s GPMG/GMG/WMIK. Check IED for NSN to see if it can be put back on the shelf or backloaded to the UK. IED detonates due to someone making a video call on their mobile phone.

21. ANA

Turn up 5 days after IED reported. Cordon area, remove IED. Corrupt elements of ANA then move IED five hundred yards further along road and bury. Inform ISAF HQ area is now clear.

22. Afghan Civilian

Dig up IED and take to nearest ISAF post, and attempts to sell IED. Upon refusal, attempts to sell IED to Taliban. Taliban take IED and bury it at target location. Civilian digs up IED and takes to nearest ISAF post, and attempts to sell IED…….and so on

The argument about protection from mines and IED’s is as polarising but in different ways.

The Taleban know that in a direct stand up fight they are going to get a thorough malleting every time and whilst this does not seemingly deter them from seeking engagements they must surely realise that their loss rate cannot be sustained. In common with all insurgencies the single issue that decides the outcome is that of patience. The side with the greater endurance will generally be the winner; if there can be a winner.

The Taleban are patient and know they have the initiative, ISAF’s clock is ticking. What makes the clock tick that much quicker is the steady drumbeat of deaths and serious injuries.

There are two ways of reducing casualties, adopt a defensive stance which minimises engagements, seeks technical means of protection and generally tries to do the best whilst minimising casualties. The second is to take exactly the opposite approach, engage in aggressive operations and whilst accepting this will increase casualties in the short term realise it will bring victory sooner, reducing the overall cost.

It is interesting to note that the Taleban are increasingly using the IED as a means of inflicting coalition casualties at little cost to them and for no other reason.  Tactics and the types of devices used are changing.  The strategy is very simply to send as many coalition soldiers home, dead or seriously injured, as possible, knowing that it will accelerate the calls, know being heard, for a hasty withdrawal.

The basic argument for withdrawal being that the Taleban aren’t the enemy of the UK so is the price really worth it.

Whether we should or shouldn’t be in Afghanistan is another argument entirely but whilst we are there we have to concentrate, in our opinion, in battering the Taleban and making sure the local population is divorced completely from them.

To achieve this victory we have to have mobility, in our previous posts on helicopters we noted that having air mobility allows one to adjust the tempo of operations to suit you, be unpredictable in movement, react at speed and with strength and generally chose the time and place of the next engagement.

If you are increasingly restricted to road moves the need for route proving and manpower intensive area security evidently decreases the combat strength available for offensive operations. As forward operating bases increase in number and size the need for stores rises in line. In the absence of air transport the need for stores needs even more route proving and security. The Taleban know this, they know exactly the number and nature of routes is limited and that the ability of even a huge force to constantly secure them is limited to known choke points and other more obvious areas so can lay their IED’s almost with impunity and sit back, knowing that the steady stream of casualties will continue Westwards and with every one, political support will wane.

If the IED has become a strategic weapon, as it did in Iraq, then it follows that we must have a strategy to counter it.

That strategy must seek to neutralise the impact of the IED, reducing political will sapping casualties and freeing up forces for aggressive combat operations. Whilst we continue to be on the receiving end of the IED we cede the initiative to the enemy, they chose the time and place of engagement and shape the battlefield, not us.

One should realise that defeating IED’s is a complex task comprising many layers, there is no magic bullet, but to distil it into a series of elements;

Don’t Be There

The easiest way by far of defeating an emplaced IED is simply not to go anywhere near it. This might sound fatuous but it needs saying. Helicopter resupply should reduce the need for many combat logistic patrols. There are other options such as air despatch, making use of new equipment such as GPS guided parachutes or even resupply UAV’s

As we wrote above, a growing force needs a huge amount of supplies and the resources expended in keeping these supplies flowing unhindered reduces significantly the available offensive power.

There is no point of course, having well supplied island bases sitting in a sea of Taleban, operations have to be mounted. These operations and operations in support of local development provide invaluable intelligence and if we are to defeat the Taleban we have to engage in operations against them.

Again, more helicopters would support these offensive operations but at some stage one has to accept that patrolling in vehicles and mounting operations with vehicles are essential activities.

Deny the Enemy the Space and Means to Employ IED’s

Aggressive patrolling  and simply having the means to deny the Taleban the space and means of deploying IED’s is again an obvious statement but without the resources and accepting the sheer size of the area we must accept that IED’s will continue to be placed.

Disrupting the manufacture and movement of IED’s and precursor materials is equally beneficial but given the simplicity and readily available raw materials such as ammonium nitrate fertiliser and other materials this is a very difficult task.

Know Where They Are

Advances sensor capabilities across a wide range of platforms including radar deployed on the Sentinel R1 and Sea King ASaC, all manner of electro optical sensors on everything from Apache attack helicopters to UAV’s and even signals intelligence provide the means of catching IED emplacers in the act. One should not also forget that human intelligence from the local population is also vital. Human intelligence is another subject but its importance should not be underestimated when being dazzled by the capabilities of electronic sensors. Human intelligence at this level requires interaction with the local populace.

Denying space has a great deal of reliance on knowing where they are.

Techniques, Tactics and Procedures

Old fashioned training and tactical skill can negate much of the impact but it only goes so far. Skills learned in conflict have to be rolled into pre deployment training and this is an area where the UK armed forces excel although with more resources more/better training would improve matters even more. This is not a criticism but more resources can only help.

Using mobility intelligently allows one to avoid area where IED’s are. Skirting obvious choke points and avoiding pattern setting are obvious mobility benefits of mobility. It is in the mobility versus protection debate that generates the most controversy. If your vehicle is mobile it can use that mobility to make sure it uses unpredictable routes, avoid chokepoints and appear almost anywhere thus achieving tactical surprise and therefore, ultimately beating the Taleban sooner rather than later.

Route Proving

Recognising that no amount of tactics or watching routes is ever going to completely stop IED’s being emplaced it makes sense for large road moves like a combat logistic patrol to clear or prove the route in advance. Again, using a wide range of equipment and tactics this can be very effective. It is however, very slow and will completely destroys the element of surprise, handing the initiative back to the Taleban. There are different methods of route proving available and the recent Talisman project seeks to combine a number of vehicles, micro UAV’s (Honeywell T-Hawk) and armoured plant to improve existing capabilities.

Passive Protection

The last resort is passive protection. When all else fails and one contacts an IED the vehicle and how you use that vehicle (seat belts and the removal of potential projectiles i.e. loose objects etc) will make the difference between being a survivable contact and a non survivable contact.

All vehicles can have some degree of protection applied after or it can be designed in from scratch.

Generating more vitriol than any other issue the ‘Great V Shaped Hull Debate’ has polarised views.

Let’s get a few things absolutely straight; protection and survivability DO NOT automatically add weight. Comments such as ‘you can’t drive around in mobile pill boxes’ abound when used to support the argument that mobility provides greater overall protection than armour or design.

V shape hulls are not inherently heavy, ceramic armour is not heavy in comparison with steel but provides much greater protection against shaped charge warheads, slat armour has a lot of fresh air but again provides great protection against RPG’s and the new Tarian armour is based on a textile which is not known for being especially heavy!

The old argument about being able to have two of the three attributes of protection, mobility and firepower are simply not valid any more, as evidenced by for example, an armour based on a fabric.

However, it is hard not to have some sympathy with the views of users of vehicles like the Jackal which has superlative mobility, who say that its mobility does indeed provide protection. This is a persuasive argument but at the user’s perspective, the strategic view is often obscured. As we state above, IED’s are a strategic weapon and it requires a strategic, not tactical counter.

Vehicles like the Mastiff are large and heavy, putting a strain on the local road infrastructure, especially bridges but they without a doubt provide excellent protection. The Ridgeback provides excellent protection in a smaller package but is still not as mobile as the Jackal or Land Rover WMIK.

The Taleban, even in the days of the Russian invasion, would probe particular vehicles weak spots and adjust tactics accordingly. The Land Rover WMIK, Vector, Land Rover Snatch, Jackal and Viking have all suffered significant losses. These vehicles were supposed to use mobility as a means of protection.

There is absolutely nothing wrong with any of these vehicles.

The problem lies when these vehicles are deployed in completely the wrong situations because of a lack of alternatives or other factors.

The Jackal for example is an excellent weapons platform, mobile, with long range and high acceleration it is versatile and effective in its role. That role is however, NOT escorting logistics convoys where its mobility is totally neutralised because it has to go at the pace of the slowest vehicle in the convoy and use the route of the least mobile vehicle in the convoy packet. In this role it is very vulnerable to IED’s and the often follow up small arms fire.

The real question is why we seem to unable to field a vehicle in sufficient quantities that has a high degree of protection from the most effective weapon in the Taleban’s arsenal i.e. the IED and a degree of mobility which will contribute to its protection.

We act as if it is one OR the other.

The Light Protected Patrol Vehicle requirement seeks to achieve this aim and it is imperative that this is accelerated and fielded as soon as possible. Whilst the government hides behind the mobility is protection argument it is curious to note that the requirement is going forward at all, if there was no need it wouldn’t be happening.

There is no doubt we have been shamelessly late in deploying protected patrol vehicles and the seemingly obsessive clinging on to the ‘protection is mobility and mobility is protection’ argument is simply not logical in the face of overwhelming evidence. That said, once decisions have been made the people responsible for getting vehicles into theatre, with appropriate engineering resources and trained personnel has been excellent. This effort should be commended not condemned, if there is a area for blame it is with the decision makers.

The IED is the largest single cause of casualties, casualties erode political support and political support is essential to the continuance of the operation, it really is that simple.

We therefore need to concentrate on all elements of defeating the threat and apply greater vigour with the appropriate military, financial, scientific and engineering resources.

Much like the helicopter issue, the first stage of this is to admit mistakes with honesty and candour then move with some purpose to a solution.

If one starts with a deep V shape hull to deflect blast from mines, geometry means that in order to have a useable volume it has to be high. Height raises the centre of gravity which makes it more prone to toppling over caused by side blast or terrain. Adding additional side armour to protect from projectiles, shell fragments and RPG attack will make the high centre of gravity problem worse.

To counter this, the designer might widen the wheelbase but this might mean it becomes too wide to negotiate narrow streets where one might want to go. Turning circles are likely to be reduced by this as well. Wide turning circles are a particular problem in the confines of built up areas, unless the vehicle can reverse at speed it might be stuck in a vulnerable position or even under attack whilst trying to execute a 23 point turn. In this respect tracked vehicles have a great advantage because they can turn on their axis. UK and US experience in Iraq highlighted the utility of tracked vehicles in built up areas, the manouverability of the Bulldog (a modified FV432) was particularly useful.

If stability can be solved by width a vehicles height might not necessarily be a bad thing, providing the occupants with and increased field of view, the higher you are the greater distance you can see, especially when there are obstacles or vegetation nearby. On the down side, high vehicles are harder to conceal and can be dangerous in areas with low power cables.

Having the occupants strapped inside a survivable cell obviously protects them should they contact an IED but they lose all situational awareness which might mean they become more vulnerable to for example, an ambush or direct fire attack. In certain operations the ability to present a low threat visual image and having easy access to a local population might engender greater cooperation leading to improved intelligence, yet another means of defence against attack.

Weight is always a problem for vehicle designers and in areas with poor road and bridge infrastrucure trundling around in 20 tonne plus armoured vehicles leaving a trail of devastation behind it is not likely to engender good relations with the local population.

As the designer seeks to counter one danger it impacts on the ability to counter another, the age old trade off measure-countermeasure is played out.

No vehicle is indestructable, the best protected armoured vehicle in the world, the Challenger 2, has been penetrated by an EFP IED but against a blast mine or large IED there is no better place to be than in a blast protected MRAP/PPV.

Some say the Finland was the originator of the V shaped blast resistant vehicle but it is certain that the concept was perfected by Rhodesia and South Africa during the 70’s in their various brush wars and insurgencies. There are some parallels with Afghanistan today, the mine and IED was and is the weapon of choice for a force that cannot match the firepower, training or discipline of the conventional forces ranged against them. The Rhodesian and South African armed forces and industrial base more or less neutralised the mine as a strategic weapon and whilst the terrain and other conditions are different in Afghanistan, is there something that can be learned from their experience, perhaps yes.

The terminology is also of note; the South African and Rhodesian forces termed them Mine Resistant Vehicles (MRV), the US forces Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) and the UK Protected Patrol Vehicles (PPV). The UK also used the term Mine Protected Vehicle to describe the types used by the Royal Engineers in the Balkans for route proving, IED recce and CASEVAC.

There are different types of weapon that present different challenges for vehicle designers but they are often grouped under one banner. The purpose built mine, the improvised explosive device (IED) that might use ‘home brew’ explosives, the vehicle borne IED and the Explosively Formed Projectile (EFP) or off route mine all act differently against a vehicle. A V shaped hull is unlikely to offer any protection against an EFP, which have even penetrated the armour of a Challenger tank.  A VBIED’s resultant sideways blast may topple a high flat sided vehicle. Modern anti tanks mines rely less on blast and have EFP warheads. Surplus munitions such as artillery shells are sometimes combined with other explosives and the tactic of linking or dasiy chaining explosives to magnify the effect or shape a reaction in the accompanying units is a tactic that was practised in Africa and seems to be on the increase in Afghanistan.

As we said above, solve on problem and it makes another worse. There is simply no universal solution which makes vehicle design simply one part of a comprehensive counter Mine/IED strategy.

The history of these vehicles is very complex with a number of manufacturers and designers being involved over many years, a book could be written on the subject alone. We have split the evolution of the blast resistant vehicle into a number of distinct phases;

Initial Designs

Initial designs took existing truck or Land Rover chassis and applied the V shape hull concept. The success of these first attempts was great but deficiencies were recognised and over the years the design concept was perfected, branching into a number specialist vehicles and designs that were no longer conversions but built from scratch.

Taking an existing chassis and transplanting a V shaped hull created an effective but very top heavy and ungainly vehicle, they were often toppled by blast but despite this its occupants more often than not survived, unlike in conventional vehicles. The injuries that did occur whilst riding in these vehicles were mainly as a result of ignoring standing orders and procedures about strapping in or securing loose objects. When subject to a large mine strike even a loose cigarette lighter can be a fatal projectile. Many of these early designs were also transplanted onto railway vehicles which were proving vulnerable to mine attack.

Some examples of these initial designs are shown below;

Panther

Leopard

Kudu

Hyena

The Buffel was probably the most widespread of the type and consisted of a V shaped hull fitted to a Unimog chassis and with extra wide wheel rims to try and counteract the stability issue. An armoured cab was fitted, dispensing with the passenger seat allowed the creation of a protected citadel for the driver that also ensured any transmission or engine components did not intrude into the drivers area during a mine contact. A number of variants were produced, some armed, some unarmed and a wide number of mechanical enhancements. Retaining the basic mobility of the Unimog it still suffered in very wet conditions, after heavy rainfall for example. The Buffel was a significant export success and has been extensively used in Sri Lanka where the locally produced version is called the Unibuffel, a snip at less than £30,000. A particulalrly useful feature of the Buffel is a very large water tank, invaluable in areas where water was a scarce commodity.

Buffel

Buffel

For further information and a series of excellent pictures see here

http://www.geocities.com/sa_bushwar2/

http://www.sa-transport.co.za/military/military_index.html

The Concept Refined

In order to address a number of issues including the high centre of gravity, the concept of a monocoque hull was developed, without a separate chassis, the hull formed the chassis rather than sitting on it.

The Mamba still used Unimog running gear but without a chassis, relying in the monocoque hull. These types are characterised by employing a sacrificial drive-train and wheels, the engine and gearbox are inside the shell.

The Casspir was designed in response to a police requirement and is one of the most widely known vehicles of the type (even appearing in a Gorillaz music video for ‘Dirty Harry’)

In a widely reported incident a Casspir detonated 4 TM57 landmines arranged in two stacked pairs, one pair under the a wheel and the second pair linked a meter away. The vehicle was launched into the air but the most severe injury sustained by the occupants was a broken ankle. The TM57 has just over 6kg of high grade military explosive.

Casspir

By way of comparison, to see the results of a single TM57 mine click here and here for a documented investigation into a mine strike in the Jowz Valley of Afghanistan against a Canadian Volkswagen Iltis (Land Rover type vehicle)

Up to Date

BAe, Navistar, Force Protection, Integrated Convoy Protection and Oshkosh (amongst many more) are currently manufacturing a wide range of blast protected vehicles, all of which can trace their conceptual roots back to those Land Rover and Unimog based lash ups produced by the South Africans and Rhodesians.

An example is the BAe RG33 Family;

RG33 SWB

RG33 LWB

RG33 Recovery

The UK is no stranger to using these vehicles, having developed route proving and casevac techniques in the Balkans using Alvis 4′s. These were replaced by the Tempest vehicle, not widely known, the contract was let to Supacat (of Jackal fame) and used an early version of the Cougar, the same vehicle that subsequently became the Ridgeback, the vehicle at the centre of the recent ‘waiting at Dubai’ controversy. The base vehicle was obtained from Technical Solutions Group, a subsidiary of Force Protection, the manufacturers of the Mastiff and Ridgeback.

UK Mamba

8 Tempest vehicles were purchased at a cost of £2.7 million (http://www.theyworkforyou.com/wrans/?id=2006-10-31c.80541.h) or roughly a third of a million each. We always caveat these figures with the statement that we don’t know the nature of the contract and whether it included documentation, initial logistics package, training or any of the numerous other factors that can make dividing the total cost a programme by the numbers of units, meaningless. Its an unfair comparison but worth making anyway, the Sri Lankan Unibuffel costs less than £30k.

The UK has purchased the Mastiff (a derivative of the Force Protection Cougar 6×6) with UK specific communications fit, electronics, remote weapon station and other modifications including extra armour on the sides in place of the glass view ports. The Ridgeback is the UK version of the Cougar 4×4, again from Force Protection. The Mastiff 2 is now in service and includes a wide range of improvements. The Wolfhound Heavy Support Vehicle is a protected logistic vehicle used for towing the 105mm Light Gun and transporting various loads, based on the Mastiff it is in service in Afghanistan (or will be very soon)

UK Mastiff

Specialist Vehicles

One of the early wheeled detection vehicles was called the Pookie (Night Ape) and consisted of a highly modified VW Beetle. It had a deep V shaped driver’s compartment, very low pressure surplus racing slick tyres and an electronic mine detection system. Although relatively slow it was very effective and during the latter years of its service the enemy was known to have placed a bounty on it!

In 1979 a number of Pookie’s detected an average of just under 6 mines per day and built at a cost of less than a single damaged vehicle repair they were a great success. None were lost to land mines although a number were damaged in ambushes that specifically targeting them. Only 1 driver was killed by a direct RPG hit. Responding to the threat of ambush they were fitted with the spider, a fearsome 24 barrel 12 gauge shotgun providing a 270 degree arc of fire.

Pookie

Pookie

The concept embodied by the Pookie was developed further into the Meerkat and Husky vehicles as part of the Chubby mine detection and removal system. The Chubby system from RSD utilises a range of V shaped and open frame vehicles to both detect and disrupt mines and IED’s. The detection vehicles are very low ground pressure but the detonation vehicles have staggered wheels and high ground pressure.  The UK purchased 3 complete sets for use in the Balkans although their status today is unknown. An unmanned conversion kit is also available. The US has a version called the Ground Standoff Mine Detection System from General Dynamics.

Chubby System

Meerkat

Section of Duisendpoot Mine Detonation Trailer

The Force Protection Buffalo is a heavier design fitted with a variety of sensors, space for mine clearance robotic vehicles and an articulated clearance arm. A number have been purchased by the UK as part of the Talisman programme.

Buffalo

The Claw

Hopefully this post has illustrated the complexity of designing blast resistant vehicles, their history and the fact that the UK armed forces are no stranger to them.

###UPDATE###

One of our commentors (see below) has highlighted a few shoddy errors in this post concerning the early UK experiences with this type of vehicle, the Alvis 4 and Tempest. Apologies for these and a big thank you to STL for putting us straight on these points. The article above has now been corrected.

###UPDATE###

For much more detail on the South African and Rhodesian experience of mine warfare we would thoroughly recommend having a read of ‘Taming the Landmine’ by Peter Stiff.

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