One such example is how Col. Shane Openshaw, the Army’s AH-64 Apache program manager is eyeing F-35-style distributed aperture sensor (DAS) tech for use on the Apache. “We’re thinking about how to do integration” with DAS-style technology on the third development phase of the Block III Apache sometime later this decade, Openshaw told me this week. “It’s very much in the realm of the possible.”

The F-35’s DAS system consists of six infrared cameras mounted in the airplane’s skin providing a 360-degree sphere of coverage around the jet. Video filmed by the cameras is fed directly onto a screen on the pilots helmet visor allowing him to literally look down through the bottom of his aircraft. Now, the system is still having its teething issues, especially the helmet part, but an F-35 flying over Maryland and Virginia recently tracked a missile launch in Florida by using its DAS system.

Now, the Apaches may not necessarily use the same system as the F-35, but its the concept that Openshaw likes. The miniaturization of sensor tech could someday allow him to install a network of tiny but powerful sensors around the Apache’s airframe and feed their data back to the cockpit. He pointed out that this could allow him to remove the 400-pound sensor turret on the helo’s nose. The reduced weight would improve the aircraft’s speed and fuel and weapons load.

Combine this with advancements in engine and blade tech that are already in the works — and possibly even pusher propellers mounted on the aft of the chopper — and modified versions of the basic Apache design could inch Army aviation ever closer to achieving the speed, altitude and maneuverability breakthroughs that the service wants from its next generation helo fleet, said Openshaw.

The UK’s Apache AH1′s are in many ways the most advanced model in existence anywhere, in others perhaps less so, but the problem the UK’s faces is that it has a relatively large fleet of Apache’s with some elements approaching block obsolescence but very little money to upgrade. With the coming reductions in Army manpower, continuing uncertainty about the future of the Multi Role Brigade, FRES and Future Force 2020 it may soon come down to choices between historic Regiments and an upgraded Apache fleet.

Perhaps the outcome will be an announcement where only part of the fleet is selectively upgraded with the rest being used for spares, oh, isn’t that happening now?

Click here to view the embedded video.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Good job they weren’t needed as much.

I like the combination of shipborne operation and 15 tonne (approximately) as offered by the CH53K but given that the UK operates one of the largest Chinook fleets in the world, the established depth of support and training functions and transfer of Merlins to the CHF this would seem rather a step (or twenty) too far.

What hampers the Chinook, in so much that it actually hampers the things it lifts, is the payload limit and lack of folding blades. With vehicles, equipment and plant getting heavier (as evidence by the shift upwards of A400 over c130) a growth variant would obviously be very attractive and participating in the programme might also provide an opportunity to develop a powered blade folding head.

50 years ago the first Chinook flew and the US Army and Boeing are in discussion about just such a growth version with various options being explored.

The easiest and cheapest option is a tweaking of engine and transmission to deliver an extra 1 tonne lift but that hardly seems stretching. A complete engine and transmission upgrade, replacing the existing 4,870shp Honeywell T55 with something in the 7,500shp size like the GE28′s from the CH53K would allow it to lift considerably more and a reported third reported is a fuselage widening although this would eliminate C17 transportability.

Interesting options and when you throw in the oft mooted European heavy lift helicopter, a Westernised Mil26 and a whole alphabet of US heavy lift programmes the future is as uncertain as ever.

Of all these though, a growth Chinook would seem the most sensible option for the UK.

A pair of ASaC Mk7′s from 857 Naval Air Squadron carried out over 100 sorties from HMS Ocean in support of the NATO led operation.

In addition, Sea King Mk4′s in Afghanistan have been withdrawn. As operations in Afghanistan seem to be changing in nature the capability of the Sea King mk4′s, which even with blade and other upgrades was marginal, is not needed when balanced against the opportunity for their aircrews to start conversion to Merlin’s which is part of the transfer of the Merlin HC3/3a fleet to the Commando Helicopter Force from the RAF.

Click here to view the embedded video.

The Sea King is a real success story and has delivered consistently reliable and cost effective service for a long time.

Reported in Jane’s recently was also news of the replacement for the ASaC Mk7′s.

The Crowsnest Programme will be moving into the Assessment Phase soon with Lockheed Martin appointed as prime contractor. The prime contractor be involved in the selection competition between Thales and, umm, err, Lockheed Martin.

Crowsnest is defined as;

A helicopter based radar and control system that allows the identification of airborne threats beyond existing shipborne sensors and the control of any embarked aircraft

So that would seem to scotch any dalliance of notions of E2 aircraft, even a shared capability with the French, the definition being explicit about the platform.

Jane’s also reported that the preferred solution is a role fit kit for Merlin HM.2′s, with 10 kits obtained for up to 8 available aircraft in the role, instead of dedicated aircraft.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Then of course, there is always this

Click here to view the embedded video.

What a superb display of skill, its an old video and there are a few others knocking about the web but this one for me takes the trophy.

Absolutely fantastic.

In the blink of an eye, instead of occupying the moral high ground, slagging off the government of the day from the comfort of the opposition benches, you now find yourself being force fed an unremitting diet of your own words from those you once took pleasure from skewering.

Apart from treatment of the wounded no other issue is as politically charged as helicopters, which makes the surfacing rumours of a change in the potential order of 12 new Chinooks and 2 replacements even more interesting for the opposition.

Britain is reconsidering its military rotor wing strategy and expects to deliver a new plan to achieve an affordable force later this year, according to the Ministry of Defence

Of course, none of this is any news to people with even a passing interest in the subject and I think we would all be completely gobsmacked if the 12+2 actually turned from hot air to reality the finality of an order reduction is going to cause a political venting of spleen not seen since, well, the last venting of spleens.

The rotary wing capability study will re-examine defence’s helicopter requirement to deliver the Future Force 2020 vision set out in the Strategic Defence and Security Review and ensure a balanced and affordable plan which delivers the right rotary wing force mix for defence

Ministry of Defence

The original intention to order 22+2 from the about to ousted Labour government didn’t fool anyone so when this was reduced by the incoming coalition to 12+2 it was seen as a more realistic figure but since then there have been persistent rumours that it would be cut even further, despite public statements to the contrary.

Just in case anyone has forgotten what our glorious leaders have had to say on the subject of helicopters, here are a few selected quotations they can choke on.

Put simply, we need to have a larger army and we need more infantry. It’s as simple as that. It is absolutely unacceptable to send our forces into battle without giving them the right equipment for the job

Liam Fox, The Daily Telegraph

The Government must explain why our Armed Forces are having to do so much with so little. If we cannot move our forces by air they are more vulnerable on the ground. How on earth did we get into such an unacceptable position

Liam Fox, Defence Management

I will give you my promise that we will do everything we can to ensure that whatever you are asked to do, you are properly, fully equipped to do so, to maximise your chance of success and minimise the risk to you

Liam Fox, The Scotsman

But be in no doubt, this PM is pro-defence, pro-armed forces, passionate about what these people do on our behalf.

David Cameron, The Daily Telegraph

Gordon Brown was warned about the shortfalls in helicopters in 2004, yet he went ahead and cut the helicopter budget anyway. This was a catastrophic decision when our forces were at war. Gordon Brown’s talk about new helicopters for Afghanistan masks the reality that the fleet is still being overworked and that the numbers available for operations are too low. Once again our troops on the ground are suffering from Labour’s incompetence

Liam Fox, The Daily Telegraph

Yes, there are difficult decisions but we will have some amazingly capable defence forces with some of the latest equipment in the world. Including more Chinook helicopters

David Cameron, The Daily Telegraph

The Government cut the helicopter budget in 2004 and is now desperately playing catch-up to diminish the effects of its own fateful decision. This state of utter confusion and contradiction by ministers will cause despair amongst the military. Not only does it appear that lions are led by donkeys, but the donkeys can’t even decide what the line is

Liam Fox, The Daily Mail

The Government has a moral duty to ensure our Armed Forces have the equipment they need; instead we have a catalogue of bureaucracy, incompetence and timewasting

Liam Fox, The Dail Mail

Whilst politicians play their games with the armed forces, as they always have, let’s not forget this isn’t a political issue but an operational one.

Bon apetit

Click here to view the embedded video.

Interesting to see an electro optical turret fitted

Click here to view the embedded video.

The Royal Tank Regiment and Scots Dragoon Guards have swapped their Challengers for Warthogs, this allows them to use their manouver and armour deployment skills to maximum advantage

As I noted, for this to work, the forces need to grapple with the problem of poor availability of certain types before looking for new types and make a significant investment in training, logistics and maintenance.

Beyond this basic concept I argued that eking out Apache airframe hours by arming the Army Wildcat may be a sensible and cost effective solution that meets many of the most likely usage scenarios.

The strategy also meets the requirements of the defence industrial strategy, i.e. as much as possible for Agusta Westland.

I called it a coping strategy and in this respect it fails to address the real issues so in this post I am going to look at the issue of vertical lift as a subject that needs an overarching strategy that is radical in places, granted, but given the importance of helicopters to every spectrum of operation it should be afforded the priority it has never had.

Before pushing on, I promised to listing the current types and their out of service (OSD) dates;

Royal Navy

• Lynx Mk3, OSD 2017, replaced with Wildcat
• Lynx Mk8, OSD 2017, replaced with Wildcat
• Merlin Mk1, OSD 2029, 30 to be upgraded HM2
• Sea King Mk4, OSD 2016, plans to replace with ex RAF Merlin HC3/3a
• Sea King Mk5, OSD 2016, replaced by SAR-H PFI
• Sea King Mk7, OSD 2016, no decision on replacement

Army

• Apache, OSD 2030
• Gazelle, OSD 2018
• Lynx Mk7, 2018, to be replaced with Wildcat
• Lynx Mk9, 2018

Royal Air Force

• Chinook Mk2, OSD 2040
• Chinook Mk2a, OSD 2040
• Merlin Mk3/3a, OSD 2030
• Puma, OSD 2025
• Sea King Mk3/3a, OSD 2016

So on to a radical future, or an exercise in wishful thinking!

Back to Basics

The Defence Industrial Strategy lists three broad mission requirements for helicopters;

ATTACK; A helicopter capable of autonomous and cooperative attack using appropriate weapons against surface (land and maritime) and sub-surface targets

FIND; A helicopter capable of autonomous action, which provides tactical commanders with reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition

LIFT; A helicopter capable of a vertical-lift capability to support military operations, which must enable the rapid deployment, in-theatre movement, re-supply and extraction of joint forces and their equipment

The first and last definition are fairly obvious but with the rapid introduction of unmanned systems the FIND requirement has become a little blurred and given that most, if not all, battlefield and maritime helicopters now carry a range of electronic and electro-optical sensors that can be integrated into a battlefield information sharing network the role of the dedicated FIND helicopter seems a little orphaned.

Those helicopters fulfilling the LIFT requirement might also be armed.

Confusing isn’t it?

At the beginning of this series on vertical lift I listed a set of requirements and I think it is worth repeating here to set the scene and flesh out the FIND – ATTACK – LIFT triad.

Training; with the greater use of synthetic training systems the need for multiple types of training helicopter may be reduced but the basic need to train on the real thing will not go away. Given the configuration of helicopters there is no real need for dedicated training version of any particular type but for initial training and some specific aspects such as external slinging or might vision training using the ‘full fat’ version can prove expensive so cheaper machines sometimes make financial sense. With the march of the PFI, most helicopter training will use civilian owned aircraft with the operational conversion type training being carried out on standard military equipment.

Light Utility/Lift; this includes the plethora of tasks that helicopters get used for day in day out; everything from moving a small team, command, convoy escort, moving a few personnel from one ship to another, checking communications, conducting a route recce, delivering a high value spare part or shuttling a Brigadier from one location to another. What characterises these requirements is that do not necessarily need high speed or high payloads, often the payload is simply a few people. In common with most military equipment, the weight and size needed to fulfil this utility mission, a mission sensors and defensive systems are piled onto a basic airframe there is very little left for usable payload. Therefore, to fulfil the light utility role, a medium utility helicopter might be the minimum!

Medium/Heavy Lift; there is some room for having different definitions of what medium and heavy lift means and specifically, whether there still exists a need for medium lift if we can do everything with the heavier and more capable types. Typically, the medium point means a section or enhanced section plus some stores and the ability to carry some self defence weapons or about 4-5 tonnes payload. Heavy lift might be defined as 30-40 personnel or about 8-10 tonnes payload. One of the most vexing questions is concerned with the top end of heavy lift, is 10 tonnes enough given the trend in vehicle weight and size, a trend that informed the A400 for example.

There are a number of considerations on passenger carrying capacity, utilising crash attenuating seating makes reduces casualties in a crash but limits embarkation/disembarkation speeds and total passengers per given area. Infantry combat weights are getting higher and whilst a significant research effort is in motion to see this reduced, helicopters must be able to cope with this equipment weight.

There is also some debate on what constitutes the best mix of personnel for an Army utility type, a section of 8 plus 2 door gunners, 16 plus 2 gunners, a platoon or combinations. A small specialist team or section may comprise a small number of personnel but have a lot of equipment and stores so this complicates the calculation even more.

Finally, helicopter assault doctrine for UK forces tends to gravitate to the larger but fewer in number support helicopter than massed attacks using lots of smaller helicopters. Instead of 20 or 30 Huey’s flying in to a backing track of Ride of the Valkyries UK forces would use half a dozen Chinooks. There are advantages and disadvantages to this approach, helicopter landing site size is reduced, overall aircrew/engines/groundcrew/maintenance is reduced but there is a concentration of risk. If a missile destroys one of those 20 Huey’s it is obviously only one twentieth of the assault force but if a Chinook goes down, the viability of the operation is at risk.

Anti Submarine; helicopters are one of the most potent anti submarine weapons, equipped with various specialist sensors and weapons. They need a stable platform, long range and endurance and a good payload for sensors, operators and weapons.

Attack; evolving from the Huey gunships of the 60’s is the dedicated attack helicopter. These are fast, high manoeuvrable, survivable and heavily armed. Latter generations concentrated on the anti tank role but in modern operations this has been joined by a number of offensive support tasks in direct support of the infantry in close combat. For this the cannon and rocket are the most common weapons used, not expensive guided missiles. As per the previous post, the cost of operating dedicated helicopters is extremely high so using an armed utility type might be a more cost effective solution where the threat level is lower.

Medical Evacuation; the ability to evacuate injured personnel to a medical facility is vital and recent advances in combat emergency medicine have seen the Chinook used in this role because of its speed and space for medical personnel and equipment but in some circumstances, for less critical casualties or limited terrain, a smaller type is needed.

Search and Rescue: whether in the civilian context or in the military Joint Personnel Recovery role the requirement is characterised by the need for long range, stability in the hover, all weather operation, capacity and a wide range of sensors/communications equipment.

Airborne Early Warning; a niche application but nevertheless vital, the lessons of 1982 were quite clear but with CVF moving to cats and traps this capability may be better serviced with a fixed wing type, the obvious contender being the Hawkeye. Given the bargain basement nature of CVF it is unlikely that no matter how sensible, a helicopter based system will replace the ageing Sea King ASaC’s.  Some aspects of the mission may also be carried out by long range UAV’s

Special Forces; since the demise of the special forces Chinook project the UK has been without a dedicated modern special forces helicopter. There are conflicting arguments, a specialist helicopter and specialist aircrew are no doubt the optimal solution but given the high specification of the general fleet(sensors/comms etc), the amount of operational flying carried out by all aircrew and the inevitable ‘stovepiping’ of a precious resource that happens the special forces role might not be worth a establishing specialist force for.

Military/Civilian Roles; In a previous post I suggested a single government rotary agency to consolidate the various types that are being operated with taxpayer funding. This include roles as diverse as a police eye in the sky, medical transfers for live organs, transporting VIP’s or customs inspections. What characterises these are a need for low operating costs and a light/medium payload.

So from this diverse set of requirements it should be obvious that my desire for ruthless commonality is going to be rather difficult to achieve.

Technology Issues

Looking forward to a radical future the issue if future technologies must be addressed and the last year or so has seen a number of interesting concepts, announcements and demonstrations.

If there is one technology focus areas that does not seem to get much attention in the military functional area it is that of cost of ownership. Because they are constantly trying to shake themselves apart helicopters are extremely maintenance intensive and this drives costs through the roof so any future technology that lowers maintenance costs should be jumped upon by the MoD like the proverbial tramp on chips.

Other means of significantly reducing operating costs include reducing fleets within fleets, radical commonality amongst sub systems and obtaining sufficient quantities to take advantage of bulk purchasing/extended production runs. Because of typical MoD short termism and the lack of strategic focus on helicopters, these have eluded the MoD.

This must stop now.

For example, if we select an electro optical sensor turret, defensive aids system, engine or cockpit display, it must be common to all aircraft in the fleet. This will cost more in the short term but will radically reduce through life costs.

Any reader of Think Defence will know one of the underlying principles I think the UK needs to pay much more attention to is ruthless commonality, but if taken to the extreme, the Royal Navy would be hunting submarines with a Chinook, clearly there has to be sensible limits and if overall cost efficiency is the goal then ‘one job one tool’ may well be the best solution when taken in the round.

Helicopters are iconic targets and the increasing weight of armour, DAS and other self protective features means that a greater payload fraction must be devoted to them and this will inevitably drive size up.

Modularity is a design feature that we should seriously be thinking about, instead of bespoke designs for each capability area; a single ‘backbone’ design onto which we fit mission specific modules may be worth pursuing.

The various compound helicopter designs from Sikorsky and Eurocopter have shown that manufacturers are revisiting older concepts but with modern materials and systems in order to advance the state of the possible; faster, higher payloads and lower operating costs are all within sight.

Advanced composite materials certainly deliver weight and strength advantages and in some instances there are few alternatives but they add cost and maintenance/repair issues. With less and less maintenance being carried out in the field we might question the composite content and perhaps accept some performance penalty to make filed repairs a little less fraught, safety issues may prevent field damage repairs but it is worth a look I think.

Given that operations in dry and dusty places will likely be the norm, brown out mitigation continues to be an area of UK technology progress, rotor design and defensive aids continue to be key UK technology competencies.

There are many technology issues that should be considered in any future helicopter strategy!

Industrial Issues

If one looks at the UK helicopter line up it is obvious, and hardly a secret, that Westland Helicopters (no Agusta Westland) have had a near complete stranglehold and this has had a detrimental effect. The MoD maintains the fiction that requirements are written and then put to competition but it is obvious that the helicopter acquisition strategy starts with this simple sentence;

What are Westland’s selling.

The Defence Industrial Strategy lists helicopters as a key as sovereign capability, operating in a twilight world of quasi commercial strategic partnership agreements that seem to serve the company well but also subvert the decision making process.

DIS states;

We also intend to promote a more open, predictable but demanding partnered relationship with AgustaWestland, to realise business transformation within the company.  We wish this transformation to provide better value for money and reduce their reliance on our investment to sustain this design engineering skill-bas

Wishing never makes a good strategy.

One might speculate on the degree by which Agusta Westland has an undue influence on the MoD and what link there is between the following;

• Air Marshal Sir Christopher Coville KCB BA FCIPD FRAeS Ministry of Defence, Commander-in-Chief Personnel and Training Command, Non Executive Director Agusta Westland in 2003 followed by Non Executive Chairman in 2005
• Air Chief Marshal Sir Brian Burridge KCB CBE Ministry of Defence Commander-in-Chief Strike Command, Senior Strategic Advisor Finmeccanica January 2006
• Sir Kevin Tebbit KCB CMG Ministry of Defence Permanent Secretary, Chairman Finmeccanica November 2005
• Lord Bach Parliamentary Under Secretary of State Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Director Finmeccanica May 2006
• David Gould CB Ministry of Defence Chief Operating Officer, Defence Equipment and Support, Consultant SELEX Sensors and Airborne Systems Ltd (subsidiary of Finmeccanica) and in 2005 Non Executive Director of VEGA Consulting (another Finmeccanica company)
• Professor Sir Keith O’Nions FRS Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, Non Executive Director Finmeccanica

All information is from the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments that adjudicates on senior government employees seeking employment in the private sector. The MoD is consistently in the top 2 of government departments with its staff seeking employment, perhaps they are so good and therefore in high demand, or is it those companies buying influence, inside information and a well thumbed address book.

The above are only the senior crown servants and ministers, beneath these there are numerous others.

Finmeccanica is like some well paid retirement village for ex MoD employees

Nothing to see here, move along now

Except, this is not good enough anymore and in my brave new world, helicopters simply become a non sovereign capability. This will create a level playing field and although we should always be aware that buying British (or Italian) has wider economic and strategic benefits. Without getting into the wider arguments, if money flows back into the economy by buying British, the simple fact is, the MoD budget never sees it.

Whilst we should always consider the industrial issues of any defence equipment their relative importance, which as become far too high of late, must be relegated to secondary concerns.

The old days of specifications being bent around what Westlands are selling/can develop should come to a rapid end.

Organisation Issues

In the introduction to this article I suggested that helicopters need to given the priority they deserve, with a comprehensive and over arching strategy that looks beyond equipment and into organisational issues.

If we accept that helicopters form a central part of any future force composition, whichever strategic direction we follow, then helicopters must be viewed as a strategic capability, too important to be left to the vagaries of inter service politics and held hostage by political/industrial concerns.

Given that public spending on helicopters takes place in various places, not just defence, a holistic view across the whole of the public sector is a valid approach. It is quite scandalous that most air ambulance services (Scottish ones are funded by NHS Scotland) are sustained by charitable donations, for a supposedly 21st century nation this is simply not acceptable. Airborne rescue, whether that is at sea, on a mountainside or motorway is the role of the state, not a private sector organisation. When one looks at these civilian government or semi government operators the diversity situation is not any better there either.

The Air Ambulance Association lists 30 helicopters, plus 2 for Scotland. In a total fleet of 32 aircraft there are 6 types (MD902, A109, Dauphin, B105, EC135 and BK117) with 5 engines. Police Service Air Support Units, of which there are about 30, operate 6 types (MD902, EC135, AS355, EC145, Bk117 and A109) and 5 engines although some are provided by private contractors. The coastguard (MCA) operates 10 helicopters with 2 types (S61 and AW139) and 2 engines although most of these are actually owned and operated by private sector organisations on behalf of the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA).

Across the non military public sector, the public purse, via donation or taxation, is paying in one form or another, for 9 types of helicopter and almost as many engine types across a total fleet of less than 75.

This is madness.

It is proposed, therefore, to create a set of common capability areas across the government domain that keeps what needs to be different, different, yet leverages economies of scale in areas that are common and where commonality can be pursued.

The Government Rotary Aviation Agency

Organisation; the National Police Air Service is due to come into being next year that will consolidate the 30 existing police aviation units throughout England and Wales. This is a logical concept but devolution means that Northern Ireland and Scotland will continue as is, thus diluting the economies of scale. The new service would absorb the NPAS and others such as the MCA and NHS. The Search and Rescue function would also fall into the remit of the new organisation and the artificial delineation between a police helicopter, an air ambulance and a SAR helicopter eliminated.

Yes, I did say air ambulances and I know they are funded by charitable donation but in 2011 this is a national disgrace, the new service would assume this responsibility and allow those charitable donations to go to other worthy causes.

The SAR-H PFI, even in its current ‘what do we do next’ phase would be ceased and the role of search and rescue incorporated into the new service.

These are all non military roles but with the lines between policing, rescue and other government role becoming increasingly blurred it makes sense for a single organisation to be established.

It makes sense for the MoD to hold the keys for the new agency because it has the organisational depth and national/international operating scale that others do not. The proposed NPAS is being led by the British Transport Police because they are the only ones with such a national role but the MoD and DE&S have this capability in place today.

The Government Rotary Aviation Agency (GRAA) would be established as a trading fund of the MoD, funding would be held separately to the services, a key element in the strategy to remove service centric priorities distorting what is a genuinely tri service capability.

It would obtain funding from the MoD, the Home Office, DFiD, Department of Transport and NHS, thus creating a finance pool.

Another factor in bringing all these together is that it provides a single coherent fleet that is available to the government and its people in times of national emergency without the complex arrangements that might be an impediment with numerous ‘owners and operators’

Serious weather incidents are increasing in frequency and there remains the ever present threat of a large scale terrorist incident.

Essentially, this scoops up the mish mash of public sector (regardless of ownership and funding) helicopter operators and tasks and puts them into a single pot.

Military Issues; one of the problems with the current rotary strategy is that it is subject to the vagaries of service priorities, none of which are helicopters and yet the provision of helicopters is a fundamental strategic factor in the success of future operations. For far too long we have lurched from one short term decision to another so by lifting the funding stream out of a single service and multiple organisations the strategic potential of helicopters can be realised.

Decision would be arrived at on a joint basis and because funding was held outside the realms of each service a long term strategic direction could be maintained.

Operational control would still rest with each service (RAF, FAA and AAC) and the Joint Helicopter Command (JHC) but strategic management and the provision of basic training and non first line maintenance would fall to the GRAA.

Once established a key task for the GRAA would be to review these military operational issues, is it optimal to maintain an RAF Support Helicopter function, is it the best solution to have attack helicopter with the Army and should a single service be responsible for all operational helicopter operations?

The decision may well be that the current RAF, FAA, CHF and AAC split is still the best solution but putting aside emotion, we have to get the most for the least and if this means the Army operating Chinooks or the RAF operating Merlin HM2’s then so be it.

Maintenance; maintenance is carried out by a complex patchwork of manufacturers, military personnel, civil servants and contractors using a variety of short and long term contract vehicles, some extremely complex. The management of these ever more complex contracts is becoming an industry in itself and many claim that the oft articulated cost benefits of availability contracts are never quite realised. Because of the diverse and ageing fleet, questionable contract negotiation performance and a number of other factors the resulting contracts seem to constrain flexibility and reduce efficiency. In a reversal of the general trend it is proposed that a single agency be made responsible for all helicopter maintenance.

The complicated issue of maintenance of aircraft in the defence realm goes back many years. In the wake of the 1998 Strategic Defence Review the Defence Aviation Repair Agency (DARA) bought together the RAF Maintenance Group Defence Agency (MGDA) and the Naval Aircraft Repair Organisation (NARO) into a single organisation and later as a trading fund of the MoD. It is important to understand that as a trading fund rather than on vote agency it was to stand on its own two feet.

DARA was, like much of the 1998 SDR, an eminently sensible idea. It was however, doomed to failure exactly because it was a good idea; good ideas never seem to proposer when there are service rivalries, pork barrel politics and civil service intransigence to get on with. The central transformational concept was to concentrate most expertise into a centre of excellence at RAF St Athan in Wales. It is here that the ‘public private partnership’ idea hove into view and more or less, wrecked a very good concept. Instead of just stumping up the money to do the job right the government insisted on involvement of the Welsh Development Agency and the integration of industry. The so called ‘super hangar’ was duly built with 47 aircraft maintenance bays, a massive project costing hundreds of millions of pounds but by 2004 the whole project (Red Dragon) was sliding into chaos with a contract for the Harrier GR7 to GR9 conversion being lost and incredibly won by the RAF’s own maintenance facility. Things went downhill from there with job losses and privatisation although the super hangar was opened in 2005.

Deep maintenance is now carried out at the RAF’s main operating bases, what was left of DARA was merged with the Army Base Repair Organisation (ABRO) which was ultimately formed into the current Defence Support Group. The rotary and business was sold to Vector Aerospace who now operate from the Fleetlands site in Gosport.

The site at St Athan, a hugely expensive and modern facility, currently maintains the VC10 fleet and whether it will continue work on the FSTA aircraft is unlikely given the nature of the contract.

MoD St Athan was also chosen as the location for the £14 billion Defence Training Rationalisation PFI that was cancelled at the end of 2010 although it is likely that St Athan will play a key role in future defence technical training. The Metrix Consortium (preferred bidder) in the words of Liam Fox, failed to develop an affordable and value for money contract proposal.

Back to helicopters…

Concentrating the maintenance of helicopters and all aircraft at St Athan made sense and collocating it with technical training makes even more sense.

The devil, as always, is in the detail.

I think we should look again at the old proposal, realise the huge investment in the facilities at St Athan and concentrate all aviation maintenance at one location, sweeping away the vested interests and service centric empire maintenance activity.

This facility would also be mandated as the single maintenance location for all government owned aircraft.

In addition to the main facility we should also have a deployable maintenance capability that is formed as a self contained and easily deployable entity that is staffed by a mixture of service personnel, civil servants and private contractors as necessary. Perhaps something can be done with the retained reserve model of engagement here but the overall goal should be a forward maintenance facility that can operate in relatively benign locations, Bastion or Kandahar for example. The decision to forward maintain or ship items back to the ranch to maintenance is always going to have to be on a case by case basis so flexibility will be needed.

Training and Personnel; for the military element there would initially be no change to the current situation but the the review mentioned above might change this. The civilian element would consist of some military personnel on secondment but the majority would be civil servants with a percentage also be sponsored reserves. One of the aims of the new organisation would be to create a unified engagement model for non military personnel and an easy means of seamlessly transferring between the two. At the end of a person’s career in the military they could move to the civilian side where their expensively provided expertise could be retained.

A single organisation would enjoy economies of scale and a reduction of administration whilst maintaining a large strategic pool of trained personnel. T

Training is carried out by a mix of service personnel and FB HeliServices at the Defence Helicopter Flying School. FB Heliservices provide single and multi engine training at Shawbury using AS30BB Squirrels and Griffin (modified Bell 412) helicopters. SAR training is carried out at RAF Valley and Army Operational Training is carried out at the Army School of Aviation in Middle Wallop.

Beyond this, advanced training is carried out by the individual services. Rotary is also included in the MFTS PFI and bid are expected soon for a replacement for the Squirrel and Griffon helicopters currently being used.

As with maintenance, the complex patchwork of contracts, PFI’s and outsourcing partnerships have created an inflexible set of contradictions (although the MFTS PFI is more flexible than most) and an over arching strategic vision is needed to sweep it all away.

Instead of private contractors providing training, using ex military pilots for example, the new agency would centralise all training, deliver flexibility/capacity improvements and provide a coherent career path for military personnel where their hard won skills and experience would continue to be used.

When looking at equipment options I have taken a wholly unrealistic clean sheet approach, if we were setting this up from scratch what options would be on the table, accepting the points from above about putting political/industrial issues second and trying to achieve coherence across all three services and the various civilian elements.

That said, if these coincide with what we already have or plan to have then fair enough.

INCREMENT 1 – LIGHT

Basic Training; usually single engine the basic training role requires ease of use, extremely low operating cost, low noise and stability. The current Squirrels are eminently suitable but given they belong to FB Heliservices there might be an opportunity to move to a new type. At this level there are plenty of options but the Eurocopter EC120B or Agusta Westland PZL Swidnick SW-4 would be front runners.

Click here to view the embedded video.

The EC120 has a massive installed base and the French armed forces have recently adopted it for the training role.

As we all know, obtaining costs for helicopters is a bit of a mugs game but going off publically available information the unit cost of the EC120B is roughly $1.5million or in other words, very cheap.

It would also provide a high degree of commonality with the next choice.

Multi Engine Training, SAR Basic Training, Emergency Services and VIP; the obvious candidate for these roles is the Eurocopter EC135 that is already in service with most police forces and air ambulance services. There is a slightly larger version called the EC145 and although it does not have the enclosed Fenestron rotor that is essential for air ambulance operation its high set rear rotor means that it still possible to load stretchers via the rear clam shell doors with rotors turning. However, Eurocopter have recently launched the T2 variant which features a number of upgrades including the Fenestron rotor, uprated gearboxes, 4 axis autopilot and new avionics so the EC145 T2 would be the ideal choice.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Click here to view the embedded video.

These would provide twin engine and SAR training for all services, VIP transport (replacing the A109’s), FOST transfer and the civil application of police, air ambulance and inshore search and rescue.

The vast majority of search and rescue missions are for lifting stranded yachtsman or tourists off cliff faces where it might be argued that the larger and longer ranged Sea Kings and their planned replacement (Sikorsky S92) are perhaps too large and expensive to operate.

Operating costs of the EC145 and EC120 are very low, this means it becomes affordable to have more for a given budget.

Using the same Turbomeca Arrius family of engines as the EC120 and EC645, commonality will be very high between types.

The cabin has a continuous horizontal floor, can accommodate a mix of seats and stretchers and in the medical evacuation role is normally configured for one stretcher and 3 medical staff. It can also be fitted with a rescue winch rated at 270 kg load.

Light Utility; there are a myriad of military roles for a simple light utility helicopter, it does not necessarily always need to be armed to the teeth or have the very latest in sensor technology, an airborne Land Rover in other words. Airborne command and control, terrain evaluation, resupply, limited close air support, convoy protection/overwatch, small team (mortar/Javelin/HMG, sniper etc) movement, cut offs/fast pursuits, communications rebroadcast; the list is endless.

A light utility helicopter has to be reasonably survivable and cheap to operate and whilst there is an opinion that light utility helicopters are a waste of resources when a larger helicopter could do the jobs just as well but I still think there is a place for them. In the most likely usage scenarios the need for door gunners and an ability to transport a full infantry section of 8 into a high threat area is not needed.

In a maritime context, again, there are a myriad of roles, personnel transport, boarding party support, logistics, anti piracy, surface attack and others.

With long range fuel tanks the EC645 has a range of just under 900km or endurance of 3 and a half hours. It is compact and can be fitted with folding main blades for shipboard compatibility. If a T2 variant were introduced its Fenestron enclosed rear rotor creates a low noise profile and although it is obviously a derivative of a civilian helicopter it features a number of survivability and resilience enhancements.

Click here to view the embedded video.

The greatest advantage of the EC645 is its commonality with the EC145, the 645 being essentially, a military version of the 145.

What does this provide; significant commonality benefits of course, engines, training, avionics and other major systems. With the large fleet of EC120, EC145 and EC645 the through life cost savings would be significant and the capital cost is low. The US Army have adopted the UH72 Lakota which is a version of the EC645 at a reported cost of less than $9 million each. The programme proceeded at pace and without any problems, the end users are reportedly very happy and costs were controlled. The UH72 is not designed to operate in high threat areas and it is a sensible of fulfilling a range of tasks with a cheaper aircraft, thus freeing up funds for the more combat oriented requirements.

Click here to view the embedded video.

A single or double cargo hook is fitted for slinging loads up to 1.5 tonnes and with all the seats removed the uninterrupted cabin floor can even accommodate a quad bike.

There are some limited armament and sensor options and it would be worthwhile providing a plug and play capability for them. The US armed forces are running an armed scout programme, the Armed Aerial Scout (AAS) and contenders include a Block II OH58F, Bell AH-6i, AVX OH-58D and the revolutionary Sikorsky S-97 Raider concept, as might be imagined, there are numerous combinations with some wanting to integrate the programme with the Joint Medium Rotorcraft programme that seeks to replace the UH-60 and AH64 by 2030.

The EADS North America proposal is the AAS-72X which is an armed scout version of the EC145/UH72 and whilst it is not fast, its versatility and low cost means it is a real contender.

For more details of the AAS-72X, it has its own website

Click here to view the embedded video.

The AAS-72X has the usual collection of sensors and a multi-purpose weapon pylon for the carriage of automatic weapons, rockets and missiles. The lightweight weapon turrets discussed in the previous post would also be a realistic option for the armed version that might perform some of the roles currently being carried out by Apache, of course much less capable but certainly much cheaper and this means more of.

The proposal would therefore be to take the EC645 but include the T2 enhancements, an EC145/UH72 T2 variant that would be introduced instead of the Wildcat.

Instead of the land variant it would be a simple swap, except in greater quantity.

In the maritime domain, the INCREMENT 2 option replaces both Wildcat and Merlin but there is also a maritime role for an EC645.

It is not meant as a Wildcat replacement but it can operate from ships, even though the lack of wheels and deck landing aids make this an occasional capacity. For larger decks which pitch less and for general utility and amphibious force support roles it could provide a lower cost alternative.

The EC645 would be obtained in a number of variants such as utility, light armed and maritime(ish) but commonality would be high.

So, INCREMENT 1 gets the UK a homogonous fleet of HIGH COMMONALITY helicopters to fulfil the wide range of bread and butter tasks in both a civilian and ‘light duties’ military context at a reasonable cost and in quantity.

Once the organisational elements are in place the equipment roll out would commence towards 2015

INCREMENT 2 – MEDIUM

Medium Lift, Long Range SAR and Anti Submarine; this is where it gets complicated because we have the Merlin issue, the issue being that it is a superb anti submarine helicopter, arguably the best in the world, but, it’s not setting the world on fire in the land based utility role for many of the reasons covered in the previous post. It is also on the large side for the maritime utility tasks carried out by the Lynx, besides it being very expensive to operate.

The pot of gold at the end of the rainbow would be a single type that could fulfil the anti submarine role, maritime lift and army utility lift roles with one airframe. It must be said that most other nations do not carry out the anti submarine role like the UK but then they are not as expert as the UK, ASW being a major specialist area for the RN.

An alternative is to retain the upgraded HM2 Merlin’s for anti submarine tasks and replace the Lynx with something larger, but then it would be butting up against Merlin size and cost. We have discussed the Puma upgrade and whilst this gets us a useful life extension it is not a long term solution.

There are many combinations and permutations here and to be honest, they are all a series of compromises but the underlying principle should be commonality.

Option 1, stick with Merlin HM2 and Wildcat for RN only and pick something else for land, both Wildcat and Merlin are a good fit for the Royal Navy and this would keep Agusta Westland happy but it means introducing another type for land and CHF use. The Agusta Westland AW149 or Sikorsky Blackhawk family would be obvious contenders.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Option 2, bin Merlin and Wildcat and go down the Blackhawk road for both the RN and Army. The Blackhawk is a superb aircraft, built using the lessons of rotary aviation in Vietnam, its unique undercarriage design improves crash survivability enormously (it doesn’t roll over as easy as a tricycle type undercarriage) for example, and would deliver on a plate a massive range of equipment options and worldwide network of operators, but it has a significant logistics footprint and is perhaps moving towards the end of its evolutionary journey.

Option 4, bin Merlin, Puma and Wildcat and introduce NH90 for both the RN and Army use, this is my preferred option…

I didn’t say it was the sensible option and there are many other combinations but sensible, that was the previous post!

This option looks at the roles and requirements for a medium weight helicopter and makes the decision that it will be the same, unfortunately, Merlin is not a medium weight helicopter and is too large for many of the roles.

Like the A400, the logic and thinking behind the NH90 is absolutely spot on, a single multi purpose aircraft pitched at a size that was suitable for a number of roles.

The Puma is about the right size for an army support helicopter but even considering the life extension it will need replacing. Much has been made of the problems the Australians and others have had with bringing the NH90 into service but some of the wild claims are just that, wild. Ground clearance is one of the most prominent but the NH90 has a massive 1cm less ground clearance than the Blackhawk, complaints about the rear ramp not being sturdy, again, not true, the complaints stem from early versions and try unloading a quad bike from a Puma or Blackhawk.

All this said, there is equally no doubt that the NH90 has some teething problems but this is like every other aircraft ever introduced and they will be resolved by the launch customers.

The NH90 Troop Transport Helicopter (TTH) can carry about 18 fully loaded soldiers or lift 4,000kg of underslung cargo and has a range of 900km. Although rated at 18 troops the most likely load would be a full section plus equipment and whilst the ramp is small, it provides useful options for small vehicles like quads and an alternative exit/entry location. With appropriate options it can carry this full infantry section with all their equipment whilst simultaneously carrying 2 door gunners and weapons.

It can also be configured for missile and rocket carriage but given the role and other options available these would not normally be used.

The TTH would support the special forces role.

We should introduce the TTH when it is mature but well before the Merlin Mk3a and Puma OSD, perhaps towards the end of this decade, 10 years or so before the Merlin OSD.

Click here to view the embedded video.

In the naval context, the Merlin HM2 contract would be curtailed to provide just enough airframes to get to the NH90 NFH in service date towards the end of this decade. Many of the sub systems from the Merlin and HM2 programme could be transferred to the NH90 NATO Frigate Helicopter (NFH)

Click here to view the embedded video.

Click here to view the embedded video.

The NH90 NFH fulfils the anti submarine, anti surface, search and rescue, logistics, special operations and by palletising the mission systems from the Sea King ASaC7’s can fulfil the Maritime Airborne Surveillance and Control (MASC) role. Armament would include Stingray torpedoes and Sea Skua missiles, in time the Sea Skua will be replaced with FASGW(H) and the LMM should also be fitted.

If one looks at the dimensions of the NH90 NFH compared to Wildcat and Merlin it is quite surprising, the NFH with tail rotor folded for stowage is roughly the same length as the Wildcat (it not having a tail fold) and when stacked up against the Merlin is much more compact, although of course it can carry less, which makes ship handling that much easier.

In order to improve flexibility the utility variant should have the same rotor and tail fold systems as the naval version because this allows them to be deployed where they are needed, on a ship or land and increases strategic transport flexibility. As well as the folding capability there should be a high degree of common fit between the variants, rescue hoists for example.

Both variants can be carried on the C17 and A400, Merlin needs a C17 or larger and the advantages of this are obvious.

NH Industries are owned by Eurocopter and Agusta Westland so the industrial element of any purchase should be leveraged and if possible an assembly facility located in Yeovil. The Australians doing similar and although there are a number of assembly locations in Europe the size of the order might be sufficient to justify such a deal.

There are also significant cost and operational benefits in adopting a helicopter that is, or will be, in service with our major European defence partners such as France, Germany and The Netherlands. Common logistics and training facilities are the obvious aspects of this. Coming into the NH90 programme at this late stage also means that the development costs and problems have, for once, been carried by others.

NH90 also uses the same engine as the UK Apache.

The result of this means an elimination of Merlin from UK service towards the end of the decade, at least a decade before its planned OSD and whilst this might seem wasteful it provides a range of benefits in other areas.

In the Search and Rescue (SAR) role it has a smaller range than the Sikorsky S92 and Merlin but can be fitted with auxiliary fuel tanks and even with standard fuel can rescue 10 survivors at 300nm. It would still be a compromise though as performance in this role is slightly less than the larger S92 but the limitations can be mitigated with other systems. Although we would be in a select few nations operating the NH90 in the SAR role and accepting that it might not be the 100% perfect solution it will be good enough.

INCREMENT 2 moves the UK to a single type with a number of high commonality variants using the NH90 as a base platform.

Increment 3 – Heavy Lift and Attack

With both the Apache and Chinook force it is difficult to envisage a change.

In the previous post I suggested a slight reduction in Apache numbers couple with an improvement in availability and supplemented in the armed role by Wildcat. Given that Wildcat does not feature in this proposal the light armed role would be assumed by the EC645/AAS72X as described above. Beyond the 2030 OSD for Apache it would make sense to align with the US Army and their plans.

The Chinook is certainly the preferred option for heavy lift, long range special forces and troop transport roles but it has a couple of ‘issues’

The first is the difficulty in operating from ships, its lack of powered tail fold and marinisation features limit its utility. The Chinook can have its blades folded but it is a manual operation and hardly practical, see here for details.

Second is the question about payload.

As with the C130 v A400 debate we need to recognise the reality of modern operations and their supporting vehicles and equipment. Vehicles especially are getting larger and heavier and for heavy lift helicopters to retain their usefulness in assault operations payloads need to improve.

There is a European Heavy Lift programme that is in the ‘talking about’ stage, an in service date of 2020 is suggested and they will sit above the NH90 in French and German service, replacing the German CH53G’s as well.  The design requirements have yet to be finalised but a payload of 13-15 tonnes seems to be the current thinking. Commonality with as much of the NH90 as possible will deliver cost savings. In these financially constrained times there seems little appetite for a brand new development and indications point to a joint effort with a US company, Sikorsky or Boeing.

Whether the design choice is a conventional or tandem configuration is yet to be seen and will depend on who the US partner is, the European Defence Agency will report on the way forward in 2011. Eurocopter have already proposed a Chinook style aircraft in partnership with Boeing but where this leaves the Germans CH53 replacement is uncertain.

The Russian Mi Mil-26 remains an intriguing option, perhaps one day many of the proposed joint ventures between western, Chinese and Russian companies might actually produce a workable and attractive proposition for western armed forces but we cannot afford to wait.

I also wonder on the possibility of accepting the limitations of a modern Rotodyne concept in order to enhance long range and high payload vertical or semi vertical lift but as radical as I think this post is, it is difficult to come out and recommend a new development!

Whilst the US has been cycling through an alphabet of heavy lift programmes that have variously included quad tilt rotors and other unconventional designs the USMC and Sikorsky have been quietly advancing the CH53K. Designed to replace the existing CH53′s it will feature a cabin 9.1m long, 2.7m wide, 2m high and able to lift a maximum payload of nearly 15 tonnes. It’s large cabin allows many vehicles to be carried internally and will have a drastically reduced maintenance overhead (the old CH53′s are very maintenance intensive)

The large cabin dimensions mean it could easily carry internally a Land Rover WMIK, Supacat Jackal (fully loaded), Supacat Coyote (fully loaded), Supacat HMT Extenda or 2 Supacat ATMP’s for example. By avoiding sling loading the range and performance is not degraded and whilst the vast majority of missions will not need to move vehicles it provides flexibility and capability.

2 463L pallets can also be carried internally and operation from austere locations is a key design factor.

The CH53K addresses two of the Chinooks limitations, maritime use and payload weight/volume, it would address a key limitation in the operational manoeuvre from the sea capability we currently have.

It will come equipped with all the latest systems and in the special forces role, its long range, which can be extended with in-flight refuelling from C130 or A400 aircraft, would be invaluable. It is some time since the UK had a credible long range special forces and joint personnel recovery helicopter capability and the CH53K would deliver it.

Although the programme has been delayed (an amusing take on the delays here) it should still be in service by 2018.

Click here to view the embedded video.

With operations scaling down in Afghanistan and the likely reduction in Support Helicopter demand in the medium term it might be an opportunity to curtail the Project Julius upgrade programme and plan for a CH53K ISD some time towards the end of the decade.

Quite simply, it allows the UK to field a single heavy lift helicopter that can be used equally from land locations or ships and will have commonality with the USMC, given that the UK has a very complimentary fit with the USMC this is a positive.

The prospect of using the CH53K as a basis for a new flying crane is intriguing. Manufacturing of the old S64 Sky Crane may well be restarted after an agreement was signed between Erickson Air Crane and a number of organisations in China but it is hard to see the benefits of a flying crane version of the CH53K outweighing the cost, it would be an interesting study though and if nothing else would allow ISO containers or modular pods to be transported in a manner slightly better than just slinging them, in a Thunderbirds 2 Style!

More realistic would be an unmanned or optionally manned helicopter for logistics transfer between ships and in the land domain.

The obvious contender is the Kaman K-Max.

After a rapid development the K-Max unmanned system will be fielded in Afghanistan later this year as part of the trials and development phase validating the concept. I have followed the K-Max unmanned since it was announced and I think it has real potential, even with a limited budget. Yes it is a bit of a one trick pony but that misses the point, its trick is vitally important.

A story last year from the MoD highlighted the job of a Combat Logistics Patrol. Operations in Afghanistan require a number of Patrol Bases (PB’s) and Forward Operating Bases (FOB’s) and these are expanding or being improved on a continual basis. The demand for materials to support operations from these locations is increasing, everything from ammunition, fuel for vehicles and generators, weapons, spares, consumables, building materials, medical supplies and even the post all have to be bought in by road or helicopter.

Efforts are underway to reduce this footprint; well drilling for raw water is a standard Royal Engineers task. A self contained ablutions unit that uses diesel to heat water, power showers, recycle water and destroy waste is being introduced by next spring and on a small scale, solar panels reduce the need for batteries or fuel to power generators for recharging. It’s not about being ‘green’ but reducing the amount of material that has to be shipped through dangerous IED and Taleban infested territory. A more integrated approach to resource rationalisation is being developed and the recent FOBEX demonstrations have shown a great deal of capability.

However, there have been numerous stories in the media about hard pressed bases going short of supplies; the effort needed to sustain operations is a significant one.

Because we do not have the force density to secure significant parts of our operating area what might be a standard logistics patrol must now be a Combat Logistic Patrol (CLP). The patrol has to fight its way in or go in such force deter attack.  The CLP in the MoD news piece consisted of 116 vehicles, many of them comprising the Manoeuvre Operations Group (MOG) which provided screening and protection. Additional cover and reactive capabilities would have been provided by UAV and manned air assets such as the Apache Attack Helicopter.

The distance between Bastion and the bases is a mere 70km, about the distance between Leeds and Manchester. Going down the M62 might take an hour but this 70km took a day because of the terrain, tactical requirements and enemy activity. It is difficult to estimate the volume and weight of the actual material delivered to the FOB’s in the Sangin Valley but the sheer effort, fuel expended, planning involved and personnel required means that it is an expensive exercise so the less shipped the better. Each patrol is a risk, especially given the prevalence of IED’s and if this risk is realised significant delay can be introduced besides the obvious human and equipment cost.

Ideally, much of these supplies would be shipped in by helicopter but much of the material is bulky and/or too heavy for the Chinook (the helicopter with the greatest lift capability) and as helicopter operations have proven to be risky (the recent loss of 2 Chinook’s confirms the operating environment is dangerous) some cargo is simply not worth the risk of helicopter delivery. Of course, we don’t have enough helicopter airlift in theatre anyway, a subject covered many times on this and other blogs.

Air despatch by low altitude air drop or parachute delivery is a possibility and is a well practiced capability but this needs a significant area to be dominated, swept for IED’s and mines and secured for the drop. The close terrain would also make air despatch and air drop difficult and inefficient. The RAF and Army Air Corps do not operate small, extreme short take off and landing aircraft that might be utilised, even in a limited manner, so this is a potential method also not available.

We find ourselves in a situation where the most practical, available and lowest risk method for the vast majority of material is the resource intensive and ponderous CLP. US forces have deployed GPS assisted parachutes and even a powered, GPS guided parafoil for precision resupply but the payloads are relatively modest and only suitable for time critical supplies.

So what we need is a method to keep the supplies flowing at a rate to sustain high tempo operations, at a reasonable cost in fuel and manpower whilst avoiding risky road moves.

The Kaman K-Max is a well proven, rugged, cheap to operate and very simple heavy lift helicopter in widespread service with many operators in all terrain. It is designed to one thing and do it well. The twin intermeshing main rotor design negates the need for a power sapping, complex and noisy tail rotor. Precision heavy lift for logging operations or siting electricity pylons for example, needs stability and precision control, qualities that are usually low on the list of priorities for tactical military helicopters where high agility and acceleration are required.

The unique design provides an exceptionally low noise signature and a very high payload, the K-Max can lift more than it weighs.

Low noise, high payload, stability, ease of control and low cost (both capital and operation) make it ideal for shifting supplies. To operate in Afghanistan it would need a full defensive aids suite which would reduce payload and dramatically increase cost. Kaman and the US DoD are investigating a simple way of reducing the risk to a pilot or the cost of defensive aids by converting it to unmanned semi autonomous operation. Landing and take off can be controlled using a portable ground station and operator if required or can be fully autonomous.

If you don’t have a pilot you don’t need millions of pounds worth of defensive aids to protect him or her.

Kaman have partnered with Lockheed Martin (who provide the mission management technology) for a USMC and Army sponsored trial which involved autonomous operations and precision manual control at landing sites. These trials have demonstrated air dropping and precision delivery and as mentioned above, will culminate in an operational deployment later this year.

The K-Max has been designed to be simple and cheap to operate with none of the usual complex helicopter systems such as tail rotor gearboxes, multi engine combining gearboxes, multi engine management systems and hydraulic controls. In its normal market, cost of operations, fuel efficiency and small logistics/maintenance footprint are its defining features. Performance is maintained at high altitude and high temperatures, in the Afghanistan environment, it would be able to lift between 1,900kg and 2,200kg depending on unrefueled range required.

Although this is much less than the CH53K in this Increment and only half that of the NH90 it is still hugely capable.

The distance between Bastion and FOB’s is small enabling heavier loads or multiple trips without refuelling. Fuel burn is minimal in comparison with other types, largely because of its efficiency and relatively low speed. Looking at the published performance figures a single K-Max unmanned could carry out three round trips from Bastion to the Sangin Valley in approximately 2 and a half hours without refuelling, delivering in the order of 5-6 tonnes of material. Material going back to Bastion could also be carried on the return leg. This assumes daylight only operations but the K-Max is certified for night time operation as well. Taking these rough calculation further, 3 sorties could be carried out per 10 hour day including refuelling and quick maintenance checks, a single airframe could deliver approximately 15-18 tonnes per day.

Click here to view the embedded video.

At approximately $5-8 million each they would seem to offer exceptional value for money and a very high efficiency solution. The reduction in manpower alone, in comparison with resource heavy CLP’s, will provide significant cost benefit. Of course not all types of material will fit within the weight and size limitations of this K-Max but a small fleet of say half a dozen, with 2 in rotating maintenance, would be able to deliver approximately 72 tonnes per day, in the environment described above, at a capital cost of much less than a single Merlin. Much more could be achieved with round the clock operation although the fleet size would need to increase to accommodate extra maintenance.

Assuming a single Foden DROPS can carry 15 tonnes and the equivalent journey takes a day, the 72 tonnes described above would need a 5 vehicle convoy, plus its recovery support, escort and protection which might include Apache Attack Helicopter, UAV’s and a the provision of a supporting Rapid Reaction Force, all for a full day. The same package would then have to do the same route again to go back to Bastion.

In being able to deliver urgent material support it would also alleviate the pressure on the CH53K and NH90 fleet, reducing expensive airframe hours, thus freeing up more of these for the task of aerial assault, medical evacuation and manoeuvre support rather than resupply. Quite clearly it could not replace a 106 vehicle CLP but it’s constant delivery rate would much reduce the need.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Its lack of speed and agility whilst an advantage for its primary mission, may make it more vulnerable to ground fires (although its very low noise would help here and night time operation would significantly reduce risk) if one looks at the fuel, manpower, maintenance, wear and tear, planning effort and risks involved in road moves it would be a valuable addition for a very modest cost.

In addition to land roles it could easily be carried aboard RFA vessels for vertical replenishment at sea.

Given that the base platform has a huge lift capacity and the unmanned variant now has relatively mature systems it is not a huge stretch of the imagination to it being used as a maritime UAV, perhaps even an unmanned MASC.

Summary

This might seem like an unachievable strategy and of course it is but the idea behind it is to generate debate, it is not all that radical in some regards, one only has to look at US plans for vertical heavy lift, high speed compound designs and optionally manned systems for real radical ideas.

Perhaps the UK’s best option is to stick with the sensible approach and see how these exciting new designs pan out.

It does however, lay out what I think is a coherent plan that delivers capability where it is needed and commonality where it is sensible to do so.

INCREMENT 1 – LIGHT,(EC120, EC145T2, EC645

INCREMENT 2 – MEDIUM (NH90TTH, NH90NFH

INCREMENT 3 – HEAVY and ATTACK (CH53K, K-Max Unmanned)

## Other posts in this series ##

The Future of the RAF 01 – Introduction

The Future of the RAF 02 – Tasks and Trends

The Future of the RAF 03 – A Takeover Bid

The Future of the RAF 04 – Fast Jets

The Future of the RAF 05 – A Bargain Basement

The Future of the RAF 06 – A Reverse Takeover Bid

The Future of the RAF 07 – ISTAR #01

The Future of the RAF 08 – ISTAR #02 (DABINETT)

The Future of the RAF 09 – ISTAR #03 (SIGINT)

The Future of the RAF 10 – ISTAR #04 (Watchkeeper and Scavenger)

The Future of the RAF 11 – ISTAR #05 (Manned Airborne ISTAR)

The Future of the RAF 12 – ISTAR #06 (High Altitude Platforms)

The Future of the RAF 13 – ISTAR #07 (Maritime)

The Future of the RAF 14 – Strategic Transport and Refuelling

The Future of the RAF 15 – Tactical Transport

The Future of the RAF 16 – Vertical Lift #01 (Introduction)

The Future of the RAF 17 – Vertical Lift #02 (Basic Requirements)

The Future of the RAF 18 – Vertical Lift #03 (A Sensible Future)

The Future of the RAF 19 – Vertical Lift #04 (A Radical Future)

The Future of the RAF 20 – Building Regional Security

The Future of the RAF 21 – Summary

TD recently did his article on the future of the rotary wing fleet.

We have had a few pre-SDSR and post-SDSR conversations about the future of the rotary fleet in the comments section of various articles.

Based on some of these comments I thought it might just be interesting to do a very quick comparison of statistics for some of the aircraft types discussed, either from the manufacturers sites, or Wikipedia.

As such some of this data is “approximate” for example Wikipedia seems to use the maximum take off or emergency power rating for engines. That for the Merlin and Chinook are definitely maximum continuous rating, not so sure about the others.

As you can see data points for various aircraft are empty, because my quick Saturday afternoon search could not find the information – if you have it, or know a source, please let us know in the comments and we can amend the table

Of course nothing is ever simple, and a lot of the conversations have been based around troop lift capacity. As Gabriele pointed out, the AW101 brochure (PDF) is very open about the seating arrangements that are possible and the standard arrangement in ‘crash worthy’ troop seats of 27 men, includes seats arrayed so that the starboard side trooping door is unusable. Not a problem in my opinion, the Chinook for example does not have side doors either. On the other hand I can’t find any thing that the figure of 33 for the Chinook suggests this is in crash worthy seating, but extrapolation would suggest it is.

For the Eurocopter EC725 Caracel, the available PDF is clear that 29 troops can be seated in the cabin, but that drops to 20 with wall mounted crash worthy seats, and if you want to use the large front opening windows for side gunners, that drops to 16. Similarly the workhorse of the US Army can seat 14, but more usual is a standard US Army squad of 11, plus two side window gunners.

At the lower end, the AW literature for the AW139M and AW149 talks about Fully Equipped (FE) troops, with support weapons (GPMG’s and LAWS?) or Lightly Equipped (LE) which I take as personal weapons and ‘fighting order’. Our venerable Puma’s seat 16, but I don’t think these are in crash worthy seats anyway, and I have not looked up figures for the refitted Pumas, but stuck with HC1.

I could not find any figures at all ref the seating details for the Mil Mi-17-1V, which fits squarely between the NH90 and the EH101 based on empty weight, it just says “30 troops” and I have the feeling that’s not in crash worthy seating.

So, there you are team, so figures to play with when disputing what our machines can manage to do.

Oh, and just in case, although I am sure you would never forget, just because a brochure gives a maximum number (for example the 40 you can cram into a Merlin) – that won’t be on a 35 deg C “hot” day at high altitude in Afghanistan.

Before we look at the future it is worthwhile reminding ourselves where we are.

The following are currently in service;

Chinook HC2, Chinook HC2A, Chinook HC3, Merlin HC3, Merlin HC3A, Puma HC1, Sea King HAR3, Sea King HAR3A, Griffin HAR2, Merlin HM1, Lynx Mk8, Lynx Mk7, Sea King ASaC, Sea King HC4, Sea King Mk5, Sea King HAS6(CR), Apache AH1, Lynx Mk7, Lynx Mk9/Mk9a, Gazelle, Bell 212HP AH1, Squirrel, Squirrel HT1, Griffin HT1 and this doesn’t include the A109E’s for VIP transport and Dauphin’s used for RN FOST etc as these are provided under contract.

We stand slack jawed in wonderment why we only have a handful of militarily useful and deployable types despite all three services operating a helicopter fleet totalling several hundred. Those that are able to deploy are being run ragged and have cost an even bigger fortune to get ready for deployment which raises an interesting point about the definition of ‘in service’

Second guessing numbers of future and current aircraft is difficult because of inconsistent reporting and changing definitions so treat the numbers in this post as ‘approximate’

The main types are;

Apache AH Mk 1; the Apache is an incredible machine and the UK version has a number of significant differences between other operators which make it the cream of the crop. Avionics, defensive aids and engines all provide an uplift in capability, provide commonality with other UK aircraft and adds features such as anti icing and folding rotor blades that allows them to operate in all weathers and from ships. The latter was ably demonstrated recently when 3 Apache’s from 656 Squadron Army Air Corps operated from HMS Ocean as part of Exercise Joint Warrior. Operating aboard were 120 engineers, maintainers and support crew (before anyone says that this seems excessive for three aircraft it was a training mission)

Apache's embark on HMS Ark Royal 24/09/2010

We often lament UK specific gold plating of existing systems but this is an excellent example of why sometimes it is worth spending the extra.

It is a highly specialised aircraft and its introduction was not without significant problems but in time honoured fashion, the forces have ironed out these problems. Apache was a classic Cold War programme, designed to destroy the advancing armoured red menace in Germany with a combination of its 16 Hellfire missiles, CRV-7 rockets and 30mm ATK M230 Chain Gun. Of course, by the time it entered service the Cold War was well and truly over but it has showed its versatility and acquired a fearsome reputation in many operations since. The design is typically US of A, a money no object drive for performance that resulted in a system with little compromise but an expensive price tag and equally expensive logistics tail, operating costs are significant.

With the benefit of hindsight the Cobra might have been a better fit (it was certainly in the competition) because of its lower price and logistics requirements but we ended up with Apache, at least we avoided the Tiger!

The total fleet consists of 67 aircraft, one was damaged in Afghanistan in 2008 and no doubt numerous are sitting in hangars with bits hanging off them because we don’t have enough spares to maintain a useable fleet. DASA lists 51 in the forward available fleet.  FAF is defined as the number of aircraft required to undertake the mandated task; including aircrew and ground crew training, ‘in-work’ rectification and operational / tactical trials. In January last year the Forward Available Fleet was 44 with an ‘available for service’ quantity of just 18. Available for service is defined as those within the forward fleet that are considered capable of carrying out their planned missions on a given date. This figure can vary on a day to day basis but it is still a good indicator or what size force we are able to generate.

By the way, yes, that’s 18 out of 67.

Availability of aircrew has been a problem with Apache, as at March last year, over a third of Apache aircrew were in breach of harmony guidelines and there is a shortage of instructors, a reflection on the accelerated speed on introduction and obviously high operational demand.

Click here to view the embedded video.

The real issue with Apache is we are not using them to their full potential because there are no armoured threats in Afghanistan, but we are using up valuable and finite airframe hours brassing up a few flip flop wearers riding a Honda or launching CRV-7 rockets into Taleban compounds because there is nothing else that can do it. CRV-7 is still widely used, a testament to the fact that not everything needs to be guided to be effective.

It is an extremely expensive way of maintaining an airborne 30mm cannon and rocket launcher.

Full operating costs per hour, including depreciation and finance charges, are stated as just under £42,000 per hour which is more expensive than any other aircraft in UK service apart from Typhoon and C17. For a reason why, have a look here

Chinook; a number of variants are in service that will still be somewhat different, despite the hundreds of millions about to be/already spent on engine and avionics (Project Julius) upgrades we will have a fleet within a fleet although vastly improved on what it is now. There is still the intention to order 10 or 12 Chinooks to replace attrition losses and provide a modest uplift but these seem to be forever talked about (they were first mooted in 2009) but never ordered so who knows whether they will ever actually enter service. They were first mentioned at the height of the helicopter scandal (30 was the rumour) and if ever there was a cynical political ploy, this was it. Given that it is unlikely, even if ordered today, they would be of much utility in Afghanistan by the time we had started the draw down one does have to question the validity of this order, especially as a new build Chinook might be sufficiently different to even the Project Julius upgrade to need a new logistics and training system.

What is Project Julius?

In January this year the Boeing UK Rotorcraft Support team began flight testing the first Chinook Mk4 helicopter for the Royal Air Force (RAF). Project Julius is the MoD’s name for the effort to modernize the current Royal Air Force Chinook fleet. Project JULIUS will modify 38 Mk2/2A Chinooks into the Mk4/4A configuration and eight Mk3 Chinook’s into the Mk5 configuration.

The Mk3 aircraft are of course the world’s most expensive helicopters due to the MoD’s truly world leading cost saving techniques!

Chinook HC4

A major part of the modification for both the Mk4/4A and Mk5 aircraft is the Thales TopDeck cockpit which will provide improved situational awareness, increased safety and options for future capability enhancement. The Thales UK’s TopDeck cockpit suite includes an onboard mission planning system and a ground mission support system completes the tactical mission capability.

The first of the upgraded aircraft will be available for operations towards the end of this year

The entire Mk2 fleet will be fitted with the JULIUS cockpit by early 2015, followed by Mk2A and Mk3 modifications by 2015 and 2016, respectively. The modifications also include the addition of a third crew-member seat, upgrades to the Honeywell T55-714 engines and an update of Airworthiness & Safety Certification and Qualification for the modernized Chinook. Tablet computer ‘electronic flight bags’ will also be provided as part of the project. The existing engines are being replaced with Honeywell T55 L714A engines, although a couple of RAF Chinooks do currently use this engine. The engine upgrade improves power by approximately 20%, increases fuel efficiency and reduces maintenance requirements. The net result will be improved performance and greater availability.

The aircraft are being modified at the Gosport Fleetlands facility operated by Vector Aerospace, Boeing’s principal subcontractor for deep support of the RAF Chinook fleet.

This programme will still see a fleet within a fleet but the commonality benefits will be significant, ruthless commonality in action, especially for maintenance and training. The project was announced in 2009 at a cost of £408 million, the engine element cost £128m and the avionics the balance of that figure, although work first started on the project definition in 2008.

The Chinook is without a doubt an excellent helicopter, fast, sturdy, and with excellent lift performance especially in hot and high conditions.

Click here to view the embedded video.

If there is a downside it is a simple but very important one, they are not designed for operations at sea. No operator has a rotor fold system which means they have to be stored on deck, this simple fact immediately means that the operations from sea need something else, un unwanted duplication and we all know how much I dislike unnecessary duplication.

The UK has a requirement for vertical heavy lift from either sea or land, not sea and land. There is no reason why a single type should not be used in either role but because the Chinook does not have the facility for rotor blade folding its employment from ships becomes compromised. Of course it can land on the deck of Ocean, CVF and even the Type 45 but cannot ‘operate’ from these ships. All stowage and maintenance would have to be carried out on deck or so massively compromise carriage of other aircraft it would not be worth bothering.

What would be ideal is a common medium/heavy lift helicopter that can operate equally well from the hangar of CVF or a hangar in Bastion. This means we could mix and match, switch airframes between operations and seamlessly transition from one mode to another whilst maintaining a common support infrastructure that has economies of scale.

Wishful thinking!

The end result of this new spend on Chinook will be a fleet comprising 46 aircraft with an out of service date of 2040. The RAF maintains Chinook at a very high availability rate, from the total fleet it seems to average about two thirds fit for purpose which compared to Merlin or Apache is very high, the upgrades should see even this good performance improved.

Merlin; again a number of variants are in service even within the utility role (HC3/3a) and the HM2 upgrade is not covering the entire fleet. None of the utility variants, which might be a replacement for the RM Sea King Commando and RAF Puma, have folding rotors, folding tails or other equipment to make them suitable for maritime operation.

Penny pinching and short termism writ large, with significant cost penalties later, typical MoD activity.

Any conversion will be costly when with some foresight we could have obtained the same version that the Italian navy has. In the frigate role, primarily anti submarine, it could be argued they are on the large side although king of the hill in terms of submarine killing. In some ways, this size is also a benefit so swings and roundabouts on that one but there is no doubt they are large for the ‘frigate’ role.

Merlin operating costs are very high, just under £28,000 per funded hour and the payload is relatively low for an aircraft of this size which limits its usefulness in the support helicopter role, in essence, it is good for personnel but less useful for stores and vehicles. Performance at altitude is also limiting.

Click here to view the embedded video.

The Merlin replaced Wessex and supposedly Puma, although in our usual penny pinching way we forgot about replacing Puma. As with Apache, Merlin requires a complex and costly support infrastructure and it might be a reasonable to believe that Apache and Merlin have sucked the money out of the helicopter budget.

If ever there was a political/industrial focussed aircraft it is the Merlin and unfortunately it results in an aircraft that would seem to be overly complex, overly expensive, occupies nearly the same space as a Chinook but with only half the lift despite having 3 engines and a very complex gearbox.

Merlin answers a question no one actually asked, apart from the Royal Navy anti submarine capability area of course. Now I am not one who thinks the submarine threat has gone away, far from it, the proliferation of very quite hybrid propulsion submarines means that whilst the threat level might have diminished, the ability to do anything about it is getting more and more difficult. The HM.2 upgrade will make the most potent anti submarine capability in the world (Merlin, Type 23, Lynx/Wildcat and RN crews) even more effective.

Out of a total fleet of 42 Merlin Mk.1’s (although some have been lost in accidents) we are upgrading 30 and the fate of the remainder remains unclear.

Lynx; we have a number of Army and Royal navy variants in service but they are all due to be replaced by 2 variants of the Lynx Wildcat (Future Lynx), a maritime and land version.

Providing a very useful service in Afghanistan is the upgraded Lynx Mk9A. In May last year they started operating in a variety of utility roles such as Combat Logistic Patrol escort, Support Helicopter escort, light transport, radio rebroadcast and limited ISTAR. Validating the general requirement for a light utility helicopter they have proven to be a success but it is uncertain what overlap there will be between Wildcat entering service and the 9A’s being withdrawn in 2016.

The Lynx Mk.9A is an upgraded version of the Mk.9 and features LHTECH CTS800N engines which offer significantly more power over the original ‘wheezy’ Rolls Royce Gems. These have vastly improved the Lynx’s hot and high performance in Afghanistan. Prior to the upgrade Lynx were severely restricted especially during the summer months. This additional engine power also allows the Mk.9A to carry heavier weapons as pictures have been released of the aircraft fitted with the 0.50 M3M HMG, which is a significant increase in fire power and range over the usual 7.62 L7 GPMG. In addition to the new engines the Mk.9A is also fitted improved secure communications equipment.

The Mk9A’s allow the Apache Attack Helicopter to be used more effectively and sparingly, reducing airframe hours and operating costs.

Click here to view the embedded video.

A total of 22 Mk9’s have been converted in 2 batches, the first batch costing £6.5 million each and the second batch £4.5 million each.

Poor performance in high temperatures was noted in the first Gulf War so this upgrade has taken nearly 2 decades to complete.

Quite why the MoD have selected the Wildcat for the AAC remains a mystery, of course the public face of the MoD makes the point that it will supplement the Attack Helicopter but this conveniently forgets Watchkeeper, the fact that Attack Helicopter actually makes a better recce platform than Wildcat, that Wildcat has no radar, an EO turret with a limited downward tilt angle and has very little utility in the ‘utility’ role means nothing when sustaining Agusta Westland is the main driver. When it became obvious that the Future Lynx would be unable to meet the requirements of the Battlefield Light Utility Helicopter (BLUH) programme it was changed to Battlefield Reconnaissance Helicopter (BRH), neat eh.

The larger engines mean higher fuel consumption but the fuel tanks remains the same and the aircraft overall is much heavier, nearly a tonne, although the extra power compensates. With crashworthy seating the space in the cabin is limited, no more squeezing 12 toms in the back as per the old days in Northern Ireland, with a door gunner we will be lucky to get 2 or 3 in, and only then if dressed for the beach!

A great deal is made of the fact that Wildcat will be able to use the existing training and logistics systems in place but is this actually the case?

Wildcat will have a completely new avionics system, will need a new simulator developing and have a much higher training overhead than current versions.  The commonality between the old and the new is also under question although given that Wildcat will replace all Lynx versions then at least duplication will be reduced.

In order to provide some differentiation between the Apache and Wildcat only the GPMG and M3M machine guns are planned. The Block 3 upgrade to the Apache remains a more attractive proposition in an either/or situation so Wildcat will remain largely unarmed.

The primary role for the RN’s 28 SCMR aircraft will be to perform anti-surface warfare tasks, with each aircraft required to carry the Future Air-to-Surface Guided Weapons (FASGW), light and heavy variants, 185km from a host ship and remain on station for 1h. The aircraft will also carry the Stingray torpedo for anti-submarine warfare missions, in conjunction with the Merlin HM.2 and utility tasks are also expected to be carried out using the Wildcat. It has also been reported that of these 28, 4 would be the Army version for CHF.

For the Royal Navy it could be argued that Wildcat is not a bad option, it will insert a hugely capable aircraft into an already established maintenance and training pipeline, even if the differences between Wildcat and Lynx are many, the costs of a new type would still be more. However, it is still a tremendously expensive aircraft and will be coming into service in a timeframe that will see a drastically reduced surface fleet. As the RN transitions to the larger Type 45/26 the relatively small size of Lynx becomes less of an attractive feature and more of a problem.

A cynic might say that Wildcat is in fact the saviour of the Army Air Corps, without the handful of Wildcat planned to be in service the AAC would be a single type Corps, if that happened it could be argued that the entire Corps was a one trick pony and ripe for absorbing into the RAF. Given the amount of real and intellectual currency the Army has spent on Apache the ‘Wildcat or nothing’ option, despite all the hot air, was grabbed with both hands.

Costs have continually risen to a point where 60 odd aircraft will cost £1.7 billion although the alternatives on offer were more expensive when considering the costs of introduction and through life support.

On the other hand, Wildcat will have state of the art avionics systems, good sensors and optics, a secure data link and full communications fit from day 1 etc so it will be an improvement over both current naval and army variants.

There will also be a great deal more commonality between the army and naval variants which is never a bad thing from a support perspective.

So, Lynx Wildcat, for all its problems and issues, is generally the ‘better than nothing’ option and due to enter service in 2013/14

Sea King; is still plugging away in the SAR, Airborne Early Warning and Commando role. One of the unsung success stories of the rotary fleet but despite a recent cost effective upgrade are in dire need of replacement. All variants of Sea King are due out of service in 2016 but with the collapse of the SAR-H PFI it is not clear if an interim contract will be in place prior to this so the Sea Kings operated by the RAF and FAA in the search and rescue capability might have to soldier on until a sensible replacement can be found or new SAR contract let.

There are two SAR variants in service, the RAF HAR.3/3a and RN HAR.5

The remaining two Sea King variants are the ASaC7 airborne early warning and control which is currently supporting operations in Afghanistan and also in Afghanistan, the HC.4 Commando. The latter is a utility variant that was upgraded with the composite Carson blades which deliver a useful performance improvement for not very much money.

Click here to view the embedded video.

No replacement for the ASac7 has yet been announced although many options exist including a fixed wing capability now CVF has changed to conventional launch and recovery.

Puma; The RAF currently has 43 in the fleet, 22 in the forward available fleet and in the same time frame as other figures in the post 11 available for service. Although the Puma saw action in Iraq it has not been deployed to Afghanistan because the pressure of yet another type in theatre would be problematical and the performance penalty of getting it to theatre entry standard would render it ineffective in the environment conditions of Helmand.

The RAF Puma’s were assembled by Westlands and first delivered in 1970. In 2007, at the height of the helicopter scandals it was announced that at least 28 HC.1 would be upgraded to HC.2 standard to extend the out of service date to 2025 although other sources cite 2022 as the revised OSD and work on the upgrade had been going on for a number of years before the announcement including a £20 million contract to Eurocopter for a test rig and early design work to inform the assessment phase. The MoD web site mentions ‘beyond 2022’ and the first are due to be delivered next year.

The extension/upgrade with see a number of improvements, more powerful Makila engines, glass cockpit, communication, navigation systems and an improvement in safety.

Click here to view the embedded video.

At around £10-15 million (depending on the options for the final pair and whether you include the assessment work) each this is actually a low cost means of obtaining a useful life extension, making use of established support mechanisms although many systems will of course, be significantly different. It is not clear if the upgrade cost includes simulators or other expensive conversion items.

It should also be noted that when announced, the contract was for £220 million and now seems to be hovering at the £300 million mark plus and some reports indicate only 24 will be obtained, as I mentioned at the beginning of the post, contradictory information is easy to find.

One of the key attributes of the Puma is its compact dimensions, unlike Merlin and many would argue that a Chinook/Puma force represents a better balance than a Chinook/Merlin combination. The original Puma offered 16 seats or 12 plus a realistic combat load. This was later reduced by fitting an internal fuel tank in the cabin so although the upgrade will offer a low cost package; we should question whether it is good value for money.

The contract does provide a low cost gap filler until the longer term picture can be decided upon.

Whether it is value for money, I guess it is better than nothing, which is the alternative.

Gazelle; one of the best looking helicopters ever made the Gazelle is showing its age. The Army has 27 on the books with a forward available fleet of 22 and, as at January 2010, 14 available for service. None are deployed to Afghanistan although I think France has some there, they are currently being used at BATUS in Canada to support the training function. With an out of service date of 2018 the Gazelle force in Canada will likely be replaced with an external contract but although initial indications were that the Gazelle would be withdrawn by 2012 it has been reported by Janes that they will be life extended to reach the original OSD.

Others; bringing up the rear are a number of other types, the Squirrel and Griffin in the training and SAR role, Dauphin for FOST transport, A109E on VIP duties and some SF types perhaps best not discussed!

Issues; the problem the UK has is not helicopter numbers, total fleet size is 522 across all types. The real problem, and it would not be hyperbole to describe it as a scandal, is that of availability. Whilst the mainstream media might have a field day about helicopters they never pick up on the shocking availability figures.

This is what happens when you neglect training, logistics, maintenance and other support capabilities.

We might spend money on FRES or Type 45 or Typhoon but do this we strip the back office of resources which has a dramatic impact on actual capabilities. As good as the Merlin or Apache is, they are very expensive hangar decorations if unavailable to commanders in the field and might as well be used as gate guardians for all the value they deliver.

If we take a snapshot and availability is always a snapshot, in March last year the UK armed forces had an in service fleet of 522 helicopters.

Of these 522, 300 were in the forward available fleet, or just over 60%

Of the 300 in the forward available fleet, a mere 200 were actually available for use, or again, about 60% of FAF

If we compare the available for service to the total fleet we get a woeful rate of 38%

Particular lowlights of the FAF to Available for Use measure include the Apache at 41% and Puma at 50%. Comparing the total fleet to available for use throws up another few interesting percentages; Merlin HM.1 at 33%, Apache at 27%, Puma at 26%, Lynx M9/9a at 35% and Merlin Mk3/3A at 36%.

We should be clear that these are snapshots at a point in time, the figures are a year old and there are very good reasons behind some of the individual lowlights but the bottom line is we are failing to maximise on our considerable investment in helicopters.

Of course total numbers still matter, for example, we are replacing 187 RN/Army Lynx and Gazelle with less than 60 Wildcat so no matter how much Wildcat will deliver in terms of availability improvements it is still a serious reduction and like ships, helicopters, no matter how good there, can be in three places at once.

A Sensible Future

The sensible and pragmatic thing to do is to carry on pretty much as we are, or in other words, a series of short term programmes to get us over a funding gap and a medium term consolidation into 4 broadly similar sized fleets, Apache, Wildcat, Chinook and Merlin.

In many ways, the UK is not short of helicopters, but it is short of deployable helicopters with sufficient aircrew and logistics support. It is in this area that we should be concentrating over the next decade or so as Future Force 2020 begins to be realised.

Making better use of what we have and reducing operating cost should be the underpinning strategies and this is pretty much what the MoD is aiming for, making significant consolidation of types, introducing ruthless commonality (not in my sense of the word though) and improving availability to negate the need for more airframes.

This will require increasing investment in logistics, support, maintenance, spares, training and aircrew.

Building on this increasing utilisation there are a number of capability enhancements and development areas that should be considered, making the assumption that the four major types will be as described;

Apache; The assessment phase for a planned upgrade will commence next year and the most obvious thing to do would be to utilise the Block III enhancements currently in low rate production. Many of the US Block III enhancements will be in advance of AH1 but others, such as additional engine power, UK Apaches have had since day 1, in fact the RTM 322 has more power than the upgraded GE T700-701D engine found in the US Block III aircraft and this has allowed the Longbow radar to be retained on UK Apaches in the hot conditions of Afghanistan whilst US ones have had to have theirs removed.

Other Block III enhancements that we should cherry pick include UAV data links which will enable Apache to integrate with Watchkeeper and improved sensor turret amongst many others. Beyond the Block III upgrades there are also a couple of emerging technologies that will have matured by the time the assessment phase concludes including the Radiance Technologies Ground Fire Acquisition System or GFAS which is a fearsome capability, essentially, a series of sensors placed distributed along the fuselage which detects/classifies ground fire and in real time indicates its source to the aircrew, thus allowing them to slew the 30mm canon or launch other weapons.

The planned out of service date for Apache is 2030.

Emerging concepts of operation may include coordination with Watchkeeper and of course, Wildcat.

One area I would like to see explored more is Apache’s utility in the littoral and maritime environment, where the 30mm   cannon would be very useful, and the UK version, with its additional EM shielding and folding rotors is well suited although not as evolved as the various Sea Apache propositions. To support this enhanced role, it would make sense to integrate the MBDA Lightweight Multirole Missile (LMM) to supplement the Wildcat.

As mentioned above, Apache’s are very expensive to operate and using their precious airframe hours and scarce aircrew for inappropriate missions should be reduced by the introduction of complimentary capabilities on other aircraft. The reason the Army Air Corps have not pushed for weapons integration on Wildcat is to protect the funding line for the Block III upgrades but this is false economy. There is no chance of increasing the fleet size so in addition to improving availability we should, in parallel, use them sparingly, the current funded hours for Apache is about 18,500 per year, about the same as Chinook.

It might also be sensible to reduce the overall size of the Apache fleet to a point where it can sustain enough to cover a single Multi Role Brigade on an enduring operation, or larger formation for a shorter duration/other out of area intervention, to free up funding for other capabilities and extend in service life. Reducing numbers might actually increase fatigue depending on operational tempo but the total fleet size is something that is worth investigating if cheaper and complimentary capabilities, such as arming Wildcat, could be funded

Merlin/Puma; the HM2 upgrade as part of the Merlin Capability Sustainment Programme is now underway and will modify 30 of the HM.1’s with a wide variety of upgrades.

With 28 Wildcat and 30 Merlin, the Royal Navy will spread these out across 19 major surface vessels with additional deployments on CVF and other vessels as needed. It is hoped that the HM.2 will achieve a greater availability rate than the HM.1  so the number should be acceptable.

I am not sure what will be gained by moving the utility Merlins into the CHF but there is no doubt that each of the Mk3/3a’s should be converted for maritime use, at least with a folding rotor and necessary electronics. As the Sea Kings go out of service a small additional buy of Merlin’s might be the pragmatic thing to do or, convert the remaining HM.1’s. This conversion would not include fitting a ramp so major structural modifications would be ruled out.

As for a replacement for the ASac7 Sea Kings I know most people would like to see the E2 in service with the UK and this would of course be the preferred option but the electronics on ASaC7 are usually very under rated and the lowest cost option would seem to be palletising the radar, electronics and consoles and simply fitting them into the surplus HM.1’s. Illustrations of this have shown the radome extending from the rear ramp, which of course the HM.1’s do not have so it might need some modification if this is possible. The current information on the future of the ASaC7’s and MASC (its replacement) has been inconsistent and incomplete.

As a throwaway, it might even be possible to life extend the Sea Kings, which would solve the numbers problem but still leave us with multiple types doing very similar numbers.

A lot of this would depend on how many upgraded HM.1’s we end up with, I still think 30 HM.2’s is a sensible number with the remainder used for MASC and maritime utility roles.

Puma HC2 will be viable past 2022 and this might enable the existing Merlins to transfer to the CHF to the RN becomes the sole operator of Merlin, with the RAF operating Puma and Chinook.

Wildcat; however much we might dislike the fact, it is on the way and although the Army will be short of genuine light utility types it is simply going to have to accept this.

If we could retain the Mk9A’s beyond their OSD of 2018 this would provide a sensible light utility (basic casevac, priority resupply for example) capability to supplement the Wildcat although the commonality benefits of Wildcat would be diluted somewhat.

It might even be possible to upgrade some of the older Mk7’s with the same engine as the Wildcat/9A

The final number of maritime versions may be reduced in line with a reduction of surface vessels but this would not be desirable in any way.

A key improvement I would like to see on the Army Wildcat’s is the provision of weapons beyond a manually armed door gun. No funding has been allocated for Hellfire or the LMM but it would make a natural partner to Apache and arguably a more suitable platform for these missiles, Apache acting as the eyes and Wildcat delivering the punch. This lack of funding might be seen to be protecting the Block III Apache upgrades but we have to be sensible and recognise the massive operating costs of Apache when set against what it doing.

As I mentioned above, using Apache to deliver 30mm, CRV-7 and the occasional Hellfire is not cost effective in the most likely usage scenario so we need to marshal and preserve Apache for when it is the most appropriate system.

Beyond having weapon commonality across the major types we might also consider adding a weapon turret to the Army Wildcat’s instead of a door gun and using them as a lower cost Apache.

A number of options exist and the Israelis have developed a Battlehawk variant that utilises a NEXTER 20mm cannon and lightweight mount that reportedly adds only a modest weight increase and firing stress, video and brochure here and here (H/T Solomon)

The NEXTER THL20 mounting has been fitted to some French Puma’s and is also used on Indian Dhruv and Romanian SOCAT Puma helicopters. The larger THL30 (30mm) has also been selected by a number of users (pic here)

As long as the Wildcat can provide a 600mm hole and space above for ammunition it could be fitted with the THL20.

Another option may be to mount the weapon in the nose, especially on the Army version which does not have this position occupied with radar as the naval version does and our friends at BAE have just the ticket. The F2 turret, which uses the same NEXTER 20mm cannon as above, has been fitted to the South African Rooivalk and a number of Mil 24 upgrades. Using the NATO standard 20×102 ammunition the turret, associated control equipment and 300 rounds of ammunition weighs 288kg which although heavier than a door gunner and M3M provides much more firepower.

Both options are available off the shelf, modestly priced and would allow the Wildcat to be used in the armed recce role, small craft interdiction in a maritime context and perhaps more importantly, allow the Apache to be reserved for more appropriate applications i.e. a spend to save deal.

Chinook; With the Julius upgrades the fleet will be as common as it is sensible to make and numbering some 46 aircraft. Given their high availability rates (about two thirds) it is worth questioning whether the mythical new Chinooks are needed. They will not be in service by the time we start drawing down in Afghanistan and with a likely reduction in Army strength post 2015, are they needed?

If a standard deployment is going to be a Multi Role Brigade on an enduring basis plus a couple of simple/complex interventions at a small scale or a single large operation of 2 brigade strength the need for Support Helicopters should be scaled on this, plus whatever SF, training and other duties are required.

Working on the two thirds availability ratio, 46 aircraft in the fleet means roughly 30 available for use across operational, training and other duties. Working back, does this mean than about 12-15 are available for operations?

Given the most likely scenario is a single brigade strength and with the Merlin fleet this provides a reasonably capable capacity.

Given a choice of extra airframes or more money for training and logistics I would plump for the latter but of course, the extras would be very useful. I would also trade additional aircraft for a development of a folding rotor head for operating from CVF and in flight refuelling capability for SF use, paired with the A400.

Of course, the extra aircraft will push the fleet up towards the 60 point and this would be fantastic, providing the UK with a significant heavy lift support helicopter fleet.

Logistics Support; given that 3 out of the 4 main types are from our friends in the south west it would make sense to realise some economies of scale and merge the existing support contracts into a single, long term, incentivised support package that should be expressly designed to improve availability. For example, the Apache is supported by the Apache Helicopter Future Support Arrangements contract that was let in 2009, running until 2014 it will cost £439million. The Merlin is supported by the 25 year Integrated Merlin Operational Support (IMOS) contract that was let in 2006, the second five year period was recently contracted for £570 million. Despite these contracts availability continues to be a challenge and it needs to be properly gripped.

Organisation; a rather contentious issue this one but one of the fundamental principles of this strategy is to relentlessly drive down costs and if this can be achieved by the elimination of duplication then we should have zero sentimentality. This might mean moving the Apache and Army Wildcats to the RAF force or even transferring all Merlins and  Wildcats to the RAF. The Commando Helicopter Force is a small force that might be better disbanded and amphibious support provided by Army Air Corps, RAF or FAA aircrew.

As in previous posts I am not claiming that this move would significantly lower costs but the principle remains, if it can be clearly demonstrated that operating costs can be reduced without degrading operational capability too far then this is something we should pursue.

The sad fact is that helicopters are not core business for any of the services and this is reflected in their funding priorities.

By the way, let’s not let this one get into discussions on disbanding the RAF etc, I have an opinion on where aircraft should be and it is well known but the current status quo is fine enough as well, there are many arguments for and against.

Weapons and Systems; one of the issues we face is the lack of weapons commonality across multiple platforms, the Army Wildcat for example will not be cleared (at least initially) for the CRV-7, Hellfire or LMM because it is an ISTAR platform but this reduces flexibility enormously. Likewise, the Merlin HM.2’s will not be able to carry LMM, Sea Skua or its replacement. This situation has to stop and so in this sensible strategy we should allocate funding to allow a common weapon fit across the three main types and that would also include getting rid of the Chinook’s old fashioned M60’s (selected because they were the cheapest option)

It would also be desirable to embark on a medium to long term coherence plan to standardise on sub systems like defensive aids and EO turrets for example.

I will be covering complex and air launched weapons in a future post in this series.

Special Forces; it would be nice to create a separate capability just for special forces use and the Joint Personnel Recovery mission but am not sure we have the money to do so and this money would probably be better spent improving capabilities across a common fleet. With the high specification of avionics, sensors and defensive aids fitted to a harmonised fleet the difference between the so called SF helicopters and your common or garden support helicopter becomes less and less. SF and JPR become a come as you are mission in terms of equipment although there will of course be some degree of specialist training. The existing ‘other types beginning with m’ will also continue as is.

Summary

So that is a sensible future, one which sees, relatively speaking, greater resources for rotary aviation across all three services but essentially, is a strategy that sees us making better use of what we have and improving flexibility/commonality across the board.

It is a coping strategy in the absence of a proper long term and ambitious vision; it’s got many many big holes in it, but is achievable.

That’s boring though isn’t it, in the next one I am going to go a bit mental and describe a vision for rotary aviation that recognises its fundamental role in the likely operations the UK will conduct over the coming decades.

## Other posts in this series ##

The Future of the RAF 01 – Introduction

The Future of the RAF 02 – Tasks and Trends

The Future of the RAF 03 – A Takeover Bid

The Future of the RAF 04 – Fast Jets

The Future of the RAF 05 – A Bargain Basement

The Future of the RAF 06 – A Reverse Takeover Bid

The Future of the RAF 07 – ISTAR #01

The Future of the RAF 08 – ISTAR #02 (DABINETT)

The Future of the RAF 09 – ISTAR #03 (SIGINT)

The Future of the RAF 10 – ISTAR #04 (Watchkeeper and Scavenger)

The Future of the RAF 11 – ISTAR #05 (Manned Airborne ISTAR)

The Future of the RAF 12 – ISTAR #06 (High Altitude Platforms)

The Future of the RAF 13 – ISTAR #07 (Maritime)

The Future of the RAF 14 – Strategic Transport and Refuelling

The Future of the RAF 15 – Tactical Transport

The Future of the RAF 16 – Vertical Lift #01 (Introduction)

The Future of the RAF 17 – Vertical Lift #02 (Basic Requirements)

The Future of the RAF 18 – Vertical Lift #03 (A Sensible Future)

The Future of the RAF 19 – Vertical Lift #04 (A Radical Future)

The Future of the RAF 20 – Building Regional Security

The Future of the RAF 21 – Summary

I should stress that I fundamentally disagree with most of this but the idea of Think Defence is to look at different viewpoints and allow space for discussion

START

I will make no mystery of the fact that the RAF will come out of my review as the big loser. I don’t make it out of hate, even if my original love for the RAF admittedly faded largely with the way they’ve constantly worked to destroy the Fixed Wing capability of the Fleet Air Arm and with how the junior service is proving hostile and problematic about mostly anything save from “Fast Jets that have a big RAF mark on the tail”, from Nimrod to the Merlin transfer plan.

My biggest source of savings and efficiencies in the review will be, indeed, the massive downsizing of the Royal Air Force. In practice, I’m planning to have the name RAF and its traditions and colors survive, but have the independent RAF command and all the top brass related to it  effectively vanish progressively, leaving the RAF’s planes, personnel and bases effectively under the command of a Joint Army/Navy air command building on the AAC and the FAA, much streamlined compared to current structures.

This will involve, mainly:

The responsibility for Fast Jets, starting of course from the F35C, going to the Fleet Air Arm. The Typhoon squadrons will remain nominally under RAF colors and with unchanged crew and formations and logistics, but the RAF command structure will vanish save for the capabilities that’ll need redistribution across a Joint Command that will inevitably still include quite a lot of experienced officers and personnel coming from the RAF.

In practice, the RAF will live on only as colors and tradition, but not as independent service. This will make the end of an era a lot sweeter than it would differently be.

The responsibility for Drones will be mainly an Army affair. However, the Joint nature of the new air force should help ensure that smart decisions are taken (example: the “navalized” Apache AH1, that can operate everywhere, from ships and ashore), like ensuring the future UCAVs are carrier-capable, so to make them effectively deployable in any and all conditions, either with land bases available or from the Navy’s flat tops.

The helicopter fleets would be partially joint: any new utility helicopter purchased would be acquired “navalized” enough to be deployable indifferently on land and on board of ships.

The RAF regiment would maintain its colors and traditions and name, but would become an Elite Force Protection deployable formation commanded by the Army and employed for the protection of air bases in operation theatres.

ISTAR, Cargo and Air-Refuelling capabilities would be joint, and would see the largest amount of remaining RAF officers involved to ensure that these key capabilities are maintained in the best conditions. The presence of the Army will ensure that both Cargo Planes and ISTAR assets are kept in very, very high consideration, with how much the army depends on both.

In the immediate, this scenario would involve a new, updated Helicopter Strategy, consisting of:

• Acquisition of 12 new Chinooks [already on order; cost neutral measure]
• Update existing Chinooks to common HC4 standard [already planned; cost-neutral measure]
• Retire Puma from service within 2015, cancel planned upgrade [savings: over 300 millions, in a very conservative estimate
• Use money from Puma retirement to modify the unused 12 Merlin HM1 (4 in stowage and 8 non-updated to HM2 variant) airframes of the FAA and have their sonar and other ASW components removed to turn them into Naval Utility role.
• The 25 Merlin HC3 of the Royal Air Force will also be navalized and assigned to the Fleet Air Arm. The Merlin will replace the Sea King HC4 in all three the Commando Helicopter Force Squadrons, for a total of 3 12-airframes formations.
• 230° and 33° RAF Squadrons disbanded with Puma retirement, 28° and 78° closed with passage of trained Merlin personnel to the FAA Squadrons. One of these Squadrons could be re-activated to take on the 12 new Chinooks once they are acquired.
• Retirement of all remaining Gazelle AH1 helicopters from service.
• Progressive retirement of Lynx AH7 as soon as Wildcat comes into service in its place. The Lynx AH9A, which uses the same Wildcat engines and has a logistic footprint roughly similar, is to remain in service. 22 units should be available, and they will add to the 34 Wildcats.

The Chinook Squadrons will transfer from RAF contol to the Army Air Corps. Odiham will become an AAC base, and eventually Benson too, if needed. With the retirement of Puma and the move of the Merlin helicopters to Yeonvilton, however, it is likely that Benson will be surplus, and thus candidate to closure, or downgraded to simple “overload” support base for Odiham.

This is justified by the fact the real users of the helicopters are either the Marines or the soldiers, and the RAF’s management of the platforms is one less than optimal (to say the least) arrangement. It has also contributed, in many occasions, in hampering the designing and pursuing of an adequate strategy and procurement for the platforms really needed by the users, since the RAF has often held very different views compared to those of the Army.

The conversion of the Merlin HC3 fleet for use on ships and the addition of 12 more converted from the currently unused, non-upgraded HM1 airframes will give the UK a modern force of Medium Lift helicopters that could deploy from ships and land bases alike. The 12 additional utility Merlin would mitigate the loss of the 24 Puma airframes currently envisaged.

12 of the Merlins, included the HC3A acquired from Denmark which are already fitted with a better avionic system inclusive of a nose-mounted anti-collision system, will be further updated for use by the Special Forces, and be kept available not just for the Royal Marines but for the SAS and SBS raids as well. These Merlins would become the true spearhead of the aerial element of the Special Forces Support Group.

The additional modifications would include a nose-mounted FLIR and anti-collision system for low-flying obstacle avoidance, Dillon Miniguns at the side doors and rear ramp for improved firepower and the in-flight refueling probe, plus armour protection against small arms fire. These Merlins would also be available for Combat-SAR role.

The Fleet Air Arm has proven, with multiple deployments of Sea King HC4, Harrier GR9 and Sea King ASaC, to be perfectly capable to deploy abroad in a land base and supply sterling service. In the latest years, the RAF cannot say, instead, to have provided any real good service at sea on the Royal Navy ships.

The Chinook Squadrons will move out of the RAF and become part of the Army Air Corps, along with the Squadron’s personnel and with the whole of Odiham, and Benson if needed.

The new Army Air Corps would inherit base and Squadrons, helicopters and personnel.

7° Squadron – Chinook HC4

18° Squadron – Chinook HC4

27° Squadron – Chinook HC4

78° Squadron – Chinook HC6 (designation expected for the new-built Chinooks)

Each squadron would line from 12 to 15 helicopters indicatively, depending on how many are tasked with the training.

The new face of the Army Air Corps

AAC manpower is believed to number some 2,034 (early 2009) personnel of all ranks, including about 500 officers. Unlike the all-officer Navy and Air Force helicopter pilot establishments, almost two-thirds of AAC aircrew are non-commissioned officers. The AAC is supported by REME and RLC personnel numbering some 2,600 all ranks. Total AAC-related manpower is believed to be some 4,600 personnel of all ranks. It is an “economic” air force, and it is hoped that enlarge the AAC with the transfer of current RAF assets will still generate savings: for sure, a lot of money will be saved on personnel pays and costs.

3 Attack Regiments – 3°, 4°, 9°. Each Regiment will line 2 Squadrons of Apache helicopters and a Light Utility/Scout Squadron with Wildcat helicopters.

In peacetime, save when on exercise, Apache and Wildcat will keep being concentrated in squadrons of sole Wildcats and sole Apaches, but wartime organization for use with 16 Air Assault Brigade (or in support of other ground forces) the regiments would assume their expected organization.

1 Air Assault Regiment – This Regiment would exist mainly to provide transport and mobility to the 16 Air Assault brigade, and it would be an important component of the Brigade organization.

It would consist of two Chinook squadrons, for a total of around 30 helicopters, enough to move a whole Battalion in a single assault wave. Of course, this regiment would be available to be used in other, different ways when necessary, and retain a significant, secondary role as reinforcement to the Special Forces Support Group.

2 Aviation Brigades (7° and 8° Regiment AAC) – One Aviation Brigade would be assigned to the 1^st UK Division and one to the 3^rd UK Division.

Each would line a Squadron of 8 Lynx MK9A (22 available, same engines of the Wildcats, to be retained for several more years until funding is obtained to replace them with a further batch of Wildcats) and a Squadron of 12 Chinooks.

I don’t expect the money to ever be available for this, but if the savings provided by closing down the RAF structure and the Benson base were to suffice, 24 more Apache AH1 should be acquired, making available one Attack squadron to each of the two Aviation Brigades and equipping the 847° Squadron Commando Helicopter Force with the remaining 8.

More urgent will be to release the funding to upgrade the Apache fleet to the standard Block III, along with the American upgrade programme on their own fleet. This will ensure the Apache remains cutting edge technology, and will also make it capable to receive imagery directly on the cockpit’s screens from external sources such as drones like Watchkeeper, significantly improving the capabilities of the platform. The army is already reportedly trying to secure funds for this very need.

8 Flight – Hereford A little-known and rarely spotted fleet of 4 Eurocopter Dauphins and 2 Gazelle helicopters that support the Special Air Service. The two Gazelle, if already haven’t been, should be retired soon.

29 BATUS Flight – Canada Currently uses the Gazelle AH1. In the future the easiest solution might be a PFI involving a civilian contractor making a small number of helicopters available to the unit.

25 Flight – Belize To disband this year with the downsizing of British presence in the BATSUB. Uses Bell 212.

7 Flight – Brunei The flight supports the resident infantry battalion from the Brigade of Gurkhas and Training Team Brunei (TTB), which runs jungle warfare training courses, as well as supporting the Jungle Search and Rescue Team (JSART) and selection for 22 SAS.

The flight use Bell 212 light helicopters that have been in service since 1994.

84 RAF Squadron – Akrotiri The Squadron is at present a Search and Rescue Squadron based at RAF Akrotiri, and uses the Bell Griffin HAR.2 helicopter. The Squadron will fall under AAC management, keep its symbol and colors but possibly be named an AAC Flight in light of its small sizes.

SAR Squadrons

As we know, by 2014 the SAR service is most likely going to be a civilian thing. Current SAR Squadrons of both the Royal Navy and RAF are more than likely to disband and vanish. The 84° Squadron in Cyprus should be safe for now, while the SAR Flight in the Falklands, which flies the Sea King, faces an uncertain future. It sure is necessary to replace the capability it provides, but so far there’s not a clear plan for this. It is likely that two helicopters will be acquired from a civilian contractor for the role.

Be it weight class, mission, payload or other factors there are clearly different types. One size does not and cannot fit all. This is where an interesting discussion can take place; I think one of the principal means of getting more value out of our not inconsiderable defence budget is through ruthless commonality and its resultant reduction in types.

How far do you go with this though, do the obvious financial and logistics benefits of commonality get trumped by the inevitable compromises that having fewer types would bring?

Therefore, instead of starting with types and specs I am going to look at what we use helicopters for, these are generally grouped into 3 categories, find, attack and lift with a few extra specialists roles.

Training; with the greater use of synthetic training systems the need for multiple types of training helicopter may be reduced but the basic need to train on the real thing will not go away.

Light Utility/Lift; this might include the plethora of tasks that helicopters get used for, everything from moving a small team, command, convoy escort, moving a few personnel from one ship to another, checking communications, conducting a route recce, delivering a high value spare part and many many more. What characterises these requirements is that do not necessarily need high speed or high payloads, often the payload is simply a few people.

Find; in the past this might have resulted in a specialist type but with the proliferation of sensor turrets, modular ESM systems and data links in most aircraft and UAV’s the need for a dedicated reconnaissance helicopter is diminishing with the role split between the attack and light utility helicopter.

Medium/Heavy Lift; there is some room for having different definitions of what medium and heavy lift means and specifically, whether there still exists a need for medium lift if we can do everything with the heavier and more capable types. Typically, the medium point means a section or enhanced section plus some stores and the ability to carry some self defence weapons or about 4 tonnes payload. Heavy lift might be defined as 30-40 personnel or about 8-10 tonnes payload. One of the most vexing questions is concerned with the top end of heavy lift, is 10 tonnes enough given the trend in vehicle weight and size (a trend that informed the A400 for example)

Anti Submarine; helicopters are one of the most potent anti submarine weapons, equipped with various specialist sensors and weapons.

Dedicated Attack; evolving from the Huey gunships of the 60’s is the dedicated attack helicopter. These are fast, high manoeuvrable, survivable and heavily armed. Latter generations concentrated on the anti tank role but in modern operations this has been joined by a number of offensive support tasks in direct support of the infantry in close combat. For this the cannon and rocket are the most common weapons used, not expensive guided missiles.

Medical Evacuation; the ability to evacuate injured personnel to a medical facility is vital and recent advances in combat emergency medicine have seen the Chinook used in this role because of its speed and space for medical personnel and equipment but in some circumstances a smaller type is needed.

Search and Rescue: whether in the civilian context or in the military Joint Personnel Recovery role the requirement is characterised by the need for long range, stability in the hover and capacity.

Airborne Early Warning; a niche application but nevertheless vital, the lessons of 1982 were quite clear but with CVF moving to cats and traps this capability may be better serviced with a fixed wing type, the obvious contender being the Hawkeye

Where this gets complicated is the need for operations at sea. Surely one would think that a homogonous fleet, able to operate equally from a ship or land base would make sense from a logistics, operational and training perspective but this is the MoD we are talking about. We have service led procurements that have resulted in a mixed fleet of aircraft that in some cases do much the same thing but only some can operate at sea.

Although not specifically a mission, but definitely a requirement, is the ability to operate, not just land, from ships.

Any look at the future must surely specify marinised systems, folding rotors etc even if the main user is not the Royal Navy or Royal Marines.

There have also been some interesting technology developments recently (lighter than air, compound helicopters, variable speed rotors and various tilt rotor technologies for example) which although might be seen as technology driving requirements, do allow us to look again at those requirements and ask if they are still valid.

In the next post I am going to look at what we have and what we plan to have and follow that up with a few ideas for the future.

## Other posts in this series ##

The Future of the RAF 01 – Introduction

The Future of the RAF 02 – Tasks and Trends

The Future of the RAF 03 – A Takeover Bid

The Future of the RAF 04 – Fast Jets

The Future of the RAF 05 – A Bargain Basement

The Future of the RAF 06 – A Reverse Takeover Bid

The Future of the RAF 07 – ISTAR #01

The Future of the RAF 08 – ISTAR #02 (DABINETT)

The Future of the RAF 09 – ISTAR #03 (SIGINT)

The Future of the RAF 10 – ISTAR #04 (Watchkeeper and Scavenger)

The Future of the RAF 11 – ISTAR #05 (Manned Airborne ISTAR)

The Future of the RAF 12 – ISTAR #06 (High Altitude Platforms)

The Future of the RAF 13 – ISTAR #07 (Maritime)

The Future of the RAF 14 – Strategic Transport and Refuelling

The Future of the RAF 15 – Tactical Transport

The Future of the RAF 16 – Vertical Lift #01 (Introduction)

The Future of the RAF 17 – Vertical Lift #02 (Basic Requirements)

The Future of the RAF 18 – Vertical Lift #03 (A Sensible Future)

The Future of the RAF 19 – Vertical Lift #04 (A Radical Future)

The Future of the RAF 20 – Building Regional Security

The Future of the RAF 21 – Summary

Being able to deliver and retrieve personnel and stores from the hover and doing the same from more or less any location that suits the operation is why we put up with their numerous less ideal characteristics, it really is that simple. In other roles, the ability to use terrain masking delivers significant advantages.

Unfortunately, vertical lift is another area the UK has been lacking in investment and the headlines reflect this, helicopters often becoming a political football, the results of which has often clouded good judgement. Lurching from one short term knee jerk expedient to another, the resultant fleet is a mess of too many types, fleets within fleets and is depressingly familiar MoD ‘short termism’ writ large.

More than anything else, the insidious and malign influence of politics, inter service nonsense and all consuming industrial concerns has left us with an overly expensive mess that delivers a Ford Fiesta capability at Rolls Royce prices where the people who pay the price are service personnel.

And make no mistake; lives have been lost because of it, despite what politicians and politicians in uniform might say.

Those responsible, civilian and military alike, should hang their heads in shame for it is their lack of courage, intellectual honesty and mealy mouth excuse making that has delivered a UK rotary fleet that is self evidently not fit for purpose.

Lack of mobility also has a serious detriment on operational tempo; the ability to achieve surprise and be unpredictable will inevitably constrain operational freedom and ultimately the achievement of goals.

This has to stop, it is time we created and, above all, followed through on a radical, single minded, coherent long term strategy, because if operations from the Falklands to Afghanistan have taught us anything, it is that one can never have too much vertical lift.

We have to be honest and recognise the undue influence that Agusta Westland has had over the years on the UK military rotary fleet and ask ourselves if the Defence Industrial Strategy’s insistence that the UK retain sovereign capability in helicopters has been a good thing or not.

I am not blind to the need to maintain sovereign capabilities in many spheres of defence but much less convinced of the need for such in helicopters and any strategy must consider the industrial issues but not be handcuffed by them.

In a previous post I looked at helicopters in the government sphere, not military but funded from the public purse nevertheless. These should also be considered.

In the next few posts I am going to look at the helicopter and vertical lift issue, again, it is included in the RAF series for convenience. In a break with the normal series convention I am going to present a couple of parallel ideas, the first is a coping strategy, to get beyond the next few years and finally, a complete fantasy clean sheet approach (expect a a bit of off the reservation blue sky thangs)

## Other posts in this series ##

The Future of the RAF 01 – Introduction

The Future of the RAF 02 – Tasks and Trends

The Future of the RAF 03 – A Takeover Bid

The Future of the RAF 04 – Fast Jets

The Future of the RAF 05 – A Bargain Basement

The Future of the RAF 06 – A Reverse Takeover Bid

The Future of the RAF 07 – ISTAR #01

The Future of the RAF 08 – ISTAR #02 (DABINETT)

The Future of the RAF 09 – ISTAR #03 (SIGINT)

The Future of the RAF 10 – ISTAR #04 (Watchkeeper and Scavenger)

The Future of the RAF 11 – ISTAR #05 (Manned Airborne ISTAR)

The Future of the RAF 12 – ISTAR #06 (High Altitude Platforms)

The Future of the RAF 13 – ISTAR #07 (Maritime)

The Future of the RAF 14 – Strategic Transport and Refuelling

The Future of the RAF 15 – Tactical Transport

The Future of the RAF 16 – Vertical Lift #01 (Introduction)

The Future of the RAF 17 – Vertical Lift #02 (Basic Requirements)

The Future of the RAF 18 – Vertical Lift #03 (A Sensible Future)

The Future of the RAF 19 – Vertical Lift #04 (A Radical Future)

The Future of the RAF 20 – Building Regional Security

The Future of the RAF 21 – Summary

Helicopter Air Bags

NASA carried out a series of helicopter crashes to investigate survival technologies some years ago including what they called a deployable energy absorber that consisted of a hinged honeycomb matrix that deployed on command.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Bell Helicopter also registered a patent on a similar system in 2006

Helicopter airframes are engineered to be very strong under impact conditions and a variety of other systems like crash resistant seating are added to improve survivability, these all add weight. Aero Sekur claim that incorporating a system like this would allow manufacturers to reduce weight significantly.

The first integrated system should be available next year and commenting at Farnborough last year Giacomo Giovangrossi, Aero Sekur’s space business unit director, said;

“The shock attenuation aspects of the system were originally developed as part of the ESA ExoMars programme and designed to bring payloads including Mars probes safely to rest, The system ensures that orientation is maintained on uneven or sloping surfaces. The airbag also features our non-pyrotechnic inflation system, significantly enhancing maintainability, reliability and operating costs.”

Interesting stuff

The MoD  police are now investigating the preferred bidder, Soteria, after allegations that a former member of the joint Ministry of Defence/Department for Transport integrated project team (IPT)  assisted the consortium in its bid preparation by providing access to commercially sensitive information.  The individual then apparently went to work for Soteria.

The Secretary of State for Transport (Phillip Hammond) said;

“On 16 December I and my Rt Hon Friend the Secretary of State for Defence announced that information had come to light regarding the preferred bid in the Search and Rescue Helicopter competition which required clarification.

“In mid-December, the preferred bidder in the SAR-H competition, Soteria, voluntarily came forward to inform the Government of irregularities regarding the conduct of their bid team which had only then recently come to light. The irregularities included access by one of the consortium members, CHC Helicopter, to commercially sensitive information regarding the joint MOD/DfT project team’s evaluations of industry bids and evidence that a former member of that project team had assisted the consortium in its bid preparation, contrary to explicit assurances given to the project team at the time.

“Since December, our two Departments have been working with Soteria to better understand the situation and its implications for the procurement process. In addition, the Ministry of Defence Police are investigating how the commercially sensitive information came to be in the possession of the bidder. It would be inappropriate to comment further on the details of the investigation until it has finished.

“However, even without the outcome of that investigation, the Government has sufficient information to enable it to conclude that the irregularities that have been identified were such that it would not be appropriate to proceed with either the preferred bid or with the current procurement process.

“The Department for Transport and the Ministry of Defence will now consider the potential procurement options to meet future requirements for search and rescue helicopters in the United Kingdom, including options to maintain continuity of search and rescue helicopter cover until new longer term arrangements can be put in place.

“We will make a further announcement once a way forward has been agreed.”

Soteria is a consortium comprising the Canadian operator CHC, Sikorsky, Thales and the Royal Bank of Scotland (yes, the one the taxpayer owns) although RBS bailed out just before Christmas when the allegations emerged. In all fairness to Soteria, it was they who fessed up with their concerns,it wasn’t of course the MoD, lets face it, they would be lucky to find water if they fell out of a boat.

Currently, SAR helicopter operations are carried out by the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force flying the Westland Sea King, and by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) using a mix of S-92s and AW139s provided by CHC under an interim contract. Under the Soteria SAR-H bid, this mixed fleet would have been replaced with a single fleet of Sikorsky S-92As based at 12 stations around the country. The service was due to be in place by 2016, when the Sea King is planned to exit service. The losers, AirKnight (Lockheed Martin UK, VT Group and British International Helicopters) will no doubt feel rather agrieved. British International Helicopters currently service military contracts in the Falkland Islands and for Royal Navy Operational Sea Training.

It was reported that the MoD would pay two thirds of the costs and the Department of Transport, the balance. The contract was reportedly was designed and the service would have been a boost to capabilities, much better aircraft for example, S92′s instead of Sea Kings and AW139′s. However, some doubts were raised such as the the differences between the words capability and effectiveness when used to describe the level of service comparison between the existing and new.

Scheduled to start operation in 2012 the requirements included launch within 15 minutes during the day, within 45 minutes at night and be able to reach all ‘Very High Risk Areas’ and 75% of ‘Medium Risk Areas’ within 60 minutes, the service also had to have the ability to surge aircraft when required.

The Soteria bid was widely recognised as being excellent, the requirements had been refined over a number of years and the bid process open and detailed, I am sure it would have been a highly professional, if PFI style expensive, service.

Always ready with an interesting quote, Bob Crowe, the general secretary of the Rail, Maritime and Transport union said;

‘This whole sordid and botched episode shows that the raw greed of the private sector should never be allowed anywhere near life or death rescue services on the high seas. Millions of pounds of taxpayers’ money has been wasted and the whole plan should now be scrapped, not shelved.’

More Than Meets the Eye

I wonder if the ‘bad apple’ narrative is a cover for something else and whilst I started this post with a cheap shot at the MoD the more I think about it, the more I think there is more than meets the eye.

Despite the technical requirements being very detailed, the desire to retain military aircrew and a politically motivated desire to retain 12 operating locations (possible more than needed with the modern helicopters being proposed) meant the contract vehicle ended up being a bit of a hybrid, restraining the ability of the operator to drive down costs and make a profit. Soteria are not a charity, they have a duty to their shareholders, lets not forget that.

In the period between naming Soteria as preferred bidder and contract award that never happened, two crucial events took place.

First, it was announced in December that military aircrews would not be part of the deal in a bid to cut costs.

Second, RBS withdrew from the consortium, again in December, without stating why.

The current narrative is that Soteria became aware of irregularities, reported it to the MoD and upon hearing of these issues, RBS wanted to put some distance between them and the deal. The news about the member of the IPT was released and everyone assumes that the skullduggery is the open and shut reason why we are where we are.

How about a few of idle conspiracy theories;

Removing the military aircrew makes the contract extremely difficult to deliver against and signals a lack of commitment from the PFI hating government, RBS realise they are never going to make a return and pull the plug. Soteria decide their best route out is to suddenly own up.

or

The government know that the deal is hugely expensive, have been scathing about PFI’s in opposition (some quotes from Phil Hammond and Liam Fox here) and after Nimrod and other MoD failures decide enough is enough. How could they collapse the deal without looking even worse than they do now, have a quiet word with RBS and suggest it might be in everyone’s interest if they withdraw from the consortium and did they know about a member of the IPT who went to work for Soteria?

or

Facing the prospect of ‘signing on’ Prince William was subsequently reported to be lobbying David Cameron to reverse the decision. David Cameron decides not to go forward with a contract that would see the heir to the throne issued with a P45 and concocts some means of cancelling the contract, see above!

Now some of these may well be the product of a fevered mind and I don’t have the first clue what actually happened (I would point out I am not making an accusation) but some of the timing does appear somewhat convenient. The individual has been named but I am not inclined to repeat it here because the man’s reputation has been ruined before the facts come to light.

Is there more to this than meets the eye or is it simply a case of a bad apple, I suspect we will never know.

What Next

Whatever the conspiracy theory, whatever the actual reality, the fact is we need to decide what comes next.

Before what happens next is decided the Sea Kings will have to soldier on, although some of them are not as old as you might think. Merlins were discounted early on because of their massive costs and significant rotor downwash so punting the RAF’s Merlins on to the SAR force seems a non starter.

I have mixed feelings about SAR remaining as a military task, retaining it within the MoD allows a larger pool of aircrew to be maintained, reduces ‘brain drain’ to the private sector and improves the image of the armed forces within the country but how much ‘actual’ movement between SH and SAR communities occurs and is it really a military task?

The more combat oriented search and rescue, or joint personnel recovery on operations, is carried out by the Support Helicopter function or more likely by the USA and in the context of a decreasing defence vote I think it becomes less and less important to retain it as a military task.

The search and rescue task, fixed and rotary, is an extremely complex task and the current mixed provision does not on face value seem to be an efficient means of delivering that task.

Whilst I do not think it is necessarily a military task it certainly is a public sector task, the actual responsibility still rests with the Department of Transport, not the MoD.

Is it about time we had a coastguard that was equipped for all aspects of maritime patrol and search and rescue?

Or even a Government Aviation Service that provides all non military aircraft, fixed and rotary?

Nicholas Soames (Mid Sussex, Conservative)

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the remaining (a) establishment and (b) structure of the Fleet Air Arm is in terms of (i) manpower and (ii) aircraft.

Nick Harvey (Minister of State (Armed Forces), Defence; North Devon, Liberal Democrat)

After implementing the decisions taken in the strategic defence and security review, the Fleet Air Arm will operate the following helicopters:

30 anti-submarine Warfare Merlins;

28 Maritime Wildcats;

25 Commando Merlins; and

6 Battlefield Wildcats.

In addition, some second line aircraft will be used for training purposes. It will employ 1,179 officers and 3,186 ratings.

The Fleet Air Arm remains the Ministry of Defence’s Maritime Aircraft Operating Authority and is a joint partner in the Joint Combat Aircraft programme.

Anyone see where a Sea King ASaC Mk.7 replacement will fit into this, it’s not like we have already spent millions on ‘feasibility studies’ is it.

It has been assumed by many, including me, that the Sea Kings would go out of service in 2016 to coincide with SAR-H (oh dear), the Merlin conversions being available and the systems transferred into the ‘spare’ Merlin HM.1 airframes.

Perhaps it is just an omission and everything will be OK (anyone convinced)

Is 28 Maritime Wildcats too much given their role and number of surface combatants likely to be in the future Royal Navy?

This would also seem to confirm that the FAA will be getting those RAF Merlin’s after all, when they have been converted to a maritime capability they should have always had, or, the tooth fairy will deliver 25 Commando Merlin’s fresh from the manufacturer!

It also looks like 847 Naval Air Squadron will be equipped with a total of 6 Battlefield Wildcat helicopters.

Project JULIUS will modify 38 Mk2/2A Chinooks into the Mk4/4A configuration and eight Mk3 Chinook’s into the Mk5 configuration.

The Mk3 aircraft are of course the world’s most expensive helicopters due to the MoD’s cost saving methods.

Chinook HC4

A major part of the modification for both the Mk4/4A and Mk5 aircraft is the Thales TopDeck cockpit which will provide improved situational awareness, increased safety and options for capability enhancement. The Thales UK’s TopDeck cockpit suite includes an onboard mission planning system providing crew with extensive tactical flexibility and the capability to optimize the mission profile to suit real-time circumstances. A ground mission support system completes the tactical mission capability and a fully secure data transfer system guarantees security. Critical flight data, including primary flight and tactical data, is continuously presented on the four main 6″ x 8″ displays, easing cockpit workload and allowing a significant increase in situational awareness.

The first of the upgraded aircraft will be available for operations towards the end of this year

The entire Mk2 fleet will be fitted with the JULIUS cockpit by early 2015, followed by Mk2A and Mk3 modifications by 2015 and 2016, respectively.

The modifications also include the addition of a third crew-member seat, upgrades to the Honeywell T55-714 engines and an update of Airworthiness & Safety Certification and Qualification for the modernized Chinook. Tablet computer ‘electronic flight bags’ will also be provided as part of the project.

The existing engines are being replaced with Honeywell T55 L714A engines, although a couple of RAF Chinooks do use this engine. The engine upgrade improves power by approximately 20%, increases fuel efficiency and reduces maintenance requirements. The net result will be improved performance and greater availability.

The aircraft are being modified at the Gosport Fleetlands facility operated by Vector Aerospace, Boeing’s principal subcontractor for deep support of the RAF Chinook fleet.

This programme will still see a fleet within a fleet but the commonality benefits will be significant, ruthless commonality in action, especially for maintenance and training.

The project was announced in 2009 at a cost of £408 million, the engine element cost £128m and the avionics the balance although work first started on the project definition in 2008.

GOOD NEWS

While specialist support crews in theatre conduct the day-to-day maintenance on the hi-tech helicopter, the aircraft also has a legion of engineering experts poised for action in the UK. Based at Attack Helicopter HQ in Wattisham, a highly-skilled group of Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (REME) craftsmen work alongside civilian contractors to run a Depth Support Unit (DSU) – an organisation charged with keeping the Apache fleet fit for flight.

Whenever an aircraft clocks up 600 flying hours it is booked into the state-of-the-art service centre to be stripped down to its bare frame and meticulously cleaned and inspected for wear and tear or damage. Parts are then repaired or replaced before the helicopter is rebuilt and sent back into service.

Warrant Officer Class 1 Christian Rouse, the man responsible for overseeing the movements of every Apache on behalf of the Joint Helicopter Force, said:

“Afghanistan is the priority and they’re flying a lot of hours out there. It’s always busy, there’s always another op on. They go out for seven to eight weeks then come back here and go into depth service. Then about 60 to 65 days later they’ll go back to the regiment.”

Up to ten Apaches at a time can be housed in DSU’s enormous hangar, where they will move sequentially along a pulse line of nine stands, spending roughly nine days at each

So an Apache can only fly for 600 hours before being completely stripped down, 6 weeks in theatre followed by about 9 weeks in maintenance and transport. This highlights exactly why you need quantity to sustain an enduring operation because you simply cannot compromise on safety.

Apache Helicopter

Instead of seeking extra speed or payload, perhaps the next focus for helicopter designers should be maintability in theatre. Numbers of personnel in theatre are politically capped, would depth maintenance make more sense if it was carried out in theatre, are we compensating for a lack of personnel by shipping the airframes back and forth?

The article also mentions waiting for spares, what, waiting for bloody spares. These are war winning machines and waiting for spares is a phrase that should never appear on a whiteboard in the workshop.

The people carrying out this maintenance, military and civilian, do a fantastic and under reported job but the MoD should not make their lives harder by under resourced spares packages.

Of course, we could make sure the spanner bashers are maintaining helicopters instead of air bumming :)

Click here to view the embedded video.

Eurocopter x3

The X³ (or X Cube Eurocopter parlance and suitably registered F-ZXXX) flew on 6 September and is truly a composite helicopter, not just in the sense of its layout.  It utilises a AS365N3 Dauphin fuselage coupled with a modified EC175 transmission, in addition to the EC 155 main rotor.  Many other components of the aircraft were also lifted from the Eurocopter spare-parts bin, including the EC145.

Click here to view the embedded video.

The missions envisaged by Eurocopter for the X³ include oil and gas exploration and support, passenger transport, search and rescue and of course, military.  Although not just simply a ‘Poor man’s V-22 Osprey’, the stub wings and propellers offer significantly higher forward speeds and range.

At high speeds the disc load on the main-rotor is off-loaded by lift from the stub wings, this helps reduce the drag from the main rotor by allowing it to rotate at a slower speed, in an attempt to keep the blade tips sub-sonic.   The stub wings also off-set retreating blade stall, inherent in a helicopter with a high forward speed.

The engines for the aircraft have been described as coming from the NH90, by this we can guess they are Rolls Royce RTM322’s.  The drive to the two wing mounted rotors is provided by two small turbo-prop engines, although the promotional video suggested transmission take-off drives.  From this it could be construed that there is an element of redundancy with direct drive from the main transmission in the event of engine failure, necessary if the props also provide yaw and anti-torque control.  From the video it appears that the two drive propellers rotate in opposite directions, the port propeller clockwise (when viewed from the front), and the starboard propeller counter-clockwise.

Initial viewing suggests that the X³ is a very logical layout and an ideal solution to the problems of high speed rotary performance.  However, from a military perspective the design does have a number of limitations.

Firstly, the additional engines for the drive props would introduce an additional large component into the maintenance and logistics chain, its also one more thing to go wrong or get hit by enemy fire, despite the suggestion of mechanical redundancy.

Secondly, admittedly this is purely a technology demonstrator, the forward drive props in their present position do risk decapitating and dismembering deplaning personnel.  This risk would undoubtedly be reduced if and aircraft like the NH90 were adapted, however, the anhedral design of the wings may still pose an inherent problem.  Although these are necessary to keep the propellers and main rotors at a safe distance from each other in the event of blade flapping in high winds or heavy landings.

Ducting the props or converting them to a pusher configuration may mitigate some of these issues. Some years ago Dowty trialled ducted turbofans on on a Britten Norman Islander.

Islander Ducted Fan

Thirdly, from a military perspective the stub wings are an ideal place to hang additional stores, such as weapons and drop tanks.  Spinning a large propeller at the front would preclude the aircraft from firing rockets or missiles unless they were fuselage mounted.

As an alternative design, the tail mounted Vectored Thrust Ducted Propeller (VTDP) demonstrated on Piasecki’s modified Sikorsky Seahawk, offers a safer and less complex solution.  It would allow use of the stub wings for the stores and put the danger of a rotating propeller where soldiers expect it to be, at the end of the tail at the back.

X49a Speedhawk

Click here to view the embedded video.

Sikorsky have also recently shown an advanced technology demonstrator, the X2.

Sikorsky X2

The single-engined fly-by-wire aircraft features coaxial rotors and a pusher propeller that Sikorsky believes will revolutionize the helicopter world with cruise speeds of up to 250 kts, some 100 kts faster than current production helicopters.

“This isn’t an airplane we are training to hover. It’s a helicopter that will go very, very fast,” said Sikorsky CEO Jeff Pino. “I think it will get to 260 kts.” (The helicopter world speed record is held by a Westland Lynx at 216.45 kts).

Click here to view the embedded video.

It is good to see companies exploring different avenues to try and resolve current design issues and limitations.  For the X³ I would give Eurocopter a ten out of ten for ingenuity and courage.

The question is, are we going to see something as innovative as this or the Sikorsky X2 from our very own AgustaWestland?

Enter the Kamov Ka-226 ‘Sergei’, the Russian alternative. Although it does not have the lift capacity of the K-MAX, approximately 3,000 lbs compared to 6,000 lbs, this miniature flying crane is smaller, lighter and has the distinct advantage of being able to re-configure its role by changing its main fuselage pod. The Kamov also has a greater range, almost double that of the Kamen product, in addition to being faster.

Ka-226

The Pods are also available for a wide range of differing roles such as Medevac, fire fighting, crop spraying and troop carrying to name but a few. The troop carrying pod can accommodate six, as well as an additional body in the cockpit. A helicopter such as the UH-60 Blackhawk requires a aircraft dedicated to the role, such as the UH-60Q and the S-70C Firehawk.

Click here to view the embedded video.

The Kamov can also carry two external 160 litre fuel tanks to extend its range. This ability has only been managed by one NATO aircraft, the older and significantly larger Sikorsky CH-54/S-64 Tarhe. The advantage that a flying crane offers over a traditional troop carrying helicopter is that it can ditch the parasitic weight of the troop compartment and increase its load carrying capability. The Sergei offers an additional advantage in that by using contra-rotating blades, power is not absorbed by the ‘parasitic’ anti-torque tail rotor.

Sikorsky Skycrane

Click here to view the embedded video.

In comparison the K-MAX’s single engine, the Ka-226 is fitted with two Rolls Royce Allison 250’s, a highly popular and reliable gas turbine, giving it a degree of commonality with Western aircraft. The Ka-226T variant has the more powerful Turbomeca Arrius 2G2, again a highly popular engine, giving the aircraft greater performance and an element of redundancy not offered by the K-MAX, something that should be considered for a battlefield role.

As a number of NATO countries still use the Mi-8 ‘Hip’, M-24 Hind and the MiG-29, operating an aircraft of Russian origin within the NATO inventory is not a great problem. Given the Ka-226’s mission flexibility it has the potential to be a great asset in a nation’s logistical support. Although the K-MAX has the distinct advantage of having an unmanned variant, it would not be too difficult to apply similar technology to the Kamov.

Given the advantages that are offered by the flying crane configuration, they could form the basis of a rotary fleet with the Ka-226T at the bottom end and a heavy lift variant based on the Sikorsky CH-53K at the other. A medium sized flying crane variant based on the NH-90 or the S-92 would not be beyond the realms of human ingenuity. Of course, flying cranes are not a panacea for the rotary world as dedicated roles such as attack helicopters and naval helicopters will still require a specialist aircraft. However, for ‘poorer’ nations, it would be cheaper and more effective to purchase a Kamov with a ‘maritime’ pod fitted with a radar and a dunking sonar than buying a high cost dedicated alternative such as the AW.159 Lynx Wildcat.

In these austere times, perhaps it is time to start looking at ‘swing-role’ helicopters that can fulfil a greater number of roles by using the flying crane as the core type, rather than trying to fulfil every role with a dedicated airframe.