This is a report from may this year

Click here to view the embedded video.

Commenting on the new(ish) aircraft Deputy Squadron Commander, Captain Pete Marfleet said;

“It’s fantastic to have the new Lynx MK9A with its upgraded engines as it means we can be here throughout the summer, supporingt the troops on the ground through the toughest time of the year. Success for us means we’ve got a convoy or a support helicopter in and out of a patrol base without any trouble. Just our presence in the overhead and the threat from our weapons systems means that the enemy wisely keep their heads down.”

One of the squadrons instructors said;

“This is a massively capable aircraft. The environment in Afghanistan is challenging to say the least but it copes extremely well. The manufacturers have done a fantastic job. Its capability means that we can take the fight to the enemy if required.”

Hats off to Agusta Westland then, clearly a well regarded aircraft has been substantially improved.

The upgrade of the Mk9′s means they will be in service until 2016, there are 22 upgraded airframes. The new engines are the same as those being fitted into the Lynx Wildcat.

The upgrade has cost about £4.5million per aircraft for the second batch, the first batch cost about £6.5million

This might not seem exceptional value for money but compare that to the cost of the Lynx Wildcat at £1.7billion for just over 60 aircraft.

Here is a quick idea on how we can save a lot of money.

Cancel the Lynx Wildcat and simply upgrade a few more Mk 7′s

We really have to ask ourselves if the extra capabilities offered by Wildcat are worth the money when the upgrades are doing so well. It might also be interesting to ask Agusta Westland what capabilities and performance we will in fact be losing in the upgrade as well.

For the price of a Wildcat we could perhaps squeeze 5 upgrades out of the budget.

As they say on Big Brother

Who goes, you decide!

With a keen eye, the author had spotted a couple of images from the USMC media operation in Helmand.

Because there seemed to be no coverage in any UK media outlets I was a little reticent about covering it, fearing that it was combat damage and there might have been a news embargo for obvious reasons.

With news starting to filter out in the UK I have assumed its safe to cover it.

Rotorhub.com has been told the incident occured on 23 June after the Merlin assigned to 1419 Flight made a heavy landing at an assault base in the Lashkar Gar area of Helmand province.

No-one was seriously injured and the incident is now being investigated while the aircraft is being assessed to see if it can be returned to service.

A heavy Lift CH53E Super Stallion helicopter has recovered a damaged Merlin, the pictures show the impressive lifting power of the helicopter but no doubt a lot of skill and expertise from all concerned also went into the whole operations.

More details from the Marine Times here

Merlin - Prior to Recovery

Merlin - Recovered USMC CH53E

So, a gracious tip of the hat to Solomon

UPDATE

Wing Cmdr. "Spats" Paterson, the commanding officer of the Joint Helicopter Force (Afghanistan) here, peers inside the 'lifeless' body of Mk3 Merlin which Marines with Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 466 recovered from a forward operating base. The helo went down in a nonhostile event recently and had to be toted back here - a mission HMH-466 was able to plan and execute in about 16 hours.

The 'lifeless' body of an Mk3 Merlin with Joint Helicopter Force (Afghanistan) here sits just off the air field where a CH-53E Super Stallion with Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 466 put it down moments earlier.

Members of the United Kingdom's Joint Helicopter Force (Afghanistan) here remove the rigging from a Mk3 Merlin after an early-morning operation to recover the aircraft from a forward operating base. The helo suffered a hard landing recently, and JHF(A) turned to Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 466 and its CH-53E Super Stallions for the lift because the Marines were the only squadron capable of reconfiguring its aircraft for a lift of this magnitude on extremely short notice.

The Lynx Mk.9A is an upgraded version of the Mk.9 and features LHTECH CTS800N engines which offer significantly more power over the original ‘wheezy’ Rolls Royce Gems. This will vastly improve the Lynx’s hot and high performance in Afghanistan. Prior to this operations were severely restricted especially during the summer months.

This additional engine power also allows the Mk.9A to carry heavier weapons as pictures have been released of the aircraft fitted with the 0.50 M3M HMG, which is a significant increase in fire power over the usual 7.62 L7 GPMG.

In addition to the new engines the Mk.9A is also fitted improved secure communications equipment. Given this quantum leap in capability over the previous Mk.7 and Mk.9 variants, it will be a welcome addition to the flight line.

Lynx 9a being loaded into an RAF C17

EDITOR: Let’s hope there are more than 2 being deployed.

Merlin, Springer and Quad Bike

Is this just normal good practice for Joint Helicpoter Command or is it a sign that the availability of air and ground crew has and continues to be a problem?

Good luck to them all of course.

Click here to view the embedded video.

H/T Cold War Warrior

As readers of Think Defence will know, the issue of helicopters is of significant interest and we have keenly followed the issue since the blog started.

The report observes all the usual niceties but is interesting in many ways because it exposes the muddle, ‘short termism’ and lack of any strategic thinking that has bedeviled the UK armed forces helicopter capability over the last decade, perhaps even longer.

Conflict has a habit of exposing shortcomings in equipment and the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated just how the absolutely critical element of tactical mobility, afforded by helicopters, has been allowed to wither. No amount of panic buying, cobbling together upgrades and hiding behind the oft used fig leaf of ‘more flying hours’ can hide the fact that failing to invest in a coherent, balanced capability has had and continues to have real implications for both operational success and force protection i.e. soldiers lives and limbs.

On the issue of…

Sensible Resource Management

The response makes reference to the requirement to balance aircraft hours in theatre with something that it calls ‘sensible resource management’

What exactly is sensible resource management, one suspects it might involve the husbandry of the finite asset that is airframe hours but surely, there is a bloody war on and we should not be concerned with sensible resource management but maximising the effect in theatre.

Enough

The MoD’s response echoes a number of senior defence staff that have repeatedly stated that we have enough helicopters in theatre. One suspects that these serving officers are wheeled out on demand to cover the embarrassment of the MoD and Government by saying move along, nothing to see here. These statements are always caveated with the desire for more.

So,

We have enough but more would be good.

Call me a simpleton but doesn’t that mean we don’t actually have enough?

The Full Picture

The initial report made a great point of highlighting what seems like deliberate lack of openness from the MoD. If anyone reads the actual transcripts of the evidence sessions it will become painfully obvious that the senior civil servants and military staff that attend the committee sessions hold it in complete contempt, arrogantly avoiding the questions at every turn.

It is not only politicians that can talk at length without actually saying anything of substance.

Reforming the system of governance and supervision within the government framework is essential if Parliament is to scrutinise effectively and hold to account the civil service and government of the day.

There are lots of other interesting information in this under reported response, full text at the link.

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmdfence/381/38104.htm

http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2009/09/unmanned-logistics-getting-the-delivery-through/

By way of an update, Lockheed Martin have released some more information on progress to date.

Unmanned K-Max

Perhaps the most interesting item in the press release from LM is the cost for the demonstration phase, $860k

Surely some mistake!

As an attempt at a more balanced fleet the suggestion on Think Defence was a slight increase in the Astute numbers to 8, keeping Type 45 at 6, a small quantity (6) fully specified C1 and a couple of novel C2/C3 concepts from a number of our contributors. Obviously with the loss of maritime fast jet aviation we would be out of the forced entry amphibious game although the combination of UAV’s, FLAADS/CAMM, Attack Helicopter and Type 45 might mitigate some of the loss of capability.

That is not to say that we could not still engage in amphibious operations because not all operations are in the teeth of advanced jet fighters so we should accept a capability reduction and recognise that future operations may have to be conducted in conjunction with allies that can provide the fast jet component.

To bring our FDR Maritime section to a close the next few posts are on amphibious/logistics capabilities and a look at a few innovative concepts.

The Royal Navy currently has 2 Landing Platform Dock (LPD), HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark and together with the Landing Platform Helicopter (HMS Ocean) form the forward element of an amphibious operation. Supporting assets are the 4 Bay class Landing Ship Dock (Auxiliary) and the RFA Point class RORO vessels (although these are not strictly amphibious in the truest sense of the word)

Bay Class LPD(A)

HMS Bulwark (Albion Class)

HMS Ocean

Hurst Point (Point Class RORO)

Taken together it is a reasonably sized and capable force although as can be expected, short in some areas.

The Albion class do not go out of service until 2033 and 2034 but HMS Ocean in 2022, acting in the auxiliary LPH role the 2 remaining CVS are also due out of service in 2012 and 2015. No plans have yet been made public for a replacement for HMS Ocean but it is widely thought that the second CVF will act in this role, although one might consider the QE class to be rather large.

If we are to cancel CVF there exists an obvious need to replace HMS Ocean.

There is an ongoing debate about the utility of specialist LPH and LPD versus the general purpose LHD. Many of the newer types of vessels coming into service with other navies seem to favour the general purpose LHD route with enhanced aviation and well decks; it is probably fair to say though that these are coming into service with navies that have smaller amphibious fleets than the RN so their vessels have to be jack of all trades. However, the RN is shrinking and these vessels will be operating alone more often than not so the flexibility offered by a LHD may well be worth accepting the inherent compromises.

With the inexorable rise in vehicle weight and volume as evidenced by the likes of FRES and PPV the specialist LPH becomes increasingly unable to support anything other than a light force. This light force would still be considered a Royal Marines area but even the Royal Marines have been subject to the weight trend. The Viking and Jackal being cases in point, both cannot be lifted by anything other than Chinook. This fact won’t change because there is a well deck, obviously, but the well deck means that a single vessel can support a more rounded and capable force alone, without the support of a Bay or Albion. The UK needs to get more out of its force so whilst the compromises imposed by having jack of all trades vessels are recognised, they are worth accepting.

The Spanish and Australian Navies have ordered similar designs in their Juan Carlos and Canberra class; at approximately 27,000 tonnes the Navantia BPE design is much larger than the Illustrious class and HMS Ocean. The design is inherently flexible and could operate F35B’s or helicopters; with hangar space for 12 aircraft, accommodation for over a 1000 troops, a well deck slightly larger than the Albion class, extensive hospital and command facilities. The design flexibility allows it to be used as an aircraft carrier although without the ability to generate sustained sortie rates or for an extended period.

Canberra Class

Juan Carlos Strategic Projection Ship LHD

If we were to replace to replace Ocean and the CVS class with a pair of these then the through life costs savings would be considerable, especially in crewing. As funds permit it might even be possible to obtain a third or fourth and operate them as a compact carrier with 6-8 F35B’s per ship, much less that the CVF of course but at least the RN could retain some fast jet aviation capability.

At a reported cost of less than 500 million Euros they would also seem excellent value for money.

The Bay class have proven to be exceedingly useful and versatile, they are relatively new so their replacement is somewhat out of scope for this post, perhaps more of the same would be useful.

Although strictly not an RFA asset the Point class, operating under a 25 year PFI, provide an excellent capability. Based on the Flensburger 2700 RORO design it has 2,700 vehicle lane metres, 10,000nm range and two access ramps. A total of 6 vessels are available for use, 4 manufactured at Flensburger and 2 at Harland and Wolff. Interestingly the project was completed 20 months ahead of schedule, the last of the class, Anvil Point, being launched in 2003.

Although the PFI concept seems to offer capability at a greater cost than outright purchase this one does show how they can be effectively operated, with little fuss or drama. The commercial charter market has seen significant shifts in the last couple of decades with the greater prevalence of the large and usually highly utilised pure car pure truck carrier, which cannot carry explosive cargoes because they do not have open decks (IMO regulations) so when the armed forces need vehicle and container shipping capacity the commercial market is less likely to be able to find suitable vessels.

As a part of this project only of 4 out of the 6 ships are used for the strategic joint rapid reaction force (JRRF) on a daily basis. The last two are chartered out on the commercial market but obviously available for MoD use when demand dictates. The Danish military have a similar concept (ARK), except they have a number of vessels on permanent charter.

The benefit of the UK approach is that the design can be dictated, for example the Point class have twin screws, rudders and bow thrusters which provide extreme manoeuvrability, have a shallow draught and reinforced and extended loading ramps for loading and unloading in a wide variety of locations. The double and strengthened hull increases build costs but given the monetary and operational value of likely cargoes mean this is a wise investment; something of note for those that seem to think that commercial off the shelf is always the answer.

As with the Bay class, their replacement is many years away.

Speaking at an evidence session for the House of Commons Defence Select Committee a number of industry figures have urged the MoD to consider fielding ‘less than fully capable’ systems, especially vehicles. It seems that industry has woken up to the coming famine in defence spending and want to get their kit in the system early so as to ensure it can be built upon when times are better.

They say that perfect is the enemy of good enough and this is fair enough but it is rather rich of the defence industry to start complaining about gold plating when they have been sucking at the teat of over specification and eternal optimism for decades.

Addressing the governmental defence committee, Sir Brian Burridge, Finmeccanica UK’s vice president for strategic marketing said ground vehicles in particular should initially be fielded with an “80 percent capability”.

With committee members describing such systems as “less than fully capable”, Burridge added that both the defence industry and the MoD were “up” for the challenge.

Up for the bloody challenge…

Here’s a challenge for you Sir Brian (ex RAF Air Chief Marshall)

• Explain how Westland (yes that Westland, owned by Finmeccanica) can win a contract for Future Lynx (AW159 Wildcat) without going through a competitive tender
• Explain how Westland (yes that Westland, owned by Finmeccanica) can charge £6.5million for an engine upgrade for a small handful of the existing Lynx fleet
• Explain how Westland (yes that Westland, owned by Finmeccanica) can sell the MoD 60 odd Wildcats for the eye watering price of £1.7billion pounds, or about £26million each.

There are powerful voices muttering about the Defence Industrial Strategy and a rising tide of opinion that says things have to change, the suggestion of rushing equipment into service quicker just so industry can milk the MoD for upgrades later is about as transparent as something that isn’t very transparent.

If industry wants to stave off calls for the DIS to be scrapped then it is going to have to do much better than this.

In what is being trailed as a radical and bold plan, an additional 30 Chinook helicopters are set to get the nod.

Great I hear you say.

But wait for it, wait for it.

You didn’t think the Government was going to come up with any new funding did you, thought not.

In the frame for cancellation is the Future Medium Support Helicopter project which was supposed to replace Puma and the Sea King HC.4 Junglies, logically this would have been a tail fold Merlin (we have blogged this many times) although NH90, Blackhawk or even the AW149 would have been realistic alternatives.

Obtaining the additional Chinook’s would give the RAF a total fleet size of approximately 70, definately none too shabby. The RAF would also relinquish the Merlin HC3/3a’s with all of them going to the Royal Navy/Fleet Air Arm to meet their commando needs. Ex RAF Merlin crews would convert to Chinook.

Single types will be consolidated at Main Operating Bases (MOB’s)

The RAF Chinook’s at RAF Odiham, the newly repainted Merlin HC3/3a’s and Merlin HM.1/2 RNAS Culdrose and the Lynx Wildcat (Army and Maritime variants) at RNAS Yeovilton. What would happen to RAF Benson is unclear but it would base the Puma’s until they go out of service and maybe act as an overflow for Odiham.

For Support Helicopter this is a good move, a sizeable fleet of a very capable aircraft, consolidated at a single MOB will deliver both military effect and cost effectiveness. We do have a concern about putting all our eggs into one basket and whether the new Chinook will in fact be new or refurbs but in general this would be a good move.

Unfortunately for the Royal Navy and Royal Marines they will be getting the last chicken in the shop.

The HC3/3a’s are not suitable for sustained maritime operation, no tail or rotor fold and issues about electronic system integration in the crowded EM environment of a warship are just a couple of issues to be concerned about. Are they better than the Sea King HC.4 even with an upgrade, perhaps so but however the MoD spin it (and spin it they will) taken in the round this is simply a reshuffling of the chairs on the deck or robbing Andrew to pay Ginger.

This amazing series of photographs shows the loading of a C17 at RAF brize Norton with the first of a batch of Merlin helicopters bound for Afghanistan.

Not much to say except, brilliant…

This is an incredibly emotive subject and coming so close to Armistice Day, a subject that is very tricky to blog, we are of course talking about a dead serviceman and his grieving family. We have a free press and free speech in this country so whilst we might find the Sun’s coverage a little opportunistic and exploitative the fact remains that it is newsworthy and in the public interest.

One might feel a little sorry for Gordon Brown, besieged on all sides but unfortunately he is the authour of much of his misfortune. Next week I am sure the headline will be ‘Gordon Brown steps on crack on pavement: Outrage’

Since we started this blog our position has been that defence needs two things, more money and better spending and the helicopter issue can be neatly encapsulated in these two needs.

Would more helicopters have enabled Jamie to survive, who knows, certainly not us. I don’t want to pick over the bones of the conversation and over analyse it but others will likely do so but a quick look at some of the issues might be useful to others.

1. The Merlins that were brought back from Iraq are not sitting in this country but are at the US Navy’s facility El Centro in California undergoing their predeployment training, at least 4 of them anyway. Predeployment training is vital, it provides aircrew and ground crew the chance to prepare for the unique challenges of Afghanistan. Each ground or air unit undergoes some predeployment training before going to Afghanistan. Whilst superficially similar to Iraq, Afghanistan is a completely different operating environment and the Merlins have been fitted with a whole host of equipment upgrades. This has been a complex and demanding task, coordinating equipment upgrades and training, training with the equipment upgrades.

2. Chinooks are such a scarce commodity that commanders have to balance competing needs and risks. If we could have all 10 Chinooks in theatre on permanent standby for use by the Medical Emergency response Teams (MERT), which comprises a number of specialist medical personnel and soldiers, then it would create such an inbalance so as to render other operations highly risky or impossible to complete. Numbers available therefore fluctuate depending on need but as a minimum it has been reported that one is always available on a 24×7 basis. The Chinook is uniquely well suited to the task because it is fast and very spacious which means multiple casualties can be treated en route to the field hospital at Bastion.

What is absolutely 100% certain is that more helicopters would support a greater operational tempo.

Related articles for further information

http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2009/07/on-the-subject-of-helicopters/
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2009/11/fast-track-chinook-order-go-on-gordon/
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2009/10/aw109-battlefield-light-utility-helicopter-par-excellence/
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2009/10/a-case-for-coherance/
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2009/09/a-tale-of-three-upgrades-%e2%80%93-puma-and-lynx/
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2009/09/a-tale-of-three-upgrades-chinook/
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2009/09/new-lynx-flies-no-not-that-one/
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2009/09/unmanned-logistics-getting-the-delivery-through/
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2009/08/danish-merlins/
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2009/08/future-lynx-wildcat-or-fatcat/
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2009/07/afghanistan-and-the-case-of-the-missing-helicopters/
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2009/05/lynx-wildcat-whats-in-a-name/

The AW109 was born out of a marketing analysis in Italy in 1965, and was the first helicopter designed by Agusta SpA to be built in significant numbers.  Prior to this, Agusta SpA had designed and built the A101G, A103, A104 and the A106.  These aircraft were constructed as prototypes, and although some did see military service, they were manufactured in very small quantities.

The original A109A featured a single Turbomeca Astazou XII rated at 690 shp, although for safety reasons this was subsequently altered to two Allison 250-C14’s.  Following a number of design changes the helicopter emerged as the A109C Hirundo (Swallow), making the first of its tentative flights on 4 October 1971.  Unfortunately, due to a number of design changes and a protracted flight programme, the pre-production models were not completed until 1975, with full production taking place the following year.  Since then the A109C has enjoyed a long and fruitful production run and has a wide and appreciative customer list, both military and civil.  Following the link-up with Westland, it is now designated the AW109.

With two pilots the AW109 can seat six passengers, compared with the seven on the Lynx Wildcat.  Fortunately the AW109 has been certificated for single pilot operation, which brings its troop carrying capabilities up to par with the Wildcat.  As an aside, the Wildcat cannot be flown with a single pilot.

One of the reasons the Wildcat was chosen for the Army Air Corps was that its ship-borne capability allowed amphibious operations; a capability which some commentators may suggest the AW109 does not have.  Fortunately it does or at least it did; the original A109 featured a maritime derivative.  It was structurally similar to the standard A109 but featured a number of role specific items such as anchorage points for deck mooring, fixed undercarriage, four-axis auto-stabilisation, radar altimeter and a rescue hoist.  In addition to this it had a radar and could carry flotation gear, Magnetic Anomaly Detection equipment (MAD), torpedoes or AS.12 missiles.  Although the AW109 is used by the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and the US Coastguard, it is not utilised as a dedicated ship-borne aircraft, although it was originally intended as such, and much of the above equipment is optional on the current aircraft.  A maritime capable AW109 is therefore still a viable and cost effective option.

In its battlefield role, the AW109 can carry a plethora of different weapon systems including HOT, TOW and Hellfire missiles, as well as 70 mm rockets and 7.62/12.7 mm machine guns.  The LUH also comes with a liquid crystal display, armoured seats, self sealing fuel tanks and a comprehensive self-defence suite.  It is accepted that all of this equipment does not make it a true battlefield helicopter, but the same can be said of both the Lynx and the Wildcat.

AW109-LUH

As a testament to the aircraft it should be noted that A109’s were used by 8 Flight AAC to support SAS operations.  Following the capture of two A109C’s from Argentine forces in the Falklands’, they were ‘adopted’ by 8 Flight to replace their Westland Scouts.  These were supplemented by a further two purchased directly and have only recently being replaced by Eurocopter Dauphins.  If the A109 is good enough for ‘them’, then its logical assume that it’s good enough to support the rest of the British army.  As further testament to the aircraft, the AW109 is also used by the Empire Test Pilots School (ETPS), so if it’s good enough for the world’s best test pilots……

'Them' A109sas 8 flt

In terms of cost, this can vary significantly depending on the type of equipment fitted, but will be in the region of €8million.  In addition to this a quick Google search will bring up a large number of second-hand A109’s, something that cannot be done for the Lynx.  This demonstrates the advantage of the A109, in that spare parts are widely available globally and attrition replacement aircraft can be purchased from the civilian market and then modified to a military standard by either the manufacturer or an authorised sub-contractor.

So, what has the AW109 got to offer in comparison to the Lynx Wildcat?  The AW109 is significantly cheaper and widely available in terms of spare parts and replacement airframes.  It is faster, it does not have high development costs as these were recouped by Agusta SpA years ago and has significantly lower operating costs.  In addition to this, AW109’s are used by a number of tropical and desert nations due to its hot and high capabilities; something the Gem powered Lynx is not renowned for.

A109 TOW

To any commentators that may suggest that the A109 is too small, AgustaWestland also produces a stretched variant called the AW109 Grand, which features 200 mm of extra cabin length.  In the circumstances, a militarised Grand does not appear to be an outlandish suggestion.

It would be ludicrous to suggest that the AW109 could replace the Lynx as a naval helicopter, but then it could be considered ludicrous to spend £1.7billion developing a helicopter that is almost identical to the one it replaces without a significant improvement in battlefield capability (the RN could have replaced their current Lynx Mk 8’s with the current Super Lynx 300, without the extortionate development costs and also maintained a high degree of commonality).  The AW109 in comparison to the Lynx offers a great deal in the LUH role and has the virtue of being manufactured by the same company; something that should appeal to politicians who may have a helicopter factory in their constituency.

In these economically difficult times it does make a degree of sense to adopt a cheaper alternative, and definitely one which has a large number of willing customers should the MOD decide to sell them off at a future date; unfortunately that is a feature the Lynx truly does not posses.

Richard Stockley

The recent story from the MoD highlighted the job of a Combat Logistics Patrol. Operations in Afghanistan require a number of Patrol Bases (PB’s) and Forward Operating Bases (FOB’s) and these are expanding or being improved on a continual basis. The demand for materials to support operations from these locations is increasing, everything from ammunition, fuel for vehicles and generators, weapons, spares, consumables, building materials, medical supplies and even the post all have to be bought in by road or helicopter.

Efforts are underway to reduce this footprint; well drilling for raw water is a standard Royal Engineers task. A self contained ablutions unit that uses diesel to heat water, power showers, recycle water and destroy waste is being introduced by next spring and on a small scale, solar panels reduce the need for batteries or fuel to power generators for recharging. It’s not about being ‘green’ but reducing the amount of material that has to be shipped through dangerous IED and Taleban infested territory.

There have been numerous stories in the media about hard pressed bases going short of supplies; the effort needed to sustain operations is a significant one.

Because we have simply failed to secure significant parts of our operating area what might be a standard logistics patrol must now be a Combat Logistic Patrol (CLP). The patrol has to fight its way in or go in such force deter attack.  The CLP in the MoD news piece consisted of 116 vehicles, many of them comprising the Manoeuvre Operations Group (MOG) which provided screening and protection. Additional cover and reactive capabilities would have been provided by UAV and manned air assets such as the Apache Attack Helicopter.

The distance between Bastion and the bases is a mere 70km, about the distance between Leeds and Manchester. Going down the M62 might take an hour but this 70km took a day because of the terrain, tactical requirements and enemy activity.

It is difficult to estimate the volume and weight of the actual material delivered to the FOB’s in the Sangin Valley but the sheer effort, fuel expended, planning involved and personnel required means that it is an expensive exercise so the less shipped the better. Each patrol is a risk, especially given the prevalence of IED’s and if this risk is realised significant delay can be introduced besides the obvious human and equipment cost.

Ideally, much of these supplies would be shipped in by helicopter but much of the material is bulky and/or too heavy for the Chinook (the helicopter with the greatest lift capability) and as helicopter operations have proven to be risky (the recent loss of 2 Chinook’s confirms the operating environment is dangerous) some cargo is simply not worth the risk of helicopter delivery. Of course, we don’t have enough helicopter airlift in theatre anyway, a subject covered many times on this and other blogs.

Air despatch by low altitude air drop or parachute delivery is a possibility and is a well practiced capability but this needs a significant area to be dominated, swept for IED’s and mines and secured for the drop. The close terrain would also make air despatch and air drop difficult and inneficient. The RAF and Army Air Corps do not operate small, extreme short take off and landing aircraft that might be utilised, even in a limited manner, so this is a potential method also not available.

We find ourselves in a situation where the most practical, available and lowest risk method for the vast majority of material is the resource intensive and ponderous CLP.

US forces have deployed GPS assisted parachutes and even a powered, GPS guided parafoil for precision resupply but the payloads are relatively modest and only suitable for time critical supplies.

So what we need is a method to keep the supplies flowing at a rate to sustain high tempo operations, at a reasonable cost in fuel and manpower whilst avoiding risky road moves.

Enter the Kaman K-Max unmanned.

We think this might be one to watch, it’s not cutting edge, it’s not sexy and it’s not expensive, so not likely to get much press or interest from the MoD.

But what it does do is offer the prospect of a significant increase in logistic capability for remote locations at a very reasonable cost.

The Kaman K-Max is a well proven, rugged, cheap to operate and very simple heavy lift helicopter in widespread service with many operators in all terrain. It is designed to one thing and do it well. The twin intermeshing main rotor design negates the need for a power sapping, complex and noisy tail rotor. Precision heavy lift for logging operations or siting electricity pylons for example, needs stability and precision control, qualities that are usually low on the list of priorities for tactical military helicopters where high agility and acceleration are required.

The unique design provides an exceptionally low noise signature and a very high payload, the K-Max can lift more than it weighs.

Kaman K Max in USN VERTREP operations

Kaman K Max

Low noise, high payload, stability, ease of control and low cost (both capital and operation) make it ideal for shifting supplies. To operate in Afghanistan it would need a full defensive aids suite which would reduce payload and dramatically increase cost.

Kaman and the US DoD are investigating a simple way of reducing the risk to a pilot or the cost of defensive aids by converting it to unmanned semi autonomous operation. Landing and take off can be controlled using a portable ground station and operator if required or can be fully autonomous.

If you don’t have a pilot you don’t need millions of pounds worth of defensive aids to protect him or her.

Kaman have partnered with Lockheed Martin (who provide the mission management technology) for a USMC and Army sponsored trial phase which involved autonomous operations and precision manual control at landing sites. Trials and integration work continues but a number of successful demonstrations have already been completed.

Kaman KMAX Unmanned

Click here to view the embedded video.

The K-Max has been designed to be simple and cheap to operate with none of the usual complex helicopter systems such as tail rotor gearboxes, multi engine combing gearboxes, multi engine management systems and hydraulic controls. In its normal market, cost of operations, fuel efficiency and small logistics/maintenance footprint are it’s defining features. Performance is maintained at high altitude and high temperatures, in the Afghanistan environment, it would be able to lift between 1,900kg and 2,200kg depending on unrefueled range required.

The distance between Bastion and FOB’s is small enabling heavier loads or multiple trips without refuelling. Fuel burn is minimal in comparison with other types, largely because of its efficiency and relatively low speed.

Looking at the published performance figures a single K-Max unmanned could carry out three round trips from Bastion to the Sangin Valley in approximately 2 and a half hours without refuelling, delivering in the order of 5-6 tonnes of material. Material going back to Bastion could also be carried on the return leg. This assumes daylight only operations but the K-Max is certified for night time operation as well.

Taking these rough calculation further, 3 sorties could be carried out per 10 hour day including refuelling and quick maintenance checks, a single airframe could deliver approximately 15-18 tonnes per day.

At approximately $5 million each they would seem to offer exceptional value for money and a very high efficiency solution. The reduction in manpower alone, in comparison with resource heavy CLP’s, will provide significant cost benefit.

Of course not all types of material will fit within the weight and size limitations of this K-Max but a small fleet of say half a dozen, with 2 in rotating maintenance, would be able to deliver approximately 72 tonnes per day, in the environment described above, at a capital cost of much less than a single Merlin.

Much more could be achieved with round the clock operation although the fleet size would need to increase to accomodate extra maintenance.

Assuming a single Foden DROPS can carry 15 tonnes and the equivalent journey takes a day, the 72 tonnes described above would need a 5 vehicle convoy, plus its recovery support, escort and protection which might include Apache Attack Helicopter, UAV’s and a the provision of a supporting Rapid Reaction Force, all for a full day. The same package would then have to do the same route again to go back to Bastion.

In being able to deliver urgent material support it would also alleviate the pressure on the Chinook fleet, reducing expensive airframe hours, thus freeing up more Chinooks for the task of aerial assault, medical evacuation and manoeuvre support rather than resupply.

Quite clearly it could not replace a 106 vehicle CLP but it’s constant delivery rate would much reduce the need.

Its lack of speed and agility whilst an advantage for its primary mission, may make it more vulnerable to ground fires (although its very low noise would help here and night time operation would significantly reduce risk) if one looks at the fuel, manpower, maintenance, wear and tear, planning effort and risks involved in road moves and the hammering the Chinook fleet is getting for the type of palletised stores that the K-Max unmanned could carry; surely it is worth a serious look.

Cast your mind back a few years when in what was a rushed decision, the MoD announced the transfer of 6 Danish Merlin helicopters. These were to be transferred to the UK, modified to UK standards and designated the Mk3a. The Danes would get 6 new ones.

The thinking behind the deal was to get the Mk3a’s into service much quicker than would have been the case if we had purchased them fresh from the production line. Whilst arguments have raged this week about aircraft hangars, armour and crewing ratios the Merlin crews are in California on pre deployment training.

There may well have be sound operational reasons why California was chosen instead of Nevada, Cyprus or Morocco (as other helicopter units do) but it doesnt help the MoD’s case. Ham fisted PR whilst in El Centro Naval Air Facility such as reported here in which the pilots talk of working five days a week and praising the nearby lake as a good R&R spot is I am sure greeted with what might be characterised as ‘less than enthusiasm’ by the young Toms in Helmand crying out for Support Helicopters.

Putting all these arguments to one side it might be worth wondering what is the status of the Danish new build Merlins. I wonder how close they are to flying out of Westlands given the conversion is about a year late and likely to be another six months.

Take your bets, we think there is a strong possibility the new Danish Merlins will be in their hangars before the old ones.

Was the decision to obtain and convert the Danish Merlins driven by political expediency or operational common sense

Comments?

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If the Lynx is the one and only answer to the needs of our armed forces, which it isn’t, this beggars the question why the MOD does not simply adopt the existing AgustaWestland Super Lynx 300 model that is already in service with a number of foreign forces, including Oman, South Africa and Malaysia; and has been for a number of years.  The development costs have already been paid for and although it will not have the systems proposed with the Lynx Wildcat, it will definitely come a very close second.  Given the costs involved this would appear to offer greater value for money, plus given its similarity to the current Lynx and it could be brought into service sooner.

South African Super Lynx

Long time supporter of Westlands is David Laws, MP for Yeovil, he gave the following comments to the Yeovil Express, dated 20^th July 2009:

“It would a disaster for both the armed forces and for South Somerset if there was any attempt to stop Future Lynx from proceeding.  It is essential that Future Lynx goes ahead, to replace the existing fleet of Army and Navy Lynx helicopters.  The Conservatives just do not appear to understand that we need both Future Lynx and a medium lift helicopter – and in my view this should be the British Merlin helicopter.  It would be madness for the Ministry of Defence to think again on Future Lynx, and it would cause yet more uncertainty and delay.  This project is already well advanced in Yeovil, and when Future Lynx/Wildcat is delivered it will lead to a big improvement in helicopter capability.  We have to find the money to meet all of our helicopter needs, and we should be focusing on reducing the number of helicopter types in service, instead of buying Blackhawk helicopters, as the Conservatives are suggesting.  We should in my view concentrate on four main helicopter types – Apache for ground attack; Future Lynx/Wildcat for naval operations, light transport and reconnaissance; Merlin for the Future Medium Helicopter; and Chinook for heavy lift.  We should be focusing now on securing extra money from the Defence Budget to buy more Merlins and Chinooks, rather than questioning the much needed Future Lynx/Wildcat.”

The above comments come as no surprise as the AgustaWestland factory is in Mr Laws constituency and he would gladly welcome any influx of investment into that locality, but his primary concern is for the manufacturer, not for the end user.  What isn’t mentioned above is that the Lynx helicopter has already demonstrated poor performance in Afghanistan and is unable to cope with the hot and high conditions.  Our forces therefore, seem to be operating quite well or at least coping without the need for a dedicated Battlefield Reconnaissance Helicopter (BRH), which was the whole point of introducing Lynx Wildcat in the first place; the role thus seems to be somewhat redundant before it actually gets into service.  Battlefield reconnaissance at the moment is carried out through a combination of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV’s) and dedicated surveillance aircraft.  The Apache attack helicopters, which the Future Lynx was meant to compliment, seem to be coping quite well without it.

The Lynx Mk 9’s used by the Army Air Corps are currently going through an engine upgrade programme and will undoubtedly be deployed to Afghanistan once back in service.  This leaves a very large question mark over Future Lynx as it would be cheaper to simply manufacture additional Lynx Mk 9’s for a fraction of the cost which would still provide a significant proportion of the proposed capability.  So, contrary to Mr Laws’ comments, Future Lynx is not ‘much needed’ it is merely ‘much desired’, neither would it be ‘madness’ for the MOD to cancel Future Lynx, nor would it be a disaster for the armed forces if it did, if anything it would make financial sense as there are cheaper alternatives waiting in the wings; alternatives which are manufactured by the self-same company.

As with all defence projects there is a cut-off point where both the MOD and the Government need to accept that a project is no longer financially viable and a cheaper alternative needs to be sought.  As an example the United States Government cancelled the RAH-66 Comanche reconnaissance/attack helicopter even though an obscene amount of time and money had already been committed to the project.  This goes to prove that merely throwing money and effort at a project will not always guarantee success or result in an effective weapon system, as priorities can quickly change.  In addition to this, in these economically difficult times there is also a moral question regarding the expenditure of this nations tax revenue, is it right that we spend vast sums in developing a helicopter which demonstrates only marginal improvements in capability and performance as is the case with Future Lynx?

Despite what politicians may think, the Future Lynx/Lynx Wildcat is not the only game in town as AgustaWestland have a number of helicopters in their product line-up that could be adapted to suit the roles of both reconnaissance and light utility; namely the AW109 or the AW139.  Given the sums the MOD seems eager to spend on the development of Future Lynx alone, these alternatives could be modified and militarised for a fraction of the cost and would still help secure the long term viability of the company.  Unfortunately AgustaWestland, the MOD and David Laws appear to be somewhat blind to this.

AgustaWestland as a company produce a number of truly exceptional and highly regarded aircraft; however, the fact that no other service in the world has purchased the Lynx as a battlefield helicopter apart from the Army Air Corps must at least say something.  All other current Lynx users utilise the aircraft in a maritime role.

In sharp comparison to David Laws, Douglas Carswell MP, may think that the Sikorsky Blackhawk is the veritable panacea to all our support helicopter woes, which it isn’t and acquiring it could possibly make matters significantly worse.  However, whatever the outcome of the Future Lynx project, the solution will not be achieved by simply throwing additional money at it.  The solution should be achieved by diligent consideration of the viable alternatives and the selection of the most cost effective, this may even result in introducing more than one type.  Having commonality between a navy and an army aircraft may be desirable but one shouldn’t be selected to the detriment of the role of the other.  Unfortunately the procurement of Future Lynx seems to be more about politics than practicalities, with scant regard to cost or common sense.  So, whatever emerges from this morass, given the lives at stake and the costs involved, it had better be worth it.

Richard Stockley

The headlines recently announced that the RAF were operating a Chinook in Afghanistan that was rebuilt using two different airframes.  This was highlighted in ‘The Sun’, which reliably informed us that, ‘The two parts were fused together — a technique often used illegally by dodgy car dealers’ and contrary to the report in ‘The Daily Mail’, both engines were still attached to the airframe as the adjoining photographs clearly testify. On the face of it, the story itself is true, although missing a few vital facts.  One should take stock and note at this point that, dodgy car dealers aside, the processors used to manufacture a 1991 Vauxhall Cavalier and a Boeing Chinook are fundamentally different to say the least.

One, namely the Vauxhall, is made from pressed steel and welded, and was manufactured in a very short period of time.  The Chinook, in sharp contrast, is hand built in a jig using solid rivets and hand-formed sheet magnesium and aluminium; this as you can appreciate takes a significantly longer time compared with the Vauxhall.  Chinooks are also subject to a greater degree of quality control.

The aircraft in question is a Chinook HC.2, registration ZA704.  ZA704, Boeing build number B-834, was manufactured in the USA by Boeing at their Ridley Park Plant, Delaware County, Philadelphia and delivered to the RAF in 1981.  It was subsequently returned to the factory and converted into a HC.2 model, and then redelivered to the RAF around 1993.  On 23^rd November 1999 ZA704 had an accident whilst on exercise at Soz, Oman.  Unfortunately whilst carrying out a run-on landing, the rear rotors touched the ground and this consequently ripped off the aft transmission, together with the structural pylon.

Rather than send the aircraft back to the manufacturers in the USA, it was decided to repair the aircraft in the UK at Fleetlands, Gosport.  To those that don’t know Fleetlands it is, or at least was, a Royal Navy repair facility that carries out third and fourth line aircraft maintenance.  I understand it has now been privatised and sold to Vector Aerospace.  Fleetlands has a long association with the UK military and their engineers are highly competent at repairing aircraft.  I have no doubts that the repair would have matched any carried out by Boeing.

Having lost its rear pylon it was decided to cannibalise one from another Chinook, ZH257.  The donor Chinook ZH257 was originally a CH-47C, registration AE-520 (Boeing build number B-797) and was captured from the Argentine Army relatively intact following the Falkland’s Conflict in 1982.  It was then used as a ground instruction airframe and was subsequently given a UK military serial number.  As the RAF Chinook HC.2’s are equivalent to the CH-47D, it was necessary to make a number of modifications to the donor pylon prior to attaching it to the recipient aircraft.

Prior to re-assembly and flight testing the repair was signed off by one of Boeing’s own engineers as they were the Aircraft Design Authority, not something they would have done had there been any doubts about Fleetlands competence.  Following this, it would have been extensively air-tested and subject to alignment checks to ensure the structural integrity of the repair; if it wasn’t, the pilots assigned to fly it would be well within their rights to refuse.  The fact that they have flown it repeatedly since demonstrates their level of confidence in the airframe.  In addition to this the repair would be subject to routine inspection for the remainder of its in service life.  As a comparison, during the Falklands Conflict a Sea Harrier received damage from anti-aircraft fire.  This damage was repaired using a Battle Damage Repair (BDR) scheme as there was little time to develop a manufacturer based scheme.  This aircraft carried the BDR repair for many years until the aircraft was eventually modified to F/A 2 standard; proof that even ad hoc repairs can still have excellent structural integrity.

So to all those deeply concerned about the ’Cut and Shut Chinook’, be rest assured, the aircraft itself is structurally sound.

Another aspect of the story was that it was brought to the attention of the media by Ian Sadler, the father of Jack Sadler who tragically died in Afghanistan, 2007.  Mr Sadler has since campaigned to improve the equipment used by the UK armed forces.  The MOD can be accused of many things, financial incompetence and short-sightedness to name but two, but on this occasion the MOD probably did nothing more than sign the cheque.  Repairs of this magnitude are nothing new and comparable ‘Cut and Shuts’ have been carried out on other types of aircraft.  In conclusion, it was undoubtedly cheaper to repair the aircraft in the UK rather than ship it back to the factory, but this is more to do with standard industry practice as opposed to penny pinching by the MOD.  There are a great many things the MOD need to be taken to task on, especially regarding helicopters (watch this space!), but on this occasion the ‘Cut and Shut’ Chinook isn’t one of them.

Richard Stockley

The link below shows a picture of AE-520 prior to being ‘spliced’.

http://www.airliners.net/photo/Argentina—Army/Boeing-Vertol-CH-47C/0864107/

Helicopters, or at least the lack of them, have generated a number of headlines and a great deal of consternation in Westminster over the past few weeks.  David Cameron, the leader of the opposition, has made a great deal of political capital out of his comments that the UK armed forces have over 500 helicopters available, with only 30 of them currently deployed to Helmand Province.  This information is undeniably correct, however, it is important to take a look at the facts behind the statement rather than accept at face value what is merely a political sound-bite.  What the commanders on the ground are shouting for is more troop carrying helicopters, and of the 500+ aircraft supposedly available, it comes as no surprise that not all have a troop carrying capability.

Helicopters are not simple creatures, they are on the whole highly expensive and complex pieces of equipment; however, given their capability and flexibility, they are highly valuable and highly sought after battlefield assets.

With regards to their day to day management, for any number of aircraft deployed in theatre only a proportion of that number will be serviceable and available for operations at any one time.  This is due to the need for ‘down time’ for regular routine maintenance and the repair of any faults that materialise during use; the harsher the operational environment, the greater number that may be unavailable.  Looking at Afghanistan, although 30 helicopters may be based there, you can bet good money that the full complement will not always be available.

In addition to the aircraft, the services have a finite number of air, ground and maintenance crews to support them, all of whom cannot be deployed in theatre at the same instance.  Troops need to be rotated out of theatre on a regular basis; in addition to this a number may be sick or injured, undergoing training or promotion courses and will therefore be unavailable for operational deployment.  As these crews are highly trained specialists, it can take years and cost millions to create significant increases in numbers.

So, with regards to David Cameron’s magic 500 helicopters, the breakdown in numbers are as follows*:

Apache WAH-64D – total number 67: Nine of these attack helicopters are already deployed to Afghanistan, of the 58 remaining in the UK, one is awaiting repair following a crash landing and 15 are in storage.  Of all the aircraft, only 32 have the necessary equipment fitted for use in Afghanistan.

Chinook HC 2/2a – total number 40: Eight Chinook’s are currently deployed in theatre, although some sources site several additional aircraft.  On paper this leaves 29 to 32, depending on who you believe, available for use.  In addition to this a number of aircraft are utilised by the Operational Conversion Unit permanently for training.  However, recent reports suggest that there are insufficient numbers of trained aircrews to keep the remainder airborne.

Gazelle AH.1 – total number 42: The Gazelle is a light observation helicopter and is due to be retired around 2012.  Given the type’s limited remaining service life and the time/cost considerations to fit them out for Afghanistan, in addition to their limited hot and high capability, this aircraft should not be considered for deployment.

Lynx Mk 3/Mk 8 – total number 61: This aircraft is primarily a naval helicopter, its role being anti-ship and anti-submarine.  Given that Afghanistan is land-locked and the number of aircraft required for deployment at sea and for training, this aircraft should not be considered for deployment.

Lynx Mk 7/Mk 9 – total number 94: Of the 94 Lynx helicopters belonging to the Army Air Corps, 72 are Mk 7’s and 22 are the Mk 9 wheeled variant.  Four Mk 7’s are currently deployed to Afghanistan, although due to the limited power of their Gem engines they are severely restricted during the Summer months.  Of the 22 Mk 9’s on strength, 12 are currently undergoing a conversion programme to replace their Gem’s with more powerful CTS800’s; these aircraft will not be completed until November 2009.  Given the numbers of aircraft available, although this does not reflect the number of aircraft in squadron service, more Lynx aircraft could be deployed.  However, given their limited performance and troop carrying capability, it would appear pointless to deploy them in larger numbers unless they have been fitted with the new engines.

Merlin Mk 1 – total number 42: Again, this aircraft is primarily a naval helicopter, however, if necessary, they could be de-roled and converted into troop carriers.  These aircraft have also recently been fitted with a new defensive aids suite, making them suitable for deployment if required.

Merlin Mk 3/3a – total number 28: A number of these troop carrying helicopters have just returned from Iraq, however given the extreme environment they have been operating in, the aircraft may require prolonged maintenance before they are redeployed.  In addition to these, the RAF recently acquired six aircraft from the Danish armed forces to supplement their numbers.  As previously, following fitment of the necessary equipment these could be deployed in sufficient numbers.

Puma – total number 34: Having been in service since 1972, the Puma is one of the troop carrying mainstays of the UK services, with several still deployed in Baghdad.  Although in recent years the type has suffered a number of losses both in the UK and Iraq, the advantage of the Puma is that it is widely used throughout the world and as such, additional aircraft can be purchased and converted in a relatively short period of time if necessary.  It also ensures that spare parts are readily available from a number of different sources.

Sea King Mk 3/3a – total number 25: This aircraft is primarily a Search and Rescue helicopter and based in the UK.  Of the 25 available, 16 are allocated to SAR duties within the UK, and 2 are based in the Falkland Islands, with the remaining aircraft utilised for training and maintenance replacements.  When deployed abroad it is usually in very small numbers, therefore, this aircraft should not be considered for deployment to Afghanistan in the troop carrying role.

Sea King Mk 4/6CR – total number 42: Six aircraft are currently deployed in theatre with a further 23 aircraft currently available.  The remainder are currently being repaired, in deep maintenance or being modified.

Sea King Mk 5 – total number 15: As previously, this aircraft is primarily a naval helicopter which, like the Merlin Mk.1, can be de-roled and converted into a troop carrier.  A number of these aircraft are presently utilised for Search and Rescue duties, due to the limited numbers available, they should not be considered for deployment.

Sea King Mk 7 ASaC – total number 13: This aircraft’s primary role is that of Airborne Surveillance and Area Control, or what used to be termed Airborne Early Warning.  Given the permanent nature of its conversion and the limited number available, this aircraft should not be considered for deployment.

Conclusion

Although the UK armed forces do have over 500 helicopters available, over 360 of these are not dedicated troop carriers, although a number could be readily converted if necessary.  Of the remaining 140 plus aircraft which are, 30 are already in theatre and the remainder cannot be deployed immediately because:

• there are insufficient air crews available and of these, not all are currently trained for operating in hot and high conditions or type rated to those aircraft currently in theatre
• not all are fitted with the necessary long range communications equipment, armoured seats or defensive aid suites required in Afghanistan
• a number of these aircraft are in deep maintenance, being repaired or deployed elsewhere
• a number of these aircraft are dedicated to training and type conversion within the UK

Given the above restrictions, it would be difficult to ‘surge’ a large number of transport helicopters to Afghanistan, in the circumstances it would be more prudent to ‘trickle’ additional aircraft and personnel as and when they became available.  If the UK did decide to surge sufficient numbers, the existing stock of spare parts would quickly diminish, this would be due to the harsh conditions experienced in theatre and the need to ensure that those aircraft presently based in the UK, but grounded due to lack of spares, were made serviceable.

Taking the above into consideration, there is a strong demand for additional troop carrying helicopters in Afghanistan, however, what is also required is a long term, coherent strategy to ensure that there are sufficient numbers of trained personnel and serviceable aircraft to achieve this.  It is not a simple case of air freighting any spare aircraft to the requisite location, this would be a recipe for disaster, but a case of providing additional funding to purchase the necessary equipment, additional spare parts and expand the present training programme to ensure that such an increase is both achievable and sustainable for the remainder of the deployment.  Our forces have a sufficient number of troop carrying helicopters available to give our commanders the capability they need, unfortunately what is missing is the political and financial support required to achieve it.

Richard Stockley

*(Note: given the ‘fluid’ nature of aircraft serviceability, the numbers of aircraft denoted as available may fluctuate and should be regarded as approximate.  These numbers do not include those based at dedicated training establishments, civilian aircraft with military registrations, Chinook HC.3’s or dedicated special forces support aircraft)

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/cm090617/text/90617w0013.htm

The opposition and media have hammered the hapless Prime Minister and Minister of State for Defence. General Sir Richard Dannatt, the outgoing Chief of the General Staff and Air Vice Marshall Sir Jock Stirrup, the current Chief of the Defence Staff, also raised the issue. Even the usually toothless Defence Select Committee gave the PM and SoS Defence a grilling.

Stepping aside from the fact that the mainstream media and most of the opposition have only really run in any meaningful way with this issue when they smell the vulnerability of the Prime Minister combined the cynical newsworthiness of the death of the highest ranking officer in operations since the Falklands conflict it is obvious that the lack of helicopters, amongst many other issues, is having a material effect on the strategic objectives, in so much that we have any.

If the assumption is made that Afghanistan is a conflict whose successful resolution is in the long term interests of the United Kingdom then it must follow that we must take the task seriously and not fight with one hand behind our backs, in short, we must do what it takes and if it takes more helicopters then so be it.

This week has also seen the growing importance of blogs and discussion forums so in a blatant attempt to jump on the bandwagon we thought there was room for another article on the issue of helicopters, in particular to look beyond the soundbite politics and simplistic answers so prevalent in the debate.

Helicopters alone are not the answer

That world renowned defence expert, David Milliband, stated that helicopters alone were not the answer. Gordon Brown insisted that the Army is properly equipped yet it was obvious that when General Dannatt was in Helmand and being ferried about in a US helicopter the truth is somewhat different, as Sir Richard pithily stated, the reason he was in a US helicopter was because no British one was available.

Labour politicians were quick to point out that because many of the casualties were incurred on a foot patrol helicopters would not have made any difference. Towards the end of the week the labour spin machine had swung into action with murmurings about Sir Richard angling for a Tory Peerage or well paid job in the private sector by dabbling in a political arena he had no business in. The Secretary of State for Defence even had to write to his junior ministers to warn them off a smear campaign which would, if perpetuated, backfire spectacularly.

Lord Mandelson accused the Tories of seeking political advantage rather than giving united backing, as if he had ever passed up the opportunity for political advantage!

Prime Ministers Question Time was dominated by Afghanistan and in particular the issue of equipment with the Prime Minister trotting out the same old meaningless statistics.

In this toxic political environment its hard to separate fact from fiction, spin from fact and total nonsense from the mainstream media.

Are Helicopters Part of the Answer?

Let’s get one thing absolutely clear (incredibly we actually agree with the banana boy), helicopters alone are not the only answer but they are part of the answer.

As seems to be usual with the mainstream media though, there is a tendency to seek simplistic answers to complex questions. Helicopters cannot take and hold ground, they cannot interact with the local population and they cannot seek an engagement with the enemy, they are an enabling capability.

However, they can patently provide two things that contribute massively to both military effectiveness and casualty reduction; unpredictability and speed of response.

Road bound, we are predictable, especially in the conditions where large vehicle movements are signalled to the enemy by the huge dust clouds thrown up and a network of local informants. Helicopters contribute to the element of surprise, appearing in strength at locations with very little advanced warning is one of the most effective tactics available, a tactic our forces are unable to utilise fully because they lack of air mobility. Rapid vertical envelopment and a rapid airborne reaction to fluid events can be shocking to the enemy and as the United States Air Cavalry demonstrated in Vietnam, incredibly effective.

Without this and with a significant logistical tail we are not following much of the accepted counter insurgency doctrine we created. The growing demand for greater forces, in order to hold ground so expensively won is fair enough but without the vehicles and helicopter lift to support them it would be pointless. We are facing a formidable enemy who can blend into the local population; we need to exploit our technical and qualitative advantages.

The core mission is to kill as many Taleban as possible in the most efficient manner possible, agility supports this and helicopters underpin agility. The mission is not to protect our troops from roadside bombs and we shouldn’t lose sight of that fact but increasing casualties undermine support and when looking at the bigger picture force protection issues are important, helicopters again contribute but don’t solve entirely, this problem.

It’s All Gordon Browns Fault

The Defence Select Committee highlighted their concerns about the lack of airlift in their report on the initial Afghanistan deployment, a couple of years ago.

To quote the report

We are deeply concerned that the UK airlift and close air support capability may not be sufficient to support the Helmand deployment.

Despite this simple warning and repeated signs before and after that the UK simply did not have enough air lift, the MoD has not delivered.

Rushed out in time for the, as usual sparsely attended defence debate, on Afghanistan this week the Select Committee again reported on the woeful situation of helicopter support for operations in Afghanistan

Behind the headlines and obvious spin from the government the simple truth is this, the Government, MoD, Service Chiefs, Investment Approvals Board, Treasury officials and the myriad of others involved in allocating each capability a slice of the defence budget simply decided that helicopters did not warrant the priority over many years that everyone and his dog are now saying they deserve.  We highlighted in a previous post the diminishing real world value of the defence budget so hard decisions would have had to be made and evidently the decisions made were simply incorrect. What many also seem to have missed whilst they are busy flinging insults is that whilst the RAF and RN operate the larger support helicopters like Chinook, Puma and Sea King they come under the control of Joint Helicopter Command (JHC), JHC comes under HQ Land, it is therefore the Army that ultimately decides funding priorities for non SAR/fleet helicopters. Established following the Strategic Defence Review in 1998 JHC comes under the ‘operational command and budgetary control of HQ Land Command’ This is not the whole story in the labyrinthine world of defence funding but nevertheless, the Army retains a great deal of influence

That said, whoever is or was in charge there has been a chronic under investment in helicopter capability for many decades and now in the face of reality the cumulative effect of those decisions is a growing butchers bill and decreasing likelihood of a successful outcome in Afghanistan.

So is it all Gordon Brown’s fault?

Not entirely, but he is the head of the ship and responsibility must rest where it falls. Gordon Brown would not look so ridiculous if he simply admitted there was a problem instead of the brazen display of deceit and obfuscation as displayed in his recent appearances.

The USMC has 120 helicopters we have 10

Much of the reporting this week has focussed on comparisons with the US forces in Helmand. In some articles and interviews it was stated that we have 10 Chinook and the US forces have 120. A US Combat Aviation Brigade does indeed have approximately 120 helicopters but it comprises a number of types, including not only Chinook but also Apache attack and Kiowa recce types. This CAB would be expected to support an entire Division and in the case of the USMC they have a mission specific Marine Aircraft Group.

The Combat Aviation Brigade from 82^nd Airborne Division and Marine Aircraft Group 40 provided aviation support for the recent major operation in Helmand, Operations Khanjar (Strike of the Sword)

It is fair to say however, that the US forces enjoy a much greater access to helicopters than do ours, it’s just not as dramatic as the figures used this week.

Whilst we might have 10 Chinooks in theatre, only 7 of them are available for routine taskings. The others are used for on call casevac and other purposes. We have a small number of Lynx (which can’t fly in the day and are being withdrawn) and 8 Sea King HC4’s

We Have Increased Helicopters by 60%

If we look at what improvements there have been in helicopter availability it is evident that it is a fairly limited.

Flying hours on the Chinook fleet have been allowed to be increased (wow, thanks, it’s not like we are war or anything)
6 Chinooks, the same Chinooks that were the result of the biggest defence procurement fiasco in recent history are being reworked at great expense. Without going over old ground it’s hardly something to crow about, correcting the errors will result in probably the most expensive half dozen Chinooks in the world, some £52 million each. First ordered in 1997 (yes that’s over twelve years ago) they will go into the general Chinook fleet and be deployed as and when available, which should be in 2010 although some have reported this is optimistic. So its not 6 extra, they would have been in service 10 years ago if it werent for monumental MoD incompetence.

14 Sea King HC Mk4’s have been fitted with Carson composite blades, manufactured by Ducommun in the USA, allowing them to operate in theatre. It has been reported that 8 of these modified aircraft are in theatre. This programme was first started in 2006 and completed in 2008 and is an example of a modest investment (just over £5m) extending the usefulness of a sturdy and capable airframe. As a stop gap this is a good one but it will create problems further down the line and convince the Treasury that they can be life extended even further past their out of service date, 2017, which is not the case.

6 ex Dutch Merlin’s have been purchased but are not yet in service. In the order of £30 million each the Merlin is a very expensive aircraft and whilst capable they are not excellent value for money. After significant modification, these 6 Merlin’s will join the existing fleet and deployed. These may be available for service this year although again, that might be optimistic.

A number of existing Lynx are being re engined to enable them to cope with the hot and high conditions of Afghanistan. At a whopping cost of £70 million 8 Lynx Mk 9’s will be upgraded with the LHTEC T800 (Light Helicopter Turbine Company, a joint venture between Rolls Royce and Honeywell) to enable them to operate in Afghanistan. Despite being in service with the UK for decades no one seemed to appreciate that the aircraft might perhaps one day need to operate in such an environment. The LHTEC T800 is the engine chosen for Future Lynx Wildcat so although offering what might seem poor value for money given the costs of integrating it into the supply and logistics stream it probably represented the least most expensive option. What the Lynx will be used for in theatre hasn’t been released.

Yes, it is true that we have more capability than when we entered Afghanistan, but then we have more forces in the area as well.

In fact in the last couple of years we have deployed more than a 60% increase of troops in theatre so it’s hardly an improvement, simply proportional to the numbers there.

In summary, 60% of bugger all is still bugger all.

Train Crash Ahead

Looking at the total numbers in the fleet, in excess of 500, one might be inclined to ask what the problem is, just get more of what we have out to Afghanistan.

We do indeed have a lot of helicopters but look at the types in detail.

Chinooks, 40 in fleet, 10 in Afghanistan
Pumas, 43 in fleet, none in Afghanistan
Merlin’s, 70 in the fleet, none in Afghanistan
Sea Kings, 90 in the fleet, 5 in Afghanistan
Apaches, 67 in the fleet, 8 in Afghanistan
Lynx, 176 in the fleet, none in Afghanistan
Gazelles, 133 in the fleet, none in Afghanistan
Other, 47 in the fleet, none in Afghanistan

A quick glance at these figures would lead one to believe that we are not serious about Afghanistan because we have hundreds of helicopters but only a handful in Afghanistan, but the Puma’s are so knackered and wheezy they would be useless, as the Lynxes. The Gazelle is very small and again, not a great deal of use, many of the Merlin’s are fleet anti submarine types as are the Sea Kings, plus they are the ones that rescue people from beaches and stricken fishing vessels. Other’s comprise mostly of training types. If we had replaced the Puma, Sea King Commando, Lynx and Gazelles with something decent in years gone by then clearly we would not have a problem.

The types are a collection of different variants and revisions, as one would expect in such a large and dynamic fleet but again, this conspires to whittle the available numbers down yet more.

It’s is no state secret that things are going to get much worse so when the mainstream media talk of revelations about future helicopter numbers it is not strictly true but I suppose, sounds good in a headline.

Examining the fleet and planned replacements more closely;

The Puma fleet is due to go out of service in 2012 and be replaced by the Future Medium Helicopter in 2018. No orders have been placed so this 2018 target is somewhat optimistic, there is talk of a life extension programme but this will only extend their life to 2022 and news this week has signalled yet more costly dithering.

The Lynx fleet, the largest numbers of helicopters we have, are due out of service in a period from 2013 to 2015 depending on type; we plan to replace this large fleet  of over 170 airframes with 62 Future Lynx Wildcat.

All Gazelles are due out of service in 2102 with no replacement planned.

There are 40 Search and Rescue Sea Kings operated between the RAF and Royal Navy, these are due out of service by 2017 with no replacement, SAR being moved to the Maritime and Coastguard Agency who will operate a PFI scheme as a replacement.

The Royal Navy operate 42 Sea King Commando troop carrying types in two variants which go out service in 2017. These are due to be replaced in the same Future Medium Helicopter programme as are the RAF Puma’s, in 2018.

The Royal Navy operate 13 airborne early warning Sea Kings for fleet protection, these are due out of service in 2018 and will be replaced by 4 MASC helicopters, a decision on type has yet to be decided but it is likely to be a case of moving the mission equipment from the Sea King’s into a Merlin.

The RAF operates 40 Chinook Mk2/2a’s that go out of service in 2015 and 2025. The older MK2’s comprise the bulk of this number, some 34 in total and these will go out of service on the earlier date. It is planned to extend their life to 2040. The 8 HC3a’s will be added to the fleet this year, maybe next and that is if the reversion work on all 8 airframes is a success. The first has only recently taken its first flight and there is a long road ahead.

This paints a sorry story of a significant future reduction in helicopter numbers, but that is only half of the problem, the real problem is availability.

The Real Problem…

The problem of helicopter airframe numbers has not just happened overnight but it obscures the real problem, that of actual availability.

For example, in recent evidence to the Defence Select Committee Quentin Davies stated that out of a total effective fleet of 28 Merlin helicopters, in May this year only 10.7 (average figure) were available for duty and out of these only 4 or 5 are actually available for a real world deployment due to training and other commitments.

It is the same story across the fleet, out of the 40 Chinook’s the reality is that only 10 are available, the others being in training or at various states of maintenance and repair.

Underneath this apparent poor utilisation or availability rate is a tale of almost heroic maintenance, stretched to breaking point logistics and an ever more weary set of flight crews.

And it is here that the real scandal lies, the behind the scenes, mundane aspects of operating aircraft; maintenance, spares, training and personnel that are preventing us making maximum use of what we actually have. Why can the Merlin’s deployed to Iraq not be immediately switched to Afghanistan, it is nothing to do with the airframes or the environment but the support infrastructure.

If the helicopter fairy magically put 50 Chinooks into Afghanistan tomorrow they would have to sit there waiting for the logistics train to adapt and for trained pilots to come through the system.

If we are to climb out the hole we have dug we must concern ourselves not with airframes, although that of course makes a significant difference, but with thesupport infrastructure to ensure aircraft are not cannibalised for spares, airframes sit around waiting for aircrew and a training goes unfulfilled.

Open the Chequebook Gordon

Unfortunately, even with an unlimited pot of cash, providing a meaningful increase in capability would not be an overnight activity. As the select committee report states, helicopter capability is built on the four pillars of equipment, manning, support and training, none of which can go from their current state to where we would want them to be in a short timescale given the current way in which we do things.

We face two significant problems, neither of which is going to be cheap or easy to resolve, that of airframe numbers and support, with the latter being the hardest to solve by a significant margin.

In the short term we may be able to find a way to accelerate the deployment of the ex Dutch Merlin’s and Chinook Mk3a’s. Even with the extra Chinook, Merlin and Lynx in theatre (which will not mean they will all be available for missions as we have shown above) this may not be enough to provide a meaningful improvement in capability.

We must also hugely increase the spares, training and logistics capability, war time is not the time for ‘lean’ maintenance. Efficiency should not be the driving factor but military effect and if that means we have a very high holding of spares on the shelf in theatre then so be it, we must accept the cost and perceived inefficiency because to do anything less is to say that just in time as a concept is more important than beating the Taleban.

The same situation also applies to the Apache Attack Helicopter Regiments and supporting REME units, which are incredibly over stretched. Restricting available flying hours for fleet management and basic cost reasons also is totally counter-productive and needs to be sorted out.

The Canadian armed forces faced a similar problem with their deployment to Afghanistan yet managed to deliver a capability to theatre in a comparatively short time comprising 6 Chinooks, 6 Griffons and 6 civilian contracted Mil-17’s

Options are available, reserve aircrew and maintenance fitters, other nations being asked for limited engineering support, using civilian contractors and other routes that would not normally be considered. This would require a bit of can do attitude and a relaxing of some of the rules and procedures that seem to slow everything down. Perhaps accepting more risk in one area mitigates a greater risk in others.

Another option we should seriously consider is to swallow our pride, admit the problem and ask the US to help. We operate in a coalition and I am sure they would be open to an honestly made request, as long as we were doing something in the background to resolve the issue. This would take real political courage but the politicians would do well to turn up at Wooton Basset to remind themselves that politics must sometimes take a back seat.

As for the Future Medium Helicopter capability that is set to replace the RAF Puma’s and RN Sea King’s by 2018 the only sensible option is more Merlin’s. This is certainly not the most desirable from an airframe cost perspective and some issues such as tail and rotor fold in the troop transport version for shipborne deployment will need to be resolved but these are not impossible issues to overcome. We already have Merlin’s in the fleet so spares, maintenance, training and logistic systems are in place. We need to commit to FMH now, place firm orders and start work on the ‘back office’ functions.

It could be argued that Merlin is the gold plated option and at £30 million each it’s hard not to agree but the costs of training, spares, logistics and all the other things that support each airframe mean that it would probably work out the most cost effective choice. NH90’s have been considered and these would certainly be cheaper to purchase, they even use the same engine as the Merlin and Apache but getting a completely new type into service would be riskier and likely take much longer than with the Merlin option. The NH90 is not as capable as the Merlin either. The same also applies to the US Blackhawk which would introduce not only a brand new airframe into the system but also a new engine. In the rush to provide vehicles for Afghanistan the Army has a serious logistic and support issue, so many types creates all sorts of maintenance, spares and training issues. The issue of equipment commonality should not be taken lightly.

With the benefit of hindsight a purchase of NH90, S92 or Blackhawk would have perhaps been the preferred choice with plenty of time to bring them into service properly but we are where are.

The Future Lynx Wildcat purchase for the Army, another disgraceful pork barrel acquisition, needs to be cancelled as soon as possible, Westland’s should then be directed to get on with the FMH Merlin deal. Wildcat is a hideous waste of scarce taxpayer’s cash, as we have covered in a previous post. The Naval version is a sensible evolutionary step that will provide a good uplift in capability even though the numbers are too low but the Army version is an aircraft looking for a user. The contract should be reshaped to decrease in overall numbers and take only the maritime version.

A replacement should then be sought for the Army Lynx, again, our previous post includes some options, the USMC UH-1Y being my favoured option although our other contributors might argue differently. We do not need a Gucci tricked out all singing all dancing ‘platform’ but we do need a simple, rugged, cheap to buy and cheap to operate battlefield taxi that we can afford in large quantities. Other blogs have suggested the CH146 Griffon, which we already operate of sorts in niche roles and this would be another good option worth considering that has many merits.

The work on extending the life of the Chinook fleet is welcomed but we need more, a significant amount more. By virtue of having no tail rotor they perform superbly well in the high altitude and high temperature environment of Afghanistan, able to move significant loads they are indispensible.  We could buy a basic refurbished model (under the the Boeing/US Army CH-47 Cargo Helicopter Alternate Procurement Strategy or CHAPS programme) like Canada did for approximately £15 million, ready for service in about a year or we could go for the latest model at £20 million each which would take a little longer.

What is a correct numbers of lift helicopters, only detailed planning would be able to define that but as a rough uninformed guess, we should really have enough to lift an entire infantry battalion with support in one go, at short notice, whilst being able to mount a number of simultaneous transport, personnel recovery and other miscellaneous missions.

In Summary

Bob Ainsworth recently said

It is cruel to pretend to those who have lost their lives that we will be able to stop our people dying by providing more helicopters

Really Bob, if we can destroy the Taleban and withdraw from Afghanistan sooner rather than later and everyone with an even an ounce of military knowledge knows that more helicopters will support that aim then we will be able to stop our people dying because they will be at home not in Afghanistan.

Helicopters aren’t the only answer but they will go a long long way to bringing success, we need to be honest, admit failures and move with clarity and speed in correcting the obvious errors of the past and that Gordon, means some honesty and an open cheque book.